Jinnah – Liaquat Partnership and the Muslim Cause in South Asia

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Abstract

Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah was the most popular of all the leaders amongst the Muslims of South Asia during the freedom movement and Liaquat Ali Khan had the distinction of being his most trusted deputy. Liaquat considered Jinnah as the only person who could put a new life into the Muslim League and save the Muslims of South Asia. Jinnah found in Liaquat a companion who could help him in his mission. Liaquat had great respect for Jinnah and Jinnah trusted Liaquat the most. Both shared a common passion - to serve the people. Combination of the two not only helped the Muslims of South Asia achieve a separate homeland for them but also worked to combat the problems Pakistan was facing at the time of its inception.

Key words: Muslims, South Asia, Muslim League, Independence Movement, Congress

If Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah was the commander of the Muslims of South Asia during their struggle for freedom, Liaquat Ali Khan played the important role of his most trusted lieutenant. Both of them possessed almost opposite traits – Jinnah was a skinny figure with a serious personality and was hardly found mingling up with people and developing friendship; on the other hand Liaquat was a stocky figure with a smiling face. He was good not only at dealing with the people but was also very friendly and people used to enjoy his company (Moon, 1974, 147). Jinnah was always shy of the camera but Liaquat was always aware of the camera and used to look at its lens (Long, 2005, 125). Yet the diversity in personality helped them establishing an unbroken partnership, which led to the creation of Pakistan. The differences in temperament were overcome by the fact that the two of them shared a common passion to serve their people. Both had legal minds, lived in England and understood the British psyche. Financially, the two of them were well-off and thus they had neither to work nor to live on donations and could devote their full time to their main cause. Liaquat had great respect for Jinnah and Jinnah trusted Liaquat the most. Liaquat accepted Jinnah as his leader and willingly played the role of his deputy. No doubt, there was a long list of people who were ever ready to assist Jinnah, but in his eyes Liaquat held a special position. The tasks, which were against the profile of Jinnah or the assignments in which Jinnah did not want to come up front, were always assigned to Liaquat and he, on most of the occasions, successfully performed them.

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Liaquat was inspired by Jinnah even prior to the days when the two actually developed a relationship. Unlike other feudal of his era, Liaquat was a staunch nationalist, ever since his youth, and was determined to get rid of injustices and maltreatment meted out to the Indians by the British. He rejected the offer of the British Government to join Civil Services after his graduation and on the enquiry of his mother replied that he considered it noble to serve his own people than to serve a foreign government (Mawat, 1987, 15). On his return from London, after completing his education, Liaquat, like Jinnah, started his political career as a believer in the concept of Indian Nationalism. Yet, to serve the political interests of the Muslim community was always his priority. He was approached by the prominent leaders of the U.P Congress to join the party but he refused their offer and joined All India Muslim League in 1923. When Jinnah, with the help of some other Muslim leaders, decided to put new life in the Muslim League and held its annual session in May, 1924 at Lahore, Liaquat, like many other young Muslims, attended the session (Afzal, 1967, iv).

The direct connection between Jinnah and Liaquat were first time established when the latter hosted a dinner party for Jinnah’s wife, Ruttenbai at Simla in 1924 (Mustafa, 1953, 39). However, it was a one off event and the two never met again for the next few years. Inspired by Jinnah’s political wisdom, Liaquat, however, supported him on different political issues. Liaquat endorsed Jinnah’s stance on the withdrawal of the Muslim demand of separate electorates and then the idea of boycotting the Simon Commission. Liaquat’s vote against the motion in favour of the Commission proved decisive in U.P. provincial legislature (Ahmad, 1970, 203). Liaquat was politically introduced to Jinnah when he was nominated as one of the twenty one members of Muslim League who participated in the All-Parties Convention held in 1928 (Mitra & Mitraed, 1990, 1928, Vol. II, 397). During the discussions on the Nehru report, Liaquat whole heartedly supported Jinnah’s stance (Allana, 1976, 285). The two of them also participated in the Round Table Conferences in London where they were once again almost on the same wave length.

