India National Congress, the torchbearer of the concept of territorial nationalism in India, emerged as a cross-communal political body. Though the party was organized by the Parsi leaders like Dadabhai Naoroji, Phelozeshah Mehta and Dinshaw E. Wacha and was joined by Hindus including Womesh Chandra Banerjee, Bal Gangadhar Tilak, Ananda Charlu, Surendranath Banerjee and Ananda Mohan Bose. One must not ignore that Bedruddin Tyabji, his brother Camuddin and Rahintulla M. Sayani, belonging to the Muslim community, were also amongst its pioneer. Tyabji, in fact, presided over the third annual session of the Congress, which was held at Madras in 1887. The Calcutta session of the party held in 1896 was presided over by Sayani.

The Muslims of South Asia launched their separate political party, All India Muslim League, in 1906. But in spite of it, the interest of the important individuals belonging to the Muslim community, to participate in the Congress activities did not decrease. Mohammad Ali Jinnah joined the Congress in 1906 and remained an active member of the party for the next fifteen years. Nawab Syed Muhammad Bahadur presided over the Karachi session of the party in 1913 and Syed Hassan Imam was the
president of the special session of Congress held at Bombay in 1918. In fact from 1913 onwards, efforts were made by the League leadership to work in collaboration with the Congress, which eventually resulted in the presentation of some demands before the British by both the parties in their annual sessions held at Lakhnow in 1916.

It was, however, Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi’s decision to support the cause of Khilafat from the Congress platform that resulted in the influx of Muslims in the party. During the Khilafat / Non-cooperation Movement the entire leadership of the Khilafat Committee joined Congress and actively participated in the activities of the party. A huge number of Muslims masses also supported the Congress’ initiatives. Muslims were frequently asked to preside over the sessions of the party. Hakim Ajmal Khan was the president of the Ahmadabad Session in 1921 while Muhammad Ali Johar presided over the 1923 Kakinada session. One notable inclusion of a Muslim leader in the Congress during the Khilafat / Non-cooperation Movement was Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, who became the youngest ever Congress President as he chaired the special session of the party held at Delhi in 1923.

Belonging to a religious family known for its scholarship, Azad got conventional education. At a young age, he was well versed in the knowledge of Quran, hadith, fiqih and had command over important Oriental Languages. Under the influence of his father, he was all set to become a pir. However, things changed fast for him and as he read more he rejected his father’s philosophy of taqlid and turned against the idea of piri-muridi. At one point of time he actually lost faith in Islam, considered the religion as “ignorance and conjecture” and almost became an atheist. This was however, a short-lived chapter of his life and within few years he outgrew this phase. It is important to note that even during this period Azad apparently followed the Islamic rituals of worship.

Exposure to the works of Muhammad Abduh, Rashid Rida, Syed Ahmed Khan and Jamaluddin Afghani and his interaction
with Shibli Nomani, brought a big change in Azad's life as he started thinking in a rational way and developed anti-colonial feeling. Perhaps, it was the concept of Pan-Islamism, which charmed him the most. The ambition of pan-Islamism had a deep impact on Azad's political thought and attitude as he took up the task to uplift the Muslims by injecting the true spirit of Islam in them. He used literary and political medium to pursue his goal. He adopted Journalism as his mode of communication and through his articles in Al-Hilal and Al-Balagh, he worked for the revival of the Muslims of his country. In his articles, he did not only discussed the religious and political issues faced by the community in India but also the issues ummah was facing around the world.

In the early part of his political career, Azad was more inclined towards the resolution of the problems of the Muslims in India and elsewhere. He promulgated the vision of establishing a pan-Islamic society based on the concept of Jamat, Khalifah, Hijrat, Dar-al-Islam and Jehad. He began his political journey with the Muslim League and remained an active member of the party during the second decade of the twentieth century. In 1915 he founded Hizbullah with the aim to transform the society in accordance with the teachings of Quran and Sunnah. His idea was to include only those in the party who believed in the fundamentals of Islam. He along with Hussain Ahmad Madani was the brain behind the idea of the creation of Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Hind. By doing so, he wanted to give the Muslims of India a forum from where they could contest for their interests and also look after the well-being of the Ummah at large. During this period he also focused on the translation and explanation of the Quran so that he could interpret Quran in the context of the new developments, world was witnessing.

