Apart from eight chapters, including introduction (Identity and Ideology) and conclusion (from Ideological to Functional State), the book contains some managed reviews of Andrew J. Bacevich, author of the American Militarism: How Americans are reduced by war; Owen Bennett Jones, BBO, the author of Pakistan; The Eye of Storm; and Teresita Schaffer, CSIS, former U.S. Ambassador and Assistant Secretary of State - all commending and appreciating the book as good reading. The contents show an Introduction of the author (page 397) but the publisher of the Pakistan edition did not consider it necessary to include the same in the book.

Not many people, even in Pakistan, are aware of the fact that the Jihadist Movement in the Tribal region in Pakistan (of today) was begun in the Nineteenth Century, temporarily stopped after the Ambela Campaign in 1862, after which it continued intermittently during the movements against the Dogra Raj and the Muslim insurgency in Kashmir, following its capture by India in 1947. A major part of the Tribal belt in northern areas of Pakistan had been a part of the state of Jammu and Kashmir. India-held Kashmiri government tried its physical possession, sending one Col. Janser Singh (Janisar Singh) to control the area. But the Muslim militia arrested him and hoisted Pakistan's flag. It was this annoyed group of the Pakistan militia which virtually fought in Kashmir during 1947-48 and was unhappy over the ceasefire.
These Jihadi groups and their movement was much more older than Pakistan. They also joined the Pakistan army, militia, police and many other administrative institutions with set mind of Jihad against the infidel, occupying their land. Pakistan’s consistent failure to bring any solution to the Kashmir problem, under India’s negative tactics, and Pakistan’s weaknesses, this group turned more and more hostile, and retaliatory. The sympathy of Pakistan’s army with this group was natural. It was not an expediency of any immediate threat. On the contrary it was inborn, and learning the atrocities being committed by Indian forces on the poor civilian Kashmiris, their revengeful feelings were being multiplied. Meanwhile a new phenomenon befell them. This time it was the Soviet attack on Afghanistan and the U.S.’s material assistance, both in arms and money, made them mercenary fighters against their enemy, irrespective of the fact, who were they, Muslims or non-Muslims. During the Afghan war the Afghani war-lords joined one group or the other, killing not infidels but Muslims. And there after 9/11, when Pakistan jointed the West in the war against terror, the wrath of this group fell upon Pakistan, which still continues, though with somewhat lesser intensity.

Haqqani, basically a journalist, did not have a proper historical background of the Jihadist movement of the 19th century, which though died down in northern India with the fall of Ambella, but virtually it remained alive in the tribal belt before Pakistan and after. The subsequent events of the movement were a natural corollary of the developments under which the Muslims all over the world, continued to suffer at the hands of the non-Muslims, whether Christians, Jews or Hindus.

