SOUTH ASIAN STUDIES

RAFIQ AHMAD  Editor

South Asian Studies seeks to provide a forum for discussion of issues and problems primarily relating to South Asia. We welcome contributions by researchers, administrators, policy makers and all other interested in promoting better understanding of South Asian Affairs.

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Jinnah and the Creation of Pakistan and Nationalism
BERTRAM E. S. J. BASTIAMPELLA

Mohammad Ali Jinnah was born in Karachi in British India on 25 December, 1876. Jinnah, the Quaid-i-Azam or great leader, died in Karachi in Pakistan on 11 September, 1948. In his lifetime, the sub-continent of India was partitioned and delivered from British domination. The role of Jinnah in this process earned for him the titles of the Creator of a Nation and a Leader of the Movement for Freedom.

Even before he was sixteen, Jinnah proceeded to London. There at Lincolns Inn and at the House of Commons he listened to lectures and debates preparing himself for the part he played so successfully later in India as a lawyer and politician. Perhaps his political conscience as a Muslim had been already aroused when he referred to the Holy Prophet (Peace be upon Him) as a "great statesman, and a great sovereign." His last two years as a student abroad were utilized "for further independent studies for the political career" he "had in mind." Jinnah "grasped that Liberalism," which became part of his life and he also developed a sympathy towards the political emancipation of women. Both Liberal thinking and a concern for liberating women underlined his concepts and actions later when he gave leadership to the Muslims in India.

Jinnah’s debut into politics was through the Indian National Congress in 1906, during the noteworthy sessions at Calcutta. Yet his venture then was tentative and diffident; but by 1940, however,

Bertram E. S. J. BastiamPELLA is Associate Professor of History, University of Colombo, Sri Lanka.
their needs and aspirations and the Muslims had learned that loyalty paid no dividends.

From 1858 to 1905, the Muslims were in a state of neutrality *vis a vis* the Hindus; from 1906 to 1911 the Hindu-Muslim rift was first marked and later became ominous; from 1911 to 1922 the two communities cooperated against a common enemy—Britain. This entente produced rapid results. Mostly at the insistence of Jinnah, the League and the Congress met in a joint session in 1916 at Lucknow and formulated common reform proposals to be sent to the Government for immediate implementation. By the terms of the Lucknow Pact, the League endorsed Congress demands and resolved to send a deputation to England soon after the war to present the Indian Claims in cooperation with the Congress. In its next session in 1917 the League endorsed the Congress resolution for complete responsible government, but stipulated three conditions; adequate Muslim representation in Councils, public services and Universities; no displacement of Persian characters from Urdu; and no interference with Muslim festivals.

The Lucknow Pact is of outstanding importance in the development of Indian Muslim nationalism. It was the first Hindu-Muslim compact in modern Indian history. Several leaders on both sides expected it to lay the foundation of permanent united action against the British. It was also the first and only occasion when Hindus not only conceded separate electorates to Muslims but agreed to the quantum of Muslim representation in the different provincial legislatures and at the centre. For nascent Muslim nationalism it was a victory, but of doubtful ultimate advantage. To win over the Congress, which had been condemning separate electorates since 1906, to their viewpoint was, however, mean achievement for the Muslims.

The Lucknow Pact gave Jinnah, the status of a leader of united India. During the war he had been working towards Hindu-Muslim unity. Deploiring racial discrimination he had urged the Bombay Muslim students union in 1915 to cooperate, unite and cultivate good will between the Mohammadans and others.

From 1915 onwards Jinnah's role grew clearer: he was now a

The comparison of social welfare systems is a developing speciality, attracting the attention of economists towards its importance specially in the developing countries of Asia. The economists of various countries are framing economic policies to improve the living conditions to create a better society. Each community not only forms its conception of the good society in accordance with its own values, its history and experience, but also maintains that what it considers good for itself is good for the world. We notice a universal desire to improve the material conditions of societies in Asia.

Social welfare programmes are important in the sense that they are primarily concerned with the welfare of the special groups of a society, e.g., the blind, the deaf, the mute and the physically handicapped and destitutes. Due to the growing importance of social welfare, different countries undertake programmes which promote general welfare of the masses, such as welfare programmes for women and children.

The book under review ascertains the elements of social welfare in ten major countries of Asia, China, Hong Kong, Sri Lanka, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Phillipines, India, Taiwan and Thailand. Pakistan, has been excluded although it is making strenuous efforts to increase the well-being of the masses and has launched various social welfare programmes.

The book considers the Ideological substructure for each country, which secures emphasis on the social welfare systems and describes the historical development of the system and the political and socio-economic context. Each chapter set out to look at the structure and administration of the system and the sources utilized to finance it. It also examines the nature of the different parts of the welfare systems, reviewing social security, personal social services and the management of the key target groups like the aged, the disabled and the handicapped, children, youth, needy families,
the employed and the sick and injured. Each chapter concludes with an appraisal of the practice of the system concerned.

The editors have divided the book into two parts: in the first describing the personal social service and social security programmes and in the second, making comparison of the features of the welfare systems in those countries.

The social security defined by them as “the whole set of compulsory measures instituted to protect the individual and his family against the consequences of an unavoidable interruption or series diminution of the earned income disposable for the maintenance of a reasonable standard of living.”

The studies included in the book are descriptive and should be placed in the context of ensuring uniformity of the paramount social values, traditions and variety of socio-economic and political forces acting reciprocally with the established norms of social need and available resources to establish a special structure of a welfare system. The editors acknowledge that different cultures create a different frame-work of relations from which to discern human welfare. So to achieve this objective they argue that regional focus is suitable instead of considering the institutions and programmes that have been developed to compare the systems which are fundamentally different.

The book starts with a chapter “Social Welfare and the Development” written by Mr. Kim. Mr. Hyung Shik Kim is a fellow of the international fellowship for Social and Economic Development Incorporation, Melbourne, Australia. His article comprising 20 pages divided into three parts, dealing with fallacies of economic development, reconceptionalisation towards development, and conceptional discussion from economic to social development.

Asian countries for the last three decades are occupied with economic development as an excellent opening instrument of resolving social problems brought about by socio-economic changes, which promised many things to many people. The decision-makers and politicians have sought to advance economic development in the
belief that it will enhance the quality of life. Everybody expects that the benefits of economic growth would minimise inequalities in the distribution of wealth and eradicate poverty. So the countries choose to maximise economic development under the assumption that this improves the quality of life and cherish the increase in GNP as the important goal of their national development. Considering some misconceptions of economic development the author states that the important task of the economists is to allocate scarce resources to achieve economic growth. But this obligation depends upon the country’s ability, which is an indispensable condition for social development. The author quotes different economists on various occasions to support his view-point. The sorrowful achievements of the United Nations Decades of Development did not seem to improve the situation. There has been an ever-widening gap between the rich and the developing countries.

While trying to present the fallacies of economic development the author argues that extents of human problems in terms of poor health, illiteracy, mortality, housing, diet and so forth are notable examples of the failures of economic development.

The author suggests to frame new concepts of development which penetrated in the lives of the people of many Asian nations and examines critically the impact of economic development upon the establishment of social structure and looks into those social problems which may have direct implications for social welfare. The present meaning of development signifies some dissatisfaction. The author claims that as a first step to identify those principles which should guide the task of social development is possible only to perform this particular task by considering a number of basic concepts such as the social aspect of development, emphasis upon the people, the powerless and the disadvantaged in particular, the basic human needs and the cost of economic development. The author suggests that any strategy adopted for the purpose should not be directed mainly at the welfare of a special group but to a society as a whole. The desire to build a welfare state must reflect the determination of a nation, to assure greater human dignity, to improve human creativity
and to provide personal freedoms, social justice and a higher standard of living. Mr. Kim is confident that when this is maintained and shared by those who are concerned with the welfare of the people then, perhaps, one may look with greater faith to achieve social development in future.

The chapter on China is written by Mr. John Dixon, Academic Director of the Management and Policy Study Centre, Canberra College of Advanced Education, Canberra Australia. The chapter consisting of 39 pages assesses the Chinese welfare system comprehensively. The values in the country are the mixture of traditional and present day ideologies. The strongest influence has come from the proletarian principle of self-reliance and mutual aid. They want to abolish poverty and assist those who are unable to take care of themselves by increasing production rather than adopting the policy of income redistribution. The welfare system is devised to promote economic development in a positive direction. The Chinese system provides a cost effective safety programme which ensures the have-nots to receive basic welfare support. The two groups, the handicapped and the unemployed, are disadvantaged but the former group is primarily a family responsibility. The other group receives no welfare support from the state because it is a temporary condition in a socialist society and, therefore, it should not be encouraged by the provision of welfare support. Decentralisation, collective self-reliance and mutual aid are the striking features of the system.

Dr. Nelson Chow from the University of Hong Kong is the writer on the Hong Kong welfare system. According to him, the decade of 1970’s is an excellent period regarding the social security services in the country, which started from a scratch. The social needs of the people are not being neglected. Individual enterprise is the core of the system. Different networks have been established to meet the needs of the unfortunate and financial services are generally supported by the government out of general revenue. Non-statutory organisations are operated with subsidy from the government. According to Mr. Nelson, Hong Kong is changing rapidly into a
highly industrialised and urbanised city, therefore, a more innovative approach towards welfare is necessary.

Mr. D. Paul Choudhry is a contributor on Indian welfare system. He is presently Director of the National Institute of Public Cooperation and Child Development, New Delhi, India. The author states that India through its successive planning, desires to achieve the goal of a welfare state by fulfilling the objectives of growth with social justice, removal of poverty, equalisation of opportunities for development, equitable distribution of development benefits, removal of inequalities, development of backward areas and the welfare of the weaker sections of the society. There are various voluntary agencies playing a significant role along with the Central Ministry of social welfare in implementing welfare programmes. More than 10,000 voluntary agencies are engaged in programmes and activities in different fields of social development and social welfare of the tender and weaker target groups. Many still feel that priority must be given to the programmes aimed at diminishing poverty by means of economic development rather than increasing allocation of social welfare. The author is of the view that India has made enough efforts for social welfare programmes, schemes and projects for all categories of weaker people. Yet the coverage is very small in comparison with the apprehended needs. However, much remains to be done.

Professor Takeshi Takahashi and Mr. Yoshiko Someya are co-authors of the article on Japanese welfare system treated in this book. Professor Takeshi is in the Department of Social Welfare, University of Kagoshima, Japan, and Mr. Yoshiko is Assistant Professor in the same Department and in the same University. In Japan the social welfare system is institutionally complete in itself. Just after World War-II Japan started with the social assistance serving as its pre-figure. The system embraces three elements: the system of health insurance with top-priority, followed by income security and then the personal social service. With the cuts in government expenditure, the financial aspect of social security and personal services programmes were affected badly. This, linked with ageing population of Japan, has
given rise to concerns leading towards welfare crisis. The author explains that in this perspective she is in the middle of a cessation for self-reflection on her social welfare system. The author has also suggested that it is timely for Japan to shift its priorities from social security to the personal social services because the emphasis in the past on medical care and income security has resulted in the low priority to the personal welfare services for particular target groups.

Professor In-Hyub Chang contributed his chapter on Korean welfare system. He is in the Department of Social Welfare, School of Social Sciences, Seoul National University, Seoul, Republic of Korea. The author writes that the Korean welfare system is in the process of development. In Korea, the public system is imperfect and incoherent and sometimes it functions as a disruptive factor by expanding the gap between people. Mr. Chang suggests that the unemployment insurance and child allowance services should be implemented. The combined effort of the government and voluntary sector is required to strengthen the present welfare system. The administrative organisation associated with social welfare system needs restructuring. The Korean government is making sincere efforts for integrating and adjusting the administrative agencies in order to eliminate inefficiency, waste and conflicts among them, which is an essential ingredient of their system. The author suggests that to raise the level of financial resources, and to meet the desired standard the government should differentiate the resources at its disposal by imposing special welfare taxes and user changes.

Mr. P. C. Sushma, Associate Professor, is in the School of Medical Science, University of Sains Malaysia, Penang, Malaysia. He has contributed on Malaysian Welfare System. It is a centralised system. Social welfare is not a service for the vulnerable groups alone but as one of the basic right of the people. The disadvantaged are the responsibility of the Social Welfare Department. The department has set the directions. Commitments have been made in this regard. The school welfare scheme is taking the lead. Here the problems are highlighted and researches are made. Parent teacher
associations have been made responsible to bring more satisfactory results. Non-government agencies sharing the responsibility can strengthen their own organisations in order to play a more decisive role.

Professor Evelina A. Pangalangan is in the Institute of Social Work and Community Development, University of the Philippines System Quezon City, Philippines. In his analysis the Philippines Welfare System has been established for the purpose of understanding common human problems. The Philosophy of development planning in Philippines has its significance and it aims to reach and uplift the poorest section of the entire population. Attempts have been made to adopt and implement different policies and strategies in order to meet their basic needs, integrating the delivery mechanism, increasing access to and effective use of social services. Budgetary constraints and the impact of inflation on the cost is so strong that social welfare services may never be sufficient to cover the increasing needs of the population. The author suggested that still some benefits are needed to complete the programme, e.g., employer financial maternity benefits, family allowance and unemployment benefits. There is a need also to look at the personal social services and social security programmes as a comprehensive and balanced approach to total human development for the advancement of welfare for the poor and the workers.

Professor Laksiri Jayasuria is in the Department of Social Work and Social Administration, the University of Western Australia, Perth, Australia. Mr. Malcolm Allbrook is a tutor in the same department and Mr. Gamini Fernando is a research student in the Department of Economics, in the same University. They are the co-authors of the Sri Lankan Welfare System. The welfare policies of Sri Lanka are mostly gifts of British Colonial policy. The social goals followed by her were those of social welfare. The combination of welfare policies, which covered the basic needs of food, health and education also included public utilities such as transport. The unique feature of the system in Sri Lanka has been its firm commitment to achieve a more equitable distribution of income. The inequalities and extreme poverty remain among certain segments of
population, especially the poor from the rural and the public sector. Due to the inversion of welfare policies in 1977 the urban middle class relapsed. A package of new policies like liberal credit facilities, land reforms and rural amenities, etc., were introduced to compensate the rural sector but unfortunately the benefits have gone to the rich peasants mainly along the urban middle class. The authors criticised that Sri Lanka has adopted a Welfare state model which is having no definite objectives. As a reluctant caretaker, she exercises regulations and controls and provides subsistence only in emergencies, situations of alarming poverty and where there is a threat to the moral discipline of society.

Dr. Gordon Hon-Sheng Chan contributed his article on Welfare System of Taiwan. He is an Associate Professor in the Department of Sociology at the National Taiwan University, Taiwan. The Taiwanese welfare system is based upon different welfare legislations, e.g., government employees insurance, labour insurance, handicapped and elderly welfare and social assistance, etc. The quantity and quality of welfare services varies from region to region and differs among those organisations which are responsible for their distribution. The significance of these schemes related to the effectiveness and efficiency has largely been diminished since the mid 1970’s. Most of the norms and values were justified by political elites which are acquainted with economic development and have discouraged the progress of a unified social security system in general and non-contributory personal social services in particular.

Professor Yupa Wongchai has contributed his study on Thai Welfare System. He is presently in the faculty of Social Administration, Thammasat University, Bangkok, Thailand. Numerous factors have affected the well-being of the population and this system has made very little progress in meeting the challenges. The problems generated by poverty unemployment, illiteracy and ill health are having important reasons for this. The traditional values emphasise the duty of the family to support family members which reduces the pressure upon the state. The senior administrators in the country’s bureaucracy have not recognised the importance and the value of
social welfare support for the needy people. Much lip-service has been paid to the concept of basic minimum needs. The social welfare support available is however, certainly insufficient in quantity and ineffective in quality. The evaluation report of the system would show unfair distribution of services and resources among the deprived sectors of society. It is essential therefore, that joint campaigns be carried out by administrators, social workers and educationalists in order to develop policies and to exert for effective and appropriate strategies to deal with the services problems within its society. The author argues that the social workers must acquire a broad understanding of their work through proper training and they must focus upon the provisions of social justice, rather than serving the interests of the wealthy and powerful elites. The author comments that the major flaw in the Thai social system is the lack of a comprehensive social security programme. The limited employer liability scheme is inadequate and this is the major gap in its social welfare system.

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DHAKA DECLARATION
OF THE HEADS OF STATE OR GOVERNMENT
OF THE MEMBER STATES OF SOUTH ASIAN
ASSOCIATION FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION
DECEMBER 8, 1985

The President of Bangladesh, the King of Bhutan, the Prime Minister of India, the President of Maldives, the King of Nepal, the President of Pakistan and the President of Sri Lanka met in Dhaka on 7 and 8 December, 1985.

2. The Heads of State or Government underscored the historic significance of their first ever South Asian Summit meeting. They considered it to be a tangible manifestation of their determination to cooperate regionally, to work together towards finding solutions towards their common problems in a spirit of friendship, trust and mutual understanding and to the creation of an order based on mutual respect, equality and shared benefits.

3. They recognised that periodic meetings at their level were central to the promotion of mutual trust, confidence and cooperation among their countries.

4. The Heads of State or Government reaffirmed that their fundamental goal was to accelerate the process of economic and social development in their respective countries through the optimum utilization of their human and material resources, so as to promote the welfare and prosperity of their peoples and to improve their

The Centre for South Asian Studies is grateful to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Director SAARC) for providing material on South Asian Regional Cooperation.
maker of history: logical, honest and forceful. He was a political leader in the great tradition. By inviting the League to hold its sessions annually at the same place at the same time as the Congress, Jinnah was adhering to his political creed. He aimed at neither an absorption of the League into the Hindu dominated Congress nor did he want to weaken the Congress by exposing it to the sectarian character of the League.

Sarojini Naidu hailed him as the dauntless soldier of unity who had risen to heights of an invincible patriotism after he brought together the League and Congress leaders on the same platform in Bombay in December 1915. At the joint Congress-League meeting in December 1916, Jinnah had presided: his first victory as an ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity. Both the Congress and the League agreed on the 'irreducible minimum' of reforms and thus overcame the domestic problem of separate electorates.

Besides the repeal of the partition of Bengal another factor was responsible for the anti-British feeling of the Muslims from 1912 onwards which made them befriend the Congress. The Indian Khilafat Movement was a purely Muslim campaign in favour of Turkey and her Sultan, the Caliph. It was anti-British and it provided at least temporarily and superficially a further bond between the Hindus and Muslims. It was anti-British for Turkey had fought Britain and Britain was on the dictating side in the peace negotiations which had spelt a threat to the Caliphate. More interesting and important thing, however, is that the bulk of the Hindus led by Gandhi made common cause in this issue with the Muslims. Led by Mohammad Ali, (1878—1930) a newspaper editor and another leading contributor to the Muslim renaissance, and by the politically astute Gandhi a strange alliance against the British was forged, albeit temporarily.

The spirit of Lucknow Pact remained still strong and the British rejection of the Congress-League scheme of reforms strengthened the strands of unity. Hindu-Muslim fraternity manifested itself on all levels. Politically, the two communities had practically coalesced and for the first time forged a united front against the British. Religiously,
quality of life. They were conscious that peace and security was an essential pre-requisite for the realization of this objective.

5. The leaders of the South Asian countries reaffirmed their commitment to the UN Charter and the principles governing sovereign equality of States, peaceful settlement of disputes, non-interference in internal affairs and non-use or threat of use of force against the territorial integrity and political independence of their States. They reiterated that the United Nations constituted the most important forum for the resolution of all issues affecting international peace and security.

6. They also reaffirmed their deep conviction in the continuing validity and relevance of the objectives of the Non-aligned movement as an important force in international relations.

7. The Heads of State or Government acknowledged that the countries of South Asia, who constituted one-fifth of humanity were faced with the formidable challenges posed by poverty, underdevelopment, low levels of production, unemployment and pressure of population compounded by exploitation of the past and other adverse legacies. They felt that, bound as their countries were by many common values rooted in their social, ethnic, cultural and historical traditions, regional cooperation provided a logical response to these problems. They conscious of their individual and regional strengths, their potential as a huge market, their substantial human and natural resources and the complementaries of their economies. They were confident that with effective regional cooperation, they could make optimum use of these capacities for the benefit of their peoples, accelerate the pace of their economic development and enhance their national and collective self-reliance. They were convinced that their countries, which had made important contributions to the enrichment of human civilization, could together play their due role in international relations and influence decisions which affected them.

8. The Heads of State or Government emphasised that strengthening of regional cooperation in South Asia required greater involvement of their peoples. They agreed to increase interaction and further promote people-to-people contact at various levels among
their countries. To this end, they decided to take steps to create awareness and public opinion in the region.

9. The Heads of State or Government welcomed the progress already made in the implementation of the Integrated Programme of Action in the nine mutually agreed areas. They expressed their desire to consolidate and further expand cooperative efforts within an appropriate institutional framework in a spirit of partnership and equality.

10. The leaders were convinced that they could effectively pursue their individual and collective objectives and improve the quality of life of their peoples only in an atmosphere of peace and security. In this context, they expressed concern at the deteriorating international political situation. They were alarmed at the unprecedented escalation of arms race, particularly in its nuclear aspect. They recognized that mankind today was confronted with the threat of self extinction arising from a massive accumulation of the most destructive weapons ever produced. The arms race intensified international tension and violated the principles of the UN Charter. The leaders called upon the nuclear weapons-states for urgent negotiations for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty leading to the complete cessation of testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons. In this connection, they welcomed the recent meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev in Geneva and expressed the hope that the meeting would have a positive effect on international peace and security.

11. The Heads of State or Government expressed deep concern at the continuing crisis in the global economy. They underscored that deteriorating economic and social conditions had seriously retarded development prospects in South Asia and other developing countries. Sharply falling commodity prices, deterioration in the terms of trade, intensification of protectionist measures, spiralling debt burden and a decline in the flow of external resources, especially concessional assistance, had caused a serious setback to the economic development of the developing countries. These had been compounded by natural disasters and precarious world food security.
situation affecting developing countries. They also expressed concern over the diminishing capacity of international financial and technical institutions to respond effectively to the needs of the disadvantaged and poorer countries and regretted that the spirit of multilateral cooperation had begun to falter and weaken. This was particularly disturbing in the face of increased interdependence of developed and developing countries and the fact that economic revival of North was closely linked to economic progress in South. They believed that developments during the past decades had clearly demonstrated the structural imbalances and inequities inherent in the existing international economic system and its inadequacy to deal with problems of development.

12. They strongly urged that determined efforts should be made by the international community towards realization of the goals and targets of the International Development Strategy as well as the Substantial New Programme of Action for the Least Developed Countries. They called for urgent resumption of the North-South dialogue and early convening of an International Conference on Money and Finance for Development with universal participation.

13. The Heads of State and Government were conscious of the historic importance of the Dhaka Summit and reiterated their conviction that the launching of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), which they had established at this meeting, would place regional cooperation on a firm foundation, play an important role in accelerating the pace of economic and social development of their countries, promote the objectives of individual and collective self-reliance and further the cause of peace, progress and stability in their region and the world.

14. The Heads of the State or Government of Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka were deeply appreciative of the exemplary Chairmanship of their Meeting by the President of Bangladesh. They expressed their profound gratitude for the warm and gracious hospitality extended to them by the Government and the people of Bangladesh and for the excellent arrangements made for the meeting.
CHARTER
OF THE
SOUTH ASIAN ASSOCIATION FOR
REGIONAL COOPERATION

We, the Heads of State or Government of Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka:

1. Desirous of promoting peace, stability, amity and progress in the region through strict adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter and Non-Alignment, particularly respect for the principles of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, national independence, non-use of force and non-interference in the internal affairs of other States and peaceful settlement of all disputes;

2. Conscious that in an increasingly interdependent world, the objectives of peace, freedom, social justice and economic prosperity are best achieved in the South Asian region by fostering mutual understanding, good neighbouring relations and meaningful cooperation among the Member States which are bound by ties of history and culture;

3. Aware of the common problems, interests and aspirations of the peoples of South Asia and the need for joint action and enhanced cooperation within their respective political and economic systems and cultural traditions;

4. Convinced that regional cooperation among the countries of South Asia is mutually beneficial, desirable and necessary for promoting the welfare and improving the quality of life of the peoples of the region;

5. Convinced further that economic, social and technical cooperation among the countries of South Asia would contribute significantly to national and collective self-reliance;

6. Recognising that increased cooperation, contacts and exchanges among the countries of the region will contribute to the promotion of friendship and understanding among their peoples;
7. Recalling the Declaration signed by their Foreign Ministers in New Delhi on August 2, 1983 and noting the progress achieved in regional cooperation;

8. Reaffirming their determination to promote such cooperation within an institutional framework;

DO HEREBY

Agree to establish an organisation to be known as South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation hereinafter referred to as the Association, with the following objectives, principles, institutional and financial arrangements.

ARTICLE I

OBJECTIVES

1. The objectives of the Association shall be:

(a) to promote the welfare of the peoples of South Asia and to improve their quality of life;

(b) to accelerate economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region and to provide all individuals the opportunity to live in dignity and to realise their full potentials;

(c) to promote and strengthen collective self-reliance among the countries of South Asia;

(d) to contribute to mutual trust, understanding and appreciation of one another's problems;

(e) to promote active collaboration and mutual assistance in the economic, social, cultural, technical and scientific fields;

(f) to strengthen cooperation with other developing countries;

(g) to strengthen cooperation among themselves in international forums on matters of common interests; and
(h) to cooperate with international and regional organisations with similar aims and purposes.

