There is a strong argument that Kashmir conflict was deliberately created by the British military strategists in alliance with the Congress leader, Jawaharlal Nehru who was under the strong emotional influence of Lady Edwina, the wife of Lord Mountbatten, the last Viceroy of colonial and first Governor General of independent India. Creating a ‘mutilated, truncated and moth-eaten Pakistan’ under the constant threat of siege by an aggressive India on the one hand and a strong central government in India led by Nehru under the close monitoring of Mountbatten was a two pronged strategy to provide a rationale for ‘defense establishment’ in Pakistan and India at the end of their colonial rule, as the British lost the hope of a common defense establishment which could act as resistance force against the Soviet expansionist designs. Lawrence Ziring notes that ‘the British had set the scene for what was to become one of the more intractable, long-term problems of modern diplomacy’.  

Similarly, Prime Minister Chou En-lai told President Nixon in a meeting on February 23, 1972 that Kashmir issue ‘was something left over from Britain’ with the objective to maintain their strategic control in the region.
Kashmir dispute provided the opportunity for General Messervy Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army to convince the Chiefs of the Staff for their belief that 'the long term policy of the Government of India would be to seek the subjugation of and incorporation of Pakistan into India' and it was felt obligatory to provide 'every assistance ... to the Pakistan armed forces' build a defense establishment in Pakistan. But surprisingly, when that moment came, just after a week of this observation, the officiating Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army General Gracy with the consent of General F. M. Aucinleck, the Supreme commander of both the dominions' forces refused to send his men to fight the Indian Army marching towards Pakistan after forcefully occupying the Kashmir valley on the pretext of Mahraja's accession letter which was “based on violence and fraud". On learning what the Indians had done, Jinnah issued orders on the evening of 27th October 1947 at Lahore to send in two brigades of Pakistan's regular army into Kashmir but, General Gracy who was then the officiating C-in-C of the Pakistan Army ‘felt obliged to stall’ and decided to ‘consult F. M. Aucinleck, the Supreme commander of ... both dominions' forces’. On 28th October 1947, General Aucinleck reported to Chiefs of Staff, London, that, "Gracy, officiating C-In-C of Pakistan Army, reported by phone to me 0100 hours night 27 October that he had received orders from Jinnah which if he obeyed would entail issue 'Stand Down Order' ... Gracy...said orders which he had not repeated not obeyed were to send troops into Kashmir to seize Baramula and Srinagar and also Banihala Pass and to send troops into Mirpur District of Jammu."

The same day, General Aucinleck flew to Lahore and met Jinnah along with General Gracy to pressurize him to withdraw his orders. General “Auk" told Jinnah, that 'unless he withdrew his order, every British officer in Pakistan’s army would be ordered to immediately to ‘stand down’. That stand down order would begin with General Gracy, the [acting] commander-in-chief
of Pakistan’s army’. 5 Angry and disturbed by what he considered to be sharp practice by India in securing Kashmir’s accession, Jinnah had no choice but to withdraw his orders. 6 The important question to probe is why General F. M. Auchinleck did not create the same pressure on Mountbatten, the Governor General of India not to order Indian Army for her illegitimate occupation of the state of Jammu and Kashmir a predominantly Muslim state.

General Gracy and General ‘Auk’s action becomes more questionable when in a similar situation, General Lockhart, C-in-C of the Indian Army, along with the chiefs of Air and Naval services were swayed by Mountbatten to review their view on the projected military operation in Kathiawar which was meant to coerce the Maharaja of Junagadh - a predominantly Hindu state who had acceded to Pakistan. On 27 September 1947, J.T.S. Hall, Rear Admiral, F. O. C. of Royal Indian Navy, R. M.M. Lockhart, General, C-in-C, Indian Army and S. Mukerjee, Air Commodore for A.M.C., Royal Indian Air Force wrote a joint letter to Sardar Patel, the Defence Minister of India to record their reservations about the ‘projected operations in Kathiawar’ stating that;

We …earnestly urge the movement of Armed Forces for the projected operations to be stopped and that the dispute regarding Junagadh be settled by negotiations. 7

Nehru and his cabinet expressing very strong voice of disapproval of their military advisors’ interference in the decision making process, wrote to Mountbatten that:

This letter seemed to us very extraordinary. In effect, it was an announcement that they could not carry out Government’s policy in case they did not agree to it. That is a position which hardly any Government can accept. The expert opinion of military commanders is of the utmost value in coming to any decision. But where questions of policy are concerned, the decision must rest with the Government. The mention of British
officers as such also creates a difficulty if they are to function only when they approve of the action taken by the Government.  

