Political Islam, the book under review, contains eight sections; the first being introductory, the rest all with four articles each, under different themes, and captioned; Modern Understandings and Explanations of Islamism (section two), Political Islam, the State and Political Power (section three), Political Islam and Democracy (section four), Islamic Movements in Multicultural Settings (section five), Political Islam and Political Violence (section six), the Globalization of Islamism (section seven), and the Future Political Islam (section eight). The last article in section eight, which the editor has put in is The End of Islamism? Turkey’s Model, which speaks well of the tempo of the publication. It may be difficult to review all 29 articles in this book, nevertheless an effort shall be made to square up misconceptions about Islam, which seems taxing Western wits and intelligence, at the present. It may be noted at the outset that all the articles included in this book were already published earlier in different journals, which have been republished under relevant sections.

How little the West is aware of Islam is evident form what Volpi states: “for many non-specialists, Islamism is seen as a modern phenomenon, something that really took off in the late 1970s and early 1980s with the Islamic Revolution in Iran, and the mujahidins struggle against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. It is a process that culminated at the turn of the century with the event of 9/11 and the decade of the ‘War on Terror’. Is Islamism that
new? The editor (Volpi) questions which is responded in four articles of section two.

Political Islam and Islamism are terms which the people ignorant of Islam, in Christianity and Judaism, usually apply to consider Divine Messages to match erring human vision in isms. The Jewish denial of Christianity was as unjustifiable as the Christians denial of Islam. All of these Divine religions were complete code of human life for their respective eras: the last Message, Islam, for all the times until the Day of Resurrection. Whether one believes it or not, Islam is suited to all models of human cultures provided the believers obey. What to do and what not to do (Awamir-o-Nahee). Ideologies and issues are subjective to human thought and philosophy open to frequent changes, which no Divine Message can stand. All such terminologies are a result of scholar’s innocence of the Divine religions. What Talal Asad, Siba Mahmood, Hussain Agrama, Steve Niva and Lisa Hajjar may have suggested, was perhaps not “to capture the state”, as the author himself noted (p.14) but a reaction of the state activism against the Muslims in general, so prevalent in the West after the 9/11 incident.

Politics in Islam is different form Muslim politics, whether of the past or present. But the Muslim political norms today are identical to what Hirchkind suggests. “Protestant Christianity plays an extremely important role in U.S. politics in setting the moral boundaries and concerns within which political discussions unfold, and hence can be considered the premier political institutions in some sense” (p.14). At another place, he adds again: “I do not refer here to the lobbying efforts of church group and other religious advocacy associations, but rather to the way a pervasive Christianity has been to a varying degree a constitutive element of Western political institutions.” (ibid). This exactly is the situation in Muslim countries, where Islamic laws molded in localized cultural politics are injected to political institution. In some countries, such institutions reach maturity and work
smoothly in national development. In other countries, (such as Pakistan) the process is still under development. Hirschkind rightly concludes: “Terms such as Political Islam are inadequate here as they frame our enquiries around a posited distortion or corruption of properly religious practice.” (p. 15).

Salwa Ismail’s Being Muslim: Islam, Islamism and Identity Politics (2.2) is a fairly convincing explanation arising today in Western Societies. However his view that “the interaction of religion and politics in the contemporary period has been associated with the rise of the Islamist movements in the Middle East from the 1970s on,” may not be very true. There were a number of Muslim movements earlier which failed and some succeeded. (Sanusi succeeded in Algeria and Tunis but Muslim Brotherhood failed in Egypt and so the Mehdivist movement in Sudan). Khomeini’s successes in Iran were infact a reaction against the Shah’s imperialistic infrastructure and his socio-religious corruption in metropolitan cities against the primitive backward, social norms in rural areas. Khomeini’s message uprooted the artificial bondages in the urban societies to give a new culture, of course identical to Islamic teachings. It disappointed the West (most particularly the U.S.A.) for the Shah had long since been emerged as U.S. protégé both in person as well as in Iranian metropolitan culture.

