The peace mission efforts for the last couple of years, and recent Indo Pakistan trade pacts, besides sport activities in India were suddenly undermined recently by the Indian open shelling across the LOC(Jan 2013). How it happened is not difficult to ascertain for students of History. Indian extremism in politics dates back from its independence struggle, particularly against Muslims of the region.

Indian politics during the struggle for independence remained under the shadows of Hindutva, an Indian ideal and ambition for the Hindu dominated state and culture for the Hindus and non-Hindus alike. Since the birth of the Indian National Congress in 1885 till the partition plan of 3rd June 1947, the Hindu extremits activated by their ideal, tried to keep Muslims under pressure. The only Hindu-Muslim agreement called the Lucknow Pact 1916, turned out to be a fatal bone in the Hindus, political throat, neither divulge able nor repulsive. The provincial ministries of the Congress rule in 1937-1939, were the replica of Hindutva rule, humiliating for the Muslims and the All India Muslim League. The call for the Muslim Homeland announced on 23rd March 1940, was piloted through successfully by Quaid-i-Azam M. Ali Jinnah, despite all opposition of the English and Hindus under negative
tactics. India revenged in depriving Pakistan of Kashmir in retaliation. How all this happened is analyzed in the following lines on the basis of contemporary and secondary sources. The whole article is an insight in Indian politics.

Indian politics before 1947 was a continuous struggle for independence, which began with the birth of Indian National Congress in 1885. The educated class in India particularly the Bengalis, with her close contact with the English for about a century, was obsessed with the desire of some share in the government, which the British political system promised under a representative government. An opportunity was provided by another development of telegraphic system in laying a cable between England and India through the Mediterranean, the Suez, the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. It strengthened the control of the Secretary of State for India (the Home Government) over the hitherto master of affairs, the Man on the Spot, the Viceroy and the Governor General of India. The difficulties faced by the Governor General, under the circumstances, obliged him to raise educated public opinion in India in favour of the policies of the Indian Government. This could only be possible if Indian public opinion was organized as a political force. Hence the birth of the Indian National Congress, appearing in response to an open letter of A.O. Hume, a retired Indian Civil Servant, addressed to the educated classes in India.

Another important development, which eventually influenced Indian Politics, in particular, the Indian National Congress, was the religio-political movements, having initially begun towards the end of the 18th century (Brahmo Samaj of Raja Rammohan Roy) but later on with the passage of time, growing in the communalist spirit. They changed their character into ethnic, communal and militant groups. Arya Samaj of Dayanand Saraswati, being another such religio-political organization, which widely affected the Indian political thinking during the contemporary period.
A substantial number of educated classes, mostly from Bengal, who joined the Indian National Congress, were also followers of the religio-political movements and reared unfriendly feelings for all foreigners. They were known as extremists, while those who had a tolerant attitude for others, were called moderates. The twin simultaneous sessions of the Indian National Congress, in 1885, amply speaks of the character of newly born political party. The session at Calcutta included solely Indian Nationalists, whereas the session at Bombay (Mumbai) was attended by many Englishmen and Non-Indian retired civil servants, professionals and academicians.

The subsequent sessions of the Congress remained undivided and perhaps a formula had been agreed upon between the two groups for greater participation of educated Indians in the Government, at the cost of a resolution by the Congress in favour of the Government of India, resolving that the Home Government be dissolved. This Resolution was passed in successive sessions of the Congress for obtaining the favours of the Government of India. But the amendment to the Indian Council Act of 1861, passed in 1892, disappointed Congress, particularly those who already distrusted the English. The partition of Bengal in 1905 added fuel to the fire and the extremist Congress started pronouncing Swaraj (self rule), which began from Bengal and gradually spread throughout Northern India.

And yet, there was another group in the Congress, called Moderates (later on, renamed as Liberals) who sincerely believed that the success in the Independence struggle depended totally upon the cooperation and through winning confidence of the ruling class i.e. the Government of India. They continued to cooperate with the Government by accepting offices as members of the Indian Council, Viceroy's Executive Council and Governor's Councils from 1919 onward. Meanwhile the two different channels of the Indian politics, following different approaches, carried their struggle. The Liberals agreed to the progressive development of self-government under the Constitutional evolution and the Extremists...
followed the agitation politics in the name of Non-cooperation and Civil Disobedience Movements (Satyagraha) which continued intermittently on occasional Constitutional and political deadlocks. It was at this juncture that the Liberal Congressite played their role. They were members of the Indian National Congress and despite differences with the extremist group, they enjoyed the confidence of the Congress High Command. They were also close to the officials as Members of Viceroy’s Executive Council or the Governor’s Councils. They had, as such, an opportunity to mediate between the Congress and the Government of India to bring them to conference table. Such mediations under Constitutional deadlock e.g. the Gandhi Irwin Pact (1931) before the Second Round Table Conference, succeeding in breaking the ice, and putting an end to the Congress’s boycott. These Liberals contributed positively in the Independence struggle till 1947, on almost every issue of the Constitution of the future Indian Federation.

The outbreak of the Second World War (September, 1939), signalled a new crisis in Indian Politics. The Government of India, too, declared war against Germany, which was taken as an unfriendly act by the Congress. They were holding Provincial Ministries in majority provinces, and considered that the Government of India should have consulted the Congress before declaring war. As such, they resigned in protest from the Provincial ministries, adopting a hard line through agitational movement. All attempts to win back Congress to support War efforts proved in vain. The Lahore Resolution (March 23, 1940) and the August Declaration, by the British Prime Minister, favouring some concessions to the Muslim minority in India, added fuel to the fire. The earlier English set-back on the war-front encouraged the Congress, an extended hostility against the Government after the failure of the Quit India Movement (1942), the Indian National Army raised under Sobhas Chandra Bose, joined hands with the Axis, against the Allied. The Allied success became visible by 1944, which turned soft the tempo of the
Congress for Wavell proposals, Simla talks and the Cabinet Mission Plan, though earlier the Cripps Mission promising Dominion Status was out rightly rejected by the Congress in 1942. It may not be an exaggeration to suggest that the Indian struggle for independence was won not by agitational politics of the Indian National Congress and other extremist groups like Mahasabha and Jan Sang. On the contrary, it was won by the diplomacy of the Liberals (Congessite in the lap of the Government), which played the pivotal role. Unfortunately, not enough work has been done on Indian politics focusing beyond prominent leaders, precisely, Mahatma Gandhi, Jawahar Lal Nehru, and Vallabhbhai Patel. It is also so because, quite a few members of the Viceroy’s council were replaced after 2 to 4 years, and mostly all of them were out of office with the formation of Interim Government in 1946 under the Premiership of Jawahar Lal Nehru. But, some of them continued to ply themselves to the cause, their last achievement being machination of Kashmir’s accession to India. Some of its details shall come at a proper place, in the following lines.

The Indian Politics and the Muslims, Pakistan Plan

The Muslims of India at the birth of the Indian National Congress were not a homogenous society. The Jihad Movement of the early 19th Century, first against the Sikhs in the N.W.F.P and then against the English in Bengal and Sithana (N.W.F.P), and eventually the general rising of 1857 (called Mutiny by British historians, and War of Independence by Indians) proved fatal to the Muslims politically, economically and culturally. They became victims of the ruler’s hostility, well examined by a contemporary critic, beside others.

Sir Syed Ahmed Khan’s efforts for Muslims educational uplift, through a number of organization, magazines, and literature beside the Aligarh College, received some attention of the rulers. But the Muslims remained far behind the non-Muslim
community, for, a great majority of the Muslims, stuck to religious education, managed by Deoband, Delhi, Lucknow and Azamgarh besides many other Madrasas elsewhere.¹⁸

The Indian National Congress claimed to be the sole representative body of the people of India, irrespective of any religion or community. It asked Sir Syed Ahmad Khan to join the Congress and help membership of other Muslims under the influence of Aligarh College. But Sir Syed Ahmad Khan was against Muslim participation in politics, for it would drag them away from education, so important from his point of view.¹⁹ And yet Sir Syed Ahmed Khan had the genuine perception of a political system, which needed for its success homogenous religious, economic and ethical values. Whereas under a pluralistic culture that India possessed, with dominant Hindu religion, “it would only injure the well being and tranquility of the land.”²⁰

Notwithstanding, Sir Syed Ahmed Khan’s efforts, Muslims of India were dragged into politics. The non-Muslim religio-political and militant movements, which emerged during the last decade of the 19th century, put the Muslims on the defensive, even during the lifetime of Sir Syed.²¹ But, the Partition of Bengal (1905) and Morley’s Declaration for Legislative Reforms, infused fresh blood in Muslim politics, and Simla Deputation (1906) with promise of Separate Electorate, helped them to assemble in Dacca on 31st December 1906 for the birth of the All India Muslim League.²² The Legislative Council Act of 1909 confirmed their political status recognizing their separate representation, irrespective of non-Muslim growing extremism against special favours to the Muslims.²³ The annulment of the Partition of Bengal (1911) cooled down, to some extent, Hindu anger, and with the changed manifesto of the All India Muslim League (1913) and Muhammad Ali Jinnah’s joining it (1913), facilitated the Liberal Congressites like Dada Bhai Naoroji and Gopal Krishn Gokhle, to advance Lord Wedderburn’s desire of joint Hindu-Muslim struggle for the common goal of self government in India.²⁴ The Declaration of Rights drafted by the Group of Nineteen²⁵, eventually, became the
basis of the Lucknow Pact (1916) between the Indian National Congress and the All India Muslim League, which cost Muslims some seats in their majority provinces of the Punjab and Bengal under the weightage, but obtained in return the recognition of the Indian National Congress for the Muslims separate representation; the only important event which remained the undercurrent of the Hindu-Muslim question until its final Award in 1932.26 And yet almost half a decade after the Lucknow Pact, the Hindu-Muslim unity and cooperation remained exemplary, till the unfortunate outbreak of the Mopla rising.27

