Pakistan as a Frontline State in War Against Terrorism: Cost & Benefit Analysis

Lubna Sunawar*

Abstract

Pakistan being an immediate neighbor of Afghanistan and a historical U.S. ally became frontline state not only in combating terrorism but a victim of aggression itself in multiple forms including sectarian conflicts, instability and extremism, discontent in the provinces, militancy, and growing violence which has dragged the country into social, political and economic quagmire. Today, Pakistan has become a source of great concern for the U.S. regarding combating terrorism. Pakistan’s western border is used by Taliban and Al-Qaeda terrorists as a safe haven where they could easily pursue their activities. These terrorist not only posing a serious security threat to the stability and security of Pakistan but on the other hand, they are trying to destabilize U.S. and its allies reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan in the War against Terrorism. This precarious situation has given these terrorists a free hand to exploit already deteriorating condition and they successfully create toxic propaganda on the basis of a narrative of government’s failure to provide stability and prosperity to the deprived people of the region.

Since Pakistan has been a key ally of Washington; it has contributed more than any other coalition partner of the U.S. in this ongoing War against Terrorism including sacrifices of more than 8,500 Pakistan military personnel and as many as 35,000 Pakistani civilians. Pakistan under President Musharraf regime not only banned several militant terrorist organizations but it acted in a prompt manner in detaining thousands of extremists from its territory. It captured many high value Al-Qaeda and Taliban terrorists thus extending full length support to the U.S. military and law enforcement agencies in rooting out terrorists’ network.

U.S. is very much aware of the fact they could not have killed and captured terrorists without the co-operation and support of Pakistani intelligence. But on the other hand, American officials believe that Pakistani military is not playing an effective role to combat terrorism. They often blame that Pakistani military is playing a dual role with the U.S. and its allies and is supporting the Afghan Taliban on the other side of the border in Afghanistan where they undermine NATO and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) efforts to bring peace and stability. Since 9/11, Washington and Islamabad have different perceptions and strategies to combat terrorism with outstanding differences but somehow both unequal partners in War against Terrorism have tried to

*Author is a PhD Scholar at Peace and Conflict Studies (PCS) National Defense University (NDU) Islamabad – Pakistan.
manage their ties. Undoubtedly, the most important and grave concern from the Pakistani military perspective has been the U.S. unreliable role in this War against Terrorism and the way it has been showing its distrust regarding Pakistan’s military efforts to fight terrorism.

This study basically examines post-9/11 period and the impact which this War against Terrorism has created on U.S.-Pakistan relations. It emphasizes:

i. the role of Pakistan as a strong and vital diplomatic, military and logistic ally of the U.S. and

ii. the repercussions for Pakistan in a long run and its position on the international stage. However, Pakistan’s role in this war is a complex phenomenon in terms of its implications.

Key words: Pakistan, War on Terror, border, groups, Taliban

From the beginning of the 1980s through September 2001, Islamabad has been supporting numerous Pashtun militant groups which were considered to be friendly and a potential asset for Pakistan against other regional players particularly India to safeguard its strategic interests in Afghanistan. In this regard, the most aligned group had been the Afghan Taliban. After 9/11, Pakistan was left with no choice but to side itself with the U.S. in their effort to defeat the Taliban government and to eliminate Al-Qaeda network in Afghanistan. Pakistan in the pre 9/11 period continued to provide sanctuary to Al-Qaeda and Afghan Taliban leadership who enjoyed asylum in the Pashtun territories of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)(Barnett & Abubakar, Oct 2006) and the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) adjacent to Afghanistan. As time passed on, these Afghan refugees have developed strong influence within Pakistani society and they managed to occupy jobs in major cities with great ease. (Katz, 2009)

During the past sixty six years of Pak-U.S. relationship, both countries have had a history of sharing strategic objectives in the region. For example, in the Cold War period, both unequal partners jointly fought against Communism as a threat. The post Cold War period witnessed a drastic shift, Communism was no longer a threat for the U.S. National Security after the disintegration of USSR but to fight against terrorism became the top most priority for the U.S. administrations.

