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This paper intends to compare autonomy of the Parliament and the power of the Military, which are two major institutions of Pakistan, during 1971 to 1977. The relations of the Military, as strongest institution of the country, with the Parliament has been studied to evaluate whether it hindered the process that might make Parliament a stronger institution or not. The Army and Parliament in no way are directly linked to each other. On the contrary, these two institutions are linked with each other through a mediocre executive. Therefore, the paper focuses over the relationship of both the Army and Executive and the Parliament and Executive.

The struggle between the army and other institutions of the State in order to gain the obvious control over the decision-making of the State has been a constant feature of the history of Pakistan. The discussion that follows will cover this continuous struggle in the period of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. During this period, the first Parliament of Pakistan was new inclusion in the political system. The relationship of Parliament with the institution of Military and with the Executive that was interlinked with both...
institutions, therefore, is to be studied in the following paragraphs.

The military's constitutional mandate in Pakistan, laid down in the constitutions of 1956 and 1962 as well as 1973, is limited to securing the frontiers against external threat and assisting in national emergencies or natural disasters on the request of civilian authorities; yet since independence of the country, the Pakistan military is the most politically influential institution in the country. Quaid-i-Azam, soon after independence, chided a young army officer who complained against important posts being entrusted to the British officers. The Quaid cautioned the officer not to forget that the armed forces were the servants of the people. 'You do not make national policy; it is we the civilians who decide these issues and it is your duty to carry out these tasks with which you are entrusted.' Despite such advice of the founder of the nation, military intervention in politics is the most conspicuous feature of Pakistan's political landscape. Pakistan's polity has been under the influence of the military through most of its history, even when not in power, it has been 'behind the steering wheel.' That is why some view it as the largest political party.

The military considers itself as an alternative institution competent of contributing to socio-economic and political development. It is claimed that the military is sucked into governance and politics because it is the most modern and capable institution. The military's organizational discipline versus the inefficacy of political institutions is one of the major justifications for the army's political intervention. Authors such as Ayesha Jalal, Saeed Shafqat, Hussain Haqqani and Hassan Abbas find the army to be extremely manipulative. The general essence of their argument is that the military deliberately acquired its multiple roles and weakened the State and its political system for its own interests.
Even defeat in the 1971 war with India did not result in the army's withdrawal from politics and civilian affairs. After that, the military rulers, having failed to manage the State, temporarily assumed a low-key profile by allowing Bhutto to run the country. Bhutto broke the authority of the Pakistani Army in internal Pakistani affairs by planting the seeds of constitutionalism, PPP, and national elections. He, soon after taking control of the country after 1971, compulsorily retired 43 senior officers of the armed forces including 2 Generals, 11 Lieutenant Generals, 10 Major Generals, one Vice-Admiral, 4 Rear-Admirals, one Air Marshal and 2 Air Vice Marshal. He ostensibly took this drastic step to purge the defence forces of what he called Bonapartism. Bhutto also began a campaign to publicize the military's surrender ceremony in Dacca. The Army opposed this campaign vigorously and the news reel film of the surrender was not shown again on Pakistan Television.

Addressing to the nation Bhutto said, "Come what may, these Bonaparte influences must be rooted out in the interest of the Country, in the interest of Pakistan of tomorrow, in the interest of the Armed Forces and the people of Pakistan." Bhutto even expressed his dissatisfaction with the traditional concept of the defence services and toyed with the idea of people's army. He said: "We must take a leaf or two out of North Vietnam's military text-books. A people's army rather than conventional Army is the philosophy that will guide us in our new defence policy." As to the military takeover, Article 6 (1) termed abrogation of the Constitution as an act of 'high treason' and said, "Any person who abrogates or attempts or conspires to abrogate, subverts or attempts or conspires to subvert the Constitution by use of force or show of force or by other unconstitutional means shall be guilty of high treason."

Bhutto wanted to bring into his hands all the levers of power and this was the only time in the turbulent history of military-civil relations that a civilian leader was able to prevail over the leaders of the armed forces. Bhutto's control over army was revealed
with the resignation of General Gul Hasan, the Army Chief. The love between Z.A Bhutto and General Gul Hasan, who replaced General Yahya Khan as chief of Pakistan army, did not last long because of the differences between them on several issues. For instance, Bhutto proposed that all Army Officers should be ‘screened by the police or Intelligence’. Gul Hasan rejected this proposal, as he was satisfied with the normal vetting process. Bhutto wanted to send army to Karachi to enforce discipline amongst the restive work force. Gul Hasan disagreed and asked him to use the Police. Bhutto wanted to attend a promotion and selection board due to sit on February 5, 1972, to replace officer casualties and to retire senior officers. General Gul Hasan was not agreed. Then towards the end of the month (February of 72), Bhutto asked Gul Hasan to crush the police strike in Peshawar. The same time Bhutto asked his National Security Adviser, Major General (R) Akber Khan for the same action, who in return ordered the School of Artillery in Nowshera to dispatch two 25-Pounder Guns with crews and Ammunition to Peshawar. He also ordered some Recruits from the Punjab Regimental Center, undergoing training in Mardan, be dispatched to Peshawar. But General Gul Hasan stopped both the attempts.