Mountbatten took no time in convincing M.M. Lockhart, General, C-in-C, Indian Army to write an apology letter explaining that ‘the paper was written in a general hurry, and...[they] were actuated by no other motive than a desire to do ...[their] duty, as Military Advisers, for the good of India’. Consequently, in line with the decision of the Indian Cabinet of 17th September 1947, a comprehensive military plan to invade Junagardh was devised by Chief of Indian army and Indian army was sent to Junagardh on 9th November 1947. Here, two questions need to be answered, first, why Liaqat and his cabinet did not create the similar pressure for getting their authority asserted when General Gracy refused to obey Jinnah’s orders and second, was Mountbatten in a better position than Jinnah to control his military advisors. The answer to both these questions lies in the strategic implications of the origin of the Kashmir conflict which has its seeds in the Partition Plan announced by Mountbatten on 3rd June, 1947.

Alex Von Tunzelmann, author of Indian Summer claims that the Plan announced on 3rd June was not the original plan conceived by Mountbatten and approved by the British government, rather it was a plan drafted by Jawaharlal Nehru, V. P. Menon, and the Governor of the Punjab, Evan Jenkins. Nehru was invited by Mountbatten and his wife Edwina to accompany them for a stay at Simla in May 1946, where he was shown the draft announcement of the secret Plan of Transfer by Mountbatten on the night of 10th May. Tunzelmann confirms that by that time, Nehru and Edwina were having an ‘affair’ which could be a great embarrassment for the British government and the Congress if known to the general public. Nehru ‘reacted very strongly against the draft announcement of the... [Transfer] plan’ especially the provision of ‘the choice by Provinces of their own choice’ was revealed by Mountbatten in a meeting with his close aides on the morning of 11th May.
Subsequently, Nehru was assigned the task to smooth the plan into an acceptable shape in consultation with V. P. Menon and the Governor of the Punjab, Evan Jenkins. 'Telephone calls were made to Congress potentates... Neither the Muslim League, the princes, nor any other body in India would be given the chance to review the plan before its announcement'. The founding principle of the Transfer Plan which then became the Partition Plan was the reappointment of Mountbatten as the joint Governor General of the two new Dominions to be established as the consequence of the partition plan, India and Pakistan and partition of Bengal and the Punjab. Nehru had the assurance from Mountbatten that Muslim League would be made sufficiently realized 'that the grant of Pakistan was dependent upon the partition of the Punjab'. This was in line with the Congress demand of the partition of the Punjab into Muslim and Non-Muslim provinces declared in a resolution passed by the Congress Working Committee on 8th March 1947 which was publicly rejected by Jinnah in his various public addresses. Rejecting the partition of the Punjab and Bengal, Jinnah very categorically declared in a press conference held on 30th April 1947, that anything less, any sub-division of Bengal or the Punjab would be a 'truncated or mutilated, moth-eaten Pakistan' not acceptable to the Muslim League. This was the stand Jinnah took in his meetings with Mountbatten, whenever he 'raised the possibility of partitioning the provinces' arguing that 'those provinces had strong internal identities: that the Hindus identified themselves more strongly as Bengalis or Punjabis than as Hindus or Congress supporters, and that the integrity of their provinces ought to be preserved above all'. Wolpert writes that 'Nehru may well have imagined that Jinnah would never accept what he called a “moth-eaten” Pakistan without Calcutta and East Punjab or perhaps...even if Jinnah did accept the fragments Mountbatten offered him, they would prove to be so unviable that “Pakistan” would before long be forced to beg Congress to permit it to rejoin the Indian Union.'
On 2\textsuperscript{nd} June, Jinnah and other leaders of Muslim League came to know about the plan when they were ‘summoned’ by the Viceroy to discuss the plan along with the leaders of the Congress who were already familiar with the plan. Mountbatten told Jinnah ‘that there could not be any question of a “No” from the League’. The next morning, League and Congress both gave their acceptance to the Plan of Transfer which was announced on the same afternoon. On 17\textsuperscript{th} May, a day before Mountbatten and V. P. Menon left Delhi for London to sell the plan to the British government, Nehru wrote to Mountbatten for ‘giving his comments on the Draft Announcement’ and confirmed the Congress’s acceptance to the proposal ‘that during... [the] interim period the Governor-General should be common to both the States, if there...[were] to be two States. For...[their] part...[they would] be happy if...[Mountbatten] could continue in this office and help...[then] with...[his] advice and experience’. However, Jinnah and Muslim League did not accept Mountbatten as the joint Governor-General of both the dominions. League decided that Jinnah would be the first Governor-General of Pakistan. This was a severe blow to Mountbatten’s expectations who already had conveyed to the British Government that he was offered by the both dominions to be their joint Governor-General. Accordingly, a clause in the Indian Independence Bill was incorporated on Mountbatten’s advice who did not wish ‘to give the impression of having imposed himself on the political parties in case of his continuing as Governor-General of both the Dominions’, stating that, ‘provided it shall be lawful for one person to hold both appointments of Governor-General for such period as may be determined by either Dominion after 15\textsuperscript{th} August’. Embarrassed and rejected Mountbatten intimidated Jinnah to accept him as the joint Governor-General or be ready to face the consequences which could be fatal for Pakistan. In Viceroy’s Personal Report dated 4\textsuperscript{th} July 1947, Mountbatten wrote;
I asked... [Jinnah] "do you realize what this will cost you"? He said sadly "it may cost me several crores of rupees in assets", to which I replied somewhat acidly "it may well cost you the whole of your assets and the future of Pakistan".23

