The Indo-US Strategic Partnership in Post 9/11: Implication for Pakistan

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The US finds itself with an unrivalled, unipolar military and political power after the disintegration of the Soviet Union in the post cold war. The short-term US-strategic interests and demands do not restrict the policy makers from long-term priorities. The long-term US policy seems to sustain a preeminent position in South Asia.

To pursue its core and national interests, and meet the newer challenges of security and trade, the US has changed its policy towards South Asia in post 9/11 period. She has reshaped its policy to achieve its goals and is reappraising its political, economic, military and strategic partnership with India. The linkage and pattern of newly emerged relationship in post 9/11 between US and India are to some extent are different from that of traditional cold war mindset. The US is using different strategic means, methods, techniques, ways, tools and linkages to advance its policy goals in South Asia and its strategic agreements with India signed in June, 2005 and July, 2005 (Nuclear Agreement) are the most recent and the best examples of Indo-US strategic partnership after 9/11 events. This article will examine and cover all the aspects of Indo-US strategic partnership and its implications for Pakistan.

Introduction

The US and India both have always considered themselves as major strategic and political powers. Both feel that the world must acknowledge this status. They have defined and described the international peace and priorities within their own norms and
terms and have developed their relations with the other states within these parameters.

During the cold war, the US regarded itself as the champion of human rights, freedom movements and democracy and looked to encircle those states who challenged its strategy through the creation of military alliances, NATO, SEATO, and CENTO etc. India kept away from SEATO and CENTO to maintain its non-aligned status and sought to buy time to build up its military potential through the notion of “peaceful coexistence”—the PanchSheel Doctrine. The non-alignment for India became a cheaper strategy for getting involved in global politics. The US not only looked to allocate its global security role, it also saw the importance of India as an ally and regional power even while India was developing its strong linkages to the Soviet Union and making its efforts to project itself as a leader of the non-aligned movements. In 1950s, the Dulles era of anti-communist defence pacts, there was a feeling that despite treaty alliances such as SEATO and CENTO with Pakistan … India must be given priorities and provided greater aid than an ally of the US because it was doing real efforts to develop institutions of freedom. When the first opportunity arose in 1962 during the Sino-Indian conflict, the US military and economic aid to India far surpassed that to Pakistan.

After the disintegration of Soviet Union in 90’s, the remarkable strategic, monetary, and political changes took place in the global politics and Washington’s obsession to establish a hierarchical system, in which the lesser units are answerable to higher levels of power in an international system, looks very important factor in accepting the existing global politics. The significant transformations in the international security system and in trade and investment patterns continued to manipulate the international affairs.

Nowadays, when crisis makes threats in the region of the world, local players and traditional partners still seem mainly to Washington—not Beijing, Moscow, or even Brussels—for way out.

For instance, Washington is the principal conciliator between India and Pakistan as well as in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The United States looks to remain the single really global authority for at least another generation.
Indo-US Strategic Cooperation: The Beginnings

It is a fact that during the post cold war era a genuine transformation in relations between the United States and India has taken place. The new US tilt and its security policy in South Asia in post 9/11 period and its strategic partnership with India is not a sudden development but the result of a gradual convergence of interests between New Delhi and Washington after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. During the post cold war, the first high level discussion and negotiations between these two countries on their strategic interests and military cooperation held in January 1992 in New Delhi. Lt.General Johnny Corns of the US Pacific Command from the US side and Lt. General V.K. Sood from the Indian side participated the meeting of the Indo- US Army Executive Steering Committee. During the meeting, the US expressed its concerns about the rise of “Militant Islam” in the region. The US also viewed that in the most volatile part of the world, which included the Islamic Crescent from Turkey to Malaysia, India was the only actor who could safeguard the US interests and act as an active regional stabilizing force. This strategic partnership and military cooperation between India and US was further developed and strengthened by the setting up of the Joint Steering Committee of the two Navies, which conducted joint naval exercises in 1992.

In 1993, the US Congress sought to establish the new categories for providing military and economic assistance to India and developing more cooperation with India which would be in keeping with the new realities to bring India closer to the US position.

In January 1995, the US and India signed the “Agreed Minute on Defence Relations” which provided for joint exercise and a trade programme. By signing this agreement, India received military and economic aid from US. In March 2000, the US President Clinton visited New Delhi and bonding between Vajpayee and Clinton reflected the coming together of the two states. The Vision Document signed by Clinton and Vajpayee declared a “resolve to create a closer and qualitatively new relationship between the US and India’ on the basis of common
interest in and complementary responsibility for ensuring regional and international security”\textsuperscript{7}. This document clearly mentioned that India and the US were strategic partners in providing stability in South Asia and beyond. Since the Clinton visit to India, the military and economic cooperation between New Delhi and Washington has moved a pace with the Bush Administration continuing and expanding the framework of this strategic partnership.