On September 11, 2001 the people of the U.S. and the world had undergone a dreadful act of terrorism. The Bush Administration within a matter of hours conceived this execution as an act of war. This action had been taken as an international crime against humanity and it was quite obvious that the
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retaliation would come along with severe consequences in a long run. President Bush announced a war to eliminate terrorists’ network which eventually led to a War on Terror. President Bush declared:

“The deliberate and deadly attacks which were carried out against the U.S. were more than acts of terror.”

http://www.whitehouse.gov

Just War Theory in all accepted forms prohibits and condemns terrorism or wars of terror. The intended killing of noncombatants in the battle field is a War Crime which needs accountability. Such a military strategy which projects the brutal use of force against weaker opponent is an act of terror which in no case is justified. It violates the primary rights of innocents on a massive scale without determining any clear jurisdiction in order to accomplish military and political objectives which do not warrant the ideology of terrorism for whatever purpose it is carried out. In the given context, where terrorism can be used as immoral and illegal tactic to apply from the perspective of the Just War practice, it can be argued, for that reason, keeping in view the level of force which is being used in self-defense against terrorism is justifiable and morally an acceptable norm in International Law. This response and interpretation may be closer under the established custom of “preemptive” act to some extent. (Snauwaert, 2004)

In a global context, the Bush Doctrine has a close association with its agenda of strategic dominance under the banner of War against Terrorism. The intention of the Bush Administration to carry out pre-emption doctrine in a unipolar world is clearly difficult and complicated. The new U.S. global approach is power-driven and is more based on power projection; some would call it imperialistic tendency of the super power to rule the world. The vital questions which need to be addressed are:

i. Is the War against Terrorism is interlinked to a foreign policy of the super power; when its own national security is at stake?

ii. Does it obtain all the rights for expansion and projection of power by all means at hand?

If the expansion of power is the driving intention, then one can come to the conclusion that the doctrine of pre-emption is unjustified; it is being driven by a wrong intention for the sake of ruling the world in hegemonic manner. (Snauwaert, 2004)

As a matter-of-fact, the Bush Doctrine created a critical situation for Pakistan with no clear way out either to impede or go along with U.S. military
engagement and tracking down of Al-Qaeda’s remnants who have taken safe asylum within Pakistan. President Musharraf himself called it a “shockingly blatant threat” told the prospect for the use coercive force was a real and decisive possibility against Pakistan in case of noncompliance. (Musharraf, 2006). However, in the wake of 9/11, a section of Pakistani establishment was very much aware of its strategic involvement in Afghanistan and the support which it had been extending to Taliban leadership. They were mindful of the fact that it had not been on the same level as it used to be in the 1990s. But the most deplorable factor for Pakistan which played a key role had been the lack of political will and resources. By that time, these non-state actors established strong foothold within Pakistan territory and were posing a serious threat to its security and stability. Pakistan has been a vital source of support for the U.S. in the War against Terrorism but according to radically changed international political environment, Pakistan had to readjust its own security dynamics and safeguard its national interests at regional and international level. (Moeed, 2003).

If a sovereign national government assigns or permits clear and major violation of the Human Rights of its own people within its territory, and it is indulging in committing crimes against humanity at massive scale (e.g., genocide) then it has nullified the social contract and thus has lost its claim over sovereignty and credibility. In such particular cases, the international community is morally justified perhaps even required in every possible case to intervene in order to protect the civilians. (Snauwaert, 2004).

War on Terror has called into questions which are directly interlinked with Public International Law. The U.S. is carrying out drone attacks in Pakistan. This becomes highly controversial and needs to be explored in the light of Human Rights violation and other morally justified norms. U.S. Administration has asserted it has taken a position in the light of International Law of Armed Conflict (ILOAC) which indicates that the U.S. is at war not only with Al-Qaeda but Taliban leadership and their affiliates with a moral justified standing. (Harold, 2010).

Pakistan did not officially request the U.S. to come into its territory and kill terrorists. In the light of this fact, any projection for the use of force within Pakistan’s territory by the U.S. is illegal. (Akbar, 2011). If the U.S.’ action of conducting drone attacks against terrorists is accepted for a while, even then it raises following points which are debatable and need particular attention:

i. Drones attacks which are carried out by CIA within Pakistani territory on its civilians are clear violation of (ILOAC) and this make
the action of the U.S unlawful and create intricacy to deal with Taliban and Al-Qaeda.

ii. Bombing of places which are inhabited by local population including houses, schools, mosques, and public gatherings cannot be morally justified on any human ground because these are not military targets. In such like a situation, it has become very easy for Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) to take advantage of this argument by raising question on Pakistan’s alliance with the U.S. If terrorism is condemned by TTP, then it is the U.S. who is committing terrorist acts in forms of drones because it kills the innocent either by targeted killing or bombing. It would not be wrong to say that counterterrorism strategy is not targeting terrorists but it is killing the innocent civilians too.

iii. The U.S.’ use of unnecessary projection of force cannot be acceptable at the cost of high civilian casualties.

iv. Killing of civilians is an obvious violation under Article 3 of Geneva Convention which proclaims that a person who is not involved in any major act of aggression cannot be murdered or subjected to violent behavior in form of torment and severe treatment under any situation. (Akbar, 2011).