ARTICLE II
PRINCIPLES

1. Cooperation within the frame work of the Association shall be based on respect for the principles of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, political independence, non-interference in the internal affairs of other States and mutual benefit.

2. Such cooperation shall not be a substitute for bilateral and multilateral obligations.

ARTICLE III
MEETING OF THE HEADS OF STATE OR GOVERNMENT

1. The Heads of State or Government shall meet once a year or more often as and when considered necessary by the Member States.

ARTICLE IV
COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

1. A Council of Ministers consisting of the Foreign Ministers of the Member States shall be established with the following functions;

(a) Formulation of the policies of the Association;

(b) Review of the progress of cooperation under the Association;

(c) Decision on new areas of cooperation;

(d) Establishment of additional mechanism under the Association as deemed necessary;

(e) Decision on other matters of general interest to the Association.

2. The Council of Ministers shall meet twice a year. Extraordinary session of the Council may be held by agreement among the Member States.

ARTICLE V
STANDING COMMITTEE

1. The Standing Committee comprising the Foreign Secretaries shall have the following functions;
(a) Overall monitoring and coordination of programme of cooperation;

(b) Approval of projects and programmes, and the modalities of their financing;

(c) Determination of inter-sectoral priorities;

(d) Mobilisation of regional and external resources;

(e) Identification of new areas of cooperation based on appropriate studies.

2. The Standing Committee shall meet as often as deemed necessary.

3. The Standing Committee shall submit periodic reports to the Council of Ministers and make reference to it as and when necessary for decisions on policy matters.

ARTICLE VI

TECHNICAL COMMITTEES

1. Technical Committees comprising representatives of Member States shall be responsible for the implementation coordination and monitoring of the programmes in their respective areas of cooperation.

2. They shall have the following terms and reference:

   (a) Determination of the potential and the scope of regional cooperation in agreed areas;

   (b) Formulation of programmes and preparation of projects;

   (c) Determination of financial implications of sectoral programmes;

   (d) Formulation of recommendations regarding apportionment of costs;

   (e) Implementation and coordination of sectoral programmes;

   (f) Monitoring of progress in implementation.

3. The Technical Committees shall submit periodic reports to the Standing Committee.
4. The Chairmanship of the Technical Committees shall normally rotate among Member States in alphabetical order every two years.

5. The Technical Committees may, inter-alia use the following mechanisms and modalities, if and when considered necessary:
   (a) Meetings of heads of national technical agencies;
   (b) Meetings of experts in specific fields;
   (c) Contact amongst recognised centres of excellence in the region.

ARTICLE VII

ACTION COMMITTEES

1. The Standing Committee may set up Action Committees comprising Member States concerned with implementation of projects involving more than two but not all Member States.

ARTICLE VIII

SECRETARIAT

1. There shall be a Secretariat of the *Association*.

ARTICLE IX

FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS

1. The contribution of each Member State towards financing of the activities of the *Association* shall be voluntary.

2. Each Technical Committee shall make recommendations for the apportionment of costs of implementing the programmes proposed by it.

3. In case sufficient financial resources cannot be mobilised within the region for funding activities of the *Association*, external financing from appropriate sources may be mobilised with the approval of or by the Standing Committee.

ARTICLE X

GENERAL PROVISIONS

1. Decisions at all levels shall be taken on the basis of unanimity.
2. Bilateral and contentious issues shall be excluded from the deliberations.

IN FAITH WHEREOF We Have Set Our Hands And Seals Hereunto.

DONE IN DHAKA, BANGLADESH, On This The Eighth Day Of December Of The Year One Thousand Nine Hundred Eighty Five.

Hussain Muhammad Ershad
President of the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh

Maumoon Abdul Gayoom
President of the Republic of Maldives

Jigme Singye Wangchuck
King of Bhutan

Birendra Bir Bikram Shah Dev
King of Nepal

Rajiv Gandhi
Prime Minister of the Republic of India

Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq
President of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan

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the Hindus had shown tactical skill in espousing the alien and purely Islamic cause of Khilafat.

But, soon after the war, this brief honeymoon ended in divorce. The Lucknow Pact provided the only example when the Congress and League had agreed on constitutional reforms. Yet, even when the Lucknow Pact was quite fresh Hindu-Muslim riots had erupted; and never again, were the two 'nations' to come together in any sphere of life. The years that followed were characterised by bitter and pointless communal riots between Hindu and Muslim peasants and artisans, and there simultaneously ensued an increasing struggle between Hindu and Muslim middle classes for jobs in the Indianised services and power under the new constitutional reforms.

Ambedkar in his book, *Pakistan* (Bombay, 1947) analysing the communal disturbances between 1920 and 1940 summed up that it was a period of "civil war between Hindus and Muslims, interrupted by brief intervals of armed peace." The Simon Commission correctly diagnosed the communal riots as "a manifestation of the anxieties and ambitions aroused in both the communities by the prospect of India's political future." (*Simon Report*, Vol. I, p. 29). The spirit of Lucknow Pact was irrevocably dead; a common adversity had then created strange bedfellows!

In November 1927, following the transitional reforms of 1919, the Simon Commission was appointed to investigate the Indian constitutional problem. This provoked disappointment because the Commission contained no Indian on its panel and a boycott was decided upon. Jinnah shared the Congress view, and the League persisted in its opposition. Britain had no right to impose a constitution through the recommendations of an all-white investigating body, and it had not heeded the Congress-League Scheme of 1917. There was no guarantee that it would now respect whatever the Indians proposed.

Meanwhile an All-Parties Conference had been convened to draw together all non-co-operating groups and a committee was appointed to draw up a constitution for free India. Motilal Nehru presided


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SRI LANKA


SOUTH ASIA


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over the committee and issued the Nehru Report in August 1928, which made the Hindu-Muslim rift final and irrevocable. The committee had recommended a fully responsible government where the majority would be sovereign and Muslim electorates were to be immediately abolished.

Muslims were stunned into unity as a response. When the Report was discussed in the Indian Legislative Assembly the Muslim members including Jinnah, who had joined the Congress in boycotting the Simon Commission strongly rejected it. Jinnah expressed grief and disgust over the shortsightedness of the recommendation which would oust Muslims from a reasonable part in India’s political future.\textsuperscript{28} Yet, he stressed a Hindu-Muslim settlement so that all communities could live harmoniously.

He referred to majorities as apt to be oppressive adding that minorities would be in fear and dread, since their rights and interests would be jeopardised; and characteristically asked for justice for the Muslim minority, and above all unity. Finally, he warned of the dangers of a Constitution under which minorities felt insecure and of the inevitable results that would follow—revolution and civil war.

This prophecy came true nineteen years later, but it failed to impress listeners then: Jinnah’s appeal had fallen on indifferent ears. Jinnah was told that he had no right to speak on behalf of the Muslims since he did not represent them. Humbled, he told Jamshed Nusserwanjee: “this is the parting of the ways.” His belief in Hindu-Muslim unity had been dispelled; and in 1929 there was nothing to kindle hope in him. However, with time, Jinnah again ascended to greatness and power.

The Times reported: “The solidity of Muslim feeling was not unexpected, but certainly disturbing to those trying to represent the Nehru Report as a demand for united India,” and concluded that “Henceforth such a claim must be manifestly absurd.”\textsuperscript{27} But the Congress, however, made the split permanent by adopting the Report. There is little doubt that the Nehru Report conferred real power upon
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Chronology of Important Events
SOUTH ASIAN REGION

July—December 1985

BANGLADESH

July 3  Bangladesh President Lt. Gen. Hossain Mohammad Ershad expanded his 14-member cabinet.

4  President Ershad left for China on a week long visit designed to promote bilateral relations, particularly economic and technical ties.

6  Bangladesh President Mohammad Ershad said that China would give his country 100 million Yuan (35 million dollars) in loans and grants over the next five years to finance a number of construction projects.

August 2  The Indian special envoy Shiv Shankar concluded his talks with President General Mohammad Ershad on outstanding bilateral problems between India and Bangladesh.

3  Bangladesh President Hossain Mohammad Ershad expanded his cabinet to 34 members.

6  Bangladesh lawyers boycotted courts at all levels in protest against bomb blasts on 5 August, in the premises of lower court in Dhaka in which 13 persons were reportedly killed.

15  A political front was launched in Bangladesh to back the regime of President General Ershad and work for early return of democracy in the country.

17  The Bangladesh government decided to overhaul its Foreign Ministry.

18  A nine-member Malaysian delegation arrived in Dhaka for expansion of bilateral trade and economic cooperation with Bangladesh.

The above Chronology has been prepared by Mohammad Sarwar, Senior Research Fellow of the Centre.
A two-member Soviet delegation headed by Anatole Valkov, Chief of South Asian Department in the Foreign Ministry, arrived in Dhaka on a five-day visit.

At the conclusion of their talks in Dhaka, Soviet and Bangladesh officials claimed considerable improvement in the relations between the two countries.

It was reported that more than 3,000 people had been arrested in a week-long crack down against crime in the Bangladesh capital, Dhaka.

A Bangladesh court sentenced six Indians each to one-year hard labour in a jail for illegal entry into Bangladesh and demanding annexation of some western Bangladesh districts to Indian state of West Bengal.

The Asian Group unanimously endorsed the candidacy of Bangladesh Foreign Minister Humayun Rasheed Chowdhury for the presidency of the UN General Assembly in 1986.

India and Bangladesh signed an accord for arrangements relating to health control of sea, air and land traffic, terminating at or transiting through each country.

President General Ershad promised elections in Bangladesh before the end of current year.

About 10 thousand students staged a demonstration in Dhaka and called for the lifting of 42 month-old Martial Law and the return of a Civilian Government.

President Ershad returned home from Saudi Arabia after attending a three-day Islamic Peace Committee meeting on the Iran-Iraq War.

Opposition alliance in Bangladesh demanded open political activities and early elections.

Mrs. Hasina Wajid of Awami League blamed President Ershad for lowering jute prices at Pakistan’s suggestion. She further argued that Pakistan already had exploited us before liberation and is continuing to do so.

The government relaxed ban on political activities to the extent that the Politicians could hold indoor meetings and undertake tours outside the Capital but the open-air meetings, rallies and street demonstrations would remain banned.
October 5  Mr. Abdul Sattar, former Justice, and the only elected
Civilian President of Bangladesh, died in Dhaka.
10  Five students were killed and 45 seriously injured after rival
factions of a pro-government students organisation clashed.
17  A ten-member delegation under the leadership of Bangladesh
Minister for Irrigation and Water Development reached
Delhi for the Joint River Commission talk with their Indian
counterpart.
18  About 5,000 newspaper men began a 24-hour strike to press
their seven-point demand including pay increase.
November 30  Bangladesh banned the entry of Sikhs into the country
ostensibly to ensure security of the Prime Minister, Rajiv
Gandhi, during his visit to Dhaka next week.
The 87 member 5th Indian scientists expedition to Antarctica
sailed aboard the Swedish ice-breaker "Thuleland" from
Mormugao harbour on a four month assignment.
December 4  The Minister for Planning Mr. Sultan Ahmed Choudhry
announced the country's third five-year plan for Taka 38,600
crore. The size of the plan showed a 22.7 per cent increase
over the actual outlay of the second five-year plan.
7  A two-day SAARC summit started at Dhaka.
8  The SAARC summit released the text of the Charter of the
SAARC.
A band of 25 leftist guerillas attacked Teker Bazar Police
Station, killed an officer and escaped with 11 rifles and a
large quantity of ammunition.
15  Bangladesh and China signed a barter protocol in Beijing
envisaging a total trade deal of 87 million US dollars. This
is the biggest ever barter protocol Bangladesh has concluded
with any country.

BHUTAN

July 13  The Foreign Minister of Bhutan, Mr. Lyonpo Dawa Tsering
said that his country would continue her bilateral negoti-
ations with China.
August 10  The Bhutanese Minister for Trade and Industry Mr. C. Dorji
said that under the March 1974 agreement, his country would
sell all surplus power from Chukha Hydrald Project being
completed by the end of 1986. According to the agreement "the surplus power will be sold only to India". (Of the 336 MW installed capacity, approximately 220 MW would be available to India every day).

The peace talks between the Sri Lankan Government representatives and the six Tamil separatist groups began in Thimpu. (See also under Sri Lanka).

Second round of talks on the Sri Lankan Ethnic Problem resumed at Thimpu. The Indian Foreign Minister Mr. Ramesh Bhandari reached there on 15 August to watch the negotiations and also to make arrangements of Mr. Rajiv Gandhi's visit to the Kingdom scheduled for the next month.

The Minister of External Affairs said that Bhutan had started the process of expanding its contacts with the outside world but it had no immediate plans to set up diplomatic ties with Pakistan or trade relations with China. He added that Bhutan would like to stay away from the super powers although it had fullscale diplomatic relations with India, Nepal, Bangladesh and Maldives.

The Indian Prime Minister Mr. Rajiv Gandhi addressed to the National Assembly of Bhutan in Thimpu.

Mr. Rajiv Gandhi left Thimpu for Delhi.

**INDIA**

Maj-Gen. Rajinder Singh Sparow appointed President of the Punjab Congress (I). (Sparow entered into politics in 1967, joined Congress in 1972 and had been the member of Lok Sabha from 1980 to 1985).

The Government announced the appointment of Air Marshal D.A. La Fontaine as new Chief of the Air Staff, with the rank of Air Chief Marshal. (He succeeded Marshal L. M. Katre who died on July 1).

The Minister of State for External Affairs Mr. Khurshid Alam Khan left for Burma on a three days visit.

The second Ministerial-level meeting of the Indo-Pakistan Joint Commission on the second day of its sitting decided to make business and transit visits much easier to promote trade and tourism on either side.
The new Ambassador of Chile, Mr. Marcelo Padella presented his credential to the President Mr. Zail Singh.

5 The three-day second meeting of the Indo-Pakistan Joint Commission ended at New Delhi without making any progress in the crucial field of trade because the differences in their basic position could not be resolved.

6 Mr. Amarsingh Choudhry was sworn in as the eighth Chief Minister of Gujrat after Mr. Madhavsinh resigned from the office in the face of prolonged violence which so far had claimed 201 lives.

7 Navy celebrated the Silver Jubilee of the "White Tiger", its premier fighter squadron, which is going to be replaced by the most sophisticated fighter aircraft "Sea Harrier" acquired in 1983.

8 Opposition legislators in Bihar initiated move to do away with the existing Legislative Council system, and asked for its abolition on the lines of recommendations of Andhra Pradesh.

9 It was officially reported that shooting, kidnappings and arson gripped the disputed border of Nagaland and Assam.

12 The seven member General Court Martial, headed by Brig. Arjun Singh Narula, accused all 11 deserters from 11 Punjab Battalion, who had fled the unit lines with arms and ammunition on June 10 last year, and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment ranging from four to twelve years and dismissal from services.

16 Indian Airforce received and inducted the first batch of Illyushin-76, the long range military transport aircraft from the Soviet Union. (The IL-76 aircraft has a payload of 47000 kg. over a distance of 4000 km. and provides facilities for the transport of heavy, large-size and self-propelled and towed vehicles. It can carry 225-troops in two decks in the cargo compartment).

The Press Trust of India, quoting Rajiv Gandhi, said that during his talks with President Jayewardene, the Sri Lankan leader had agreed to grant the Tamils sufficient autonomy.

The government decided to disband the ninth Battalion of the Sikh regiment, fondly known as the "Moolan's Sikh". (It was the first to be affected by the Army action when on
June 7 and 8, a majority of its troops mutinied and deserted their unit lines at Sri Ganganagar in Rajasthan).

The External Affairs Ministry summoned the Charge de Affair of the Ecuadorian Embassy, Mr. Adolf Alwarez, to find out truth about reports emanating London about the meeting of his country's delegation with Dr. Tagjilt Singh Chauhan.

The International Development Association (IDA), the World Bank's concessionary loan affiliate, had approved two credits, totalling $201 million, for irrigation projects in Maharashtra and Kerala.

In an interview with BBC, the Indian Secretary in the External Affairs Ministry, Ramesh Bhandari said that the recent meeting of Indo-Pakistan Joint Commission in New Delhi made little progress but brought realistic results.

The Press Trust of India reported that two days of rioting in the western city of Ahmadabad had left 17 dead and more than 20 wounded.

Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi said that he would not hesitate to impose emergency rule if India's security was threatened or the country faced external aggression.

India and Afghanistan had agreed at stepping up of trade and include non-traditional items in the export list of India like transport equipment, tractors, drugs and formaceuticals, tyres and tubes, chemical products and general merchandise, etc.

The Defence Minister, Mr. P. V. Narasimha Rao informed the Parliament that the government had decided not to manufacture Mirage-2000 indigenously.

The Indian Prime Minister held talks with top Sikh leader, Harcharan Singh Longowal, in a bid to end the three year old crisis in Punjab.

Mr. Rajiv Gandhi the Prime Minister of India announced in the Parliament that he and Sant Harcharan Singh Longowal had signed a memorandum settling the Punjab problem. According to the accord the disputed city of Chandigarh would go to Punjab in exchange to Hindu-speaking areas of Punjab to Haryana.
July 24 Three retired officers of the Indian Army were awarded ten-years imprisonment each on the charge of selling military secrets to America.

25 At a meeting of Trade Ministers in New Delhi, the Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi said that the world’s trading system was being threatened by mounting protectionism in the industrialized nations.

The United Akali Dal, led by Baba Joginder Singh, rejected the accord on Punjab describing it as a “Sellout”.

Rajasthan refused to accept the clause of the Rajiv-Longowal accord relating to the sharing of river waters.

26 Five opposition parties in Haryana decided to launch a movement against the Rajiv-Longowal accord on Punjab. Under the leadership of Mr. Devi Lal, 29 MLA’s resigned from the Assembly and decided to observe Haryana bandh on July 31.

The Indian Atomic Energy Commission Chairman, Dr. Raja Ramana said that India was nearing self-sufficiency in the nuclear programme and the country could develop, if it wanted to, a suitable nuclear delivery system. With the country developing fast broader technology he added, there would be no shortage of fuel for the nuclear plants and Indian natural Uranium reserves could last 10 thousand years.

29 The Lok Sabha passed the Punjab budget for 1985-86 and the necessary appropriation for Rs. 380.37 crore.

30 Indian and Pakistani Foreign Secretaries level delegations, held bilateral talks at New Delhi. Mr. Niaz A. Naik, Pakistan’s Foreign Secretary was also scheduled to meet the Indian Chairman of Policy Planning Committee and the Minister of State for External Affairs.

31 Indian and Sri Lankan Scientists in their meeting on atomic cooperation discussed ways and means of expanding cooperation in the peaceful use of atomic energy.

Unidentified assailants shot dead a Congress (I) Parliamentarian and his wife in New Delhi.
July 31
India and Trinidad signed a comprehensive agreement on scientific and technical cooperation in New Delhi. The President of India hosted a lunch in the honour of the visiting Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago, Mr. George Chambers and other members of his delegation.

August 2
The Indian special envoy Shiv Shankar concluded his talks with President General Mohammad Ershad on outstanding bilateral problems between India and Bangladesh.

3
Extremist leaders of the Akali Dal said that they would launch a protest campaign against the Rajiv-Longowal accord from 14 August.

6
India-Afghanistan Joint Commission meeting began in New Delhi to promote economic, commercial and technical cooperation between the two countries.

7
India and Afghanistan signed a cultural agreement in New Delhi.

Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and leaders of India’s main opposition groups failed to reach an agreement on holding elections in the northern state of Punjab.

8
Rajiv Gandhi held talks with Dr. Farooq Abdullah of National Conference (F) along with Begum Abdullah and other members of the Parliament from Sri Nagar.

The Chief of Army Staff, General A.S. Vaidya, left for Moscow on a six day official visit.

The three-day meeting of the Indo-Afghan Joint Commission for Economic Trade and Technical Cooperation ended in New Delhi. As a result of the meeting, India agreed to extend its assistance in the fields of public health, industry and agriculture. However, on the question of India’s adverse trade imbalance no concrete steps emerged.

10
The 100 MW Dhruva, the largest research reactor in the world, at Trombay became critical. (India’s sixth and latest reactor is capable of producing enough weapon-grade plutonium for fuelling up to 30 nuclear bombs per year. Being entirely indigenous, the Dhruva reactor is not subject to international safe-guards, and nobody’s concurrence is required to utilize plutonium from it. Stockpiled plutonium can be converted into bombs in a matter of days).
August 12  Mr. G. S. Tohra, the President of Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee (SGPC) filed a suit against the government for the recovery of Rs. 1000 crore as damage for the loss caused to various gurdwaras in Punjab during the Army action in June last year.

The Second unit of the Madras Atomic Power Plant, Kalpakan attained “criticality” at 1.25 p.m. just two years after the first unit was made critical. (The ultimate commercial operation would be possible in December 1986).

13  Addressing the Parliament the Indian Defence Minister, Narasimha Rao disclosed that India intended to manufacture the latest type of military hardware in the coming four years.

At least seven soldiers were killed in an ambush by anti-government rebels in the Indian State of Manipur.

15  Indian Premier signed an accord with the Assamese leaders, ending the six-year anti- alien agitation in that northeastern border state.

It was reported that V.S. Arunachalam, scientific adviser to the Indian Defence Ministry, was on a 10-day visit to the United States.

18  The Assam State Assembly was dissolved after 20 Ministers tendered their resignations.

The Indian Defence Ministry announced that 1,137 Sikh soldiers who rebelled after the army stormed the Golden Temple last June were being rehabilitated into the armed forces.

19  The Akali Dal decided to take part in the Assembly and Parliamentary elections scheduled for next month in the Indian State of Punjab.

A care-taker government took over power in the Indian State of Assam as part of an accord with militants demanding the expulsion of alleged illegal immigrants.

It was reported that India had asked the Sri Lankan government to offer “better proposals” regarding share in power to Tamils living in the northern part of the Island.
the Hindu majority and envisaged a Hindu raj: and that was the impression in the Muslim mind. The Lucknow Pact had been forgotten; the good old days of the Khilafat had passed, never to return. The unity of the Congress-League scheme was buried under the debris of communal riots.

The fundamental Muslim demand for separate representation—conceded in 1909 by the British, and in 1916 by the Hindus, was rejected by the Report and by the Congress. The Muslims, as much as Jinnah, were totally disillusioned. From 1928 the Congress became a predominantly Hindu body; and the Muslims looked upon it as the enemy of their claims and interests. The Nehru Report made the Muslims close their ranks. Political differences and personal rivalries among Muslims were hushed; and a separate Muslim national feeling attained maturity though it had no name for another ten years.

In May 1930 the Simon Report was published.\(^{28}\) It contained an ably reasoned refutation of the claim that India was a ‘nation’ in the sense in which France or Sweden were. There followed the three Round Table Conferences soon after Jinnah was disappointed and silent. Muslims left the first Conference feeling that the British Government was interested in Hindu aspirations and insensitive to Muslim apprehensions. The second Conference failed in an atmosphere of suspicion and contempt; suspicions among the Indians and common contempt for Britain. Gandhi had refused to consider any compromise until the Muslims accepted the Nehru Report totally—an unacceptable demand to them.

The Muslim demands indicated that Muslim nationalism was coming to the point of demanding a territory for its consummation. The aims were to gain control over north and northwest India; to feel secure that Muslim culture would develop and expand; and the scattered minorities of co-religionists in the other parts of India could be protected.

The 1935 Act was introduced after careful preparation. The Muslims objected to it because a strong centre implied increased Hindu strength. They also opposed the central government’s power
Indian Election Commission decided to extend the date of election for the state assembly and for parliamentary seats of Punjab from 22 to 25 September.

Indian Foreign Secretary, Ramesh Bhandari held a meeting with Sri Lankan official, Hector Jayawardene in New Delhi. President Nyere of Tanzania arrived in Bombay on a four-day state visit to India.

Indian Government served deportation orders on three Sri Lankan Tamil leaders. Mr. Sathyendra, who represented TELU at the abortive phase in two of the Thimpu talks, had already left for Britain before the deportation orders could be served on him. Two others, deported were Mr. S.C. Chandrasasan convener of PROTEG and Mr. A S. Balasingam, top theoretician of LTTE and official spokesman of ENLF. All non-Congress (I) parties and the ruling AIADMK in Tamil Nadu denounced the deportation as an act of "betrayal". (See also under Sri Lanka).

India and Germany entered into a new double taxation agreement. The agreement was reported to provide incentives to new investors and reduction of Indian tax on fees for technical services.

The main Sikh political party, the Akali Dal, confirmed Surjit Singh Barnala, as its temporary Chief.

A Bangladesh court sentenced six Indians each to one-year hard labour in a jail for illegal entry into Bangladesh and demanding annexation of some western Bangladesh districts to Indian State of West Bengal.

The extremist faction of the Akali Dal decided to boycott upcoming elections in the Indian State of Punjab.

More than 1,000 Indian Tamils were arrested in south India during a day long protest against the government’s deportation of the Sri Lankan Tamil militants.

21 members mainly from Haryana Assembly resigned in protest against Premier Rajiv Gandhi’s Sikh Peace Plan.

An agreement was signed between India and Mauritius to render assistance worth Rs. 2.5 crore for 23 new projects in Mauritius in diverse fields ranging from agriculture,
August 30

industry, energy, bio-gas, tourism, communications, health and training facilities.

31

It was reported that the Indian army had been ordered to shoot all persons who enter Indian Punjab illegally.

After eight days of intensive discussion the Indian and Sri Lankan officials reportedly prepared draft proposals that could form the basis for resolving the two year old ethnic crisis in the Island.

