Pakistan’s Post 9/11 US Policy: Prospects and Constraints

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After the 9/11 attacks on the US, Pakistan is a very important strategic ally in the US-led global war on terrorism since it was in the US’s endeavours to drive back the Soviet Union from Afghanistan (1979-1989). In the last eight years (2001-2009), Pakistan’s relations with the US have gone through an indispensable reformation. At state and policy levels, there is developing gratitude of the restraints and prospects of strategic partnership. However, Pakistan is tackling a number of its own challenges even as it has entrusted itself to help out the US for attaining its objectives. Solemn questions endure about the nuclear proliferation, armed forces dominance over civilians, fragile systems for justice provision, domestic threats from terrorism and sectarian violence, as well as remaining qualms over Pakistan’s capability to eternally throw away the use of militants in Indian-held Kashmir. India-US 10-year Defence Pact, Indo-US Nuclear Agreement, and Agreement on Civil Nuclear Cooperation signed in June 28, 2005, July 18, 2005 and March, 2006 respectively point out imperative queries for the future of the existing Pak-US relations. This paper presents an overview of the changing dynamics of Pak–US relations and contends that, in spite of these disabilities and confines, Pakistan has a
prospect to build a strategic partnership with US. This paper argues that presently both countries look to have a rational evaluation of mutual strategic goals and challenges and change in global and regional geo-political environment necessitates a strategic partnership between Pakistan and US.

Pak-US relationships are very old. Pakistan’s relations with US have had a mixed history\(^1\) and the relationship has experienced the broad vacillation in the last sixty-two years. These relations are distinguished by major ups and downs on the basis of changing perceptions of the US. Even though the relationship between the two countries provided vital interests of the both states but it replicated nonexistence of consistency and lack of a long-term strategy based on a larger theoretical structure, a shared vision or permanence. During the sixty-two years of their relationship, the US and Pakistan have shared the strategic objectives as ‘Containment of Communism’, during Soviet Invasion in Afghanistan so called ‘Afghan Jihad’ and now, the War against Terrorism; though both are different in their interpretations of threats and their intensity, which carries on to be a problem area. Pakistan, an essential ally for the US – led war against terrorism as it fights to stabilize Afghanistan and stop the global threat and danger posed by al Qaeda activists and its allies, has been heavily burdened by the cost of battling Taliban insurgents along its Afghan border\(^2\).

Pakistan foreign policy has been possessed mostly with keeping its autonomy and sovereignty from the danger created by a much bigger and more authoritative country that stayed entrusted to the concept of “Akhand Bharat” (undivided Indian subcontinent). Saeed Shafqat contends that “the history of Pak-US friendships is a story of amity, apprehensions, strategic alliance, some achievements, and a
few dissatisfactions and yet, in spite of all these odds, these relations are going through a fundamental restructuring and are going towards a long term and enduring partnership.”

Denis Kux has examined the past patterns of Pak-US relations and wrote: “the both countries have not had concrete underpinnings of mutual national interest.”

Stephen Cohen describes the Pak-US relations as “episodic and discontinuous.” Tariq Ali argued that the US was capable to expand structural existence in Pakistan from its very beginning. K. Alan Kronstadt, a Specialist in South Asian Affairs, has expressed in CRS Report for Congress: “A stable, democratic, prosperous Pakistan vigorously engaged to crush Islamist militancy is believed very important for US interests. The present top-tier US concerns regarding Pakistan include regional and global terrorism; Afghan stability; domestic political stability and democratization; nuclear weapons proliferation and security; human rights protection; the ongoing Kashmir problem and Pakistan-India tensions; and economic development. Pakistan remains a vital U.S. ally in U.S.-led anti-terrorism efforts.”

The United States was the first country that acknowledged Pakistan and showed a welcoming inclination towards the new state. The US President Truman passed on a warm message on Pakistan’s independence on August 14, 1947 and sent an official deputation led by Assistant Secretary, Philips Talbot to attend the inaugural ceremonies of Pakistan. He expressed his views, saying, “I wish to assure you that the new dominion embarks on its course with the firm friendship and goodwill of the United States of America.”
This research paper discusses the following major aims and goals:

1- To see the over-arching US strategic objectives and global and regional interests in South Asia are and the extent to which they converge with Pakistan’s national interests.

2- To examine US role for helping out Pakistan to tackle challenges during the different phases of close cooperation and estrangement.

3- To study the role of Pakistan as a pivotal ally in US-led counterterrorism efforts in Post 9/11 period.

4- To discuss the present warmth in relations between the United States and Pakistan and the future prospects of these relations in the perspective of geo-strategic and geo-political factors.

The Cold War period 1947-91 and the Centrality of India:

At the time of independence, Pakistan was extremely cognizant of the power inequality in the region, and in its security considerations; India has been perceived as the primary security threat for Pakistan. The conflict over Kashmir in October 1947 has intensified their apprehensions. The anxiety of India made a syndrome of uncertainty that boosted the military in Pakistan from its very beginning and hunted for ways to level it out. In view of the fact from the very inception of Pakistan, its leaders have adopted sturdy pro-US and anti-India approach and
direction. They were in addition weary and cynical of Soviet intentions. In short, the Pakistani leadership had shown a consensus on an India centric foreign policy. To fight the Indian danger; Pakistan took on a two-pronged policy of looking for alliance with the US and following friendship with China. Touqir Hussain, an ex. Ambassador pointed out that “the viability of the state was at stake which forced Pakistan to look in the direction of the US, which in turn was seeking to encourage a strategic consent of non-communist Asian states to make sure the growing lines of communist influence”. In a bipolar world, during the Cold War Era, marked by vigorous rivalries between the communist and non-communist power, with the third world’ trying to steer clear of these rivalries under the cover of non-alignment, Pakistan’s policy of alignment reflected a deliberate decision on her part to link her policies with the West and more particularly the United States. The geo-political pragmatism and strategic coercion on both sides have taken the two states closer.

Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan had himself made contact with the US President Truman in 1948, looking for aid in return for defence cooperation. Liaquat Ali Khan to Pervez Musharraf, the rulers in Pakistan have taken on a pro-US foreign policy (except for Mr. Bhutto). Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan’s official visit to Washington in May 1950 put down a “positive impression on the Congress and the White House”. This visit laid the foundations of Pakistan’s strategic dependence and pro-US policy. Pakistani leadership was convinced that taking up a pro-US foreign policy was in Pakistan’s public interest, because it assured economic assistance and military support. The Commander- in -Chief of the Pakistan army, General Mohammad Ayub Khan, was inexorable in convincing the civilian leadership to join the US-led alliance. Pakistan was vigorously looking for the US military, economic and
technological aid in the 1950’s. The amorphous cordiality of the early years gave way to unqualified alignment in the fifties based on the series of bilateral and multilateral treaties\(^\text{17}\). For that reason, it was almost expected that when the US was seeking for partners to shore up its arrangement in the Cold War, Pakistan gave positive respond while India preferred to make its global sphere of power in the non-aligned world. Pakistan chose to turn into a close ally of the US since its assistance set up an impression of balance of power in the region. When the US chose to assist Pakistan, it was not just that Washington liked Pakistan but also because of its incapability to persuade Indian leadership to their side\(^\text{18}\). The US disappointment did not mean that she observed India as a threat. On the contrary, Pakistan’s security considerations have long been India centric, built around the dispute over Kashmir. Both the US and Pakistan came in to the alliances from different perspectives and with different objectives.

For the US throughout the Cold War, Communism was the major threat and its containment was the global perspective and goal. During the Cold War era, the focus of US policy was containment of the Communist bloc headed by the Soviet Union and China. To attain this objective, the US took up a strategy of building alliances with countries that were on the side-line of these states. She used these alliances to contain communist ideology and power. Pakistan, on the other hand, had different regional perspectives and apprehensive. India was and remains a major security threat for Pakistan and its keenness to join the treaties was to restore the Indo-Pak disparity of power, to make safe west’s moral and diplomatic support over the Kashmir issue and to have admittance to resources for economic development\(^\text{19}\). By joining South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1954 and Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) in 1955, Pakistan allowed the US
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... to use the Pakistani air space and airfields, provided the logistical support, if and when needed, and agreed the collaboration with the US in intelligence gathering. In return for these services, Pakistan obtained military weaponry and training programs for officer cadres in the armed forces and financial and academic support for developing economic institutions. Apart from the financial and military aid, which provided as a valuable balancer in the face of India’s overwhelming superiority, the liabilities flowing from adherence to the Pacts turned out to be considerable\(^20\). Hamza Alvi and Khusro Amir wrote that during the defence pacts, the US has provided the economic aid to Pakistan and was able to grow deeper its links and presence in the military and economic sector in Pakistan\(^21\).

The most important accomplishment of the military coalition with the US was the formation of the Planning Commission that turned into central for economic planning, development and growth of Pakistan during the 1960’s. For joining these alliances, Pakistan had to pay a political price in terms of protests and hostility from the communist powers and condemnation from India. During 1953-1961, the US extended two billion dollars in aid, out of which, one-fourth was in military aid\(^22\). Pakistani policy makers continued the strategy of alliance with the US “was not flawed conceptually though it suffered at times from errors of judgment”\(^23\).

