Many scholars state that the American media have the power to create national “images” or stereotypes. As Hennessy (1985) describes:

There are some valid reasons why the mass media are felt to be powerful influences on the political dialogue and in the political resolution of social conflict. One is that the mass media do indeed influence political decisions by giving or withholding publicity….. Another reason is quite simply that political decision makers often think they are important. If enough people whose collective influence is great think that the New York Times editorials are important…. then these media presentations do become influential (p. 249).

For many of us, it is the only view of the world we have, accurate or not. And that is why the media is so important. The purpose of this present article is to see how the image of one particular country- Pakistan was portrayed during 1980-1990 in the editorials of the New York Times (NYT), a newspaper with a national readership in the United States. Conventional wisdom would have it that one duty of the press is to lead the public and provide guidance for the reader through its editorials (Berdes, George R- 1969). The primary purpose of the ‘Times’ editorial page is to focus public attention and to provide leadership on current issues of political, economic and social importance to our city, our state, our country and our world. The NYT is considered as one of the world’s premier newspapers and is often
studied as a model of the American press. It publishes relatively more foreign news compared with other elite American newspapers, and also serves as a reference newspaper for other media (Semmel, 1976; Riffe and Shaw, 1982; Haque, 1983; Potter, 1987). The NYT promotes itself as “America’s newspaper of record, offering objective reporting and comprehensive analysis in politics, business, the arts and entertainment” (Prestera, 1987).

**Background of the Study**

After the political change in Iran and Russian intervention in Afghanistan in 1979, Pakistan attracted more attention in the press of the world by playing a significant role in the region. It was also in the interests of the United States to review its policy in order to establish good relations with Pakistan.³

Because of increasing interest in the region, the United States authorities lifted the ban (see footnotes 4, 5, 6 and 11 for details) on economic and military aid to Pakistan despite their previous suspicions about the development of Pakistan’s nuclear programme. Initially, Pakistan rejected the US’s offer of $8400 million in aid, but later it was accepted after satisfactory negotiations between US and Pakistani high officials. In the light of the geopolitical, military, economic and historical interests of the United States, it will be revealing to monitor the role of the NYT⁴ regarding its country’s interests and policy.

This paper also investigates the image of Pakistan in the NYT on two topics related to the US-Pakistan relationship i.e. (1) US policy with respect to Pakistan’s position on Afghanistan (A); (2) US military and economic aid to Pakistan and Pakistan’s military and nuclear programme (B). In fact, these two issues were the most dominating factors in US-Pakistan relations during 1980-1990.

During this period (January, 1980 – August, 90) Pakistan underwent a variety of political, economic, and diplomatic changes which had important consequences for relations with its
neighbours and its role in regional and international affairs. The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and the Iranian revolution thrust upon Pakistan enhanced security role as a ‘front line state,’ as a major recipient of American military and economic assistance, and as an active participant in the affairs of Islamic South West Asia.

Close and frequent readings of the documents made possible the demarcation of the period of this study (1980-1991) into the following phases of the policy:


This period includes the beginning of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, political change in Iran, the emergence of Pakistan’s strategic importance, Carter’s regime in the United States and the martial law regime of Zia-ul-Haq in Pakistan.

In this phase, US President Jimmy Carter stated US policy concerning US interest in the region:

> and finally, I have served notice in my State of the Union address and I would like to quote the words: ‘an attempt of reaching the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.’

During this phase of the foreign policy, Carter's administration lifted the ban on US military and economic aid to Pakistan.

In addition, the Secretary of State gave a statement before the Senate Appropriations Committee assuring Pakistan of US support:

> The President is also taking action to deter further aggression in the area. We have assured Pakistan of our support. And the Soviet Union is on notice that any attempt to control the vital
Persian Gulf will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force. (February 1, 1980)³

Phase II February 1981-April 14, 1988

This phase includes the periods of Ronald Reagan’s administration in the United States and the non-party base elected regime of Muhammad Khan Jonejo in Pakistan, amendment in section 669 in the US law, a period of generous military and economic aid to Pakistan and the beginning of political dialogue that led towards the Geneva Accords. During this period the Reagan administration adopted a bold Afghan policy. In this phase, US policy has been:

- To provide cross-border humanitarian aid to the Afghans.
- To support Afghans in their efforts to form an interim government that could actively embark on a strategy that would lead to a political solution.