Soon the moment arrived when Bhutto decided to get rid of Gul Hasan when he refused to provide a briefing on contingency planning for all Ministers. Few days later, on March 3, 1972, Lt. General Gul Hasan Khan and Air Marshal Rahim Khan were asked to resign from service in very dramatic way. According to Ghulam Mutafa Khar, Gen. Gul Hasan and Gen Rahsem both were ready to coup but conspiracy was disclosed and Bhutto managed these men to be arrested in the President House.

After the resignation of Gen. Hasan, Gen. Tikka Khan was appointed as the Chief of Army Staff (COAS). The ‘Chief of Staff’ (CoS) replaced the title ‘Commander-in-Chief’ for all the three Branches of the Armed Forces of Pakistan. As a result of this change, General Tikka Khan became the first Chief of Army Staff and Air Marshal Zafar Chaudhury was appointed as the first Chief
of Air Staff, who replaced Air Marshal Rahim Khan. General Tikka Khan, COAS (1972-76) stressed professionalism and loyalty to the constitution and the civilian authority established there under.

General Tikka Khan's loyalty with civilian government was coincided with the hold of Bhutto over other trouble makers in the armed forces. On March 30, 1973, Government announced that fifty-nine Military Officers had been arrested on the charges of plotting to overthrow the government. According to the authorities, arrested officers were planning to overthrow the Government during a Military March-Past Ceremony by arresting the President, Governor of Punjab, Ministers and Chief of the Army Staff. Few weeks later, on May 2, 1973 twelve officers from Air Force were arrested on the same charge. The Court Martial Trial of the accused Military officers began on July 9, 1973. It was presided over by Major General (Later General and the President of Pakistan) Zia-ul-Haq.

Again there was some resentment over the government politics in a small group of the Army and the Air Force officers. This came to light when 14 officers of the Air force including two Group Captains, and 21 officers of the Army including 2 Brigadiers (one retired) were arrested on charges of conspiring to seize power by arresting the top government executives and the top brass of the Army. The Plan was discovered before it was launched. The Chief of Air Staff, Air Marshal Zafar Chaudhary, ordered the premature retirement of all the fourteen Air force officers. Their cases were reviewed by the government. The premature retirement of 7 officers by the Air Headquarters was cancelled and they were reinstated. The premature retirement of the other seven officers was confirmed by the embargo on their re-employment was lifted. The revision of the Air Headquarters decision was resented by the Chief of Air Staff. The civilian leadership asked him to resign which he did.
The creation of the Federal Security Force\(^{30}\) (FSF) was also a controversial issue between the army and the government. Army considered it a parallel institution that might decrease the need and importance of the Army. It would also decrease the hegemony of the Army. The formation of the FSF was also an act that was committed without the consent of the Parliament. The Act of the formation of FSF was not brought to the corridors of the Parliament and it was made through a presidential order.

The FSF operated like Bhutto’s private Savak that signalled to other political leaders the significance of military force in the political discourse. However, the FSF also deepened the fears of the generals regarding Bhutto’s intention to minimize the importance of the military. The establishment of an auxiliary force would ultimately reduce his reliance on the army.\(^{31}\) FSF was generally used to disrupt opposition meetings and harass government opponents. This expanded political role of the security agencies led to the questioning of Bhutto’s credentials as a democrat. It also weakened the political foundations of his elected government, making Bhutto more vulnerable to political blunders.\(^{32}\)

It was this situation over which the British envoy commented that “the army is the only foreseeable alternative government, but they have shown no desire to repeat the experience of 1958-71.”\(^{33}\) General Zia-ul-Haq who succeeded Tikka Khan in 1976, advised the troops to adhere to their professional role and paid tribute to the civilian government for maintaining deep interest in the modernization of the army.\(^{34}\) The co-operation of armed forces or the upper hand of Bhutto regime over the institution of armed forces was marred with the new elections when a movement started to protest against the rigging in elections gave the chance to Army General who enforced martial law and thus a short period of civilian hegemony over the military institution ended.