After Liaquat’s second marriage with Ra’ana¹, the couple went to Europe for a delayed honeymoon in 1933. Jinnah in those days was in England, serving a

¹ It is interesting to note that the first marriages of both Jinnah and Liaquat were arranged and they took place when they were young. Later, after attaining maturity, both of them again got married and this time with the girls of their own choice. It is also a coincidence that the second wives of both the leaders were not Muslims by birth and they embraced Islam at the time of wedding.
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self-exile. While in London, the couple met Jinnah in a social function. Jinnah invited them for a dinner at his residence. In the meeting that took place on the occasion, Indian politics was discussed at length and Liaquat persuaded Jinnah to go back to India and assume the leadership of the Muslim League. He, along with his wife, tried to convince him that he was the only person who could put a new life into the League and save the Muslims of South Asia from complete disaster. Jinnah, after some reluctance, showed his willingness and asked Liaquat to survey the situation and feelings of the people regarding his return. He made a commitment that if Liaquat would give him a green signal he will return to his motherland (Bolitho, 1969, 105). Liaquat on his return home talked to a cross section of people and when he was convinced, he wrote to Jinnah asking him to come back. The latter responded according to his promise (Ziauddin, 1990, 30). This was the first manifestation of Jinnah’s trust in Liaquat and it proved to be the beginning of a unique relationship between the two. Jinnah, who at that time was in search of a close associate, found the one in Liaquat (Imam, 1970, 195). From then onwards, Jinnah, though out his life, had a complete faith in Liaquat and Liaquat proved himself to be a man who followed Jinnah without slightest doubt or reluctance.

Before the return of Jinnah to India, Liaquat wanted to bridge the gulf between different factions of the Muslim League. He called for the Council meeting of the party in New Delhi on March 4, 1934, in which the League leaders with different point of views were invited. The All India Muslim League Council meeting on March 4, 1934 not only resulted in the removal of differences in the ranks of the League but the party also unanimously elected Jinnah, in his absence, as the president of the united body of the Muslim League (Pirzada, 2007, Vol. II, 204). With this Liaquat’s interest in politics was enhanced and started working full time for the League. Jinnah visited India twice during 1934 and then in early 1935 he finally sold his house at Hampstead, London and shifted back to Bombay. On his return, Jinnah’s first priority was to reorganize Muslim League and for this he needed a good team. He offered Liaquat to become the General Secretary of the party, which Liaquat agreed after a little hesitation. Jinnah himself moved the resolution for the election of Liaquat as Honorary Secretary of the Muslim League for a term of three years in the twenty fourth session of the party held at Bombay in April 1936. The resolution number X passed in the All India Muslim League Twenty-Fourth Session on April 11-12, 1936, was unanimously adopted by the session (Pirzada, 2007, Vol. II, 236). Liaquat held this office till the establishment of Pakistan.

Liaquat developed differences with the Muslim League leadership of United Provinces over the issue of the distribution of tickets for the elections of 1937. He believed that the provincial leaders dominating the League Parliamentary Board in the United Provinces did not enjoy support of the masses for having
veiled kinship with the Congress (Afzal, 1967, vi). The major point of differences between Liaquat and leaders like Khaliquzzaman and Nawab Ismail was that the former represented rural class while the latter represented urban class. He resigned from the Board and contested and won the elections to United Province Legislative Assembly as an independent candidate. In the house, instead of Muslim League benches, he sat on the seats reserved for National Agriculturist Party of Nawab of Chattari (Inqilab, 1937, April 27). However, Liaquat’s differences remained only on the provincial level and he remained loyal to Jinnah and the Muslim League in the national politics and continued to hold the position of the General Secretary of the party.

In a letter to Jinnah on November 11, 1936, he also resigned from the Central Parliamentary Board but while giving the reason for this act he mentioned that he did not want to put Jinnah in “any embarrassing situation” (NAP, QAP, 335/2-3). No doubt, the two leaders were not in contact with each other from May to October, 1937, but it was only because Liaquat was out of the country performing his duty as member of Indo-British Trade Commission. Otherwise, he continued his relations with Jinnah and before leaving for London visited him on his trip to Bombay in May 1937. On his return Liaquat wrote a letter to Jinnah on November 16, 1937 in which he gave suggestions for the improvement of the League (NAP, QAP, 335/25-27) shows that Liaquat, in spite of all the differences, was still anxiously thinking of and taking full interest in the reorganization and strengthening of the party. Finally, after some negotiations with the Central Parliamentary Board, Liaquat started sitting on the Muslim League benches (Khaliquzzaman, 1961, 190). When Nawab Chattari was invited to form Government in U.P., he is reported to have offered a ministry to Liaquat but the latter rejected the offer (Mawat, 1987, 60). It was also Liaquat, who published the Pirpur Report in November, criticizing the anti-Muslim policies of the Congress provincial governments. When Khaliquzzaman was absent from the UP Assembly during the winters of 1938-39 to attend Palestine Conference, Liaquat filled in the vacuum of Muslim League’s leadership in the province (Long, 2004, 7).

