ABSTRACT

This research study looks at the exposition of ‘Nuclearization of South Asia’ through a discourse analysis of the editorials of The Hindustan Times and the Dawn during post nuclear tests scenario that includes the issue of CTBT, testing of Agni II, and Ghauri II missiles by India and Pakistan respectively in 1999. The study finds that the print media of India and Pakistan are concerned about the nuclear race in the region. It also concludes that the elite press not simply comments on the events but also directs or formulates the foreign policy.

KEY WORDS: Nuclearization, South Asia, Discourse Analysis, The Hindustan Times, Dawn

Introduction

The nuclearization of South Asia is a post independence phenomenon. The two countries of the region, India and Pakistan have been engaged in the nuclearization programme. India and Pakistan’s nuclear programmes were impelled by quite different factors. Indian programme evolved as a result of various international and domestic factors. At an international level, India’s misgivings about nuclear-armed China and its quest for great-power status have proven to be powerful incentives (Ganguly, 2001: 101).

Pakistan’s uneasy relationship with India explains its acquisition of nuclear weapons. Pakistan’s nuclear energy program dates back to the 1950s, but it was the loss of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) in a war with India that probably triggered a political decision in January 1972 (just one month later) to begin a nuclear weapons program (U.S. Department of Defense, 1996). The consequent break-up of Pakistan induced a deep sense of insecurity in the minds of the Pakistani decision-making and political elite. Cognizant of the Indian conventional
superiority, the Pakistani elite chose to invest in a nuclear weapons option (Bhutto, 1969).

This research study looks at the exposition of nuclearization of South Asia through a discourse analysis of the editorials of *The Hindustan Times* and *Dawn* during post nuclear tests scenario which includes the issue of CTBT, testing of Agni II, and Ghauri II missiles by India and Pakistan respectively in 1999.

**The Indian Nuclear Programme**

“India’s nuclear weapons program was started at the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre in Trombay in the mid-1950s. It was based on the country’s abundant natural thorium reserves” (Creasman, 2008). “Its foundation was laid by the US Atoms for Peace Program, which aimed to encourage the civil use of nuclear technologies in exchange for assurances that they would not be used for military purposes” (Sethna in Weiss, 2003). “India’s first reactor, the 1 Megawatt (MWt) Aspara Research Reactor was built with British assistance in 1955. The following year, India acquired a CIRUS 40 MWt heavy-water moderated research reactor from Canada” (Ramana, 2007). “The United States agreed to supply heavy water for the project (Creasman, 2008). More than 1,000 Indian scientists participated in US nuclear energy research projects from 1955-1974” (Weiss, 2003). “The United States also assisted India in building and fueling the Tarapur reactors” (Yager, 1980). In 1964, India commissioned a reprocessing facility at Trombay, which was used to separate out the plutonium produced by the Cirus research reactor. On May 18, 1974, India conducted a nuclear test at Pokhran in the Rajasthan desert. The Indian Government declared it as “a peaceful nuclear explosion experiment” and stated that India has “no intention of producing nuclear weapons” (Perkovich, 1999).

According to the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, “India began work on a thermonuclear weapon in the 1980s (Strategic Security Project, 2002). In 1989, William H. Webster, director of the CIA, testified before the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee that, “indicators tell us India is interested in thermonuclear weapons capability. According to Webster (1990), “India was purifying lithium, producing tritium and separating lithium isotopes. India had also obtained pure beryllium metal from West Germany”

“After 24 years without testing, India resumed nuclear testing with a series of nuclear explosions known as Operation Shakti”. Prime Minister Vajpayee authorized the tests on April 8, 1998, two days after the Ghauri missile test firing in Pakistan (Strategic Security Project, 2002). Charnysh (2009) noted down that, “On May 11, 1998, India tested three devices at the Pokhran underground testing site, followed by two more tests on May 13, 1998. One of the detonations was claimed to be thermonuclear.” The country is a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), but only four of its 13 nuclear reactors are subject
Pakistan’s Nuclear Programme

Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme was established in 1972 by Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto, who founded the program while he was Minister for Fuel, Power and Natural Resources, and later became President and Prime Minister. Pakistan’s nuclear programme began for purely peaceful purposes.