As secretary of State Alexander Haig stated: “The Reagan foreign policy, therefore, begins with a justifiable pride in our country, its ideals, and in its achievements.”⁸

The Reagan administration was generous with US military and economic aid to Pakistan. And for this, an amendment was proposed by Secretary of State Haig:

“The proposed amendment to section 699 is an important—indeed essential—building block in a new relationship. It is a necessary step which will permit us to provide assistance to this beleaguered country. But your action will also have symbolic value. Not only Pakistan, but others among our allies and friends, are looking to the United States to demonstrate its commitment to support those friends who are standing in the way of a Soviet thrust into this vital area.”⁹
Phase III Nov. 1988-Aug 1990

During this phase-Benazir Bhutto- a less hostile leader to India and Najibullah, was elected in the general election and withdrawal of USSR troops from Afghanistan was completed on February 15, 1989. This was the period of the Bush administration in the United States. The Bush administration preferred Benazir’s regime because of her positive attitude towards the US proposal i.e. formation of a broad-based interim government in Afghanistan for political settlement in Pakistan. Moreover, the assurance about Pakistan’s nuclear programme given by Benazir in her election campaign made her government credible for the Bush administration. However, the elected regime of Benazir continued to pursue key areas of Pakistan’s Afghan policy. Benazir pledged in her campaign to ‘remove the ambiguity’ about the nuclear energy programme and devote it to civil purposes.

This phase extends to dismissal of Benazir by President Ghulam Ishaq Khan in August 1990. The Bush administration was interested in strengthening the regime of Benazir in Pakistan. According to Aurther Hughes, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence:

We also believe the sale would reinforce the confidence of the Pakistan military in the ability and the willingness of the civilian leadership to provide for the nation’s security. We think that this sale would contribute to the national self-confidence required for Pakistan to take risks for a reduction of regional tensions.

In this phase the US Afghan policy may be described as follows:

- Removal of Najibullah in Afghanistan
- Dialogue between the leadership of Mujahideen and representatives of the population.
Leading towards act of self-determination and installing a representative government through election.\textsuperscript{13}

It has been noted that there was a significant harmony between Pakistan and the US on the above-mentioned two topics during phases I and II, whereas disagreement was observed on the issue of political solution in the beginning of phase III.

**Research Questions:**

- How did the *New York Times* portray US military and economic aid to Pakistan?
- How did the *New York Times* portray US policy with respect to Pakistan’s position on the issue of Afghanistan?
- How did the *New York Times* portray the nuclear programme of Pakistan?
- Are there some biases\textsuperscript{14} presenting information about Pakistan?
- What was the relationship (if any) between the US press (NYT) and the US policy towards Pakistan during 1980-1990?

In this paper the word “image “ refers to the composite of information on Pakistan’s position on the issue of Afghanistan (A) \textsuperscript{15} vis-a-vis US policy towards Afghanistan, military and economic aid to Pakistan and Pakistan’s nuclear and military programme. The analysis will focus on factual information as well as opinions, impressions, attitudes, beliefs, sentiments, thoughts and assertions in conjunction with how such information is presented in the editorials of the NYT. Further, this analysis will investigate the nature of the relationship (if any) between the US press and US foreign policy and interest.
towards Pakistan during the period 1980-1990. The notion of ‘national interest’ defined by Furniss and Synder (1955) has been accepted in this study: “The national interest is what the nation i.e. the decisions-makers, decide it is.” (p. 17)

**Theoretical Perspective**

The Western – particularly the American-press system is typically distinguished from other systems, at least partially, on the basis of its reputed adversarial “watchdog” role.

Some journalists are troubled with this chasm between normative and operative press-government relations. Which is the operative model for coverage of international relations? Relations with any individual nation must be viewed within a larger context. Therefore, Washington’s stated policy towards a given nation may be inconsistent with the press coverage that reflects accurately the cultural or historical affinity of that nation, or even its true strategic importance.

Many communication scholars have developed different theories to explain and interpret the mechanisms, interactions and operations of the mass media in the society. For the purpose of this study, the Libertarian Theory of Press and the Mass Manipulative Model are particularly useful. The manipulative Model, however, conceives of news operation and mechanism as follows:

Here the media and journalists are often seen as acting directly in the interests of the owners, whose interests in turn are quite opposed to the public at large and to any true presentation of events in the world. The journalists are ideological hacks who select news according to the criterion of whether it serves the interests of their paymaster, omitting all else. They distort reality in order to fit the propagandistic needs of their employers (Cohen and Young, 1974: 17-18).
One should add to these theses stating that foreign news coverage tends to follow the path of the foreign policy of the news organization’s home country.