The US is playing a vital role to cultivate India as its lever to realize a goal that has become fundamental to its strategy in post cold war era: to remain firmly embedded in Asia at a time when the continent is emerging as the world’s new centre of gravity and China would be challenger to the US. The US President, George W Bush changed its policy towards China when he came to power in 2001 and called China a “strategic competitor” rather than a “strategic partner”. The Bush administration decided to help India to become a “major world power in the 21st century” to contain China which, according to a recent Pentagon report, might emerge as a strategic rival to the United States. The China factor has played an important role to emerge Indo-US strategic partnership. The US policy in Asia is China-centric like India. Both the immense democratic countries, having a common perception with the common threat, have come much closer to each other. In southern Asia, India and Japan watch China’s rising economic and strategic power as a danger. Both are previously in a mutual strategic alliance, and at the same time they are escalating their strategic cooperation with the non-Asian power, the United States. In East Asia, for now, US relations with Japan develop always closer as the Japanese become more and more worried about China and a nuclear-armed North Korea\textsuperscript{8}. China’s emerging position in East Asia also strengthens the Australian and Indian wish for closer ties with the United States. It comes into view that Japanese, Australian, and Indian union in strategic relationships would mechanically ensure Chinese power in Asia and the Pacific region.

In the same way, in South Asia, the growing economic power of China is an accelerating cause for cherished Indo-US relation. Analysts believe that the Indo-US defence pact is developed to assist India for becoming a “key globe power in the 21\textsuperscript{st} century to hold China which, according to a “Pentagon
Report”, might come into view as a strategic challenger to the US9. It is also important to mention here that senior US officials, including Defence Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, and Director, CIA, Potter Goss, have also expressed their apprehensions about the emerging Chinese economic and military power. Washington so, worries that it’s imperative interests, mainly in South Asia, could be threatened by China and India is a single state in the region that can help US to contain China. Pakistan is an extremely close partner of China, which cannot fit this triangle. India’s emerging strategic power is measured by Pakistan to be hazardous. Islamabad is making use of every existing option for defying Indian ascendancy in the region. It is carrying out its most excellent to maintain its mutual strategic arrangements with the extra-regional powers – the United States and China – while at the same time making sure the trustworthiness of its conventional and nuclear forces.

On April 17, 2002, the US and India made the first major weapon deal in more than 10 years and US agreed to provide 8 Raytheon Co. long-range weapon locating radars to India. The radar system worth $ 146 million is designed to pinpoint enemy’s long-range mortars, artillery and rocket launches10. On May 22, 2003, the US approved the sale of Israel’s Phalcon airborne early warning system worth $ 1.2 billion to India11.

A senior US official pointed out in a closed-door gathering of strategic analysts in New Delhi in June 2005, that “the worst outcome for the US is an Asia from which we are excluded and the key challenge for the US over the past 100 years has been to remain engaged every where and not allow any other industrial power to dominate a given region”12. The US official continued to say: “If I were China, I could be working on kicking the US out of Asia….Right now we have a lot of alliances but there is no architecture embedding us in Asia. This worries us and Indo-US partnership is seen by Washington as a vital element in the planned architecture”13.

The CIA analysis report also shows India as the most important “swing state” in the international scenario—a country that could maintain the balance between war and peace, between chaos and order. The National Intelligence Council, CIA’s brain trust, compared the emergence of India and China to the rise of Germany in the 19th century and the US in the 20th century in
mapping the global future\textsuperscript{14}. The US has concerned about the growth and development of the Chinese military, its monetary policy and its increasing power projection capabilities. The Secretary of States Condoleezza Rice and Defence Secretary Rumsfeld both have sharply expressed their feelings and doubts on these grounds. “And unbridled China is not in the US interest and by bolstering India; the US can contain China and arrest the growth of Chinese influence in the Indian Ocean rim lands and Chinese penetration of Myanmar”.

An Indian analyst disagreed with CIA’s report and wrote: It is a fact that the US has concerns about the growth of China as an emerging economic and military power and emphasized India to build up as a counter force to China. The US thinks that India has a potential edge against a rising China. It is not correct. India is now improving its relations with China and may never go back to the time when the two countries were at odds with each other. India has a dispute over the boundary with China and it looks that if both countries start serious talks to settle this issue then they may come to a settlement before long\textsuperscript{15}.

The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a think-thank in America has prepared a report and senior associate Ashley J.Tellis presented it to House Committee on International Relations on June 15, 2004. To align with India, the Carnegie Endowment report recommends that the US should take five steps:

\begin{itemize}
\item[a] The US should help India to grow its military and economic power to prevent China’s dominance in Asia.
\item[b] There should be end of the illusory idea of military balance between India and Pakistan and India should be provided more military and economic aid.
\item[c] The US should endorse India’s membership in the UN Security Council, G-8, APEC, and International Energy Agency.
\item[d] The US should remove the objections to the Iran-India gas pipeline project.
\end{itemize}
The US should allow the sale of dual-use technology, including nuclear safety equipment to India.”

Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbot occupied with India's foreign minister (Jaswant Singh) in 14 rounds of talks over two and a half years. Talbot’s talks with Singh were Washington's first truly sustained strategic engagement with the Indian leadership.

The US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, had also expressed her views during her visit to Delhi in March that “the President Bush very much values to enhance the relationship between the US and India, the fact that we are becoming in many ways important global as well as regional partners.”