The Aligarh Movement, which grafted the birth of the All India Muslim League, was one of the two parallel movements running by the Muslims of India. The other being the religio-political, which sprang in early 1920s by the name of Tabligh and Tanzeem Movements in defence against the religio-militant Movements of Shudhi and Sangton, sponsored by Dayanand, Lala Lajpat Rai and Bhai Parmanand, supporting B.G. Tilak exploiting extremist political perception to grow in Indian Nationalism.28 Sheikh-ul-Hind Muhamood Hassan of Deoband, too, came out from his educational institution, supporting Turkey, incidentally the only free and independent Muslim Country left of Western colonization, and yet threatened to Balkanization with the beginning of the second decade, in the 20th century. The Muslim world, emotionally attached to the Ottoman Caliphate, was alarmed over the war-clouds in Europe, and Turkey being on the enemy side of the British. Sh. Mahmood Hassan involved himself alongwith Ubeid-ullah Sindhi in the ‘Silken Letter’ Conspiracy, which when revealed, proved fatal for the participants, particularly after the Hijrat Movement.29

The Allied victory in the World War-I proved ruinous for both Germany and Turkey. Muslim unrest in India over the future of Caliphate, was capitalized by Mahatma Gandhi to launch his non-Cooperation and Civil Disobedience Movements against the English, which with the abolishing of the caliphate by Mustafa Kamal Pasha in Turkey, and the back-call of the non-cooperation
movement by Gandhi, following the Chaura Chori incident, left the Muslim Khilafate confused and bewildered.\textsuperscript{30}

The back track of the Indian National Congress from the Lucknow Pact in her annual session of 1926 obliged Muslim leadership (30 including Maulana Muhammad Ali and Jinnah) to deliberate in Western Hotel Delhi, on the five alternatives received from the Indian National Congress. The Delhi proposals were taken by Muslims as a substitute of the Lucknow Pact, abolishing weightage.\textsuperscript{31} The safe guard which Muslims adopted in case of joint electorates, were (i) one third reservation of Muslim seats in the Imperial and Provincial legislatures, (ii) Constitutional reforms in N.W.F.P, (iii) separation of Sind from Bombay, (iv) one third Muslim seats in services and (v) finally, that no legislation in the Imperial or Provincial legislatures would be allowed regarding any community unless 2/3rd represented majority of the concerned, agreed to the amendment.\textsuperscript{32} The Indian National Congress hijacked by the extremist group, and the Hindu Mahasabha, rejected even the Delhi Proposals and the All Parties Conference convened to prepare future Constitution of India under a Committee, headed by Motilal Nehru, failed to satisfy Muslim demands, put forth by Jinnah at the Calcutta Convention resulting in the parting of the Ways.\textsuperscript{33} The Simon Commission Report (1930) also rejected the Nehru Report, conceding separate Muslim representation, as already agreed in 1916. Other issues, both political and constitutional demands, were left to a mutual consultation for which a Round Table Conference, representing, all big or small political groups, princely states etc. or individuals of noticeable identity were convened.\textsuperscript{34} Indian National Congress, boycotted the first Conference, since (i) Nehru Report being rejected and (ii) the Simon Report did not incorporate any of the demands of the Indian National Congress, particular on the representative government in the provinces and the Federal structure.\textsuperscript{35} The Agreement (1931) between Lord Irwin and Mahatma Gandhi, squared up the differences between the Government and the
Congress, and the Mahatma joined the second R.T.C. as the sole representative of I.N.C., claiming that no one except himself had the authority to speak for the whole India as they only represented sections of the Indian Society. The Indian National Congress was the only political party with national outlook and bearing. As such, Gandhi being its sole representative had the right to speak on behalf of the Indian Nation.\(^{36a}\) Gandhi being present in all the four committees, his arrogance became a major impediment in successful working of any committee. The R.T.C. failed despite a fervent appeal by Ramsay Macdonald to all leaders to reach a communal settlement before the British Government made her own announcement.\(^{35}\)

The agitational politics of the I.N.C. continued unabated. Meanwhile, the Government of India Act was passed on 24th July 1935, and became operative on 1st April 1937 except its second part, the Federal Structure, which could not function until a specific number of princely states had joined the Federation.\(^{37}\) The elections for the Provincial Assemblies were held in 1937 and its results; victory of the I.N.C. and Muslim League losing all seats except a few, made the Congress power-conscious and uncompromising. Her arrogance manifested when she refused to form ministries in the provinces, unless the extra-ordinary powers vested in the governors by the Government of India Act 1935, had been withdrawn. The deadlock continued until Linlithgow, the new Viceroy assured them that the governors would not interfere in the routine administration of the Provincial Governments.\(^{36}\) The working of the Congress ministries in the provinces was the practical demonstration of its political perception, particularly towards the Muslims. In the United Province, where the Muslims had substantial representation both from the Muslim League as well as Independents, it was expected that the Congress would form a coalition government. But the Congress's pre-condition for the Muslim League's Parliamentary Party were such that no one with the slightest touch of self-respect could ever accept the humiliation, which was reflected in the demands.\(^{39}\) The
subsequent three reports prepared under orders of the Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah on different Congress provinces viz. The Pirpur, Sherif, and Fazl-ul-Haq's Reports were indeed revealing more than what Marquees of Lothian suggested during his visit to India in 1937-38 about the Muslims. "They were profoundly disturbed from one end of India to another. The rise of Congress to power made them feel for the first time what it was to be in minority. They had actually become aware of the Hindu rule." Surprisingly enough the Congress ministries in the Provinces were not accountable to the Legislatures but to the Congress High Command, which directed the Provincial Cabinets in their daily administrative routine matters.

The outbreak of the World War-II, in September 1939, followed by the declaration of war by the Government of India against Germany proved a God-sent relief for the Muslims of India. The Indian National Congress, obsessed with power in the provinces, felt offended on India's joining war without consulting them. Their resignation was observed as the Day of Deliverance, and the All Indian Muslim League, in her Lahore Annual General Meeting, passed a number of Resolutions including the one for the separate Muslim homeland. England, at the hour of great crisis, sustaining set-backs one after another, needed support, both moral and material. She wanted Government of India to evolve a Defence Council for boosting up war efforts. Muslims alone were cooperating, and the Indian National Congress consistently opposing, subsequently, with a Quit India Movement.

The Indian National Congress had started craving for Dominion Status, when in 1920 Australia and Canada were granted the same. India having been denied, she claimed complete independence, urging upon the Government of India for an immediate transfer of power. She was utterly disappointed upon the Government of India Act of 1935. They were somewhat consolled with the provincial ministry, and having begun politics in princely states, she believed that the Congress could win over a
substantial number of States joining the Federation for the Congress's Government at the Center. But outbreak of the World War II completely upset their political plans. The Lahore Resolution, demanding a separate Muslim homeland and the August offer by the British Prime Minister, granting special concessions to Muslims in future Constitutional set up, were enough cause of frustration for the I.N.C. The Cripps offer, at this juncture, was too small to satisfy Indian ambition for two reasons: (i) for it was effective only after the War, and (ii) because it provided an opportunity for some units to separate themselves from the Union. And yet the Government efforts to form a National Government were encouraging for the Congress. Many were keen to join it but, then, Gandhi put his foot down, to the disappointment of many.

The year 1942-43 passed in Congress's attempts to woo Government of India for more power sharing at the Federal level. Failing to mould Wavell, it turned towards the Muslim League for a possible compromise. Meanwhile a formula for the Partition of India, prepared by Raj Gopal Acheria, and approved by Gandhi, appeared in press on 10th July 1943. It was stated to be an agreed formula between Jinnah and Gandhi, whereas it was totally rejected by Jinnah later.

By mid 1944, English victory in the War was visible and its residues were only hoisted over Far Eastern Regions, including Burma. Renewed efforts were made to overcome political and constitutional deadlocks and also have a united India or partitioned. Sapru's proposals, suggesting a parity between the Hindus and Muslims in the Viceroy Interim Government, became the bases of Liaqat, Bhola Bhai Desai Pact in April 1945, much propagated by the Congress through press, despite its ineffectiveness. Wavell, however, prepared a Plan in mid 1945, and took to London for approval, before its announcement by the British Prime Minister on 14th June 1945. Despite the hostile behaviours of the Indian National Congress and the Indian
National Army engaged in fighting the British troops with the Japanese.\textsuperscript{51} England did have a soft corner for Indian political aspirations. Some Constitutional Advancement was possible only after the war was over, but at least an expansion in Viceroy’s Executive Council, for an interim period, was possible, provided the two major communities of India came to an agreement and other minorities, too, got representation.\textsuperscript{52} Wavell, then, in a broadcast speech announced to convene a conference of the former Chief Ministers in provinces, the leaders and the deputy leader of the Muslim League Parliamentary Parties in the Central Assembly, leaders of the Congress and the League in the Council of States, besides small groups and individuals (Gandhi and Jinnah).\textsuperscript{53} Gandhi and the Congress had some reservation for parity, previously agreed between Liaqat and Desai. The Congress Working Committee, advised her representative in the conference: (i) All managements be made on tentative base (ii) Communal parity was unacceptable, (iii) it was not applicable in the provinces, (iv) that the Congress had the right to nominate some Muslim members from amongst the Nationalist Muslims.\textsuperscript{54} Jinnah was not to compromise on the right of the Muslim League to nominate all Muslim representatives in the Viceroy’s Executive Council. And yet the total number of the Muslims in the Council would be one third of the Congress nominees, including caste Hindus and Sikhs.\textsuperscript{55} The Conference having begun at Smila on 25\textsuperscript{th} June continued intermittently till 14\textsuperscript{th} July and eventually failed as the Viceroy denied the Muslim League’s right to nominate all the five members to his council. He insisted to include one member, not from the League, but from the Punjab Muslims.\textsuperscript{56} The failure of the Wavell Plan was thrown upon Jinnah and Muslim League. But it also proved that Jinnah’s resolve for Pakistan, as the only solution of the future Indian settlement, was not compromising. Secondly, the Muslim League believed in principle that she alone had the claim to represent Indian Muslims, which the Government and the Indian National Congress must recognize. Jinnah was also apprehensive of the attitude of the Congress in the interim government if constituted, with out sufficient safeguard
from the Viceroy, which he did not commit. The Congress leaders took the League's policy the other way round. She preferred not to share power, rather deny it to her opponent.