People participate in a democracy through electing representatives of their own interests. People do not have the access necessary to watch their elected officials and see that the officials serve the public interests. This is where the media comes in. In a democratic society the press fulfills an adversary function in acting as a watchdog on the government. Hence the normative relationship between government and press in a democracy is mainly an adversarial one. The adversarial press role is much touted in the United States (a democracy) as the ideal model, especially by press practitioners.

In discussing the relationship between the media and foreign policy, the present study will pay particular attention to the impact of government on media output as well as to the impact of media on foreign policy.

Although there is a scholarly disagreement about the definite nature of the power of the press over either public opinion or foreign policy (Hennessy, 1985; McQuail, 1984; Cohen, 1963; Slade, 1981; Spiegel, 1985) the belief in media influence remains. This researcher believes that the press plays a critical role in the formation of elite opinion, and it is for this reason that media coverage of foreign affairs remains a topic of heated debate. This study will examine the nature of relationship (advocative or adversarial) between a libertarian press and the foreign policy of a state. But, in this study, I accept the interpretation of the term ‘adversarial’ as defined by Dennis:

“Adversarial” simply means that the media should be critical, argumentative and contentious in their relationships with government. The libertarian idea (not to be confused with the Libertarian Party) allows multiple voices in the market place and keeps the press as free as possible from government involvement (Dennis and Merrill, 1991; 26)
Literature Review


Dorman and Farhang (1987), in their extensive study of twenty-five years of press coverage of Iran by the prestige US print media, conclude that: (1) The American news media more often than not followed the cues of foreign policy makers rather than exercising independent judgment in reporting the social, economic, and political life of Iran under the Shah; and (2) journalists proved easily susceptible to ethno centrism, a condition that served the policy foals of official Washington remarkably well.

The studies of Tadayon (1980), Weaver and Wilhoit (1981), Pirou Shoar – Ghaffari (1985), and Bokhory (1989) conclude that the US press gives substantial and favourable coverage to the countries where its political, economic and military interests lie.

Hammond (1987) describes that in the case of the US arms supply to Saudi Arabia (an ally of the US), the NYT highlighted the Israeli fears that arms sold to Saudi Arabia could be used against Israel. Hammond (1987) argues that the arms coverage is also misleading when Saudi arms purchases (paid for at high prices as a means of “recycling petro-dollars”) are termed “aid” while Israeli arms (subsidized by US tax dollars) are termed “purchases.”16

Several other studies e.g. Becker, 1977; Ramaprasad, 1983; Brown, 1980 and Kuan-Hsing Chen, 1983, however, reveal that the US media do not necessarily support American governmental policy because, in a free press system, the press is not supposed to be an actor in inter-governmental interactions.

In the case of Pakistan, the US media did not support US policy during the late 60’s and 70’s (e.g. during the War of 1971
between India and Pakistan). Khan’s study (1984) shows that during the period of President Eisenhower (1953-54) Pakistan gained favourable treatment in the US press. Studies of Mujahid, 1970; Becker, 1977; Kamran, 1984 and Bokhory, 1989 show that the US press has been inconsistent about Pakistan’s coverage, especially during the 50’s, 60’s and 70’s and before the 80’s. In a broad sense, it can be said that the overall role of the *New York Times* had been interactory (i.e. sometime adversarial and sometime advocative) with the US policy toward Pakistan.

Since Islam is an important ingredient of the constitution and foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan inclusion of a few pieces of literature about Islam will be helpful to understand the portrayal of Pakistan’s image. Jack Kramer (1979) in his article, argued:

> It is not hard to posit a ‘worst possible’ scenario should Khomeini take over. Khomeini’s obscurantist religious pronouncements, his anti-Americanism…. All portend the kind of chaos and underground Communist movements well known to exploit (February 5, 1979, p-50)

Studies of Said (1981), Kamal cited in Adnan (1989); Jansen, 1979; Richter (1988) and Shaheen (1990) indicate that Western media were not only critical towards Islam but also promoted stereotypes about the Muslim World and Islamic values. In addition to this, research by Gabriel (1988) and Rifai (1987) reveals that the NYT supports anti-communist and pro-democracy activities of the nations.

Based on the literature, it is concluded that, the US media support American governmental policies and give favorable treatment to the countries where US political, economic and military interests lie.

**Hypothesis:**

The NYT will support US policy towards Pakistan in all the three phases.
Methodology:

The methodology employed in this study is content analysis as defined by Berelson (1952) and Budd (1969). Most of the information regarding US policy towards Pakistan (1980-90) was gathered from the US Department of State Bulletin and from Congressional publications.