September 4

Akali Dal (Talwandi Group) decided to withdraw their nomination papers and boycott the elections for the State Assembly of Punjab and the Lok Sabha.

A prominent supporter of Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, Mr. Arjun Das along with five others were gunned down in Delhi by the extremists.

5

The United Akali Dal called upon the Sikhs to boycott the coming Punjab elections in a peaceful democratic way.

The Chinese Vice-Premier, Mr. Yao Yilin said that China had a very sincere desire to improve relations with India and to settle boundary question between them.

6

The state cabinet in both Tripura and Tamil Nadu was reshuffled while in Tripura, two ministers were revealed and one CPI (M) member inducted.

The new U.S. Ambassador to India, Mr. John Gunter Dean, presented his credentials to President Zail Singh.

7

Assembly Elections from two constituencies in Jullundhur city in Punjab countermanded following the death of a candidate contesting two seats.

The total number of pre-election preventive arrests in Punjab touched 650.

A Sikh extremist suspected of killing Mr. Arjun Das committed suicide in police custody.

The Government of India released a sum of Rs. 12.57 million for the Chandra Canal project being executed by the irrigation department of Nepal, under the Nepal-India cooperation programme.
The Panthic convention of the United Akali Dal rejected the Punjab accord and called for boycott of elections in the State for September 25.

Lt. Gen. Anand Sarup took the charge as Master General of Ordinance at the Army Headquarter in Delhi.

Another prominent Congress (I) leader, Mr. Subhash Chandra Shingara, was killed by the extremists.

Equador closed its mission in India and its Charge de Affairs Dr. Adolfo Alvaraz left for home.

The Election Commission appointed 12 central observers, one for each district, for the coming Lok Sabha and Assembly elections in Punjab.

India was reported to be negotiating a multi-million-pound arms deal with the Britain and was supposed to get aircraft carrier HMS Hermes as a bonus.

It was stated in the party's election manifesto that Akali Dal promised to restore peace in Punjab if it was voted to power in the next elections.

India and Britain signed a protocol which provided a framework for transfer of British technology to India.

The second batch of Mirage 2000 aircraft reached India from France.

The space department allocated a sum of Rs. 40 crore for 1985-86 for funding development of technology by the Indian industry.

The Indo-Swiss joint commission started its fourth session in Berne, to identify specific areas for promoting bilateral trade and industrial cooperation.

The two regional parties of Meghalaya—the All-Party Hill Leaders Conference and the Hill States Peoples Democratic Party decided to merge into one single party under the banner of Hill People's Union.

King Birendra Bir Bikram Shah Dev of Nepal arrived in New Delhi on a three-day state visit.

The new Polish Ambassador, Mr. Tanusz Swit Kowski, presented his credentials to the President Mr. Zail Singh.
September 17
East Punjab Government officially denied the press reports that 400 trained infiltrators had crossed into the state from Pakistan to disrupt the elections.

24
Pre-election arrests in Indian Punjab amounted to 300 persons.

25
Elections held in Indian Punjab in almost peaceful atmosphere.
In a major reshuffle in the Central Cabinet by Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, Mr. N. D. Tiwari, B. R. Bhagat, A. B. A. Ghani Khan Choudhary were inducted as ministers.

26
The Akali Dal won State Assembly elections with sweeping majority in East Punjab. The party nominated Mr. Surjeet Singh Barnala as Chief Minister.

October 1
The Deputy Speaker of Held Jammu and Kashmir State Assembly resigned from the ruling National Conference and withdrew support to the Shah Government.

After New Delhi’s recognition of Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) proclaimed by Polisario guerrillas, Morocco broke off diplomatic relations with India.

3
The President Mr. Zail Singh arrived in Kohima, Capital of Nagaland on a three-day visit to the State.

The World Bank approved $2.35 billion aid for India for the year 1985-86.

5
Sikh separatists have opened a Khalistan Embassy in Quito, the Capital of Equador.

About 500 Muslim religious leaders from the four Southern States of Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala and Tamil Nadu, resolved in a conference, to refer all Muslim divorce cases to a Community Court instead of Civil Courts. It asserted that the Government should not interfere in the Muslim Personal Law.

7
India told the International Monetary Fund that she will not use the fund facility for the next six years.

The opposition-sponsored Kerala Bandh turned violent at some places resulting about 75 people, including 22 policemen, injured.
October 8
Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi, inaugurated 9th Lawasia Conference of judges and lawyers from Asia and Pacific in New Delhi.

9
The Election Authorities in Assam rejected about 300 thousand claims for electoral rolls of 126 Assembly Constituencies in the State.

The Indian High Commissioner in Colombo, Mr. J. N. Dixit, met the Sri Lankan National Security Minister, Mr. L. Athulathmudali and discussed with him the demand of the Tamil groups regarding consolidation of the cease-fire agreement.

10
The Chief Ministers of Assam, Sikkim and Madhya Pradesh held separate meetings with the Minister for Internal Security, Mr. Arun Nehru.

Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, inaugurated a three-day annual conference of senior naval officers in New Delhi.

11
Mr. Rajiv Gandhi expressed India's willingness "to go to any extent" to normalize relations with Pakistan but said limitations were being put by the other side.

Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, while addressing members of the Parliament, said that India intended to go in far a second aircraft-carrier as it was essential for the country to have a strategic force.

India acquired MI-17 Soviet helicopter for high altitude operations.

12
India formally announced abstaining from joining World Bank's proposed Multi-national Investment Guarantee Agency.

A plot to assassinate Mr. Rajiv Gandhi was reported to have been foiled by the British Police which had detained over a dozen Pakistanis and Sikhs under the Prevention of Terrorism Act.

13
Admiral R. H. Tahliliani, Chief of Naval Staff, left for Sweden and Yugoslavia on a two-week official tour.

The annual convention of the Janata Party concluded to launch a nation-wide campaign on economic issues.
October 13  
Lt. General M. Maya Das took over command of the crops in the Northern Sector.
India denied Anderson report that it was on its way to building a nuclear arsenal.
Mr. Rajiv left Delhi for London on a three-day visit to UK.

14  
India decided to buy 27 French Dauphin helicopters.

18  
Rajiv Gandhi and President Ershad of Bangladesh reached an understanding of the long-disputed sharing of the river waters.

The fast breeder test reactor at Kalpakkam near Madras, went critical, heralding a new era in the country's nuclear power production programme.

19  
India and Pakistan signed an agreement for cooperation in the field of health and family welfare.

20  
Foreign Secretary Mr. Ramesh Bhandari met with Sri Lankan President at Nassau and discussed with him the possibilities of resuming the dialogue between the Sri Lankan Government and the Tamil militants.

21  
Mr. Rajiv Gandhi reached Cuba on a day's visit to that country.

22  
Mr. Rajiv Gandhi reached New York from Cuba to participate in the UN 40th anniversary.

23  
The Chinese foreign spokesman in Beijing told newsmen that India and China would hold substantive discussions on their long-standing official level talks in New Delhi from November 4 to 10.

24  
Mr. Rajiv Gandhi conveyed to Mr. Reagan, the Indian people's "concern, even disquiet" over Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme.

26  
Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi paid an unscheduled visit to Moscow on his way back to New York.

November 16  
Mr. Arjun Singh, the Governor of Punjab was released from his duties and inducted in the Central Cabinet with the Commerce Portfolio. Air Vice-Marshal H.L. Kapur (retired) also sworn in as the Lt. Governor of Delhi.
At the end of his three day's visit to India, the Pakistani Minister for Finance, Planning and Economic Affairs, Dr. Mehoob-ul-Haq said that India and Pakistan had agreed to expand economic ties.

Mr. Rajiv Gandhi met with Sultan Qaboos-Bin Saeed of Oman at Muscat and discussed the possibilities of expanding commercial and trade activities between the two countries.

India signed a comprehensive deal with Britain for the purchase of eleven Sea Harrier Aircrafts for the Indian Navy.

India and Japan signed credit agreement for 31 billion Yen for gas pipe-line, fertilizer, hydro-electric power and telecommunication projects.

Mr. Rajiv Gandhi reached Tokyo on a three day's state visit to Japan, and signed an agreement under which Japan would provide a credit of 30 billion Yen for converting petroleum gas into energy in Assam through turbine technology.

Mr. G.S. Tohra was re-elected as SGPC President for another one year.

Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi criticised the Punjab Government Act of releasing the detenus.

The 87-member fifth Indian scientific expedition to Antarctic sailed abroad the Sweedish ice-breaker Thuleland from Mormugao harbour.

The TULF leader, Mr. A. Amirthalingam, presented alternative proposals to Mr. Ramesh Bhandari, the Indian Foreign Secretary, for the Sri Lankan ethnic problem. The Mezo National Front leader, Mr. Laldenga, held talks with the Indian Home Secretary.

Mr. Rajiv Gandhi reached Dhaka to attend SAARC Summit.

Rajiv Gandhi met President of Pakistan and Sri Lanka, at Dhaka.

The Union Minister for Programme Implementation, Mr. A. B. A. Ghani Khan Choudhry, conveyed the demands of All Assam Minority Students Union to the Prime Minister.
India asked Sri Lanka to restrain its security forces.
The Foreign Minister of Zimbabwe met the Indian Foreign Minister at New Delhi.
15 India voted for the expulsion of South Africa from the Antarctic Treaty.
27 India and USSR signed a protocol on cooperation in the Power Sector.

NEPAL

July 1 Mr. Inderdoo Singh, a leader of the Nepali Congress called for the release of political rights and resumption of dialogue to solve the crisis in the kingdom.
4 Mr. P. Shivshankar, as the special envoy of Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, arrived in Kathmandu, to hold talks on bilateral matters.
9 The Finance Minister, Dr. Parkash Chandra Lohani, presented the budget to the Rashtrya Panchayat for next financial year with a total expenditure of about 11.5 billion rupees.
15 The Foreign Minister, Mr. Randhir Subba, said that our’s and India’s perception on security were different, and added that it would continue until India changed the perception of her security.

The Economic survey of Nepal showed an increase of five fold in the trade deficit from Rs. 925.0 million in 1974-75 to Rs. 4810.4 million in 1983-84. The trade deficit with India during 1979-80 to 1983-84 increased by 50.0 per cent. The highest increase in this respect was recorded in 1982-83, when export declined by 15.2 per cent and imports increased by 9.6 per cent.

30 Nepal’s first indigenous computer in Devnagri and Roman scripts, with a 900 kilobyte disc memory was installed at the Nepal Agriculture Development Bank.
31 A contingent of 133 members of the 666 strong Shrinath Battalion of the Royal Nepal Army left for Lebanon to join the UN peace keeping force there.

August 2 The Government presented a Bill for enactment of new anti-terrorist laws to the Rashtrya Panchayat.
August 9  India and Nepal signed two separate agreements for a total grant assistance of about Rs. 58 million rupees. According to the agreement, Rs. 58 million were to be utilized in electrifying 76 Nepali villages in Nuwakot district and Rs. 38 million for the construction of a building to house the Museum and Librarycum-documentation Centre at the Forestry Institute in Hetauda.

September 2  Japan signed an agreement with Nepal to provide a grant assistance, of Japanese Yen 847 million. (about Rs. 62.25 million). (The grant was supposed to be utilized for the construction of training buildings in the Horticulture Development Centre, Kirtipur, Kathmandu).

6  The Nepalese Government announced the suspension of publication of 105 newspapers which had failed to comply with the Press and Publication Act. These newspapers, including 11 daily, 16 fortnightlies and 78 weeklies, were registered in 1984.

18  The Government of India released a sum of Rs. 21.75 million for the Chandra Canal Project being executed by the Irrigation Department of Nepal under Nepal-India Cooperation Programme. (See also under India).

The King Birendra Bir Bikram Shah Dev reached New Delhi on a three-day State visit, after concluding an official visit to Australia.

The Indian President, Mr. Zail Singh hosted a Banquet in the honour of King Birendra and Queen Aishwariya of Nepal.

19  The King spent a busy day in Delhi, meeting Mr. Rajiv Gandhi the Prime Minister, and other ministers separately.

20  The King and the Queen of Nepal returned home after a State visit to Australia and official and unofficial visits to Brunei, Malaysia, Japan and India.

October 3  The Nepalese National Panchayat passed the civil code (Eighth Amendment) bill 1985 providing for death penalty for murder.
October 8  The US Deputy Secretary of State Mr. Whitehead reached Kathmandu on a two-day official visit.

November 30  The Nepalese Government announced an average 14.7 per cent devaluation of its currency against all major foreign currencies including Indian rupee.

SRI LANKA

July 3  India and some other littoral states strongly opposed the Sri Lankan move to hold an Indian Ocean Marine Affairs Conference.

5  Major Sri Lankan Tamil militant groups, including the People’s Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE) reached at New Delhi to work out a joint strategy for the Thimpu Conference scheduled to begin on July 8, to solve the ethnic issue in the Island.

8  According to BBC, Tamils in the north of Sri Lanka staged a demonstration to demand a separate state of Tamils in the Tamil-dominated north of the Island.

10  According to BBC, the Sri Lankan Government released more than 600 Tamil prisoners and lifted the curfew imposed in the country since November 1984.

11  Four major Tamil separatist groups rejected Colombo’s proposals at peace talks in Bhutan aimed at ending the Island’s ethnic crisis.

Mr. S. Thondaman, Minister of Rural Industrial Development, appealed to India to extend a helping hand for the human development of the people of India origin in Sri Lanka.

The Finance Ministry, Mr. Ronnie de Mel told the Parliament that the International Aid Group had pledged Rs. 13.2 billion for development work and the commitments for loans and grants would rise from 460 million dollars in 1984 to US $600 million by 1988.

July 14  The Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that the peace talks on Sri Lanka’s ethnic crisis being held in Thimpu (Bhutan) would be adjourned until August 12.
to interfere in the provincial criminal administration as this would enable a Congress Cabinet at the Centre to paralyse the administration of a Muslim province. The Muslim League found the federal scheme, "fundamentally bad"; "most reactionary, retrograde, injurious and fatal...", and rejected it. However, it undertook to work the provincial part of the scheme "for what it is worth."29

The Congress took office under this constitution, but on the assurance that provincial Governors would not use their special powers unnecessarily. These powers had been provided to protect minorities from oppressive majorities, but the fact that the Congress did not want the Governor to exercise the powers naturally excited the Muslims. Already at the Round Table Conference they had been alarmed by Gandhi's insistence on accepting the Nehru Report; now the Congress attitude to the Communal Award was as yet another straw in the wind. The demand for doing away with safeguards indicated to the Muslims the Congress's growing ambition to rule India on the principle of majority rule without the essential ingredient of the voluntary acquiescence of the minorities.

For the first time, with the advent of Congress to power, responsible governments were installed in provinces; the Congress tasted power for the first time, and for the first time Muslims realized its impact. The Congress ministries were made accountable not to legislatures but to the party command; and the "first true attempt to apply British parliamentary democracy to India at once produced a system which was not recognizably British."30 The rigid party control over ministers was aimed at maintaining the unity of the Hindu nationalist movement. This practice was contrary to the underlying assumptions of the 1935 constitution, which had envisaged provincial autonomy as a training ground for self-government rather than as a testing ground for nationalist totalitarianism.

Secondly, Congress refused to share power with the Muslims. The Congress was unprepared to abandon its claim to speak for all India. When the Muslims asked for coalitions, the Congress refused to enter into them and wanted the Muslim League to merge itself in
July 16  The Press Trust of India, quoting Rajiv Gandhi, said that during his talks with President Jayewardene, the Sri Lankan leader had agreed to grant the Tamils sufficient autonomy.

23  Sri Lanka bought six training planes from Italy to be used for anti-guerilla operations. The defence officials in Colombo said that the defence costs had exceeded the year’s budgeted expenditure of 3.6 billion rupees (133.3 million dollars) by 2 billion rupees.

31  Indian and Sri Lankan scientists in their meeting on atomic cooperation discussed ways of expanding cooperation in the peaceful use of atomic energy.

August 1  More than 9,000 Sri Lankan Buddhist monks in a signed memorandum to President Junius Jayewardene demanded general elections or referendum on any negotiated settlement between the government and the Tamil minority to resolve the Island’s ethnic crisis.

2  Tamil separatist guerillas killed a Sinhalese Buddhist monk in Sri Lanka’s north central Polonnaruwa district.

3  A six-member Muslim delegation led by Sri Lanka Freedom Party’s former minister, Dr. Badiudin Mahmud arrived in Madras for talks with Lankan Tamil groups, to plan a common strategy for talks going to be held in Bhutan on August 12.

6  Indian Foreign Secretary, Mr. Ramesh Bhandari, reached Colombo to meet President Jayewardene in connection with the forthcoming talks between Sri Lanka and Tamil leaders at Thimpu next week.

The Government released 525 Tamil prisoners held under detention for alleged terrorist activities as a part of a Government undertaking in the current ceasefire agreement.

7  Eelam National Liberation Front decided to attend the second round of talks on Sri Lanka’s ethnic dispute beginning in Thimpu shortly.

9  A group of Sinhale-Buddhist hardliners formed a National Front to protect the “rights and interests” of the majority community and asked the Government not to proceed with the Thimpu peace talks until conditions conducive to negotiations were created in the Island.
August 10
The President of Sri Lanka, Mr. J. Jayewardene, conferred full powers on Mr. Hactor Jayewardene, leader of the Sri Lankan Governmental delegation to the Thimpu talks so that the contingent be in a position to take decisive steps at the negotiations. Meanwhile the Tamil Eelam PLOTE leader demanded the release of 20 PLOTE members as a condition for the group’s participation in the talks.

11
The Sri Lankan Government and Tamil opposition delegates reached Thimpu (Bhutan) for the second phase of talks beginning on August 12. The Government group consisted of 20 members while Tamil delegation consisted of 15 members. (It was interesting to note that both groups included a Muslim representative, adding a new dimension to the second round of talks. Mr. Faiz Mustafa was assisting the Government while Mohammad Prem Nawas assisted the Tamil group. Constituting one-third of the population in the Eastern province, the Muslims had made it known that “the problems and aspirations of the Muslim community should be given full consideration” in any political and constitutional settlement of the problem).

12
The peace keeping talks between the Sri Lankan Government representatives and the six Tamil Separatist groups began in Thimpu. The Sri Lankan Government delegation rejected demands by Tamil leaders.

13
The official Sri Lankan delegation at Thimpu rejected the four-point charter of demands of the militant Tamil groups saying that the acceptance of it amounted to grant of a separate Tamil Eelam. (The four-point charter provided for recognition of the separate national identity of Tamils, respect for the integrity of the traditional homeland, recognition of the right to self-determination and citizenship, rights for all Tamils who had chosen to make Sri Lanka their homeland).

15
The Indian Foreign Secretary, Mr. Ramesh Bhandari left for Thimpu to watch the ongoing talks for the Sri Lankan ethnic issue.

17
Tamil groups walked out of the peace talks with Sri Lanka’s Government in Bhutan.

As a result of ethnic violence more than 100 persons were killed in the northern town of Vavuniya in Sri Lanka.
August 18 Tamil separatist guerillas reportedly went on the offensive, calling off a ceasefire and hijacking a train in a series of attacks which, according to the Government sources, left many dead.

19 It was reported that India had asked the Sri Lankan Government to offer "better proposals" regarding share in power to Tamils living in the northern part of the Island.

22 A second round of Sri Lanka peace talks in Bhutan was indefinitely adjourned.

23 Sri Lankan Government accused Tamil separatist guerillas of preparing for a major offensive and committing some 600 ceasefire violations last month.

24 Indian Foreign Secretary Ramesh Bhandari held a meeting with Sri Lankan official, Hector Jayewardene in New Delhi.

25 Security forces killed 26 separatist guerillas in a gun battle in Sri Lanka's eastern province.

30 More than 1,000 Indian Tamils were arrested in South Indian during a day long protest against the Government's deportation of the Sri Lankan Tamil militants.

31 After eight days of intensive discussion, the Indian and Sri Lankan officials reportedly prepared draft proposals that could form the basis for resolving the two year old ethnic crisis in the Island.

September 1 Sri Lankan special envoy, Hector Jayewardene met with Indian Prime Minister. Meanwhile, the Government of India announced that Indian and Sri Lankan officials prepared a draft proposal covering "all issues of importance and relevance" and it could form the framework of an eventual accord between Colombo and its Tamil minority.

An armed gang set fire to about 30 Tamil houses in Northern town of Vavuniya and kidnapped a former member of Sri Lankan Parliament, Mr. M. Suvaram a leader of TULF from his residence at Jaffna.

2 The Tamil organisations—PLOTE and TULF, denounced the possibility of accepting any separate pact with the Sri Lankan Government, leaving out other Tamil groups, but appraised the draft proposal jointly worked out by Indian and Sri Lankan governments.
September 3  Two moderate Tamil politicians, Mr. A. M. Alalsunderam and V. Dharmalingam were kidnapped and killed near Jaffna by the Tamil militants. Both of them had participated in the latest round of talks between the Tamil leaders and the Sri Lankan Government in Thimpu (Bhutan) which proved inconclusive.

5  The Sri Lankan Government clamped a 16-hours curfew in Eastern areas after guerillas had killed one soldier. In Jaffna city, Tamils observed a protest strike demanding the release of 170 detained Tamils.

6  Sri Lanka hoped that India's mediation would help bring about an early accord to resolve the Island's ethnic problem.

The deportation orders of Mr. A. S. Balasingam, a top theoretician and official spokesman of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam from India, revoked on the instructions of Mr. Rajiv Gandhi.

7  Security forces raided and destroyed a major hideout of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in the Eastern Batticaloa town and recovered a sophisticated radio manual LTTE, personal documents, two lorries, two motor cycles and a jeep.

8  President Mr. J. R. Jayewardene, ruled out any proposal of holding a general election or referendum to get the people's mandate to resolve the Island's ethnic problem.

Tamil guerillas attacked 3 Sinhalese fishing boats in the coastal town of Trincomalee and drowned two of them.

Indian Prime Minister offered help in solving Sri Lankan crisis.

Indian and Sri Lankan officials, in Madras, signed a memorandum of understanding on atomic cooperation and identified two areas of immediate collaboration—nuclear radiation in food and medical goods.

Over 50 Tamils were killed in three villages and another 34 Tamils were burnt alive when their bus was hijacked and set on fire by a gang of Sinhalese.

10  Eight Tamil guerillas were killed and the house of a former Tamil member of Parliament, Mr. R. Sampathan of TULF, at Trincomalee, set ablaze.
Security forces imposed curfew in Mulkirigala city after two UNP supporters were shot dead and one seriously wounded as voting began in a parliamentary by-election.

Tamil militants blew up a train in Sri Lanka.

The Government of Sri Lanka unilaterally extended the ceasefire for the next three months with Tamil militants.

During a joint operation by the army and police commandos in the Eastern Trincomalee district, about 20 Tamils were killed and 85 surrendered to the authorities.

A nine members ENLF (Eelam National Liberation Front) team reached New Delhi from Madras for a meeting considered crucial with the Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, on the ethnic crisis in Sri Lanka.

The Indian High Commission in Sri Lanka, Mr. J.N. Dixit, called on the President Mr. J.R. Jayewardene and the National Security Minister, Mr. Lalith Athulathmaddali.

Sri Lanka refused to permit the International Road Cross or any other organisation into the country to monitor the ceasefire between the Government and the Tamil militants.

Tamil militants rejected Sri Lankan Government plan for setting up a ceasefire monitoring body.

The TULF and ENLF held the Government fully responsible for ceasefire violations and disappearance of about 400 Tamil youth in the Eastern Province following the door-to-door search by the armed forces.

Eighteen Tamils were killed and 87 mortar shells, five mortars, 500 detonators were recovered during a raid by the armed forces in Vivuniya district.

Mr. S. Mahendran, leader of the Eelam Revolutionary Organisation of Students (EROS) in eastern district was shot dead during a security operation.

The delegation consisting of the leaders of two militant Tamil groups ENLF and EPRLF, reached New Delhi from Madras to hold talks with the Indian Foreign Minister.

The Tamil militant groups, in a common stand, have insisted on “a fool-proof ceasefire monitoring machinery” as a precondition to any meaningful discussion on the ethnic problem of the country.
Chronology of Important Events

October 7 The Sri Lankan Government conceded some vital demands of the Tamil groups for evolving an effective ceasefire monitoring machinery in the troubled northern and eastern provinces of the Island.

9 The Indian High Commissioner in Colombo, Mr. J.N. Dixit, met the Sri Lankan National Security Minister and discussed with him the demands of the Tamil groups regarding consolidation of ceasefire agreement.

18 Mr. Rajiv Gandhi and President J. R. Jayewardene had a luncheon meeting at Nassau (Bahamas) during which they were understood to have exchanged views on the ethnic problem of Sri Lanka.

December 3 Hundreds of people rushed to hospital following a gas leak at a state-run fertilizer factory at Colombo.

30 President J. R. Jayewardene invited Indian Foreign Secretary to visit Colombo for indepth talks on the ethnic issue.
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Manuscript should be clearly typed on one side of the paper only, and should be double-spaced. Two copies should be submitted.

Bibliographies and footnotes should be placed at the end of the article. Footnotes should be numbered consecutively, and bibliographies should be arranged alphabetically. Foreign words should be underlined.

Bibliographical references should be complete in respect of the title of the book, the name of the author, the year and the place of publication.

Utmest care should be taken to prepare statistical data for publication. All headings, columns, rows, symbols, units of measurement, periods, political and geographical areas, and sources should be clearly stated in each statistical table, instead of giving such explanations in the text.