The US Secretary for State Condoleezza Rice visited India in March 2005 and she set out to lay a new cornerstone for the transformed relationship between India and US. She told the Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh that the United States would alter its long-held framework that tied and balanced its relations with "India-Pakistan. This was a different US attitude towards Pakistan and it was entirely a new and comprehensive engagement between the United States and India. She also told Mr. Singh that the United States would break with long-standing nonproliferation orthodoxy and work to establish full civil nuclear cooperation with energy-starved India. She also expressed her views that the President Bush highly values to expedite the relationship between the US and India and this is a fact that both countries are becoming important regional and global partners and they are cooperating with each other in many ways.

In the above discussed context, we need to examine the 2005 Indo-US Strategic Agreements of a 10-year Defence Pact on June 28, 2005 and a Nuclear Agreement on July 18, 2005. Highlighting some of the central points and factors of the Indo-US Defence Agreement one by one, the fallout and its impacts for Pakistan can be assessed more clearly.
India- US 10 Year Defence Pact

The United States and India signed a 10-year Defence Pact in Washington D.C on June 28, 2005 to strengthen defence and military relations between the two countries. That landmark agreement was a productive instrument for India and would help to facilitate joint weapons production, co-operation on missile defence and the transfer of civil and military technology to India. This agreement has paved the way for the possible lifting of US export controls for sensitive military technology to India without signing CTBT. The agreement is designed to achieve two main objectives:

a To help India to advance America’s strategic goals in Asia  
b To help India to become a major world power this may project its military presence beyond its border.

The Indo-US “Strategic Partnership” was based on common values and interests. The defence pact will chalk out a route for defence cooperation between India and US during the next ten years. The Washington has justified that the pact was based on the global security challenges and its perceived strategic interests in South Asia. The defence pact which came after intense talk’s hours before the formal negotiations of Indian Defence Minister Pranab Mukkherjee and the US Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld is a logical offshoot of the strategic partnership. Rumsfeld and Mukkherjee expressed in a joint press briefing that the Washington and New Delhi have set up a new era of their relationship and we are transforming our relationship to reflect our common principles and shared national interests. The both countries decided to formulate a defence procurement and production group to examine defence trade, as well as prospects for co-production and technology collaboration, research development, testing and evaluation and naval pilot training. To overcome the challenge of criticism from Indian media that the US is not sincere to supply the high-techs weapons to India and cannot be relied as a long-term supplier, it was decided to
setup a bilateral “defence procurement and production group”\textsuperscript{27} to oversee defence trade and prospects for co-production and technology collaboration.

Interestingly, the \textit{New York Times} has quoted a military analyst as suggesting that “The Washington decision to supply F-16 plane to Islamabad may have been planned for pressuring India to buy American products and India would have gone its merry way. But the game has been changed when Pakistan announced that she is getting the F-16s. For last many years, India has coasted on Russian and locally manufactured fighter jets. Now, if Pakistan buys real new American planes, India has to have them too\textsuperscript{28}”. From the US government perspective, the \textit{New York Times} wrote: “Weapon supply to Pakistan and India strengthen the American presence on the Chinese border and its interest in this region. The deal will open the new markets for US throughout the Asian region for military contractors, which are looking for the more foreign buyers as the Pentagon budget comes under pressure”\textsuperscript{29}.

On June 30, 2005, the Pakistan foreign office spokesman expressed Islamabad’s concern over the defence pact. He said that Pakistan had already conveyed its concern to Bush administration over its negative consequences of the Indo-US strategic partnership, in particular, over the induction of new weapons system such as missile defence that would destabilize the strategic balance in the region and may trigger an arms race here”\textsuperscript{30}. Foreign Minister Khurshid Mahmood Kasuri has also expressed the same view. I believe that the government reaction over this issue did not cover the feelings of the people and these statements were, however, rhetorical and not sufficient to match the gravity of the situation. Pakistan should convey its serious concern to US as she had a non-ally NATO status. The US should make it clear, its military collaboration with India my not have perilous effect on Pakistan. Nicholas Burns, Assistant Secretary of State visited New Delhi in June 2005 and said that US has devolved a strategic partnership with India as she is a rising and democratic power in the world and a trusted friendly country”\textsuperscript{31}. The statement testifies that the Washington has recognized India to play a vital role in South Asia. Washington also believes that Asia is poised to become flush point of strategic gravity in international politics and is keen to develop
its ties with India due to the vitality and importance of India and its long-term interests in South Asia and beyond. The US has decided to bond its close relations with India to safeguard its vital interests in this region.

Alan Kroonstad of the Congressional Research Centre has also acknowledged this claim. According to report prepared by this centre: Washington has changed its policy in South Asia and it appears to be inserting a bigger gamble on India and according to various political analysts; New Delhi and Islamabad are no longer recognized as the same in Washington. Pakistan is observed as a middle power and India has the much larger prospective down the road. You would not listen to strategic associate being used much with Pakistan but you will hear it with India”32. Washington has changed its policy in favour of India that the doctrine of equality among the two nations of South Asia has been deserted. The both countries also shaped a security policy group to dish up as the most important mechanism to lead the bilateral strategic security relationship and to make sure the improvement of the Indo-US strategic partnership. The Defence Procurement and Production Groups have also been established to examine defence trade and over see the technology partnership between the two countries.