The origins of Pakistani nuclear programme are markedly different from those of India’s. Weiss (2003) opines that, “Initially Pakistan seemed to have been seeking only civilian nuclear capabilities. Its civilian nuclear programme began with participation in the US Atoms for Peace initiative.” Indeed it was not until after the Eisenhower administration launched its “Atoms for Peace” programme in December 1953 that Pakistan’s leadership sought to develop a small nuclear research programme. In October 1954, the Pakistani government expressed an interest in the development of nuclear energy. Ganguly (2001) writes that, “In 1955, the Pakistani government formed a 12-member Atomic Energy Committee to advise the government on the peaceful uses of atomic energy and signed an agreement on nuclear cooperation with the United States.” Later on, the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) was formed, with Dr. Nazir Ahmad, a Cambridge-trained physicist, as its head. Pakistan’s decision to develop a nuclear device came much later.

According to Information Bank Abstracts (1974), “India’s 1974 testing of a nuclear ‘device’ gave Pakistan’s nuclear program new momentum. Prime Minister Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto regarded India’s nuclear program as a vehicle for intimidating Pakistan and establishing hegemony in the subcontinent.” Epstein (1977) describes that, “He (Bhutto) vowed that Pakistanis would ‘eat grass’ to keep up with India.” In September 1974, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) predicted that, “Pakistan would require at least 10 years developing a nuclear weapon” (AP, 1978). The same month, the head of Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC), Dr. Munir Ahmad Khan, in his address at the IAEA conference, said that: “Pakistan would ask the United Nations General Assembly to declare the South Asian subcontinent to be a nuclear weapon-free zone” (Information Bank Abstracts, 1974). Teltsch (1974) writes, “Two months later, the UN General Assembly approved the Pakistani proposal by a vote of 82-2, with India and Bhutan voting against it.”

Through the late 1970s, Pakistan’s program acquired sensitive uranium enrichment technology and expertise. The 1975 arrival of Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan considerably advanced these efforts. Dr. Khan is a German-trained metallurgist who brought with him knowledge of gas centrifuge technologies that he had acquired through his position at the classified URENCO uranium enrichment plant to IAEA safeguards. However, India did not sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) or the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
in the Netherlands. He was put in charge of building, equipping and operating Pakistan’s Kahuta facility, which was established in 1976. Under Khan’s direction, Pakistan employed an extensive clandestine network in order to obtain the necessary materials and technology for its developing uranium enrichment capabilities (Strategic Security Project, 2002).

“In 1979, alarmed by Pakistan’s nuclear ambiguity and quick technological progress, the United States stopped its military and economic aid to Pakistan. Only three years later, the embargo on aid was lifted, however, as Pakistan remained US staunchest ally against communism in the region. In 1985, in a second attempt to slow down Pakistan’s nuclear development, the US Congress passed the Pressler Amendment, prohibiting all US foreign aid to Pakistan until the state proved that it possessed no nuclear explosive devices”. Pakistan had acquired the capability to assemble a first-generation nuclear device (Pakistan Profile, 2010). Hathaway (2000) accounts that, “As a result, in 1990 US economic and military aid was cut off and sanctions were enacted to deter the country from developing nuclear weapons.”

Despite sanctions, the final Pakistani decision to conduct nuclear tests came in the aftermath of the Indian nuclear tests of May 1998. “On May 28, 1998 Pakistan successfully conducted five nuclear tests. The Pakistani Atomic Energy Commission reported that the five nuclear tests conducted on May 28 generated a seismic signal of 5.0 on the Richter scale, with a total yield of up to 40 KT (equivalent TNT).” Dr. A.Q. Khan said that one device was a boosted fission device and that the other four were sub-kiloton nuclear devices. On May 30, 1998 Pakistan tested one more nuclear warhead with a reported yield of 12 kilotons. The tests were conducted at Balochistan, bringing the total number of claimed tests to six” (Strategic Security Project, 2002). Pakistan did not sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). According to the Defense Department report, “Pakistan remains steadfast in its refusal to sign the NPT, stating that it would do so only after India joined the Treaty. Consequently, not all of Pakistan’s nuclear facilities are under IAEA safeguards” (Strategic Security Project, 2002).