The United Nations Security Council’s Charter has not authorized any nation to use aggressive force against any other sovereign nation for carrying out unilateral attacks and the U.S. has no right under above mentioned basis to use drones against any sovereign nation. In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, the Security Council passed Resolution 1368 which condemned the 9/11 attacks on the U.S. mainland and activated Article 51 of Self-Defense. But along with this, the Security Council did not however authorize the use of force against any particular state for any self-vested reason. Even if it did carry such action, this particular action would have to have complied with the principles of requirement and proportionality and would have been based on some rational grounds in order to prove the use of force. Necessity in the *jus ad bellum* refers to the decision of any state to use force as a last option and that the use of major force can accomplish the required purpose of defense. (Bayman, 2006). Apparently, the basic purpose of U.S. to use drone attacks in Pakistan is to kill the militant insurgents. These elements are quite active in attacking the U.S. troops in Afghanistan or have joined with Al-Qaeda to design future 9/11-type deadliest attacks against the U.S. or any other nation of the world. (Mary Ellen, 2010).
In Congressional hearing in March 2009, David Kilcullen, said:

I think one of the things we could do that would send a strong message right now is we could call off the drone strikes that have been mounted in the western part of Pakistan. I realize that they do damage to Al-Qaeda leadership. Since 2006 we have killed 14 senior Al-Qaeda leaders using drone strikes. In the same time period we have killed 700 Pakistani civilians in the same area. The drone strikes are highly unpopular. They are deeply aggravating to the population. And they have given rise to a feeling of anger that coalesces the population around the extremists and leads to spikes of extremism well outside the parts of the country where we are mounting those attacks. Inside the FATA [Federally Administered Tribal Areas] itself some people like the attacks because they do actually target the bad guys. But in the rest of the country there’s an immense anger about them. And there is anger about them in the military and the intelligence service. I realize it might seem counterintuitive, but we need to take our foot off the necks of these people so they feel that there’s a degree of trust. Saying we want to build a permanent relationship, a friendship with them whilst continuing to bomb their population from the air, even if you do it with robot drones, is something that they see through straight away. (Kilcullen, 2009).

It is believed that U.S. drone strikes regularly kill far more unintended targets than intended ones in the western section of Pakistan. It is evident that drones do not kill only targeted militants but there is a great possibility that these drones kill high numbers of civilians. In areas, where armed clashes occur frequently, local population prefers to vacate or take some safety measures in order to be on safe end. (Mary Elen, 2010).

U.S. War on Terror: Impact and Apprehensions for Pakistan

The U.S. Administration’s representatives and well-known U.S. think tanks now realize the need and importance to develop long-term, practical and strategic partnership with its key ally Pakistan. They are keen to continue this relationship even after the partial withdrawal of U.S led NATO troops from Afghanistan by the end of 2014. The former U.S. Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton in a briefing to the U.S. Congress admitted this fact that U.S. left Pakistan all alone after the withdrawal of the Soviet troops at the end of the Cold War. This abandonment led Pakistan into the situation where it had to cope with the outcome of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan during the 1980s in the form of extremism and militancy and is one of the U.S. biggest and regrettable mistakes. During the same Congress hearing she also
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accepted that U.S. has not been fair to Pakistan and treated it in a poor manner. (http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2009). This statement was encouraging from the perspective that it carried a positive message of acknowledgement and realization by the U.S. at official level of the past administrations’ mistakes in its policies toward the region and particularly its relationship with Pakistan. In a later statement before the U.S. Armed Services Committee, she also admitted that the U.S. strategy against Al-Qaeda has not been persistent and remain ambiguous over the last 8 years since this War against Terrorism started back in 2001. The U.S. is fighting this war without any particular focus and as the focus remain elsewhere which gave Taliban and Al-Qaeda a golden opportunity to gain momentum; not only in Afghanistan but across the border to a country which has attained nuclear capability as well and has numerous challenges to face as a key ally of the U.S. to combat terrorism. (Amer, 2010).

After the end of Cold War, President Bush took clear advantage of the events of 9/11 which itself provided chance to the Bush Administration to advance its foreign policy aims and the extensive use of power projection and intervention on massive scale against the weaker and economically poor states. (Wilkinson, 2007).

The history of Afghan war (1979-1988) is still very much alive for Islamabad to forget. The U.S government completely disregarded the importance of development of good relations between Osama Bin Laden and Inter Service Intelligence agencies of Pakistan. The U.S. policy makers and analysts were fully aware and concerned that a large and massive aid provided to Pakistan during the Afghan war through ISI was used in the development of Pakistan’s nuclear capability in future. But at that time because of U.S. involvement in Afghan war, the primary purpose was the defeat of the Communist forces. So Pakistan’s nuclear program did not raise any concern and was deliberately ignored by the U.S. policy makers. But, once the Afghan war ended, the Soviet troops pulled out from Afghanistan, the U.S. dramatically cut-down its aid for Pakistan and Afghanistan. Afghanistan which had already been a bleeding ground and was pushed in a messy situation in form of internal strife between different warring factions ultimately resulted in political instability, expansion and strengthening of Al-Qaeda network and other Mujahidin groups.(Clarke, 2004).