Jinnah was not disappointed with Liaquat’s decision to contest 1937 elections as an independent candidate as he was well aware of the complications of the U.P. provincial politics. He knew that the controversy of Liaquat’s differences with other members of the U.P Central Board was negatively attributed to Liaquat only by a segment in the press, which undermined Liaquat’s whole hearted and selfless attachment to the Muslim League (Mujahid, 1981, 24). When M.A.H. Isphahani inquired that why was Jinnah not taking a strong

\[2\] For the other side of the story see (Khaliquzzaman, 1961, 152-188).
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action against Liaquat?, he replied, “With regard to Liaquat Ali, the matter is under consideration. Have a little patience” (Zaidi, 1976, 95). Central Parliamentary Board of Muslim League under the leadership of Jinnah refused to accept Liaquat’s resignation and informed him that he was still a member of the board. In the Patna session of the Muslim League, Jinnah termed Liaquat as a ‘great asset’ for the party and helped him being once again unanimously elected as the Honorary Secretary of the League, in the Resolution number VII, passed in the All India Muslim League Twenty-Sixth Session, December 26-28, 1938 (Pirzada, 2007, Vol. II, 290).

Liaquat, along with Jinnah, emerged as the main actor on the Muslim political scene. He worked to promote consciousness, commitment and sense of loyalty amongst the Leaguers and made them equipped with the tools which could help them prepare the ground to launch a struggle in the times to come. He helped Jinnah in the re-organization of the party and opening up of its branches throughout India. It was his idea to make a ‘shadow cabinet’ for the party on the pattern already practiced by Congress or the British Labor Party (Wolpert, 1984, 161).

Liaquat advocated the idea of the participation of students in politics and encouraged them to organize the student wing of Muslim League. He also considered it important for the party to have its own English Newspaper and suggested Jinnah to launch one from Delhi. Liaquat started working on the project of launching a Muslim League English newspaper since 1941. It was because of his efforts that ultimately the Dawn was published first as a weekly in 1941 and then became daily in 1942 (Long, 2005, 133). Jinnah used to take Liaquat’s advice before making any big decision. The idea to celebrate day of deliverance on December 22, 1939 was taken by Jinnah only after getting Liaquat’s consent, who in his letter written on November 11, 1939, suggested that ‘it will show to the people in India and abroad that the return of the Congress ministries, without a settlement with Mussalmans will lead to great trouble’ (NAP, QAP, 335/40-44). The strategy for the celebration of the day was also finalized on the advice of Liaquat, who suggested that the Day of Deliverance should not be ‘observed to gloat over the exit of the Congress, but to offer thanks to God for releasing the country from an oppressive regime’ (Star of India, 1939, December 11).

The untiring and sincere help that Jinnah was getting from Liaquat made him acknowledge that it was a pleasure for him to work with Liaquat (Haq, 1966). The trust Jinnah had in Liaquat can be judged from the fact that Jinnah in his will signed on May 30, 1939 nominated Liaquat, alongside his sister Fatima and his Bombay solicitor Chawala, as the joint executors and trustees of his estate. Though after signing the will the Jinnah lived for another decade
but he never amended the document. This shows that how close was the personal relationship between the two and how much trust Jinnah had in his chief lieutenant (Wolpert, 1984, 170-71). The depth of relationship can further be counted from the fact that before Jinnah had his own house in Delhi, he always used to live with Liaquat on his visits to the city. Once, in September 1939, Pir Ali Mohammed Rashdi inquired from Jinnah that though the League by that time had emerged as a truly mighty organization, yet it only revolving around the personality of Jinnah and had no second line of leadership, not even a number two man, who could hold on. Jinnah without waiting for his statement to be concluded moved in his chair, waved his hand in his usual manner and said ‘Liaquat, Liaquat, Liaquat’ (Rashidi, 1970, 135).

Liaquat always wanted Muslim League not to support the British in their war efforts and it was primarily because of his arguments that Jinnah ultimately decided to withdraw the party’s support for the British during the Second World War. In his letter to Jinnah on November 16, 1939, Liaquat felt concerned about not having a defined policy of the party towards the war and showed his mistrust in the Unionist co-members of the League (NAP, QAP, 335/36-38). In another letter written on December 11, 1939, he was of the view that ‘nothing will satisfy them (British) except the support of the Muslim League like slaves’ and hoped that party would ‘never agree’ to give such a support (NAP, QAP, 335/124-126). He even supported Congress on several motions against the British in the Legislative Assembly during the war years. It was on his suggestion that Muslim League asked its members not to join the Viceroy’s National Defence Council and when few of them refused to obey the instruction, Liaquat, as General Secretary of the Party, issued them notices to explain their conduct before the Working Committee of the League. Jinnah was completely behind Liaquat in his stance and was even ready to start a conflict with Muslim political stalwarts like A. K. Fazlul Haq and Sikandar Hayat on this issue.