An Indian leading english daily, The Indian Express stated this pact a “Path breaking Defence Agreement” that will make out the mutual goals on which collaboration between armed services of both countries can be identified. The agreement is being witnessed as a noteworthy accomplishment as it is for the first time after the Pokharan tests that Washington has determined to advance defence ties with New Delhi33. It is for the first time in Indo-US relationship that both countries will recognize the political parameters for further significant defence cooperation. The key characteristic of the agreement will be the safety of sea lanes that will translate into combined operating of significant oceanic man routes like the Malacca Straits. This joint understanding will be under the wide goal to look after and protect global trade and not permit disruption of key maritime trade routes.

According to an Indian analyst: A few of the articles in the agreement impinge on New Delhi’s free speak. It takes me back of the accords or treaties throughout the cold war which India
powerfully diverged. Yet if there is no compulsion on New Delhi to accomplish what NATO, CENTO and SEATO required from its members, the deal with the US amounts to an alliance. It keeps out other nations and counteracts the UN Charter based on the one-world concept. According to a sub-clause of article 4 of the agreement India and America will work together in multinational actions when it is in their common interest. If the “common interest” of the two countries goes beyond the interests of the rest, what is the UN for? America did not bother about it when it assaulted Iraq. An international action has to have the stamp of the UN approval. This has been India’s point of view. In July 2005, the Indo-US relationship received further boost up when both countries pledged to step up cooperation on nonmilitary nuclear activities, civilian space programmes, dual-use high-technology trade, and an unmitigated dialogue on missile defence.

**Indo-US Nuclear Agreement:**

When Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited Washington in July 2005, the US offered India the full benefits of civil nuclear energy collaboration and permitted India to get the same amenities accorded to a member-state of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty without signing the accord, a move tantamount to recognize India as a nuclear weapon state. The agreement was proclaimed in a combined declaration on July 18, 2005, describes for the first proper reformation of the nuclear non-proliferation regime in the last 30 years to put up India’s desire for acceptance as a nuclear power. When a question was raised to Indian Prime Minister how far he had done well to ask US for the taking away of US limitations on nuclear and high-technology supplies to India, he said: we have had a very positive and fruitful meeting and the issue has been tackled in a way that gives me great contentment. President Bush and Prime Minister Singh stressed the significance of developing a closer links between the two countries and it will develop even closer in the days and years to come. President Bush said: “He would ask Congress and allied nations to pick up sanctions
stopping Indian access to civil nuclear technologies”\textsuperscript{39}. The US had imposed sanctions on India in 1998 when it conducted its second round of nuclear tests, but approved to pick up those and other sanctions after the September 11, 2001 attacks reward for support in the war on terrorism. India has not signed the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the US law disallows the export of technology that could assist a nuclear programme of any country that not signed the treaty. President Bush expressed: “Nuclear collaboration could comprise of quick consideration of fuel supplies to US-built Tarapur nuclear power plant near India’s business center of Mumbai”\textsuperscript{40}. The Tarapur reactor is reportedly downward to its most recent supply of fuel from Russia, which has spoken its helplessness to carry on the supply because of the US restrictions on India.

Indian Prime Minister declared that his country would agree to presume the similar responsibilities and practice like the other foremost states with highly developed nuclear technology. They incorporated untying civilian and military nuclear facilities and programme in a phased style and putting its civilian facilities under safeguards imposed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Global Nuclear Watch Dog and also promised to uphold India’s suspension on nuclear testing”\textsuperscript{41}.

The Under Secretary of States for Political Affairs, R. Nicholas Burns, who contributed very influential part to finalize the nuclear deal, described the deal “a most important progress forward for the US and the high-water mark of US-India dealings since 1947”\textsuperscript{42} and the agreement deal does not point out that Washington is currently recognizing India as a nuclear armaments state and that is a separate issue”\textsuperscript{43}. The high-ranking US spokesperson said that the acknowledgment matter was moved up by India but we rejected and given the reality that they did not stick to the NPT.

The US permitted India to attain the similar amenities accorded to a member – state of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty without signing the accord and it is a development to recognize New Delhi as a nuclear weapon state. The deal allows New Delhi to secure global assistance for its civilian nuclear reactors at the same time as keeping its nuclear arms. Mr. Bush communicated his admiration to Manmohan Singh over India’s well-built dedication to stop WMD proliferation and declared as
a responsible state with highly developed nuclear. So far these benefits are kept for five states - the US, Russia, China, Britain and France - these are recognized as legal nuclear states under the NPT. In this agreement, the US approved to modify its own non-proliferation laws.

The proliferation specialists moved up sturdy apprehensions that growing Washington collaboration with New Delhi would grow weaker US efforts to force down Iran from halting its nuclear weapons aspirations.

The Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) expressed it’s sever concerns: “If the US is somber about nonproliferation, it should not provide India privileged dealing. The proclamation of planned US nuclear assistance to New Delhi is troublesome and India has an insecure gas centrifugal plant used for armed services that has depended on doubtful and probably illegal imports. The gas centrifuge technology which New Delhi is building up could also extend to other states. For this reason alone, if the US is serious regarding to its nonproliferation objectives, New Delhi should not offer favored dealing”.

Former Pakistani diplomat Touqir Hussain, a research fellow at the US Institute for Peace stated: “The execution of the US decision will run into grave concerns, like the NPT, the Suppliers Club and the Zangar committee. On the other hand, New Delhi has anted much of its attachments with the Washington on acquiring civilian nuclear technology. It is an equally economic and tactical gambit-backdoor admission into NPT as a nuclear power”. Leonard S Specter, Deputy Director of Centre for Non-Proliferation, International Relations and Security Network expressed his views: “If you allow India to achieve same facilities as legitimate nuclear states signed the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), many other nations are likely to tread through it. China is before now believing of selling other reactors to Pakistan”. The Democratic Congressman from Massachusetts, Edward J. Markey has said, “Why should Washington put up for sale illicit nuclear supplies to India? We cannot make favours, smashing the rules of the nonproliferation treaty to support one nation at the threat of undermining critical international treaties on nuclear weapons”. Daryl G. Kimball, Director of the Arms Control Association drew attention that this
is a stunning paradigm of the Bush administration’s strategy of exceptionalism for friends at the cost of a constant and successful assail on the threats of nuclear weapons”.

This deal offering to India is the achievement of ex-US ambassador to New Delhi, Robert Blackwell, a Deputy National Security Advisor under Condoleezza Rice, along with his close friend, Ashley J. Tellis, an Indian-American expert on US-India relations at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. In 2005, Telis presented a wide apparition for India-US relations in an essay titled: “India as a new global Power” which encouraged geo-strategic collaboration between the two states based stalwartly in Washington security and armed sales to New Delhi and its support for India’s rising nuclear armory.

The renowned US daily Washington Post quoted the Telis’s report “If Washington is serious regarding to move forward its geopolitical aims in Asia, it would facilitate New Delhi to develop its strategic potentials such that India’s nuclear armaments and linked delivery system could prevent the rising and completely more skilled nuclear forces Beijing is possible to acquire by 2025”. Washington Post further expressed that the Indo-US deal has been resisted by nonproliferation bureaucrats, as well as John R. Bolton, the official named by the President to be UN ambassador. Bolton viewed that such collaboration would stand for gifting country that built a nuclear weapon in secret; by means of technology it achieved under the pretext of civilian power. Both North Korea and Iran are deemed to have tried the similar way to build up nuclear weapons. Some officials viewed that the agreement would be harmful at a time when the US is endeavouring to ratchet nuclear-weapons ambitions. As part of the Pact, President George W. Bush changed the long-standing US policy and clearly recognized India as a legal nuclear power, finishing New Delhi’s 30-year quest for such acknowledgment.

The deal is a “Significant Plum” for the world’s mainly crowded democracy and strengthens India as a major strategic US partner in Asia for coming years.

The accord will make up a most important exemption to the prohibition of nuclear aid to any country that does not agree to international checking of all of its nuclear facilities. India has not signed the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The deal seeks to
confer New Delhi access to much-needed, but long-denied, U.S. nuclear technology and fuel. New Delhi in return would break up its military and civilian nuclear amenities. India will put its civilian nuclear facilities release for checking and international inspections. While military facilities will stay exempt. It will be the first time from the last three decades; New Delhi will present its civil nuclear program to international checking by eternally placing fourteen of its twenty two nuclear power plants and all of its upcoming civil reactors underneath the protection of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Inside a production, almost 90 percent of Indian reactors will possible be wrapped by the agreement. Lacking of the deal, New Delhi's nuclear power program would have stayed a black box. Through this deal, India will be taken into the international nuclear nonproliferation mainstream.

The deal grants much more payback to India than what is projected in the media.

1- However, New Delhi decided to open its civilian nuclear plants for inspection to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors so far she had the right to make a choice which of the reactors are civilian and which are not.

2- Armed amenities and stockpiles of nuclear fuel that New Delhi has produced in past will be exempted from checking and be protected.

3- The accord only talks about on the subject of the civilian nuclear services while the quantity and capability of weapon programmes, which is unlimited, is not discussed and deal does not require India to restrict or limit its fissile material manufacturing.

It was outlandish that India was not asked to end the production material for weapon now or to cease from structuring additional weapons and New Delhi does not still presume the obligations that Washington has signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), to talk in good faith, termination of nuclear
armaments competition at an early date and the removal of nuclear arsenals.