Bhutto was temporarily successful in asserting the primacy of civilian government.\(^{35}\) He successfully curbed the role of the
armed forces in the political permutations of the country and
subordinated it to the civilian leadership. He also demolished the
supremacy of the bureaucracy in political affairs through effective
reforms in the civil services. He succeeded in evolving political
and economic institutions, yet he miserably failed to embrace
democratic norms, thus shaking the foundations of the
parliamentary democracy in Pakistan. 36

While asserting civilian supremacy over the military, the
Bhutto government adopted policies to extend the popular
support it enjoyed at the time of assumption of power and
endeavored to lay down infra-structure for political institutions.
These policy measures included the introduction of socio-
economic reforms, formulation of the constitution, and the use of
the ruling PPP as the major instrument of political mobilization. 37
Bhutto’s reforms of the military and bureaucracy were also meant
to accumulate power within the office of PM subsiding military-
bureaucratic elite along with the Parliament and Cabinet. 38

It is worth mentioning that due to the Indian designs, it was
impossible to decrease the power of army to the maximum
extent. 39 The Indian designs clearly reflected through the public
statements of Indian leaders and the actions of the Indian
Government in which they threatened Pakistan’s existence as a
sovereign State. The Indian National Congress, the founder party
of India since 1947, declared while accepting the partition plan of
3 June, 1947: "The Committee earnestly trusts that when present
passions have subsided, Indias problems will be reviewed in their
proper perspective and the false doctrine of two nation theory in
India will be discredited and discarded by all." Gandhi, the
political saint of India, declared: "The Muslim League will ask to
come back to Hindustan. They will ask Jawaharlal Nehru (to be
allowed) to come back and he will take them back". Nehru, Prime
Minister of India for the first seventeen years, said: "Indias heart
has been broken, but its essential unity has not been destroyed"
and he asked his people how they would repair that broken
heart. 40
Therefore, Mustafa Khar maintains that Bhutto could not harness the army as much as was necessary. He decreased the power of army in the beginning but could not continue later. Therefore, Mustafa Khar maintains that Bhutto could not harness the army as much as was necessary. He decreased the power of army in the beginning but could not continue later. From the standpoint of Bhutto’s relationship with the military, he made the blunder of miscalculating the resilience of the armed forces in thwarting the strategic changes he had brought about in their management. Initially, he seemed to have taken a major step forward in changing the command and control structure of the organization, which granted the prime minister the position of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces.

Bhutto attempted to control Military by stopping the growth of the military’s commercial ventures, which curtailed its financial autonomy. However, these measures were reduced to nothing by the lack of change in the overall tenor of policy making. He erred by viewing the military as a junior power that could be controlled and utilized for promoting his interests, and so he allowed the army to regroup. The military capitalized on Bhutto’s dependence on military force for building his personal political power. It emerged from the ashes of 1971 sufficiently strengthened to prepare for another takeover in 1977. He enjoyed popular support in the early stages of his rule while the military’s reputation had declined dramatically owing to the East Pakistan debacle. However, Bhutto’s assertion of civilian supremacy did not prove durable for three major reasons: First, his efforts to personalize power rather than work towards establishing viable participatory institutions which eroded his popular support. Second, in their determination to dislodge Bhutto, some of the opposition leaders made it clear in the later stages of anti-Bhutto agitation (1977) that they would not challenge the military in the event of his overthrow. Third, by 1977, the military had recovered from the hock of 1971. When the senior commanders found out that the Bhutto regime was discredited and could not survive without their support, they retrieved the political initiative.
What did assembly do to tackle army?

Having eliminated the generals whom Bhutto perceived as potential or real rivals, the Parliament opted to establish civilian control through constitutional means. The Parliament's strategy was to confine the role of the military to defence and security matters. The Constitution clearly defined the functions of the military and imposed high treason as any attempt to abrogate or conspire to abrogate and subvert the Constitution by the use of force or show of force or by other constitutional means. The Parliament was authorized to make laws for those found guilty of high treason. In September 1973, the Parliament passed a law providing death sentence or life imprisonment for the subversion of the Constitution. The Constitution also laid down the oath for the personnel of the armed forces which specifically forbade them to take part in political activities of any kind.