Jessica T. Mathews writing a foreword of the book suggests: “Haqqani show how perceptions of Pakistan’ external and domestic threats have provided a deliberating partnership of expediency between Islamists and the military”. (p.vii). Jessica did not note, here, the role of the U.S. in creating such model in
Pakistan. It is true that the government officials did use Islam “to unify the multiethnic and multilingual Pakistan state” but it was late in 1968-69 when Pakistan’s eastern wing was threatening separation under India’s machination, and a futile attempt was made in the name of religion, for national integration. Jessica’s observations that the “Conflict with neighbouring India has mainly benefitted the Pakistani military, which has used its exalted status to play a decisive role in government policy, even during period of civilian rule”. (ibid). This statement is as incorrect as if one may suggest that the U.S. military and nuclear buildup was a result of growing and expanding Socialism, during the post world war II scenario. Politicians and diplomats are indeed learned and well groomed people with suggestive temperament. They may conclude from chaotic situations, such as in Pakistan for the last half a century or so, whatever they may, and sometimes their judgment may come true. But they could also be faulty and incorrect, as the religious movements and their play up in Muslim politics had been and still is most complicated, at least for the people who are ignorant of the movement activated in 1827, and with reorientation in 1875 (Deoband School) re-emerging in “the Silken letter conspiracy” of Anwar Pasha and the Khilafat Movement (Sheikh ul Hind Abul Hassan). This was followed by the Hijrat Movement of Ubaidullah Sindhi which greatly influenced Muslims of present Pakistan regions (i.e. Sindh, the Punjab, and the Frontier province, now Khyber Pakhtoonkhaw including the tribal belt. Afghanistan then under British control closed the borders of Afghanistan for the immigrants which obliged the people to return to their homes where they had now become foreigners. The Muslim sufferings were untold which added to their irritation and hostility against the Government of India. The formation of the Jamiat ul Ulema-i-Hind (1920) at this juncture, and their associations with the Indian National Congress was evidently because of the Congress anti-imperialist activities, the Muslim League losing less active, and also being a party of the selected affluent of northern India and Bengal. The Indian National Congress exploited the situation, as the support of
the JUI for the Congress, could help solving the communal question, evolved during the 20s and early 30s. It was finally resolved by the Communal Award in August 1932, after the II Round Table Conference. Not until the mid 1940s, the Muslim League compromised with the JUI and two of its prominent members (Shabbir Ahmad Uthmani, and Abdul Hamid Badayuni) joined hands with Liaquat Ali Khan during the elections campaign for 1945-46. The victory of the Muslim League and the consequent creation of Pakistan in 1947, enhanced their influence with the newly formed government under Liaquat Ali Khan, who was obliged to announce the formation of the Basic Principles Committee under Khweja Nazimuddin to determine the basic principles of the Pakistan’s future constitution.

Apart from the B.P.C. and its report which accrued the Objective Resolution – a preamble of the Constitution of 1956 and included as a text in the Constitution of 1973, the two J.U.I.’s ulama founded a Madrasa in Karachi on the pattern of Deoband, which later on ushered in the Madrasa Movement, now spread up to all big and small towns of Pakistan, offering religious education with free boarding and lodging. How this movement has functioned during the last three or four decades, especially after the official patronage granted to them in 1977, is too well known to the people of Pakistan and in particular the students of history.

Religious appeal had always been popular in the masses of the Orient, in particular, the sub-continent. The strength of faith lies not in the religious knowledge both in religious emotionalism created under family background, whether of Muslims, Hindus, Sikhs, or Christians. Among Muslims, however, the Madrasa system of education is as old as Islam. But the Madaris of the first three centuries after the advent of Islam were of far different nature than the Dars-e-Nizami – the regular syllabi introduced in the Madaris in the sub-continent as elsewhere. The objectives, too, seemed different. The highest degree from Madaris, provides
just an opening in Madarasa as a teacher without another option. Recent introduction of computers in Madaris has facilities of downloading different religious texts of scholars' works, which are usually not available in the libraries. Whether or not other disciplines of sciences and humanities are made available in the Madarasa, is yet a big question mark.

But the most important aspect of this movement still lies unrevealed in the movement and needs a thorough investigation. The Deoband School established by Maulana Muhammad Qasim Naunethavi (1876) was under an objective to prepare students in the Madrasa for Jihad against the un-Islamic forces. For the Jihad movement began in 1827 did not succeed because of lack of popular Muslim support. This resulted in the failure of the movement after the fall of Balakot (1831) as also after the Ambella Campaign in 1862 and the ensuing exodus of the religious class, in particular the participants of the Jihad movement, to Indomen Island (Kalapani). It was then usually assessed that the Muslims, not properly religiously educated, did not know the importance and value of Jihad in the survival of the Muslim Society. It has already been noted earlier that the principal of Deoband School, actively joined the Jihad in support of the Turkish Caliphate.

Whether or not preparation for Jihad is still the objective of the Madarasa Binnauri, Karachi, founded in 1948, after the Deoband School, by Taqi Uthmani and also in other madarasis, founded subsequently, such as Jamia Ashrafia (Lahore) and Madrasa-i-Naimiya (Lahore) etc. But it is too well known that some madarasis were or perhaps still, provide Jihad training to their students, openly or secretly. The Deoband Madrasa aimed the Jihad against the infidels, and particularly foreign rule. The Jihadis in Pakistan began using arms against all those who did not see eye to eye in their interpretation of Islam.