The level and range of Pak-US partnership has varied under different administrations. The departmental relations were built up between the US Defense Department and the Pakistani military. In spite of complication in Pak-US relationships, these links have carried on and supported the two states to stabilize conditions of regional crisis\(^24\). Military has hampered the growth of a party system and representative institutions in Pakistan and remained a part
of the problem and the US is seen as aggravating and abetting these problems\textsuperscript{25}. From this viewpoint, Pakistan is described as a vassal state\textsuperscript{26}. When Pakistan developed its relationships with China in 1962 in wake of large-scale western military weaponry and financial assistance to India, Pak-US relations deteriorated strained. During the discussion on Kashmir dispute in the Security Council in 1964, the US ambassador did not demand for any positive step by the United Nations for resolving the issue, but proposed bilateral dialogues between India and Pakistan\textsuperscript{27}. During the 1965 war between Pakistan and India, the US instead of supporting her ally, took up a position of impartiality, and cut off military aid and stopped supplying the military equipments to the both countries. The popular opinion in Pakistan after the war was that the US was not sincere and serious to the Pakistan’s security and survival. The US policy towards South Asia has regularly moved from equilibrium of power model in the fifties and sixties to a place of ‘better acknowledgment of India’s predominance since 1971\textsuperscript{28}.

Pakistan also played very important role as a negotiator and an intermediary in July 1971 to bring closer and for amity between the US and China during Nixon regime. In August 1971, India signed a twenty year (1971-91) Treaty of Friendship with Soviet Union. This agreement made possible for India to advance its armed invasion of East Pakistan in November 1971 and break up Pakistan on December 16, 1971. The breakup of Pakistan made worse its uncertain condition—propagation of humiliation, antagonism and rivalry towards India\textsuperscript{29}. This mistrust and intensely embedded resentment has sustained to be a major impediment for ‘untangling’ India and Pakistan\textsuperscript{30}. During the seventies, the US attempted to follow a policy of amity with India and Pakistan, the two main states in the region and perpetual antagonists’\textsuperscript{31}. In May 1974, India made a test
of nuclear explosion which intensified Pakistan’s insecurity syndrome. In the beginning, Pakistan looked for assurances and security from the US. However, the US response was very cool and then Islamabad came to a decision to secure a nuclear processing plant from France. Pakistan’s desire to obtain nuclear armaments turns into a major annoyance in US-Pakistan relations. The US Democrat President Jimmy Carter (1976-80) who paid an official visit to India and Iran in 1978 turned down Pakistani request to visit Pakistan. The US also withdrew the deal of 100 A-7 jet fighters to Pakistan and raised the Symington Amendment and suspended all military and economic aid to Pakistan. Pakistan’s nuclear programme developed into a main annoyance for the US and carries on to remind apprehension among the policy makers and the community of policy intellectuals during the Carter regime.

**Soviet Invasion in Afghanistan: The US and Pakistan Strategic Partnership**

The Iranian Revolution in February 1979 and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 transformed the fortune of Zia’s military government in Pakistan. The US President Jimmy Carter announced to present a quick offer of $400 million in financial and military aid to Pakistan after Soviet invasion in Afghanistan. The military dictator General Zia-ul-Haq realized the American comprehensions in the changing scenario of the region and refused to accept this offer as “peanuts”. The two most important developments i.e. the Iranian Islamic Revolution and the Soviet invasion, showed cataclysmic for Pakistan. Pakistan was granted the status of a ‘frontline state’ by US. In 1980’s, the Pak–US partnership aimed to defeat Soviet Union in Afghanistan and cultivated an alliance of Muslim holy warriors that encouraged International Islamism to fight and beat communist Soviet Union, costing about $7 billion. According to Ahmed Rashid, “the effort of the
two was to turn Afghan jihad into a global war waged by all Muslim states against the Soviet Union”\cite{35}. An 11 party alliance was established under the umbrella of the Hizb-e-Islami led by Gulbudin Hekmatyar\cite{36}. The 11 party coalitions continued to work till its degeneration after the Geneva Agreement in 1988 with the close involvement of the military regime of Zia-ul-Haq, which in turn instrumentalized the Jamat-e-Islami of Pakistan as its principal political arm\cite{37}. The architects had no idea that one day these Jihadi groups would become a major source of national and international terrorism.

President Ronald Reagan’s government restructured a framework of Pak-US partnership to repel the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and chalked out an aid package of military and financial assistance to Pakistan to achieve the policy goal\cite{38}. During the Afghan Jihad, (1979-1988), the subjects of deviation, the nuclear program and the Kashmir dispute stayed behind and due to Soviet –India Friendship Treaty, India – US relations remained “alienated”, while the US-Pakistan coalition flourished. Pakistan took advantages from collaboration with the US and its military staff with US training, got skilled in intelligence gathering and combat training. In December 1981, the US waived off Symington amendment sanctions for a period of six years and the US President Ronald Reagan pronounced a $3.2 billion aid package for the period of six years at $400 million per year for military equipments purchasing, including F-16s and $100 million per year in economic aid. The Pak-US collaboration during the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan had done their work so effectively and sounded that even before the first aid package ended, President Reagan announced another $4 billion package, $2.20 billion in economic and $ 1.72 billion in military aid. In December 1987, the US Congress agreed to sanction one more $ 480 million military and
economic aid package for Pakistan and approved to waive off the Symington amendment sanction for a period of another two and half years. In 1988, President Ronald Reagan issued a certificate to the Congress, “Pakistan does not have nuclear weapons”. During Afghan war, Pakistan got benefits from the US collaboration. It revitalized the institutional linkages between the US and Pakistani military in areas of intelligence gathering, logistical support and training. It was perhaps one of the most effective and successful collaborative ventures developed by the two countries. The US spent about $7 billion during the Afghan war. After the signing of the Geneva Peace Accord in April 1988, the US again reconsidered its relationships with Pakistan and Pakistan’s nuclear program and its administration post Soviet withdrawal Afghanistan developed into major issues of differences in mutual relations. The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in February 1989 successfully meant that the US had attained its goals and she had no more long-term interests in the region. During 1989-94, a number of geo-political developments took place in the region which played the dramatically reshaped US foreign policy and Pakistan had no space in this changing situation.

The specialists on US-South Asia relations have pointed out to the need for redefined US policy in the region. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace has published a study recommending a redefined US policy towards India. The Asian Society has called for new US South Asia policy in the context of the changing world order. Therefore, US policy in South Asia had arrived at a turning point. Pakistan has no longer a front line status after the pulling out of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, nor was US bothered by the policy of non-alignment pursued by India. It has opened up the new opportunities for the US to restructure its relations with both, Pakistan and India. There
had been outstanding changes in the attitude and goals of the US. The US also made cuts in the International Military Education Training (IMET) program and IMET funding for Pakistan remained at zero between 1990-2002. In 1990, the US decided to discontinue the already promised $564 million economic and military aid to Pakistan and also stopped the supply of 28 F-16s; for which Pakistan had previously made payment. President George H. Bush turned down to issue a certificate that Pakistan does not have nuclear weapons. Senator, Larry Pressler introduced the new amendments to impose sanctions against Pakistan. With the enforcement of Pressler amendment, the supply of military aid to Pakistan was stopped. The unrest in Indian held Kashmir in 1989, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan in February 1989, the unexpected disintegration of Soviet Union in January 1991 and the end of the Cold War, civil war in Afghanistan (1989-94), Gulf War in 1991, and termination of Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty (1971-91) were the developments which led US to review its policy towards Pakistan.

**The Post Cold War Period 1991-2001**

The sense of a practical turnaround of US stance towards Pakistan was generated by the Pressler Amendment which took place on October 1, 1990\(^\text{42}\), by the expression of new US apprehensions over Islamic fundamentalism, as well as signs of US interest to foster were to build up the friendly relations with India and cut off the military and financial aid and enforce sanctions on Pakistan. In Post-Cold War era, Washington relationships with New Delhi was believed to be a priority over her relationships with Islamabad because of India’s potential as an economic and strategic partner. The US seems to be more eager to make Pakistan adjust to the realities in South Asia\(^\text{43}\). This changed US policy towards Pakistan was the part of Washington’s special attention in South Asia to
watch its interests. These moves in US policy in South Asia appeared most shocking for Pakistan. In Post-Cold War era, Pakistan relationships with India have arrived at new ebb over Kashmir; the both countries went to the edge of war. Throughout this era, Washington showed little trend to bring its weight and prestige to contribute any part for the settlement of Kashmir and Pak-US relations strengthened the descending trends in the mutual perceptions. Pakistani feelings began to be more and more overlooked by the impression that Post-Cold War US foreign policy had an anti-Islamic factor, whereas American policy architects believed Pakistan’s involvement in many terrorist acts in the US and elsewhere. In May 1992, Secretary of State James Baker warned and bluntly threatened Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, “if Pakistan did not cease and desist from aiding the Kashmiris, it would designate the country as a terrorist state under a 1985 Congressional mandate.”