In this study, the unit of analysis is the unsigned editorial. The indexes of NYT and NEXIS data base information about NYT were the main sources of this study. The researcher did a complete issue-by-issue investigation of the NYT’s editorials during the period of 1980-1990. All this was done to ensure the inclusion of all editorials in the study.

Descriptive phrases and adjectives used by journalists were identified and classified into two issues. The researcher found an immense and frequent connection between US aid and Pakistan’s nuclear programme. Therefore both these topics were embodied in one category i.e., (B). To make classification mutually more exclusive, decisions were made on the basis of contents potentially related to the particular issues and the judgments of the coders:

A Issue of Afghanistan (includes all items related to the issue of Afghanistan with the mentioning of Pakistan or with the dateline of Pakistan or US policy with respect to Pakistan’s position on Afghanistan).

B US military and economic aid to Pakistan and Pakistan’s nuclear programme.

To measure the direction of the contents, the method that Berelson calls “the total problem” i.e. the assumption that the meanings reside in “the totality of impression” – the Gestalt, and not in the atomistic combination of measurable units, was adopted. This totality of impression was used to determine the “direction” or “orientation” of the communication. For the
purpose of reliability the data were coded for direction on a three point-scale: supportive (+), neutral (O), and opposite (-) with regard to research questions. To achieve acceptable levels of reliability, category boundaries were defined, coders were trained, and a pilot study with a fresh coder was conducted to check intercoder reliability.

Directions of the contents were measured separately in different phases with regard to the US policy in those phases. Admittedly, a degree of judgment is involved in interpreting these documents and arriving at conclusions about overall foreign policy. Nonetheless, these were ‘official’ records of policy.

**Findings**

During the investigation, the researcher faced difficulty while classifying two editorials. To make judgment more reliable, I used five coders from the University of Iowa. All were in agreement with my judgment in this regard. Therefore these two editorials were equally counted as (A) and (B).

During 1980-1990, a total of 50 editorials on the two above-mentioned topics were published in the NYT, i.e., a total of 24 (48%) on (A) and 26 (52%) on topic (B).

Seven editorials were written on the above two topics in the NYT during Phase I (i.e., January 1980-January 31, 1981) of the foreign policy. Only two editorials were about (A) in the NYT whereas five were related to issue “B”. The NYT gave a balanced and neutral treatment (50% and 50%) to the issue of Afghanistan (A) while giving a highly negative (100%) to issue (B). All editorials on “B” were highly negative to the US policy towards Pakistan during this phase (see Table 1).

A total of 28 editorials were written during Phase II (i.e., February 1981- April 14, 1988). Out of 28, 12 were written on issue (A) whereas 16 were related to issue (B). In this Phase, the NYT overall gave favorable and balanced treatment to Pakistan
on issue (A) (i.e., 41% and 37.3%), but gave highly negative (87%) treatment to issue “B” (see Table-2).

In Phase II (March 2, 1988- August 1990), the NYT was very supportive (90%) to issue (A) was compared with Phases I and II, but remained consistently negative (100%) to issue (B) (see Table 3).

Table 4 indicates that on issue (A), the NYT overall (62.5%) supported the US policy on issue (A) during the period of study (1980-90), particularly in Phase III.

Table 5 indicates that the NYT did not support US policy on (B) at all. It was very negative (92.3%) to US policy on (B), especially during Phase II (The Reagan administration’s period). Out of 26 editorials on this issue, none was supportive to US policy in any of the phases.

In Phase I, the NYT tried to make the policy-makers careful and conscious while making any decision about US military and economic aid to Pakistan. It published five editorials on issue (B), all were negative to US policy. It also tied up Indian concern on US military aid to Pakistan. The NYT opposed US military and economic aid to Pakistan in its editorials. The NYT in its editorials connected the issue of military and economic aid with Pakistan’s nuclear programme and Pakistan’s Islamic status. For instance, the NYT expressed its fears in its editorials reminding the US policy-makers not to forget the experience of Islamic Fundamentalist regime in Iran21.