Liaquat was not absent from the scene even when the Muslim League under the leadership of Jinnah decided to redefine their goal and demanded for separate state(s) in the Lahore session of the party in March 1940. When the Muslim League started looking for options to find a constitutional solution to their problems, Liaquat actively participated in the meetings of the party and gave important suggestions. By that time he was convinced that the British democratic system was not suitable for India. On August 1, 1938 he issued a press statement in which he criticized the Federal portion of the act of 1935 as it to him, provided ‘inadequate safeguards for the Muslims’ (NAP, QAP, F.49/187). He supported Jinnah’s idea of partition and being the General Secretary of the party moved a resolution in the Subjects Committee on March 22, calling for the rejection of the 1935 Federal Scheme and the formation of
independent states comprising of Muslim majority areas with necessary territorial adjustments. On the objection that why the names of the Muslim majority provinces were not included in the resolution, Liaquat replied, ‘If we mention Punjab by name, then it shall mean that the frontier of our state extends to Gurgaon, whereas under territorial adjustment we want to include in our proposed state Delhi and Aligarh which are the centers of our culture and education’ (Batalvi, 1976, 22).

After the Lahore Resolution, Liaquat spent all his energies to advocate the League’s mission for the political division of India. He toured different provinces, interacted with the Muslim leaders as well as masses tried his utmost to defend the position taken by his party. At a time when Jinnah was also pre-occupied in negotiating with the British Government and the Congress and hardly had any time to plead his case before the Muslims of South Asian, Liaquat became the focal point and worked for the political mobilization of the Muslim masses. He successfully made arrangements to hold Pakistan Conferences all over the country in order to popularize the idea of a separate homeland among the Muslims. Liaquat hailed the idea of Pakistan as the charter of independence for the Muslim India and appealed to the community to unite under the banner of Muslim League and support its demands(Mitra & Mitraed, 1990, 1941, Vol.II, 235). As member of the Muslim Masses Civil Defence Committee, Liaquat played an important role in keeping Muslims away from the Congress activities and brought about greater solidarity and contact between the Muslims of the various provinces(Mitra & Mitraed, 1990, 1943, Vol.I,278). Indeed, a great deal of credit for consolidating the position of the League and projection of the idea of Pakistan goes to Liaquat.

Jinnah trusted both the competence as well as capabilities of Liaquat and wanted to give him the maximum number of important assignments. In 1941, Liaquat was elected as the member of the Central Legislative Assembly on the ticket of Muslim League, where he was immediately appointed as the Deputy Leader of the party. As Jinnah, the parliamentary leader of the League was not able to take active part in the proceedings of the Assembly on account of his bad health and heavy political workload, the whole burden of saving Muslim interests in the assembly fell on Liaquat’s shoulders. Liaquat at the same time was also the Convener of Muslim League’s Parliamentary Board, member of All India Muslim League Civil Defence Committee, Managing Director of Dawn trust, the Convener of Committee of Action and the Honorary General Secretary of the Muslim League. Liaquat worked with dedication and devotion to justify the confidence of his ‘Quaid’. It was in recognition of his services to the Muslim nation that Jinnah while recommending his name for the post of Honorary General Secretary in
December 1943, described him as his ‘right hand man’. Jinnah further declared in the Thirty-First Session of All India Muslim League, that Liaquat was a ‘thorough proletarian’ and hoped that ‘other Nawabs would follow his example’ (Pirzada, 2007, Vol. II, 447).

A controversy related to Liaquat’s betrayal of Jinnah appeared when the former held a series of meetings with Bhulabhai Desai, the leader of Congress in the Legislative Assembly, in the autumn of 1944. In these meetings a formula suggested by Desai to resolve the Congress-League deadlock on the issues like the formation of the interim central government and the reconstruction of the Governor-General’s Executive Council was discussed. There were speculations that an understanding had been reached between the two leaders and the press while publishing the gist of the proposal termed it as Desai-Liaquat Pact, which to them was an accepted arrangement between the two parties (Qurashi, 1969, 223). Desai, in a meeting with Wavell, requested the Viceroy to implement the proposals and assured him that Liaquat had shown his consent to his plan. However, when the Governor of Bombay met Jinnah on the advice of the Viceroy, the latter told him that he knew nothing about the talks between Liaquat and that neither he nor his party has given their consent to the proposal (Afzal, 1967, x).