According to an American analyst: “The overall picture in evaluating the trends after the ending of the Cold War is that Washington’s objectives and perceived interests claim a open situation of “impartiality” toward India and Pakistan. The US is expected to preserve a degree of interest in serving to resolve regional issues and disputes, including Kashmir, in consonance with the optimistic aspect of its foreign policy tradition.” During Post Cold War Era, Pakistan’s nuclear policy and its close relations with Islamic radical groups were the sources of tension between US and Pakistan. Islamabad’s involvement for the uprising in Kashmir and its closeness with the Taliban in Afghanistan moved up the option of the US State Department labeling Pakistan as a state that officially sponsored terrorism. The US took a U-turn and Pakistan became the most sanctioned country after 1990. The US played down its ties with Pakistan, whereas, in spite of 40
years of an Indo-Soviet strategic alliance, India was recognized as a partner in its new agenda and China was the only country continuing with its widespread correlation with Pakistan, supporting it in keeping its deterrence capability against the rising threat from India. The efforts to develop the security relationship between the US and Pakistan started when the US, Secretary of Defense, William Perry, suggested reviving some military to military contact during his stay in Islamabad in 1995. The consequence of this visit was the 1995 Brown Amendment, which eased some sanctions, but did not lift the ban on military assistance. Talking to the newsmen in New Delhi on January 12, 1995, he said: “American and Indian interests were well served by a strong American-Pakistan security relationship”. He further stated that the new defense links between India and the US will play a helpful and useful role in the serving India and Pakistan to a better role.

On May 11-13, 1998, India carried out her five underground nuclear explosions and affirmed that it is a nuclear weapon state. It placed huge pressure on Pakistani leadership to conduct nuclear tests. The internal demand and hope was to explode a nuclear bomb; the external pressure was to refuse to accept the explosion. As a prologue to these nuclear explosions, Indian Defence Minister George Femandes, soon after taking charge of his ministry in March 1998, had initiated telling China as the number one long-term danger to India. Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee in his letter to US President Bill Clinton describing his decision to test the nuclear devices quoting the occurrence of an explicit nuclear weapon state China on Indian border and continued to charge Beijing of helping Pakistan to build up a nuclear capability. Pakistan's Foreign Secretary expressed his views: “India had put in the fabricated threats from China to advance its own
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Pakistan restored the strategic equilibrium in South Asia by carrying out six underground nuclear tests on 28 and 30 May, 1998. It drew enlarged attention and US inclination at that time was to force Pakistan not to carry out nuclear tests. After the Indian and before the Pakistani nuclear tests, some countries tried to budge in the Security Council a Pakistan precise resolution calling for Iraq-like sanctions against any country testing a nuclear device in future. This attempt was prevented only by the threat of Chinese veto.

This nuclear capability of India and Pakistan was condemned and had seriously concerned for the US policy makers at the dawn of the 21st century. China also joined US in condemning the South Asian states which had threatened and put at risk the global non-proliferation regime. A joint statement was released after Clinton’s meeting with Jiang Zemin on June 27, 1998 insisting India and Pakistan to cease from further nuclear tests, not to weaponries or set up nuclear weapons and missiles capable of delivering them and sign CTBT immediately and unconditionally. The Chinese President bestowed guarantee to Bill Clinton that China would work narrowly with US on international program for non-proliferation. This joint declaration was taken in certain Pakistani circles as a change in China’s position on supporting Pakistan.

Tanvir Ahmad Khan, Pakistan's former Foreign Secretary said: “China joined US in condemning the sub continental nuclear tests need not cause any apprehension for Pakistan. Pakistan has no intrinsic dispute with non-proliferation or with the purpose of the CTBT. China understands the compulsions that drove it to nuclear deterrence.” The US enforced sanctions on India and Pakistan; thus, the nuclear tests reengaged the US in India and Pakistan. But the US sanctions did not remain lengthy and President Clinton lifted foreign assistance sanctions October 27, 1999 for the
both countries\textsuperscript{63}. Washington assumed a clear policy of persuading Islamabad and New Delhi for bilateral talks. This resulted, both countries launched mutual discussions and Indian Prime Minister Mr. Vajpayee visited Pakistan in February 1999 and pronounced the Lahore Declaration 1999. The military led by Gen. Pervez Musharraf was not totally persuaded the importance of the peace process with India. At present, there is proof to propose that where Indian Prime Minister’s visit was on, Pakistani military was planning to initiate the Kargil operation\textsuperscript{64}. The political fallout from Kargil was enormous set back for Pakistan; it showed a paradigm shift and the US determinedly twisted its policy towards India\textsuperscript{65}. At the international level, Pakistan was stigmatized as an “irresponsible state”\textsuperscript{66}.

During the Nawaz-Clinton meeting on July 4, 1999, the US had put pressure on Pakistan to control the activities of Kashmiris activists who were patronized by Pakistani military\textsuperscript{67}. Under the US pressure, Pakistan had to pull out the troops from Kargil. In September 1999, decision made by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif yielding to the US pressure to take out the support for Taliban extended the bay between the civilian government and the military and surfaced the way for the military’s coup. The US itself twisted to the Taliban in 1996 and shortly in 2000 gave the Taliban government $42 million in the “war against drugs”\textsuperscript{68}. In October 1999, when military dictator General Pervez Musharraf, ousted the civilian government of Nawaz Sharif, Pakistan was ever more segregated and relationships with the US were at their lowest ebb. In 2000, the Clinton management reshaped its South Asian foreign and defense policy by taking into account the strategic and geographic importance of this region and pressurized India and Pakistan to sign the CTBT without conditions and abstain from deploying ballistic missiles and agree on a comprehensive frame work to resolve bilateral issues
including Kashmir. The US President Bill Clinton paid an official visit to Bangladesh, India and Pakistan in March 2000 and during his visit, referred South Asia, one of the most volatile regions in the world and obviously clarified his management’s policy towards South Asia at the 21st century. Speaking to the media in New Delhi, President Clinton alleged that the fundamentalists within the government in Pakistan were behind the aggressions in Kashmir and put pressure on the military regime to take note it. He pushed Pakistan “to resolve differences with India peacefully” and “sign CTBT and called upon Islamabad to create conditions for a dialogue with New Delhi and stated the US will not negotiate the Kashmir Dispute”. He asked Pakistan “to move away from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and Pakistan’s nuclear weapons did not make Pakistan a safer place”. He pressurized Pakistan “not increase its deterrence potential and it did not build Pakistan’s people safer”.

The Vision Document signed by Clinton and Vajpayee declared a “resolve to create a closer and qualitatively new relationship between the US and India” on the basis of common interest in and complementary responsibility for ensuring regional and international security. The Clinton’s visit was an extraordinary transformation in the US policy towards Pakistan and India it was said a fresh thaw in the US defense strategy and foreign policy in South Asia and this visit showed a huge change by moving away from Pakistan. Washington’s strategy on the way to New Delhi was one of “Cooperation and towards Islamabad it was one of Engagement to maintain line of communiqué open”. This latest twist toward New Delhi risked tarnishing the older Pak-US relationships and was probable to compel Pakistan to depend upon China to much larger level to preclude Indo-US supremacy in South Asia.
President George W. Bush also carried on the same policy and placed a premium on amity with New Delhi when he took the charge of government in 2001. He changed its policy toward China and called China a “strategic competitor” rather than a “strategic partner”. India was announced as “a strategic and main trade partner and the US desired to see India as a major world power”\textsuperscript{78}. The Bush administration decided to help India to become a “major world power in the 21st century” to contain China and the Bush management has appreciably readjusted its nuclear policy in South Asia and did not ask India and Pakistan for signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and cease their nuclear weapon programmes. Concerning the Kashmir conflict, the Bush management’s policy was that it should be settled between India and Pakistan taking into account the desires of the Kashmiris\textsuperscript{79}. Paying as a mediating role for a negotiated settlement, the State Department spokesperson Christina Rocca has expressed: “The United States is not engaged in these dialogues and would not be unless asked to by both sides and that is still the position”\textsuperscript{80}.

It is clear that Washington’s foreign policy in post cold war has changed in India’s favour and that the doctrine of parity between the two nations of South Asia has been abandoned. In the meantime, as Indo-US strategic corporation kept on getting stronger, a new aspect emerged in Pak-US relationships in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorists attacks on the symbols of the US financial (World Trade Centre) and military power (Pentagon).

**Post 9/11 Scenario: Pakistan and the US**

The traumatic events of 9/11terrorist attacks have instantaneously changed the political landscape and scenario of the world\textsuperscript{81} and these events also transformed
the fate of Musharraf’s military rule as the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan had changed the fortunes of Zia’s military regime in 1979. The post-9/11 developments have profoundly affected Pakistan’s bilateral relations, national integrity, internal stability, economic situation and geo-strategic location and it again got the status of frontline state. As the war against Soviet infidels could not be won without Pakistan; similarly the war against global terrorism could not be fought without Pakistan. Following the attacks, the US President George W. Bush said: “Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. Either you stand with civilization and good (US) or with barbarism and evil (them). Choose and to those nations that choose wrongly, beware.”