The tone of the NYT’s editorials during Phase II (Reagan’s administration) was very harsh and direct. During this phase (Feb, 1981—April 14, 1988), out of 28 editorials, 12 were written on (A). The NYT’s editorial treatment to issue (A) was supportive and balanced (i.e., 41.66%- and 33.3%) whereas a total of 16 editorials were on issue (B), out of which fourteen (87%) were negative whereas two (12.5%) were neutral on issue (B). The NYT tried to manipulate Congress for the President’s accountability. Moreover, it showed its serious concern about Pakistan’s nuclear programme and urged that it be stopped and
advocated more decisive action than the mere termination of aid.\textsuperscript{22}

In Phase III, the NYT carefully supports Bush’s Afghan policy and emphasized political settlement. The NYT suggested that the US has no interest after the departure of USSR troops from Afghanistan. It also supported US policy i.e., to establish a broad base government in Afghanistan. The NYT suggested that Benazir’s regime was the most suitable for finding a political settlement of this issue. It seems as if this phase of the policy was the period of understanding between the Bush administration, Benazir’s regime and the NYT. During this phase 14 editorials were published in the NYT, out of which 10 were on issue (A) and five were on (B). The NYT unlike other phases gave favorable treatment to US policy on issue (A) (i.e., 90\%) but remained negative (100\%) on issue (B).

Table 4 indicates that throughout the period (1980-1990), the NYT overall gave favourable (60.8\%) and balanced (21.7\%) treatment to the issue (A) while giving highly negative (92.3\%) to issue (B). In the light of the findings, hypothesis of the study has been partially rejected.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1 (Phase 1)</th>
<th>Jan 1980-Jan 31, 1981</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(N=7)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category</td>
<td>Supportive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neutral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n=2)</td>
<td>(50%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n=5)</td>
<td>(0%)</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2 (Phase II)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(N=7)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Category</td>
<td>Supportive</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Negative</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Neutral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n=12)</td>
<td>(41.60%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(25%)</td>
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<td>(33.3%)</td>
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Table 3 (Phase III)

(N=7)

<table>
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<th>Neutral</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A  (n=10)</td>
<td>(90%)</td>
<td>(10%)</td>
<td>(0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B  (n=5)</td>
<td>(0%)</td>
<td>(100%)</td>
<td>(0%)</td>
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Table 4

(Overall characterization of (A) during 1980-1990)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Supportive</th>
<th>Negative</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I-1980-1981</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II-1981-1988</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III-1988-1990</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (n=24)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(62.5%)</td>
<td>(16.66%)</td>
<td>(20.83%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5

(Overall characterization of (B) during 1980-1990)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Supportive</th>
<th>Negative</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I-1980-1981</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II-1981-1988</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III-1988-1990</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (n=24)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(92.3%)</td>
<td>(7.7%)</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Discussion
Since the whole world had been supporting the just cause of the resistance movement of the Afghan people during 1980, the NYT had no other choice except to give a favourable and balance treatment to issue (A). The NYT viewed issue (A) through issue (B) i.e., US military and economic aid to Pakistan. It also tied this issue to Pakistan’s nuclear programme and its Islamic status. It warned the US policy-makers to be careful about military aid to Pakistan. It opposed the military regime in Pakistan.

In Phase II, it seems as if US military aid to Pakistan and Pakistan’s nuclear programme was on the top of agenda of the NYT. It seems as if it was the policy of the NYT to oppose US military aid to Pakistan and to resist Pakistan’s nuclear programme. (see editorial “No Peanuts for Pakistan” …. March 18, 1980). The NYT seemed very consistent and committed in opposing US military aid to Pakistan. When, Pakistan agreed to accept American aid, after getting some assurances form the US State Department, the NYT did not stop criticizing Pakistan and kept on reminding and exhorting American decision-makers to ask for meaningful assurances regarding Pakistan’s nuclear programme. The NYT tried to open a debate on this issue. This was during the Reagan’s Presidency. The tone of the NYT was very harsh towards Reagan’s policy of supporting Pakistan with heavy weaponry. It referred to side-diplomacy. During this phase the NYT kept on influencing the policy-makers and Congress to check the Reagan administration. It also referred to the Reagan administration as an “amnesia-prone administration.”

In Phase III, NYT supported the Bush administration’s policy on Afghanistan but consistently remained negative to (B). There was complete harmony between the US and Pakistan on (A). Benazir’s regime was favoured by the Bush administration (see statement of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence – in footnote # 12). Both regimes agreed to a political settlement and to form a broad-based government in Afghanistan. Both US and Pakistani regimes were also interested in bringing Zahir Shah from Italy to play a role. This proposal for political settlement was rejected by the Mujahideen and the previous regimes (Zia
and Jonejo) in Pakistan. The NYT favoured ending US military aid to Pakistan, citing the withdrawal of USSR troops from Afghanistan. It also suggested the adoption of a lenient attitude towards the Soviet Union. It advised the US administration that now no American interest was left in this region after the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan.\(^{27}\) It also suggested that Benazir was the most suitable leader for US’s interests. The NYT characterized Benazir as an effective and pragmatic bargainer for the US. It (NYT) portrayed her as secular and less hostile towards Najibullah and India. It recommended that the US administration should not miss this opportunity of talking on Afghanistan. It also appreciated the possible shift in US policy towards a political dialogue.\(^{28}\)