The defence of the country as well as the institution responsible for the defence was seldom discussed in the house. On 17th January, 1974, Senator Khawaja Safdar sought leave of the House to discuss the failure of the Federal Government to provide the Pakistan Defence Forces with modern weapons, so as to enable the Defence Forces to effectively protect the borders of Pakistan against future Indian aggression, especially when the Indian Armed Forces have been equipped with the latest and most sophisticated arms including SAM-6. The Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and Defence, opposing the motion, assured the mover and the House that there had been no inaction, neglect or dereliction of duty by the Government in looking after the defence of the country. However, the Minister stated that he could not disclose those measures. When the mover asked permission to speak on the admissibility, the Deputy Chairman ruled that so many things could not be divulged in the House in the public interest. Therefore, he did not permit the adjournment motion to be made. The mover, however, insisted to speak on the issue. Finding no way to satisfy the mover, the motion was put to the House who voted not to discuss the motion.
On 3rd December, 1974, Sirdar Sher Baz Khan Mazari wanted copies of White Paper on Balochistan to be supplied to the members of the National Assembly. Malik Mohammad Akhtar, without making a promise that he would supply the document to the members, said that the White Paper was not an Assembly record and could not be so treated. 48

On 16th January, 1974, Maulana Noorani sought to move an adjournment motion relating to the statement of General Tikka Khan, COAS, on the installation of latest weapons near the border of the country. The Minister of State for Defence objected to the adjournment motion, stating that the statement of General Tikka Khan appeared to have been mis-reported in the newspapers in as much as he had disclosed about the induction of modern weapons into the armed forces of the neighbouring country and not about the installation of the same on the borders of Pakistan. He assured the House that Government was taking necessary measures to meet the situation, but could not disclose the same in the public interest. The objection was upheld by the Speaker who ruled the motion out of order as a discussion thereon would be detrimental to the public interest. 49

On 15th June, 1974, during discussion on the General Budget Abdul Khaliq Khan, made certain remarks like “mercenary army” with reference to Pakistan army, and also made allegations of atrocities committed by the army on East Pakistan. Objection was taken under role 226 (j) of the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in the National Assembly, 1973 that the words were treasonable, seditious and defamatory. Thereupon, the Speaker observed that the words “mercenary army” shall not be published in the press, but they should remain on record. When a member requested that it should be published in the press to expose such persons, the Speaker thereupon observed that there was not restriction that the matter about army should not come in the press. Only one word, i.e., the word “mercenary army” shall not come into the press but shall form part of the record. It shall not be expunged. Thereafter, the Deputy Leader of the House
requested that allegations of atrocities on East Pakistanis, which were made by Abdul Khaliq Khan in his speech, should also not be published in the press as the War commission was inquiring into it and it had international complications.\textsuperscript{50}

Conclusion

The relationship of army and the government during the Bhutto regime were often governed by the personality of Bhutto. To curtail the hegemony of the power seeker generals, Bhutto made effort to weaken the authority of army over civil government from inside of the army. Bhutto strived to curtail the powers of Army and this effort was, to much extent, successful. Army itself had decided to remain behind the scene in order to get confidence of the people that had shattered due to surrender at Dhaka in 1971. Bhutto, however, did not weaken the institutional supremacy of the army in contrast to other institutions of the State including the Parliament. The defence remained a subject altogether out of the access of the Parliament. Even the political decisions to obstruct the authority of generals were made without any reference to or from the Parliament. Parliament also could not assert its powers in contrast of army.

Notes and References

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6 Ayesha Siddiqa, 59.
7 Ibid, 64.
10 Ayesha Siddiqa, 65.
12 Iftikhar H. Malik; 73.
14 Ghulam Mustafa Khar, Interview by the researcher, 13 June 2012, Khar House 478 Meer Street Lahore; Siddiq Salik, State and Politics A Case Study of Pakistan, (Lahore: Al-Faisal Nashran, 1997) 124.
15 Shuja Nawaz, Crossed Swords Pakistan its Army and the Wars within, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2008), 323.
16 Bhutto’s Address to the Nation on 4th March 1972.
18 Siddiq Salik, 129.

22 Ghulam Mustafa Khar, Interview by the researcher, 13 June 2012, Khar House 478 Meer Street Lahore.

23 Muhammad Ayub, 356.


25 Muhammad Ayub, 358.

26 Ibid, 359.

27 The Pakistan Times, 1 and 3 April 1973.

28 Rizvi, Military & Politics, 221.

29 Ibid, 221.

30 FSF was created in September 1972, it was headed by a retired police officer Haq Nawaz Tiwana, with a budget of Rs 5000,000, Tiwana was replaced by another police officer Masood Mahmud. (Mubasir Hasan, 268)

31 Ayesha Siddiqa, 81.


33 Report of British High Commissioner in Pakistan, (Foreign and Common Wealth Office, 37/ 1787)

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