When the Muslims of South Asia launched the Khilafat Movement with the aim to restore the institution of Khilafat; to safeguard their Holy places in Hijaz and Palestine; and to keep the Ottoman Empire intact, Azad wholeheartedly got involved in it. He wrote several articles, issued statements and made speeches to
make the Indian Muslims aware about the need and significance of pan-Islamism and the importance of the institution of Khilafat. He presided over the conferences of Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Hind even in the presence of senior Ulema and delivered speeches from different forums. In his famous speech delivered before the Bengal Provincial Khilafat Conference in February 1920, Azad examined in detail the challenges of the Muslims at that time and suggested the only solution of their problem was to reconstitute the Muslim society on the models of Islam as prescribed by Quran and Sunnah.  

Azad was also part of the team of ulema who considered India as Dar-ul-Harb and called for the migration of Indian Muslims to Afghanistan. He also wanted to emerge as “Imam-ul-Hind.” However, this desire of Azad remained unfulfilled.

Interaction with Gandhi completely changed the future course of Azad’s life. After being released from the Rachni Jail, Azad developed close relationship with Gandhi. From then onwards he and Gandhi were on the same wavelength in their anti-imperial struggle during the Khilafat / non-cooperation movement. Azad was impressed by Gandhi’s personality as well as philosophy. He started believing in the concepts of styagraha, ahimsa, swadeshi and swaraj and became the advocate of communal harmony and humanism. He started emphasizing on the concepts of tolerance and harmony in Islam and his national identity started dominating his religious identity. Closeness with Gandhi created gulf between Azad and the Muslim League as he even declined the offer to preside over the Ahmedabad session of the party to be held in December 1921.

Azad was thoroughly disappointed when Gandhi decided to withdraw the support of the Congress from the Khilafat Movement, yet he continued his support for the party. Gradually he fully got involved in the activities of the Congress and emerged as a pleader of the concept of Indian Nationalism. For him, the Congress was the only type of sangathan, which was required for the Indian people. He voiced the ideas of freedom, national unity and cultural harmony and gave his full to make Congress a strong body. When in 1923, the party was divided into
“Ghandhites” and “Swarajists”, Azad played an important role to bridge the gulf between the two factions. It was because of Azad that Swarajist leaders like C.R. Das, Motilal Nehru and Vallabhbhai Patel were first allowed to contest the Council elections in January 1923 and then were eventually facilitated to re-enter the Congress.

The years after Khilafat / Non-cooperation Movement were marked by communalization which resulted in the outbreak of communal riots. At this stage, Azad’s main focus was on the issue of Hindu Muslim unity in India. He gave Quranic justifications to stop the Muslims from participating in the communal violence. He also participated in the meetings of Unity Conferences with the aim to bridge the gulf between the two major communities. In order to resolve the communal problem and to find out the solution he was willing to discuss the problems with Muslim League leadership. However, he failed in his attempts because of his visible bias towards the Congress, its leadership and its policies and agenda, something Muslim League was not ready to accept.

When the Nehru Committee presented its report, Azad appreciated the efforts of the committee and considered its recommendations as beneficial for the Indians. He tried to convince the Muslims that the Report had also taken care of their interests and aspirations and claimed that “the safeguards promised to the Muslim minority were adequate to warrant unreserved Muslim support to the Congress.” Muslim League still invited Azad to participate in its Council meeting to discuss the Nehru Report. Azad tried to convince the other six members of the Council that the report was in the interest of the Muslims of India. However, his arguments were not strong enough to convince the Muslim League to accept the report in full or even a part of it. When Jinnah presented his Fourteen Points to counter the Nehru Report, Azad strongly criticized and opposed them.