This US President message to the international community has turned into the animating perception of US foreign policy. On September 15, 2001, Pakistan declared that “it would make complete support and collaboration to the global community in its war against violence and terrorism without using its armed forces in any act beyond its geographical boundaries.” In his well-known “Lay off” address to Pakistani nation on September 19, 2001, General Musharraf said: “They have offered total military amenities to America. The purpose is to get rid of Pakistan declared as a terrorist state and damage our strategic interests and the Kashmir cause.” The US publicized on September 23, 2001 that it had much proofs for the involvement of Osama Bin Laden and his Al-Quada activists in terrorist attacks. The statement, however, did little to drive out the worldwide suspicion about the FBI capability to overwhelmingly link the attacks to Bin Laden. Most of this cynicism comes out to have originated from the conflicting statements issued by the FBI itself.
These attacks put down the basis for growing new world order.

South Asia was the adjacent region of Afghanistan, the place where the activists prepared the plan for the terrorist attacks of 9/11 (American View). Pakistan was the single state in the neighborhood which had ambassadorial relationships with the Taliban government. In this changed situation, the international community looks to be at the back of the US in its war against terrorism where as inwardly, “various under currents are gradually shaping up the strategic dynamics of the world in general and Asia in particular”\(^89\). When the US made a decision to start a war on terrorism against Al-Qaeda and named it “Operation Enduring Freedom”, it presented a grim choice to the world: “You are either with us or with the terrorists”\(^90\). The US wanted support from Pakistan to launch an operation against Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. Under the tack hammer of Bush policy, Pakistan was asked forcefully to give up its help to Taliban regime in Afghanistan and its forbearance of Al-Qaeda and give logistical and intelligence support to allied forces and make it sure to give all information about Taliban and Al-Qaeda. The military dictator General Pervez Musharraf decided to join the US led alliance against global terrorism.

In Pakistan, his opponents and detractors have criticized his Afghan policy. A leading English Daily Columnist, Ayaz Amir portrayed his decision as “opportunistic”\(^91\), former chief Jamaat-e-Islami, Mian Tufail Mohammad even charged that “he has compromised national sovereignty”\(^92\). According to an Indian analyst, “Pakistan caved in no time and offered all help in less than 24 hours”\(^93\). Dr. Moeed Pirzada admired Musharraf’s decision and wrote: “Pakistan joined the US led- coalition
against its former ally Taliban regime in Afghanistan, to safeguard its national interest in a radically altered international scenario. The alternative would have had disastrous consequences: international isolation, threat to nuclear and military assets; and a possible economic meltdown”\textsuperscript{94}. The allied forces could only launch operation against Al-Qaeda activists in Afghanistan with the support of Pakistan. This view has grown validity by Bob Woodward’s appropriate description of decision making at the White House. Bob Woodward puts our attention to this information that Secretary of State, Colin Powell, informed President Bush that in order to extricate the Taliban and take away Al-Qaeda from Afghanistan, “whatever action he (Bush) took, it could not be done without Pakistan’s support”\textsuperscript{95}. The US demanded Pakistan to fulfill seven claims\textsuperscript{96}:

1- To prevent Al-Qaeda operational from Pakistani border and stop any and all support to Osama bin Laden.

2- To give the blanket over flight and landing rights.

3- To allow air, naval bases and borders.

4- To provide intelligence and immigration information.

5- To condemn the 9/11 terrorist attacks and control all local expressions of support for terrorism against the United States, and its friends or allies.

6- To end all fuel shipments to Afghanistan and prevent Pakistani citizens to join Taliban.
7- To cut diplomatic relations with the Taliban Regime and support the US in its attempts to arrest Osama and if the facts confirm that Al-Qaeda is really linkage to the terrorist attacks. In this American-led war against terrorism, Pakistan decided to abandon the Taliban and side with Washington. Immediately following the 9/11, India vociferously charged that Pakistan was docking terrorists that it was supporting cross border incursions in Kashmir and that it was not acting sufficient measures to curb the cross border violations. Indian Cabinet Committee on Security held its meeting on September 13, 2001 to lay out the bare bones of a response strategy and the foreign secretary, MS. Chokila Iyer, and the Chief of Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal A. Y. Tipnis also attended this meeting. The committee made its consensus that it is necessity for India to build up an active recognition with the US administration’s counter-terrorism drive. The Indian Prime Minister Mr. Vajpayee had already written a letter to the US President Mr. George Bush for offering him Indian support against global terrorism and expressed: “India is ready to work together in the investigations in to this crime and to make stronger our corporation in leading international efforts to make sure that terrorism never does well again”. There are indications that before 9/11, Indians were expecting Mr. Bush visit’s to India in the first quarter of 2002 and something, which Indian strategy saw as a serious
setback to the gains, made during Clinton’s visit to India in March 2000.100

In India, anxiety was growing as summed up in The Hindu’s editorial of September 18, 2001 that “contours of a possible coalition are still far from clear”101. Yet again on September 20, 2001, The Hindu pointed out that “in spite of tacit American pledge that current collaboration between the US and Pakistan require not to weaken peace and politics elsewhere on the international stage, the map of forming the nucleus of a globalize alliance against terrorism does not yet seem to have crystallized”102. Between September 11, 2001 and October 7, 2001, on one hand India offered the US its air bases for launching an operation against Afghanistan and on the other hand forcefully campaigned to declare Pakistan as a ‘terrorist’ state103. India was disappointed, when the US made a decision to use Pakistani bases for logistics, air and intelligence operations. The US immediately restored its traditional relationship with Pakistan, much to India’s nuisance.

At the same time, it also deepened its strategic relationship with India104. In his address to the nation on December 31, 2001, the Indian Prime minister Mr. Vajpayee has expressed his views: “the leadership of Pakistan made a praiseworthy decision to join the global alliance against terrorism in Afghanistan, even though it meant a severe U-turn in their policy of supporting to the Taliban regime”105. But what was their actual purpose? If it was the similar as that of the international community - namely, to crush terrorism and extremism - then I extend my hand of alliance to them. I wish to tell them: “Shed your anti-India mentality and take effective steps to stop cross-border terrorism, and you will find India willing to walk more than half the distance to work closely with
Pakistan to resolve, through dialogue, any issue, including the contentious issue of Jammu & Kashmir. In October 2001, following the US launched bombing in Afghanistan, Musharraf made a crucial progress and rapidly introduced changes in the military top brass. Two of his closest associates, Mahmud (chief of ISI) and Usmani (Deputy Chief of army Staff) were prematurely retired and General Aziz was promoted to a ceremonial position of Chairman Joint Chief of Services Staff – a cosmetic position. He took into custody the selected religious leaders and banned five Jihadi groups, which had been labeled as “terrorists groups” by the US State Department.

The terrorists attacked the Indian Parliament on December 13, 2001 in which 9 policemen and parliament staffer were killed and all the five terrorists were also killed by the security forces. The Indian government alleged that the terrorists were identified as Pakistani nationals and they set off massive blasts and have used AK-47 rifles, explosives and grenades for the attack. India compared the December 13, 2001 terrorist attack on Indian Parliament it with 9/11 attacks on WTC and again started a campaign for declaring Pakistan as a terrorist state. In his address to the nation on December 31, 200, the Indian Prime minister Mr. Vajpayee alleged that “For a long time, the rulers in Islamabad relied on military confrontation, as exemplified by the wars they waged in 1948, 1965, and 1971, to settle this issue in their favour.

After failing abjectly in their endeavor, the anti-India forces in Pakistan decided to foment terrorism and religious extremism as the principal means to instigate separatism in our country and they are nursing a dangerous delusion. The Indian Home Minister, L.K Advani, at a press conference in Washington, D.C on January 9, 2002 accused that “Pakistan is paying the fundamental, deep and
Pakistan’s clear support to the global community in its war against terrorism as well as logistical and intelligence support against international terrorism; its desertion of the Taliban regime in Kabul and the Bush Administration’s priority to take out the Taliban government had apparently put off the US from declaring Pakistan a terrorist state. Pakistan had effectively broken out of its segregation by approving to offer an abundant support to the US in its war against terrorism. Musharraf was also guaranteed of complete support of the US to resolve the Kashmir conflict and give economic aid to Pakistan. Secretary of State Colin Powel verified that “Pakistan had accepted all US demands and requests made in connection with any designed military operation against Osama Bin Laden, whom President George W. Bush claimed as ‘main involved suspect in 9/11 attacks’.

Speaking to the media at Camp David, President Bush expressed his thanks to the military regime and citizens of Pakistan for providing of categorical help on war against terrorism to hunt down the terrorist. Following the 9/11 events, the US policy towards Pakistan has gone through a paradigm shift that requires to be realized in the broader background of all the changes in the global environment, particularly in South Asia. To help out the global community and US for their campaign and war against
terrorism, Pakistan got the economic and military benefits, rescheduling—not written off, $1.8 billion debt from the Paris club. This rescheduling of Pakistan’s debt was at low interest rates and was given the major concession, saving $1 billion during the three years (2001-2004).  