Tables, maps, and diagrams should be numbered and given at the end of the article, each on a separate sheet of paper. They should be clearly drawn so that they are suitable for photocopying as submitted.

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the Congress ceasing to exist as an independent body. No independent self-respecting political body could have accepted these terms.

The Muslims now quickly recognized the extent and depth of Hindu hostility, and each atrocity perpetrated by Congress administrations was recorded, verified and published. Reginald Coupland has admitted that there was some truth in these charges. Briefly, it was evident that "there was every sign that the new constitution signified a Hindu raj, pure and simple." Jinnah as chairman of the League’s Election Board had desired nevertheless to cooperate with the Congress provided there was a genuine coalition between independent parties, but this desire could never materialise.

It is common place to connect Congress rule with the emergence of the idea of Pakistan. L.S. Amery, a former Secretary of State for India, believed that it was the conduct of the Congress ministries that drove the Muslims towards separation. The Muslims learned that there was no effective protection against the coming of the raj in which they would be relegated to the unenviable position of a permanent minority. The Congress rejection of the idea of cooperative living with the Muslims was a fatal tactical mistake which wrecked the chances of any united India and practically ensured a partition of the Indian subcontinent on religious lines.

The Muslim League in 1937, when it contested the elections for provincial assemblies, had fared poorly. The League was still a middle class organization that had done little to mobilise mass support; but now the irritation and exploitation faced by the Muslims obtained as a result for the League an overwhelming support from the Muslim lower-middle and working classes. Jinnah reduced the annual membership fee and provided easy access to membership in the League.

Urged by Iqbal, Jinnah conducted a campaign, emphasising that Islam was in peril. At Lucknow he announced that, "on the very threshold of what little power and responsibility is given, the majority community have clearly shown their hand, that Hindustan is for the Hindus." At Karachi, he accused the average Congressman, "of behaving and acting towards the Mussalmans in a much worse
manner than the British did towards Indians." Jinnah pronounced at Patna that, "The Congress has now killed every hope of Hindu-Muslim settlement in the right royal fashion of Fascism."

Muslim reaction to the end of Congress rule indicated their feeling of extreme disquiet. The Muslims alleged that the Congress flag had been hoisted on government buildings, that Hindi was imposed and Urdu displaced, that Muslim children were compelled to sing Bande Mataram and worship Gandhi's portrait; and the indignation of the Muslims at their experience under Congress provincial governments made them reflect again on their future under an All-India federation; they feared that they would be always a minority under a Congress government; and they made up their mind to avoid that future.

When the Congress ministries resigned en bloc in October 1939, Jinnah called upon the people to observe a Deliverance Day on 22nd December to mark the end of oppression. This day was celebrated not only by Muslims but also by others who were displeased with the way in which the Congress had used power, and it demonstrated clearly the depth of communal feeling. It was conceded by even those who disapproved of it that it was a retort invited by the action of the Congress. The Muslim reaction to Congress obviously had generated the idea of Pakistan; this view seems credible enough.

The more the Congress insisted on a strong Centre hereafter and a Constituent Assembly, the more it roused Muslim apprehensions. In 1935—1937, Jinnah had opposed the 1935 Constitution because it had not conceded responsible government to the Centre. After the experience of provincial Congress rule, however, he revised his views. Provincial autonomy was a substantial concession towards responsible government, but he had seen how Congress utilized this power; and he believed that if similar responsibility was extended to the Centre, Congress rule over whole of India was unavoidable. A Congress dominated central government could nullify the autonomy of Muslim provinces and a very weak Centre at this juncture might have satisfied the Muslims, but the Congress was adamant on a strong federal government, and the Muslims therefore refused to have any Centre.
The Muslims wanted to have their own separate Centre: but this was partition: the Muslim reply to Hindu unitarianism: this was Pakistan: the Muslim response to Hindu hegemony.

Iqbal in 1930 had not argued for a Muslim State but only for a Muslim bloc in an Indian federation. His ideal was to unite the Muslim provinces in the North-West so as to bargain more advantageously with the projected Hindu Centre.

During 1932-33, Muslim students in England evolved another scheme. They formed the Pakistan National Movement led by Chaudhari Rahmat Ali, (1897—1951) a Punjabi at Cambridge, and issued its first pamphlet on ‘Pakistan’ in 1933—*Now or Never*. The essence of their plan was the formation of an independent Muslim state comprising the Punjab, the North-West Frontier Province, Kashmir, Sind and Baluchistan, independent of the rest of India, and to be allied with the Muslim states of the Middle East. The word ‘Pakistan’ coined by Rahmat Ali contained the initials of these component units. The idea was different from Iqbal’s Muslim federation within a larger Indian federation; it involved the creation of an entirely separate Muslim Indian federation. But the Muslim League disowned this concept and the idea made no progress until the Muslims had endured the crisis of Congress rule.

In 1938-39 three other schemes also had appeared, each designed in its own way to appease the demands of Muslim nationalism. None of these zonal, or regional zonal, or regional federation schemes favoured a complete separation between the Muslim and non-Muslim areas. Neither were they approved by the Muslim League nor did they fire the imagination of the Muslim masses.

Then the partition of India—clean and complete—was, however, officially adopted, for the first time in March 1940, when the Muslim League, fresh and free from Congress rule, at its annual session at Lahore passed the famous Lahore or Pakistan Resolution on 24 March. It was reiterated that the scheme of federation embodied in the 1935 Act was “totally unsuited to and unworkable in the peculiar conditions of this country and is altogether unacceptable to Muslim India.” The constitutional plan was to be reconsidered
de novo and it was declared that "no constitutional plan would be workable in this country or acceptable to the Muslims unless it is designed on the following basic principles" ... "that geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted, with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary, that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority, as in the North-Western and Eastern zones of India, should be grouped to constitute 'Independent States' in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign."

At least, the Muslims and Jinnah had taken the final plunge and committed themselves to complete separation. Muslim nationalism had reached full maturity and now demanded a territory of its own; and Pakistan was inevitable. No one contributed more than Jinnah to persuade the League to adopt the Pakistan resolution. He emphasised that the Hindus and Muslims had two different religious philosophies, social customs, literature; and that they neither intermarry nor interdine, and that they belonged to two different civilizations based on conflicting ideas and conceptions. Jinnah was certain that "in yoking together two such nations under a single state, one as a numerical minority and the other as a majority, would lead to growing discontent and final destruction of any fabric that would be built up for the government of such a state."

For at least fifteen years prior to the Lahore Resolution, the notion, however nebulous, of a separate Muslim bloc or alliance or federation had prevailed. From 1925 to 1939 a long line of British observers of Indian affairs had pointed to the coming of Pakistan; similarly Muslims too had envisaged, however vaguely, their own state before 1940.

Between 1937 and 1940, a remarkable transformation had occurred in Jinnah too. He reversed his life's labour for Hindu-Muslim unity; and for the first time, at sixty, he emerged a popular figure—Quaid-i-Azam or as The Great Leader. The influence of Iqbal on him was discernible. By 1940, to Jinnah, the skilful parliamentarian, Pakistan appeared to be essential, and he recalled later that "from 1925 onwards... many efforts were made for the adjustment of Hindu-
he had involved himself so much in politics that at a vast gathering of Muslims in Lahore he was the principal personality when the Muslims declared that they would sever themselves from the Hindus to form their own nation through the monumental Pakistan resolution. In the years in between, the political awakening of Jinnah, influenced by the liberalism of Gladstone, made him collaborate with moderates like Dadabhaji Naoroji and G. K. Gokhale. He was for long in the political arena an apostle of Hindu-Muslim unity; at times a lone voice crying in the wilderness, at times an ineffectual angel beating his luminous wings in the void.

It is therefore a challenging exercise to discover when Jinnah considered Pakistan inevitable and was convinced of the imperative need to create it. It is also fascinating to find out the reasons which impelled Jinnah to become the maker of Pakistan and discover the concept of nationalism behind Pakistan.

The idea of "two nations" in pre-partition India was neither sudden, nor was it unique to the Muslims or Hindus. Among the personalities, who subscribed to the emergence of Pakistan, Syed Ahmed Khan (1817—1898), occupies a foremost place. His service towards Muslim revivalism arose in 1875, which later flourished as Aligarh University. Syed Ahmed first foresaw partition realising that mutual absorption being impossible, Hindus must part. In 1883 speaking of "two nations," Muhammadan and Hindu, he believed that in undivided India, "To hope that both could remain equal is to desire the impossible and inconceivable." This idea assumed a concrete shape in the mind of Jinnah. Syed also believed that through education Muslims could find freedom, peace and reason; another idea that was to be uppermost in Jinnah's thinking.

As a member of the imperial Indian Governor General's Legislative Council (1878—1883) Syed Ahmed persuaded the Viceroy, Lord Ripon, to grant Muslims separate nomination to local self-government bodies. "So long as differences of race and creed, and distinctions of caste form an important element in the socio-political life of India,
Muslim differences’: ‘Everytime we were the petitioners, the supplicants standing at the doors of Mr. Gandhi and the Congress, with our proposals formulated’; and ‘For some reason or other the reply was always ‘No’. ’14 No wonder therefore that at Lahore in 1940, the Quaid-i-Azam had entertained no qualms whatever about the imperative need for Pakistan; he was certain of it.

Both in India and Britain, meanwhile, by 1939 public opinion was acquainted with the widening schism in the Indian body politic, and the Lahore Resolution of 1940 did not come as an unexpected shock. The Pakistan scheme proved the desperation and apprehension of Muslims at the prospect of Hindu domination; and the Muslim League had decided on a division as direct answer to the Congress policy persisting in a unitary nationalism and majority rule.

The assumptions on which the Muslims had accepted the 1935 Constitution were destroyed by the working of provincial autonomy in Hindu provinces, and the Hindu demand for a constituent assembly for formulating a constitution for all-India was the last straw. If the Hindus wanted a strong Centre and were not prepared to compromise, the Muslims wanted no Centre; and if the Hindus believed in majority rule, the Muslims denied that they were a minority. We are a nation apart and therefore entitled to rule ourselves, they asserted instead. To the objection that the creation of Pakistan would not solve the minority problem as a substantial Muslim population would still be in India, they replied that Pakistan would not only safeguard the Muslims left in India on the principle of mutual retaliation, but also provide self-respect to those within the boundaries of Pakistan.42

With the adoption of the Pakistan ideal by the Muslim League in 1940, Muslim nationalism came into its own. It took Muslims three-quarters of a century to decide what they wanted. They had tried a revolt in 1857, friendship with Britain, opposition to the Congress extremist agitation, cooperation with Congress, neutrality, negotiations, appeals and threats; but the march of history had made a nation out of a community. To the Congress claim that India was a national state, that it was neither plural, nor multi-national, the Muslims replied with the idea of a separate Muslim nationalism. It
was difficult for a minority to battle with a majority; democracy would ensure the victory of the larger group. But it was possible to elevate the conflict to the plane of nationalism. India, pronounced Jinnah, was not merely a national problem; it was an international problem and must be solved as such, he added.\textsuperscript{13}

The greatest victory of Muslim nationalism came in 1942 when the British War Cabinet accepted in principle the idea of Pakistan. The Draft Declaration, published in March 1942, provided for a province to opt out of the proposed Indian Union with the right of forming its own independent government. This 'non-accession clause' was a major concession to the Muslim demand for Pakistan. Within two years of the Lahore Resolution, the British Government had officially and publicly accepted the spirit of Muslim nationalism and agreed to its political manifestation, Pakistan; and this did not satisfy Jinnah at that time for it fell short of Pakistan itself.\textsuperscript{14}

Pakistan was now within the realm of possibility, and it was no longer the dream of one stubborn leader, Jinnah, but the declared goal of Muslim India. The Muslims began to strengthen themselves. The Muslim League’s organization under Jinnah was improved, its publicity streamlined, its discipline tightened and its message spread over India. Gradually it built up power, prestige and popularity. Jinnah was no longer a Muslim leader: he was now the leader, the symbol of Muslim nationalism.

As the League grew in stature, Jinnah gained in authority. His name was now bracketed with Gandhi even by the Hindus. The Viceroy, conscious of Jinnah’s strength and his following, now consulted him in all important matters. No longer was Gandhi the sole spokesman for India, and no longer was Congress the sole repository of patriotism and nationalism. In practical terms, though without confessing it, everyone now knew that within the bosom of India pulsated two nationalisms—one Muslim, the other Hindu.

Finally the basis of the nationalism on which Pakistan was considered inevitable may be briefly discussed. The words ‘nation,’ ‘nationality’ and ‘nationalism’ are an explosive and polemical set of words in political parlance.\textsuperscript{42} Even the concept contained in these
words eludes one, but the concept itself is not inert. When nationalism is on the rampage no semantic defences provide security. People make their own definitions and die for them.

There is, however, substantial agreement on "nationalism" as a sentiment, a consciousness, a sympathy, which binds a people together. It is the desire of a group of individuals, who are already united by certain ties, to live together and if necessary to die together, as the Muslims in India did before 1947. It is the wish of a people who feel that they are one to go on living as one. This argument is strengthened if nationalism, like so many other human experiences, is presented as a state of mind which is neither rigorously nor reasonably definable. We know that we are a nation; and therefore we are a nation: this was how the Muslims described themselves in India before Pakistan.

The articles of this strange faith which has made and remade modern history, drawn lines across maps upon its own responsibility, killed many in national wars, and also made many free, have to be discovered. Pre-eminent is the common group feeling, as was evident among the Muslims, which inspires the members of a nation. The feeling that we all belong to one nation expresses this sentiment. The second, a sequel to the first, is the love of fellow nationals. The third, a consequence of the first two, is common hostility to other groups. Before 1947 the Muslims in India considered themselves a nation and looked with fear and hostility upon Hindus and Sikhs. This feeling is inevitable in a geographical area occupied by more than one nation, particularly if one national group feels its existence is denied, opposed, threatened or even criticized by the other as in pre-1947 imperial India, when the Congress ignored or mocked the two-nation theory.

The fourth article is a common territory possessed or coveted by a nation. Once the emotion of nationalism has been aroused, territory is an indispensable step towards establishing a state. In India, the Muslims claimed the Muslim-majority provinces as their homeland. Another, is the existence of a common sovereign government or the desire for it. The Muslims wanted autonomy in Muslim majority areas: this is the next move after a territory has been
mentally demarcated and a claim to it is stated. Sovereignty or political independence is the final or ultimate goal of nationalist movements as it was with the Muslims in pre-partitioned India.

The existence of common moral, social or economic institutions or ideas is also essential for a nation. Next is the possession of some common cultural characteristics, such as the Urdu language among Muslims and similar customs, manners, literature, art, music and folklore. If someone shares these with others and wants to continue sharing them, he is a member of that nation. Culture furnishes a lasting foundation to nationalism while religion is also salient.

Belief in Islam made a Muslim: religion gave him his individuality, his distinguishing mark, his singularity. The Indian Muslim was not prepared to lose his individuality. In the secularism of present times religion seems to have lost much force; yet it produced a controversial nation-state in the post-war period—Pakistan. Jinnah made it plain that he was a Muslim leading Muslims and Islam was the basis of his nationalism. Pakistan is a country created to embody belief or doctrine or theory: it owes its existence to an ideology.

Common history or common origin is vital too. Whether the history is real or invented is pointless as long as the members of a nation believe in it and revere common historical figures as national heroes. A common character shared by the national group is also a determining force. Thus, geography, history, religion and culture combine to mould the contours of national character; and to a great extent these factors moulded Muslim nationalism and made Pakistan.

Common pride in national achievements and a common sorrow in national tragedies contribute additionally to make nationalism. Simple devotion to the nation is no less important. "My country, right or wrong" is one extreme expression of this feeling; and finally the hope that the nation will one day be great or, if it is already so, the greatest also builds up nationalism: this feeling and hope lay in the thoughts of the maker of Pakistan—Jinnah.

These conditions enumerated above their order reflect the nature and composition of nationalism. The feeling of oneness, love for
fellow nationals, and hostility to other groups make up the emotional basis of nationalism. Territory, sovereignty, and social ideas form the political and social apparatus of nationalism. Beliefs, culture, religion, history and character constitute the spiritual equipment of nationalism. Pride in historical achievements relates to the past, devotion to the national cause concerns the present, the wish to achieve greatness is a hope of the future; but together they portray the sentiment of nationalism on three time-levels. Muslims were conscious of their being a nation when they came to know what their interests were and what was conducive to their safety, freedom, and prestige, and when they came to have ideas to achieve what they desired to achieve.

The idea of a Muslim nationality in pre-independence, India started with a small nucleus. Its influence spread till it reached millions. The idea originated with a few learned leaders—Syed Ahmed, Ameer Ali, Iqbal and a few others. Gradually, however, the different strands of Muslim life and culture were synthesized and the image of a Muslim India arose which was simultaneously the cause and effect of a coherent intellectual life. The ideals of a culturally united community and a socially consistent society were accepted by the Muslim masses and they were also persuaded that they shared the same historical background. Thus were laid the foundations of a separate nationalism in pre-partition India. This separate nationalism received an impetus from Hindu opposition and throve on opposition. The higher the tempo of Hindu criticism the greater became the determination of the Muslims to reach their goal: Muslim enthusiasm for Pakistan was in direct proportion to Hindu condemnation of it.

The encounter between Hindu and Muslim cultures, that began over a thousand years ago, had profoundly influenced both Hindu and Muslim nationalism. Yet they had remained distinct with an emphasis on their separateness. They mixed but never fused; they coexisted but never became one. Eventually, the Muslims and Hindus separated under Jinnah who had believed that the other party would compromise on his terms; but as the latter had taken up the attitude of all or nothing, Jinnah was inexorably, inevitably and implacably driven to the bitter end of a victory in establishing Pakistan.
A few years before Nehru had written: "The Muslim nation in India—a nation within a nation, and not even compact, but vague, spread out, indeterminate. Politically the idea is absurd. Economically it is fantastic; it is hardly worth considering. . . . This idea of a Muslim nation is the figment of a few imaginations only, and but for the publicity given it by the Press few people would have heard of it. And even if many people believed in it, it would still vanish at the touch of reality."46

On the other hand, Lala Lajpat Rai, a founder of the Hindu Mahasabha had suggested the partition of India between Hindus and Muslims as early as 1924. Sarvakar, a President of the Mahasabha, had spoken of the Hindus and Muslims as two nations. Iqbal had suggested to the Muslim League a Muslim state in 1930, and Rehmat Ali invented the name Pakistan in 1933.47 But it was left to Jinnah to assert that no power on earth could prevent Pakistan.

Muslims became under the leadership of Mohammad Ali Jinnah a nation, organised, unified, conscious of their political and cultural heritage and future aspirations, and determined to pursue their chosen path to their destined goal, irrespective of all obstacles and all opposition.

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The Governor Generalship Issue and the Quaid-i-Azam Mountbatten’s Version and the Real Story

M. RAFIQUE AFZAL

In historical literature, no study can be objective if it is based solely on partisan sources. In the case of an event or a personality where only partisan sources are available, the job of a historian becomes really difficult. He has to approach the sources with extreme caution, and since he cannot countercheck the authenticity of his facts with sources giving the other side of the story, he must subject these sources to severe internal criticism. This has not happened in the case of many aspects of the Movement for Pakistan. A glaring example is the issue of the appointment of Pakistan’s first Governor-General. British as well as Pakistani scholars, in their writings on this issue, have used primarily Mountbatten’s version, which is reflected in his private papers and the British Government Records based on Mountbatten’s reports to the Home Government as the last Viceroy of undivided India. It is now common knowledge that Mountbatten did not act as ‘a high-level umpire’ in the process of the transfer of power and those who had doubts about his partiality have only to go through the relevant volumes of the officially-sponsored carefully-selected British Government Records about the Transfer of Power. Even otherwise, no one would miss to notice that Mountbatten, acutely conscious of his place in history, was always enthusiastic in his lifetime to encourage, assist and commission writings on himself, especially his ‘historic’ role during the last days of the British raj in South Asia. Did he mispresent or

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and influence her inhabitants in matters connected with the administration and welfare of the country... the system of election pure and simple, cannot be safely adopted," and "the large community would totally override the interests of the smaller community...," feared Syed Ahmed.* These ideas and apprehensions lasted throughout the course of Hindu-Muslim relations as enduring factors in Muslim political thought.

No less was Syed Ahmed’s contribution to later development through Aligarh. The products of Aligarh symbolized a desire for social reform with a staunch loyalty to religion which were carried by them throughout Muslim India. Syed Ahmed also founded the Muslim Educational Conference which in Muslim India preceded the Muslim League. It was the first and then the only forum for Muslims in India. Syed Ahmed’s sagacity saw that a strong cultural base needed to be built before an enduring political fabric could be erected. The Aligarh Movement was partly educational, partly literary, partly religious, and wholly cultural. Political unity is but a delusive hope without prior cultural homogeneity. Syed Ahmed’s contributions towards building a base on which the Muslim League was founded cannot be exaggerated. Moreover, the Aligarh Movement not only produced public men who later took to politics, but also inculcated discipline among the masses. Aligarh subscribed to the role played by educational nationalism among Muslims as much as the Hindu University at Benares contributed towards educational nationalism among the Hindus.

Ameer Ali (1849—1928) was yet another leader who created among Muslims a consciousness of the progressive nature of their religion and a sense of pride in Islam’s historical achievements, which became powerful emotional factors in rallying the Muslims towards the movement for Pakistan. His biography of the Holy Prophet wielded influence on the new generation of Indian Muslims, while advocacy of such matters as female emancipation and reform of Muhammadan personal law affected the community’s thinking. He participated little in politics, but intervened on one important occasion. In the constitutional reforms of 1909 a deputation headed by him induced a
suppress the facts to get the right place in history? No writer has raised doubts in this regard, although in quite a few cases, the correspondence in the relevant volumes on the Transfer of Power does not tally with the Reports that he left for the future historian in his private papers. All the British writers, including H. V. Hodson and Larry Collins/Dominique Lapierre, accept Mountbatten's version uncritically as the last word. In fact, most of them exert to extol Mountbatten's role in the transfer of power and exonerate him of any blame or mistake in the whole process of partition. They would have us believe that he was infallible. This is quite understandable. For them, Mountbatten, a close kin of the royalty, was not only a 'hero' of the second World War but also one who manoeuvred to keep the successor states of the British Empire in South Asia within the British Commonwealth. Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, according to them, was motivated solely by ego in becoming the first Governor-General of Pakistan which, they maintain, harmed the interests of the new state; and they seem to relish citing Mountbatten's abusive language against the founding-father of Pakistan, used by the former to express his own frustrations.

Pakistani scholars also base their studies of this issue on Mountbatten's version and the account of Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, a civil servant who participated in the partition process, but based his otherwise well-argued work mainly on secondary sources. They more or less accept Mountbatten's version but contest the conclusions drawn from it that Jinnah was motivated by ego and that his assumption of the office of Governor-General harmed Pakistan's interests during the partition of the Punjab and Bengal and the division of assets. A recent work by a young Pakistani scholar, Dr. Ayesha Jalal, is of a different category. Ayesha Jalal, in the last chapter of her Ph. D. dissertation, and in a lengthy article in the Modern Asian Studies, has dealt with the issue of Pakistan's first Governor-General. Jinnah could not get a more casual and hostile treatment from any biased Indian or a British writer than what he gets from her pen. The unusual reception of her works has not been for their scholarly merit but due to the novel interpretations
she gives about Jinnah and the All-India Muslim League case for Pakistan. Since Ayesha Jalal is a Pakistani and claims to have used all the relevant primary sources, including the All-India Muslim League Papers and the Quaid-i-Azam Papers, her work is likely to be taken as the most authoritative work and representative of the Pakistani scholarship. But unfortunately she has not used properly and fully her sources as she gives the impression to have done. As for the Governor-Generalship issue, the relevant documents in the Quaid-i-Azam Papers after June 3, 1947, are not yet declassified, and are not available to scholars. She also ignores to point out that some important documents of crucial meetings relating to the Governor-Generalship issue could not be traced in the Mountbatten Papers even by the editors of the twelve volumes on the Transfer of Power.3

Therefore, hardly any trained historian would agree with her sensational and wild assumptions in The Sole Spokesman, including the basic one that the Pakistan Demand was not a spontaneous and genuine demand of the South Asian Muslims but merely a bargaining counter. Such assumptions are not only uncharitable to the Quaid-i-Azam and an insult to the Muslims’ urge for a separate homeland but also are incorrect historically as well as inconsistent with her main line of argument. The same is the case with her account of the Governor-Generalship issue. She analyses this issue on a totally erroneous premise, i.e., Jinnah did not have a “real strong political party organization,” therefore, he wanted to have a strong central government “to discipline the particularism of the Muslim-majority provinces” and his “notoriously wayward followers.”6 Such assumptions and conclusions are totally baseless and designed to belittle Quaid’s image and his statesmanship, by underscoring and even ignoring facts and the hostile situation in which he had to function, especially during the viceroyalty of Lord Mountbatten. One fails to understand why this sheer travesty of history is perpetuated. Jinnah achieved, what he did, with the support of his devoted followers and a disciplined political party, the All-India Muslim League, which commanded the allegiance of the Muslim
Congress had close alliance with the local Muslim leadership. How Mountbatten tried to achieve these objectives is a different story, not directly relevant to the present study? However, he did rather innocently, without disclosing his real motives, try to persuade Jinnah and the All-India Muslim League leadership to give up the Northwest Frontier Province because of its being a deficit province, costing the Centre Rs. 3.50 crores annually, and later, after his visit to the NWFP, advised the Congress leadership not to contest fresh elections there while he was writing to Jinnah that elections “would not be acceptable to Nehru.” In the case of Baluchistan also, which came within “the outer line of India,” Mountbatten turned down Jinnah’s three proposals for a more representative vote and then excluded the Sardars of the Qalat State from the Shahi Jirga in the vote for Pakistan which created a difficult situation for the Government of Pakistan after Independence. Jinnah had to devise his strategy within the limitations of these behind the scene machinations about which he was not aware at the time.