With the rejection of Nehru Report by the Muslim League and the unwillingness of Congress to accommodate the Fourteen Points of Jinnah, a deadlock was created in the Indian politics. Under these circumstances, Azad along with other prominent
nationalist Muslims including M.A. Ansari, Abdul Ghafrar Khan, Dr. Syed Mahmud, Dr. Safuddin Kitchlew, Raja Sabib Mahmudabad, TAK Sherwani and Choudhary Khadiquzzaman, founded the All India Nationalist Muslim Party on July 27, 1929. Azad held an important position in the new party. The main target of the party was to get support of the Muslim community for the Congress and the ongoing nationalist movement. The Party, however, failed to gather much needed Muslim support.

In spite of the communal friction in India, Gandhi decided to launch Civil Disobedience Movement in 1930. Ansari, wanted Gandhi to postpone the idea till a time that the Hindu Muslim question was resolved but Azad showed no reservation on this issue. He actively participated in the preparations for the launching of the movement. He advised Gandhi regarding the names of the Muslims, who could promulgate the Congress' point of view. He visited different areas and addressed several public meetings with the aim to mobilize the masses, especially Muslims, to participate in the movement. He also participated in almost all the major activities of the Congress, yet he was not given any significant position in the party.

Azad got prominence amongst the Congress leadership only after the death of Dr. M.A. Ansari in 1936. This was the time when he was given important responsibilities in the party and was consulted on issues of importance, especially related to the Muslims. A question that arises here is the reasons behind a sudden surge of importance that Azad got in the Congress, in spite of the fact that he was sincerely and actively working with the party ever since he joined it? The answer is simple. The Congress wanted to prove itself as the cross-communal organization and by the early 1930s the party had lost the support of the overwhelming majority of the Muslim community. Only few non dynamic and non popular middle class Muslims were left in the party. To prove their point they first gave Dr. Asari, one of the few competent Muslims left in the party, an important position and when he died he was replaced by the next best choice, Azad.
Azad was elected as the member of the Congress Working Committee on April 16, 1936. He was also nominated as the member of Congress Parliamentary Board. He refused to contest the election and preferred to run the party campaign in the Muslim dominated areas during the elections of 1937. Congress was disappointed with its performance on the Muslim constituencies, where the party could only manage to win around 5% seats, and decided to launch the Muslim Mass contact Movement. Azad was assigned the task to market the party in the Muslim majority regions of Bengal, UP, Punjab and NWFP. Throughout the Congress rule (1937-39) Azad kept defending the strategy of his party and pleaded that the Muslim League’s allegations of Congress’ policies being anti-Muslim in nature, were “absolutely false”.

Despite all his efforts and sincerity, Azad’s strategy to deal with the Muslim League was not appreciated by the Congress leaders and his ideas had no importance. In post election scenario, Azad wanted collaboration between the Congress and the Muslim League and through the negotiations with the League leadership in the UP wanted to include Khaliquzzam and Nawab Ismail Khan in the provincial cabinet. However, he faced difficulties in selling the concept to his own party men. When the idea was presented before Nehru, he put strict conditions before the League leadership. Azad also failed to convince Gandhi and the latter also submitted to the ideas of Nehru. UP League considered Congress’ proposal as their “death warrant” and rejected it. Azad blamed Nehru for the failure of the dialogue, considered it as the “most unfortunate development” and believed that “Jawaharlal’s action gave the Muslim League in UP a new lease of life.”

When Subhas Chandra Bose disagreed with Gandhi’s strategy and resigned as Congress’ president, Gandhi persuaded Azad to contest the Presidential elections of the party. Azad was reluctant but could not say no to Gandhi. Azad was elected as the next president of the Congress. In his presidential address delivered at the Ramgarh session of Congress on March 19, 1940 Azad’s major focus was on India’s political problem in the background of the
Second World War. He put a lot of emphasis on the communal harmony in order to put pressure on the British Government. He regarded “common nationality”, which to him had evolved over centuries due to mutual cultural interactions between the Hindus and the Muslims, as the need of the hour. To him, India’s success was dependent upon “three factors: unity, discipline and full confidence in Mahatama Gandhi’s leadership”.