This study examines the nature of treatment given to the Nuclear Programs of India and Pakistan by two leading English language newspapers namely, The Hindustan Times and Dawn during 1999. It thrashes out the similarities and differences between the editorial coverage of these newspapers and analyses their role in dealing with issues of nuclear proliferation.

Significance of the Newspapers
Assessing the portrayal of “Nuclearization of South Asia” and the related issues of CTBT, testing of Agni II, and Ghauri II missiles by India and Pakistan respectively in 1999; one newspaper each from India and Pakistan, i.e. The Hindustan Times, and the Dawn has been selected to take a view of the positions of the two newspapers. The rationality behind the selection of these newspapers is that both the dailies are metropolitan newspapers having vast circulation and popularity among the readers and are playing an important role in the formation of public opinion.

The Hindustan Times

HT Media Ltd., a media conglomerate and one of the largest media houses in India, the 78-years-old publishing group with a workforce of more than 4,500 employees publishes India's single largest circulated English daily, Hindustan Times. It has a circulation of over 3 million and a readership of 8 million in India (www.hindustantimes.com).

Dawn

The Dawn is an English-language daily newspaper owned by The Herald Ltd. Published from Karachi, Lahore, Islamabad and Peshawar, and read throughout Pakistan, Dawn enjoys nation-wide influence. It targets highly educated readers and claims an audience containing many influential executives and policy-makers (http://dawn.com).

Keeping in view the significance of the above-mentioned newspapers, this work seeks to conduct the discourse analysis of editorials on the nuclear programs of India and Pakistan.

Research Questions

This study is directed at researching the following questions:

**Research Question 1:** What was the approach of The Hindustan Times and Dawn towards testing nuclear missiles by India and Pakistan?

**Research Question 2:** How did the newspapers deal with the issues of sighning CTBT?

**Research Question 3:** How did the newspapers express concern about nuclear race in the region?

**Research Question 4:** What were the similarities and differences between the editorial coverage of the two newspapers The Hindustan Times and Dawn with special reference to “Nuclearization in South Asia”? 

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Literature Review

There have been studies on the nuclearization of South Asia vis-à-vis its portrayal by the print and electronic media. A vast body of literature is also available on nuclear proliferation, deterrence, conflicts and socio-economic perspectives in this regard. Following is a brief review of studies related to this research work.

Brigadier Naeem Ahmad Salik (2009) provides a comparative study of the dynamics of the South Asian nuclearization through his work titled “The Genesis of South Asian Nuclear Deterrence: Pakistan’s Perspective”. Salik characterizes “the Indian approach to nuclearisation as assertive and the Pakistani stance as purely defensive and adamantly views the ‘action-reaction’ phenomena as the sole contribution to Pakistan’s quest for achieving nuclear parity with India.” In light of the Indo-US civilian nuclear deal, after its endorsement by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and agreement on safeguards between India and the IAEA, Salik estimates that, “with assured supplies of fissile material from the NSG, India would be free to divert fissile material produced from its indigenous uranium resources to build about 75 to 90 additional weapons per year” (p.185).

Ganguly, Sumit and Kapur, S. Paul’s (2009) edited work on “Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia: Crisis Behaviour and the Bomb” contains optimistic and pessimistic views of the South Asia nuclear proliferation environment in chapters written mainly by political science scholars from India and the United States. The book offers contrasting analyses of four major crises between India and Pakistan: the 1987 Brasstacks crisis, which happened before either nation possessed nuclear weapons; the 1990 crisis, where both nations had an “opaque” nuclear capability; the 1999 Kargil war, which occurred after each nation had tested nuclear weapons; and the 2001 to 2002 crisis, which resulted in a nuclear standoff.