Previously, debt rescheduling of Pakistan from the Paris club in 1999 and 2001 had been short term and at very high interest rates. Thus this new debt rescheduling has permitted Islamabad to keep debt repayment sustainability. Moreover, the half of the US debt has been written off. The US has also announced $ 50 million in special aid, plus $25million for Afghan-Refugee-related expenses. Japan announced that she would give $40million to Pakistan. Canada is reportedly converting its $ 28.5 million debt into rupees that will fund development projects. The various US sanctions for the taking away of which Pakistan has been struggling for a long time, have been waived. On September 22, 2001, the US waived all three nuclear related sanctions i.e. Pressler, Symington and Glenn.

The Glenn sanctions were also waived for India. The waiver of these sanctions removed restrictions in four areas: (a) All economic and development assistance sanctions which include agricultural credits, loans by International Finance Institutions, commercial bank loans, and EXIM Bank credits for Pakistan. (b) Military sanctions (including Munitions list license and foreign military sales [FMS]) and military spare parts, both official and commercial. (c) Revision of some 92 Pakistani entities, involved in nuclear and missile activities, barred in 1998 from buying the US goods. (d) Dual use items and high-tech which includes performance computers (HPCs). The lifting of the nuclear related sanctions and democracy related sanctions (section 58) are arguably the most important development in Pak-US relations since 1990. It has now opened the way for substantial economic and
military re-engagement between Pakistan and the US\textsuperscript{121}. The US support for Pakistan’s reform agenda gives her access to an average 650 million dollars from the World Bank’s IDA. A Joint Pak-US Economic Forum has been established. Exim Bank and OPIC are giving guarantees to the private sector\textsuperscript{122}.

In post 9/11, the US was looking for full and practical cooperation from Pakistan to hunt down the suspects involved of Al-Qaeda in the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon\textsuperscript{123}. President Pervez Musharraf reassured Washington for his unstinted support in the fight against terrorism. The US Secretary of State Colin Powell was pleased with the response from Islamabad\textsuperscript{124}. In his effort to win the confidence of the nation, President Musharraf emphasized Pakistan’s four main apprehensions, “Pakistan’s defense, revival of economy, security of strategic nuclear and missile assets, and the Kashmir dispute that had significantly contributed towards the strategy formulation at this crucial stage of Pakistan’s history”\textsuperscript{125}. The US clearly initiated at official level to force Pakistan to prevent cross border terrorism and alleged for the transformation of nuclear technology to North Korea\textsuperscript{126}.

Pakistan insisted and maintained that violence in Indian held Kashmir was indigenous and a response to India’s cruel policies; Pakistan was not supporting or helping this\textsuperscript{127}. This increased apprehensions between India and Pakistan and enforced the US to keep engage with both to make sure that it does not rise into a nuclear conflict. The US pressure compelled General Musharraf to deliver his major policy speech in January 2002. In which he promised the international community that Pakistan was committed to crush the terrorism; it would not permit its territory to be used by any the terrorist groups\textsuperscript{128} and he theoretically
changed Pakistan’s Kashmir policy by denouncing cross border terrorism\textsuperscript{129}. He banned five Jihadi groups, but India remained doubtful and insisted that the regime needs to show convincing commitment that it has finished the support of terrorism\textsuperscript{130}. The international community remained hopeful and some applauded Musharraf’s risk taking and pragmatic leadership. On July 28, 2002, the US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, during his visit to India and Pakistan, clearly called for restraints by the two countries and the resumption of the process of dialogue. After meeting Pakistan president Pervez Musharraf, he hoped that, “The recent reduction in tensions and preliminary de-escalatory steps would bring the rivals to the bargaining table”\textsuperscript{131}. Substantiating his optimism, he said: “I think the possibility of dialogue in the near future is something that can be achieved”\textsuperscript{132}. Talking to Reuters in Sigonella, Italy, on July 27, 2002, Powel said: “Ultimately we have to get to dialogue or else we will just be stuck on the plateau which would not serve our interests. We do not want to be back where we were few month ago”\textsuperscript{133}.

Basically, the gist of Powell’s, urges for dialogue between India and Pakistan centers around Kashmir and during his visit to India and Pakistan, he categorically called Kashmir as a conflict impeding the process of normalization between the two South Asian rivals\textsuperscript{134}. Mr. Boucher, the State Department spokesman provided a glimpse of US role and expectation in a briefing on the US, Pakistan -India relations, he said: “We have very important relationship with India and Pakistan. These are different relationships based on the circumstances and opportunities that we have with each of these countries. We think that strong relationships with the US could be the basis for progress in the region, easing
tensions in the region, and we are willing to use our relationship to try and accomplish that for the sake of both countries.”

On 17 March 2003, the US President Bush removed the remaining sanctions and Pakistan had received $118.1 million from the IMF as the fifth trench of a $1.31 billion loan.

In April 2003, the Bush administration refused to recognize the New Delhi allegations relating Pakistan to Iraq and asked Pakistan and India to start negotiations and resolve their issues peacefully. The Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh expressed that “India has solid evidence against Islamabad of its involvement in terrorist activities and hence it has a strong case for military action against Pakistan than Iraq and also made allegation that Pakistan has weapons of mass destruction, a basis mentioned by US to start war against Iraq, and India would be given good reason for taking preventative action on the Pakistan border.” The State Department spokes-woman Joanne Prokopowicz rejected Indian stance and expressed that “New Delhi should not make use of the United States led defensive fighting against Iraq as a pretext for an attack.”

The US Secretary of States Colin Powell also disallowed Indian stance by saying: “I do not think that there is a direct parallel between the two situations (Iraq and Pakistan)” In June 2003, President Pervez Musharraf paid his third official visit to the United States in less than two years. During the meeting at Camp David, both the leaders talked about mutual, regional and global matters. President Pervez Musharraf was praised by President Bush, as a “courageous leader and a friend of the United States” at a press briefing following the meeting.
President Musharraf reciprocated, “We have reviewed in depth with President Bush how to strengthen and expand the Pak-US bilateral relationship and to give it greater depth and meaning. Both sides have reaffirmed that our ties should be made more broad-based and multifaceted and placed on a long-term and predictable basis”\textsuperscript{141}. President Bush has agreed on a five-year (2005-2009) economic and defense related aid package for Pakistan and announced a $3 billion five year economic aid package including half related to defence and security\textsuperscript{142}. Annual installments of $600 million\textsuperscript{143} and evenly divided between military assistance and economic support\textsuperscript{144}, began in FY2005. During the meeting, it was also discussed to create the greater people-to people contacts and close interaction between the parliaments of the two countries to promote the cause of democracy\textsuperscript{145}. President Bush opulently admired Islamabad’s endeavour to fight against the global terrorism, and expressed that “the US supported Pakistan and India to ease tension in South Asia and resolve all issues, including Kashmir”\textsuperscript{146}.

General Tommy Franks, United States Army, Former Commander, Central Command, appeared before the House of Armed Services Committee United States House of Representatives on July 10, 2003 and stated: “Pakistan’s support has been essential to our achievement in Operation Enduring Freedom. President Musharraf has committed substantial national resources against terrorism to include arresting a number of Al-Qaeda leaders, freezing the accounts of known terrorists and banning fund-raising to support Kashmiri militancy. He has pursued these actions despite ongoing tensions with India and significant domestic pressure, and he continues on a path toward democracy and sustained economic development”\textsuperscript{147}. The US State Department and Central COM. recognized and realized the countless ways in which Pakistan was
responding its obligations in the US-led war against terrorism. In August 2003 after Joint Chiefs chairman General Richard B. Myers’ visit to Pakistan, the Defense Department official expressed that “Pakistan is providing “phenomenal” support to the United States”.  

Prime Minister Mir Zafarullah Khan Jamali paid his official visit to the United States in October 2003 at the invitation of President Bush. Both the leaders held their talks in the Oval Office and discussed a wide range of mutual, regional and global issues and agreed to fight against terrorism jointly. Mr. Jamali expressed that “Pakistan has been reciprocal as far as the fight against terrorism is concerned”. Mr. Bush’s Press Secretary, Scott McClellan, expressed in a press briefing that they discussed the regional issues, situation in Kashmir and efforts to stabilize Pakistan’s border with Afghanistan and President Bush put emphasis on the need for dialogue between India and Pakistan.

In October 2003, US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage paid a visit to Islamabad and held talks with President Musharraf and Foreign Minister Mr. Kasuri and talked about the bilateral relations, regional situation, and war on terrorism in Afghanistan. In November 2003, Joint Council for Foreign Relations and Asia Society Task Force has issued its report in New York entitled “New Priorities in South Asia”. The report has highlighted that “Pakistan presents one of the most complex and difficult challenges facing the US diplomacy anywhere in the world today. Its political instability, entrenched Islamist extremism, economic and social weakness, and dangerous confrontation with India have cast dark shadow over the nuclear armed nation. Even through Pakistan offers valuable help in rooting out Al-Qaeda remnants, it has failed to prevent Islamist terrorists from using its territory as a base for armed attacks on Kashmir and
Afghanistan”. The Council for Foreign Relations and Asia Society Task Force has suggested that Pakistan must be offered financial and defense aid as the US interests need a stable Pakistan at peace with its neighbours. It was the first occasion while a leading think-tank in the US has not only recognized that Pakistan is behind the uprising in neighbouring countries, but also advocated a strategy of “carrot and stick” in dealing with Pakistan, unlike the “all carrot and no stick” approach of Mr. Collin Powel and his State Department mandarins. An Indian Analyst commented on the report that it is, however, remarkably silent on whether the military establishment in Pakistan that has dominated both domestic politics and foreign policy and national security thinking in that country, can be persuaded to give up its cherished beliefs like “strategic depth” in Afghanistan or bleeding India “with a thousands” cut in Kashmir.