The General Election scheduled for December 1945, (Central Assembly), and January 1946 (Provincial Assemblies) proved that Muslim League rightly claimed the true representative party of the Indian Muslims. It had won majority, if not all, the Muslim seats at the center and the provinces. While India was busy with its communal strife in putting down others, England made yet another effort for a political settlement in India. The Cabinet Mission, consisting of Pethic Lawrence, Secretary of State for India, Stafford Cripps and A.V. Alexander, were commissioned to assist the Viceroy in bringing a settlement in accordance with the aspiration of the Indian political groups. The Plan was published on 16th May 1946. The Partition of India (Pakistan Plan) was considered unfeasible, as it would leave a Hindu minority in Muslim areas and Muslim minority in Hindu areas. Pakistan, as such was not a solution to the communal problem. The Plan divided India into three regions (i) Hindu India (ii) Muslim India in the East (Bengal and Assam) (iii) and Muslim India in the North West, Baluchistan, Sind and the Punjab. The Central Government with Foreign Affairs, Defence and Communication, had limited subjects, the rest with Provinces, enjoying residuary powers also. The minorities were provided with a safeguard that no communal issue could be legislated unless three fourths of its members did not agree in the respective house. The Congress was highly delighted on the announcement of the Plan, which in fact was the death signal for Jinnah's Pakistan. The Muslim League Executive Council held its meeting in Delhi on 6th June to consider the Plan and saw in it the future Pakistan, as a sovereign State. The Plan was accepted by Muslim League, despite displeasures of some of its members. Jinnah wrote to the Viceroy reminding him of the previous understanding between them about the proposed Interim Government with 12 portfolios: 5 for Muslim League, 5 for the Congress, one each for Sikh and Indian Christians etc. He
informed Wavell that any change in the agreed Plan would result in the forfeiture of the co-operation of the League. The condition, which the Congress put forth for Interim Government, was unacceptable for Viceroy and those of Viceroy unacceptable to the Congress. The Cabinet Mission, meanwhile, proceeded ahead with its programme, offering share in Government to any political group accepting the Plan. But Wavell was reluctant to offer Muslim League to form interim Government notwithstanding Congress rejection. Wavell had some soft corner for the Congress, which was reflected by British press. Ian Stephens, the editor of the Statesman criticizing Wavell stated, “Politicians may do so, but it is not the business of the statesmen to eat their words…. What was so emphatically considered needful and proper on 16 June cannot well, within 10 days, have radically transformed its nature.” The Economist was more blunt against British policy: “when Congress refuses to play, the Muslim gets nothing but when Muslim also refuses to play, the Congress gets power.” The Cabinet Mission, infact, had different expectations. The Plan did not concede Pakistan. It was expected that League might reject it. It was sufficiently promising for the Congress. It was expected that she would welcome the opportunity, they rejected. The Cabinet Mission and the Viceroy chose to go back on their pledge rather have a League’s government.

It was not long enough when the Indian National Congress woke up from her slumber and Nehru announced to join the interim government, with a will to bring changes in the legislature, at their pleasure and make the ‘Formula’ more feasible to the requirement of the Congress. The press conference of the Congress’s new President convened on 10th July 1946 was more emphatic, justifying Congress’s acceptance of joining the Constituent Assembly. The intentions of the Congress were clear. They wanted a dominating government where the minorities would remain totally dependent and at the mercy of the Congress. The Congress infact derived ‘an action replay’ of what she did
between 1937-39 during her Provincial ministries. Nehru, in his press statement, declared ‘what we do then, we are entirely and absolutely free to determine. The Union Government would be much stronger than what was contemplated by the Cabinet Mission Plan.’

The intentions of the Congress alarmed the Muslim League. The Executive Committee passed two resolutions: (i) withdrawing from the acceptance of the Plan, and (ii) observation of Direct Action Day, to get rid of a possible Hindu Dominated Rule. All Muslims, honoured by England with investitures, renounced their titles, due to resentment to the British unfriendly attitude. A change visible in the believer of Constitutional and lawful struggle, to agitational and unlawful method, marked the height of indignation felt by Muslim League on the prejudiced conduct of the Government and the Cabinet Mission, supporting the Indian National Congress. This was beyond expectation of both the Congress as well as the Government that Jinnah could ever, just in one move, turn the political table in his own favour. If the political move, which the Congress assumed after Nehru’s acceptance of the Plan, had been without the declared ambitions of the Congress, Muslim League, perhaps, may have co-operated in joining the Constituent Assembly, hoping better prospects for future. But Nehru’s dimension made possible and easy for the Muslim League, the advancement of Pakistan, earlier than expectations. The later repentance of the Indian National Congress on the great blunder committed was nothing but a remorse and regretfulness. William Burton rightly remarked: “if common sense is an element in political maturity, Congress seems to have little claim to that particular quality.”

The Interim Government was sworn in 2nd September 1946 without Muslim League. The jubilant Congress ambitious for the proverbial Hindu raj, could now perceive its achievement in the near future. The Muslim observed Black Day throughout India on the Congress’s assumption of office. Wavell was criticized by
Muslim League for his partisan attitude, much less than what he
got from England, particularly from Winston Churchill, the
leader of the opposition, who reiterated that the rule of Hindu
majority would never be observed without a civil war.\textsuperscript{77} This was
not a solitary voice. Quite a few other Englishmen regretted
Wavell’s losing Muslims’ confidence. Among them were Lord
Temple wood, Sir Samuel Hoare, Lord Scarborough and Lord
Cranbourne etc.\textsuperscript{78}

A little more than a month made League to realize that
remaining out of the Government was more harmful to the cause
of Pakistan. As such she decided to join the Interim Government
on 25\textsuperscript{th} October 1946.\textsuperscript{79} Liaqat Ali (Finance), I. I. Chundiger
(Commerce) Abdur Rab Nishter (Communication), Ghazanfar Ali
Khan (Health) and J. N. Mandal (Legislative) joined the interim
government. Inclusion of a schedule caste member by the Muslim
League was a big blow to the Congress’s claim, besides other
disappointments. Nehru was not consulted by Wavell while
letting Muslim League joining the Interim Government. Liaqat Ali
Khan refused to accept Nehru as director of affairs in portfolios
with the Muslim League.\textsuperscript{80} The Cabinet did not work smoothly
enough, much against the expectation of the Congress; the finance
ministry proved a big impediment in the growing ambitions of
Home and Defence Ministries.\textsuperscript{81}

On 20\textsuperscript{th} February 1947, Attlee, the British Prime Minister
made his historic statement of the transfer of power in June 1948
and that Wavell was called back from India, who was being
replaced by Lord Mountbatten.\textsuperscript{82} The new Viceroy reached Delhi
on 22\textsuperscript{nd} March, 1947 much to the rejoicing of Indian National
Congress, for Nehru had developed special relationship with
Mountbatten visiting him while he was still Commander of the
Eastern Forces in Burma.\textsuperscript{83} At the same time Lord Ismay would
not show a concern to England on the appointment of Lord
Mountbatten if he had not smelt or visualized some extraordinary
relationship between Nehru and the new Viceroy. Campbell
Johnson suggests the same in his diary between the lines. How did this relationship play in Indian politics, is evident from the future course of developments: firstly in preparing the Partition Plan in accordance with the wishes of the Congress and secondly in planning the accession of Kashmir, in whatever manner possible. Mountbatten involved himself in the plotting of the Indian National Congress, making quite evident his personal dislike of Jinnah and the Pakistan Plan.

The Indian National Congress was over obsessed with the idea of the partition of India ever since the Lahore Resolution was passed by Muslim League. Dr. Ambedkar’s publication: Thoughts on Pakistan: appearing first in 1941, showing the Partition line on the Indian map, not much different from the actually line drawn by Radcliffe in 1947 is just one example. Raj Gopal Acheria’s Plan of the Partition of India, later on rejected by Congress, appeared in 1943, speaks of the same story, since such thought provoking proposals were not suggested in vacuum. They could only be the positive response to the speculative discussion within the Congress High Command since 1940.

Lord Ismay records that Mountbatten had a Partition Plan to discuss in his meeting with Provincial governors on 15th and 16th April 1947. The governors kept on apprising political situation in their respective provinces, justifying the Partition of Bengal and the Punjab, demanding referendum in N.W.F.P. and Sylhet. While Ismay and George Abell were going to London with the Plan for a formal discussion with the British administration, Mountbatten earned a dispute with Nehru on the future status of India. Congress aspiring a republic, would be severed off from the British Commonwealth, which Mountbatten did not like. Jinnah had assured him of Pakistan’s link with the British Commonwealth and he desired India also to remain as a Dominion under the British Crown.
V. P. Menon accompanying Mountbatten to Simla, convinced him that immediate transfer of power would facilitate the Congress to accept Dominion Status for an Interim period, which might satisfy Mountbatten in keeping India under British Commonwealth. V. P. Menon had already taken Patel, Nehru and Gandhi into confidence. Mountbatten thanked Menon for solving the problem for him.