Several similarities were found between the case of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. In the case of the US arms supply to Saudi Arabia (an ally of the US), the NYT emphasized the Israeli fears that arms sold to Saudi Arabia could be used against Israel. Its editorial position appears uncompromising on this subject. Similarly the NYT magnified the Indian’s position, that US military aid to Pakistan threatens Indian security. When the State Department made the decision of economic and military aid to Pakistan – it (NYT) not only criticized that decision but also suggested supplying nuclear fuel to India. The NYT, in nine editorials expressed its support of Indian concerns regarding US military aid to Pakistan and Pakistan’s nuclear programme.\(^{29}\) It should be noted that Pakistan proposed a simultaneous inspection of the nuclear plants of both India and Pakistan. President of Pakistan Zia-ul-Haq in an interview stated:

Let’s have an even-handed policy…… Pakistan’s offer is that if India agrees to sign a nuclear non-proliferation treaty, we will be signing one minute before…. Let’s have mutual inspection of both unclear installation, and if that is not acceptable, let’s have a bilateral nuclear nonproliferation treaty, and if that is not acceptable, an international agreement. What’s good for the goose is good for the gander. Why is Pakistan alone to be put on the spot? (interview United Nations, New York, Oct. 20/1985. The NYT, 10-21:6).
But the NYT, instead of appreciating Pakistan’s proposal for inspection, continued to view Pakistan’s but no India’s nuclear programme with suspicion. It seems as if the NYT always looks at US-Pakistan relations through the widow of Indian interests. Despite the Indian alignment with the Soviet Union during the 70’s, the NYT took a favourable stance towards India. For instance, besides critical editorials of the NYT, when the US made a clear announcement to supply arms to Pakistan—the NYT continued its efforts to influence State Department officials asking for more and more assurances regarding Pakistan’s nuclear programme. It is noted that from April, 1977 to December, 1980 was the period when Jimmy Carter was president and when democratic conditions had been restored in India, and hence, was the time of most favourable India-US relations (Ramaprasad and Riffe, 1987).

The NYT took a strong stand against its own country’s policy (i.e. US military and economic aid to Pakistan). In its editorials, NYT did not consider the Soviet operation in Afghanistan as a serious threat to Pakistan’s security. The NYT’s editorials failed to hide their bias against Islam. In one editorial, NYT stated that Pakistan did not deserve military aid because it is a non-aligned, Islamic fundamentalist country that is being governed by an unstable and repressive military regime. In an editorial titled ‘Counterpunching on Afghanistan’ NYT states:-

Though no one can yet say whether the Soviets intend to torment Pakistan, that country’s security is now of urgent American concern. But it does not automatically follow that America must enter into open-ended arms sales to a divided country ruled by an erratic Islamic fundamentalist, (Jan, 6, 1980).

The researcher understands that anti-Islam bias and the pro-Israeli trend of the NYT might be one of the probable reasons for negative treatment of Pakistan in NYT’s editorials. The NYT in its editorials consistently criticized Pakistan’s Islamic posture and tried to portray the image of Pakistan as a fundamentalist
state like Iran. It seems as if there are some cultural and ideological biases against Islam. Said (1981) writes:

There are, of course, many religious, psychological, and political reasons for this, but all of these reasons drive from a sense that so far as the West is concerned, Islam represents not only a formidable competitor but also a late coming challenge to Christianity (1981:4).

One possible reason might be the anti-Islam sophisticated Jewish lobby’s control on the NYT, particularly on the editorial page as described by Chafets (1985):

The NYT, America’s most influential newspaper, is owned by the Sulzberger (Jew) family... Many of America’s leading editors are Jewish, including A.M. Rosenthal of the NYT.... There are a number of Jews among America’s most prominent syndicated columnists, including Anthony Lewis, Flora Lewis, and William Safire of the NYT (Chafets, 1985: 276-278).

Ghareeb (1983) points towards the editorial influence of the Jewish lobby. Jewish influence on the American press, to the extent that it exists, comes from slow and patient educational efforts over many years to make the men who determine the editorial position of newspapers, radio or television stations aware of the justice of the Israeli cause (p 20-21).

The studies of Daugherty and Warden (1979: 781) further indicate the anti-Arab character of the NYT. Like the Post, the NYT was frequently critical of the Arab nations. Anti Arab editorials in the Times outnumbered “Israeli Supportive” editorials by an almost three-to-one ratio (29 editorials non-supportive of Arab nations, versus 11 supportive of Israel). His study further notes that 26 per cent of the Israeli-Arab editorials supported Israel while only 12 per cent supported the Arab nations.