Unruffled Jinnah refused to succumb to Mountbatten's intimidations. An 'insult', Mountbatten could never forget and Pakistan had to pay a very heavy price.

According to the Plan, power was to be transferred by 15th August 1947—ten months in advance of the June 1948 deadline and the British India was to be divided into two Dominions, Hindustan comprising of Hindu majority areas and Pakistan with Muslim majority areas. Following the principle of the partition plan, it was decided that the provinces of Bengal and Punjab would also be divided. Two Boundary Commissions, one for each province were established 'with the terms of reference to demarcate the boundaries of the two parts of the respective provinces on the basis of ascertaining the contiguous majority areas of Muslims and non-Muslims.'24 Along with the division of Bengal and Punjab, there were 600 autonomous princely states given the choice to accede to any dominion or remain independent which was considered by Nehru 'balkanization of India'. Congress was not in favour of granting the right to any state for an independent status. On the contrary, Muslim League took a 'legalistic' rather than 'pragmatic' stand favouring the right of princes to decide the fate of their states. 'Jinnah's view concurred with that of the Nawab of Bhopal, Chancellor of Princes, who told Jinnah on 6 June that the Viceroy had been pressurizing the States into joining the 'existing' Constituent Assembly.'25

Mountbatten's role in the partition of India needs to be investigated in the light of new evidence available. Many historians question Mountbatten's impartiality in determining the crucial issues of the partition and its alliance with the Congress leadership.26 Writing about the Memoirs of Christopher Beaumont who was private secretary to the senior British judge,
Sir Cyril Radcliffe in 1947, when he was chairman of the Indo-Pakistan Boundary Commission, the BBC's Alastair Lawson reports that 'Memoirs of a British civil servant never seen in public until recently, show how much the Partition of Punjab and India was decided by just two men'. 27 Alastair Lawson writes that ‘The family documents show that Beaumont had a stark assessment of the role played by Britain in the last days of the Raj’. The document states that:

The viceroy, Mountbatten, must take the blame - though not the sole blame - for the massacres in the Punjab in which between 500,000 to a million men, women and children perished," he writes. "The handover of power was done too quickly.”

Lawson claims, that “The central theme ever present in Beaumont’s historic paperwork is that Mountbatten not only bent the rules when it came to partition - he also bent the border in India’s favour”. According to Lawson, “The documents repeatedly allege that Mountbatten put pressure on Radcliffe to alter the boundary in India’s favour”.