The Jamaat-i-Islami of Maulana Maududi, had entirely a different approach in a probable planting of Islam.
mic society in India. His opposition to the Pakistan movement was his personal bias against Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, his western style of living and culture. But when Pakistan was made and the Congress support for Maulana Maududi ceased to exist, the Maulana escaped to Pakistan and here found an opportunity to promote his philosophy of the Islamic State. There were two major differences between the Jamaat, and the other religious movements such as J.U.I. and J.U.P. The later two organizations were not so politically organized and disciplined than the Jamaat which had created an opening for them in schools, colleges and Universities in Pakistan, through unions and providing them training and literature (published by the Jamaat on Islam and its political structure) which helped in grooming up students to Islamic values. After a couple of decades the Jamaat was the most disciplined and organized political group in Pakistan, much more advanced in political precepts of the democratic system than any other political or religious group.

Hussain Haqqani himself remained in the Jamaat for some time. He over emphasizes the role of the Jamaat in the proposed process of Islamization in Pakistan. He observes “The Jamaat-i-Islami played a key role in mobilizing theologians to force an Islamic constitution”. (p.25) He adds “when (Chaudhri) Muhammad Ali, as Prime Minister, finally thrashed out Pakistani Constitution in 1956, it included the Objective Resolution in its preamble... and declared Pakistan’s official name as the ‘Islamic Republic of Pakistan’”. (ibid). Husain Haqqani gave the credit of all this to Maulana Maududi. (ibid).

There was yet another factor which created an international image of the Islamic movement - the cult of Maulana Maududi. The Jamaat had in its membership many many learned scholars, who translated the works of Maulana Maududi in English, besides some other European languages such as German and French. Their literature proved very effective in creating, both positive and negative, impacts in the U.S.A. and Europe, where the
movement for the conversion to Islam began much to the concern of the Christian and Jew churches. It is not claimed that the spread of Islam in the West was all because of the literature of the Jamaat-i-Islami. There were many other missionary movements working in Europe, Africa and the U.S.A. including the Indian Ahmaddis. But their literature on Islam as compared to that of the Jamaat-i-Islam was not so prolific, scientifically disciplined and organized, both on politics and socio-economic structure in institutional organizations, which indeed was appealing and touching hearts of the learned and knowledgeable. Sick of the Christian’s artificiality in religio-cultural norms, people in the West were open to all kinds of obsenity in the name of modernism in Western Culture. Mary (Maryam) was not a solitary example, who revolting against the Christian environment immigrated to Pakistan and married a friend of Maulana Maududi. She became a columnist in English Dailies on Islamic thought and culture, becoming popular in Pakistani intelligentsia. (I had an opportunity to meet her with another American Barbara Metcalf, then a student of Ph.D. working on Deoband, who had some keenness to meet Mary living in Santnagar, near Islampura, Lahore with her husband). She refused to meet Barbara and was quite harsh when the latter went upstairs to meet Mary. The visitor was quite disappointed.

As a student of History, I can well perceive the apathy and the antagonism which may have developed in the West over the years after the wave of conversion to Islam, which became more hostile gradually and in particular during the post 9/11 era. The U.S.-Pakistan relationship which grew under compulsions from either sides, remain checkered, hot and cold, with the passage of time. Husain Haqqani observes: “However, Jamaat-i-Islam’s critique of Western civilization and values, helped shape the Pakistani state’s later world view of suspicion towards the United States” (p.25). Husain Haqqani, himself a Pakistani, is perhaps ignorant of Orient’s characteristic. They are sincere friends and devoted to friendship. But if deceived, they cannot possibly make up. The
U.S. government was aware that Pakistan-U.S. alliance was based upon a mutual understanding. The U.S. wanted Pakistan's cooperation against the Soviet expansionism and Pakistan desired U.S. assistance against Indian aggressive designs against Pakistan. Pakistan, joining the Defence Pacts, had explained to the U.S. that Pakistan had no fear of Communism or its expansionism. She had no dispute with Soviet Russia. On the contrary, her Western alliance was focused mainly against Indian aggressive designs, which was confirmed by the U.S. President in 1955 (Prime Minister Mohammad Ali Bogra's visit) stating: “Pakistan's sovereignty and territorial integrity was the corner stone of U.S. foreign policy” (S.M. Burke). But a couple of years later when the U.S. interests shifted from Soviet Russia to China, India being a vast country with seven to eight hundred million population, somewhat equal to China, Pakistan was thrown into the background and India was flooded with money and arms, without any formal alignment with the West. Pakistan's agitations, protests, were ignored altogether as a result of which skepticism came in way. Pakistan was U.S. ally, not India. Yet U.S supported morally India in 1965 (Indo Pak war) and again in 1971 when Pakistan was cut and deprived of its Eastern wing. The U.S. administration was also aware that Pakistani initiative to become a nuclear was only after India's explosion of her first nuclear device (1974). Had there been the slightest faith of Pakistan's government in U.S. professed friendship perhaps Pakistan could do without.