It is true that Liaquat took part in the discussions, but it is also a reality that he made no commitment with Desai on behalf of his party. He made it clear during the negotiations that whatever he said was his individual view and he was not speaking on behalf of Muslim League. In his press statements of September 1 and 10, 1945, he categorically denied Desai’s stance that an agreement or a settlement was reached between the two of them and termed the negotiations as ‘merely proposals’ and not ‘a pact’ (Afzal, 1967, 28-33). He told Desai that Muslim League has already given its stance in its resolution. However, he mentioned that if Desai could get the nod of Gandhi and Congress leadership on his proposals then Liaquat would also discuss the suggestions with Jinnah (Islam, 1970, 234-235). In an interview with the Eastern Times, Liaquat commented that he had not consulted Jinnah and without his consultation no settlement can ever be reached (Eastern Times, 1945, September 15). In short, to Liaquat, the meeting with Desai was not of any political significance.

Jinnah on the other hand was not very happy with Liaquat, who without informing him indulged into negotiations with Desai (Moon, 1974, 114). However, he accepted Liaquat’s clarification and did not stop him to work as his closest aid. In an interview, Jinnah remarked that talks between Liaquat and Desai were without his sanction and the only thing he knew about them was Liaquat’s denial (Asr-i-Jadeed, 1945, January 24). A good look at the
correspondence between the two immediately after the episode and the body language in their meetings shows no shift in their behavior. Liaquat also continued to hold important positions in League. Only few months after this episode, Jinnah appointed Liaquat as his deputy leader of the party’s delegation in the Simla Conference held on June 25, 1945. In late 1945, Quaid-i-Azam in a meeting with a group of young men said, ‘Gandhi has men who can advise him and whom he can depend on... I have only Liaquat’ (Fazal, 1970, 199).

Due to his bad health it was not possible for Jinnah to run Muslim League’s campaign during the elections of 1945-46. Showing his faith in Liaquat, he advised him to tour all the provinces in order to propagate the League’s program and to win over the support of Muslim voters and masses. Liaquat spent all his energies to win the maximum number of seats so that they could show to the world that the Muslims of India were behind the demand for Pakistan. Liaquat visited Aligarh Muslim University in September 1945 and gave a call to the Muslim students for support in the election campaign. In his Address at Aligarh Muslim University on September 24, 1945, Liaquat informed the students that he was sent to them by their Quaid (Afzal, 1967, 33). Jinnah himself selected the Meerut constituency for Liaquat to contest the election against Mohammad Ahmad Kazmi, a joint candidate of Jamiat-i-Ulama-e-Hind and Congress. Jinnah also took personal interest in the politics of that constituency. Liaquat lived up to the expectations of his leader and won the elections by securing sixty-two percent of the total votes polled. Massive victory of Muslim League on the seats reserved for the Muslims also goes to the credit of Liaquat. Jinnah was elected as the leader of the Central Assembly Muslim League party and Liaquat as the deputy leader (Mujahid, 1981, 635). During the negotiations with the Cabinet Mission, Liaquat once again assisted Jinnah, in pleading the case of the Muslim League.

When Muslim League decided to join Interim Government, many expected Jinnah to himself lead the party in the cabinet. However, he opted not to become part of the cabinet so that he could run the affairs of the party and support the Muslim League ministers from outside. Once again, he assigned the important task of leading the League members in the cabinet to his most trusted person and nominated Liaquat for the job. As always, Liaquat once again lived up to the expectation of his leader. He without any hesitation accepted the challenge and proved to the world that Jinnah’s selection was purely on merit. Liaquat and his team had no previous administrative

3The other four Muslim League nominees were I.I. Chundrigarh, AbdurRabNishtar, Ghazanfar Ali Khan and JogandaraNathMandal.
experience, yet because of their commitment and hard work they did well and made their party proud of their performance.

Nehru wanted the Interim Government to work like a cabinet and himself to act like a Prime Minister (Afzal, 1967, xii). Liaquat, however, became a hurdle in the fulfillment of this desire. Only one day after joining the Cabinet on October 26, 1946, Liaquat in a press conference stated that the Government was formed under specific circumstances and thus could not work as a united cabinet. He further clarified that the League’s bloc in the cabinet would not recognize any other leader except its own (Ashraf, 1946, 430). When Nehru held informal meetings of the cabinet, Liaquat disapproved this act and started chairing similar type of meetings of the Muslim League members in the cabinet. Nehru was irritated because of this act of Liaquat and out of his frustration declared the League ‘Kings party’. Liaquat took a serious notice of these remarks (Ali, 1973, 93).