A study on the portrayal of Pakistan in American print media after 9/11 content analyzed Time and Newsweek with special reference to Pakistan’s nuclear programme. The findings of the study show that the concept of agenda setting and its related terms framing and priming have been effective in US media after 9/11 incident. The study deducts that Pakistan’s nuclear programme framed negatively by the U.S. print media (Toor, 2008).

In another study on “South Asia’s Cold War: Nuclear Weapons and Conflict in Comparative Perspective” the author Basrur, Rajesh M. (2008) uses a theoretical framework of “cold war” to analyze various hostile relationships between countries and determine the role that nuclear weapons have played in the resolution or intensification of those conflicts. Analysis of previous cold war tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union, the United States and China, and the Soviet Union and China support the theoretical argument.
Sokolski’s (2007) edited work on “Pakistan’s Nuclear Future: Worries beyond War” focuses on the nuclear challenges facing Pakistan if a moderate government were to remain in power and no war break out with India. Commissioned and vetted by the Non-proliferation Policy Education Centre (NPEC), the researched essays are written by a variety of scholars and policy experts in national security, non-proliferation, and the nuclear industry.


Rajain, Arpit’s (2005) book “Nuclear Deterrence in Southern Asia: China, India, and Pakistan” examines the possibilities of deterrence and limited nuclear war in the complex triangular nuclear relationship between India, Pakistan, and China. He looks at the prevailing attitudes in the three countries about nuclear-related issues, such as arms control and nuclear strategy.

Ganguly, Sumit and Hagerty, Devin’s (2005) work “Fearful Symmetry: India-Pakistan Crises in the Shadow of Nuclear Weapons” analyze the historic and cultural underpinnings of that uneasy relationship since independence in 1947, focusing especially on the four major wars that occurred. A chapter is then devoted to each of the six crises referenced in the book’s title (in 1984, 1986 -7, 1990, 1998, 1999, and 2001- 2), and the authors seek to explain why those incidents did not escalate into full-scale war.

Matinuddin, Kamal’s (2002) work “The Nuclearization of South Asia” examines the rise of nuclear weapons in South Asia and attempts to rectify what the author sees as a misconception that Pakistan is responsible for the nuclearization of the region. Focusing largely on the hostile relationship between Pakistan and India, the book explains what caused both countries to seek to acquire nuclear weapons.

Another book titled “A Nuclear Strategy for India” written by a former Rear Admiral of the Indian Navy, Menon, Raja (2000) is a comprehensive examination of what nuclear weapons mean to India’s defence strategy. “The author argues for a clear joining of nuclear strategy and diplomacy. The book concludes with an argument for better command and control and a discussion of how Indian nuclear strategy affects its diplomatic relations.”

Bidwai, Praful and Vanaik, Achin’s (2000) work “New Nukes: India, Pakistan, and Global Nuclear Disarmament” traces the nuclearization of India and Pakistan, discusses the threats that nuclear armament poses to both nations and the
world, and provides a roadmap for global disarmament. The authors state that “the proliferation in South Asia has altered the global nuclear weapons regime because it has undermined the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty and rekindled the nuclear arms race.”

Hagerty, Devin T. (1998) in his study “The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation: Lessons from South Asia” addresses controversy over nuclear proliferation, considering relations between India and Pakistan as an example in which increased nuclear weapon capabilities resulted in greater stability. He concludes that if the nations that possess nuclear weapons wish for others to disarm or to not develop such arms, they should lead by example and denuclearize their own arsenals. He claims that in South Asia, nuclear proliferation helps to maintain peace rather than provoke conflict.

Hypothesis

After reviewing the above-mentioned scholarly work on the “Nuclearization of South Asia”, it is hypothesized that:

H1: The newspapers of India and Pakistan supported the official stance on testing nuclear missiles and issue of signing CTBT during 1999.