The growing US-Pakistan partnership is under regular inquiry because of an eternal course of media reports and writings in US and Europe that keeping on to represent a “zealous and nuclear-armed Pakistan” as the “real rogue state”. The US media continued to put allegations of Pakistan’s involvement in nuclear proliferation and supporting Taliban and Al-Qaeda for the rise of religious militancy and the US policy think tanks, academia and media community do not pervade much self-confidence in Pakistan’s capability to transcend the trends of Islamic militancy and consider it a threat larger than Iraq. Bill Keller, James Risen and David Rhode have expressed the similar view point and argue that “despite remove from power of Taliban, the regime in Afghanistan is fragile and Al-Qaeda remnants are more and more operating from Pakistan”. The US journalist, Hersh criticizes and labels Pakistan as the “most dangerous friend”. A renowned
Pakistani writer analyses: “Today Pakistan is seen as an undesirable but unavoidable ally”\textsuperscript{162}.

In December 2003, President Pervaz Musharraf said in an interview with Reuters: “We are for United Nation Security Council Resolution on Kashmir, however, now we have left that aside and if we want to resolve this issue, both sides need to talk to each other with flexibility, coming beyond status position, meeting halfway somewhere”\textsuperscript{163}. The US welcomed President Pervaz Musharraf’s proposal for giving up the demand for referendum in Kashmir and called it a constructive development\textsuperscript{164}.

In March 2004, US Secretary of States, Colin Powel visited Pakistan and held talks with General Pervez Musharraf and Foreign Minister Mahmood Kasuri and discussed a wide range of mutual, regional and global issues. These talks were the major steps towards improving relations. When in a press conference, the human rights situation in Kashmir was drawn to his attention, the US Secretary expressed that had discussed the whole situation and raised the issue with his hosts in New Delhi\textsuperscript{165}. US Secretary of States, also declared that the US would designate Pakistan a “major non-NATO ally”, in a move that would boost military cooperation between the two countries \textsuperscript{166} and that is significant step towards strengthening security relationship but does not guarantee strategic partnership\textsuperscript{167}. In May 2004 commander of the US forces in Afghanistan Lieutenant General David Barno commended the support of Pakistan against the Al Quada activists\textsuperscript{168}. In June 2004, Musharraf called upon the Pakistanis, the Muslim Ummah, and the West, particularly, the US to take on his idea of ‘enlightened moderation’ to face the challenges and problems those confront them\textsuperscript{169}. 
To the Muslim world, he pleaded, “Shun militancy and extremism and adopt the path of socioeconomic uplift” and to the West and the US he asked, “Resolve all political disputes with justice and to aid in the socioeconomic betterment of the deprived Muslim world”\textsuperscript{170}. In June 2004, Pakistan has been officially designated as a major non-NATO-ally of United States by President George W. Bush\textsuperscript{171}. This position designated to Pakistan would give the right to Pakistan to get priority delivery access to military equipments, stockpiling of defense hardware, and acquire of depleted uranium for anti tank rounds, collaboration in military and defense training, and cooperation in research programmes and loans\textsuperscript{172}. This status of a major non-NATO ally is not equal to the status of NATO members as given in article 1 of North Atlantic Treaty Organization as they have the guarantees of mutual defense and security against an external aggression. In February 2005, President Bush lifted the democracy related sanctions, making possible for Pakistan to carry on to get US aid. This has been done by approving the “Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programmes Appropriations Act 2005, with respect to Pakistan”\textsuperscript{173}. In March 2005, the US gave approval to restart the sale of F-16s after a 16-year pause and 55 new and 25 used F-16s were offered to Pakistan.

**India- US 10 Year Defence Pact:**

The US and India made a 10-year Security Agreement on June 28, 2005 to make stronger security ties between India and US. This pact will assist India to “make possible combined weapons production, co-operation on missile and the transfer of technology”\textsuperscript{174}. The defence pact is tackling the method for joint weapon production, cooperation on missile defence and possible lifting of US export controls for sensitive military technology\textsuperscript{175}. The spokesman of the Pakistan foreign office stated that “the apprehensions by
Pakistan had been already communicated to US over its pessimistic consequences, in particular, over the induction of new weapons system such as missile defence that would destabilize the strategic balance in the region and may trigger an arms race here.”

Foreign Minister Khurshid Mahmood Kasuri has also spoken in a similar vein. These statements were, however, rhetorical and not sufficient to match the gravity of the situation. It is the responsibility of Pakistani leadership to tell Washington in clear terms, that its security and military partnership with India, which it has justified on the grounds of meeting the global security threats and its perceived strategic interests in South Asia, may not only have a perilous effect on Pakistan, but in the long term, its consequences may turn out to be harmful to the US itself. Nicholas Burns, Assistant Secretary of States, paid his visit to India in June 2005 and expressed that “devolving a strategic partnership between the US and India as a rising power in the world, as a democratic power and as a friendly country”.

A Research Scholar at the Congressional Research Centre, Alan Kronstadt, has written that “the US appears to be placing a bigger bet on India and according to many analysts; India and Pakistan are no longer perceived as equal in Washington. Pakistan is viewed as a middle power and India has the much greater potential down the road. You would not hear strategic partner being used much with Pakistan but you will hear it with India”.

**Indo-US Nuclear Agreement:**

The US and India signed a Nuclear Agreement in July 18, 2005 in Washington to improve cooperation in civil nuclear, civil space and high-technology commerce which was called the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership. The US will provide full access to nuclear technology for peaceful nuclear energy. India will identify and separate civilian and military nuclear facilities. India will continue
its unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing. The US will ask 43-members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to treat India as an exceptional case and seek changes in NSG guidelines.\textsuperscript{182}

Former Pakistan ambassador Touqir Hussain expressed that “The implementation of the US decision will run into serious issues, like the NPT, the Suppliers Club and the Zangar committee”\textsuperscript{183}. The two countries have developed confidence in each other. Pakistan has been striving to acquire nuclear power plants from the US, which it believes are vital to meet its dire energy requirements in the coming years. Foreign Minister Khurshid Mahmood Kasuri said that Pakistan was endeavouring to convince the US to enter into a package deal on civil nuclear energy as it had done with India so that a balance of power could be maintained in the region\textsuperscript{184}.

The US President George W. Bush visited Pakistan in March 2006 and held talks with President Gen. Pervez Musharraf. Both the leaders discussed the issues of terrorism, nuclear non-proliferation, Kashmir, energy, and democracy\textsuperscript{185}. Pakistan pointed out its energy needs and demanded US to deal with Pakistan for civil nuclear energy as it had done with India\textsuperscript{186}. Pakistan was right to raise the issue of the country’s energy needs. But instead of showing understanding for our predicament and offering alternatives, Bush chose to out rightly dismiss our plea, in a manner that was unnecessarily curt. “Pakistan and India are different countries, with different needs and different histories,” Bush asserted. Thus the American leader confirmed the de-hyphenation that has emerged as the cornerstone of his South Asian policy. Whether this will stabilize the region is not so certain.

Before departing on the trip to South Asia, his administration put out the word that only two subjects
would be the focus of the American president’s conversations, one each in Delhi and Islamabad. In the Indian capital, Mr. Bush was to concentrate his efforts on finalizing the deal with India that would give it the status of a nuclear power equal to those enjoyed by America, Britain, China, France and Russia. It has shown that Washington is keen to span the distance with New Delhi at full speed and cover in a few months the ground that they did not for decades. India has not signed the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. While India will place its civilian nuclear facilities open for inspection, its military facilities will remain exempt. The joint declaration issued after the Bush-Singh talks in Delhi on March 2, 2006 provided little substance on what the two sides had agreed on the subject of nuclear collaboration. The discussions in Pakistan were to focus on the contribution that country was making to the war on terrorism.

The decision of nuclear collaboration between India and US left a bad taste in the mouth in Islamabad and strengthened critics who had maintained that the US, while calling Pakistan its great ally in the war against terrorism, is actually building India at the expense of Pakistan. The decision is also going to have an adverse effect on the already negative US image held on a popular, public level in Pakistan. An editorial in The New York Times regrets that “the Bush-Musharraf summit meeting is one between two leaders far more interested in guns than butter.” So, the Bush administration is not willing to be acceded Pakistan’s request regarding the extension of nuclear plants for peaceful purposes. Pakistan asked the Bush administration for the provision of at least two power plants for civilian purposes, the diplomatic source said and added that the demand was made to meet country’s energy requirements through power generation up till 2010. The US decision to clinch agreement with India on nuclear
energy cooperation and its refusal to provide nuclear power plants to Pakistan would not have a positive impact on the relations between Islamabad and Washington. The leading English daily Dawn in its editorial criticized Bush’s visit to Pakistan:

“George W. Bush’s 24-hour visit to Islamabad was an unusual exercise in diplomacy, given the tight security that hemmed him in and the anti-American demonstrations that greeted him in Pakistan. Yet Mr. Bush needs Pakistan. He could not have fought America’s war against terror without cooperation from Islamabad. In that context, President Bush’s visit had something to offer though not everything that Islamabad had been hoping for.”