The pronouncement is possible to leave a bad impression in Pakistan and reinforce critics who have lengthy upheld that the US, while labeling Pakistan its grand partner in the fighting against violence, is really structuring India at the cost of Pakistan. The deal is as well leaving a bad result on the already negative US picture held on an accepted, public level in Pakistan. Washington, of course, has been immediate to reassure Pakistan and China that the agreement was not meant against them. Secretary of States Condoleezza Rice told President Pervez Musharraf that there was no top secret pact with New Delhi and that the collaboration mostly concerned Indian nuclear reactors for peaceful reasons\(^57\). Since the political analysts in Washington have expressed their views that the US should at the present be expecting a Pakistan enjoying major non-NATO ally status to push the Washington for a similar agreement. Islamabad has been making every effort to get nuclear power plants from Washington, which it thinks are imperative to accomplish its awful energy necessities in the coming years.

The Bush administration is not prepared to accept Pakistan’s demand concerning the expansion of nuclear plants for peaceful purposes. Pakistan requested the Bush administration for providing of at least two power plants for civilian purposes and this demand was formulated to arrange the country’s energy necessities through power generation up till 2010\(^58\). The Washington pronouncement to settle deal with New Delhi on nuclear energy collaboration and its denial to give nuclear power plants to Pakistan would not have a optimistic impact on the relations between Pakistan and the US.

The Under Secretary of States, R. Nicholas Burns stated on July 19, 2005 that “Bush administration found a quite constructive response between its ally’s overseas and Congressional leaders for a current accord to provide India assistance for its civilian nuclear programme while permitting it to maintain nuclear weapons\(^59\). The Secretary of States, Condoleezza Rice told the newsmen that the response of President Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan was “constructive” and “not very problematic”\(^60\).
The deal would carry a main change in the international agreements managing nuclear technology, essentially letting off India from very old requirements that only countries preparing to disown nuclear weapons may acquire or attain civilian nuclear technology, equipment and fuel from the world’s main nuclear energy providers. New Delhi has never signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty and not at all agreed to check up of its nuclear facilities. Now it agreed to allow inspection of its civilian but not its military nuclear facilities. The agreement got condemnation from nuclear specialists at research institutions.

John S. Wolf, a former Assistant Secretary of States for Non–Proliferation Affairs, now President of the Eisenhower Fellowship programme in Philadelphia, stated; “It is letting down that we have offered something to New Delhi and not obtained something considerable in return and this accord is not easy to bring together with the global standards proceeded by the US for the last 40 years.”

Pakistani media has condemned and acted in response powerfully to this deal and it should for New Delhi has basically attained double purposes – upholding India’s nuclear armory and attaining civilian nuclear technology. The deal left alone Pakistan, which feels pleasure itself to become the frontline state in the US –led war on terror and a major non-NATO ally, stumped.

Tom Lantos, senior Democrat on the House of Representative International Relations Committee stated in Washington on September 8, 2005 that a clear fresh Indo-US deal is at risk if India does not make efforts with Washington to penalize Iran for its nuclear weapon–related activities.

The prominent US Congress man Lantos expressed his views in a hearing, he powerfully supports nearer ties with the world’s largest democracy but India will forfeit a very heavy cost for their totality disregard of US apprehensions vis-à-vis Iran, the only most important global threat we look. In spite of enormously developing ties with Washington, New Delhi is following a US–opposed gas pipe line with Iran. Under Secretary of States, R. Nicholas Burns stated during his Indian visit in October, 2005 that US was determined to execute a mutual nuclear deal and accomplish the responsibilities under the accord. He was speaking to the reporters in New Delhi. India and the United States signed a milestone civilian nuclear
cooperation pact on March 2, 2006 during President Bush visited to New Delhi\textsuperscript{64}. International Atomic Energy Authority Chief, Mohammed ElBaradei stated that it would be a landmark, well-timed for ongoing labours to combine the non-proliferation regime, fight against the nuclear terrorism and make stronger nuclear safety\textsuperscript{65}. British Prime Minister, Tony Blair ricocheted ElBaradei and said that the arrangement can build a noteworthy input to energy, security, development, economic and environmental objectives for New Delhi and the international community as well as representing a net gain for the non-proliferation regime\textsuperscript{66}. But Nicholas Burns wrote that he waited for “broad-scale international support” for the agreement. This deal will grow deeper the strategic corporation, generate new prospects for US businesses in India, increase global energy security, and lessen India’s carbon emissions\textsuperscript{67}. The Indo-US strategic partnership, despite the tactical association between Islamabad and Washington, could enhance the irregularity in the balance of power between India and Pakistan, which might reduce the nuclear threshold between the two influential and confrontational neighbours of South Asia. Pakistan has the severe concerns over the Indo-US nuclear deal and there are real apprehensions that India may divert its nuclear material to build up nuclear arms, which would have serious implications for Pakistan. The Indo-US nuclear deal is very sensitive, principally in view of the post-9/11 period and the continuing US-led war on terrorism. The Washington justifies the agreement as to deal with India’s energy requirements for its growing economy. The energy needs of India could have been tackled in a much different manner. The parallel resources of energy could have been explored similar to supporting and growing the Indian coal industry, expanding the use of renewable energy sources and also by making India’s electricity grid more efficient. President Bush’s visit to India in March 2006 more strengthened this joint venture. On the other hand, US improved its strategic relationships with Pakistan, which were refined and continued through elevated consultations, debit relief, aid commitments, and removing of sanctions. Washington’s upholding of its relations with New Delhi and Islamabad offers a motivating experiment of balancing assumption and of the political dealings between regional and international power dynamics\textsuperscript{68}. Pakistan
has also articulated its deep apprehensions over the much improved level of imminence that the US was mounting with India. However, time has arrived when the apprehensions should be transformed in the modification of foreign policy.