Nomination of Azad, as the president of Congress only few days before the passage of Lahore Resolution by the Muslim League, was indeed a significant move. The Congress knew that in order to counter the idea of Muslim Nationalism as advocated by the Muslim League they needed to present Congress as the representative body of the Muslim community. It is also important that the Congress broke its age old traditions of electing a new President almost every year, and Azad continued to hold the slot for the next six years. Presence of Azad as the head of the Congress was enough to argue against Jinnah’s stance that Muslim League alone was the political representative body of the Muslims of India. To further damage the Muslim League’s point-of-view, Azad termed the idea of Pakistan as fallacious and impracticable.

Though Azad remained the president of Congress from 1940 to 1946, the real power was not in his hands. He was personally inclined to negotiate with the British for seeking political concessions and was in favour of extending Congress support to the British Government during the War, if the party was given assurance of the freedom of India. However, he did not bring the idea before the Congress Working Committee, fearing that his opinion would be turned down by Gandhi. Azad also had serious reservations about launching of the Quit India Movement. When he tried to convince Gandhi about this idea, the latter bluntly told him that the two of them could not work together. Gandhi in a letter to Nehru suggested that “Maulana Saheb should relinquish Presidency”. It was only after the interference of Patel and the surrender of Azad before Gandhi’s idea that Azad was allowed to continue as the president of the party. It is also worth mentioning that Cripps also held meetings with Gandhi and
Nehru, while the official President of the Congress was Azad. Azad suggested that Gandhi’s negotiations with Jinnah in 1944 would be a “political blunder” as to him Jinnah, by that time, had lost his “political importance” 39. Yet, Gandhi ignored Azad’s opinion and went ahead with Gandhi-Jinnah talks.

On the other hand Jinnah, who by now had emerged as the Quaid-i-Azam for the Muslim League and had set separate state(s) as the ultimate goal of his party, had never appreciated the idea of Azad being presented as the representative of Congress. When Gandhi asked Jinnah to negotiate with Azad before meeting Gandhi in 1937-38, 40 Jinnah refused. He was willing to see Nehru, Bose or any other leader of Congress but not Azad. 41 When Congress Working Committee in its meeting held at Delhi from July 3 to 7, 1940, passed a resolution demanding the setting up of a Provisional National Government, Jinnah reacted strongly against it. Azad sent a telegram to Jinnah on July 12 and tried to clarify that Congress actually meant national government and not a cabinet limited to any single party. Jinnah, in his reply refused to discuss the matter with Azad, as to him Azad had “completely forfeited the confidence of Muslim India” and was acting like a “Muslim show-boy Congress president” 42. Azad was run down as “renegades” and charged of a “sell-out” to the Hindu Congress by the Muslim League leadership. Aligharh students and teachers, who once used to idealize Azad later turned against him. Bulk of Barelwi ulema became his critics and started considering him as a traitor 43.

When Lord Wavell invited Indian leadership to discuss his proposals at Simla in June 1945, Azad’s name was missing from the original list of invitees 44. Congress knew it well that Jinnah’s main plea at Simla would be that his party was the sole representative party of the Muslims of India. So, in order to counter Jinnah, they not only made sure that Azad should be present at Simla Conference, but also authorized him to act as the chief negotiator on behalf of the Congress 45. At Simla, Azad was ready to accept Wavell’s proposal that there would be equal number of Caste Hindus and the Muslims in the Executive
Council. However, he was not ready to concede to Jinnah’s idea that only the Muslim League would nominate the Muslim members. To him, Jinnah was giving religious colour to a purely political issue and acceptance of his demands would mean that Congress was ready to acknowledge that it was a communal organization. He questioned that “what right Jinnah had to dictate whom the Congress should nominate”. Azad refused to accept the Muslim League as the only representative party of the Muslims as it failed to form government even in the Muslim majority provinces after the elections of 1945. When Simla Conference failed, Azad put Jinnah responsible for it.