While the Bush visit carried a lot of meaning for India, it was a non-event in Pakistan. Mr. Bush spent part of his one day in Pakistan watching, and playing cricket is enough to show that he did not have much to discuss or do here. During his South Asian tour, President George W. Bush visited three countries. In Kabul, he gave Afghanistan the reassurances that it craved; in New Delhi, he gave India what it wanted; and in Islamabad, he gave Pakistan what it deserved. The visit of President Bush to Afghanistan, India and Pakistan has brought home the point once again that “India is and likely to remain for a long time the centerpiece of the US policy towards South Asia. In contrast, Pakistan, despite its services in the war on terror, seems to have lost its earlier pre-eminent position in US foreign policy calculations.”

During this brief visit, President Bush went to four cities, one each in Afghanistan and Pakistan and two in India. He went Kabul and Rawalpindi-Islamabad as a war
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president meeting his soldiers in Afghanistan and the soldier-president in Pakistan. He went to Delhi and Hyderabad in India as “the leader of the world’s largest economy which was at the frontline of creating a new global economic order”\(^{195}\). The US has avoided linking North Korea’s nuclear test to the Dr Khan network, pointing out that Dr. A. Q. Khan has been ‘out of business’ since the discovery two years ago of a gang of nuclear proliferators he allegedly ran. Asked at a regular briefing on October 10, 2006, whether Washington has been interrogating Dr Khan in the wake of the North Korean blast, State Department spokesman Sean McCormack said: “I don’t know who’s talked to him lately. But he’s out of business, and that’s a good thing for non-proliferation efforts around the world”\(^{196}\). Mr. McCormack, however, explained that Pakistan was not being blamed for nuclear proliferation in countries that were once described as the “axis of evil” because Islamabad has co-operated with the US war against terrorism\(^{197}\). Pakistan’s new civilian government was welcomed by US and Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte in March 2008 expressed: “The United States is committed to work with all of Pakistan’s leaders on the full spectrum of bilateral issues, from fighting violent extremism to improving educational and economic opportunities.... The United States will continue to help the Pakistani people build a secure, prosperous, and free society”\(^{198}\).

Many Pakistanis are offended of perceived US interference and pressure during the Bush regime. A senior defense analyst who is a retired army general criticized Bush administration alleged policy toward Pakistan and wrote: “By forcing US will and pressure against the wishes of Pakistani people, the Bush administration more increases anti-American sentiments in Pakistan; discredits the war on terror; and makes it more difficult for the new civilian
government to stabilize. The drone attacks by US in the tribal areas, threats of more to follow, and Washington’s fierce opposition to peace agreements also lead to widespread resentment and instability. In July, 2008, Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gillani paid an official visit to US and held talks with US President George W. Bush. A joint statement was issued reaffirming the U.S.-Pakistan “Strategic Partnership.” Gillani’s visit was criticized and panned by many analysts in Pakistan and abroad, who observed that “the new Pakistani leader failed to make an impact on the audiences in both Washington and Islamabad, thus further straining already tense bilateral relations.” Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi visited the US in September 2008 to attend for the third round of the Pakistan-US Strategic Dialogue and held talks with then-Deputy US Secretary of State Negroponte in Washington. The two leaders “reaffirmed their commitments to a wide-ranging, substantive, and long-term strategic partnership.”

It would be a great shock and alarming for Pakistani people, ruling establishment and civil society by reflecting President Asif Ali Zardar’s image as a corrupt and controversial figure presented in CRS Report for Congress, prepared by K. Alan Kronstadt in February 6, 2009 for the members and committee of Congress. He wrote: “In September, Benazir Bhutto’s widower Asif Ali Zardari—a controversial figure long bedeviled by corruption charges who had taken the reins of her Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) upon her demise—ascended to the Pakistani presidency with the congratulations of senior U.S. officials.” An idea of “Friends of Pakistan” (FOP) group has been initiated in September 2008 during the meeting of President Asif Ali Zardari and the top diplomats of the United Arab Emirates, Britain, and the United States. The foreign ministers from Australia, Canada, France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, and Turkey, and representatives of China, the European Union, and the United Nations also joined the meeting.

The “Friends of Pakistan” (FOP) group was launched to work in strategic partnership with Pakistan to fight against terrorism, Islamic radicalism, fanaticism, and aggressive extremism; build up a comprehensive move toward economic and social development; organize an approach to stabilizing and developing border regions; deal with Pakistan’s energy shortfall; and assist democratic institutions in Pakistan. The FOP gathered in Abu Dhabi in November 2008 to talk about the parameters of its work. Participants noted down “Pakistan’s formidable challenges, difficulties and called for well-coordinated international action to address them. Such cooperation is planned for four broad areas: development, security, energy, and institution-building”.

President Asif Zardari has expressed that Pakistan is looking forward to a “new beginning” in her mutual relationships with the US, but he repeated his admonition that his country “needs no lectures on our promise for combating terrorism. This is our war. He has emphasized the Obama government to make stronger Pakistan’s democracy and economic growth in the interest of fighting extremism”. In November 2008, The New York Times published a report that “since 2004, the US military has used secret authority to carry out covert attacks against Al Qaeda and other militants in several countries, including Pakistan”.

The Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009 (the Kerry-Lugar Bill):

The Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009 (the Kerry-Lugar Bill) was passed by the US Senate
on Sept 24, 2009 and the US president signed it on October 15, 2009. This Bill would make possible for the provision of about 7.5 billion dollars non-military aid (economic aid) to Pakistan over the next five years. The White House spokesman Robert Gates said that “this law is the tangible manifestation of broad support for Pakistan and President Obama wanted to engage Pakistan on the basis of a strategic partnership ‘grounded in support for Pakistan’s democratic institutions and the Pakistani people’”. The bill has been publically condemned and has come widely under fierce criticism in Pakistan, which dampened the US desire to showcase the bill as a major milestone towards establishing long-term partnership with Pakistan. The humiliation faced by Gillani government over the Kerry-Lugar aid and conditionality have shown troubles and difficulties in the domestic sphere that will take a lot of savvy to resolve it. The details regarding the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009(Kerry-Lugar Bill) were not provided to Parliament prior to it presented to the US Congress for its approval.

The Parliamentary potentially influential bodies i.e. the Cabinet Committee on Defence, National Assembly and Senate Standing Committee on Defense were not involved. The military has openly got involved and disagreed with the government, which bodes ill for civil-military relations. The Army Chief General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani has conveyed a strong protest over the degrading language and observations in the Kerry-Lugar Bill on Pakistan’s military services and intelligence agencies to General Stanley Mc Chrystal, the Commander of International Forces in Afghanistan during his meeting at GHQ, Rawalpindi. General Kayani pointed out that the Pakistani people, the military and intelligence services were furious at the observations made on Pakistan’s security establishment in the Kerry-Lugar Bill. The leading
English daily Dawn in its editorial on October 16, 2009 expressed:

“The government’s frantic diplomacy to defuse the domestic opposition to the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009 has yielded an ‘explanatory statement’ from the US Congress that attempts to allay concerns here that the Act will undermine Pakistan’s sovereignty and national interests. ‘There is no intent to, and nothing in this Act in any way suggests that there should be, any US role in micromanaging internal Pakistani affairs, including the promotion of Pakistani military officers or the internal operations of the Pakistani military’”\textsuperscript{214}.

The author of the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009 (the Kerry-Lugar Bill), Senator John Kerry advocated and stated that “the United States has enormous stakes in Pakistan’s stability and should support the country economically and militarily to assist it overcome serious challenges, and at the same time make it clear to the Pakistanis that Washington respects their sovereignty”\textsuperscript{215}. He was expressing these views before the Council on Foreign Relations while speaking about US policy toward the region in the light of his October 2009 visit to Pakistan and Afghanistan. He further expressed that “the Obama government is assisting Pakistan to make stronger its ability to readdress its economic and security challenges and majority of Pakistanis acknowledge that they look an existential challenge of terrorism and violence.