The U.S has never hesitated in withdrawing its support but it has also introduced many sanctions on Pakistan from time to time against its all time most allied ally. This has further exacerbated and undermined its ability to play any productive role in bringing peace and stability for its western neighbor. (Gates, 2014). The Bush Administration had already decided for a concrete
military action against Al-Qaeda network and Taliban leadership in Afghanistan much before the event of 9/11. This clearly reveals the strategic objectives of the U.S., i.e. not only to fight terrorists but the real purpose of this war launched as anticipated by the neo-conservatives had dual agenda including the regime change in Iraq and the removal of the safe havens of terrorists in Afghanistan. (Zakaria, 2008).

It is not wrong to say that 9/11 incident proved to be a blissful factor from Pakistan’s perspective. President Musharraf who was earlier struggling to gain the legitimacy of his action against elected civil government in a form of bloodless military coup successfully received not only legitimacy from the world in general and U.S. in particular; but this Global War on Terror provided Pakistan with massive military and economic aid.

Though, it was evident from the very beginning that President Musharraf failed miserably to develop any long term strategic partnership with the U.S. Since both the partners have had their own national interests to pursue which make this ongoing War against Terrorism venture less effective. In addition, as far as the presence of militants is concerned, both the U.S. and Pakistan have different strategies to contain them. International media has been underlining Pakistan’s ineffectiveness as a potential player in this war. In Los Angeles Times, Harrison while highlighting the significance of U.S- India relations in the region shows apprehension by saying: “if Pakistan is an ally of the U.S., then good luck to the United States of America. (Harrison, 2001).

The Pentagon and U.S. State department share the same view that their strategic interests could be better paid off whenever there is a military dominated government in Pakistan as it has been the case in the Cold War period. The Bush Administration after gauging Pakistan’s precarious position in the wake of 9/11 moved fast and wasted no time and announced lucrative rewards for Pakistan for its categorical support and cooperation as a frontline state in the U.S. War against Terrorism.

The U.S. had a large coalition of countries who strongly condemned terrorist act on U.S mainland. Pakistan was also in the eye of the storm as it had the history of association with the Taliban. As Pakistan had been the principal supporter of highly unpopular and un-recognized Taliban regime, it was asked by the U.S. to use its influence to persuade Taliban leadership to handover Osama bin Laden unconditionally. The ISI Chief, General Mehmood was on official visit to the U.S. when 9/11 occurred. The U.S. official took advantage of his presence and conveyed U.S. demands to the Pakistani military government led by then General Musharraf, for launching U.S. led military operation in Afghanistan. (Harrison, 2001).
The U.S. on the basis of ground realities never tried to threaten Pakistan with the use of military action in case of non compliance. However, the U.S. officials threatened to add Pakistan to a U.S. State Department’s list of seven terrorist-sponsoring nations due to its close association with the Taliban regime. (Barbara & Nicholas, 2001). According to one high-ranking officer at U.S. Embassy Islamabad, President Musharraf was told categorically to abandon support which was being provided by his military government to Taliban leadership or be ready to be treated like the Taliban which itself was quite alarming because the U.S. tone was aggressive. (Christine, 2004).

General Musharraf’s narrated in his memoir, *In the Line of Fire*, the tone of U.S. Secretary of State Poel was rigid who asked him to decide whether we were with them or with the terrorists. He further adds that the U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage, was even more rude in conveying his message to General Musharraf through ISI Director General Mehmood that Pakistan was left with almost no choice as we had to choose sides and if we chose terrorists, we were told by U.S. Deputy Secretary to be prepared to be bombed back to the Stone Age. (Christine, 2004).

In Musharraf’s book, *In the Line of Fire*, he claimed that some of the demands were “ludicrous.” (Musharraf, 2006). For example, Musharraf explained that the fifth demand depended “on the interpretation of what comprises of verbal support for terrorism.” (Musharraf, 2006). In his memoir, Musharraf strongly asserted that he never agreed to the second or third demand because granting the U.S. total access to Pakistan’s naval ports and fighter aircraft bases would jeopardize Pakistan’s “strategic assets.” (Musharraf, 2006). He stated that he only agreed to give the U.S. permission to use two bases, far from “sensitive areas,” that could only be used for logistics and aircraft recovery purpose, and not for any offensive operations. (Musharraf, 2006). According to Musharraf, “The rest of the demands we could happily live with.” (Musharraf, 2006). He was happy that the U.S. accepted his adaptations to the demands without creating any fuss. (Musharraf, 2006). There was a general notion in Pakistan that General Musharraf accepted the demands completely and without any adjustments.