The Victory of Labour Party in the British elections of July 1945 and the appointment of Attlee as the Prime Minister was considered as a positive development by the Congress leadership including Azad. Predicting that the new British Government would try to find some solution to the Indian problem, Azad prepared his formula for the future settlement of India. He, being the advocate of composite nationalism, discarded the idea of the creation of a separate Muslim State and pleaded before the Muslims to merge their political identity with the Hindus in the better interest of the community. He suggested that if the League and Jinnah decides to drop the idea of Pakistan, federal form of government with a weak centre should be enforced in independent India. He proposed for joint electorates with the reservation of seats. He also recommended that there should be parity of Hindus and Muslims in the central legislature and executive till the time communal problem subsided in India. In the early period, he suggested that head of the Federation should be Hindu and Muslim by rotation. Azad wanted to make the idea public by issuing a press statement but Patel stopped him from doing so as to him the issue was too sensitive to be expressed by the individuals.

Mulana Azad in a letter to Gandhi, written on August 2, 1945 shared his formula with the man who was not even a member of the Congress. Although he was the President of the party, Azad was defensive in his approach and in an apologetic way he
described that he was giving the formula only in his personal capacity. He wrote that the Muslim interests were best served by a federating and United India and if they were given assurances they will drop the demand for a separate homeland. Gandhi in his reply on August 16 asked Azad to shelf his idea till the two of them would meet and discuss things at length. He criticized the idea of having Hindus and Muslims as the alternate Heads of the State. He instructed Azad not to utter anything related to communal problem without consulting the Congress Working Committee. In fact, Gandhi did not like Azad’s formula and indirectly snubbed him. Congress Working Committee in September 1945 completely rejected Azad’s proposal. Nehru in order to sideline Azad, insisted that a subcommittee of the Congress Working Committee rather than the party president should hold discussions with the Cabinet Mission.

Azad firmly believed that his formula was the only option which could protect India from division. So when he got the opportunity to meet the members of the Cabinet Mission on April 6, 1946, he pleaded before them that the future constitution of India should be federal in nature ensuring maximum provincial autonomy. He suggested that only defence, communication and foreign affairs should be central subjects while the bulk of the issues should be given to the provincial responsibility. In addition to that he recommended for a third list of subjects where the provincial legislature would decide whether to retain the issue as provincial subjects or delegate them to the centre. All this was not acceptable to both Gandhi and Nehru. In a letter to Nehru, Gandhi wrote, “I do not understand him, nor does he understand me. We are drifting apart on the Hindu-Muslim question as well as on other questions. Therefore, I suggest that the Maulana should relinquish Presidentship.” Azad was replaced by Nehru as the president of Congress in July 1946, when the negotiations with the Cabinet Mission were still on.

Although, Azad was never in complete command of the Congress, even as its president and his decisions were hardly implemented, yet, with his removal from the post, his words
completely lost their significance. He and his contentions for the Unity of India were sidelined and against his wishes Congress turned down the Cabinet Mission Plan. The failure of the Cabinet Mission, to Azad was the last nail in the coffin of United India. When the Congress decided to join interim set-up, Azad was reluctant to hold a cabinet portfolio. It was on the insistence of Gandhi and other Congress leaders that he eventually had to change his mind. Yet, Azad did not want to join the interim government on the Muslim quota. He insisted that he should be included on the quota reserved for the Congress members. Patel opposed Azad's point-of-view and went to the extent that he indirectly threatened Azad and told him that his terms and conditions would not be acceptable. Azad, by that time, hardly had left with any support in the Congress. He conceded to Patel's hawkish approach and joined the cabinet as education minister.