Methodology

Methodology employed for this research is discourse analysis. “A number of studies undertaken in recent years to research various pertinent social issues, and in particular issues related to ideology, have employed discourse analysis as a research methodology” (Duncan, 1996; Sonderling, 1998; Stevens, 1998; Van Dijk, 1993b, 1997). The study of mass communication is shifting from content analysis to a more sophisticated discourse analysis of media texts. Emphasis has shifted from unified approaches employed in conventional linguistic studies (analysis of individual words, phrases, and sentences), to the analysis of structures and functions of actual forms of language. The study of language beyond the surface of the given text in its socio-cultural context is called discourse analysis (Akhtar, 2000).

“Discourse analysis does not constitute a single unitary approach, but rather a constellation of different approaches.” Terre Blache and Durrheim's (1999) research approach “was used to perform a discourse analysis on a selection of newspaper articles.” Terre Blache and Durrheim (1999: 154) define discourse analysis as “... the act of showing how certain discourses are deployed to achieve particular effects in specific contexts.”

Garrett (1999:3) considers that, “It is not concerned with language alone. It also examines the context of communication: who is communicating with whom
and why; in what kind of society and situation, through what medium; how different types of communication evolved, and their relationship to each other.”

Discourse is both a social process and a linguistic structure; the two cannot be separated; yet it is possible to highlight one aspect more than the other (Akhtar, 2000).

Ulka (1992) argues, “Discourse is not simply an isolated textual or dialogical structure but rather a complex communicative event that also embodies a social context featuring participants as well as production and processes” (Ulka 1992 in Akhtar, 2000). Discourse is part of the speaker’s (or say reader’s or writer’s) cultural construction of reality. It is an interdisciplinary osmosis, which relates parts of the text (sentences, paragraphs, etc) to each other, and to its socio-cultural context (Duranti, 1985 in Akhtar, 2000).

**Category for Analysis**

The category system is used to classify the media contents. The discourse analysis of the editorials of *The Hindustan Times* and the *Dawn* under this research study has been categorized into one broad category “Nuclearization of South Asia.”

An editorial would be considered positive (+) from Pakistan’s point of view if it supports Pakistan’s decision to detonate the nukes and terms India responsible for the nuclearization of the region. Pakistan’s motive could be described as: to avoid nuclear blackmailing by India; to reduce reliance on foreign powers for national security and to attain parity with India which has an edge on Pakistan in conventional weapon (Arif, 2001:51). Similarly THT would support the Indian governments’ decision to go nuclear for constructive purposes. While all editorials opposing the foreign policy statements would be considered negative (-), and an editorial having balanced material would be ranked neutral (0).

**Findings**

Findings of this study comprise quantitative and qualitative data. Quantitative findings show comparative topical coverage of the editorials of the Dawn and The Hindustan Times on the “Nuclearization of South Asia” during January 1 to December 31 of the year 1999. While the qualitative findings show the comparative topical direction of the editorials of both the newspapers during the period of the study. Two tables for each analysis have been compiled in this regard to compare Indian and Pakistani newspapers’ editorial stance.

**Quantitative Data**
Table 1 illustrates that a total numbers of 30 editorials were published by both the newspapers during 1999. Out of them *Dawn* published 10 editorials while *The Hindustan Times* 20. *The Dawn* gave 33.33 % coverage while *The Hindustan Times* wrote 66.66 per cent.

Table 1 Comparative topical coverage of the editorials of the Dawn and The Hindustan Times on the “Nuclearization of South Asia”

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<th>Dawn</th>
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**Qualitative Data**

Table 2 shows the final comparative topical direction of the editorials of the *Dawn* and *The Hindustan Times* on the “Nuclearization of South Asia” during 1999. According to this table the *Dawn* adopted positive stance by giving 70% coverage and remained neutral by giving 30% coverage, whereas the *Dawn* did not write a single editorial against the policy of the government on the specific issues of the study. In comparison to it *The Hindustan Times* gave 50% positive coverage and was neutral by giving 30% coverage, whereas it looks critical by giving 20% negative coverage. The table shows that only *The Hindustan Times* has criticized its country regarding its policy on the “Nuclearization of South Asia.”