The U.S. conveyed these demands to Pakistani leadership on 13th of September, 2001 i.e just within 4 days of the bombing on the U.S. main land. It was quite obvious from the aggressive tone of the U.S. that Pakistan had to pay the price of its links with the Taliban and the U.S opted for coercive diplomacy in the wake of 9/11 which ultimately left Pakistan with no other viable option to go for.
On 19 September, 2001 General Musharraf addressed Pakistani nation. During his speech, Musharraf highlighted four critical concerns which compelled him to make Pakistan the U.S. coalition partner: Pakistan’s stability and security particularly in face of Indian aggression from the East in general and the U.S in particular, the recovery of the economy which was in shambles, Pakistan’s nuclear and missile assets and finally the Kashmir issue which has been the most pivotal problem between India and Pakistan till date. He declared that “Pakistan comes first, everything else is secondary.” (Musharraf address to the nation, 2001).

Pakistan in all circumstances occupies a major place in the strategic calculations of the American policy makers and they are completely aware of Pakistan’s contribution on War on Terror. This argument is further authenticated by the fact, although the Bush Administration was knew of the double dealing of the ISI, but it still preferred to rely upon ISI for sharing of important intelligence information pertaining to Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. One cannot entirely hold Pakistan responsible for carrying out policies which do not serve U.S. strategic interests in the region but U.S. has not been fair to Pakistan when it comes to Pakistan’s role as a frontline state in this War against Terrorism.

According to Pakistan’s Embassy official in Washington, D.C, “Pakistan has deployed more than 1,00000 of its troops to the Afghan border and has launched more than 38 major successful operations to flush out foreign terrorists who are a threat to stability of region in general and Pakistan in particular. Pakistan is the only regional country in South Asia to participate in the U.S. coalition maritime interdiction operations, the foremost maritime component of Operation Enduring Freedom. Additionally, the intelligence provided by Pakistan has led to numerous successes against terrorism around the world from capturing to handing over top Al-Qaeda terrorists. For example, all of the top Al-Qaeda leaders captured till date have been seized in Pakistan with the government’s help, while Pakistan itself has arrested more than 700 terrorist suspects. The government of Pakistan has also taken many steps to ban and place under strict monitoring a large number of sectarian and militant organizations and enacted numerous antiterrorism laws by freezing 32 bank accounts which were suspected of belonging to terrorist organizations.” (Touqir, 2005-06). For all the above mentioned services which Pakistan rendered unconditionally to the U.S, Pakistan in return expected a high level of foreign investment, aid and trade on smooth basis. It also wanted free market access of its products to Europe and the West and a long term bilateral economic working relationship with the western world in general and the U.S. in particular. (Azeem, 2009).
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Even after 13 years of this ongoing War on Terrorism, there is a clear trust shortfall on both sides. Despite this supposition, there has been little or almost no understanding between Pak-U.S. officials of how the funds given by the U.S. were actually being utilized within Pakistan in its support for U.S. led War against Terrorism. The U.S. strongly believed that the Pakistani military utilized these funds by purchasing conventional military equipment for its own domestic needs instead of fighting terrorism and advancing U.S. strategic objectives in the region. (Adam, 2011). The U.S. and Pakistan though with different objectives and unequal partnership in this War against Terrorism are believed to be in a “billing dispute of sizeable proportions” over the use of the billions worth of dollars which are being provided by the U.S. to Pakistan in the last couple of years. Washington has rejected more than 40% of the claims which Pakistan put forward as compensation. This includes military equipment, food, water, troop housing, and other operating cost during the military operation on the basis of “unsubstantiated” or “exaggerated” claims far from reality. (Adam, 2011). While the U.S. is of the view that Pakistan is spending the foreign aid on the purchasing of items that are not directly relevant to the purpose for which it was meant to be used. Some U.S. officials have been constantly showing apprehension by saying that “some of the aid is being diverted to the border with Pakistan’s traditional rival, India.” (Umbreen, 2011).

Pakistan has certain reservations and raised concern from time to time regarding its role in War against Terrorism. There is a general public reaction in Pakistan pertaining to its role as a front line ally of the U.S. The policy planners of Pakistan share the same perception that once the U.S. “War on Terror” is over in Afghanistan, Pakistan will once again be an isolated and abandoned to tackle with the consequences of the war by utilizing its own efforts. Pakistan will lose a front line status and along with this, as well as the U.S. favorable gesture as this had been the case in post Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Regrettably, the War on Terrorism today is no more confined to Afghanistan only. It has now entered into Pakistan’s border areas where large numbers of militants have entered and taken asylum. These elements consider this territory quite safe and suitable for planning and executing their terrorist campaign. These militants have been a serious security and political problem which has compelled Pakistan Army to take a strict military action against them. The militant are comprised of Taliban and Al-Qaeda and many other terrorists of foreign nationalities particularly from Central Asian Republics. They have now gained multiple strength by joining many local religious militant groups within Pakistan. They are together more organized than ever before and have established strong foothold to carry out terrorist activities. A large section of people in Pakistan believe that Pakistan is the net
loser as a U.S. partner in a long run since this War against Terrorism started back in 2001. (Islam, 2008).