Azad tried his utmost to convince the Congress leaders to avert the partition. He told Patel that the acceptance of Partition would mean that the Congress would accept Jinnah's slogan of two nation theory. To his surprise, Patel replied that whether he liked it or not the fact of the matter was that there were two nations in India. Nehru's ideas were no different. He wanted Azad to accept the reality of partition and not to make a fuss by opposing Mountbatten. Azad was hoping against hope that at least Gandhi would never accept partition as he had earlier declared that the Congress would only accept Pakistan over his dead body. To Azad's biggest disappointment, Gandhi also had fallen to the pressure of Patel and Nehru and accepted the partition of India on communal lines.

Azad made a last disparate effort to avoid partition and retain the unity of India. He tried to convince Mountbatten that the partition would result in the beginning of the catastrophic riots, which would engulf the entire country. He requested him that in order to avoid such a situation, the Viceroy should reconsider the idea of the implementation of Cabinet Mission Plan. Azad failed to realize that Congress had finally decided not to accept the idea
of a weak center as the solution. Even if Jinnah and Muslim League would accept his idea, Congress would certainly reject it.

Though Congress was not ready to accept any of Azad’s suggestion, Azad was still not willing to leave the party. On the contrary, when the All India Congress Committee session was convened on June 14, 1947 to rectify Congress Working Committee’s decision to accept Third June Plan, Azad not only participated in the meeting but also seconded the resolution presented by Govind Ballabh Path and thus endorsed the partition plan. Speaking at the occasion he said, “We should accept our defeat but we should at the same time try to ensure that our culture was not divided”. He added, “If we put a stick in the water, it may appear that the water has been divided but water remains the same and the moment the stick is removed, even the appearance of division disappears”. He could only express his wishes in the speech as he reiterated, “The decision is only of the map of the country and not in the hearts of the people, and I am sure it is going to be a short-lived partition”. However, the fact remains that with the transfer of power to the Indians, unity of the country was lost and Azad’s desire to accomplish composite nationalism in India was buried under the heap of partition.

Azad’s calculations proved true as massive communal riots followed the partition of India on both sides of the boarder. On the Indian side, the trouble started from East Punjab but it soon engulfed Delhi as well. The Muslims in the capital of India were not safe. Many of them were killed, the others fled to Pakistan and a lot more had to leave their homes and took refuge in the camps. The Administration was silently watching the Muslims being killed, looted and raped as there was hardly any person in the top command, both in civil and military, who was not in the grip of communal virus. In his autobiography, Azad openly blamed Patel, the “Iron Man of the Congress” and the then Home Minister of India, for not taking things seriously. Patel went to the extent that he declared that “Muslims had no cause for complaint or fear”. When Gandhi decided to fast till peace was restored in Delhi, Patel told him that he was “fasting without any justification”.
Azad could only be a spectator watching his community been tortured or at least being ignored by the Indian Government, when his own party, the Congress, was at helm of affairs.

To sum it up, Azad always remained sincere with the Indian National Congress, ever since he joined the party. He gave his hundred percent to his party and always stood by its policies and decisions. On the contrary, the party has not done justice to his services. No doubt, he remained longest serving president of the Congress during the freedom movement and then held an important portfolio in the first cabinet of independent India. Yet, he probably was worth more. In fact he held offices but his views were never given due significance. He was given importance in the party only at the time when there was no other competent Muslim left in the Congress; as President of the party, he was dependent on Gandhi, Nehru and the others for the final decisions; and at the end of the day he was betrayed by the Congress, as against his desire, it eventually accepted the partition plan at the cost of Indian unity. In spite of this Azad continued his affiliation with the party and served as the education minister in Nehru's cabinet till his death on February 22, 1958. One reason for this could be his loyalty. But one cannot also ignore the fact that this also reflects Azad's weak personality. He knew that he and his ideology had no place in the Muslim League and had he developed differences with Gandhi and his policies, his fate would not have been different from that of Chittaranjan Das, Veer Nariman and Subhas Chandra Bose. He compromised, retained his position in the Congress and prolonged his political career.

Notes and References

1. One important thing to be noted here is that there were some main stream Muslim Leaders who refused to join Indian National Congress. Syed Ahmed Khan was invited to attend the inaugural session of the party while Syed Ameer Ali had the offer to join the party along with other leaders of Indian Association in 1886. Both of them
abstained themselves from becoming the member of INC, though both had different reasons behind their decision.