Liaquat was interested in having Home department in the Interim Government but Congress was not willing to give any important portfolio to the League. After long negotiations, eventually Wavell offered Muslim League the ministries of Finance, Posts and Air, Commerce, Law and Health. Congress had actually surrendered the all-important Finance Ministry only under the impression that the League had no expert in the field of finance and would not be able to manage the affairs of the ministry. To them, League would either decline the offer or otherwise they would make fool of themselves (Azad, 1959, 166). Probably, Congress had forgotten that though Liaquat was not well versed with the finance problems but he had twenty years of parliamentary experience both at provincial level and center and that it had made him the master of the parliamentarian techniques, effective in speeches and quick in repartees (Ikram, 1997, 476). Liaquat, being the chief representative of his party in the cabinet, decided to lead from the front and took the challenge.

Congress leadership was convinced that a Muslim could not successfully run the finances of the country and were sure that Liaquat as Finance Minister would end up as a disaster. However, Liaquat made his critics silent by his unambiguous success as a Finance Minister. He influenced the working of all the Government offices. Each and every proposal of all the ministries was subject to the approval of his office. Even the post of a peon could not be filled without the endorsement of Liaquat’s ministry. In addition, as finance minister, Liaquat also had the power to veto any plan proposed by other ministries. Liaquat either rejected or modified most of the proposals presented by the Congress ministers (Azad, 1959, 167-168). Liaquat also started putting pressure on the British Government and told the Viceroy that it was not justified to
spend public money on a Constituent Assembly, which was constituted against the formula defined by the Cabinet Mission (Allana, 1976, 435).

As Finance Minister, Liaquat’s biggest challenge was to prepare and present the first ever Indian budget introduced by a public representative in the Central Assembly. For doing so he hired the services of Muslim financial experts like Malik Ghulam Mohammed, Zahid Hussain and Chaudhry Mohammed Ali. Congress criticized Liaquat for involving the Muslim Government officials in his political activities. However, this was nothing unusual since many of the senior Hindu officials were also acting in a similar capacity for the Congress block in the Cabinet. Liaquat told his team that instead of presenting a conventional budget, their task was to be innovative by preparing a budget with social and economic objectives (Ali, 1973, 110). While presenting the budget in the Assembly on February 28, 1947, Liaquat described that the main objective of the budget was to stop the rich becoming richer and the poor, poorer. In his speech he emphasized on the importance of regional planning in the economy of the Indian subcontinent (Afzal, 1967, 84-85). The budget came as a pleasant surprise even for the Muslim League as even Liaquat’s own friends were hardly expecting such an achievement from a person who had no previous experience of dealing with finance related issues (Nishtar, 1970, 70). Khawaja Nazimuddin termed it as ‘poor man’s budget’ and the Times’ correspondent termed it as ‘a socialist budget’, as it soaks the rich and provide relief to the poor (The Times, 1947, March 2). The budget was greeted with enthusiastic approval by all the sections of the Central Assembly and Liaquat’s speech in the house is still considered as one of the best chapters of Pakistan Movement.

The first reaction of the Cabinet to the proposals was favorable and Congress failed to find any issue which they could criticize. Abul Kalam Azad wrote in his book that they were not against Liaquat’s proposals in principle (Azad, 1959, 175-176). Seth Govind Das, a Congress member, declared it as the most satisfactory budget in his legislative life of twenty-three years. N.V. Gadgil appreciated the budget by saying that the poor man will get his salt the rich man his grave (Dawn, 1947, March 3). However, due to the pressure of the big Hindu businessmen, who were the chief sponsors of Congress, the party decided to oppose Liaquat’s budget (French, 1997, 266). In their speeches on the Legislative Assembly on the issue of Indian Finance Bill, Congress leaders accused Liaquat on March 27, 1947 of having formulated the budget on the basis of economic zones, and criticized that it would pave the way for the creation of Pakistan (Afzal, 1967, 105). Congress desire to reduce taxes on the rich businessmen exposed Nehru’s socialist slogans. Liaquat, on the other hand, stood firm to face the opposition and was not ready to compromise on his budget proposals. It made Congress realize that
they had committed a mistake by offering Finance Ministry to Liaquat and compelled them to think for the first time in terms of partition (Azad, 1959, 207). The credit, no doubt, goes to Liaquat whose policies as Finance Minister created a situation that put Congress on the back foot but one cannot forget Jinnah’s contribution, who actually selected Liaquat for the assignment.