The Pakistani military has taken the firm actions against Pakistani Taliban and remnants of al-Qaeda in Waziristan and it deserves a great credit for that”\textsuperscript{216}. Strategically, the
upheaval over the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009 has shown the long-lasting differentiations in both the US and Pakistani establishments. Quetta, Muridke and nuclear black-marketing tiptoed into the Act because the Obama administration thinks Pakistan is trouble maker and the problem creator, and not necessarily part of a cooperative solution to regional problems and Pakistan establishment firmly believes the US is out to undermine the country’s interests. Cooperation between the two states will continue, but so will the dissent of hawks in both countries\textsuperscript{217}. In March 2010, US military officials announced the Pentagon would be providing Pakistan with advance military technology, which includes smart bombs, a dozen surveillance drones and 18 late-model F-16 fighter jets\textsuperscript{218}. On May 26, 2010, the Obama administration has released $288 million funds to Pakistan for some of the costs incurred last year in military operations against Taliban militants. These are part of the Coalition Support Fund (CSF), a US programme to repay the countries that have incurred costs supporting counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency operations\textsuperscript{219}. $288 million funds are in addition to the more than $1.2 billion in reimbursements already transferred to Pakistan this year. The US has provided $656 million earlier this month\textsuperscript{220}. The US embassy said in a statement that the US has paid $7.4 billion to Pakistan under the Coalition Support Fund programme since 2001, adding that it has given more than $11 billion to Pakistan in security assistance and CSF reimbursements\textsuperscript{221}. Pakistan claims the war on terrorism and militancy had cost it $35 billion in the last eight years.

To sum up, during the post 9/11 period, the US and Pakistan have done considerable development for taking away misperceptions and starting firm policy measures to promote an environment of trust and confidence at state to state level. The US has provided extensive resources to
assist Pakistan and from 1947 to 2005, Pakistan got over $15 billion in US economic and military aid and Pakistan is one of the largest recipients of US assistance. From 2002 to 2005, the US has provided $2.63 billion to Pakistan in direct aid and $1.22 billion was given in 2005. The US has paid $7.4 billion to Pakistan under the Coalition Support Fund programme since 2001 and it has given more than $11 billion to Pakistan in security assistance and CSF reimbursements. Restoration of Defense Consultative Group (DCG) and the revival of IMET are major steps taken by US after 9/11 events. The revival of IMET was on priority for Pakistani agenda and during 2003-04, 100-300 officers of Pakistan’s armed forces had undergone IMET. The Defense Consultative Group (DCG) was a forum for security policy dialogue between the US and Pakistan. Since its revitalization in October 2001, it has started to offer opportunities of regular meetings, high level exchanges on military to military cooperation, transfer and procurement of military utensils and technology from US to Pakistan, fighting against terrorism and promoting security and strategic relations between the two countries.

Development Assistance and Economic Cooperation group was also set up in post 9/11. That was the outcome of the greatly changed strategic situation in the region and Pakistan’s role as a front line state in the US war against terrorism. In 2002; the US allowed a resumption of spare parts for Pakistan’s fleet of F-16 aircraft. In addition, in the period 2002-2004, $2.3 billion was given to Pakistan in coalition support payments (anti-terrorism fighting). The United States is the leading foreign financier and investor in Pakistan and is also the single biggest trading partner of Pakistan. During 2005-2006 financial year, Pakistan’s exports to the US were $3.25 billion and imports from the US were $1.125 billion. During the five years period (2001-05), the foreign exchange reserves have added to $
12 billion from 1 billion and GDP growth has averaged over 5.5%/. Exports are growing at 13% and fiscal deficit is less than 4%. Large-scale manufacturing is up 18% and the private sector is growing-- 87% of the banking sector is in private hands.\(^{229}\)

The US agreed to provide six C-130, six Aerostat surveillance radars, 12 radars and 40 Bell helicopters, military radio systems, eight P-3C aircraft, six Phalanx guns, 2,000 TOW missiles, 300 Sidewinder air-to-air missiles, 60 Harpoon anti-ship missiles and 115 self-propelled howitzers.\(^{230}\) The US is working on various précised programs for Pakistan through USAID and the US Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL). USAID programmes focus on promoting equality, stability, economic growth and improved well-being of Pakistani families, including assistance to improve access to quality education and is flowing at an average of 500-700 million annually.

In August 2002, the USAID signed a $ 100 million five-year bilateral agreement to help and improve the quality of education in Pakistan and education initiative with the Government of Pakistan, particularly in Sindh, Baluchistan and Tribal Areas.\(^ {231}\) Yet another positive development is that the US has increased the award of Fulbright fellowships to Pakistan from 10-12 a year to at least 100.

J. William Fulbright Fellowship Student Competition, J. William Fulbright Fellowship Scholar competition, Fulbright/USAID Fellowship student Competition, Fulbright/HEC/USAID Fellowship student Competition, Hubert H. Humphrey Fellowship Competition, South Asia Teacher Training Project, Higher Education in the 21\(^{st}\) century: Access and Equity, Fulbright Visiting Specialists
Programme: Direct to the Muslim World, Fulbright Foreign Language Teaching Assistant (FLTA) Programme and Fulbright Scholar-in-Residence Programme: Academic study of Islam were announced for the Pakistani Scholars and students for the year 2008-09 by the U.S. Educational Foundation in Pakistan (USEFP). INL assistance has helped Pakistan fortify its 1,500-mile border with Afghanistan, contend with smuggling and trafficking, border security, as well as with financial crimes and money laundering. Washington needs a strong and healthy partnership with Pakistan if it is to have any chance of eliminating Qaeda's leaders, defeating a resurgent Taliban and turning back nuclear weapons proliferation. But strong and healthy partnerships are not built around political charades.

It is obvious that the US wants to establish “full spectrum” global strategic domination and prevent the emergence of a potential rival. To achieve this, the US wants to build a system of alliances. Washington is seeking a strategic partnership with India; with Pakistan it is solidifying a relationship forged after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. India has become a partner of the United States in the fields of economics, politics and diplomacy. The US sees India, the world’s largest democracy, as a natural strategic ally against China and wants to enable India to act as a counterpoise to China.

Pakistan has assigned a much more limited task: its job is to continue to fight Islamic extremism and associated terrorism by securing its borders against infiltration and by ridding from its own society all extremist elements. The current close relationship between the US and Pakistan is likely to be short-lived, as Washington treats Islamabad as a fair-weather friend and no real strategy exists to seal a concrete deal.
Conclusion:
The security interests and geo-strategic considerations remained central to US-Pakistan relationships. It is most significant to acknowledge that the US has always had an abiding interest in Pakistan. In the post 9/11 scenario, the US policy towards Pakistan has gone through a paradigm shift that necessitates to be realized in the broader framework of ‘all the changes in the global environment,’ particularly in South and Central Asia. In this broader context, Washington has redesigned and reformed its foreign policy goals in South Asia and vis-à-vis its relationships with Islamabad and New Delhi separately; rival China. The present Indo-US strategic partnership is a part of Washington’s China contain policy, whereas the post-9/11 Pak-US alliance in the war against terrorism is US strategy to fix Pakistan in Middle East. Pakistan has assigned a much more limited task as a good soldier on the war against terrorism: its job is to continue to fight Islamic extremism and associated terrorism by securing its borders against infiltration and by ridding from its own society all extremist elements. Hence, it has become possible for the US to improve its relationships with the two South Asian countries simultaneously, in pursuit of two separate agendas which revolved around two different regions and two different projects. It is too clear; that the shift is taken by the security imperative. The regional stability and the war on terrorism has made essential for Washington to stay engaged with Pakistan.

It has been a feeling in Pakistan over the last 62 years that Pak-US relationship has simply been a one-way traffic and that the US has always used Pakistan for its selfish purposes. The Obama administration not only realized Pakistani public emotions and feelings but also assured Pakistan that the US would develop public and private partnership with Pakistani people and government. The US
Secretary of State Hiliary Clinton has expressed that she had already conveyed this message to US Senate during her personal hearing before the Foreign Affairs Committee of Congress. The US and Pakistan have built up significant improvements in the security areas and Washington’s support and collaboration with Pakistan should have not only focused on the war on terrorism, but there are several other areas and issues of concern to the US in which we will have to accept the current realities and future developments as they occur. For instance, national and global security, terrorism, nuclear proliferation, Islamic militancy, economic and strategic opportunities in South Asia, democracy, and anti-Americanism in the Muslim world. Washington and Islamabad would have to do more in cultural, educational and growing deeper relationships in the economic policy arena to make a sustainable and credible partnership. The US would require making more than just slackening tensions between Pakistan and India if it intends to win the war on terror. The US could also prove greater severity to facilitate normalization of relations between India and Pakistan by persuading the two to step forward from merely engaging in dialogue to take concrete decisions for conflict resolution. Pakistan will feel comfortable and do more for the NATO forces in Afghanistan if its Eastern border will be secured.

A hasty withdrawal and an inconclusive outcome in Afghanistan could not only destabilize Pakistan but the entire region, and that could have global consequences. The United States should assist Pakistan to follow a course that arranges its people's democratic aspirations and socioeconomic needs. The Obama administration shows to make out the long-term need of Pakistan; however it has been hesitant to take up actions that could make Pakistan a strategic partner. We cannot change the reality that the US has chosen India to act as a counterweight to China, a role
that we neither have the capability nor the desire to play. Keeping in view the limitations of the existing Pakistan-US strategic partnership and the uncertainties about its future course, we must broaden our foreign policy options. It doesn’t need a genius to see that our strategic relationship with China will be the linchpin in the conceptual framework of our future foreign policy. Will the US concur to collaborate with Pakistan in the field of civilian nuclear energy? No, not now and even less so in future. In a strange irony both Pakistan and US have historically been part of the problem and part of the solution for each other and this paradigm is unlikely to change.

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