The ‘Pakistan’ in the ‘Dickie Bird Plan,’ the plan for the partition of the subcontinent Mountbatten sent to London through his Chief of Staff, Lord Ismay, on May 2, was in accord with Mountbatten-Congress understanding; with even an option for undivided Bengal to stay Independent. Dissatisfied even with this Plan and without waiting for a response from the Home Government on it, on May 8, Mountbatten endorsed a Nehru-Patel Plan for a transfer of power by June 1947, to the existing central government, leaving the whole question of Pakistan until later, in return for a Congress promise to keep undivided subcontinent in the British Commonwealth and even to accept Dominion status! Mountbatten also asked for an ‘authority’ from the Home Government “to warn” Jinnah if he refused to cooperate with this Plan. However, the British Cabinet, in a meeting on May 15, dismissed this Plan because of its unfeasibility as well as its conflict with ‘the pledges’ that the British Government had given “to Parliament about safeguarding minorities.” Even after this rejection, Mountbatten did not hesitate to use threats implicit in this Plan in his subsequent talks with
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Jinnah. Meanwhile, when the India Committee in London considered the ‘Dickie Bird Plan,’ it amended the Plan “out of recognition.” The Committee rightly felt that consistency demanded that the option of Independence provided for Bengal should be extended to all the provinces otherwise the Plan would not be “defensible in Parliament.” In the presence of the May 8 Nehru-Patel Plan for the transfer of power and the subsequent developments, it is hard to believe Mountbatten’s ‘hunch’ theory, in justification of his, to say the least, unfair act of showing the revised Plan received from London on May 10, only to Nehru. Mountbatten’s invitation to Nehru for a stay in Simla was a deliberate well-thought-out act. He wanted to get Nehru’s approval to the Plan before he placed it before the Conference of political leaders which he had called on May 17. The presence of V. P. Menon, the Reforms Commissioner, and Krishna Menon in Simla was also not accidental; it was preplanned. But events took an unexpected turn. When Nehru studied the revised Plan, along with V. P. Menon’s advice, he realised its deeper implications. His reaction was quite natural; in his view, it was a plan for the “complete Balkanisation of India,” worse for the Congress than the Pakistan Demand of the All-India Muslim League. He, therefore, rejected it outrightly. For Mountbatten, this rejection came as a ‘bombshell,’ and he got really panicky. All his schemes of implementing his mandate with the cooperation of the Congress seemed to be crumbling. The scheduled meeting of the political leaders had to be postponed to June 2. Henceforth, in the pursuit of an acceptable plan, he was more dependent on the Congress leadership than before.

Under the new arrangement, Mountbatten asked V. P. Menon to redraft the Plan in consultation with Nehru, and the new Plan, to which Sardar Patel’s approval was obtained from New Delhi ‘on the telephone,’ was communicated to London for approval. The Congress acceptance of the revised Plan was subject to the condition that power would be transferred within two months. The Government in London, confused by this turn of events, asked Mountbatten to come to London to explain personally the new Plan; a telegram
from the Prime Minister to this effect was received in New Delhi on June 15.

Jinnah and the Muslim League leadership were completely unaware of the Mountbatten-Congress negotiations. They had nothing to suspect that any foul play was going on. Liaquat Ali Khan thought that "the reason for the postponement" of the meeting of the leaders was merely to enable Mountbatten to go to London, while Mountbatten himself informed Jinnah on May 11, that the postponement was due to the parliamentary recess in London from May 23 to June 2. On his part, Mountbatten now did not want to face another "bombshell" from Jinnah, after the Plan had been approved from London. Therefore, on May 15, he had a meeting with Jinnah; interestingly the minutes of this important meeting could not be traced in the Mountbatten Papers. What was actually discussed we do not know. But it was at this meeting, as reported by Mountbatten at his Staff Meeting the following day, that the issue of a common Governor-General was raised for the first time. It was included in the 'Heads of Agreement,' drafted by V. P. Menon and signed by Nehru on behalf of the Congress; point 6 read: "The Governor-General should be common to both the states. We suggest that the present Governor-General should be reappointed."

The Heads of Agreement also stipulated the possibility of one central authority and immediate demission of authority to it for the interim period. Mountbatten wanted Jinnah's signatures on this document. Jinnah's actual response is yet not known but he refused to sign the document and took 'very calmly' Mountbatten's threats about the immediate demission of authority to the Interim Government on a Dominion status basis.

Mountbatten had another meeting with Jinnah on May 17, a day before his departure for London. He did not write an account of this meeting himself, as was his normal practice, but recorded his impressions of it, about six weeks later, in his 'Personal Report' to the Prime Minister on July 4. The writers have partly based their accounts of the Governor-Generalship issue on this Report. Mountbatten wrote; "Jinnah had consistently impressed on me the
absolute need for me to remain until the process of partition was completed. I managed (not without difficulty) to persuade Congress to agree that I must also be allowed to accept a similar offer from Pakistan . . . . Before I went to London Jinnah said that although I thought two Governor-Generals would be better than one, he asked me specifically to stay on as a super-Governor-General over the other two. From that day to this he has repeatedly impressed upon myself and my staff the need for us all to stay.”

This is an absolutely distorted version of what actually went on in this meeting or after it. Mountbatten’s impressions are not corroborated even by the “Record of Interview” made the same day by the Conference Secretary, V. P. Erskine Crum. He recorded: “The question which now required clarification was whether Mr. Jinnah would prefer Pakistan to have its own Governor-General or to share common Governor-General with Hindustan. . . . Mr. Jinnah said that he could not commit himself on this subject straight away; but he had been giving some thought to it and he felt that it would be better to have two Governors-General. Also there should, in his opinion, be a Representative of the Crown to be responsible for the division of assets as between two states.”

Jinnah wanted Mountbatten to fill this post but the latter declined the offer because such an ‘Arbitrator’ would be junior in rank to the two Governors-General. However, after further discussion, Mountbatten suggested that Jinnah should send him “a letter the following Monday (19th May) giving a full description of his suggestion of a supreme arbitrator and two Governors-General.” The Viceroy wanted Jinnah to write in this letter that if his scheme was found impractical, he would accept, as a less desirable alternative, a common Governor-General for the two states. Jinnah at first “expressed himself violently opposed to this suggestion” but eventually, agreed to “think it over.”

Even this account by the Conference Secretary gives only a part of the truth. The actual story is, however, different. It was a case of deception and double-dealing, pure and simple. After Jinnah’s refusal to sign the “Heads of Agreement,” V. P. Menon, on Mountbatten’s instructions, drafted six-point “Proposals for Transfer
of Power during the Interim Period," which still envisaged the possibility of one central government, transferring power in that case to the existing Constituent Assembly on a Dominion Status basis and turning the Interim Government immediately into a Dominion Government. Point 4 provided for a common Governor-General for both the States. Nehru was provided with a copy of these proposals for comments and approval. In a detailed letter to Mountbatten on May 17, commenting on the clause relating to the common Governor-General, he wrote on behalf of the Congress: "We agree to the proposal that during this interim period the Governor-General should be common to both the states, if there are to be two states. For our part we shall be happy if you could continue in this office and help us with your advice and experience." Jinnah was not provided with a copy of the six-point Proposals. Instead, he was told verbally by Mountbatten in his meeting on May 17, that Nehru, representing the Congress, had agreed to the Proposals for the transfer of power, including sharing of a common Governor-General. Mountbatten, who had to leave for London on the following day, insisted on having a signed letter from Jinnah signifying his agreement to the Proposals, which the latter had not seen. Jinnah was the last man to be led into a blind alley in such a way. He insisted on seeing the 'Proposals' and Nehru's letter about them, before he committed himself to anything in writing. In the end, Mountbatten saw the genuineness of Jinnah's demand. It was agreed that Sir Eric Meiville would provide Jinnah with a copy of the Proposals for Transfer of Power along with Nehru's letter and Jinnah would then write a letter required by Mountbatten for use in London.

Mountbatten and his staff were faced with a great predicament. They did not want to show Jinnah the six-point Proposals because its contents conflicted with what they had been telling the Muslim leader personally. Therefore, they drafted hurriedly the same day, i.e., May 17, two new three-point alternative proposals with a changed heading "Proposals for Transfer of Power during the Interim Period on the basis of Two Independent States" and sent
them to Jinnah and not Nehru’s letter. Point 2 in the Alternative ‘A’ Proposals provided for a common Governor-General and that in ‘B’ called for separate Governor-General for each state. The other two points in both the Proposals were the same. When Jinnah received just the two three-point Alternative Proposals, he wrote back to Meiville on May 18, that “as arranged with the Viceroy yesterday, I have not received the copy of the letter of Mr. Nehru, which was to be sent to me this morning . . . until I get a copy of that letter, as I pointed out to the Viceroy and yourself, I will not be able to make my comments on these proposals.”

Meiville was reluctant to provide him with a copy of Nehru’s letter for obvious reasons. It was after a reminder from Jinnah that only extracts from Nehru’s letter, containing comments on the six-point Proposals, were sent to him. Jinnah could not be deceived now, if there were ever chances earlier. He dictated a note for communication to Mountbatten in London in which he wrote that “it is difficult for me to gather from these extracts what is the exact attitude of the Congress, as I find them rather confusing. The drafts A and B consist only of 3 paragraphs, whereas Pandit Nehru’s letter refers to paragraph 5, which does not exist in the draft furnished to me. It shows that Pandit Nehru’s comments refer to some other draft and not to the draft on which my views are sought.” In view of this contradiction, Jinnah, expressing inability to give his comments or opinion, wrote in the end that the subject matter of these drafts could be taken up after June 2, in the light of the announcement of the British Government. Meanwhile, on May 19, Nehru’s comments had been obtained on Alternative A and B in which the Congress leader again made references to the six-point Proposals. On May 20, Meiville supplied Jinnah with Nehru’s letters of May 17 and 19, but still not the text of the six-point Proposals. Jinnah could not change his position on the basis of these letters and the matter stood at that.

The announcement of the June 3 Plan, incorporating the principles of partition of the subcontinent into India and Pakistan, should have settled the issue of Governors-General of the two states.
The parties which were to assume power in the two successor states should have been approached directly without any reservation, but this did not happen. On the one hand, Mountbatten, in his talks with Jinnah on June 2, and at his press conference on June 4, held that the Governors-General would be appointed “on the recommendations of the two Governments,” advising Jinnah about the wisdom of avoiding “any party commitment on the subject for, say, two months.” On the other hand, he was pursuing this issue, without Jinnah’s knowledge, trying for a provision in the draft Independence Bill “for the two Dominions to have the same man as the Governor-General,” simultaneously asking his staff that it would be ‘quite fatal’ if Jinnah came to know of it. As far as Jinnah is concerned, nobody raised the issue of Governor-General’s appointment with him till June 23.

Meanwhile, the draft Bill did include, as Mountbatten desired, a clause about the possibility of a common Governor-General for the two successor states, but, to his embarrassment, the Secretary of State also wrote that for keeping this clause in the Bill, letters requesting the same person as the Governor-General would be needed from the Congress as well as the Muslim League for presentation to British Parliament along with the Bill. Jinnah again could not be bypassed. Mountbatten now proceeded with caution, desiring a “spontaneous invitation” from Jinnah rather than an “immediate decision.” A strategy, devised earlier in the first week of June but abandoned at the time, was taken up. Two members of the Viceroy’s staff, Ismay and Meiville, were to see Liaquat in order to ask him to convince Jinnah about the usefulness of a common Governor-General. We do not know the details of their first meeting with Liaquat since its minutes could not be traced in the Mountbatten Papers but when they met him again on June 20, the latter told them that he had not yet had “an opportunity of talking it over with Jinnah.” He promised to raise the issue with the Quaid as soon as possible. Why Mountbatten was so desperate to become the common Governor-General is anybody’s guess. But one explanation is the Mountbatten-Congress understanding to keep the
reluctant Secretary of State, Lord Morley, to grant Muslims separate electorates. In Britain the Agha Khan (1877-1957) and Ameer Ali did yeoman service to the Muslim cause. It was mostly owing to their efforts that the partition of Bengal was allowed to stand and the Muslim plea for separate representation was answered by the Morley-Minto reforms.8 The Agha Khan, Ameer Ali and others often referred to their community as ‘nation’ or ‘a nationality’.

Muhammad Iqbal (1877—1938) was Pakistan’s great poet. He favoured communal electorates and separate communal representation in the public services. In December 1930 Iqbal delivered the presidential address at the Muslim League’s annual sessions held at Allahabad. He stated that the principle of European democracy could not be applied to India. Communalism was indispensible to the formation of a harmonious whole in a country like India. The Muslims were the only people in India who could fitly be described as a nation in the modern sense, he added; and then came his famous utterance: “I would like to see the Punjab, the North-West Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single state. Self-Government within the British Empire, or without the British Empire, the formation of a consolidated North-West Indian Muslim state appears to me to be the final destiny of the Muslims at least of North-West India.”9 Iqbal thus broadcast the germs that could grow later into the idea of a Muslim bloc.

Among the literary figures of Muslim India, who provided a impetus to national consciousness, Iqbal ranks high. He sang of the storied past; he turned a minority, already self-conscious of its destiny, into a solid group, declaring that the life of Islam as a cultural force in India very largely depended on its centralization in a specified territory. The Muslim demand was actuated by a genuine desire for free development which was practically impossible under the type of unitary government, then being contemplated by the nationalist Hindu politicians, with a view to securing permanent communal domination in the whole India, asserted Iqbal. He added that the principle that each group was entitled to free development on its own lines was not inspired by any feeling of narrow communalism.10
unity of the Armed Forces intact, even if the subcontinent was divided into Pakistan and Hindustan. Although Jinnah and Liaquat had been pressing the Viceroy for a division of the Armed Forces before the transfer of power since March 1947, he had not taken any step so far in this direction. But on June 20, Liaquat also gave a warning to Ismay and Meiville that the League leadership had resolved not "to take over the reins of government [on August 14], unless they had an army on the spot and under their control." 27

Mountbatten, now impatient to wait for an indirect answer, himself raised the issue with Jinnah on June 23. He asked the Muslim League chief, whom he wished to have as the first Governor-General of Pakistan, and stressed the advantages of a common Governor-General for both the successor states during the initial period; although he made it "abundantly clear that he was not asking for the appointment himself," which was not a correct statement. He explained that he was keen to have the name because it affected a clause in the Bill that was shortly to be laid before Parliament. When the Viceroy informed Jinnah that he would be shown the Bill, the Muslim League leader immediately responded that he would give the name after he had seen the Bill. About the criterion of selecting the Governor-General, he told the Viceroy that "the rule of his [Jinnah's] life was that he must always consider the interests of his people. At various times of his career he had to pass over those nearest and dearest to him." 28 Jinnah's response must have made Mountbatten uneasy because just two days after this meeting he sent a telegram to the Secretary of State, seeking an amendment in the relevant proviso to the effect that "provided it shall be lawful for one person to hold both appointments of Governor-General for such period as may be determined by either Dominion after the 15th August." But he did not get an encouraging response from the Secretary of State. Everything now depended on the overt consent of the All-India Muslim League.

The Bill was shown to the political leaders on June 30. After a full evaluation of the pros and cons of the issue, the All-India Muslim League decided to have Jinnah as Pakistan's first
Governor-General. It was Liaquat, and not Jinnah, who in a letter to Mountbatten on July 4, communicated the decision to this effect: "I am authorised to inform you that the All-India Muslim League, the successor authority, tender advice to His Majesty the King to accept the name of Mr. M. A. Jinnah as the Governor-General of Pakistan." Mountbatten, thus outmanoeuvred by Jinnah, expressed his frustration and anger in his subsequent reports and communications to London, pouring his venom against the founder of Pakistan in the most abusive language. Unfortunately, it is primarily on this source-material that the writers—British, Indian and Pakistani—have so far based their accounts of the Governor-Generalship issue.

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10. Ibid., p. 535, n. 3.
15. Record of Interview between Mountbatten and Jinnah, May 17, 1947, ibid., pp. 872-73.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
22. Quaid-i-Azam Papers, File No. 21, pp. 61-62.
24. Jinnah to Mieville, May 21, 1947, ibid., p. 82.
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Recent Demographic Trends in India

K. BALASUBRAMANIAN

INTRODUCTION

India, with an estimated population of about 740 million in mid-1985, is the second most populous country in the world. Its population exceeds 15 per cent of the world's total, but this 15 per cent lives on less than 2.5 per cent of the world's total land area. Average levels of income place the country among the poorest. According to World Bank estimates, the GNP per capita of the country was US $ 260 in 1982 (World Bank, 1984).

The total population of India has virtually doubled since independence. The net addition to the country's population has been continuously increasing from time to time. During the last three decades alone the net addition to India's population was of the order of 320 million which is more than the entire population of North America. It is often said that the country adds roughly the total population of Australia every year. These facts, however, conceal the changes in the demographic characteristics that have occurred in recent years. A study of the trends in demographic parameters for India and its major states would reveal the dynamics of population growth. As discussed later, available empirical evidence strongly suggests that some important demographic characteristics of India's population are changing and they are changing somewhat rapidly in certain parts of the country. Using the Census and Sample Registration System (SRS)\textsuperscript{1} data, this paper examines the recent trends in some important demographic variables for India and its major states.\textsuperscript{2}

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TRENDS IN GROWTH RATE

The recent census of 1981 placed the total population of India at 685 million as on March 1, 1981. The net addition to India's population in the ten year period, 1971-81 was 137 million as compared to a net addition 109 million in the previous decade. The average annual exponential rate of growth of population during 1971-81 decade was 2.25 per cent as compared to 2.20 per cent recorded during the previous decade. Thus the growth rate over the last two decades has virtually remained constant. However, it is important to note that the steady acceleration of the rate of population growth shown by successive enumerations from 1921 up to the 1971 census has apparently been halted. The levelling-off of the rate of population growth during 1971-81 is an indication of the beginning of the secular downward trend in the growth rate of population (Table 1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Census Year</th>
<th>Population (Million)</th>
<th>Decadal Change in Population</th>
<th>Average annual exponential growth rate (Percentage)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>238.4</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>252.1</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>5.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>251.3</td>
<td>-0.8</td>
<td>-0.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>279.0</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>11.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>318.7</td>
<td>39.7</td>
<td>14.22</td>
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<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>361.1</td>
<td>42.4</td>
<td>13.31</td>
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<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>439.2</td>
<td>78.1</td>
<td>21.63</td>
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<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>548.2</td>
<td>109.0</td>
<td>24.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981*</td>
<td>685.2</td>
<td>137.0</td>
<td>24.99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) The 1981 Census total population of India includes projected population of Assam where the census could not be conducted owing to disturbed conditions prevailing in that state then.

The apparent failure of India’s rate of population growth to decline in the decade 1971-81 has created concern among planners and family planning administrators. Questions about the effectiveness of the family planning programme were asked. The failure of the growth rate to decline does not necessarily mean that fertility and mortality rates have not changed. And, the changes in fertility and mortality need not necessarily alter the growth rate. It is therefore necessary to study the trends in fertility and mortality in order to assess the fertility impact of the family planning programme and mortality impact of public health programmes. Moreover, because of the heterogeneous nature of India’s population, it is also necessary to undertake state level analysis for two main reasons. *First*, the all-India picture is likely to mask the incipient changes taking place in certain states of India. *Second*, since some of its individual states could as well be considered as separate countries in terms of sheer size of population, demographic studies at the state level are warranted.

**REGIONAL DIFFERENTIALS IN GROWTH**

Although the growth rate for the country over the last two decades has virtually remained constant, considerable variation in growth rate exists among the states of India (Table 2). The states of Kerala, Orissa and Tamil Nadu have shown significant reductions in their growth rate between 1961-71 and 1971-81. The most pronounced decline—a 0.54 percentage-point drop in the average annual growth rate—was recorded in the state of Kerala. The other two states, Orissa and Tamil Nadu, have registered the same amount of decline of 0.37 percentage-point decline in the growth rate between 1961-71 and 1971-81. In contrast, five of the largest states, namely Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Karnataka, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh with a combined population of 305 million, show increases in their growth rate. Most notable among these is India’s most populous state, Uttar Pradesh, where the growth rate accelerated from 1.8 per cent per annum in 1961-71 to 2.3 per cent per annum in 1971-81 (Table 2). The states of Gujarat, Haryana, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra and
### TABLE 2
Population in 1981 and Trends in Population Growth for Major States of India

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States</th>
<th>Population in 1981 (Thousands)</th>
<th>Av. annual exponential growth rate during:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1951-61 (Percentage)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andhra Pradesh</td>
<td>53,550</td>
<td>1.45</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bihar</td>
<td>69,915</td>
<td>1.80</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jammu and Kashmir</td>
<td>5,987</td>
<td>0.90</td>
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West Bengal have recorded slight declines in their growth rate during this period. On the whole, the growth rate of population during 1971-81 had shown a decline in 8 of the 15 major states accounting for about a half of India’s population in 1981. The apparent increase in the growth rate in Punjab, which is one of the most developed states of India and where the family planning programme has achieved some degree of success, needs further examination. Since the volume of inter-state migration is negligible in most of the states of India, trends in population growth rates are mainly explained by trends in birth and death rates.
MORTALITY: STEADY IMPROVEMENT

Mortality, an important component of population growth has undergone a dramatic fall during the last three quarters of this century. The crude death rate (CDR) had declined from a level of about 45 per 1000 population at the beginning of this century to a level of around 15 in mid-seventies. During this period the longevity or the expectation of life at birth had increased from a level of around twenty-three years to a level of above fifty years. Public health programmes and other measures undertaken to control malaria and other communicable diseases have evidently contributed to an improvement in longevity of population.

The declining trend in mortality continued unabated through the seventies. The SRS data indicate that the CDR for the country has declined from 16.1 in 1970-72 to 12.1 in 1981-83, a reduction of 25 per cent in ten years (Table 3). The pace of decline in mortality

TABLE 3

Trends in Crude Birth Rate and Crude Death Rate based on a Three Year Moving Average of SRS Data for India, 1970-82

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Crude birth rate per thousand population</th>
<th>Crude death rate per thousand population</th>
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<tr>
<td>1981-83</td>
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</table>

Note: The estimates for India exclude Bihar and West Bengal for the period 1970-72 and 1978-80.

in the early seventies seems to have slowed down with the CDR hovered around 15 per 1000 population. However, the pace of decline in mortality seems to have accelerated during the late seventies and the death rate declined from the level of around 15 in 1975-77 to the level of about 12 in 1980-82. It is worth noting from the figures given in Table 3 that, although the death rate for rural areas is considerably higher than that for urban areas, the pace of decline in the death rate during the 1970s has been of the same order for both rural and urban areas. While the rural death rate has declined from 17.6 in 1970-72 to 13.3 in 1981-83, the urban death rate has declined from 10.1 to 7.6 during this period.

REGIONAL DIFFERENTIALS IN MORTALITY

There is considerable variation in the level of mortality among the states of India. The SRS estimates of crude death rate for major states of India for 1970-72 and 1980-82 are given in Table 4. In 1980-82, the CDR varies from the lowest of 6.7 for Kerala to the highest of 16.0 for Uttar Pradesh. In general, most of the Northern states excluding Punjab and Haryana have higher mortality level than the Southern states. The Eastern states of Bihar and Orissa also have higher mortality levels than the Southern states.

Most of the states have recorded declines in the CDR of about 20 to 30 per cent between 1970-72 and 1980-82. In the case of Bihar, the magnitude of decline in the CDR is vitiated by the fact that the estimate for the period 1970-72 is particularly deficient. For Haryana, the CDR seems to have hovered around 10 in most of the 1970s and in the case of Madhya Pradesh, the decline in the death rate is only marginal. In the states of Assam, Gujarat and Tamil Nadu, the pace of decline in mortality has been relatively more rapid in rural than in urban areas. In contrast, the pace of decline has been slightly faster in urban than in rural areas in the states of Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa and Punjab. In the remaining states, both urban and rural mortality appear to have declined at the same pace during this period. Further decline in the overall national death rate cannot be achieved unless there is significant decline in the death
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N.A. = Not available.

Iqbal returned from the Round Table Conference (1930-1932) after futile negotiations for communal representation in the future constitution. Disappointed, he urged the Muslims to trust neither the Hindus nor the British but to become self-reliant. His politics arose from a deep sense of history and scholarship. Iqbal’s influence over the fortunes of Muslims and on Jinnah was profound and permanent. He studied the fortunes of Muslims in India and dismissed as impossible the unity in which Jinnah believed and argued for over twenty years. To base a constitution on the conception of a homogeneous India, or to apply to India the principles dictated by British democratic sentiments is unwittingly to prepare her for a civil war, was Iqbal’s view.11

Iqbal advocated a Muslim bloc; and even demanded and defined the frontiers of a proposed “consolidated Muslim State”, “in the best interests of India and Islam.”12 In spite of disillusionment, Jinnah was hesitant in yielding to Iqbal’s advocacy. But a decade later, Jinnah admitted that he had “finally been led to Iqbal’s conclusions, as a result of the careful examination and study of the constitutional problems facing India.”13

Intellectuals like Syed Ahmed and Iqbal had ploughed well the soil mentally. It now awaited a statesman with a vision to look into the future and the strength to make the people look with him. So when Jinnah arrived with his call for a separate national state, people welcomed him as the long-sought-for deliverer, the liberator of the oppressed. More than anything else, Muslim literature reflected the contours of cultural nationalism because it enshrined in itself the thoughts and ideals, the history and language, the art and character of the people who had produced it.