2 By September 1919, the All India Khilafat Conference had unofficially begun to accept Gandhi as their leader and later on the request of Gandhi joined Congress. See Mushirul Hasan, Nationalism and Communal Politics, 1885-1930 (Delhi: Manohar, 1991), 129.

3 At that time he was only 35 years old. See Abul Kalam Azad, India Wins Freedom: An Autobiographical Narrative (Calcutta: Orient Longmans, 1959), 12.


5 Azad met Shibli Nomani for the first time in 1905. However, the two of them were exchanging letters from the beginning of the 20th century. See Gail Minault, “The Elusive Maulana: Reflections on Writing Azad’s Biographies” in Mushir-ul-Hassan, ed. Islam and the Indian Nationalism: Reflections on Abul Kalam Azad (New Delhi: Manohar, 1992), 20.


7 Historical record shows that Azad was present at the inaugural session of the All India Muslim League, held at Dacca in 1906. He also attended the 5th session of AIML to be held in Calcutta in March 1912. See A.G. Noorani, “Maulana Azad”, Criterion 5, no. 3 (July/September 2010): 11. However, he formally joined the party on December 10, 1913. He did not participate much in the affairs of the party after 1920 but he formally quit it in 1928. See Syed Sharifuddin Pirzda, Evolution of Pakistan (Karachi: Royal Book, 1995), 264.

8 According to the constitution of Hizbullah (Party of Allah), only those who possessed the following eight qualities were eligible to join the party: i) to offer repentance to God; ii) to serve God; iii) to praise God; iv)
to fast to God; v) to submit to God; vi) to fall prostrate in worship; vii) to abide by what is right and to refrain from what is wrong; and viii) to observe the limits set by God. See V.N. Datta, Maulana Azad (New Delhi: Vanguards Books, 1990), 68.


10 This speech was later published in form of a booklet, Masala-e-Khilafat wa Jazirat al-Arab. See Sandeep Chawla, “The Palestine Issue in Indian Politics in the 1920’s”, in Mushir-ul-Hassan, ed., Communal and Pan-Islamic Trends in Colonial India (New Delhi: Manohar, 1985), 73.

11 Syeda Saiyidain Hameed, Islamic Seal on India’s Independence: Abul Kalam Azad – A Fresh Look (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1998), 102-03

12 Azad met Gandhi for the first time on January 18, 1920. The meeting had a deep impact on both the personalities.

13 While addressing the Special Session of the Congress in 1923, Azad said, “I strongly believe that Mahatma Gandhi is the only true leader. As and when India will achieve freedom it would only be under his leadership.” See Azad, Presidential Address at the Special session of the Congress, September 15, 1923 in Malik Ram, ed., Khutbat-i-Azad (Delhi: Sahitya Akademi, 1990), 196-207.


15 Abdul Razzaq Shahid, “Quaid-i-Azam and the All India Muslim League, 1924-1937” in Riaz Ahmad ed., Pakistani Scholars on Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah (Islamabad: Quaid-i-Azam Chair, Quaid-i-Azam University, 1999),
256. However, it is interesting to note that when Jinnah called for a meeting of the Muslim League Council at Delhi in 1924, Azad along with Muhammad Ali Johar, Hakim Ajmal Khan, Dr. M.A. Ansari and T.A.K. Sherwani attended that meeting. See M. Naeem Quraishi, “Jinnah and the Khilafat Movement, 1918-24,” in Ahmad Hassan Dani, ed., World Scholars on Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah (Islamabad: Quaid-i-Azam University, 1979), 159.

16 When Gandhi decided to withdraw from the Khilafat Movement, Azad was in Alipore jail. He was disturbed by the decision, he confined himself to his cell and refused to interact with anyone. See A. R. Malihabadi, Zikr-i-Azad Maulana Azad ki Refaqat main Artees Saal (Calcutta: Ujala Press, 1960), 200-202.