Beaumont’s Memoirs confirm other historians’ observations, “It need only be mentioned that Mountbatten as India’s Governor General presided over the initial phase in formation a more perfect Union”. 28 Mountbatten established a States Department in July 1947 with the aim “to help India achieve its aim of leaving no state behind”. 29 Vallabhai Patel was made the head of this department which had only one representative of the Muslim League. Siding entirely with Congress, Mountbatten ‘agreed to help Patel and pledged to deliver “a full basket of apples” before 15th August’. 30 Using his ‘royal connections to exert pressure’ on the princes, Mountbatten succeeded in getting the majority of States to accede to India except the five of the most important states-Hyderabad, Kashmir, Bhopal, Travancore and Junagadh. 31 Mountbatten in his personal report wrote on 25th July 1947;
"If we can get Hyderabad and Travencore in, I think that nearly all other states will accede." 32

This is exactly what happened. Ambiguous over their future ‘the princes were forced to vacate their lands’ 33 and by 15th August 1947, with the exception of Hyderabad, Junagarh, Bhopal and Jammu and Kashmir, all the other princely states had acceded to India. In consolidating a perfect Indian union, British role ... was not insignificant... [rather] it could be argued that the British set the scene’, by their ‘diplomatic silence’ on the choices given to 600 autonomous princes to join any dominion. 34 It was not made explicit, whether, princes were ‘required to yield to the preferences of their erstwhile subjects, or were they free to determine their futures in accordance with traditional royal prerogatives’. 35

In three of the remaining holdouts, Hyderabad, Bhopal and Junagadh, the population was largely Hindu but the princes were Muslims. Though, historically these states were seats of Muslim Civilization, geographically they were apart from the areas which were going to be included in Pakistan except Junagadh which was at a short distance from Karachi. 36 Bhopal and Junagadh were quickly overrun and incorporated into the Indian union without giving any consideration to Pakistani protests. 37 Hyderabad suffered the same fate in September 1948, on the very day of Jinnah’s funeral. Forceful occupation of these three states by the Indian army despite the decision of their princes not to accede to Indian dominion did hurt sentiments of the people of newly created state of Pakistan for their loss but it was overshadowed by the occupation of Jammu and Kashmir state. India’s argument for the occupation of Hyderabad, Bhopal and Junagadh was that following the principle of partition, Hindu majority states had to accede to India. Negating its own argument, the Indian troops who arrived by air in Srinagar on 27th October 1947 deprived the predominantly Muslim population of Jammu and Kashmir from determining their future according to the wishes of the majority population.
Kashmir was not an isolated pocket rather it had geographical and historical links with the Western Punjab. The whole of West Pakistan\(^38\) [was] dependent on the Indus and its tributaries for existence as a civilized and populous state.\(^39\) At the time of partition, the irrigation canals of the Indus system watered approximately 34 million acres of land in West Pakistan. Out of this only five million acres were in Indian Punjab. The catchments of the five main left bank tributaries of Indus all lay in the Indian Hill States or in Kashmir. Kashmir contains most of the catchments of three major rivers, the Jhelum, Chenab and Ravi. With the partition of Punjab, the control of three rivers, the Ravi, Beas and Sutluj went to Indian domain causing a loss of six million acres of land in West Punjab. The inclusion of Kashmir in India meant the control over the Jhelum and Chenab rivers would pass to India depriving the whole West Pakistan its main source of life.\(^40\) Moreover, Kashmir had great strategic importance, owing to its position in high Central Asia close to Russia, China, Afghanistan and Tibet. The only road link between India and the state was via Pathankot, a non-Muslim tehsil of district Gurdaspur, which was a Muslim majority district and contiguous with western Punjab. The Boundary Commissions’ decision to award three of the four Tehsils of Gurdaspur including Pathankot to eastern Punjab, which was to be a part of India, set the scene for blocking Pakistan’s claim to Kashmir was not actually an independent decision of the Boundary Commissions. Rather this decision was taken even before the establishment of the Boundary Commissions. To award Gurdaspur to East Punjab was decided in the meeting held on 11\(^{th}\) May 1947, at Simla with the aim to provide a road link between India and Kashmir.\(^41\) Radcliffe was forced by Mountbatten to follow this decision. Confirming this fact, Beaumont the private secretary of Radcliffe ‘complains that he was “deftly excluded” from a lunch between the pair [Mountbatten and Radcliffe] in which a substantial tract of Muslim-majority territory - which should have gone to Pakistan - was instead ceded to India. Lawson reports that Beaumont’s papers say that the incident brought “grave discredit on both men”.\(^42\)
Access to Gurdaspur enabled New Delhi to dispatch troops to the predominantly Muslim state after having secured, and not without some help from Mountbatten, the Mahraja’s controversial letter of accession. Linking the Radcliffe Award with the occupation of Jammu and Kashmir by Indian troops, Ziring writes:

The Radcliffe Award had given the Punjabi Muslim district of Gurdaspur to India with the full knowledge that New Delhi would thereby have road access to the mountain state. Thus, by air and then by land, Indian troops occupied Jammu and Kashmir, soon after the transfer of power, even while the Mahraja’s accession to India revealed serious legal flaws that New Delhi refused to clarify.