Pakistan today has fallen victim and is vulnerable to non-state actors called “Pakistani Taliban.” They are trained in the “Madrasas” or religious schools located in tribal belt which has been the custom since Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. (Gunaratna & Khurrum, 2011).

Christine Fair in her article “Pakistan Losses Swat to Local Taliban,” says the so called process of Talibanization which was previously confined only to South and North Waziristan has now developed strong foothold in settled and largely inhabitant Tribal areas of Pakistan such as Bajaur, Mohmand agency, Orakzai, and Kurram agency.

At present, the U.S. is heavily involved in its efforts to eliminate Al-Qaeda network and Taliban strong foothold. It requires politically stable and economically strong Pakistan to fight terrorism and extremism as a frontline state. In addition to that, a state which can promote U.S interests in the region. On the other hand, the relationship between the two countries at the same time has both advantageous and disadvantageous dimensions. (Gunaratna & Khurrum, 2011). In the U.S. led War against Terrorism, Pakistan entered to combat terrorism. Today Pakistan is struggling hard for its very security and survival not only from external forces which pose a serious threat but from the internal growing tendencies in form of militancy and fundamentalism that has made Pakistan the front line target of the terrorists and their notorious plans. (Rana, 2009).

The terrible situation which Pakistan is facing regarding terrorism is directly related to the 1980s when General Zia was in power in Pakistan. Pakistan inherited the legacy of the Afghan war because of its front line status as a proxy state in the war against Soviet Union. This Afghan war had directly impacted Pakistan socially, politically and economically. General Zia adopted Islamic policies which have had a negative impact and led to sectarian violence. Due to Pakistan’s ISI involvement into Afghan war, Pakistan had become a weaponized society. Extremist elements took full advantage of many controversial laws introduced in the name of Islam. They exploited religion for their own self-vested interests and eventually gained strong foothold.

The U.S. due to its strategic objectives in Afghanistan ignored the rise of extremism in Pakistani society as an outcome of Afghan war and fully backed General Zia of his unconditional support to the U.S. It was also during General Zia’s period in the 1980s when Mujahideen were all prepared, trained and
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equipped from the Pakistani camps especially established for this purpose by ISI and CIA. From there they went into Afghanistan in order to fight Soviets and expansion of their Communist agenda in the region. The Mujahideen of yester year who played a pivotal role in the fall of Soviet Union in Afghanistan were abandoned by the U.S. once the war was over. They left with no clear future vision and these Majahideen joined hands with like-minded people and later emerged as Al-Qaeda and Taliban with anti-American backlash. Amir Rana writes, in later years these Majahideen with the help of strong collaboration of religious parties and other jihadi groups form or join the local Taliban militant groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan as well.’ (President Musharraf interview with CNN, 2004).

In addition to external front where Pakistan is heavily involved in fighting terrorism and facing threat from its both neighbors in the East and North-West; it is confronted with host of other numerous internal problems including ethnic violence, sectarian hatred, ineffective police, poor law and order condition, corruption, poverty, a poor economy and lack of good governance. Due to ineffective police and poor law and order situation, the society witnesses bomb blasts and suicidal attacks. Mostly security forces and installations are the main targets but now public places even mosques are more vulnerable and have become the target of terrorists thus exposing government’s failure to tackle the situation effectively.

Thus, despite Pakistan’s offering unconditional cooperation to the U.S. led coalition in post 9/11 to eliminate terrorists’ networks; a cloud of ambiguity still hangs over Pakistan-U.S. relations. U.S. rhetoric to “do more” without acknowledging to what extent it has dragged Pakistan to its own so-called War on Terrorism. Since 2003, U.S. military commanders raise concern that Pakistani security forces are not doing enough to capture the militants. As these militants are capable enough to target NATO and ISAF forces stationed in Afghanistan and then they flee into Pakistani frontier with great ease. President Gen. Musharraf denied this accusation in one of the interviews with CNN:

I don’t think any other leader has said that we are not doing enough and we need to do more. It is unfortunate that these statements come from the Afghan leadership’.….we are fighting the same enemy. If we start throwing blame on each other, we weaken our positions. (Khurrum, 2010).