Husain Haqqani observes, “Pakistani Islamists did not seriously challenged the plans of Pakistani leaders to build their economy and military with U.S. assistance, but they periodically questioned U.S. intentions which enabled Pakistan's rulers to cut opposition from both right and left in fulfilling their era of the bargain, when Pakistan became a U.S. ally”. (p.25) What bargain and with whom? This is an ambiguous statement unqualified; even the names of rulers who wanted to fulfill their end, remain unidentified. The sole concern of the Pakistani rulers between
1953-57 was Kashmir and relations with India, besides the constitution making. Alliance with the U.S. had nothing to do with the latter. U.S. friendship, too, did not give Pakistan enough, let alone the bargaining. Haqqani further adds: “A parallel development during Pakistan’s formative years was the rise to power of the military and civil bureaucracy. The politicians of the Muslim League had little or no administrative experience and relied heavily on civil servants inherited from the raj.” (p. 26) Haqqani is perhaps ignorant of the fact that politics and administration are two different departments. The politicians frame policies of a respective department in line with the manifesto of the political party and the bureaucracy implements it under the supervision of the minister concern. Haqqani is also wrong when he suggests that to occupy senior military and civil positions the junior officers were crazy for their earlier withdraw “playing religious cards to move British officers out”. (p. 26). The fact is that a good majority of British officers, both in civil and military services, had been withdrawn after the return of Mountbatten from India, and by 1950 only a dozen or so British officers were left over who did not have any key position. (S.M. Burke).

And yet, the confusion between politicians and civil administrators did exist for some obvious reasons, mainly the political incapability or immaturity of the people, mostly the feudalist class, tuned to their agrarian culture. The political vacuum was filled in by the experienced bureaucrats. Who when raised to power, caused the most serious damage, when their political failure inspired a more organized institution – the army – to seize power. Most unfortunately, the father of the nation, died even when Pakistan was not fully on her feet. It was just crawling when the Quaid-i-Millat was assassinated. The rest of the leadership was still in its infancy to meet the political and constitutional challenges, not too often faced by any newly born country.
Referring to the 1947/49 Kashmir War Husain Haqqani suggests: “Muslim Officers of Pakistan’s army involved in the Kashmir military operation... used the Islamic notion of Jihad to mobilize the tribesmen they had recruited as raiders, for the seizure of Kashmir”. (p. 29). This is again a journalistic view of a situation in the valley without projecting the movement of the Muslim Conference against the Dogra Raja since 1930, having been fueled by the Raja’s declaration of accession to India. When the Indian regular forces landed in Srinagar on 26th October, 1947, Pakistan’s army denied of any action by Aulnerk, despite the Quaid’s orders of moving army in Kashmir, there seemed no other way to save poor Kashmiri Muslims from the wrath of the Indian army, except moving the people used to fighting, (the Tribesmen) to help their brothers in Kashmir under the supervision of an army officer, who had the training of the modern war-fare. Jihad was the only popular name used for armed conflicts against the infidels and rightly so as the Kashmir war was not short of it. But if Pakistan had to allocate ‘70%’ of her budget to her defence, it was no surprise since she was receiving regular threats of war from India ever since her creation in August 1947. This was coupled with another threat that a substantial number of Pakistan’s population both Muslims and non-Muslims, had sympathies with the Indian National Congress, before the partition and their loyalty to Pakistan was still a question mark. In the Punjab the Unionists, and in the Frontier province (now Khyber Pakhtoon Khwah) the Red Shirt leaders were in that camp. Had this contact with the Congress ceased to exist or continued, is debatable. But the precautionary measures obliged the Government of Pakistan to organize its intelligence agencies, which was done with the creation of FIB and ISI (i.e. Federal Investigation Bureau and Inter Services Intelligence) in 1948, besides the provincial CID (Criminal Investigation Department). There had already been a sorry experience. Mandal, the Scheduled Caste federal minister of the Government of Pakistan, had escaped to India with some secret documents, concerning his ministry which made the administration skeptical.
Haqqani’s reflections on Pakistan’s foreign policy, beginning from Liaquat Ali Khan, quoting Margaret Bounce White – a Jew Life magazine reporter – photographer, who managed an interview with the Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah before the creation of Pakistan. Jinnah had indicated that Pakistan’s foreign policy would be oriented towards the Muslim World but there could be an expectation of U.S. support. After the creation of Pakistan the Quaid’s, “emphasis on U.S. alliance increased”. He said, “America needs Pakistan more than Pakistan needs America... Pakistan is the pivot of the world as we are placed (on) the frontier on which the future position of the world revolves”. (p. 30)