V. P. Menon rightly boasted how he managed the whole show while getting approval of the new Plan i.e. the immediate transfer of power from the Congress. It was not deemed necessary to consult Muslim League in the matter, notwithstanding the enormous administrative difficulties, which Pakistan might suffer. India was inheriting the administrative machinery of the Government of India; the Army, Air Force and Naval Headquarters all located in the Capital. “As far as Pakistan is concerned, we are putting up a tent. We can do no more.” Mountbatten’s bias against Pakistan, for whatever reasons, was so favouring Congress’s ambitions, that “she could well calculate an early breakdown of Pakistan after its birth.

Gandhi, who was cut off from negotiations on the Partition Plan, was in the troubled waters as regards the North Western Frontier Province and Bengal. In the former province, Badshah Khan (Abdul Gheffar Khan), the Red Shirt leader, with the government of his elder brother, Dr. Khan Sahib, was the protégé of the I.N.C. irrespective of more than 89.93% of the Muslim majority in the province. Gandhi was concentrating that the N.W.F.P. remained somehow or other with the Red Shirt leaders without a referendum. Even if, it might not be possible, the province could become independent Pakhtoonistan, cut off from Pakistan, for a possible reunion with India when time was ripe.

In Bengal, Hussain Shaheed Suhurwardi, expelled by Jinnah from the Muslim League earlier, was in league with Sarat Chandra Bose (brother of Subhas Chandra Bose) trying to remain out of the
Indian orbit, as an independent sovereign state of Greater Bengal. Whereas the Congress had rejected the idea, independent Greater Bengal was indeed in Indian interest, if remained within Indian Union. Gandhi was in close contact with the Bengali leaders to undo what Muslim League had achieved over the years. But the scheme of the United Bengal was killed by Shyama Prasad Mukherji, the Mahasabha leader, and Gandhi returned empty handed. Mountbatten went to London on May 18, for the final approval of his Partition Plan, accompanied by V.P. Menon. Having obtained the desired approval, he placed the Plan before seven main leaders of the Congress, League and the Sikhs. Mountbatten announced the Partition Plan in full detail, which was accepted by Nehru, Patel, and Kripalani, provided the Muslim League also accepted it. Jinnah was silent and non-committal. He could not commit anything unless he had placed the whole Plan before the Executive Council of the League. Mountbatten was, however, verbally assured by Jinnah the acceptance of the Plan to be announced next day, the 3rd June.

The Plot for the Accession of Kashmir and Mountbatten

Like the Partition Plan, the accession of Kashmir, too, was pre-planned and well managed. The Indian National Congress, defining her policy for the accession of Princely States as early as 1931 (the Round Table Conference) had already announced that all the Princely States, would, at the withdrawal of the British from the area, become part of the Indian Union, as the Instrument of Accession with the Paramount power would cease to exist. The Muslim League’s stand was different. Quaid-i-Azam believed in principle if the Princely States desired to remain independent, there was no legal binding upon them to join the Federation. Jinnah remained firm on his principle stand even when the Partition Plan was announced which allowed the Princely States to join any of the two Dominions on the basis of the geo-cultural contiguity or remain independent. On the contrary, the Indian National Congress viewed the accession for Princely States
obligatory to any of the two Dominions, "as they did not have the means to establish international relations or declare war, they could not become sovereign independent states." The different approach of the two political parties was already well known to the people. Even the Chamber of Princes, organized as early as 1921, also became aware of the thinking of the Congress and the Muslim League since the beginning of the All India States People Conference in 1927 for the object of attaining "responsible government for the people in the Indian States through representative institutions under the aegis of their rulers." Nehru was himself the President of the States People's Conference and wooed Sh. Abdullah (of Jammu and Kashmir) to become its Vice-President in 1946.

Nehru's contact with Sh. Abdullah began in 1938 when they met in Peshawar, and two years later, in 1940, Nehru himself visited Kashmir along with Abul Kalam Azad and Khan Abdul Ghaaffar Khan. Sh. Abdullah's political ideas impressed Nehru. He found him a secularist and his pro-Congress leaning, in particular, his popularity in leadership, running the National Conference, against the Muslim Conference of Chaud Hari Ghulam Abbas and the Mir Waiz Muhammad Yosuf. Sh. Abdullah's involvement in the Quit Kashmir Movement alarmed the Kashmiri ruler Hari Singh, who arrested Sh. Abdullah while he was on his way to New Delhi on invitation from Jawahar Lal Nehru. In fact, Hari Singh, being aware of the political conditions in India, and the Congress's ambitions, was rearing some thoughts of remaining independent, after the British withdrawal. C.R. Kak, his Prime Minister, was a clever person and his proficiency in Kashmiri language was an added quality to impress people to his ideas. He was aware of the recommendations of the Cabinet Mission with regard to the Princely States, and the subsequent Conference of the Princes in Bombay held in January 1947, which resolved that the accession of the States with Union would be subjected to negotiations between the Union and each one of the states. Another
statement of British Government in February 1947, announcing the withdrawal of England from India after the transfer of Power in June 1948, suggesting Princely States to become sovereign independent state, thereafter, was enough encouragement for those, who aspired independence. There were also states like Baroda, Bikanir and Patiala, which considered Patel as their best well-wisher. But others did not like his conspiring demeanours and frequent outbursts. Nehru, too, had committed himself in the same category announcing in the Indian State People's Conference, Gwalior, on 18th April, “any state which did not come into the Constituent Assembly would be treated by the country as a hostile state. Such a state…..would have to bear the consequences of being so treated.” Apart from Kashmir, there were other states also which aspired to remain independent. Hyderabad Deccan and Travencore announced their independence. The Nawab of Bhopal, who was Chancellor of the council of princes, was against individual state dealing with India. On the contrary, he wanted negotiation with India on collective basis. Having failed in his mission, he resigned, and the Maharaja of Patiala succeeded him. In July 1947, the State Departments of the two new Dominions had been formed. Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar was appointed as Minister for States and Ikramullah, as Secretary; whereas Sardar Patel already held the charge of the Home Department besides the Minister of State and V.P. Menon, as Secretary. The latter had also the privilege of being the Constitutional advisor of the Governor-General and had, therefore a claim of closer link between the Viceroy Mountbatten and the Indian National Congress. Working on the Congress's Plan and in consultation with Sardar Patel, V. P. Menon drew up an instrument of Accession for Defence, External Affairs and Communication and a stand still arrangement for Customs, Currency and other such matters. In all other subjects, the States autonomy was kept intact. The two documents i.e. the Instrument of Accession and the Standstill Agreement were considered independent. Mountbatten came to the rescue of his protege Menon in convincing majority of the Indian Sates
announcing their affiliation and accession to India. This partisan conduct of the Viceroy for India alone, had reasons other than the personal influence of his assistant, V. P. Menon, which needs some explanation.

Mountbatten, after assuming the responsibility of the Viceroy and the Governor-General of India, had the desire to meet the Indian political leadership and develop personal contact to read their political perception and depth. Mountbatten was also obsessed with the desire of keeping India United, and any threat to its unity, a challenge to his political acumen and sagacity. He had some mastery in eloquence with a superb quality in convincing others to his views. Nehru, according to him, was a leader, with some distinction in political ideals, which India needed for its international status after independence. Gandhi’s personality of a half naked Faqir had a different charm for Mountbatten. “He will go down in history as Christ or Buddha,” he said. He was unaware of Gandhi’s simulative qualities and duplicity of character, which made him later disputed with Jawahar Lal Nehru and Vallabhbhai Patel. Gandhi was well aware of their opinion. He said, “They call me Mahatma, but I tell you, I am not treated by them as a sweeper.” Mountbatten’s meeting with Gandhi was interesting and useful. He had found another supporter on his views of United India, apart from Nehru. “So long I am alive,” Gandhi told Mountbatten, “I will never agree to the Partition of India.” “But any alternative,” asked Mountbatten, “if Partition becomes imperative?” “Give the baby to Muslims,” replied Gandhi, “instead of cutting it into two pieces.” “Will the Congress agree to your proposal?” asked Mountbatten. “The Congress would yield to every thing to avoid partition,” replied Gandhi.

Mountbatten’s meeting with Vallabhbhai Patel was a sorry experience, when the latter, as Home Minister, handed him a written note. Patel’s arrogance was almost insulting for Viceroy. He asked the minister to withdraw the note and on his refusal
threatened to resign. The note was finally withdrawn after some sharp exchange of words between the two.\footnote{120}

With Jinnah, Mountbatten had six meetings in one month (April 47) to convince him of the virtue of undivided India.” Viceroy used all his tactics, political sharpness, motivation and diplomatist sagacity to convince Jinnah for a United India but no promise could move the Muslim leader an inch from his goal. Mountbatten’s renowned concealed ability to persuade people to his point of view, not only because of his persuasive quality but also because he had the knack of being able to present facts in their most favourable light. “I tried every trick,” said Mountbatten, “I could play, used every appeal I could imagine to share Jinnah’s resolve to have partition. Nothing would.”\footnote{121} Mountbatten and Jinnah did agree on one point before entering into exchange of some strong statements. They agreed only on speeding up the British withdrawal “after surgical operation” in words of Jinnah.\footnote{122} Mountbatten threatened serious consequences. Jinnah replied that it might perish without. On the contrary, the two Dominions would settle thereafter.\footnote{123} Mountbatten, then spoke the Congress’s language “If the Muslim minority in India could not live amicably with the majority non-Muslims, how can the non-Muslim minority in Muslim majority provinces of Bengal and the Punjab could easily settle? If you insist on dividing India to get your Islamic State, Mountbatten rhetorted, ‘then the very logic will compel me to divide the Punjab and Bengal, as a part of the bargain.”\footnote{124} Jinnah protested on the economically unviable and moth-eaten Pakistan, Mountbatten said, “Better do not take it.”\footnote{125}

This dialogue between Jinnah and Mountbatten, noted above, is recorded by a number of contemporary and secondary sources. Here it is reproduced to conclude that:

\begin{enumerate}
  \item Mountbatten, already on a Mission named Operation Seduction (to keep India United as a British legacy)
was supported by the Indian National Congress, besides other small political non-Muslim groups;

ii) the Mission of Mountbatten was failed by Jinnah, much to the annoyance of the Viceroy; unlike Nehru and Gandhi, Jinnah did not let Mountbatten to spell bound himself with his persuasive faculty, which further irritated him;

iii) Jinnah's firm stand on the partition of India, made Mountbatten to suggest partition of the Muslim Majority provinces of Bengal and the Punjab, which, if accepted by Jinnah "would automatically collapse because of its economically unviability;"

iv) Mountbatten, as such, had become a party in the opposite camp to the Partition Plan, which the Indian National Congress exploited to the best of its interest, in particular, the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India.