Salwa observes: “Islamist actors can be classified, largely, in to militants, conservatives, and moderates.” Each of these grouping tends to be characterized by particular social origins and modes of action.” (p. 17) This is not wholly incorrect except for the militant groups. This group was not born as such but created under anti-Muslim activism in Eastern Europe, Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Kashmir. The type of repression against unarmed Muslims of Bosnia, Herzegovina, Palestine and more recently against Iraq and Afghanistan was committed by respective state could only produce the type of militants we see moving around. In Kashmir, there is hardly a Muslim family, which has not suffered from the
Indian forces, with all possible torches and killings. The entire Western community remains a silent spectator because, it were the Muslims on the receiving end. Any maltreatment to a Christian in the East for whatever reason became a matter of serious concern for the same Western countries. What could be its possible outcome? The militants, who become so to revenge and satisfy their inner self. If today the West stops exploiting the resources of the Muslim countries, and totally withdraw from the areas, the terrorism shall die a natural death.

Salwa has yet another question. He observes: “In current accounts of Islamism, we are presented with either the alienated subject of modernity or with the confused subject of post-modernity.” (p.22) What is modernity or post-modernity after all? If it is molding life to facilitate with modern living patterns i.e. use of electronic accessories and other home equipments and transportation, they have nothing to challenge Islamic values and norms. On the contrary, if modernism or post-modernism is personal, particularly in female projection in some what nudity, then of course, Muslims abhor it, and they should, not for others. They are not religiously allowed to interfere. It is for only Muslim women. This is what Salwa observes: “some scholars have argued that process associated with modernity and with post-modernity such as objectification, rationalization, individualization and relativization, have contributed to the definition of contemporary Muslim Self.” (p.22) This is true that Muslims do care for their religious identity, where ever they live; but they too absorb to some extent other cultures in their day to day life. It is alright so long as they do not surpass limitations bound by religion. Salwa says: “with the spread of literacy and the expansion of education, Muslims no longer rely solely on religious authorities to understand and make sure of their religion.” (ibid) This is surprising, especially coming from men with perception of high learning. Expertise and specialization is the need which has immensely enhanced in the present world. This is prevalent in the Western World more than else where. In all walks of human
activity we have developed a craze to consult a specialist, which even top educational qualification and professional experiences does not prevent. We all consult, physicians, surgeons, civil engineers, architects etc at time of need, despite learned. The clerics are also specialists in religious studies. I wonder if there is any harm in consulting them, particularly for those who are not much conversant with the sources of knowledge in the religion. This is subject to your personal satisfaction and this is true with others, too, whom you consult as experts.

One cannot but agree with Salwa when he concludes: “taking account of the sociality and historicity of religion it is central to understanding the production of religious identity in the public sphere. In other words the identity constructed is rational; it shapes and shaped by other social dimensions, such as gender, class and lifestyle.”(p.26)

François Bongat’s: From National Struggle to the Disillusionments of Decolonization. The triple temporality of Islamism (2-3) is a formal analysis of early Muslim movements of North Africa and Egypt in the Nineteenth century. These movements, according to Bongat were anti-imperialism. There were other such movements like the Yemenite and the Iranian (Dr. Mussadaq’s) which failed despite anti-imperialist. Finally Bongat examines the Al-Qaeda’s activism first against the Soviets (jihad against Afghanistan supported by the U.S.) and later against the U.S. and the consequent war against terrorism (still in the running). Bongat, in his conclusion just reminds the causes of the 9/11 attacks.