The Hindu-Muslim conflict was not merely religious. It was a clash of two civilizations, of two peoples who had different languages, different literary roots, different ideas of education, different philosophical sources, and different concepts of art; and such a yawning cultural gulf was enough to destroy any affinity which the two peoples might have had and to reduce to nought all efforts at unity. This cultural variance was highlighted by the endeavours of intellectuals like Iqbal.
rates of the larger states of Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh where current mortality levels are very high.

The most important component of the overall mortality is the infant mortality rate (IMR). Like many other countries in the developing region, India had a very high level of infant mortality of over 200 per 1000 live births at the beginning of this century. Over the decades, there has been considerable reduction in the level of infant mortality as a result of the rapid advancement made in the field of medical sciences and the general improvement in the living conditions. In 1982, according to SRS estimates the IMR for the country as a whole was around 105. As compared to this, the IMR for the developed countries ranges between 10 and 20. Even for some developing countries like Korea, Philippines, Sri Lanka and Thailand, the levels of IMR are considerably lower (between 40 and 75) as compared to the level of over 100 prevailing in India.

Over the last two decades, the decline in general mortality has been much faster than the decline in the IMR. This is mainly due to the fact that general mortality responds rather quickly to public health measures whereas changes in IMR depend on a number of factors like the availability and accessibility of ante-natal and post-natal care facilities, facilities of infant care after birth, the level of female education and the general socio-economic development which are all too slow to change.

Large variations have been observed in the value of IMR among the states of India. Whereas Kerala succeeded in achieving an IMR of about 30 in 1982, Uttar Pradesh, the most populous state of India had an IMR of about 150, almost five times the rate of Kerala. Other states with IMR of over 100 are Assam, Bihar, Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh and Orissa. Most of the states have recorded declines in IMR during the 1970s. The States of Kerala and Punjab have registered substantial reductions in IMR between 1972 and 1982. In contrast, the level of IMR remained virtually constant in the states of Haryana and Orissa during the 1970s. The states of Jammu and
Kashmir had an IMR of 68 in 1982 which is much lower than the national average, but this level remained virtually constant during the ten-year period 1972-82. Further significant reductions in the overall mortality level depend largely on the tempo of decline in IMR. There is considerable scope for the IMR to decline significantly in a number of states where the current levels are exceedingly high (Table 5).

From the standpoint of enhancing the acceptability of small family norm, it is absolutely necessary that the level of infant mortality which is currently very high in India has to be brought down to a low level. Available knowledge indicate that there exists a direct relationship between infant mortality and fertility. A decrease in infant mortality, especially in the presence of the family planning programme, is likely to contribute to an increase in the use of contraception and thereby reduces fertility. Many empirical studies have shown that reduction in infant mortality is a precondition for fertility reduction. The Government of India perceives that the current levels and trends of infant mortality are unacceptable and needs significant improvement. One of the policy measures formulated by the Government is to reduce the IMR from the current level of over 100 to below 60 by the year 2000 in all the states of India.

**FERTILITY: ONSET OF DECLINE**

In the absence of a reliable vital registration system, the birth and death rates in India are estimated from the census data. From 1970 onwards fertility estimates are available from the Sample Registration System (SRS) and the two nationwide sample surveys conducted by the office of the Registrar General, one in 1972 and the other in 1979. The SRS provides estimates of birth and death rate at the state level. Besides, the 1971 and 1981 censuses provide some data on fertility and they can be used for studying fertility differentials and trends during 1971-81.

Prior to 1961, the level of fertility in India was high and remained virtually constant. Our knowledge on the level of fertility was somewhat sketchy because of paucity of data on demographic variables.
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<td><strong>105</strong></td>
<td><strong>-24</strong></td>
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N.A. = Not available.

Sources:
Since estimates derived from the registration data are unreliable, one has to lean heavily on the census-based estimates of fertility for the 1950s and the 1960s. Different crude birth rate estimates based on 1951 and 1961 census data vary between 42 and 48 births per 1000 population per annum. Such a large variation in the estimates of birth rate was mainly due to different assumptions involved in the methods of estimation. There is, however, some consensus among demographers that birth rate during 1951-61 was about 45 (Rele, 1982). For 1961-71 decade, the estimates of crude birth rate vary between 40 and 42. These census-based estimates imply that crude birth rate in India declined by 7 to 11 per cent between 1951-61 and 1961-71 primarily due to a decline in marital fertility. The changes in the age and marital composition of the population contributed about one third of the decline in the birth rate during this period while decline in marital fertility accounted for about two-thirds of the decline in CBR (Adlakha and Kirk, 1974).

From 1970 onwards, we have SRS estimates and they indicate that the Indian birth rate has been slowly but steadily declining from 37.2 in 1970-72 to 33.3 in 1976-78. This suggests about 11 per cent decline in the birth rate between 1970-72 and 1976-78 (Table 3). However, since 1976 the declining trend in the birth rate has been halted and the rate has stalled at the level of around 34. This stalling of birth rate is mainly due to two factors. First, changes in age-sex composition of population was not favourable to a decline in the birth rate during 1971-81. An increasing trend in the proportion of women in child bearing years would tend to check in the birth rate or even make it to increase even when marital fertility declines. Secondly, the proportion of women effectively protected by the official family planning programme remained almost unchanged at the level of 23 per cent between 1976 and 1981. The combined effect of these two forces tended to keep the birth rate at a constant level of 34 per 1000 during 1976-81 (Zachariah and Patel, 1984).

Besides the birth rate, sufficient evidence is available to show that fertility, measured in terms of the total fertility rate, has declined significantly during the 1970s. The two sample surveys conducted
in 1972 and 1979 by the SRS provide a direct estimate of age specific fertility rates and the total fertility rate. Using this information and making suitable adjustments for plausible errors in the SRS data, Preston and Bhat (1984) estimated the total fertility rates for India in 1971-72 and 1978 as 5.60 and 4.69 respectively, implying a reduction of 0.91 births per woman or a decline of 16 per cent in 6.5 years.

The state level estimates of crude birth rate (CBR) based on SRS data for 1970-72 and 1980-82 are given in Table 6. Barring the states of Bihar and West Bengal where the completeness of sample registration is substantially below the national average, all the major states have shown declines in the CBR between 1970-72 and 1980-82. Kerala has recorded the lowest birth rate of 26.2 while Uttar Pradesh has the highest birth rate of 39.2 in 1980-82. All the states in the southern region including Maharashtra but excluding Andhra Pradesh have birth rates below 30 while the northern states excluding Punjab but including Bihar have rates over 35. The other states of India have birth rates between 30 and 35 in 1980-82. More than 10 per cent declines in the birth rate between 1970-72 and 1980-82 have been registered in the states of Gujarat, Kerala, Punjab and Tamil Nadu. The remaining states also have registered declines of between 5 and 10 per cent during this period. It is worth noting that in most of the states the pace of decline in the birth rate has been faster in rural than in urban areas. However, in the states of Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Maharashtra and Orissa the birth rate in urban areas has declined relatively faster than that in rural areas during the 1970s (Table 6). Thus, available evidence from SRS suggests that the crude birth rate has declined in all the major states of India (except Bihar and West Bengal) during the 1970s although considerable variation has been observed in the magnitude of decline.

Further evidence that fertility has declined in the 1970s can be obtained by studying the changes in the distribution of births by order of birth. Both the 1972 and 1979 sample surveys of SRS provide distribution of births by order of birth. The proportion of births of order 4 and above in rural India has declined from 47 per cent
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<td>32.0</td>
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<td>29.1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orissa</td>
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<td>33.0</td>
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<td>-5</td>
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<td>West Bengal</td>
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<td>N.A.</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>-</td>
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</table>

N.A. = Not available.

in 1972 to 38 per cent in 1978, while in urban India the corresponding proportion declined from 44 per cent to 33 per cent during this period (Registrar General, 1981). The reduction in the proportion of higher order births between 1972 and 1978 is another piece of evidence of decline in fertility in the 1970s.

Further evidence that fertility has declined in the 1970s can be obtained from the census data of 1971 and 1981. Although the census data are undoubtedly deficient in level, changes in fertility between 1971 and 1981 can be assessed assuming that both 1971 and 1981 census data are subjected to the same margin of error. In rural India, the general marital fertility rate has declined from 177 in 1971 to 143 in 1981, while the total fertility rate of married women has declined from 5.5 to 4.5 during this period. The corresponding figures for urban India are 154 and 123 and 4.5 and 3.8. All religious groups have shown declines in fertility. Comparison of the average number of children ever born per woman derived from the 1981 census with similar data collected in the 1972 SRS survey also supports the conclusion that fertility has declined in 1970s, although the two sources of data are not strictly comparable in all respects (Registrar General, 1983 : 45).

Both 1971 and 1981 census data have shown the existence of fertility differentials by religion, rural/urban residence and education. The existence of fertility differentials is itself an indication that the overall level of fertility in India has started to decline in the 1970s.

According to 1981 census results, the proportions of population in the age groups 0-4 and 5-9 have declined between 1971 and 1981. The magnitude of decline is higher in the age group 0-4 compared to that in the age group 5-9, which suggests that fertility decline may be greater in the second half of the decade than that in the first half. All the states have exhibited a similar pattern of downward trend in the proportion of population aged 0-4 and 5-9 between 1971 and 1981 (Registrar General, 1983 : 26-28).

Further, the mean age of the male population of India has increased from 24.8 years in 1971 to 25.5 years in 1981 and that of
the female population from 24.4 years to 25.4 years. The mean and median ages of the population have increased in all the states between 1971 and 1981 except in Uttar Pradesh where it has remained at almost the same level. This shows that the population of the country has been aging and this may be partly due to improved mortality conditions and partly due to lesser proportion of population in the younger age groups as a result of decline in fertility during the recent past (Registrar General, 1983: 30-33).

In conclusion, we may say with confidence that India as a whole experienced a significant fall in fertility during the 1970s. All available evidence is remarkably consistent on this score.

TRENDS IN NUPTIALITY

Nuptiality, an important determinant of fertility has undergone significant changes during the last two decades. Some selected nuptiality indicators based on census data are given in Table 7. The singulate mean age at marriage for females has shown an increasing trend over 1961-81 for India and its major states. For the country as a whole, it has increased from 16.1 years in 1961 to 17.2 years in 1971 and further to 18.3 years in 1981. Variations are observed among the states of India. The lowest mean age at marriage of 16.1 years is found in Rajasthan, while Kerala has the highest mean of 21.9 years in 1981. In general, it is observed that women in northern states tend to marry relatively at a younger age than their counterparts in southern states.

Another indicator which describes the nuptiality pattern is the proportion of women married by age. In 1981, 43.5 per cent of women aged 15-19 were currently married for the country as a whole. This proportion is more than 50 per cent in Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh. It is less than 15 per cent in Kerala and Punjab and between 15 and 30 per cent in Gujarat and Tamil Nadu. More than 90 per cent of the females in the age group 20-24 were currently married in Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh, while in Kerala and Punjab the corresponding proportion is less than 70 per cent. (Table 7)
**TABLE 7**

Selected Nuptiality Indicators for Major States of India, 1961-81

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States</th>
<th>Singulate female mean age at marriage</th>
<th>Percentage married females to total females in age-group:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Andhra Pradesh</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>16.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bihar</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>15.3</td>
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<td>Gujarat</td>
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<td>Haryana</td>
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<td>14.8</td>
<td>15.5</td>
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<tr>
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<td>17.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>17.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) Assam and Jammu and Kashmir are excluded because data are not available.

N.A. = Not available.

**Sources:**
2. Data for 1971 and 1981 are taken from Registrar General (1983), Report and Tables Based on 5 per cent Sample Data, Series I, Part II, (Special), Government of India, New Delhi.
Recent Demographic Trends in India

Between 1971 and 1981, the proportion of currently married women aged 15-19 years has declined significantly indicating the fact that the nuptiality pattern has been changing. For the country, this proportion has declined from 55.4 per cent in 1971 to 43.5 per cent in 1981. All the states have shown similar pattern but significant declines have been observed in the states of Gujarat, Haryana, Maharashtra, Orissa and Punjab.

In both the 1971 and 1981 censuses the question on age at marriage was canvassed for all currently married women. Using this information, one can compute the mean age at marriage of all currently married women. It should, however, be noted that this mean based on the response of all such women would naturally be lower because older women of age 30 and above who are currently married are more likely to have been married at younger ages than those who are currently married and below 30 years of age. Nevertheless, despite this limitation, such data are useful to study trends and differentials in age at marriage by socio-economic variables.

It is observed that the mean age at marriage of currently married women for rural India has increased from 15.4 years in 1971 to 16.5 years in 1981, while for urban India, it has increased from 16.8 years to 17.6 years during this period. Moreover, the increase in the mean value has been observed for all religious groups (Registrar General, 1983 : 38).

In conclusion, we have sufficient evidence to show that nuptiality indicators have shown significant changes during 1971-81. This is quite consistent with the evidence of decline in fertility in the 1970s, as discussed above.

TRENDS IN INTERNAL MIGRATION

Internal migration, though having no effect on a country’s total population size and growth, is very closely related to the distribution of population within its sub-regions, especially the rural and urban areas of the country. At the sub-national level, besides fertility and mortality, internal migration is an additional but an important component of population growth.
Iqbal’s contribution to the moulding of Pakistan lay also in his propagation of a policy mass contact which Jinnah successfully adopted, thereby converting the Muslim League from a middle class group into a popular party.

Syed Ahmed, Ameer Ali and Iqbal illustrate three principle trends of the Muslim renaissance—the rapprochement with Western learning, the re-discovery of Islamic principles and Islam’s former glory, and the impetus towards a new Islamic democracy. None were politicians, pure and simple like Jinnah, but they were inexorably lured into politics, and more crucially into seminal Muslim nationalism.

For sixty years, however, the evolution of Pakistan was inextricably intertwined with the movement for Indian independence. The Indian National Congress comprised not only leading Indian nationalists; many of the creators of Pakistan including Jinnah were involved in it. But by the dawn of the twentieth century certain events began altering the character of the Congress and caused the Muslims to organize their separate political organization.

As the anti-Muslim and anti-Western ideas of B.G. Tilak grew, Muslim participation in the Congress decreased. Tilak was the leader who, by his orthodox religious views and belligerent political action, largely alienated the Muslims from the mainstream of Indian nationalism. Tilak inoculated Hindu orthodoxy into the national movement, believing that a religious fervour must permeate politics for a missionary enthusiasm to be generated. "Tilak knew that once the spiritual and religious springs of India’s great past were revitalized the greatness and glory of her future were assured," and Tilak idolized Shivaji, the Maratha Chieftain, who had murdered a Muslim general through guile. He established anti-cow-killing societies to stop Muslims from sacrificing cows on Eid-ul-Azha, and appealed to the people to turn out all foreigners from India—the British and the Muslims. Although Tilak strengthened the nationalist movement he also alienated the Muslims: at the Benares session of the Congress in 1905, the Muslim delegates had dwindled only to a mere seventeen out of an earlier seven hundred and fifty-six.
The census is the major source of data on internal migration in India. According to 1981 census, inter-state life-time migration formed a small fraction of around 3 per cent of the total population. This proportion seems to have remained stable over the last few decades. However, if the definition of a migrant is modified as to include the detailed identification of place of birth statistics, then about 30 per cent of the total population are classified as internal migrants as per 1981 census. This includes intra-state migration (intra-district and inter-district) and inter-state migration. Of the total internal migration, the intra-state migration formed about 88 per cent, while the inter-state migration formed the remaining part of 12 per cent.

The data obtained in the last three censuses permit to draw a broad view of mobility pattern according to different streams and according to the distance between origin and destination. The most predominant stream of migration is rural to rural, with females claiming a very high proportion than males. The least important is the urban to rural stream which accounts for about 6 per cent of the total volume of migration. The other two streams directed towards urban areas, namely, rural to urban and urban to urban have improved their share in the total volume of migration to a moderate extent between 1971 and 1981. Of these two, the rural to urban stream is comparatively more important, particularly so among males, although females too had improved their share in the volume between 1971 and 1981 (Registrar General, 1983: 64-65).

The 1981 census also revealed that the intra-district migration, that is short distance mobility, is preponderant and accounts for 62 per cent of the aggregate volume of internal migration. Next in importance is the inter-district migration which accounts for 26 per cent, while the remaining 12 per cent accounts for a long distance movements, that is inter-state migration (Registrar General, 1983: 53). The predominance of short distance mobility is more striking in the case of rural stream; more so for females than for males. In the case of rural to urban stream, the inter-district and inter-state movements predominate over intra-district movement. In this case,
females, more than males are confined to short distance migration. On the whole, it is observed that the distribution of migrants according to the distance between origin and destination has not undergone any significant change over the census decade 1961-81 (Registrar General, 1983 and Premi, 1984).

URBANIZATION: PATTERNS AND TRENDS

The 1981 census results show a significant acceleration in the rate of urbanization in India during the decade 1971-81. The level of urbanization measured in terms of the proportion of population living in urban areas has increased from 18.0 per cent in 1961 to 19.9 per cent in 1971 and then to 23.3 per cent in 1981. The average annual exponential growth rate of urban population was 3.85 per cent during 1971-81 as compared to 3.21 per cent in the previous decade.

The level of urbanization varies considerably among states of India. Of all the major states, excluding Assam and Jammu and Kashmir, Maharashtra has been the most urbanized state with 35 per cent of its population living in urban areas in 1981. The states of Tamil Nadu, Gujarat, Karnataka, Punjab and West Bengal have urbanization levels well above the national average of 23.3 per cent. The least urbanized states are Bihar and Orissa with urbanization levels not more than 13 per cent.

The 1981 census results also revealed that the relatively less urbanized states of Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Orissa, Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh have all experienced faster rates of growth of urban population, whereas the more urbanized states of West Bengal, Tamil Nadu, and Maharashtra have shown slower growth rates. However, all the states have shown an increasing pace of urbanization during 1971-81 decade.

While the level of urbanization in India is not considered to be high, the absolute number of urban inhabitants exceeds the total population of any of the countries in the world excluding China, U.S.A., and U.S.S.R. According to the projection worked out by the Planning Commission, the urban population is likely to increase to around 235 million in 1991 and further to 317 million accounting
for over 31 per cent of the total population in the year 2001. It is also estimated that the proportion of population living in class I cities with population 1,00,000 and above is likely to increase from 60 per cent in 1981 to 69 per cent in 2001. And, 12 more million plus cities will be added, bringing the total number of such cities to 24 in 2001.

The future trends of urbanization are likely to contribute to a decline in fertility. Since urban fertility is generally lower than rural fertility, an increasing pace of urbanization is likely to have a depressing effect on the overall fertility level. Since natural increase does not differ very much between rural and urban areas, a significant fall in urban fertility is required, besides slowing the volume of rural-to-urban migration, for curtailing the city growth. Thus, family planning programmes have a significant bearing on migration and population distribution and should be recognised as an essential and integral part of population distribution policy.

INDIA’S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE

India’s future population growth is mainly determined by the future course of fertility and mortality. If the observed rate of population growth of 2.2 per cent per annum during 1971-81 continues unabated, the country’s population would double its size to reach the staggering figure of 1.5 billion in the next three decades from now. Such an unpleasant situation is very unlikely to happen because available evidence strongly suggests that some important demographic parameters of India’s population are undergoing changes and the onset of a demographic transition has already begun in India. In certain states of India, both fertility and mortality appear to have declined rapidly in recent years.

The Government of India has formulated its long-term demographic goal of reaching replacement-level fertility (net reproduction rate of unity) by the year 2000 for all the states of India. This corresponds to reaching a CBR of 21, CDR of 9, IMR below 60, expectation of life at birth of 64 years for both sexes and 60 per cent of couples in the reproductive ages 15 to 44 effectively protected by
contraception.

While formulating these long-term demographic goals, the changes that would be needed in social and cultural factors for regulating fertility behaviour have not been taken into account. Various studies clearly brought out that the differences in fertility levels among states of India are largely explained by differences in social and cultural variables rather than differences in family planning variables. If this is the case, and given the fact that there exists tremendous diversity among the states of India, the prospects of achieving the replacement level fertility by the year 2000 for all the states of India seem to be rather unrealistic.

While this goal might possibly be achieved in states like Kerala, Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu where the social changes are conducive to rapid decline in fertility, the prospects of achieving replacement level fertility in the states of Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh are very bleak because the social and cultural changes needed to achieve the desired goals are quite enormous. In fact, there exists a greater potential for rapid population growth in most of the northern states of India because mortality levels are still relatively higher in these states and there is considerable scope for further large reduction in mortality to occur.

In order to reach the net reproduction rate of unity, it is estimated that 60 per cent of couples in the reproductive ages 15 to 44 have to be effectively protected by contraception by the year 2000. As of March 1984, for the country as a whole, only about 29 per cent of couples in the reproductive ages were effectively protected by contraception. For certain states, the couple protection rates were as low as 13.5 for Jammu and Kashmir, 15.8 per cent for Bihar, 15.5 per cent for Uttar Pradesh and 17.9 per cent for Rajasthan. If the past trends in family planning are any indication of the future, most of the northern states would be able to achieve the couple protection rate of no more than 30 to 35 per cent by the year 2000 even if the present tempo of the family planning programme continues.

Regardless of whether the demographic goals set by the
Government would be realised or not, India’s population would continue to increase and in all likelihood it would touch the billion mark in the year 2000. Not only will this size become unmanageable for a developing country like India with limited resources, but the problems of regional imbalances in population variables would be a cause for concern. The country should plan now itself to accommodate a population of one billion by the beginning of the 21st century and to tackle the various problems that are likely to arise in the years ahead. India’s demographic future largely depends on how the Government will adopt the economic and demographic policies in the next fifteen years in order to provide better living conditions to its growing number of people.

NOTES

1. The Sample Registration System (SRS) is a dual record system with the main objective of providing reliable estimates of birth and death rates at the state and national levels. The system was initially introduced in 1964-65 on a pilot basis in few selected states but since 1970 the entire country has been covered. It covers about 2400 sample units in rural areas and about 1300 sample units in urban areas. The field investigation consists of continuous enumeration of births and deaths by a resident enumerator. Full-time supervisors conduct a retrospective survey, usually every six months, to arrive at an independent set of vital rates for each sample unit. Unmatched and partially matched events are verified in the field. The vital rates are based on an unduplicated count of births and deaths. The estimates of vital rates for the states of Bihar and West Bengal are particularly deficient.

2. According to the recent census of 1981, India comprised of 22 states and 9 Union Territories. For the analysis of trends and differentials in growth of population, only 15 major states (excluding Assam) with a combined population of 645 million, accounting for 94 per cent of India’s
total population in 1981, are considered. However, in the discussion on fertility and mortality trends, Assam also has been included, since data from SRS are available for that state.

3. This total includes the population of Jammu and Kashmir, where the census was taken later than in other states and the projected population of Assam where the census could not be conducted owing to disturbed conditions prevailing in that state then.

REFERENCES


11. Registrar General, *Report and Tables Based on 5 per cent Sample Data*, Series I, Part II, (Special), Government of India, New Delhi, 1983.


are theistic in belief, and secondly, those that are not, Islam shares with the theistic religions, a common belief in the origin of life, creation and its purpose, the human species and its nature and destiny. These then are the bases of inter-faith relations in so far as the theistic religions are concerned. On the other hand, Buddhism and other non-theist or agnostic religions have a different understanding of the universe, of the human person, of other forms of life, of birth, death and after-life, of existence in other spheres or life cycles and of the whole cosmos itself. Concepts such as creation or eternal human destiny are alien to such religions. However, there is a shared acceptance among all believers, whether theistic or non-theist, agnostic or a theist, that the human being has an innate dignity and value and he/she is worthy of respect. There is also implicit acknowledgement among all religions of the value of the universe, especially of planet earth and the physical environment in which the human species lives and has its being. There is an emerging consciousness of the importance of the environment for the sustenance of human life itself. Thus, there is a perception of order, balance and equilibrium between the human species and the physical environment in which it has to develop. The human person occupies the place of primacy in the physical environment and from that derives an accepted hierarchy of being and of values. It would be correct to say that all religions acknowledge such an hierarchical order of being and of values. Thus, the primacy of the human being in the physical universe and the different perceptions and beliefs of his role and relationships provide the starting point of this paper’s discussion of Islam and Inter-Faith Relations.

HUMAN PERSON, UNITY AND DIGNITY

The prevailing concepts of human unity and the fundamental equality of all persons are based on different ideological, scientific or religious interpretations of reality, including the human species. We in Islam believe that God, the One, has created all human beings. By direct intervention in His own process of creation, the God brought into being the human species, the original man and woman. God also intervenes in every human creation by infusing into each being a
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soul. This is the basis of the Quranic principle of the unity of mankind. All differences of ethnicity, colour, sex, caste or status, are of secondary importance, if at all. What is fundamental is that all human beings are created by God, and therefore are God's creatures and all are equal in nature and in their rights as persons. In the Islamic tradition, the basic dignity of the human person derives from the fact that all humanity is God's creation. The differences we observe today are due to a multiplicity of factors, but they should not be a permanent impediment to the reconciliation and unity of the human race. It is a function of religion to promote the process of human reconciliation or peace and foster unity among peoples everywhere.