The U.S. and the Western world strongly believe today that Pakistan’s western Tribal belt bordering Afghanistan has become a home of terrorists where government writ does not run thus giving them the firsthand opportunity
to plan and execute attacks. In sum, undoubtedly, the Tribal areas of Pakistan are being utilized as a safe haven by these terrorists where government seems failed apparently to establish its writ and so far this has been the most serious concern for Obama Administration. (Gunaratna & Khurrum, 2011).

In the history of this country, Pakistan Army for the very first time launched military operation in the Tribal areas against terrorists. For this action, government has to face domestic disapproval of its action from the media, masses and leading various political parties. In addition to this government initiative, the terrorist incidents have enormously increased in Pakistan and become a norm of the day. The expenditures of the operation which is an essential component in the War against Terror also added an extra burden to an already ailing economy of Pakistan. The growing trust deficit in Pak-U.S. relations and the lack of acknowledgement of Pakistan’s role as a front line state have created a serious split between Pakistan-U.S. relations.

Another area of concern for the U.S. is the political unstable Pakistan with weak institutions, economy and other major problems which Pakistan is confronted with make it more vulnerable to extremism and militancy. If these issues are not addressed effectively and go unnoticed, then there is a growing fear for Obama Administration that Pakistan which is surrounded by numerous external and internal problems will be an easy prey for terrorists to take over. This is one of the reasons that Washington is not happy with and has shown concern for Pakistan’s nuclear arsenals which it believes could be easily taken over by the terrorists. U.S. wants to see a stable and economically strong Pakistan which it considers is too essential to counter terrorism in the region for peace.

It is assumed that after the partial withdrawal of the U.S. led NATO troops from Afghanistan, the situation will be more precarious for Pakistan in the region as U.S. priorities will also be changed accordingly. In that situation, the U.S would prefer to move towards India (as it has always been the case) its traditional ally and is more favorable and economically strong than its strategic partner Pakistan. If it happens as mentioned then this policy shift will definitely make a big difference in this region in general and for Pakistan in particular.

Reimbursement for the losses incurred upon Pakistan in the War against Terrorism is nowhere to be seen. The funds which are being promised to Pakistan as a coalition partner by the U.S. are being badly postponed, over audited and drastically reduced on the basis of various excuses, conditions and pretexts made by Washington from time to time. Congress has set certain conditions pertaining to extending military co-operation which are difficult to meet. According to general perception, Pakistan not only suffering from the
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loss of human lives and the damage of vital infrastructure but it is fueling the whole bill of War against Terror by itself. This has been a source of great concern for Pakistani civil and military leadership who think that as a non major NATO ally, Pakistan is only being used as a proxy tool to advance U.S. strategic interests in the region.

Being the neighboring country of Afghanistan, Pakistani society, politics, security environment, continuous political turmoil and economic structure has undergone a very severe but this is an uncertain change for the worse. What Pakistan gets in Afghanistan especially in post 9/11 period and from its partners in War against Terrorism is a big question mark. To many, it is a complete disregard of its contributions and sacrifices. The eye opener incident soon after the Afghanistan invasion by the U.S. was the installation of Northern Alliance dominated government in Afghanistan despite of Bush Administration’s time and again assurance to Pakistan that no anti-Pakistan government would come to power in Kabul. This has given India a value added advantage to intervene in Pakistan and to build number of consulates and missions along the border of Pakistan and it also enables India to sabotage Pakistan’s efforts for the dialogue process with Taliban.

At times, the U.S. officials have been skeptical over the role of Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), which it considers a strong player with ability to influence the extremists on both sides of the border where they have taken safe asylum. Keeping in view, ISI pivotal role during the Soviet Afghan war, U.S. feels that still ISI maintains close association with the extremist elements who are trying to destabilize peace process. Due to uncertain political future of Afghanistan after the withdrawal of U.S. led NATO troops, Pakistan would be left on its own to tackle with the likely aftereffects of U.S. War on Terror in the region and that is why ISI wants to take all major stake holders on board.

The drone attacks have severed Pak-U.S. relations gained momentum in 2007 but the earlier strikes were kept secret for one or the other reasons and were even denied by the Pakistani government officials. It is generally believed that the Pakistani government has not only accepted drones on its territory but has given the approval for the attacks. It is only possible with due intelligence information which is being provided by the military establishment to the U.S. intelligence agencies to execute these attacks in Waziristan. The U.S. has acknowledged that without Pakistan’s co-operation and intelligence information pertaining to Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, the success in this War against Terrorism could not have been possible at any cost and would remain just a dream far from reality.
Pakistan-U.S. relationship faces a sharp downturn since 2011. Three major incidents in a row of 2011, including Raymond Davis Case, Osama bin Laden’s death and Salala tragedy at the end of year marked a clear trust deficit and lack of understanding on both sides. In addition to this, U.S.’ continuous rhetoric to “do more” and conditions in relation to aid flow imposed by Congress on Pakistan from time to time badly damaged their partnership.