The United States clutches huge political, economic, and strategic advantages in the global arena\textsuperscript{69}. It stays what Bill Clinton described it in 1997: “the indispensable nation\textsuperscript{70}”. It overlooks on top of the rest of the Great Powers\textsuperscript{71}. Washington’s unilateral approach in global political affairs, therefore, was criticized at different meetings. On June 15, 2006, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, in its Shanghai Summit Declaration, declared that it would construct a positive role to set up new global security structural design of common trust, mutual benefit, parity, and mutual respect. Such approach is based on the broadly renowned principles of international law\textsuperscript{72}. The Bush administration expended $2.1 trillion on the military between 2003 and 2008, which added to the country’s potential military power and upset the emerging balancers. The US with its globe-circling missiles and its bristling naval task groups and its fleet of long-range bombers, with aircrafts in the atmosphere every minute of every day, has made a military power that can hold American power anyplace on earth, almost immediately.

\textbf{Implication for Pakistan}

The Indo-US deal’s implications are probably to be global and regional. This Indo-US Civil Nuclear Deal not simply disagrees with the letter and spirit of previous US non-proliferation regulations, but as well not in good turn of the deep-rooted standards of demeanor between a globally recognized nuclear weapon state and one that has followed its nuclear programme outside the domain of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

There are severe implications for Pakistan, which have to take into explanation. The differentiation among reactors geared to armed requirements and those destined for civilian purposes are very skinny. Any Indian administration can reroute products of civilian amenities to armed ones if and at what time it decides
to carry out accordingly. The accord would in addition facilitate New Delhi to buy conventional weapons valued five billion dollars from Washington. It will as well shed its shadow on the nuclear confidence-building talks with Islamabad. While the single super power with very important stakes in South Asia, the US should pursue the procedures that should contain rather than support an arms competition in the region. The Indo-US Deal is a clear sign that the US no longer will deal India and Pakistan as equal competitor in South Asia and that it has at last recognized India as the leading power in the region. Pakistan is an appreciated US partner in the war against terrorism and is carrying on enjoying a major non-NATO ally status. However the Washington has a deeper and a more significant strategic association with New Delhi. The defence accord is a major progress in the framework of overall India-US links. It should be a subject of concern for Pakistan that the US has overlooked Pakistani apprehensions that the delivery of the most up-to-date missile defence system to India will upset the strategic equilibrium of power in South Asia. The Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) system is a most important step beyond Washington’s former offer for deal of PAC-2 which India had already refused. Contrasting to the earlier Patriots PAC-2 which functions by catching close up to targets and exploding them out of the sky, PAC-3 interceptors have no likely to explode and depend upon kinetic energy to remove short and medium series missiles taking nuclear, biological or chemical warheads. A PAC-3 system holds smaller but four times more missiles than PAC-2(16vs4) and has a longer range. Until 2004, 175PAC-3 systems had been introduced to the US army. There is a genuine threat that the transfer of PAC-3 to India will show the way to an anti-missile race in the region of South Asia and forcing Pakistan to either look for the similar or parallel anti-missile system for itself. This will essentially indicate an offensive raise in defence spending. The Pakistan budget for 2009-2010 has already added to the defence expenditure by 22 percent. A sheer go up in military spending is hurdle to wipe away the benefits of economic growth achieved by Pakistan and stay the social sector as famished as before. The cost India forfeited in the form of withdrawing its claim for a UN cover for joint military operations. Beside other things, the deal foresees the usage of
Indian troops in vague US-led “multinational operations” around the world in spite of whether these are approved by the UN or not. Of course, the wording of the accord does not spell out that these operations would be US-led and includes the proviso, when it is in their common interest.

The most important implication is that the deal in a roundabout way pushes India to build a severe quantitative appraisal of how big a nuclear force it really wants, even if we admit at face value the requirement for a nuclear prevention. Eleven years the 1998 tests and still basking in the magnificence of having become de facto nuclear weapon states, neither New Delhi nor Islamabad show any importance to put a ceiling on the size of their nuclear forces. The approach developed by the strategic circles of both states is that these are at a standstill early day in their nuclear build-up. Their implicit yardstick looks to be lay down by the armory of the other small nuclear powers, France, the UK, and China, a several of hundred warheads, possibly including fusion weapon (H-bombs), apart from whether deterrence necessities in South Asia actually call for this. But, at least for New Delhi, the luxury of carrying on to make war heads and missiles as speedily as resources and technology will permit, which hedging on the final dimension of its nuclear armory, may have got closer to an end with the agreement with the US. Infect, the nuclear portion of the agreement entitles India to announce which segment of its nuclear amenities are civilian and therefore unlock to safeguards and security, and which sections it could maintain under cover as defence related. Within these over all curves, the accord is very noninterventionist in the demands it puts on India. There is no firm time structure for dealing this division, and the option of which amenities are civilian and which are military, has been left totally to New Delhi. But this extremely authorization has persuaded a lot public debate of the enormity of its future nuclear plans and has spotlighted global concentration on India’s fissile material stockpiles and production goals. The objectives pointed out in India’s Nuclear Doctrine Document that its nuclear forces are self-protective rather than antagonistic in nature and the only motive for its nuclear force is to uphold a nominal deterrence capability. But such declaration of aim will hold no certainty unless the ensuing nuclear build-up is
dependable with them. Unluckily, such uniformity is overlooking even from the original Nuclear Doctrine document.