During the last phase of the freedom movement, Liaquat could be seen standing shoulder by shoulder with Jinnah, representing Muslim League on almost all the important forums. When the Labour Government invited two leaders from each party to discuss the future of India at London in December 1946, Jinnah took Liaquat with him (Qurashi, 1969, 283). Liaquat along with Jinnah and Sardar Abdur RabNishtar represented the League in the most important meeting of June 2, 1947 where the main stakeholders of the transfer of power discussed the final draft of the June 3 Plan with Mountbatten (IOR, L/P&J/10/817). Liaquat along with Nishtar also represented League in the Partition Council which was formed to implement the division of the assets of the Government of India. Later Jinnah himself replaced Nishtar in the Council and Liaquat retained his place(French, 1997, 314).

Mountbatten never enjoyed good relations with Jinnah and it even became difficult for the two of them to convince each other on any matter. In this scenario it was Liaquat, who with his polite but realistic approach, used to negotiate, on behalf of the League, the important issues with the Viceroy. Liaquat was the one who managed to convince Mountbatten that the British should stop considering Cabinet Mission Plan as the final solution and should start looking for other options as the solution of the Indian problem. Jinnah showed complete trust in Liaquat and assigned him the task to operate at the highest level. Liaquat did not even falter for a moment and fearlessly carried out the policies of his leader. Liaquat’s patience, calmness and capacity for a detached and objective analysis of events, enabled him to convince Mountbatten and his team and win independence for the Muslims of India.

When Pakistan was created, the relationship between Jinnah and Liaquat became even stronger and the two successfully shifted their roles from the leaders of a freedom movement to the responsibility of running a state. For the two most important positions in the new state of Pakistan, the names of these two giants were the obvious choice. Mountbatten had the ambition to become the common Governor-General of both India and Pakistan. His hopes were finally broken down when Liaquat as the Secretary General of Muslim League in a letter written on July 4, nominated Jinnah’s name as the future Governor-General of Pakistan (NAP, QAP, F.2/171). Later, when Jinnah as the President of Muslim League and the designate Governor-General of Pakistan had to select the Federal Cabinet, he did not even think twice before
nominating his most trusted lieutenant for the all-important post of the first Prime Minister of Pakistan. Liaquat was also given the responsibility to run the important ministries of Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations as well as Defence (NDC, 24/CF/47).

Jinnah and Liaquat complement each other as Governor-General and Prime Minister in resolving the initial problems Pakistan was facing at the time of its inception and providing the new state a solid base. Since, Liaquat was busy shuttling between Delhi and Karachi to negotiate with Mountbatten and Nehru the left over issues related to partition, Jinnah focused on consolidation of administration at Karachi. Though Liaquat officially held the Foreign Affairs portfolio, the ministry was practically run by Jinnah. According to the opinion of the officials of Foreign Office, Ikramulla, the Foreign Secretary, used to share all the information and take directives directly from Jinnah (Dar, 1980, 342). Liaquat never objected. On the contrary, Liaquat himself used to take advice from Jinnah on all the important matters. In its first meeting, chaired by Liaquat, the Federal Cabinet of Pakistan unanimously invited Jinnah to chair its meetings and to guide them. Later in another meeting of the cabinet held on December 30, 1947 it was decided that no policy decision will be taken by the cabinet in the absence of Jinnah(Afzal, 2001, 47).

The only time when differences arose between the two after the independence of Pakistan was when Liaquat expressed an idea to resign as the Prime Minister in a letter written to Jinnah on December 27, 1947. Actually reason for the resignation was neither political nor any personal conflict between the two leaders. In fact, it was because of the jealousy between Jinnah’s sister Fatima and Liaquat’s wife, Raana. The two of them never enjoyed even cordial relations and always used to look for opportunities to score points against each other. According to a note written by Kay Miles, an English friend of Raana, on two consecutive dinners the two ladies quarreled over insignificant issues and Jinnah on the second occasion could not resist and snubbed Liaquat’s wife (Long, 2005, 138-39). Liaquat himself has given the same reason in his resignation sent to Jinnah on December 27, as he wrote ‘I am sorry to learn that she (Raana) has incurred your displeasure for some unknown reason’. He further expressed that because of the ‘strong criticism and condemnation’ of his wife by Jinnah it had become ‘very embarrassing and difficult’ for him to continue his ‘duty’ as the ‘Prime Minister’ (NAP, F. 120 (Vol. IV)-GG/77-78).