Referring to the East West Cold War, Bounce White attributed Pakistan foreign policy as, “bankruptcy of ideas in the new Muslim state”. She adds that “Pakistan desires to benefit from the disputes of others...her early focus on the Palestine dispute”. (.31). Quoting from the Dawn Karachi She stated: “Muslim lying began advocating that trained ex-serviceman be dispatched in the holy cause...considering the Jewish State it was urged that a united front of Muslim countries be formed to meet the challenge. (p. 31).

Husain Haqqani has over emphasized that Pakistan from the very beginning depended upon U.S. economic and military assistance. He notes Liaqat Ali Khan’s three fundamental interests that would defend Pakistan’s external interests: “Integrity of Pakistan, Islamic culture and the need for economic development”. (Liaqat Ali Khan Pakistan the Heart of Asia, Harvard University Press (1950 p.11). Haqqani adds that Pakistan’s integrity was an euphemism for ensuring adequate defence and military preponderance; it implied Pakistan’s need of a great power patrons to help pay for its defence.
True, Pakistan’s need to build up a strong defence, against Indian’s frequent threats, was an imminent necessity. Pakistan was keen for a solution of the Kashmir dispute and the rulers of country were confident, however false, that U.S. was in a position to manage a plebiscite in the valley, forcing India. It was under this scenario that political and the military leadership supported U.S. in their policy against the Communist expansionism. This is what Haqqani calls “a deal whereby Pakistan could – for the right price – serve the West’s eastern anchor in the Eastern alliance structure.” (P. 35).

Haqqani’s opinion about Ayub’s rule that it was “like a wild horse that had been captured but not yet tamed” (p.43) appears somewhat biased. Soldiers are disciplined to come to the needs of their professional activities. No military officer had ever dared to seek such an opportunity so long political leadership was strong in the country. When opportunism walked in politics and peoples’ interests overlooked with wavering economy, it was an opening for the more disciplined organization to come to front and save the country. It is not an analysis for the justification of Marital Law of 1958 but the story of negative factors leading to the political crisis in Pakistan. Hussain Haqqani has not denied that economically Pakistan’s growth rate during Ayub’s era was on top in the entire region and either wings, well prospered, to the satisfaction of the people.

Ayub’s unpopularity began with his efforts to segregate clerics from politics. Jamaat-i-Islami, the most organized religious group was the sufferer. Its occasional criticism caused some restrictions upon its leaders Maulana Maudoodi, but Ayub’s efforts to convert Pakistan as Peoples Republic instead of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, was foiled after strong reaction and he was obliged to amend the title of the 1962 constitution. (p. 44).