Mohammed Ayoob’s “Deciphering Islamic Multiple Voices – Intellectual Luxury or Strategic Necessity?” is an analysis with different dimensions. Asking a question ‘who speaks for Islam?’ he suggests that it has been a matter of great concern in Europe and the U.S.A. Eversince the Princeton historian Bernard Lewis, and most vividly presented by Harvard Political Scientist Samuel
Hatington, in fact predates the events of 9/11, their arguments suggesting Islam as fundamentalist or of the activist, has acquired more credibility in the West. (p.44) He further adds, “the major impact of this essentialist and monolithic interpretation of Islam on Western perception is not merely to paint all Muslims with the same black brush, but also to accord the most extremist and violent elements in the Muslim world the position of authentic spokes person for Islam... for they are able to quote selectively from the Quran and the tradition of the Prophet (P.B.U.H.), and stretch the meanings of such quotes through very creative interpretations, to justify killing civilians” (ibid) (Ayub quotes from Quinton Wiktorowicz: A Genealogy of Radical Islam, Studies in Conflicts and Terrorism Vol. 2, No. 2 March-April 2005) Ayub, too, derives such perceptions to be Islamic. But he adds that “just as there is no Islamic monolith, currently there is no single individual group or institution that can rightfully claim to speak for Muslims, let alone on behalf of Islam.” (ibid) He also quotes Robert Hefner (Introduction: Modernity and the Re-Making of Muslim Politics, in his own edited book: Remaining Muslim Politics: Pluralism, Contestation, Democratization, Princeton, New Jersey, 2005), how Muslim disagree in their belief as to who qualifies as a religious authority and whom the ordinary Muslim should follow? According to Ayub, “Islam has neither a pope nor a clearly delineated religious hierarchy. While a loose hierarchical traditions does exist among the Shia clergy, even in Shia Islam, which is minority branch, there is currently no single individual source of religious authority with the title of Marj-i-Taqleed”. (p.45). It is here that Islam, Shia Islam, Sunni Islam, or any other attributed Islam is misunderstood because of some incorrect perceptions on Islam itself. With its Divine beginning, it turned out to be non-Divine after the demise of the Holy Prophet (P.B.U.H.), with different followers practices, claiming each one of them as sunnah. The Holy Prophet (P.B.U.H.) practiced Islam for 23 years, thirteen years in Mecca and ten years in Medina. Those who followed him were mostly those who lived in Hijaz. Other Muslims, living at distant places, followed only what they
learnt from the Divine instructions from others i.e. the non-Divines. This created some differences in following the Traditions. But it was Muslim Culture as it did not change the Divine basics of Islam. They are similar in all the Muslim schools of thought. Unlike the variant organs of Christianity which divided the Church fundamentally i.e. Catholics, Methodists, Evangelicals/Calvanists and Protestants, all Muslim schools of thought, irrespective of their cultural differences, assemble to perform the pilgrimage every year for a month or so, forgetful of whatever variations they have of their own culture. Not in Ahram (the Hajj dress) they worship in their cultural dress unnoticed by others, while they prostrait before the Al-Mighty. In Islam ‘Intention’ (Niyyah) is important than the practice of a ritual. This brief explanation is just to stand as an identity of the fact that Muslim culture is emanated from Islam but it is not Islam. It is known as Muslim culture. Those who are different spokesman of Islam as Ayub suggests, represent their different cultures and cultural practices. In Shiite Islam whatever variance, it is so nominal even in cultural Islam. But in the basic principles (USUL) they are united with one voice.

Khomeini’s advent against the Shah of Iran, did give his movement a political colour and he did find some opposition among the Iranian clergy. But he was supported by Najaf (Iraq) and Beirut (Lebanon). These differences were only temporary. Once the dust was settled, it was all squared up. There is no comparison between the times of Ayatullah Barujardi and Ayatullah Khomeini. Iranian society was not that corrupt earlier as under metropolitan Tehran. Ayatullah Sistani and Ayatullah Bahrir Hussain, too, supported morally the Khomeini Revolution. They, all of them, are authorities, who speak for Islam with confidence and they were listened to as the people flocked around the others in early era, Imam Abu Hanifa, Imam Shafii, Imam Malik and Imam Hanbal. They retained the focus for learning through their Ijtihad (Decree) without dividing one Muslim from another. But with the passage of time the value of these Doctrinal
Interpretations, were deemed outdated and the doors of Ijtihad were opened (Shah Waliullah) in the 18th century, followed by many other Muslim scholars including Abul Aala Maodudi in the 20th century. Ayub's contention that the emergence of a number of Muslim state in West Asia, South Asia, Central Asia and South East Asia, besides many in North Africa, have undermined the authority of the Ulema. (p.47). This is, perhaps, not a correct assessment because behind the independence movement in each one of the Muslim country there did exist some religious movement, headed by the Ulema class which speaks well of their popularity. In fact, it was this popularity of the Ulema class which fostered in the Muslim community sectarianism, fanaticism and also in-tolerance. Ayub's thesis that localization of the Ulema predication to the respective countries, too, harm their common goals as now their religious and national goals seemed identical. (p.48). Nevertheless, it is correct that one off-shoot of sectarianism and on developing polarization was that they formed small fanatic militant groups to ply them against other sects which resisted their views with logic.

Ayub's view that the Shia Ulema were more disciplined and articulated than Sunni Ulema, (p. 50) is perhaps not correct. For late, at least in Pakistan, they are better organized with sound religious educational standards. Madrasa Deoband of Taqi Uthmani i.e. Jamia Binnorya (Karachi) Jamia-i-Ashrafia and Jamia Naeemiya (Lahore) are good examples.

Towards the end Muhammad Ayoob has highlighted his thesis that without centralized Islam, it is difficult to identify a single Islamic spokes person.