Further, Mountbatten's negative approach for Jinnah and the idea of Pakistan to deprive Muslims of their majority areas, in whatever way possible, can be seen from the scheme of United Bengal, put forth by Hussain Shaheed Suhurwardy,126 the Chief Minister of Bengal, in his appeal to the Viceroy. The scheme was immediately dispatched to Attlee's Government for consideration and approval of three and not two independent states. Mountbatten did not have any interest in the United Bengal, except that it could deprive Jinnah a Muslim majority region in Eastern India and cripple the idea of Pakistan. The scheme was also presented to Nehru who immediately rejected it. "India would be fragmented into dozen pieces. After Bengal, Kashmir, and Hyderabad could also become independent and so many other Princely States" said Nehru.127 Mountbatten, disappointed, abandoned the scheme and asked Nehru to bring him a revised Partition Plan, acceptable to the Indian National Congress.128 He,
however, consoled himself and also told Rajgopal Acheriya. “East Bengal would be out of Pakistan in a quarter of a century.” His predication was identical to the one which, then, the former President of the Indian National Congress, Abul Kalam Azad, made and published later.\textsuperscript{129}

Mountbatten and the Congress entrusted redrafting of the Partition Plan to V.P. Menon.\textsuperscript{130} This is irrespective of the conflicting reports on the redrafting which was already done by a Congress Committee consisting of Kripalani, (President I.N.C.) with Jawahar Lal Nehru and Sardar Patel and then entrusted to V.P. Menon for handing it over to Mountbatten.\textsuperscript{131} Jinnah’s papers (Published) have another interesting story, which appears to have some link with the final outcome of the redrafting of Partition Plan. Infact, the Plan which was finally prepared in just a couple of hours or so, could not be possible unless it had been well studied and worked upon before.

The Lahore Resolution (1940) did create a question mark of what actually the Muslim demands really meant. Rajgopal Acheriya’s Plan (1943), in particular his suggestion to institute a commission to determine the areas of Muslim majority in the North West and East of India and also to hold a referendum in these areas to ascertain whether or not they intended to join the future Indian Constituent Assembly.\textsuperscript{132} I. Jenkins note to the Viceroy, dated 23\textsuperscript{rd} July 1945, was also in response to an enquiry about the Partition Plan, as suggested by the Muslim League.\textsuperscript{133} V. P. Menon, the Executive Secretary to the Viceroy, wrote to George Abell, from the Viceregal Lodge, New Delhi, advising him to desist from further discussion on the Partition Plan till such time that we have a definite Plan with us.\textsuperscript{134} Menon also included a secret report on the Partition Plan, which suggested the possibilities of the partition of Muslim majority areas of the Punjab and Bengal.\textsuperscript{135} Lord Wavell’s telegram to Sir Pethic Lawrence, dated 5\textsuperscript{th} February 1946, is self-explanatory in suggesting that the Partition Plan was under discussion between the Viceroy and the
Secretary of States. It is interesting to note that the Partition Plan under discussion (prepared during Wavell’s tenure) did not show Gurdaspur District in Pakistan because it existed in close vicinity of the religiously important Sikh Center at Amristar. Wavell had also suggested partition of Bengal on divisional basis rather than districts, so as to keep a link between Assam (Muslim majority area) and the rest of India. “It will be better if Dinagpur (Muslim majority area) is cut off from Pakistan and granted to India, as in the Western Sector Gurdas Pur is being given to the Indian Punjab to give India a passage to Kashmir.”

It is obvious how the Partition Plan had been cooked in the Congress’s kitchen over the years with the help of the Viceroy’s in office. V. P. Menon being the confident of the Congress and as much as that of the Viceroy, had an opportunity to present to Mountbatten the Congress’s Plan, which Mountbatten took to London with V. P. Menon, on May 18, 1947. The Plan was approved by the British Cabinet. Lord Ismay’s statement is on record: “I’ve seen some performances in my lifetime, but what he (Mountbatten) just did to the people in there, beats them all.”

Mountbatten almost spell bounded his audience. Convincing Attlee, the British Prime Minister and his Labour Ministry, was easy. But to tame down the imperialist conservative Opposition leader, Winston Churchill, was all the more difficult. Mountbatten tipped him with Nehru’s consent to the Dominion Status under the umbrella of the British Commonwealth, which fairly consoled the ego of the conservative leader.

Mountbatten met seven Indian leaders only on 2nd June and apprised them of the Partition Plan, which was to be announced in the British Parliament the next day. The Viceroy solicited the written consent of the leaders on the Plan, which Nehru Kirpalani and Patel had already given on behalf of the Congress, but the Muslim leaders, particularly Jinnah were silent. Lord Ismay reports: “Jinnah was in one of his difficult moods. After discussing the Plan as scandalous, he said he himself would support it and do
it best to get the Muslim Council to do likewise, but he could not commit them, in advance. After a good deal of horse trading, the most that the Viceroy could squeeze out of him was an admission that Mr. Attlee might safely be advised that he could go ahead with his announcement about the Plan to the House of Commons on the following day. On 3rd June Mountbatten, Nehru and Jinnah were on the Air (All India Radio) announcing the Partition Plan and the Transfer of Power on 15th August, 1947 under emotions of both, pride of successes, and failures. All of them seemed to be jubilant over the achievement of goal with casual reflections of sorrowful shades on their faces, of their failures. Jinnah's note ended with Pakistan Zindabad, not knowing what trick in all his haste of obtaining his assent, Mountbatten had played in league with the intriguing Congress. Lamb is justified in concluding that "the mechanics of Partition as applied to the Punjab, more than any other single factor, created the immediate background to the Kashmir dispute ....... Mountbatten has been accused (perhaps, rightly so) of having participated in the manipulation of Partition with deliberate intent to favour the interest of India over those of Pakistan."

The announcement of the 3rd June Plan was followed by another announcement of the two Boundary Commissions, one for Bengal, and the other for the Punjab, under Cyril Radcliffe (Vice Chairman of the English Bar Council), with two Muslim judges, and two non-Muslim judges of the High Court, as its members. The Commission was instructed to demarcate the line of Partition on the basis of ascertaining the contiguous majority areas of the Muslims and non-Muslims in the Punjab and Bengal, taking into account other factors. What were other factors, and from whom these instructions came? The statement of Arthur Henderson, did not specify it. The only possibility is that the Viceroy would have added the line on advice from Jenkins, the Governor of the Punjab. It is doubted if the Sikhs demand was seriously noticed, but Mountbatten already bent upon to harm the Muslim cause in whatever way possible, could
have added these words. The later developments did prove the Viceroy’s involvement against Pakistan, and his instructions to the Governor of the Punjab in that respect. There is also a possibility that Cyril Radcliffe being totally ignorant about India, must have been briefed by someone on his mission, either from the Prime Minister’s or the Viceroy’s Secretariat, or by the Viceroy himself. The grant of the Award, later on, suggested that it was politically motivated rather than judicial. Radcliffe himself did not have political ambitions, like Mountbatten. Nor did he have direct contact with the political leadership, except the Muslim and non-Muslim members of the Commission. He was allowed to stay in the Viceroy’s Lodge and his frequent contact with the Viceroy’s Secretariat and the Viceroy himself cannot be ruled out. Unfortunately, the Government of India destroyed the record of the Boundary Commission, which could be of extreme importance, immediately after 15th Aug 1947. Radcliffe himself did not take any paper on his return home, nor he made or was allowed to make a comment on his own Award. This is of course not a conclusive evidence, but it at least reflects upon something which happened behind the curtain in which apart from the Congress High Command, the Viceroy himself and to some extent Cyril Radcliffe, too, seems to be involved. The apology tendered by Michael Brecher and Philip Ziegler for their respective heroes, denying charges of secret alignment with the I.N.C. as most speculative, were amply proved, on the basis of contemporary documents, published by P. N. S. Mansergh on the Transfer of Power. The hostilities of the Congress, for the Muslim League, grown over the years, with certainty of Partition from a position of possibility, failing in all the efforts, she made to negate the same, turned them virulent against the Muslims and Pakistan. Mountbatten’s personal experience of meeting Jinnah and his firmness to his stand on Pakistan, negating all arguments of the Viceroy for a United India, and further turning down Mountbatten’s personal ego to become the Governor General of both India and Pakistan, were enough reasons for his alignment with the Indian National Congress. Earlier Mountbatten, after the
approval of his revised Partition Plan by British Cabinet, announced "hastefully that he would be the first Governor-General of both the new Dominions, at least, for the initial stages of Partition. From his point of view, it could facilitate him, as Chairman of the Joint Defence Council, to manage division of asset of both the Dominions in a fair manner, which, as it really happened, his interests remain solely involved in Indian favour, being the Governor-General of India, forgetting altogether his second responsibility. Moris Jones, another Constitutional Advisor to Mountbatten reports his annoyance and fury on Jinnah's announcing himself as the first Governor-General of Pakistan. Behaving like a militant Hindu, his hot words and temper threatening Jinnah: "Do you realize what this will cost you? "Several crores of rupees in assets "replied Jinnah."It will cost you the whole of your assets and the future of Pakistan," said Mountbatten.