Sir Cyril Radcliffe, the chairman of the Commission who never visited India and had no understanding of Indian demography or cultures was a choice of Mountbatten. Sir Cyril Radcliffe was given three weeks to complete his task. Beaumont writes that ‘it was “irresponsible” of Lord Mountbatten to insist that Beaumont complete the boundary within a six-week deadline - despite his protests.’ Without any basic knowledge of Indian demography or cultures, Sir Cyril Radcliffe was bound to consult the Viceroy. Radcliffe hardly attended any meeting of the boundary commission and preferred to be more in contact with Mountbatten than members of his committees, ‘as his office was just down the hall from that of the Viceroy’. Radcliffe’s reviews of the deliberations of the committees and examination of the maps and other records were conducted in the presence of Mountbatten. ‘Thus, when the committees failed to agree on the drawing of boundaries between the two dominions, Radcliffe preempted their work and made all the decisions for them.’ The Award was handed over to Mountbatten on August 13th 1947, but he did not make it public till 17th August. Award did not satisfy any party, but Radcliffe’s decision to award Gurdaspur to India led to suggest that ‘some strategic concerns’ were at work and convinced Radcliffe. ‘The Gurdaspur maneuver merely prepared
the ground for a display of arms in which India and Pakistan were
provoked to make war on one another the very day they became
free of imperial rule". At a Hindu Maharaja’s choice, but with a
British Governor-General’s backing three million Muslims in the
region always considered to be vital to Pakistan, if she were
created, were legally to be made Indian citizens.

Ian Stephen, the editor of the Statesman, who was invited for a
dinner by Lord and Lady Mountbatten on October 26, 1947
noted:

I was startled by their one-sided verdicts on affairs. They
seemed to have become wholly pro-Hindu. The atmosphere at
Government House that night was almost one of war. Pakistan,
the Muslim League, and Mr. Jinnah were the enemy. This tribal
movement into Kashmir was criminal folly. And it must have
been well organized. Mr. Jinnah, Lord Mountbatten assured me,
was sitting at Abbottabad, ready to drive in triumph to Srinager if
it succeeded.

Stephens writes that ‘subsequent inquiries showed that
Mountbatten was wrong and Jinnah was in Lahore where General
Auchinleck met him along with General Gracy on 28th October
and got Jinnah’s orders to send Pakistani troops in Kashmir
cancelled. General Auchinleck reported to the Chiefs of Staff that
‘This consultation resulted in “cancellation of Mr. Jinnah’s orders
and an arrangement with Mountbatten for a conference of the
political heads of both Governments at Lahore on October 29th”’.
Jinnah had no choice but to cancel his orders on the assurance
given by General “Auk” that Mountbatten would bring Nehru and
representatives of Kashmir government to Lahore on October 29th
to resolve the issue of Kashmir. Nehru ‘refused to “discuss
anything” with Jinnah. Stephen writes that due to various
reasons, no political leader attended the meeting and ‘when after
a three days postponement, Lord Mountbatten alone attended it
and he could do no more than undertake to refer to his absent
colleagues the proposals Mr. Jinnah put forward’ which included a
cease-fire within 48 hours, withdrawal of Indian troops and the tribesmen and empowering the two Governor Generals to administer the State and arrange a plebiscite.\textsuperscript{55} The Indian Government's rejection\textsuperscript{56} of these proposals, in spite of Mountbatten's official and publically declared statements that acceptance of Maharaja's accession to India would be followed by a referendum, forced Jinnah to proclaim that;

Some people might think that the acceptance of the June 3 Plan was a mistake on the part of the Muslim League. I would like to tell them that the consequences of any other alternative would have been disastrous. On our side, we proceeded to implement this Plan with a clear conscience and honest intentions. Time and history will prove that. On the other hand, history will also record its verdict on those whose tracery and machinations let loose forces of disorder and disruption in this sub-continent...We have been the victims of deeply-laid and well-planned conspiracy executed with utter disregard of the elementary principles of honesty, chivalry, and honour.\textsuperscript{57}

Notes and References

3 Minutes of the Chiefs of Staff meeting, London, 21 October 1947, L/WS/1/1133, IOR.
5 Stanley Wolpert, Shameful Flight; The Last Years of the British Empire in India (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 186.