In the case of Pakistan, the editorial policy of the NYT was not supportive of US policy and its interest towards Pakistan. It would also be noted that Pakistan, since its independence, has
been a staunch supporter of Palestinian cause and has always condemned Israel’s atrocities in Palestine. Jews are very much concerned about the military and nuclear buildup of any emerging Muslim power, especially Pakistan. Merrill also mentioned that the NYT has a pro-Israel tendency and has several pro-Israeli journalists on its editorial staff.

It is speculated that the NYT adopted the same policy against Pakistan as was adopted against the US military aid to Saudi Arabia. It seems as if the NYT opposes military buildup of any Muslim country that has any evidence of Islamic practice.

On the basis of the studies of Becker (1977), and Ramaprasad (1984), it can be speculated that the NYT has a policy based on its own ideology towards the Muslim World’s military build up i.e., to oppose Pakistan’s unclear program. The NYT’s editorials have a tendency to oppose Pakistan and prefer India whenever any conflict arises between India and Pakistan. The NYT’s stance is that this could destabilize the balance of power between India and Pakistan and will make the Indian authorities annoyed with America. The NYT did oppose the non-supportive US policy towards India during Indo-Pakistan conflict of 1971 (Becker, 1977 and Ramaprasad, 1984). It supported the US policy towards Pakistan against the danger of Soviet communism, but seriously opposed Pakistan’s military power.

However, the NYT editorials failed to influence the US policy-makers to change their foreign policy towards Pakistan. This view is also supported by Wes Gallagher, the President of the Associated Press for fifteen years, who said in an interview that the editorial judgment of the NYT was neither decisive nor effective. He said that he did not believe that the administration was influenced by the editorials because he feels that in many cases the editors are feeding off information filtered and leaked by the administration itself. Roland Wolsely, in a review in Braley’s book, said that the New York Time editorials were not influential. He rejected the pint of view of “others” as he put it, who claim that “the NYT runs the United States”. He noted “if it does, it has does, it has done a poor job for it was defeated in the
1984 national election when it sought, through editorial policy, to replace President Reagan and certain of his foreign, as well as domestic, policies.” This study disagrees with several studies mentioned in the literature review indicating that the US media supports US policy.

**Summary and Conclusion**

This research challenges several other studies (e.g. Bokhory, 1989; Tadoyan, 1980 and Pirouz, 1985) which concluded that overall the US media support the American governmental policies and give favourable treatment to the countries where US political, economic and military interests lie. The conclusion of this paper also rejects studies (Frances, 1967; Mills, 1969; Houghton, 1946; Liu, 1969; Kam, 1979; Dewey, 1967; Kriesberg, 1946; Paletz and Entman, 1981; and Lynch and Efendi, 1964) which shows that the US media support American governmental policies. This study supports studies (Becker, 1977; Ramaprasad, 1983; Brown 1980 and Kuan-Hsing Chen, 1983) showing that the US media do not necessarily support American governmental policy because, in a free press system, the press is not supposed to be an actor in inter-governmental interactions. My study supports Gareeb, 1983; Hammond, 1987; and Chaffet, 1985 that the NYT is staunchly pro-Israeli and anti-Islam in character. Hence it rejects Ajani’s study (1982) that suggests that “the US elite newspapers are not, as usually alleged, the blind horse of Israeli’s policies and actions (p.79).

The study reveals that the NYT kept on reminding the US authorities and policy-makers not to forget the lesson of Iran. It (NYT) also tried to open a policy debate on US military and economic aid to Pakistan. In the light of the findings of the data and discussion, it can be concluded that the NYT was very critical of the United States foreign policy towards Pakistan, especially on the issue of military and economic aid to Pakistan.

The findings of this study are more similar to the findings of Ramaprasad, 1984; Becker, 1977; Gareeb, 1983 and Hammond,

Data reveals that the NYT has anti-Islam bias. It is speculated that this anti-Islam bias of the NYT prevented it from supporting US military and economic aid to Pakistan. If Pakistan were not an Islamic state, the NYT would support US policy of military and economic aid as most of the studies conclude in the past. Therefore, it is speculated that NYT has a policy to oppose military buildup of any Islamic power in the world.