Like Nehru, Mountbatten too was in the habit of presuming things before hand in accordance with his aspiration. During his visit to London in May 1947, (obtaining approval of the Revised Partition Plan from the British Cabinet) he gave an impression in England that he would be the Governor-General of both the Dominions of India and Pakistan. Jinnah conveyed to the Viceroy on 2nd July that while the governors of most of Provinces and all the Chiefs of the three services were Englishmen, along with other British officers, it was a political exigency that he should himself hold the office of the Governor-General. A common governor general of the two Dominions acting on the advice of the Prime Ministers of opposite political outlook and interests could create problems in holding a common governor general.

However, there is a point in the statement that the British Government should not have approved Mountbatten to become Governor-General of India, alone and that, too, as a party to the Congress, favouring her at the cost of Pakistan's political and geographical interests.
The Planning for the Accession of Kashmir by I.N.C.

The political stand of the Indian National Congress and that of the All India Muslim League has already been discussed in the previous lines. Like many other major Princely States, the Dogra Raja of Jammu and Kashmir was also ambitious to remain independent, for more than one reason:

1- the State of Jammu and Kashmir had approximately 80% or so Muslim majority in population but mostly unrepresented in the State Assembly under the Constitution, which was more liberal and sympathetic to the Kashmir’s Pandits nominated in the Assembly by the Raja himself, rather than elected;

2- the Maharaja had so long successfully controlled the Muslim population through heavy taxation and severity, despite their uprisings in the valley, since the early thirties;

3- the National Conference of Sh. Abdullah and the Muslim Conference of Ch. Ghulam Abbas and Mir Waiz had contacts with the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League, respectively, but the latter political party was less active than the former.

In November, 1946, the British Resident in the valley submitted a report to its parent office that “I am inclined to think that the Maharaja and Pandit C. R. Kak, the Prime Minister, are seriously considering the possibility of Kashmir not joining the Union…. The Maharaja’s attitude is, I suspect, that once Paramountcy (of the British Empire) disappears, Kashmir will have to stand on its own feet and that Kashmir will be free to ally herself with any power not excluding Russia, she chooses.”
Such a report, from the British resident late in 1946, appears to be a part of the Congress’s Plan on Kashmir, as shall be noticed in later development. Ever since the Russian Occupation of Central Asia, towards the second half of the Nineteenth Century, the British India began suffering from Russo-phobia. Attempts to undo Russian success beyond Oxus and also in Afghanistan, failed. They felt threats from Russia on the North Western border and therefore held control of the Northern Belt through Political Agencies, enforced by Lord Curzon with the dawn of the 20th Century. Gilgit Agency was as such to control the entire Northern area, which is now the part of Pakistan. The biggest British concern that the Communist influence in Central Asia might create problems for the successor government of the British in India, seems obnoxious and whimsical. That India may be able to resist Russian penetration in Gilgit more than Pakistan, obliged the British in England to allow the valley of Kashmir to merge with India and receive the support of Jawaharlal Nehru, when consulted. The Quaid-i-Azam and the Muslim League were not consulted in the matter.

The Document is very revealing. Mountbatten returned Gilgit to the Maharaja of Kashmir before the announcement of the state’s accession to India in Oct. 1947. The Maharaja sent a Brigadier Gansara (perhaps Janisar) Singh on 30th July 1947 to take over the region, only to find that the military scouts in the Northern areas and the local population in general wanted to join Pakistan. The Brigadier, who was appointed Governor of the Northern areas, became powerless and was arrested by the Gilgit Scouts, whose Commander Major W. Brown assisted by Capt. Mathieson agreed with his men on 3rd Nov. 1947 that they should come out openly for Pakistan. On the following morning, Pakistan’s flag was hoisted over Gilgit and two weeks later a political agent of the Government of Pakistan reached to take over his responsibility.
It is amazing to note that the keenness and importance of Gilgit with which the Government of India came out for its security, resolving that India rather than Pakistan, should possess the region, did not work. The accession of Kashmir to India was claimed to be of extreme importance for the same. But when Brigadier Gansara Singh was arrested by the Gilgit Scouts, little action was taken either by the Maharaja himself or by the Government of India. It is unconceivable that Major W. Brown, Commandant of the Gilgit Scouts, may not have contacts with the military command in India. There is no indication in the record of any such contact or the reaction of the Indian Defence Ministry over the ‘misconduct’ of the Gilgit Scouts. Even if the Northern region was returned to the Dogra Raja, the Indian army could intervene in Gilgit also, as it did in Srinagar. On the face of it, obviously it appears that the Gilgit issue was only a hoax in the Indian Plan for the accession of Kashmir to India, in which Mountbatten, the other British officials, including the military command were a party. Mountbatten too played up the Gilgit issue only as an excuse for his alliance with the Indian National Congress.

Despite Mountbatten’s sincere support, Indian skepticism on the Viceroy’s fidelity remained unhidden. On 14th June, Mountbatten received a private letter from V. P. Menon in which he was warned of the serious consequences for the future Anglo-Indian relationship, if the State of Jammu and Kashmir was permitted to go to Pakistan. Such an act may not be popular in newly Independent India, and put at risk the extensive British interests there. “It was essential”, Menon added, “that the state of Jammu and Kashmir be brought under Indian folds.”

Mountbatten went to Srinagar with his wife on 17th June 1947. The Chief of Staff Ismay also accompanied him. There they stayed as the guest of the Maharaja for six days. Mountbatten and the Maharaja had an earlier acquaintance in a polo match at Jammu when the Viceroy accompanied the Prince of Wales. A day
before Mountbatten was scheduled to return, he received another letter, this time from Jawahar Lal Nehru. It was a long note, in response to some inquiries asked by Viceroy himself. Nehru had thus passed on some important information to the Viceroy. The main points in the letter were:

1- the Muslim population of the state was only 77%;

2- the National Conference was the most popular political organization of which Sheikh Abdullah was the most popular leader;

3- the Muslim Conference allied to the Muslim League had little influence in the state.

Nehru advised Mountbatten to dismiss Kak, the Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir and instead appoint Sh. Abdullah after his release from Jail. He (Nehru) finally concluded, “If any attempt is made to push the state into the Pakistan Constituent Assembly, there is likely to be much trouble because the National Conference is not in favour of it, and the Maharaja’s position would also become very difficult. The normal and the obvious course appears to be of Kashmir is to join the Constitutional Assembly of India. This will satisfy both the popular demands and the Maharaja’s wishes. It is absurd to think that Pakistan would create trouble if this happens.”

Nehru was highly disturbed since Kak was still the Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir and he had a soft corner for the Muslims in the valley so ruthlessly suppressed by the Maharaja. Sh. Abdullah was still in jail. Nehru wanted an immediate change in the Valley’s administration. Sh. Abdullah’s release from Jail could only help maturing Plan of Kashmir’s accession to India. Mountbatten’s advice to the Maharaja to consult the will of the people and do what the majority thought best, did not suit India. Nehru’s letter to Mountbatten of 17th June, could not release Sh.
Abdulah from Jail. He, therefore, decided to go to Srinagar himself to do the needful. Mountbatten did not like Nehru to be so impatient. The future Prime Minister of India should be more considerate towards four hundred million people, who needed his attention at this grave moment rather than four million Kashmiris.

Mountbatten’s involvement in the implementation of the Plan, prepared by the Congress earlier, now appears more visible. It is also evident that the liaison between the two (i.e. the Viceroy and Congress) was the confident man V. P. Menon, himself a Congress man so close to Mountbatten. This personal letter to the Viceroy during the latter’s visit to the Valley urging upon him the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India, with an advice at the end that this letter be destroyed is enough substantial evidence in proof thereof. This coupled with the detailed note of Jawahar Lal Nehru which was prepared at the request of the Viceroy himself and sent to him at Srinagar was suggesting the same lines and warning same consequences if Mountbatten failed in persuading the Maharaja for the accession of State to India. When Mountbatten returned to New Delhi, Sh. Abdullah was still in Jail, which frustrated Nehru. Unlike most of the Congress men, Mountbatten could not be emotional on the accession of Kashmir over night. He indeed was well prepared for playing his cards in a manner, which may not expose him to the record of history. His negotiation with the Maharaja is not recorded. Nevertheless, it is evident from the fact that Mountbatten did not show interest to meet Ghulam Abbas or Mir Waiz, as he gave no importance to the Muslim Conference, depending totally upon the advice of Menon and Nehru that National Conference and Sh. Abdullah alone enjoyed the confidence of the people of Valley, keen to join Indian Federation.