Table 2 Comparative topical direction of the editorials of the *Dawn* and *The Hindustan Times* on the “Nuclearization of South Asia”

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**Discourse Analysis of the Editorials of The Hindustan Times**

On testing the Agni missile an editorial tilted “Agni still untested” (1999) says: “New Delhi could certainly have done better than to call off such an important technology trail without giving ample thoughts to the significance of the Agni-Plus testing vis-à-vis world opinion.” *The Hindustan Times* also discusses the government policies and their shortfalls. It writes, “It is a measure of how strong Indian foreign policy is that the United States can mount additional pressure on this country at a time when
President Bill Clinton is under siege at home, being tried by the Senate on charges of perjury and obstruction of justice. It is also a measure of America’s imperiousness that it can pressure India to “unconditionally” sign the CTBT after it has attached outrageous conditions in belatedly ratifying the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention and before any clear sign has emerged that its Senate will ratify the test ban treaty.”

The paper further writes: “What is disturbing is that New Delhi has allowed the United States to hold parallel talks on parallel points with India and Pakistan when its effort should have been to break out of the India Pakistan straitjacket and not to strengthen it. How else would India be able to credibly present its broader security concerns and interests?”

This editorial of The Hindustan Times titled “Under Pressure” (1999) was written at the time when the US was adamant to directing India and Pakistan to come to negotiating table on the issue.

Similarly on the CTBT issue, an editorial titled “CTBT subterfuge” (1999) reads, “The Vajpayee Government is seriously miscalculating if it thinks it can first cut a deal with the US and then build a national consensus in favour of the controversial Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.”

In its editorial “Smothering the Agni” (1999) The Hindustan Times writes, “The Agni-2, as an essential nuclear delivery vehicle, is pivotal to India’s goal to erect a credible minimal deterrent.”

In its course of discussion it says, “More importantly, the government should not forget that yielding to pressure – or even entertaining pleas for “restraint” from those that habitually unleash their missile or military power on the helpless – only begets additional pressure. The longer India takes to test its delivery vehicles, the more difficult it will become for it to build a credible nuclear deterrent. The Agni-2 provides another example of how India can injure its own interests.”

After the Agni test by India, the paper in its editorial “Agni ablaze” (1999) tactfully favours the government decision while its previous stand on the issue was otherwise. It reads, “The credit for reviving the languishing Agni programme and building the Agni-2 goes to Prime Minister Vajpayee. The Agni-2 launch is a logical corollary to the Shakti tests of less than a year ago which demonstrated India’s capability to manufacture a range of sophisticated nuclear weapons. Not to produce and test the Agni-2, India’s main nuclear delivery vehicle, would have undercut the very objectives of the Shakti tests.”

It adds, “India finally has a missile that can reach the heartland of China, which by concluding missile de-targeting pacts with the US and Russia has an added capacity to target India with its increasingly lethal missile arsenal.”

In “Missile tit-for-tat” (1999) the newspaper endorsed the Indian official viewpoint and blamed Pakistan for using its minimal sources in a competition against India. It also accuses China of patronizing Pakistan. The editorial reads, “With its haunting preoccupation with India and obsessive compulsion to match
every Indian advance, Pakistan has to contrive a tit-for-tat even if it means stealing technology from the West, engaging in underhand deals with North Korea and getting direct but clandestine assistance from mentor China. It is remarkable that a country with a narrow industrial base has not had a single failed test since it began testing missiles. Such is its urge to equal India in every respect that when India calls its latest missile Agni-2 and shows its range exceeds 2,000 km, Pakistan has to name its new system Ghauri-2 and claim a similar range.

The key question is: Who is assisting Pakistan in its tit-for-tat strategy against India? As in the nuclear-weapons field, it is China that has actively assisted Pakistan in developing various missiles so as to neutralize Indian advances. By using Pakistan against India, China keeps India not only confined to the subcontinent but can patronizingly talk, as it did in reaction to the Agni-2 test, about the need to avert an India-Pakistan arms race.”