Not only does Islam believe in the Divine origin of human creation, but also that each human person has a divinely-oriented purpose or destiny. All beings are enjoined to strive towards perfection so that they may tend towards union with the All-Perfect One, who is God. Islamic doctrine, therefore, places great emphasis on the righteousness of the soul. By doing so it reminds us of the transcendental nature and purpose of human existence. Our earthly existence does not circumscribe the life of the human person. There is an existence beyond our mortal life on earth, an existence which knows no pain, nor sorrow, nor death. It is endless existence with the author of life, the source of all joy, the Perfect One. Our human striving is basically to achieve that end, to return to the source of life, of joy, of goodness.

But Islam, while sharing with the theistic religions this eschatological vision of life, also affirms with them that earthly existence is a means by which to achieve our common human destiny. The universe, too, is a part of God's creation, and is not to be despised. The striving towards perfection has to be achieved in and through this earthly existence, which has value in itself. Islam teaches that the human can be divinised and that each individual can and should participate in the process of divinisation. Therefore, each individual is of value not only intrinsically but also in relation to his potential and purpose. Service to humanity is an important aspect of Islamic
Indian nationalism had long been essentially a Hindu nationalism. The earliest political bodies were Hindu even in their designation—the Sarvajanik Sabha and the Mahajana Sabha. In 1882, Dayananda founded the Cow Protection Society, an overt anti-Muslim gesture. Swadeshi, the chief instrument of the Indian National Congress was essentially a Hindu concept. Bankim Chandra Chatterjee, the Bengali Hindu novelist, claimed to be one of the fathers of Indian nationalism, propagated anti-Muslim ideas in his popular stories: while this gave a new unity and national pride to the Hindus, it also "instilled in the minds of Muslims suspicion and fear, which subsequent events did not eradicate."  

Nothing illustrates the Hindu character of India nationalism more vividly than the agitation carried on against the partition of Bengal between 1905 and 1911. Religion and politics were combined in good measure. The Bande Mataram was a Hindu revolutionary poem in Bankim Chandra Chatterjee’s novel, Ananda Math, which invoked divine assistance against the Muslims and the British and roused the people to expel both from India. This song, distasteful to the Muslims, became a ‘national anthem’ of the Congress sung not only at its meetings, but also at the opening of the Legislative Assembly sessions in the Hindu provinces when the Congress was in power during 1937–39. Despite Muslim protest it continued as the Congress song till 1947. Nationalism was clothed in a Hindu garb when its ultimate goal was Ram Raj, the golden age of Hinduism. 

The hold of orthodox Hinduism over the Congress was made explicit when Annie Besant and Gandhi were turned out when they insisted on social reform and abolition of untouchability. K.M. Panikkar says that from the end of the nineteenth century onwards Indian nationalism had two aspects—one political, the other religious. This politico-religious philosophy was meant to give the nation clear ideas about the conception of freedom it stressed Hinduism and defended it as the symbol of Indian nationality. Altogether Hinduism got too deeply embedded in the Congress either to be explained away by its leaders or to be ignored by the Muslims. A nationalism arising from Hindu roots and countenancing a Hindu outlook did not appeal
teaching which enjoins its adherents to strive to promote the spirit of human fraternity. The Quran stresses not only the spirit of self-sacrifice but also exhorts its followers to shun selfishness. It says: "And they prefer others above themselves though poverty becomes their lot. And whosoever is saved from his own avarice—such are they who are successful." (59 : 9). The Holy Prophet has said: “You cannot be a true Muslim until you wish for others what you wish for yourself”; another saying is: “The best among men is one who does good to the people.” He also said: “Be kind to all living beings, so that God may be kind to you.” (All quoted from Bukhari). DAWA in Islam means to practise one’s faith and thereby be an example to others and to unite to Islam.

The Holy Prophet enjoined us to consider ourselves as humans first. We share a common humanity, which is the basis of our unity. It is (Taqwa)—God consciousness—which alone constitutes the basis of one’s superiority over the other. Taqwa includes solicitude and goodwill towards others. “Have fear of your Lord, who created you from a single soul. From that soul He created its mate, and through them He bestrewed the earth with countless men and women.” (1 : 4). “The noblest of you in Allah’s sight is the most righteous of you.” (13 : 49).

PROPHETS IN HISTORY

The Holy Prophet (Peace be upon Him) taught us that all religions in their pristine essence are one, emanating as all of them did, from the self-same Divine source. It is an Islamic belief that different prophets were sent at different times to meet the needs of the time. The basic message of Islam is Peace and Submission to the will of God. The holy Quran says: “La-a-Ikraha Fid-Deen,” which means, there is no compulsion in religion. It also says: “Lakum Dinakum Walyadin,” which means, your religion with you and mine with me. This interpreted in the modern context must tell us Muslims, that despite our differences on religion, we must understand one another and live in peace and unity. Belief in the Books of God that were revealed before Islam and in the prophets
before the Holy Prophet is an article of faith in Islam. Permitting others to practise their own faith was the principle on which the Holy Prophet preached Islamic faith. It would not be out of context here to refer to the Charter for the Christians of that time to practise their own faith, which the Holy Prophet of Islam provided. Islam exhorts Jews, Christians and others to act according to their creeds. (Quran, Chapters 3 and 5).

Muslims are enjoined to believe in all the prophets, irrespective of whether they were named in the Holy Quran or not. Sura 4:164 and 40:78, mention the fact that there were other prophets before Muhammad (Peace be upon Him) whose names were not mentioned to him. The Quran requires belief in the truth and righteousness of all the prophets and in the revelations vouchsafed to them by God. Torah and Injil are repeatedly mentioned. There is no compulsion in religion, the right way has indeed become distinct from error. (2:256). This is the policy of Islam towards other religions. The Quran emphatically recognises all the Prophets who preached Muhammad (Peace be upon Him) and condemns any discrimination amongst them. Further, belief in the scriptures revealed to the Prophets before Prophet Muhammad (Peace be upon Him) is enjoined on Muslims. Twenty-five Prophets are named in the Quran and reference is made to as many as 1,24,000 unnamed prophets. At the advent of Islam, those who were not adherents of the Islamic faith were referred to as the People of the Book and admitted and accepted as part of Muslim societies. It was in this context that though Muslims were enjoined to carry the message of Islam to non-Muslims, they were warned that there is no compulsion in religion.

FREEDOM OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF

In Islam, there is no question of one religion versus another. The Holy Prophet Muhammad (Peace be upon Him) preached the oneness of God and in doing so, sought to eradicate the potential causes of conflict between man and man—the differences such as those based on the different perceptions of religion. In Islamic
terminology, irreligion is what is referred to as Kwfr. Kafir does not refer to one who is not a Muslim, but to one who does not believe in a religion.

Peace at all times should be uppermost in the mind of a Muslim. The Islamic greeting, Assalamu Alikum, means Peace be with you. The response, Wa Alaikum Salam, means Peace be also with you. The message of Islam is that of love, goodwill, understanding of others, truth, justice to all, kindness to all creatures created by God and charity. These are the core values of all religions. Muslims believe that the fountainhead of all religions is the one and universal God. The only additional claim that Muslim make is that with the Holy Prophet Muhammad (Peace be upon Him); the message of God came in an expanded and complete form covering all aspects of life and that he was the seal of prophethood.

By peace we do not mean the absence of conflict or tension. Peace has both a personal or internal dimension as well as a social one. The individual is called upon to be at peace with himself, with his desires, his aspirations, his conscience. He is also called upon to be at peace with his neighbours, beginning with members of his own family, his neighbourhood, his social community and his country. God is the source and sustainer of peace—internal as well as social.

There is a misconception that because Islam is a religion based on Divine Revelation provided by a single holy book, it can neither tolerate nor cooperate with the followers of other religions such as Hinduism, Buddhism or Christianity. This is furthest from the truth. The Quran confirms the revelation given to earlier prophets. The Quran says: “Verily those who believe and those who keep the Jewish religious rule, and Christians and Sabaeans—whosoever believeth in Allah and the Last Day, and doeth right—their reward is with their Lord: and no fear shall come upon them, neither shall they suffer grief.”

The Quran accepts the virgin birth of Christ and speaks of Jesus as God’s “word which He cast upon Mary, and a spirit from Him.” Ameer Ali wrote in 1889, that there is no difference between Christianity
and Islam except for the conception of the sonship of Jesus. The Charter of Religious Freedom preached by Prophet Muhammad (Peace be upon Him) gives Christendom on behalf of the world, of Islam, for all times to come “till the end of the world,” the freedom and preservation of Christianity. There is nothing strange in this, for as Sura 21 : 107 says: God sent the Holy Prophet as “a mercy unto all creatures.”

Muslims draw inspiration from two main sources. One being the Quran and the other the Sunna, or way of the Prophet, which includes his reports of his day-to-day behaviour, actions and tacit approval of things said and done in His presence. “The acceptance and understanding of the Prophet’s legacy is essential in Islam, because first its acceptance is enjoined by God in the Quran, and second, it supplements and explains the Quranic message.”

The Quran comprises the dogma, a body of narrative and moral and juridical injunctions. Central to the dogma is the belief that there is no god but God and that Muhammad (Peace be upon Him) is His Apostle and the last of the Prophets.” Belief in angels, the Day of Judgment, Paradise and Hell, in the righteous being rewarded and the wicked being punished is complementary to faith in the One God.

COMMONALITIES WITH OTHER RELIGIONS

The word ‘Islam’ is derived from the root word which means ‘Peace.’ It literally means “absolute submission to God’s will,” but it does not imply any idea of totalism. Next to Christianity, it is the religion with the largest number of adherents in the world. It is not a religion formulated by Prophet Muhammad (Peace be upon Him) but is a summation of all previous religious norms decreed by God through His revelation to all Prophets, including Moses (Peace be upon Him) and Jesus Christ (Peace be upon Him). The Christian God and Allah is the one same supreme God. The Muslims prefer to use the word ‘Allah’ since the Arabic language is revered by all Muslims as it was the language in which the Quran was revealed.

If you ask a Muslim when Islam began, he would have an
unexpected answer. It is as old as time, as old as God's creation, as old as Adam and Abraham and Moses, he would say. Was not Abraham himself a Muslim and his son Ismael, the father of the Arab race? Every person is born a Muslim. This is part of Muslim belief. But if we are to seek for what is distinctive in the Islamic religion, then we must look first and last, to the person, character and career of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (Peace be upon Him).

The Quran does not speak of other great world religions such as Hinduism and Buddhism, but it explains the existence of other religions when it states: "And if the Lord willed, all who are in the earth would have believed together," and the Quran also states: "For each we have appointed a divine law and a traced-out way." "Had God willed He would have made you one community. But that He may try you out by that which He hath given you He hath made you as you are. So vie with one another in good works. Unto God ye will all return." God has revealed Himself "at sundry times and in diverse places." There are several instances in the Quran which refer to the mystery of God's purpose in creating different peoples and nations and insists on their unity. According to the Hadith, when the Prophet stood up for a funeral, one of his companions remarked, "it is a funeral of a Jew." The Prophet replied, "Is it not a soul?" He said, "if you behold a funeral, then stand." It is known that the first Muezzin who gave the call for congregational prayers was Bilal, an emancipated Negro slave.

Another attitude which Islam shares with other religions is respect for life in its various forms. The Quran and the Hadith are explicit in respect for all forms of life. The Quran says "and there is not an animal on earth nor flying creature upon wings but is a people like unto yourselves. We have neglected nothing in the book of decrees. Then unto their Lord they will be fathered."

It also says: "Every creature knoweth its prayer and its praise; and God knoweth when they do." Even the sun and the moon and the stars.

Failure to understand the basic principles of Islam would mean
failure to appreciate the true spirit of Islam. The French proverb 'to understand is to forgive' is never truer than in matters concerning religion. Prophet Muhammad (Peace be upon Him) Himself never claimed that Islam was a new religion. He asserted, on the other hand, that it was as old as the hills. In Quranic theory Islam is a religion which has existed since the beginning of the earth and will exist till the Day of Resurrection. From time to time this religion is corrupted. When people forgot the principles of the true faith, God in His infinite mercy sent to them a Reformer, a Rasul, or a Messenger, in order that he may point the way and warn the people. Such were Abraham (Peace be upon Him), Ismael (Peace be upon Him), Moses (Peace be upon Him) and Jesus (Peace be upon Him), the son of Mary. Such was also Prophet Muhammad (Peace be upon Him), the son of Abdullah, who claimed that he was merely a man like others, liable to err in human affairs, but divinely guided and inspired in matters of religion.

The principle of brotherhood, which Islam has made real, is one of its greatest glories. All religions have taught brotherhood in various ways, but no religion in history can claim to have made brotherhood so real and natural in every day life. At this point one is reminded of the wars amongst Muslim nations in the world today which challenges the edifice on which Islam stands. As with other religions, so with Islam; what matters is what we do, not what we profess to be. In his last sermon, the Prophet told his people that excellence consisted only in deed. Pride of colour or race was condemned. The Arab is not superior to the non-Arab. You are all sons of Adam. And Adam was made of clay. Verily all Muslims are brothers. He said, "If a deformed Abyssinian slave holds authority over you and leads you according to the Book of God, hear him and obey him." Nowhere has the true spirit of Islam been so tersely summarised as in this last speech of the last Prophet of Islam.

SOCIAL DIMENSION

Islam is not a religion for the recluse. It is social in dimension. Its adherents live in society and they are required to live peacefully
among others irrespective of their beliefs. A Muslim must live a full life. He must be in the world, but not of it. In other words, his values should not be worldly, material and ephemeral. He has a transcendental vision of the world and of human existence. However, this does not mean that the earthly condition of human existence is irrelevant. On the contrary, Muslims are obliged to seek to build, to develop the social community and social environment, not to despite it or ignore it. Social conditions influence individuals, their thinking and acting. Sub-human conditions and inhuman relationships distort the concept of human dignity and the fundamental equality of all human persons. We must, therefore, seek to improve and develop the social condition of human existence.

Islam disavows coercion, constraint or imposition. The Quran says: *Laa Ikraha Fid-Deen*—There is no compulsion in religion. The right way has indeed become distinct from error (2:256). This is the attitude of Islam towards other religions. Islam, according to its own claim, is a ‘*Deen-al-Fitrarah*’ or ‘religio-naturalis,’ i.e., religion is but part and parcel of man’s nature, it is inborn in man and has only to be awakened in him. Thus, we in Islam are encouraged to work for an inter-religious brotherhood of the followers of all faiths. However, Islam rejects both irreligion and polytheism. The Holy Prophet was against the ideology of “believing in nothing and daring everything,” which he considered dangerous. A Muslim is enjoined to foster the factors that make for unity rather than seek to identify differences. Islam does not attempt to make religion a bone of contention. Nor does it seek to build fences of religious exclusivity. Rather, it seeks to build bridges of understanding. Islam is also a religion of hope. The Holy Quran says: “Don’t be despondent and don’t despair of the mercy and blessings of God whose mercy is all pervading.” Allah is the source of a Muslim’s hope, for Allah is Infinite Being and Infinite Power. It is the certainty of a Divine Providence that sustains all humanity that is the basis of our hope. In communicating with the Divine, human beings are reminded of their humanity, the common condition of frailty, of mutual need, of dependence on one another. We realise how contingent or dependent
In Islam, the channels of communion are called *Ibadat*. These are prayer, fasting, poor tax, charity in thought and belief in One, Unique and Universal God of all. *Ibadat* is to be practised without distinction or discrimination, for self-elevation or perfection of self, through spiritual, physical, moral and material practice.

The Quran also refers to *Muamalat*, which means one’s dealings with human society. Much emphasis is given to this aspect that it is said that God will not forgive a defaulter unless the person or the persons whom he had wronged forgives him. Obligations to one’s neighbour is a matter of paramountcy. The Holy Quran is explicit in its statement that one who is dearest to his fellowmen is dearest to God. It is an Article of Faith in Islam that we are answerable to God for our deeds—good or bad. Islam enjoins one to regard social welfare as important as one’s own welfare. Islam has also sought to assimilate other counsel, without *compromising* its principles, its basic concepts and its Articles of Faith. However, this does not mean it is syncretist in religion. It has not diluted its beliefs, but is open to the values of other religions and of other societies, provided they are not contrary to its own values. This absence of rigidity enables Muslim society to maintain an equilibrium between the essential requirements of Islam and those of modern complex societies.

**NOT EXCLUSIVE**

Islam is a religion which enhances the insights and values that have been preached by Prophets who are inspired by God, some explicitly and others implicitly, in different ages and different countries. The Quran states: “Say: we believe in God and in what has been revealed to us as well as to Abraham, Ismael, Isaac, Jacob and their descendents; we (also believe in) what was given to Moses, Jesus and to all the prophets raised by the Creator of the Universe; we accept them without making any distinction among them.” (2:136; 3:83).

Before the revelation of the Holy Quran some nations and people claimed Divine origin for their beliefs but denied such origin to the
creeds of other nations or people. This could be interpreted to mean that God did not provide His guidance to other people and nations. The concept of a ‘chosen people’ and its exclusiveness has caused dissension and discord among various members of God’s creatures. Islam does not subscribe to this concept, for it teaches that God has not made any invidious distinction between different peoples. The Quran commences with the words of glorification and thanksgiving to God, the Creator and Provider of the whole Universe. The words used here are so general that they include all the different peoples in different ages and different parts of the world. This verse clearly indicates that the Quran does not accept the belief in a special covenant of God with a particular people to the exclusion of all others. Perhaps, the concept of ‘a chosen people’ and of a special relevation, is open to a different interpretation, other than to suggest exclusivity or privilege. In all humility one should strive to understand the concept as perceived in the Jewish and Christian traditions before pronouncing on the validity of such concepts.

Be that as it may, the Quranic verse teaches a Muslim to believe that not only does the Creator and Provider of the whole Universe give the means of physical growth equitably to all on earth, but also He provides them with the means of spiritual development. This noble teaching assures to all people the certainty of God’s sustenance and providence. All mankind comprise a fraternity of dependent beings, destroying that narrowness of mind which separates brother from brother under the universal fatherhood of God.

There is another dimension of inter-faith relations which deserves close examination. God as the Creator is also the Lord of history. He was in the beginning, now is and ever shall be. He revealed Himself in all ages to different peoples in diverse ways. He was the unknown God of the animist, he was the personification of power as symbolised in the elements. He was a personal God whose assistance had to be invoked, who had to be propitiated, interceded with, worshipped, adored and glorified. He was perceived in a multitude of ways by millions of people. And God chose to guide people in every age through prophets, sages and teachers. The Divine
as the source of inspiration, was in some cases explicit and in others implicit. But the teachings of the various preachers of religions were not preserved in their original purity. The passage of time and the lack of efficient means to preserve such teachings intact led to human interpolations and wrong interpretations. The very language in which those teachings were proclaimed being liable to constant change, they became open to different interpretations. Later generations found it difficult to get at the original message and meaning. As time went on, new situations arose in human affairs, calling for a new order of things. Each age and emerging circumstances produced prophets for their time who sought to lead their society authentically. Prophecy is more than social criticism. Underlying the Prophet's critique is a world vision that is basically moral. The Quran says: "Every nation has had its guide" (10:47); "And there is not a people but a warner has gone among them" (35:24). That in every age a prophet has been raised among every nation is taught repeatedly in the Quran. This great truth was revealed to an unlearned Arab who did not even know what nations then existed and what scriptures they possessed. Such teaching is the basis for the universality of a Divine message to the whole of mankind. Humanity will always be under the deepest obligation to the Holy Prophet of Islam for enunciating this principle.

**FUNDAMENTALISM**

We move now from the sphere of Islamic teaching and belief to that of practice. An aspect of religious practice that has led to some discord is what has come to be called Islamic Fundamentalism. Among Muslims one does not speak of Orthodox Islam, Modern Islam, or Fundamental Islam. The term fundamentalism is mistakenly applied to Islam by non-Muslims in general, and in the modern world it bears a political connotation as well. One is made to believe that 'Fundamental Islam' does not permit inter-faith relations and tries to insulate itself from other religions that are practised. The perception of so-called 'Islamic Fundamentalism' is that held by persons with a background of what one might term 'secular Christianity.' This is no way implies any disrespect to
own political force and leadership. Griffiths concludes that it sealed the Muslim beliefs that their interests were separate from those of the Hindus and no fusion of the two communities was possible.\textsuperscript{18}

The Muslims of India now began to re-create their political history. The factors that forged the Muslim League were the old belief that the Muslims were a separate entity, and the Hindu character of the Congress which prevented Muslims from associating with other Indians; the agitation against the Bengal partition, which conveyed to Muslims the Hindu designs of domination, and the Muslim desire to have their exclusive electorates in all representative institutions.

The years 1906—1911 constitute a period when the Hindu-Muslim rift widened and deepened almost beyond repair. The Muslim League had been founded, separate Muslim electorates established, and the feeling grew that Muslim interest lay in cooperation with the British and in maintaining a severe aloofness from the Congress. Their only hope lay, believed Muslim leaders like Aga Khan, in the establishment of a Muslim political body to secure "independent political recognition from the British Government as a nation within a nation."\textsuperscript{19}

Jinnah, in the meantime, continued to increase his reputation and fortune as a lawyer ignoring both the Congress extremists and the League's sectarian aims. On any cause affecting the Muslims he was just and sympathetic, but in politics he did not raise his voice very much. He continued to attend meetings of the Congress and was yet hopeful of Hindu-Muslim unity.

The annulment of the partition of Bengal shocked the Muslims; and it created distrust in future promises and actions of the Government. For the Muslims, it heralded a new age of intense political consciousness and activity. Their first gesture of challenge was a resolution of the Muslim League in 1912-13 changing the League's aim from 'loyalty' to a "form of self-government suitable to India."\textsuperscript{20} 'Suitable' was the operative word for the Muslims still refused to identify themselves with the Congress demand for unqualified self-government. They retained the right to modify self-rule according to
Christianity. All it is meant to convey is that some Christians seek to emphasise the secular or horizontal dimension of Christianity, namely, that while religion could admit no dichotomy between the sacred and the secular, it must incarnate itself in the secular world. In other words, religion is not other-worldly. The kingdom of God begins on earth.

This view of Christianity is different from the fundamentalist position that the scriptures must be understood literally, that the vertical dimension of Christianity is more important and that the world is fraught with evil and therefore one has to guard against its dangers. It is a narrow, restrictive understanding of Christianity which would seek to protect its members within the confines of a ghetto. Thus, religion is regarded as a private matter.

The Quran makes it clear that religion cannot confine itself to one segment of human life, nor can it choose to abstain from exercising any decisive influence over everyday life. Religion is no private matter for each individual. The moral dimension of human activity, be it political, social or economic, is the concern of religion. Moral issues affect the relations not only of individuals but also of groups, communities and nations. It must be emphasised that Islam is a total and integral code and way of life and is concerned with every aspect of human well-being, whether it is religious, economic, social or political.

On the other hand, ‘fundamentalism’ has been understood to mean a restrictive interpretation of scripture and teaching and preoccupation with the preceptual aspect of religion, ignoring the moral dimension in human activity, unless there is explicit applicable reference in scripture to the ethics of the situation. The fundamentalist’s understanding of religion is different from the creative response of religion to specific situations and human predicaments. Fundamentalism lays store by the letter of the law or precept, ignoring its spirit.

There is still another understanding of the expression ‘fundamentalism,’ which represents both an individual and collective effort
of believers to look afresh at the teachings of the Quran in order to ensure that its pristine character is preserved. At this point one must condemn the actions of certain Muslim political leaders who have taken advantage of and abused their positions and employed certain strategies to achieve their own political ends by misquoting the Quran or the sayings of the Holy Prophet. They have contributed to the turmoil in the world. Islam has always had an integral set of values, completely self-sufficient, with only one standard of truth and commanding the believer to live an integral and authentic life, accepting nothing but what is harmonious and directly relevant to the way of life as indicated in the Quran. It is a perception of life in its totality.

History would recall the efforts of Lenin when he coined the term ‘Islamic socialism’ to capture the imagination of the peoples of the nine Muslim provinces of Russia and bring those people under the influence of his own ideology. Islamic fundamentalism to the Russian would then have a different dimension. Islam stresses that moral and spiritual development must accompany advancement in science, industry, economy and other beneficial aspects of life. Islam seeks to promote psychological and spiritual unity in which men and women are all brothers and sisters of one large family, irrespective of differences of language, place of origin, ethnicity or colour. The social system in Islam depends for its protection and progress on the individual himself, on personal discipline and adherence to individual conscience rather than on coercion or direction by any external power. For a Muslim, this system is basically sacred and belongs to the Supreme Authority—God, to whom man submits in love, obedience and loyalty. A believer’s first duty is spiritual. He must recognise that material power and gain may be a means to his advancement, which in any case must accord primacy to the spiritual. Islam which flourished among societies and nations with diverse cultures and histories during the past fourteen centuries, continues to grow and influence mankind in the civilised world. Modernisation or development is not perceived as being antithetical to Islam, provided the values of either process are not at variance with the teachings of the
Holy Quran. Islam is open and receptive to all that is good and conducive to the progress of man in all aspects of life. Again, Islam also respects the values of all religions and is opposed only to the irreligious.