Guilain Denoex: The Forgotten Swamp. Navigating Political Islam is another such perception or misperception of Islam which appears reading 2.5 in the book under review. The chapter itself seems to be a reactionary attempt against the electronic media trial of the U.S. war against terrorism in Afghanistan symbolizing
it as Islamic fundamentalism or Islamic radicalism, with a title as Denoeux suggest “We need to drain the swamp”. (p.55) He questions, “Are Muslim fundamentalists merely the expressions with in Islamic world, of a broader fundamentalist trend visible in other great religious traditions? Why do so many scholars prefer the term Islamism to fundamentalism?” (ibid). This is besides his query about the position of Usama bin Laden and that of Taliban in “the broader spectrum of Islamic phenomenon (ibid). Apart from some explanations to the terms, the authors observes: it is imperative that the concepts used in the discussions be fully understood in their complexion and reunification.” (p.55). He adds “the Central objective of this paper is to contribute to such a goal” (p.56)

Differentiating rightly the difference between Muslim and Islamic, Denoeux makes a note on the fundamentalist approaches of other religions: Christians, Hindu, Sikhs and Jews. But Islamic fundamentalism to him, is a reactive movement, driven by individuals who have come to feel that their faith faces a deadly threat to their survival.” (p.57). What an intriguing and provocative apology of the West. Instead of straight away admitting the fact what Andrew Shryock (Islamic Phobia and Islamic Philea) confessed: “The fast conversion of the West to Islam”, Denoeux made it due to the threat to the very existence of Islam. What a wishful thinking? It is more surprising for a person who recognizes difference between Islam and Muslim culture. Even if the author would have suggested that the culture of the fundamentalist was under threat, that would be incorrect too, for they were indeed reactionary against the Western exploitation of the Muslim resources and wide scale Muslim Killings. Denoeux adds, “two prominent students of religious fundamentalism have noted that the concept applies to ‘beleaguered believers’ who, when confronted with the encroachment of outsiders who threaten to draw (them) into a syncretistic, irreligious or irreligious culture milieus,” go back to their faith basic and practices in an effort to ‘preserve their distinctive identity as a
people or group". (p.57) (Oliver Roy: The Future of Political Islam, Cambridge-Harvard University Press, 1994). Denoeux has made a reference to Shah Waliullah of the Eighteenth century and his contemporary: Muhammad bin Abdul Wahab in Najd (presently Saudi Arabia among his followers) who preached, what the author has alluded to the movement of the so-called fundamentalist today. This is what is called putting the cart before the horse.

Denoeux derives that the word ‘fundamentalist’ is correct in the context of Islam for the ardent faith in the Holy Book and the Holy Traditions and the practice according to their teachings makes all Muslims fundamentalist not just one group which is alleged to be following the Islamic fundamentalism (p57). He adds: ‘Most important, to the extent that Islamic fundamentalists do not necessarily claim to have a political project and do not necessarily enter the political arena, the word ‘fundamentalism’ is not well suited to analyzing those movements that use Islamic referents to wage political battles’ (p.57). What an innocent, at the same time ignorant statements about Islam and its precepts. Politics is the very basis of Islamic fabric. A better society organized, disciplined, sympathetic, caring, sacrificing with resources both moral and material, and strong against the unfriendly and hostile, is an ideal of Islam well demonstrated during early years of its polity before the rise of monarchical regimes. At times, when political expansionism was the cherished goal, all around, the message of Islam was of healing the wounds with love, affection and serving humanity, irrespective of religious affiliation. This was the verdict of the Divine (The Holy Qurran) followed then, and it is even current today. But they defended Muslim polity yesterday and they are still busy in defending their community, despite there are many, who unknowingly, play in the hands of their enemies. Deneoux’s comparison of fundamentalism between Muslims, Christian and Jews is subjective without a logical base. Comparisons are usually odd, but if analysed with reason they are meaningful and effective. The
author does not recognize that Christian fundamentalism was aggressive opportunism and so of The Jews, but of the Muslims only defensive against the frequent onslaught against them. History of Europe, after the death of President Titu of Yugoslavia, and the ensuing annihilation of the Chechens in Bosnia and Herzegovina; the U.S. attacks on Iraq and Afghanistan, finally built up Al-Qaeda (1988) sponsored by US, through arms and dollars earlier. Students of History were unaware of any terminology alike Muslim Fundamentalism during or after the cold war. Deneoux has rightly concluded ‘that in particular they (Christian and Jew fundamental movements) failed to highlight that the military occupation and the neocolonial exploitation of one side by the other have been key forces behind the rise of the so called Muslim Fundamentalism in Palestine’. (p. 58).