In an editorial “Nuclear challenges” (1999) the newspaper wonders, “In one stroke, India broke free from its self-imposed chains and arrived as a nuclear-weapons state with sophisticated fission and fusion capabilities. The tests also challenged the nuclear non-proliferation regime and showed the impracticability of indefinitely maintaining a hierarchy of power based on open discrimination.”

In “Nuclear blackmail?” (1999) The Hindustan Times writes that this potential of nuclear power is being used by Pakistan to blackmail India which is more democratic and straightforward. “It is worth noting that Mr. Nawaz Sharif’s observations were made in the context of his visit to forward areas in “Pakistan-occupied Kashmir” where he saw the “desire of martyrdom” in the faces of Pakistani soldiers and said that his country’s nuclear and missile technology has given it “great courage”. Some of it may well be bluster, aimed at maintaining morale at time when Pakistan’s diplomatic isolation is virtually complete.” It also quotes BBC as “Even the BBC has noted in one of its programmes the element of nuclear blackmail in Pakistan’s pronouncements.”

The Hindustan Times gives nuclear capability a new dimension from Indian side as a clean source of energy through an editorial “Power from atoms” (1999), “New Delhi is serious about reaching that 10,000 MW of nuclear capacity soon, probably the best way would be to make use of thorium-based heavy water reactors. A reactor strategy based on the thorium fuel cycle could also offer India an environmentally clean source of energy.”

About CTBT, the newspaper in its editorial “CTBT in limbo” (1999) writes, “India’s concerns were centred on the reality that the CTBT was not so much about testing as about verification. Moreover, the CTBT was designed as a central pillar of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime, which stipulates that only the five traditional nuclear powers have the lawful right to hold nuclear weapons.”

Discourse Analysis of the Editorials of the Dawn
Dawn comments that Pakistan faces a strange paradox following the nuclear tests of May 1998. Its editorial titled “Against all canons of prudence & propriety” (1999) reads, “The national economy has come under severe pressure following the tightening of the screw by the international financial institutions and the aid givers. As a result of this crunch, the government has been able to ensure the disbursement of its budgetary allocations to various departments and agencies.”

The newspaper expresses its concern about the nuclear race in the region and believes that the dynamics of India-Pakistan relations are such that the provocative act of one invariably leads to a reaction from the other. The editorial titled “Hardly a confidence building exercise” (1999) argues, “Had India not tested a nuclear device in May, would Pakistan have emerged from the nuclear closet? Certainly not. In fact, provocation and response together form a unifying thread running through the fraught relationship between Pakistan and India.”

After nuclear tests at Chaghai, the Pakistan government expressed its willingness to sign the CTBT on the condition that it did not have to do so under coercion and India also become a signatory at the same time. On this issue Dawn in its editorial captioned “CTBT: time to forge a consensus” (1999) writes: “Although some critics are of the view that signing the CTBT would be detrimental to the security concerns of the country, the fact is that the time has come for Pakistan as well as India to renounce the nuclear arms race. They are not in a position to channel their precious resources into an expensive nuclear weaponisation programme which would erode further their capacity to promote the socio-economic development of their people.”

The paper questions, “Is not it now time for the government to call an all party conference to take the leaders of public opinion into confidence on the CTBT? In the process, it would be possible to forge a consensus, which will help when the treaty later comes up for ratification in the parliament. Moreover, it is also time to educate people about the whys and wherefores of the CTBT and Pakistan’s compulsions for signing it.”

Dawn adopts a realistic approach towards testing missiles because it considers that “Pakistan and India have lived with an arms race for a long time. It has not done either of them any good and has only resulted in the diversion of scarce resources into unproductive channels.” In an editorial (‘Agni a painful choice’, 1999), it comments, “There could not be a more cruel indictment of this arms race than the poverty and misery, which scar the faces of both countries.”

Dawn further argues, “After all, testing nuclear devices and firing long-range missiles is not a sign of national greatness or even machismo. In today’s world there are other things that can’t like the ability to give a fair and civilized standard of living to one’s citizen. It is in this department that Pakistan and India should compete with each other. But what to do when a painful choice is forced upon you? It is such a choice that India is forcing on Pakistan and since there is no escaping the implications of this. India must know that to any of its sabre-rattling
it will get a befitting response even if this tinged with regret and the dire call of necessity.”