Undoubtedly, the effective counter insurgency operations in ground need time and patience to achieve productive results; especially when the insurgents are equipped with more sophisticated weapons, well trained and financed. To make the matter more worse, they enjoy the support of a friendly population and have mastery over the land. The Tribal areas of Pakistan have been used as the battle ground for ongoing military encounters between the security forces and insurgents. This war effected area might need ten years or more for rehabilitation and reconstruction to be pacified through economic development and administrative reforms which are already being taken by the government. (Sarwar, 2009).

Conclusion

Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired, signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed. The world in arms is not spending money alone. It is spending the sweat of its laborers, the genius of its scientists, the hopes of its children. (Dwight Eisenhower)

The advent of 9/11 attacks has changed the U.S. traditional character of dominance and primacy as a sole global power. It is now focusing more on the strategy of deterrence rather than the conventional political tools to tackle with the security related issues. 9/11 attacks have brought an opportunity for the U.S. to interpret the doctrines of Self-Defense and Pre-Emptive Strike in a way it likes. The U.S. has interpreted these doctrines primarily to seek out the legitimacy and the excuse for use of power to the world pertaining to its own self defense.

Today Pakistan is confronted with numerous external and internal challenges and the military operations which it launched in the Tribal areas in order to eliminate them for its territory. Thirteen years back when Pakistan joined this U.S. led Global War on Terrorism, it was a reluctant partner. But with the passage of time, it has played a very vital and crucial role in eliminating Taliban and Al-Qaeda networks.
Fighting against terrorism is not just an uphill task for Pakistan and the U.S. who are facing massive repercussions and severe consequences but for the entire world community to deal with this threat with prudence and sagacity. The stable and peaceful Pakistan and its relations with Afghanistan after the withdrawal of U.S. led NATO troops are very important for the U.S. in the region. By eliminating the fatal diseases from the society that have sabotaged Pakistan to a greater extent, i.e extremism and terrorism; it is understood that the U.S. can be victorious in its pursuit to defeat violence and terror which for now is like a utopian model to achieve. If the two unequal partners in the War against Terrorism want to achieve their objectives; mutual faith, joint support and collaboration must be central to Pak-U.S. relationship.

In order to combat militancy and terrorism, Pakistan civil and military leadership should formulate a coherent strategy. Without any clear roadmap, it would not be possible to defeat the menace of terrorism. Before going to negotiation table, Pakistan civil and military leadership should not forget that history of peace deals with terrorists is not satisfactory when we look back at peace agreements conducted by Pakistan Army during President Musharraf era; as these peace pacts are being violated by the terrorists from time to time. Use of force against militants should be an option if table talks fail to produce any concrete result. The U.S. can help Pakistan to a greater extent to tackle the external and internal issues it faces today. While military co-operation undoubtedly is essential for combating terrorism but it cannot provide any assurance of major dramatic change in the Pak-U.S. relationship overnight. This co-operation can and must be expanded at political, economic, and social level between two countries.

Bossy language, undue demands, criticism, and blaming each other over past failures from both sides would not yield any productive results at the end of the day; but will instead damage the mutuality of their common understanding. Building a unanimous agreement to deal with the threats Pakistan is facing requires an effective strategy at both civil and military level. Terrorism today is a deadly disease which has spread its tentacles all across Pakistani society, but can be rooted out by joint strategy within its strategic working partnership with the U.S. in years to come.

The negative perception in the western world prevails against Pakistan’s role as a frontline state. The U.S. in particular and western world in general is skeptical of Pakistan’s military role in the War on Terror. It is generally assumed in International media that Pakistan is not doing enough to promote U.S. strategic interests in the region. In real politics, every nation has national interests which it keeps supreme and which cannot be sacrificed at the cost of national interests of other nations.
Pakistan public has shown severe resentment and outrightly rejected any possibility of compromising state sovereignty at government level. For instance drone attacks, presence of foreign troops to be stationed on Pakistani soil for a long period and allowing much room for foreign intelligence agencies to work within the country with great ease, and the signing of non-transparent agreements without determining any clear limits to what extent this co-operation must be extended on the War against Terrorism. All these highlighted concern have caused great uneasiness among the people, as a result masses have lost trust on the elected parliament. Thirteen years back, Pakistani nation supported President Musharraf’s decision for joining the anti-terrorism partnership for the protection of the national interests and in the face of imminent threats which it faced from India and the U.S. led coalition forces after 9/11. But it is the dire need of the time that the conditions and limits of collaboration with the U.S needs to be redefine now in a clear-cut way, especially keeping in view the worsening security situation on Pak-Afghan border.
End Notes


From “Address by the President of Pakistan General Pervez Musharraf to the Nation on 19 September 2001.”


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