Deneoux’s explanation of Salafism and Wahabism is interesting. He has traced some spread of Wahabi influence in the Muslim world with Saudi’s affluence, besides some debates on Islamism or Political Islamism or Political Islam, Islamism and modernity, (p. 60) Islamism versus Fundamentalism or Salafism (p. 61) etc. He has also carried some interesting conclusions, analyzing varied Jihadi movements in and around Afghanistan. A comprehensive review on all what Deneoux has said should need a hundred pages or more.

Section three of the book: Political Islam, the State and Political Power aims at moving into domain of explanation to assess the many theories about Islamism and how successful (or not) they have been in deciphering the key aspects of the Islamist phenomenon for domestic and international politics.” (p. 81). Fredric Volpi, the editor of the Book, reflecting his ignorance about the Universality of the Holy Quran observes, “the language of Islam expressed in a primitive religious idiom some basic political concern that local population could not yet express using a modern political vocabulary and tools”. (p. 82). This is what I said earlier the Western ignorance about Islam which need
education and acknowledgment. The editor does not recognize Muslim democrat sovereign state except the post-Iranian Revolution set-up in Iran and its sustenance. He observes, “it was not until the Islamic Revolution that political Islam was deemed to be truly viable state actor – and analysis – how normally the Islamic Republic behaved in a world of nation states. (p.82).

This section carries four papers. The first by Gudrun Kramer who highlight the difficulties in Muslim states to practice Western type of democratic institutions, particularly in good governance. Kramer rightly suggests that the political program of the Muslim states does not include a blueprint for organizing political institution. “Ideologies and activists are more concerned with the morality required to sustain an Islamic state”. (p.82). This is true to some extent and also that its wrong application causes impediments in good governance of the country.

Tames Piscaton's second paper on Religion and Real polity, Islamic responses to the Gulf War, reflects some cold and hot reactions of Pro and Anti-Saddam adventures, without creating any side impact on the past position of the Islamic state in the Middle East. The states indifference of the Muslim countries, did multiply the anti-West feelings supporting the militancy groups, already existing in some areas.

The third paper of Mahmood Mamdani: Good Muslim Bad Muslim, a Political Perspective on Culture and Terrorism, is fairly a good attempt to highlight how the Western instrumentalization of the Afghan Mujahidin in the 1980s and of the Taliban in 1990s contributed to articulate an Islamist message that was violent but tactically useful for the internal actors involved in the conflict. Only when these Islamist organization ceased to be useful for external sponsors or became hindrances...their dangerousness begin to be phrased in terms of religious agenda'. (p.82). This instrumentalist approach, the author pleads, is still current in the war on terror.
The fourth and the last paper in this section by Salman Sayyid: The Islamist Impasse? It is a basic fear which delimits the realm of opportunities for positive exercise in Muslim politics. Gauged form the Western parameter, these attempts seems a failure or unstable. Salman rightly suggests that “Political Islam wakes the possibility of an international order less grounded on the notions of sovereign nation states, which chimes with some of the transformation induced by the contemporary process of globalization”. (p.83). Salman has a genuine reason to conclude that the Eastern democratic setups have indigenous modest bound by their political cultures and socio-economic bond, which remain repeated under threat from the West – in particular from the solo superpower. He concludes: “Islamism in a project that draws much of its strength form a conviction that there is no need for a detour through the labyrinth of Western history, before one can arrive at a vision of a good life and a just order – universal values can be generated from Islam”.(p. 133).