11 Compiled and edited, Lionel Carter, Punjab Politics, 3 March-31 May 1947, At the Abyss Governor's Fortnightly Reports and other Key Documents (New Delhi: Manohar, 2007), Minutes of the Second Meeting held at Vice-regal Lodge, Simla on 11 May, 1947, in which Nehru, Jenkins and Menon participated, Appendix 37, pp. 304-310.

12 Minutes of the First Meeting (Viceroy's 12th miscellaneous meeting) held at Vice-regal Lodge, Simla on 11 May, 1947, Appendix 36 in Ibid, pp. 301-304.

13 Alex Von Tunzelmann, Indian Summer, The Secret History of the End of an Empire, p. 191.


15 Minutes of the Second Meeting held at Vice-regal Lodge, Simla on 11 May, 1947, in which Nehru, Jenkins and Menon participated, Appendix 37, pp. 304-310, op.cit.


17 Ibid.

19 Stanley Wolpert, *Shameful Flight: The Last Years of the British Empire in India* op. cit., p. 179.


26 For criticism of Mountbatten’s role see Andrew Roberts, *Eminent Churchillians* (London: Oxford University Press, 1994). A. Roberts has reopened the controversy concerning Mountbatten’s role in the award of the Muslim majority tehsils of Ferozepur and Zira to India with the consequent control of the Sutlej river canal headworks, pp. 93ff.

27 Alastair Lawson, ‘1947: The Partition of Punjab was a Disaster’, BBC 22 April 2011.

28 Alex Von Tunzelmann, *Indian Summer*, op.cit., p. 91.

29 Ibid., p. 218.

30 Ibid.

31 For a detailed account of Mountbatten ‘heavy-handed strategy’ of coercing the princes of States to accede to India, see Alex Von Tunzelmann, *Indian Summer*, op.cit.

In Junagadh the situation was opposite to Kashmir; it was a Hindu majority state with a Muslim ruler. He decided to accede to Pakistan, but the Indian Army overtook the state and arranged a plebiscite, which recorded a 90 percent vote in favor of accession to India. This process was not repeated in Kashmir where India never allowed arranging the plebiscite to decide the fate of the state.

Present day Pakistan.

Note on the result of control by the Indian Dominion on the waters of the Indus tributaries in Kashmir, L/WS/1/1204, IOR.

Minutes of the Second Meeting held at Vice-regal Lodge, Simla on 11 May, 1947, in which Nehru, Jenkins and Menon participated, Appendix 37, pp. 304-310, op. cit.

Lawson, ‘1947: The Partition of Punjab was a Disaster’.

L. Ziring writes, ‘Indian forces had entered Kashmir prior to receipt of the Instrument of Accession, and it is doubtful that there ever was such a document’ Pakistan in the Twentieth Century: A Political History, op. cit., p. 95.

Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan in the Twentieth Century: A Political History, op. cit., p. 92.

Lawson, BBC.

Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan in the Twentieth Century: A Political History, op. cit. p. 59.
48 Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan in the Twentieth Century: A Political History, op. cit., p. 63.
50 This tribal movement, according to Stephens’s account opened suddenly on October 19th, when 900 Mahsuds set off in motor trucks from Waziristan. {As early as 1937-8. Those of Waziristan alone for months had pinned down no fewer than 50,000 troops of the Imperial forces in sanguinary war-fare.} Others from nearby soon followed: Wazirs, Daurs, Bhittanis, Khattaks, Turis and some Afridis from farther north. And before the leading British personages on the Frontier—governor, chief secretary, and divisional commanders—knew what was happening, the spearhead of the forces, about 2000 strong, had slipped across the strategic bridges on the Indus at Khushalgarh and Attock, and was away towards the Kashmir border at Domel. See Ian Stephens, Pakistan, op. cit., for a detailed account pp. 192-211.
51 Ian Stephens, Pakistan op. cit., p. 203.
52 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
55 Ian Stephens, Pakistan op. cit., p. 206.
Nations Security Council for violating her sovereignty and continued Pakistani military occupation of Azad Kashmir kept Nehru to conclude that the circumstances were not right for a plebiscite to be held, despite the passage of a United Nations resolution calling for a plebiscite to be conducted by its nominee administrator.