The Indo-US deal sets out away from the monarchy of Pak-India relations and has broader implication. The nuclear treaty practically amounts to America’s acknowledgment of India as a nuclear power. According to a Pakistani analyst: “The importance of the pact was spelled out by Dr Singh when he said that it should be observed against the background of India’s 1974 nuclear test and the international community’s decision to refuse nuclear technology to India”\(^74\). The agreement is not at all astonishing. One of the world renowned defence experts while responding to US pronouncement of F-16s deal to Pakistan had very properly envisaged that it means the US is going to offer India something amazingly big\(^75\).

**Conclusion**

India’s vital position in South Asia, its strategic position between Western Asia and Southeast Asia and its appearance as an economic power give it an influential place in global politics. This study looks at Indo-US strategic relations and their possible impact on Pakistan’s national security. In the 1960s; Washington took nuclear technology to South Asia through New Delhi. Islamabad’s entry in the race of getting the nuclear technology was very late, it was after it’s overwhelm and the dismemberment by New Delhi in 1971. With the appearance of the US as a unilateral player on the world arena, India readjusted its strategy, placed itself to face the rapid growth of China, replaced state socialism with economic liberalism and openness to globalization, and began to bind its close relations with this sole superpower. The strong anti-Islamic sentiments in US and West present Pakistan’s nuclear programme as an Islamic programme. Even though Pakistan has taken up a very pro-US and capitalistic approach to deal with economic and political issues but public attitude here didn’t emerge in lieu with the government’s policies. The burly anti-US feelings in Pakistan moreover played an imperative role to strengthen the present Indo-US Nuclear Deal. The consequences of Indo-US strategic
partnership might come out clear-cut – that is, an armaments competition between India and Pakistan– but the matters are more multifaceted. Collaboration between New Delhi and Washington, particularly in the nuclear and space fields might enlarge the irregularity in the conventional and non-conventional balance of power between India and Pakistan. Despite the strategic cooperation between Pakistan and US, that asymmetry may probably lesser the nuclear threshold between the confrontational neighbours. Indo-US partnership in the field of missile defence systems has an apathetic effect on the strategic environment of the entire region.

The absolute impact of the accord will just launch to take effect, just the once the US makes the vital alterations in its 1978 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act. Pakistan has questioned Washington that these modifications should not be India-specific but the US is formerly appearing for the adjustment for India as a “special case” in terms of the Nuclear Supplier’s Group Rules. Pakistani people should keep in mind that in the after math of the announcement of the agreement, there was considerable anxiety affirmed by the international society concerning to the nuclear components of the agreement. It was considered in a different way that the Washington was carrying on unilaterally for identifying New Delhi de-facto nuclear authority exemption; that it was unfair to the members of the NPT to put up such an exception for India. The Washington is placing down a dreadful example, which could hold up more proliferation in non-nuclear weapon state. The solitary optimistic feature of the deal was that it might facilitate to gain a large amount of India’s nuclear facilities within the track of international safeguards.

It is supposed by the international community that India will budge ahead through the strides to let go key sectors of its nuclear reactor amenities to such safe guards. In the absence of such a demonstration of outstanding faith, a lot of rewards that India might have expected to acquire because of the deal, in terms of accessibility of Uranium and sensitive technology for civilian reasons could not turn up. Even though this agreement provides India substantial suppleness at what time and which of its reactor amenities it can select as civilian, the management has to oppose the pull of unrestrained nuclear weapon objectives. India as well has sufficient plutonium supply previously formed
in the Dhruva and Cirus reactors to build dozens of warheads further. There is too the plutonium being separated from spent reactor fuel reprocessing services at Tarapur and Kalpakkam.

If this plutonium is destined to be utilized for speedy breeder reactors as an element of the programme to alter out rich thorium resources in to fissile Uranium (233) for civilian reactors, there are no grounds why the reprocessing plants can not be unlock to safe guarding. Thus, India will not suffer the loss of safety if it were to dump all of more manufacturing of fissile materials for armed purpose and say publicly each and every one its power reactors unlock as civilian; open to safeguarding. This will make possible it to put down fears of its reactor facilities being used to fuel a nuclear arm race. As far as the Washington is concerned, it would be a real gainer from the civil nuclear deal. In addition moving forward American strategic interests in Asia, this agreement will make possible to provide the global market for the US defence contractors, particularly at this moment when Pentagon budget is going under pressure. The Washington weapons sales are an extremely gainful means of sweetening the largely strategic partnership package settled with New Delhi.

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