There are a number of intriguing readings in the last five sections, but reviewing each one of the article may not be possible except the last one by Jenny B. White: The End of Islamism? Turkey’s Muslim-hood Model. The author’s explanation of his thesis is interesting which is being presented in a long question but selective. He observes: “The Radical period is over, predicted Akaf Beki, Ankara correspondent for the Islamic television station, Kanal 7. Islamism has become ‘religion’ relegated to the civil realm, found only in religious communities, no longer in the state…Islamism has become Muslimhood” (P. 446). The author supports the statement of Akaf Beki with another – a politician scholar Mehmet Aydin, minister in the new Justice and Development Party (AKP) government; this party won the election in November 2002 with enough votes to form a government. Aydin insists that his party no longer accepts the label “Moderate Islamists”; rather, party members consider themselves as moderate Muslims, whose religious ethics inspire their public service as individuals but cannot be construed as party of their identity as political actor in the public sphere. AKP is a
political movement and the movement actors have a very warm, close relationship, primarily as individuals to...religious experience...At the moment, I believe that all the ministers are fasting...We are religious people, but our actions in the public sphere...do not have religious side or a theological meanings.”(ibid). He (Aydin) then, compares himself with George W. Bush, who, too, supported his faith based religious programs. Such a close relationship also exists in Europe where the Church and the State have close relationship.(ibid). Jenny supporting his thesis presents another statement of a Turkish Islamist scholar Ali Bulac, who claims to have distanced himself entirely form Islamism, saying that it was a period now over, as people lived their belief within a pluralist framework. (ibid). The author, quoting the founder of Modern Turkey, (Kamal Ataturk, without referring to the works of religious ideal, Mustafa Kamil), defends state secularism saying, “In Turkey a series of secular governments, backed by a fieriest kamalist military have implemented this model by setting legal curbs on religious expression in public. Religious insignia of all kinds whether turban or Roman collar are forbidden on the street, women’s head covering, while tolerated in streets, are banned in government offices, the civil service and many university classrooms and more subtly discouraged in other workplaces and arenas. The state has replaced the Ulema with the ministry of Religions Affairs that train and oversee all religious specialist wets sermons, supervise mosques and religious schools and issue advice about how to be good Muslims that the state feels is compliable with a rational, scientific, secular society.” (p. 447). Jenny explaining the end of Islamism in Turkey and quoting the Reforms of Mustafa Kamil, has refuted his own argument. What he describes is disciplining Islamist ideas from the traditional medieval social pattern to the current socio-cultural requirements. He (Jenny) did it because he has little knowledge of Islam. Islam is a complete code of human life, of the individual in his personal conduct and of the society in their collective responsibility, in politics and in non-political civil needs, to meet the challenges of ever molding socio-economic and
cultural patterns. It cares just to adhere the basic principles explained in the Divine Instructions without enforcing any peculiar bondage upon its followers. As such, Islam preaches a society fostering love for one another, service to humanity, sacrificing to meet challenges facing their society and practicing the Will of God in the betterment of the people, among whom you live. Islam does no go into the disputes attributed to the Muslim cultures in different part of the Muslim world. It demarcates individual and collective responsibilities condemning the attempts to over rule the Verdict of Almighty. The rituals, so popular in Islam, and the status of the religious scholar is alike other specialists in human needs like physician, surgeons, psychiatrist, business experts, administer etc. They are consulted by people needing their advice and they command respect. So does the Ulema class. They are specialist in religion (provided they really are) and they are respected with reverence. So is the status of the popes and cardinals in churches, and people take guidance from them in day to day life. Islam is not just offering rituals: offering prayers five times a day, fasting in a month, paying Zakat (some percentage of the income as alms to poor and deserving) or performing Haj (the pilgrimage). These are the practices to create a virtuous society sympathetic to one another. Jihad is against one’s own evil thinking and doing, except the one which is in self-defence against forces gathered to harm you. If Muslim became offensive, hunting others, he ceases to be a Muslim or a good Muslim. Islam is a religion which makes in your resources those claimants who are deprived of living necessities. Muslim politics is not what the Muslim are doing today or have been doing mostly in the past. It is an embodiment of all human virtues serving humanity and achieving this objective has usually been the ideal of the Islamic or Muslim states before the beginning of the monarchical traditions under Muslims. I am sorry for Jenny’s ignorance. But Islam as a code of human life can not be wiped out from a society. Even if the socio-cultural values of Islam be practiced, such as honesty in trade, commerce, personal dealings, human interrelationship, respect of family relations,
neighbors or state undertakings, individuals or collective, helping
the weak against tyranny, are all Islamic values, I am sure such
practices are the vision of any good society, which are out from
the Islamic womb, whether in the name of Christianity, Judaism
or any other culture or society living for the betterment of
mankind. Islam teaches an affectionate treatment for also the non-
humans, the beasts, pests, birds and vegetation. The Holy Qurran
has condemned them who spoil them for their living ambitions.
There can neither be an end of Islam, nor an end of his everlasting
values which are owned by Muslims and non-Muslims alike.

This book, with all its venom against Islam and Muslims is
based upon certain whims and known prejudices which have been
prevalent in the West, more a result of propaganda literature,
than on solid knowledge and positive thinking.