Yet another circumstantial proof of Mountbatten’s involvement in the accession of Kashmir to India was his influence over Cyril Radcliffe in granting Muslim majority tehsils of
Gurdaspur, Batala and Pathankot (of District Gurdaspur) to India in the Boundary Commission Report. A provisional map prepared by the Commission showing Zira and Ferozepur Tehsils in Pakistan side, was perhaps to compensate the Gurdaspur District granted to India.\(^\text{167}\)

The provisional map was sent to the Viceroy, whose private Secretary George Abell, immediately dispatched the same to I. Jenkins, Governor of the Punjab, to implement the Plan. A similar note was also sent to Jenkins from Christopher Beaumont, an Assistant to Radcliffe. The Plan was thus known to many others in the Punjab Government.\(^\text{168}\) There was hardly any secrecy of the new Plan, more so because it had passed so many hands in the Viceroy' Secretariat as well as in the Governor's House, Punjab. The local ministerial assistance, provided by the Government of India to the Boundary Commission, also knew about the map, which obviously alarmed all concerned. Nehru's letter to Mountbatten, endorsing a memorandum from A. N. Khosla, Chairman Central Waterways, Irrigation and Navigation Commission, including a reference to the table talk between Radcliffe and his Commissioners,\(^\text{169}\) was later on handed over by Mudie, the successor of Jenkins, to the Government of Pakistan.\(^\text{170}\)

Nehru's letter to Mountbatten dated 9\(^\text{th}\) August is meaningful in the sense that something had happened which was against their Plan. Radcliffe may have been influenced by the Viceroy to the extent of providing a passage from India to the state of Jammu and Kashmir, which is amply reflected in Mountbatten's statement of 4\(^\text{th}\) June: “it is unlikely that the Boundary Commission will throw the whole of the Gurdaspur District in the Muslim majority areas.”\(^\text{171}\) But the Plan did not include any compensation to Pakistan, as was visible from the map. The Viceroy politely rebuked Nehru: “I should not do anything to prejudice the independence of Boundary Commission and that, therefore, it would be wrong of me to forward any memorandum, especially at
172 And yet Mountbatten instructed Jenkins, the Governor of the Punjab on 10th/11th August 1947 in a telegram to eliminate salient i.e. to delete from Pakistan, the Ferozpur and Zira Tehsils and put them in India.173

Liaqat Ali Khan, learning the wrong done contacted Ismay who wrote back. “You surely do not expect the Viceroy to suggest to Radcliffe that he should make any alteration. Still less can I believe that you intend to imply that the Viceroy has influenced this Award. I am well aware that some on uninformed section of public opinion, that the Award will not be of Radcliffe but the Viceroy's. But I never for a moment thought that you should ever imagine that he should do such things.”174

Ismay's deliberate attempt to cover-up Mountbatten's wrong with a mis-statement to Liaqat Ali Khan is evident from documents available in the archives. There is also a possibility that a written instruction would have been sent with further instruction, to destroy it, as is noticed in such cases where the documents were not destroyed, despite instructions.175 Mountbatten was worried about the Sikh problem in the Punjab. His advice to Radcliffe that while balancing up the boundaries of West Pakistan, he would bear the Sikh problem in mind. Mountbatten's advice did work to the extent that he awarded Zira and Ferozepur Tehsils again to India (East Punjab).176

Radcliffe Award had been delivered to the Viceroy on 12th August 1947. But Mountbatten did not let it publish till 16th August, ostensibly because of Sikh trouble, in-fact to keep secret before Indian Independence that a passage to Kashmir from India had been granted.177 Hodson's apology that Kashmir was in nobody's mind when Gurdaspur District was being awarded to India. Its importance, according to him, was realized only when the Indian troops passed on to Srinagar through Pathankot.178 According to Ch. Muhammad Ali, one of the two Secretaries of the Partition Council, he was advised by Liaqat Ali Khan to see
Ismay on 9th August and convey to him the great concern of Jinnah on the issue. He warned if Gurdaspur District was awarded to India, it would be considered a political rather than a judicial Award. There had been quite some discussion on the Award whether or not it was changed under the influence of Mountbatten. At a time when this injustice to Pakistan was about to be brought it was decided to bring it to the notice of the Security Council. England again came in with pressure that Pakistan avoided it.

The entire record of the India Office on the Transfer of Power and the British Foreign Policy archives, during the period, show how English bias against Pakistan had been sustained, to keep alive Indian interest to remain in British Commonwealth. Besides, Jawahar Lal Nehru, rather than Muhammad Ali Jinnah, was considered a leader of international status, by Mountbatten and the Government in England. Mountbatten’s friendship with Nehru and his unfriendly feelings for Jinnah are noted in these lines earlier. After the sad demise of Jinnah on 11th September, 1948, the Indian leadership began grudging Mountbatten's decision of precipitating the transfer of Powers from June 1948, to August 1947, notwithstanding the fact that it was done by the Viceroy on the advice of the Congress leadership. Jinnah's serious illness was now revealed after his death, which made the Indian leadership repent of earlier Transfer of Power. According to the Indian leaders, without an active Jinnah Muslim League leadership would have accepted United India at least under threats of practical difficulties of the partition. Mountbatten, too, stated after his return to England if he knew about Jinnah's illness, he would have, with little hesitation, postponed the transfer of Power for another year.

However, Mountbatten’s statement could be considered as another evidence of his supporting the political ambitions of the Indian National Congress. This also creates doubts in the integrity and loyalty of all British officers, including Provincial
governors, and army chief in Pakistan, who may be in frequent communication with Mountbatten, serving against Pakistan’s interest.

Concluding from the above lines, it may not be difficult to suggest that the Indian Politics had its three phases in the evolution of its independence struggle. In its first phase it remained busy in keeping out the Muslims from the Legislative Reforms, which began from 1892 onward. In the Second Phase, the Congress began challenging the Muslim claims of one third representations in Legislatures and Services, and punishing them of their doggedness and obstinacy during their Provincial rule (1937-39); they opened up their venomous propaganda against the Muslim League, Jinnah, and Pakistan. In the last phase, with certainty of the Partition of India having appeared, their sole effort was to cripple Pakistan with whatever means possible. Kashmir’s accession to India included in the last phase of the Indian politics, before the Partition, which continued as the undercurrent of the Indian Foreign Policy during the post Independent India.

Notes and References

3- Rudra, A. B: (1940) Viceroy and Governor-General of India, Humphrey Milford Oxford University Press, p.145.


7a- Ibid, pp 27-35

8- Bannerjea, Surrindra Nath: A Nation in the Making pp: 125-131. For differences between the two groups see Mujandar, History and Culture, op.cit. pp. 573-589.


11- Ibid, pp273, 301-5.


13- Vithal Bhai Patel (President Legislative Assembly), Sir Sankaran Nair, (Chairman Cabinet Committee for Parliamentary Affairs) and Jayakar, mediated between Irwin and Gandhi, facilitating the negotiations. See Gugh Tinker: Viceroy’s Curzon to Mountbatten pp.126, Oxford University Press, London. Dodwell and Sethi, op.cit, suggest that the Pact was concluded with the mediation of the Liberal Congressite. Tej Bahadur Sapru and Jayakar, p. 613

14- This was an assurance to Muslims on their demands. See Resolution of All India League from April 1940 to April 1941; Resolution No: 1 quoted by I. H. Qureshi (1965), The Struggle for Pakistan, p.156, Karachi University.

15- Gweyer and Appadorai: Speeches and Documents on Indian Constitution.


18- For details see Sayyid Tufaiil Ahmad (Urdu, 1946), Musalmanon Ka Roushan Mustaqbil, Badayun Press, and Ruh-i-Roushan Mustaqbil, Badayun Press, 1946.

19- Bannerjea, Surinendra Nath (1925), A Nation in the Making pp.74,84.


21- Defence against Urdu Language in the language controversy, the very existence of the Aligarh College was threatened; see G.F.I. Graham (1909). Sir Syed Ahmed Khan, London, Abdul Hamid, Muslim Separatism, pp.38-40.


24- Qureshi, I. H. op.cit, p. 45; Tilak and Gokhle were political opponents see Mujandar 1983 History and Culture Struggle for Pakistan, V. Bhavan Books, Bombay, pp.582-89.

25- Nineteen out of 27 elected members of Indian Legislature, prepared a draft Constitution for India called the Declaration of Rights. It was presented to Lord Chelmsford, see Abdul Hamid Muslims Separatism p.122.

26- The Indian National Congress and the All India Muslim League did not agree on any political issue thereafter. The Hindu – Muslim Question continued to tax wits of the Indian politicians until the Communal Award of August 1932, see I. H. Qureshi op.cit pp.46-63.


31- Hamid, Abdul p.193

32- Ibid.

33- Dr. Ambedkar suggests that Muslim demands were not very big. No serious attempt was made to bridge up the gap. See Pakistan or the Partition of India, Thackers Publishing House, Bombay, 1946, p.304.

34- Dodwell and Sethi (1958) op.cit., p.613.

35- Wedgwood Burn wrote to Irwin to come to terms with the Congress so that R.T.C. could be more useful. See B. R. Nanda (1958) Mahatma Gandhi, pp.301-3, London.
36- Ibid.


38- For details see Ch. Khaleeq-uz-Zaman (1961), Pathway to Pakistan, p.157, Longman, Green, London.

39- For Gandhi’s dictatorial position in the Congress see A. R. Bannerji: Dictatorship by Proxy in India, Asiatic Review, July 1938, pp. 565-69.

40- The Viceroy appointed some prominent Muslims in the Defence Council, without the knowledge of All India Muslims League. Later on the Govt. informed the Quaid-i-Azam and sought his cooperation. The Quaid took an exception of the Viceroy’s conduct, asking Muslim members to resign. Those who did not, were expelled from the Muslim League. See I. H. Qureshi Struggle for Pakistan, pp.174-75.


45- Civil and Military Gazette, 10th July, 1943.

46- Ahmed, Jamil-ud-Din: Some Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah, Muhammad Ashraf, Lahore, 1952 (2 vols), ii, pp.130, 132 The Formula was the Partition of India
on the basis of Muslim and Hindu majority areas on the basis of self determination and adult Franchise.

50- Tej Bahadur Sapru, a Liberal Congressite was Chairman of the Conciliation Committees, not representing any political party. Jinnah refused to negotiate with it since it was not a representative body, as such unauthorized, see I. H. Qureshi op. cit. p.225.


53- Wavell’s Speeches, 1943-47, Govt. of India Publication, New Delhi 1948, pp.73-76.

54- Khaliq-uz-Zaman, Khaliq: Path way to Pakistan. p 113.