17 Datta, Maulana Azad, 129.


20 Bombay Chronicle, April 4, 1929.

21 According to Datta he was its “convener” See Datta, Maulana Azad, 137. Whereas Shashi Ahluwalia said, Azad was elected as its “president.” See B.K. Ahluwalia and Shashi Ahluwalia, Muslims and India’s Freedom Movement (New Delhi: Heritage Publisher, 1985), 127.

22 Qaiser, Resisting Colonialism and Communal Politics, 29.

23 The only exception was when both Gandhi and Nehru were put behind the bars, Azad became acting President. However, soon in August 1930, Azad was also imprisoned
and thus reign as an acting president was very short lived. See Ahluwalia, Muslims and India’s Freedom Movement, 127.


25 Nighat Ekbal, Great Muslims of Undivided India (Delhi: Kalpas Publications, 2009), 78.


27 Azad, India Wins Freedom. 22. Muslim League started claiming that aim of the Congress ministries was to eliminate Muslim cultural and religion by using administrative machinery. Jinnah accused the Congress of pursuing the policy, which to him was “exclusively Hindu.”

28 S.M. Burke and Saleem Al-Din Quraishi, Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah: His Personality and His Politics (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1997), 224.

29 Congress virtually wanted the complete merger of the Muslim League (UP) in the Congress and to cease to function as a separate group. Even then they were only ready to give Muslim League one Ministry instead of two. See. The Leader, August 4, 1937. Even Nehru commented, “the conditions imposed on the League for merging itself with the Congress were stringent, the underlying idea being to prevent the League from accepting these terms”. See Nehru to Prasad, July 21, 1937, RPF, File No. 1/37, Letter No. 42


32 In the elections, Azad scored 1841 votes as compared to his opponent, M.N. Roy who polled only 181 votes. Hisdustan Times, February 16, 1940.


34 The only exceptions were when Rashbihari Bose remained president of the party for two consecutive years in 1907 and 1908; Madan Mohan Malaviya in 1932 and 1933; Jawaharlal Nehru 1936 and 1937; Subhas Chandra Bose in 1938 and 1939. However, single individual occupied the position of the President of Congress for more than two consecutive years.


39 Ibid., 93.

40 Gandhi to Jinnah, February 24, 1938 in Syed Sherifuddin Pirzada, Quaid’s Correspondence (Islamabad: Services Book Club, 1987), 92.

41 Stanley Wolpert, Jinnah of Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1993), 160.


45 Azad to Wavell, June 21, 1945, Wavell Papers, Political Series, April 1944 – July 1945, Pt.1, 258.

46 Wavell to Amery, June 25, 1945, IOR, L/ PSJ/ 8/ 524.


48 The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, July 18, 1945. Also see A.B. Rajput, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad (Lahore: Lions Press, 1946), 185-190.

49 Jinnah judged Azad's formula as "the height of defeatist mentality" and believed that the implementation of it would put the Muslims of India on "the mercy and good will of others". See Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, ed. Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah. Vol. I (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1968), 33.

50 For full detail of Azad's scheme see Jenkins to Abell, August 25, 1945, Wavell Papers, Political Series, July to September 1945, 65-67. Azad was quite sure that once India would get independence, the communal problem would immediately evaporate. See Azad, India Wins Freedom 152.

51 Patel to Azad, August 29, 1945, CWSVP, vol. 10, 80-81, quoted by Qaiser, Resisting Communalism, 250.

52 Jenkins to Abell, August 25, 1945, Wavell Papers, Political Series, July to September 1945, 65.
53 See Jenkins to Abell, August 28, 1945, Wavell Papers, Political Series, July to September 1945, 67.

54 For details see CWC resolution of September 1945 in Valmiki Choudhary, ed., Correspondence and Selected Documents of Rajendra Prasad, Vol. VI (Delhi: Allied Publishers), 346.


56 Ibid., 147.


59 Qaiser, Resisting Communalism, 261-262.

60 For details see Azad, India Wins Freedom, 201-204.