In the case of Pakistan, it is very difficult to make a generalization about the treatment of Pakistan in the US media. In a broad sense, it can be said that between the late 60’s and 80’s the role of the New York Times was adversarial to the US policy towards Pakistan. Three probable reasons are described for the NYT’s anti-Pakistan character:

- Anti-Islam bias
- Pro-Israeli lobby
- Pro-Indian tilt

Pakistan was portrayed differently during the different regimes in Pakistan. During martial law, Pakistan was portrayed as a country leading towards erratic fundamentalist Islamic creed and Zia’ul-Haq was portrayed as a typical third world dictator, a devout Moslem autocratic partner of the United States, Pakistan’s strong man and a leader of an unstable regime. Benazir was portrayed as secular, effective, less hostile towards Najibullah and India, a credible democratic leader and a pragmatic bargainer for the United States. In addition, it is interesting to note that the NYT was very critical and harsh in three editorials towards Engineer Gulbadeen Hikmatyar, the most powerful leader of Afghan Mujahideen. Hikmatyar was portrayed as ultra-fundamentalist and anti-Western (see NYT’s editorial-April 12, 1988).
The findings indicate that the NYT overall took a position on opposing US military aid to Pakistan and Pakistan’s nuclear programme whereas it supported the US policy on (A), especially during Phase III. Therefore, the only hypothesis of this study is partly rejected. This study suggests that the relationship between US foreign policy towards Pakistan and press was within the frame of Libertarian theory. In a democratic country like the US, the press (NYT) does not necessarily follow the policy-maker’s position. It seems that, the NYT follows its own ideology of opposing military power of the Muslim world. The NYT played the role of a smart watch-dog. In this regard and hence followed the ‘adversarial model’ whereas at an over all it supported US policy on (A), especially during Phase III and hence followed the ‘advocacy mode’. Therefore it can be concluded that in the case of US policy towards Pakistan – the role of the NYT’s partly adversarial (as defined by Dennis) and partly advocative i.e., the overall an interactory. Further, in this study, the NYT followed a latent ideology of its owners towards the Muslim world’s procurement of nuclear power and hence followed the ‘Manipulative model’.

Notes and References

1 In this study NYT will refer to the *New York times*


3 See William borders article in the NYT January 20, 1980, P. 4,3:1
4 In this study NYT will refer to the *New York Times*.


7 See *Department of State Bulletin* March 1980, P.35.

8 See Sec. State Haig’s address before the American Society of Newspaper Editors (ASNE) on April 24, 1981. This was also published under the title: “A New direction in US Foreign Policy” in US Dept. of State Bulletin 81(2051), June 1981.

9 See *US State Department Bulletin*, vol. 81/No.2051, p. 53-54.

10 This proposal does include the involvement of Zahir Shah (Ex-King of Afghanistan) living in Italy. Mujahideen categorically refused to accept any role for Zahir Shah in this conflict. This decision of Mujahideen was also dismissed by Pakistani regimes of that time (i.e. Zia and Jonejo regimes).


14 Here notion of ‘bias’ refers to the negative image of Pakistan.


17 See the *Constitution of Pakistan*, Preamble (P.I), and clause 40 (P. 24), 1985).


19 In his MPA study, Robert Prot followed this procedure in classifying contents in US magazines (Syracuse: Syracuse University, 1965 p.6)


21 For example, see editorial “No Peanuts for Pakistan” in the NYT – March 10, 1980.

22 See editorials titled: “Stop Pakistan’s Nuclear Bomb” - (March 13, 1987-NYT) and “Punish Pakistan’s Perfidy on the bomb”—(July 17, 1987-NYT)
23 See editorials titled: ‘Asia needs help, not A-bombs’---

24 See editorial of the NYT- July 19, 1981.

25 See editorial of the NYT dated November 2, 1981.

26 This statement was made by one of the Afghan leaders in Peshawar (Pakistan) on August 1989.


30 For evidence, see editorials: “The Israelair strike against Iraqi nuclear reactor near Baghdad demonstrates the grave dangers that are posed by nuclear-arms proliferation in the Middle East. The bold Israeli move eliminates the immediate threat while it adds uncertainty to an always volatile Middle East,” by Alan Cranston, Democratic of California, a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in the NYT. It states: ..... Pakistan today is on the verge of attaining nuclear-weapon capability and is preparing a test site. Will Pakistan, an unstable dictatorship ruled by Gen. Zia-ul-Haq, Chairman of the Moslem Conference, fulfill; to call for ‘Holy war’ against Israel? (Signed editorial, NYT—June 10, 1981)

31 The destruction of the Iraqi nuclear reactor by Israelis is an appropriated example.
32 This information is based on an interviewed with Merrill on February 5, 1991 in Communication Center, The University of Iowa.


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