56- Ibid; see also V.P. Menon: Transfer of Power in India, pp 206-7

57- Ibid; see also E. W. R. Lumby: The Transfer of Powers in India, pp 54-56.

58- Ibid.


60- The Congress was trying to upset Muslim League, the largest Parliamentary Party in the Punjab, forming a coalition government with the Unionists and Akali Dal. See Qalbi-Abid. Muslim Politics in the Punjab 1921-47, Vangread Lahore, 1992, pp.280-91, It is suggested that the Governor of the Punjab was also involved with the Congress to keep League out of the government. Ibid p.322.
61- Command Papers 6821 paras 4-11, quoted by I. H. Qureshi Struggle for Pakistan, p.259.

62- ibid paras 15-17.

63- Raoof, A. Meet Mr. Jinnah, Muhammad Ashraf, Lahore, 1945.


65- Command Papers 6861 quoted by I. H. Qureshi Struggle for Pakistan, p.266.

66- Menon, V. P. Transfer of Power, p.274.


68- The Economists 7 August 1946.


72- Qureshi, I. H. Struggle for Pakistan, p.275.


76- Ibid.

77- House of Common Debates 431-55, 12 December 49, Col:1363-69 (quoted by I.H.Qureshi p.281)

78- Ibid.

80- Ibid, The only important Portfolio offered to Muslim League was Finance, in a hope that Muslims, not usually composed to Financial Management, may make a fun of themselves in the forthcoming Annual Budget and be subjected to mockery, ibid. p.85.

81- The Indian National Congress began hectic efforts to oust Muslim League from the Interim Government. Ibid, p.96. Mansergh includes a demand from Sardar Patel that the Muslim League may resign from the Interim Govt. to form a separate government. See Minutes of Viceroys 56th Staff Meeting item 4 Vol-XII, p.66.

82- Johnson, Campbell: (1953) Mission with Mountbatten, Robert Hale, London, p.44.


85- Indian Annual Register 1944, vol.ii pp.129-30 has given full text of the proposal, based upon the majority regions of Muslims and Hindus. Khaliq-uz-Zaman has given just the summary, see Pathway to Pakistan.

86- Johnson, Campbell: Mission with Mountbatten, p.58.

87- Ibid, p.72.

88- Ibid.

89- Ibid, Jinnah’s assurance to Mountbatten in his meeting on 12 April, 1947.
Nature of Indian Politics before 1947


92- Menon, V. P.: Transfer of Power in India, p.370.

93- Johnson, Campbell: Mission with Mountbatten, p.87.

94- Ali, Ch. Muhammad: Emergence of Pakistan, p.137.

95- Pyarelal: Gandhi, p.171.

96- Ibid, pp 84, 185.

96a- The new Plan was prepared by Menon. It was opposed by Lord Ismay and Abell. But Mountbatten persisted on and carried on the Plan with the author for final approval, see Mosley, The Days of British Raj.

97- The seven leaders were: Nehru, Patel, Kriplani, Jinnah, Liaqat Ali, Abdur Rab Nishter and Baldev Singh see Ch. Muhammad Ali Emergence of Pakistan, p.149.


100- Jinnah's Statement in the Federal Structure Committee, supporting Hyderabad Deccan's plea see Coupland Constitutional Problems, p.153

101- Ali, Ch. Muhammad Emergence of Pakistan, p.229.

102- Ibid


105- Ibid.
The Quit Kashmir Movement was launched in Kashmir by Sh. Abdullah in alliance with the I.N.C. against the Dogra ruler. Mir Wais also supported the Movement since the Muslim Conference was already in revolt against HariSingh's atrocities since 1930. Pandit R.C. Kak (Prime Minister Kashmir) got arrested both Sh. Abdullah and Ghulam Abbas, before the Movement could become dangerous. ibid p.46.

Menon, V.P: The Story of Integration of the Indian States, p.78.


Ibid.


Ibid.

Mountbatten gave a reception in honour of the Princes in July and politically influenced each one of the prince to join Indian Union. See Mountbatten: (1949) Time only to Look Forward, N. Kaye, London, pp.39-42.

Mountbatten had already met Nehru in Singapur and was highly impressed by him. Nehru knew the future of assignment of Mountbatten and the later, also knew that Nehru was the future Prime Minister of India. Indian politics must have been on the agenda of their talk, as much as the Muslim League and their political ambitions. See Collins Freedom at Midnight p.84.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid, p.89

Gandhi, the Indian god-father, was considered responsible for the Congress's rejecting Cripps Mission, the Wavell Plan and the Cabinet Mission Plan. His status as spiritual leader, Bapu, earned him overwhelming support of the majority, resisting or
rejecting any decision of the Congress to Executive Council or that of the Congress High Command. See Collin p.93 On his invitation from Mountbatten on the letters coronation ceremony, he dictated his acceptance immediately and then advised his Steno to post the acceptance letter after some days “lest the Youngman (Viceroy) may feel, I am dying to meet him.” ibid p.89. Gandhi’s own disciple doubted his credibility for he frequently denied what he had said earlier.

118- Ibid.
120- Ibid, p.97.
121- Ibid, p.103.
122- Johnson, Campbell: Mission with Mountbatten.
123- Ibid.
124- Ibid.
125- Ibid.
126- Hussain Shaheed Suhurwardi was expelled from the All India Muslim League in 1946 in view of his activities against Pakistan Plan and the Muslim interests. See Campbell Johnson, Mission with Mountbatten, p.66.
127- Lamb: Kashmir a Disputed Legacy, p.126. Pyarelal suggests that the scheme of Greater Bengal was initiated by Mahatma Gandhi who met at Calcutta Surat Chandra Bose (brother of Sobhesh Chandra Bose), Hussain Shaheed Suhrewardi and Abdul Hashim, the Secretary of the Bengal Muslim League. Gandhi based the case of Greater Bengal on common language, culture, and history of the Hindus and Muslims. The scheme was intended to refute Two Nation Theory of the Muslim League. The scheme was opposed by the Maha Sabha leader, Shyama Prasad Mokherji, see Pyarelal: Gandhi, pp:170-80.
Ibid.


V.P. Menon was the eldest member of a poor family and a street boy, having joined the Viceroy’s Secretariat in 1929. He reached the position of Executive Secretary to the Viceroy with personal efforts. See Lamb, p.108.

Ibid, p.103.

Zaidi, Zawwar Hussain (ed) Jinnah Papers vol.i, part.ii, Appendix 12, Document No.4., National Archives, Govt. of Pakistan.

Ibid.

ibid, Document No:37.

Ibid.

Ibid.

ibid, Document No:52.

Ali, Ch. M: Emergence of Pakistan, p.149.


Winston Churchill: later on was greatly annoyed on Mountbatten’s tricks. When back to London after completing his Governor-Generalship for a year in India, he was given a warm welcome by Anthony Eden. Churchill glowered a pointing threatening finger at him as he strode towards Churchill without stretched arm. “Dickie! You stand there. What you did to us in India was like whipping your riding crop across my face.” S.Wolpert, Nehru, Oxford, New York, 1996, p.101.

The 3 June Plan.


The Dawn, New, Delhi 4 June 1947.
144 - Lamb: Kashmir is a disputed legacy, p.103.


147 - Jankins to Mountbatten, 3 May 1947, Transfer of Power, vol.x, D.298. The Sikhs were demanding Jalundar, Ambala, Lahore, and Montgomery Divisions.


150 - Transfer of Power vol.x, Annexure to Doc.454 and 473, see also Viceroy's Council Papers dated 2 June 1947.


Nehru's accession predictions going wrong are noted by his biographers.

Nehru became the first Prime Minister of India. His accession predictions going wrong are noted by his biographers.


Transfer of Power, vol.xi, Doc. 506. cf. Ch. Muhammad Ali, op.cit. p.174 such a difficulty was experienced by F.M. Auchinleck, who when referred to by Gen. Gracy on Jinnah's orders to send troops to Kashmir, insisted upon neutrality of British Officers.


Hassain, F.M.: (1978) Gilgit the Northern Gate of India, Asia Publishing House, New Delhi, pp. 146, 158.

Lamb, Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy, p.105

Transfer of Power, vol.xi, D.201, Menon advised Mountbatten to destroy this letter after reading it. But it is still preserved in Mountbatten Papers.

Collins, Freedom at Midnight, p.205.


Ibid.

Transfer of Power, vol.xii, Provisional Map is included at the end of the volume; see also Qalb-i-Abid: Muslim Politics in the Punjab, Lahore 1992, p.333.


171- Sherwani, Latif: Partition of Indian and Mountbatten, p.125.

172- Transfer of Power, vol.xii, D.395

173- Ibid.


175- Mountbatten letter to Ismay 2 April 1948 (regarding the Boundary Award of Bengal) had instructions at the end that the letter be destroyed. But the letter is on record see Ismay Papers vol.iii, 7/27.

176- Ali, Ch. Muhammad: Emergence of Pakistan, p.219; See also Justice Munir’s Report dated 5 August 47 Proceedings of the Partition p.243.

177- Jinnah claimed Calcutta in East Bengal which was over ruled by overwhelming Hindu population see Collins: Freedom at Midnight, p.212. Hence the delay.


180- Note of Noel Baker to Attlee 26 Feb.1948 L/ POJ/ 10/ 119.


183- Husain, Dr. Ijaz: (2004) Dimensions of Pakistan India Relations, Heritage Publication, Lahore quotes a British historian Andrew Roberts saying that circumstantial evidence prove Mountbatten’s
involvement in Kashmir. Another evidence from the Diary of George Cunningham it is narrated that when Frank Masservy, C.i.n.C. of Pakistan Army entered to check the tribesmen in Kashmir, he found Mountbatten directing military operation to Indian Troops p.354.