To India’s test firing of its medium range missile, Agni-II, Pakistan responded in kind by firing its own Ghauri-II, which had a comparable range. Dawn in its editorial ‘(A befitting response’, 1999) comments, “Both countries should be concentrating on other things and improving their economic performance, thus removing some of the poverty and deprivation, which is the lot of their respective peoples, instead of pursuing chimerical and quixotic notions of power and global importance.”

Dawn questions “of what use is a weapon, which can target Pakistani cities when there is an answering weapon that can come in on Indian cities? India, of course, has an excuse for testing its military might. It says that its security concerns go beyond Pakistan. But this is a specious excuse with ruinous implications for the stability of South Asia. Whatever India might say, the country, which directly feels threatened by it, is Pakistan.”

For that reason, Dawn speaks out that: “whatever India does as far its nuclear programme or missile testing is concerned places Pakistan under an obligation, and a stern one at that, to match it muscle to muscle. This is a formula for never-ending arms race. A halt must be called to this madness.” Dawn advises Pakistan and India must sit together to devise ways and means to control this spiralling competition. “Whatever they have so far unfurled and tested is sufficient to provide a strong enough basis for a concept of mutual deterrence. Let both countries be satisfied with this. Both countries must show themselves to be mature and responsible members of the international community.”

Dawn supports the signing of CTBT on the motivation that sensible posture on the CTBT will enable Pakistan to seize the moral high ground on the nuclear issue. An editorial (‘CTBT: time to decide’, 1999) writes, “This would work to Pakistan’s advantage in foreign affairs.” The newspaper wants the government to create a consensus on the CTBT by taking the other political parties into confidence. It widely welcomes the Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s statement at the National Defence College in Islamabad that Pakistan is ready to sign the CTBT.

Dawn calls for downsizing the defence expenditure. Its editorial, (‘India’s nuclear ambitions’, 1999) writes, “India and Pakistan must move towards scaling down their military build up and even renounce the nuclear capability they have acquired.”

**Conclusion**

The study concludes that the print media of India and Pakistan aggravated the situation on the issues of nuclearization instead of bringing the neighbours closer. The study also funds that the press not simply comments on the events but also directs or formulates the foreign policy.
On the nuclearisation issue, *The Hindustan Times* argued that Pakistan was actually not capable of undertaking nuclear tests on its own. It accused Pakistan for stealing technology from the west, engaging in underhand deals with North Korea and getting assistance from its mentor China. It said that country with a narrow industrial base has not had single failed test since it began testing missiles. On testing Ghauri-2, it commented about Pakistan that with its haunting preoccupation with India and obsessive compulsion to match every Indian advances. It also lambasted its own ruling party BJP for misleading the masses about CTBT. When the Indian government delayed tests of its missile “Agni”, the paper expressed its anxiety as to why the missile tests were not conducted on time to establish Indian supremacy in this field. It said the longer India takes to test its delivery vehicles, the more difficult it will become for it to build a credible nuclear deterrent.

*The Dawn* was concerned about the nuclear race in the region. It said that the dynamics of India Pakistan relations are such that the provocative act of one invariably leads to a reaction from the other. Had India not tested a nuclear device, Pakistan would not have followed suit. “Pakistan and India have lived with an arms race for a long time. It has not done any good to them and has only resulted in the diversion of scarce resources in to unproductive channels” It said, “What to do when a painful choice is forced upon you? It is such a choice that India is forcing on Pakistan and since there is no escaping the implications of this. The country which is directly threatened by it is Pakistan” (‘Agni a painful choice’, 1999). It advised India and Pakistan to move towards scaling down their military build up and even renounce the nuclear capability they have acquired. Overall, the daily Dawn kept a balanced, sober and realistic approach in its editorial writings when compared with *The Hindustan Times*.

References


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