According to Kay Miles’ note, Jinnah was upset over the ‘threat to a personal friendship &political partnership which had weathered so many storms, & had been built up on a solid foundation of mutual respect and affection’. He immediately called Liaquat, expressed his distress and asked him to visit
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Governor-General’s House. The two had a detailed meeting on the same night. Jinnah refused to accept Liaquat’s resignation and told him that he considered Raana like his daughter and had criticized her out of his affection. Liaquat promised to continue both professional and personal relations with his Quaid and the two decided that neither Raana nor Fatima would ‘be allowed to come between them in their friendship’ in future (Long, 2005, 138-39). From then onwards Jinnah and Liaquat were always on the same page and Liaquat, may be because of his embarrassment, became more particular of taking Jinnah into confidence before making any decision.

Allegations of Jinnah’s mistrust for Liaquat, when he was on his death bed were also raised by Fatima after the death of her brother. Knowing the history of Fatima’s feelings for Liaquat and his wife one needs to counter check the charges. A good look at the accounts written by others who were present with Jinnah at Ziarat and Quetta proves that Jinnah continued his trust in Liaquat even till his last breath. Mazhar Ahmed, Jinnah’s Naval ADC during his last days was of the view that Liaquat was among the very few who were allowed to see Jinnah even when the latter’s health restricted him to meet visitors (Ahmed, 1976, 146-47). Liaquat was woeful over the death of Jinnah but he knew that now it was his duty to lead the nation. He told his people that the shock of Jinnah’s death ‘should not unnerve’ them. He said that now it was the duty of the nation to ‘do, what the Quaid-i-Azam wanted to’. He promised that he and his colleagues had ‘dedicated lives to the service of Pakistan’ by following the path which Jinnah followed ‘after the establishment of Pakistan’. Praising his leader in his broadcast address to the nation on September 12, 1948, Liaquat commented that ‘Quaid-i-Azam will go down in history as one of the greatest men of this world. To him, ‘very few people have had the good fortune to undertake a tremendous work and complete it in their own life through their strength and wisdom’ (Afzal, 1967, 169-71).

With the death of Jinnah, Liaquat realized that the enemies of Pakistan believed that ‘Pakistan would disintegrate and the Pakistanis would not be able to hold the country’. He was also aware that many Pakistanis were also disappointed to the extent that they had started thinking that ‘the existence of Pakistan depended extensively on Quaid-i-Azam’. So in this scenario he recalled Jinnah’s message that ‘If Pakistan is to fight in self-defence, you should never surrender in any circumstances, however strong the enemy may be. See that you keep on fighting to the very last’. In his broadcast message on September 22, 1948, Liaquat pledged that as long as he would hold the office of Prime Minister he would ‘never forget these words’ and would ‘always act up to them’ (Afzal, 1967, 172-77). Liaquat fulfilled his promise and during the next three years that he spent as Prime Minister he always tried to serve Pakistan by following the footsteps of Jinnah. On the emotional front he
always remained loyal to Jinnah’s memories. He immediately decided to hire a historian who could collect all the facts about Jinnah’s life in a biography. For this purpose Liaquat took personal interest and requested Beverly Nichols, and after his refusal to Hector Bolitho to do the job. It was because of Liaquat’s personal interest that the first biography of Jinnah was written.

In short, during the last leg of Pakistan Movement, Jinnah needed a dependable deputy who was a freedom fighter but not a revolutionary, a political organizer; a states man guided by reason and had the capacity to achieve his goal through peaceful and legal way. Liaquat, on the other hand was in search of a leader to work with. Two of them found their requirements in each other. Both developed good relationship based on understanding and trust. On three different occasions, opportunities arose where Jinnah could lose his confidence in Liaquat, but he not even for a while questioned his integrity and without any explanations continued his faith in the sincerity of his lieutenant. Liaquat also stood firm like a ‘right hand man’ of Jinnah. Devotion to their cause, persistence in effort and struggle, presence of mind, self-confidence, courage, conviction, patriotic zeal, administrative ability, political insight, and at the top of it, believe in their partner were some of the characteristics enabled the dual to achieve what otherwise looked impossible. There could not be a better partnership than the one between Jinnah and Liaquat which helped the Muslims of South Asia in their struggle for freedom and formation of a state.
End Notes


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