JIHAD

Another aspect of Islamic thought that is misunderstood by non-Muslims is *Jihad*. They think *Jihad* means only a religious war that is waged in the path of God and according to their rules and instructions laid down for it in the *Shari'ah*. This is furthest from the truth. The truth is that whatever endeavour is made at a particular time for the preaching and propagation of Islam, and the moral and spiritual correction and guidance of mankind is the *Jihad* of that age. It is well known that the Holy Prophet remained in Mecca for about thirteen years after the mantle of apostleship had fallen upon him. During this period the *Jihad* of the Holy Prophet and his companions consisted altogether in adhering steadfastly to the faith in spite of the terrible persecution meted to them by their enemies, and in doing all that lay in their power to spread the Divine Message of Islam and to reform morally and spiritually those who lived around them. (See Appendix I for explanation of the relevant Sura).

To devote oneself to the noble task by guiding the ignorant and educating the ignorant, to spend time and their money on it and to sacrifice their comfort is *Jihad* in the *Divine Estimation*. In the present time this animates the tasks before every religious person. Islam does not divide its followers into two distinct categories of clergy and laity and therefore in the absence of a clerical order imposes on every Muslim the obligation to *understand* the message of its religion and practice its teaching as best as it can, and convey by precept and example to all those groping in the dark, the message of Islam, the message of light which is the message of divine guidance, love and mercy. A Muslim’s love for good and truth imposes upon him the duty to cultivate love for His creation. A Muslim’s expression of love for truth is not only to be truthful to
himself, to do that which is right and shun that which is evil in respect of his own self, but to disseminate the message of Truth, to enjoin the right and forbid the wrong as taught by the Holy Quran. A Muslim's interpretation of Jihad begins as a soul-searching exercise. To rid himself of Nafs Ammura (animal instinct), to develop Nafs Lawwana (the sixth sense—tranquility and human nature and seek to know himself—Mutma-e-Inna (understand yourself and become Insan Kamil—the spiritual plane). He knows then that to God all human life is precious and God is not for the chosen few. God is the Lord of the World. The Quran says: "That whatsoever kills a person, unless it be for manslaughter or for mischief in the land, it is thought that he had killed mankind. And whoever saves a life, it is as though he had saved the lives of all men" (Sura 35). The Holy Prophet of Islam said "Mankind is the family of God. The dearest among men with God is one who is good to his family." He continued to say "The whole earth is made a Mosque for me and the pure." He also said "Be kind to all living beings so that God may be kind to you. God is never kind to a person who is not kind to the people."

The Prophet also said that 'a Muslim who lives in the midst of society and bears with patience the afflictions that come to him, is better than the one who shuns society and cannot bear any wrong done to him.'

These three things are enjoined upon the faithful:

(a) To help others, even when one is economically hard-pressed;
(b) To pray ardently for the peace of all mankind; and
(c) To administer justice to one's own self and treat all justly.

Hadith confirms that the Holy Prophet on one occasion offered the Mosque to the Christian priests to offer their prayers. This particular Hadith is too well known among Muslims to elucidate.

The morality of violence as a form of punishment and the concept of a Just War are two other matters that need to be understood in Islamic jurisprudence.
The history of Islamic law and its legal system can be divided into four distinct periods. The first period began with the Hijrah of the Holy Prophet to Madina and ended with his demise. The second period commenced with the date of his death and the foundation of different schools of jurisprudence and would cover the period of the companions of the Prophet and their successors who did the compilation, interpretation and extension of the law by collective deliberation. The third period refers to the successful study of law, religion, and it was then that the four schools of Sunni were established. Since then there has been no independent approach and evaluation of the law and the jurists have been engaged within the limits of the four schools to develop the work of their founders. This fourth period may not be regarded as having come to an end as yet. The laws attempt to preserve the sanctity of human life and its dignity and concern for justice.

Rights according to Islamic jurisprudence are of two kinds. First, rights of God (society) and, second rights of the people as individuals. Punishment, according to Islamic law is divided into two classes—Hadd and Ta’zir. In Hadd, the measure has been specifically apportioned. In the case of Ta’zir, the court has the discretion as to the measure and form in which such punishment is to be imposed. Hadd is most difficult to impose and the instances are very few, according to recorded history. The law is prescribed for the protection of society. The social legislation of Islam aims at a state of affairs in which every man, woman and child has enough to eat and wear, an adequate home, equal opportunities and facilities for education, and medical care. Comprehensive social security schemes have been handed down in many Quranic verses and have been simplified by the Holy Prophet and the Caliphs. It is against this background that punishment is meted out. Hadd is a form of deterrent punishment that is meant to be imposed only when man behaves like an animal.

In regard to Just War, I would refer to Al-Hadith, Vol. II by Al-Haj Maulana Fazhul Karim. (See Appendix II).

In conclusion, Islam preaches the brotherhood of man. The
Muslim brotherhood is a community within the wider brotherhood of those who subscribe to the belief in the existence of the One God and the accountability of man on the Last Day. This brotherhood does not countenance either a superior or an inferior caste, nor does it believe in a fatalistic approach. Each man will reap what he has sown. Man must work out his own salvation. He cannot hope for anything for which he has not striven.
APPENDIX I

EXPLANATION OF SURA II : 178

Sura II : 178. O ye who believe!
The law of equality
Is prescribed to you
In case of murder:
The free for the free,
The slave for the slave,
The woman for the woman.
But if any remission
Is made by the brother,
Of the slain, then grant
Any reasonable demand,
And compensate him.

1. Note first that verse and the next make it clear that Islam has much mitigated the horrors of pre-Islam’s custom of retaliation. In order to meet the strict claims of justice, equality is prescribed, with a strong recommendation for mercy and forgiveness. To translate Qisas, therefore by retaliation, is I think incorrect. The Latin legal term Lex Talionis may come near it, but even that is modified here. In any case it is best to avoid technical terms for things that are very different. Retaliation, in English has a wider meaning, equivalent almost to returning evil for evil, and would more fitly apply to the blood-feuds of the Days of Ignorance. Islam says: ‘‘If you must take a life for a life, at least there should be some measure of equality in it; the killing of the slave of a tribe should not involve a blood feud where many free men would be killed; but the law of mercy, when it can be obtained by consent, with reasonable compensation, would be better. Our law of equality only takes account of three conditions in civil society; free for free, slave for
slave, woman for woman. Among free men or women, all are equal: you cannot ask because a wealthy, or high born, or influential man is killed, his life is equal to two or three lives among the poor or the lowly. Nor, in case of murder, can you go into the value or abilities of a slave. A woman is mentioned separately because her position as a mother or an economic worker is different. She does not form a third class, but a division in the other two classes. One life having been lost, do not waste many lives in retaliation; at most, let the law take one life under strictly prescribed conditions, and shut the door to private vengeance or tribal retaliation. But if the aggrieved party consents (and this condition of consent is laid down to prevent worse evils), forgiveness and brotherly love is better, and the door of mercy is kept open. In Western law, no felony can be compounded.

2. The jurists have carefully laid down that the law of Qisas refers to murder only. Qisas is not applicable to manslaughter, due to a mistake or an accident. Then, there would be no capital punishment.

3. The brother: The term is perfectly general, all men are brothers in Islam. In this, and in all questions of inheritance, females have similar rites to males, and therefore the masculine gender imparts both sexes. There are considering the rights of the heirs in the light of the larger brotherhood. In Sura 178-179 we have the rights of the heirs to life (as it were), in 180-182 we proceed to the heirs to property.

4. The demand should be such as can be met by the party concerned, i.e., within his means and reasonable according to justice and good conscience. For example, a demand could not be made affecting the honour of a woman or man. The whole penalty can be remitted if the aggrieved party agrees out of brotherly love. In meeting that demand the culprit or his friends should equally be generous and recognise the good-will of the other side. There should be no
subterfuges, no bribes, no unseemly bye-play: otherwise the whole intention of mercy and peace is lost.

With handsome gratitude
This is a concession
And a mercy
From your Lord
After this whoever
Exceeds the limits
Shall be in grave penalty.

Sura II: 179. In the law of equality
There is (saving of) life
To you, O ye men of understanding
That ye may
Restrain yourselves.

Sura II - 180. It is prescribed
When death approaches
And of you, if he leave
Any goods, that he make a bequest
To parents and next of kin
According to reasonable usage
This is due
From the God-fearing.

5. There are rules of course for the disposal of intestate property. But it is a good thing that a dying man or woman should, of his own free will, think of his parents and his next of kin, not in a spirit of injustice to others, but in a spirit of love and reverence for those who have cherished him. He must, however, do it “according to reasonable usage.” The limitations will he see further on.

Sura II: 181. If any one changes the bequest
After hearing it
The guilt shall be on those
Who make the change
For God hears and knows (All things).
Sura II : 182. But if any one fears
Partiality or wrong-doing⁶
On the part of the testator,
And makes peace between
(The parties concerned)
There is no wrong in him:
For God is oft-forgiving,
Most merciful.

6. A verbal will is allowed, but it is expected that the testator will be just to his heirs and not depart from what is considered equitable. For this reason definite shares were laid down for heirs later. (Quran—Sura IV, Verse II, etc.). These define or limit the testamentary power, but do not abrogate it. For example, amongst kin there are persons, e.g., an orphan grandson in the presence of surviving sons who would not inherit under the intestate scheme, and the testator might like to provide for them. Again there may be outsiders for whom he may wish to provide, and jurists have held that he has powers of disposition up to one-third of his property. But he must not be partial to one heir at the expense of another, or attempt to defeat lawful creditors. If he tries to do this, those who are witnesses to his oral disposition may interfere in two ways. One way would be to persuade the testator to change his bequest before he dies. The other way would be, after death, to get the interested parties together and ask them to agree to a more equitable arrangement. In such a case they are acting in good faith, and there is no fraud. They are doing nothing wrong. Islam approves of every useful device for keeping brethren at peace, without litigation and quarrels. Except for this, the changing of the provisions of a will is a crime, as it is under all Law.

own political force and leadership. Griffiths concludes that it sealed the Muslim beliefs that their interests were separate from those of the Hindus and no fusion of the two communities was possible.  

The Muslims of India now began to re-create their political history. The factors that forged the Muslim League were the old belief that the Muslims were a separate entity, and the Hindu character of the Congress which prevented Muslims from associating with other Indians; the agitation against the Bengal partition, which conveyed to Muslims the Hindu designs of domination, and the Muslim desire to have their exclusive electorates in all representative institutions.

The years 1906-1911 constitute a period when the Hindu-Muslim rift widened and deepened almost beyond repair. The Muslim League had been founded, separate Muslim electorates established, and the feeling grew that Muslim interest lay in cooperation with the British and in maintaining a severe aloofness from the Congress. Their only hope lay, believed Muslim leaders like Aga Khan, in the establishment of a Muslim political body to secure "independent political recognition from the British Government as a nation within a nation."  

Jinnah, in the meantime, continued to increase his reputation and fortune as a lawyer ignoring both the Congress extremists and the League's sectarian aims. On any cause affecting the Muslims he was just and sympathetic, but in politics he did not raise his voice very much. He continued to attend meetings of the Congress and was yet hopeful of Hindu-Muslim unity.

The annulment of the partition of Bengal shocked the Muslims; and it created distrust in future promises and actions of the Government. For the Muslims, it heralded a new age of intense political consciousness and activity. Their first gesture of challenge was a resolution of the Muslim League in 1912-13 changing the League's aim from "loyalty" to a "form of self-government suitable to India." "Suitable" was the operative word for the Muslims still refused to identify themselves with the Congress demand for unqualified self-government. They retained the right to modify self-rule according to
APPENDIX II

JIHAD (HOLY WAR)

(a) *Jihad*: The word is derived from *Jahadun* meaning exertion or striving. Technically it means exerting of one's power in repelling the enemy to the extent of one's ability, whether by word or by deed. It also means a war undertaken for a just cause and for the defence of Islam. The Holy Quran used the word in various ways:

1. "Those who strive hard for us, we will certainly guide them in Our way, and Allah is surely with the doers of good"—29 : 69.
2. "Whoever strives hard, he strives only for his own soul"—29 : 6.
3. "Strive hard for Allah such a striving as is due to him"—22 : 78.

It appears therefore that the word has been used in different senses, but some European writers twisted it in all cases of holy war.

(b) *Object of Jihad*: The Holy Quran says: "Permission to fight is given to those upon whom war is made because they are oppressed, and Allah is well able to assist them, those who have been expelled from their homes without a just cause except that they say: "Our Lord is Allah, and had there not been Allah's repelling some people by others, there would have been pulled-down cloisters, churches, synagogues and mosques in which Allah's name is much remembered, but Allah will help him who helps His cause"—22 : 39, 40 Q. The object of *Jihad* is therefore self-defence which is also a natural law with regard to all animals, and the object is not propagation of the faith. The Holy Quran strictly prohibited conversion by force saying "There is no compulsion..."
on religion"—2 : 256 Q. Jihad is Holy War in the sense that, had there been no war, no religious liberty, no justice and no house of God, irrespective of caste and creed, would have been saved. This magnanimous pronouncement of the object of war in protecting the holy places of all faiths is nowhere found in the world except in Islam. For absence of good motive in war, the world is now in utter chaos, and imperialistic and bureaucratic tendencies have cropped up to an amazing extent. All the wars undertaken by the Prophet and his companions were of this type. The Quran says in unmistakable terms about the object of war in another verse: "And fight in the way of Allah with those who fight with you, and be not aggressive"—2 : 190 Q. This verse also warns the Muslims not to be excessive in killing such as the killing of women, children and the old. The Holy Prophet used to pray in the field of Badr in the midst of actual fight: "O Allah! I beseech Thee to fulfil Thy covenant and Thy promise. O Allah! if Thou wilt, Thou will be worshipped no more."

(c) Against whom to fight? Fight must be against aggressors who create disturbance in the world and destroy the houses of God of all faiths. Islam however prohibits to fight with those who do not take an aggressive part or who are under any treaty with the Muslims on payment of Jizya tax which is a token of submission to Muslim rule. The Quran recites: "(Fight with the aggressors) except those of the idolaters with whom you made a treaty. They have not injured you in anything and have not backed up anyone against you. So fulfil their treaty to the end of their terms. Surely Allah loves those who are careful of their duty"—9 : 4 Q. Again it says: "If one of the idolaters seeks protection from thee, give him protection till he hears the word of Allah, then make him reach his place of safety. This is because they are a people who do not know"—9 : 6 Q. Again the Quran says: "Allah does not forbid you
respecting those who have not made war against you on account of (your) religion, and have not driven you further from your homes, that you show them kindness and deal with them justly. Surely Allah loves the doers of justice"—60 : 8 Q.

(d) Merits of Jihad : Jihad is one of the chief meritorious acts in the eye of Islam and it is the best source of earning it, but it shall be undertaken with the intention of self-defence as said above. If it is purged of that motive, it is devoid of all merits:

1. He who fights for chivalry, heroism. fame of worldly gain acquires no merit and the aggressor is doomed to eternal perdition (23 : 53, 54).

2. Jihad is the best action of a Muslim (23 : 19).

3. A great reward has been promised for supplying even arms and ammunition to the warriors (33 : 80).

There are innumerable traditions relating to the merits of Jihad. Here are a few traditions:

1. Merit acquired in Jihad is no less than what is earned in praying and fasting (23 : 1).

2. Fire will not touch a foot which trod the path of Allah (23 : 8).

3. All the sins of a martyr will be forgiven except debt (23 : 19, 20).

4. The doors of paradise are under the shade of swords (23 : 60).

5. Paradise is guaranteed for the martyrs (23 : 39, 40).

6. A coin spent in the way of Allah brings innumerable blessings (23 : 37). For these rewards, the Holy Prophet wished that he should die several times in holy war and be back to life several times for holy war.

(e) Spiritual Jihad : "The greatest Jihad," says the Holy Prophet,
"is the fight against the evil passions of oneself (4:193) because there are the enemies of the soul working secretly to undermine the more vital qualities of man. The great tussle which ensues in the mind between the good and evil forces of a man is called the greatest fight. There are two propensities in a man—beastly and angelic. Man is an animal and therefore he has got like other animals the propensities of an animal. He has also got a soul, a thing from Allah, and therefore he has also got propensities for good deeds. At the age of discretion, one tries to prevail over the other. The struggle of the soul to gain the upper hand over the animal nature in a man is called the greatest fight or Jihad.


South Asian studies as such have been on the wane in North America, more so since the late-1960s due to some other regions attaining more geo-strategic vitality in the global policy-perspectives of the U.S. in particular. The temporary upsurge for ‘going-East phenomenon’ in the Age of Protest in the late 1950s and early-1960s withered away in the decade of quiet 1970s. No wonder, the South Asian Sub-continent was a no-priority at all for the U.S. strategists in the said decade and similarly, the graduate courses or research dealing with the said region turned into a more routinized and non-ambitious pursuit.¹ Due to the events in Iran and the beginning of stalemate in Afghanistan, happening in 1979, an added stir took place in the official as well as academic circles that resulted into a massive source-material as South-Asia-related themes.² The area became a hotted of heightened rivalry between the superpowers; quick paced developments of regional vitality took place and along with serious researches, a general curiosity about the region, its peoples, their socio-political, religio-economic realities increased on a rather unprecedented scale. In the host of books, surveys, articles, reports, seminars and conferences, debates on aid plans, bi-lateralism, hari-splitting on issues like nuclear programmes, or regional cooperation one finds an activated journalistic courage. On the region as such,³ Richard Reeves, Passage to Peshawar is a representative piece of journalistic literature on Pakistan based on his visits to the country in the summers of 1983 and 1984—"because of my wife’s work; she
was preparing a report on conditions in the camps housing more than two million refugees from war across the border in Afghanistan." Richard Reeves, a contributor to The New Yorker magazine with sojourns with The New York Times and Esquire is a syndicated columnist whose column appears twice a week in 150 newspapers across the U.S. Besides, he is the chief correspondent of 'Frontline,' the documentary series of Public Broadcasting Service. Richard Reeves published six books earlier including American Journey; A Ford, Not a Lincoln; Old Faces of 76; Convention; and Jet Lag.

An early version of Passage to Peshawar appeared in the form of a long article in The New Yorker in October 1984 raising a mixed reaction by the readership. (The New Yorker had earlier serialized Ved Mehta's autobiographical writings in the Summer of 1983). Based on fourteen chapters, the paper-back has on its cover the portrait of a Pashtun holding a 303 rifle with the winding Khyber Pass in the background. The book touches upon almost every subject such as the workers at the Gadani Beach, Kalash in Chitral, Afghan refugees, American diplomats, high officials in the Pakistan Government, women, literacy, university life, political developments, U.S.-Pakistan relations and the Pakistani expatriate labour. Going through the pages one feels as if the author has written the book in quite a haste and at stages frequent generalizations in the form of sweeping statements pinpoint the lack of a substantial knowledge of the cultural realities, historical cross-currents and the new emergent forces in the Pakistani scenario. To Reeves, the struggle is between modernism and traditionalism, whereas to a keen observer of Pakistan, there is more to it. Pakistan, like most of the countries in the world, is a multi-ethnic society where regionalism, economic disparity, quest for an egalitarian and a viable socio-political order, persistent role of pressure groups and regional issues pose serious challenges adding to the host of internal and external threats. Reeves, in spite of his 'sensational' and provocative style, poses, serious questions about some of the basic problems afflicting Pakistani society and his 'pinchy' observations cannot be brushed aside as mere criticism by some Western roving journalist.
He seems to have enjoyed his journey through the country: "There were many wonders and exotic ways between the Hindu Kush and the Arabian Sea. Pakistan is an exciting place, from the ancient city of Mohenjodaro to the ancient ways still practiced in the pagan valleys Rudyard Kipling wrote of in The Man who would be King, just to be in the country was an adventure." He feels uncomfortable with a lack of cleanliness in the people and grumbles at official functionaries for their tardiness. "Moving around the country, I felt as if I were spending half my life in PIA offices—Pakistan International Airlines—forever confirming and reconfirming, finding the person who was willing to handle something for me." To him, the toughness of the people in harsh circumstances from ship-breaking at Gadani beach to the fasting millions in Ramazan, including those Westernized elites with whom he interacted the most, is an amazing reality: "On the contrary, I saw some of the most sophisticated people in the country bended in the faith that month with the meanest of their Muslim brothers and sisters... to the point of endangering their health." Reeves keeps on wondering at the perseverance of the struggling people who feel the tensions due to the developments across the borders: "The United States had become a great friend of Pakistan, a multi-billion dollar friend, since the Soviets moved the first of more than 100,000 troops into Afghanistan on December 24, 1979, to impose a subservient government on the people of that country between the southern border of the Soviet Union and the northern borders of Pakistan." Thus, Pakistanis, "because of the geopolitical chance that put their lands along invasion routes mapped by strategists from Alexander and Genghis Khan to Leonid Brezhnev, were going to be facing the consequences of many decisions—many of which they never made."

The influx of the Afghan refugees in Pakistan and the resultant imprints on the observers create a sense of pathos simultaneous with many questions about these uprooted people in a friendly country: "On the roads and in the bazaars, the Afghans themselves blended into the people and the summer dust of Asia before monsoons. There were no walls, no fences, no guards around the refugees or their
camps. The image I remember of those people coming through the passes of the Hindu Kush with only what they could carry is of men and boys and water buffalos in muddy irrigation canals.” And, of course, the wounded amongst them are the tell-tale of a lasting human misery. “A young man, what was left of him, held my eyes with his until I cried as the blankets were pulled from his wasting body, most of it scar tissue from burns.” It again brings Richard Reeves to the people of Pakistan and what they suffered when the world’s greatest and acutely painful migration took place in 1947-48. “It was that pending slaughter, driven by the dark energy of ages of hostility and by forces even more mysterious and frightening to Westerners, which convinced the British to run—leaving the people of the subcontinent free and independent to pick up the bodies and the political pieces.”

Reeves wonders at the way bureaucracy works in Pakistan and poses the question in his seventh chapter. “Who Runs Pakistan?” It is the core of his entire study and may raise quite a few eyebrows: “Somewhere behind these telephones—and the bend over windows of the bureaucracy—sat the latest generation of civil servants of high education and low pay (often the children of the last generation) who had been administering, manipulating, avoiding and fearing the illiterate masses since the fateful day that the first Englishman showed the first Indian the proper elbow and wrist motion for banging paper with a rubber stamp. Whether you wanted to build a steel rolling mill near Gandani Beach or go to college or bury your recently deceased uncle, you needed the right papers. And a lot of them. And it cost . . . . The civil service (at its higher levels, the VIPs and VVIPs) controlled the recommendations, the permissions, the passes, the letters, the telephone calls that made things happen in Pakistan—the things that the civil service wanted to happen. In its most refined form, the special recommendation was family. Nepotism was the nervous system of Pakistan.” He frowns at the oligarchy of influential, well-connected families that are running or ruining Pakistan with no change whatsoever in the entire system from “the illegal commerce of the country, from bakhshish to the smuggling of tires and narcotics, seemed to a very large extent, to be financed by and profiting the same old oligarchy.” By data, he proves the domination of such
families in all fields of Pakistan’s local, regional and national life and who “could not afford to have new power centres and politicians attracting and agitating their own illiterate masses.”

Reeves is horrified at the rate of literacy in the country in the wake of so-called Urdu-English controversy. He was surprised to find lowest rate of literacy amongst Pakistani women and their tough livelihood in rural areas in particular. The figures he has given on the total strength of the trained and skilled professionals are too disappointing and more so in case of working women in the urban centres. The frustrations of the youth “in a society of stunning boredom” has resulted, to him, in the wider use of drugs resulting into a wider glum where “men mainly stared; there was not much smiling . . . laughing I rarely saw joy like that in Pakistan.” Richard Reeves might have seen such dismal scenes, yet in many cases like in rural areas, despite drudgery, life in folk traditions has still retained some of its colourfulness, though the psycho-economic tensions are there.

Before ending his book, Reeves admonishes his own country for not doing enough for the furtherance of education and health standards in Pakistan. “The shame of the United States of America was that in countries under American patronage, Pakistan for one, the illiterate masses stayed illiterate, while in countries under Soviet patronage—Cuba and Nicaragua were examples—people learned to read and write within one generation.

“Why were we the ones afraid of literacy, the great carrier of modernization? I was astounded to realize that my country, the one place and people who had the most to gain materially and spiritually from the modernization of other peoples, was out there resisting the most fundamental linkage between the old and the new-literacy.” Reeves feels that with positive help from friends like the U.S., Pakistan can resolve many of its problems and a new era can ensue in the history of these hard-working people.

Richard Reeves’ book, as mentioned above, raises many questions and answers very few. It raises challenges for the reader and invites
the serious attention of the policy-makers. Modernization of the society seems to be the pre-occupation of the author throughout the volume, yet one may differ on the means and fruits of modernization, too. Like the foreign aid, modernization and foreign models are not the panaceas for countries like Pakistan. The overhauling of the set-up, a viable, representative and participatory political order added to by cultural vitality, long-term planning, increased sincere efforts for literacy and health, decentralization, better management of resources and a tolerant system can gear Pakistan toward a prosperous future. Reeves' book is not an anthropological or political study, yet despite its certain weaknesses, it is thought-provoking. Most of all, we need to know what do others think of us? It is our prerogative to differ, but the diversified feedback to our knowledge of ourselves, interacted in a more tolerant way can be eventually beneficial to us. It is an interesting addition to the recent more research-based studies on Pakistan emanating from the United States by authors like Wolpert, Ziring, Wriggins, Baxter, Cohen and others.\textsuperscript{6}

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