Haqqani has overlooked Ayub’s effort to square up U.S. changing global interests from Soviet Union to China, offering all
out effort to support U.S. against Communism. This was not obviously, in the love of U.S., rather to seek U.S. indulgence in the Kashmir dispute, thrown in abeyance by India, ignoring all international pressure launched through U.N. Commissions – the last being of Jarring who remained in the subcontinent till 1957. Ayub’s complaints, overtures, protest were all overlooked by Jhonson, supporting India, more after the Sino-Indian conflict, flooding India with military and monitory support.

Haqqani rightly suggests, “different priorities in Pak-U.S. relationship which since 1962 were facing new dimensions. U.S. wanted Pakistan to square up her relationship with India forgetting the Kashmir dispute, revisit her relationship with China, re-iterating the northern territory of Jammu and Kashmir given to China in 1960, border agreement etc. (pp 44-45). Haqqani then, notes Ayub’s creation of Bureau of National Reconstruction, which proposed solution of Pakistan’s security in irregular warfare. (p.46). The result was the 1965 war with India which bred anti-Americanism among Pakistanis. Another effect of this war, according to the author, was that it linked the Pakistan military closer to an Islamic ideology religious symbolism and calls to Jihad were used to build up the morals of soldiers and the people. (p. 47). Surprising, Haqqani – a Muslim – and earlier a member of the Jamiat-i-Islami – could be so ignorant of the Muslim’s articles of faith which contains Jihad amongst other articles. It is equally binding upon civilians besides the army men. It runs in the veins of all Muslims like blood, with no exception. Soldiers of Islam are not demoralized by strength of the enemy but they are upset only when their political leaders lead them down. Haqqani adds, “Pakistan’s state controlled media generated a frenzy of Jihad extolling the virtue of Pakistan’s soldiers of Islam. An officer of Pakistan’s Inter Service Public Relations wrote years later:” “There was a spurt of gallantry stories of Divine help of superhuman resistance and of unrivalled professional excellence in the face of overwhelming odds. The story of the suicide squad – a band of dedicated soldiers who acted as live
miedes to blow up the advancing Indian tanks in the Sialkot sector - became one of the most popular war legend. There was no end to stories about Divine help. People both soldiers and civilians had actually seen with their own eyes green robed angels deflecting bombs from their targets...soldiers were seen shooting enemy aircrafts with their 303’s.” (pp 48-49).

Agreed, this was all journalistic exaggeration as such marvels do not happen. But what about Ghazwa-i-Badar where according to the Holy Quran a thousand angels came to help the Muslims, only 313, against a thousand of mushrikin. Has the Holy Book exaggerated? No book of history on Badar points out any one from amongst the mushrikins, having being killed by an angel. Yet the Verdict of the Quran stands undeniable. Existence of suicide band among the soldiers in 1965, may be doubtful. But the recent history of the Pakistani fanatics had proved it that Muslims do have the guts to give up lives for a cause, right or wrong. But defending home could not possibly a miscalculation. Similarly; shooting enemy aircrafts with 303s is attempted even today in Afghanistan which is not a surprise, irrespective of achieving target.

Haqqani adds, “Official propaganda convinced the people of Pakistan that their military had won the war. Pakistan had occupied 1500 square miles of Indian territory. 1300 square miles of it in the west while India secured 350 square miles of Pakistani real estate...Moreover...Pakistan had held its own against a larger army it came out of the war a weakened nation.” (.49). What a biased analysis. It is true that Pakistan did not succeed in achieving its goal of capturing Kashmir. But what did India get accept saving Kashmiri, despite 5 times bigger force with immense resources. Pakistan’s successes in water and air were undeniable, and looked by the international community with surprise and appreciation. Haqqani makes no mention of it for it could annoy his masters. The war did remain undecided but the Tashkent Agreement favoured more India than Pakistan for it made no promise of a plebiscite in Kashmir.
The last years of Ayub Khan, before the transfer of era to the next military rule of Yahya Khan, saw an unsuccessful effort rather a mismanaged Round Table Conference, to solve the political issues, mainly between the two wings of Pakistan. Infact this was a dialogue between two systems i.e. the feudalists of West Pakistan and the middle class politico-economic structure dominated by non-Muslim pro-Indian hierarchy. The popular Awami League of Sh. Mujib ur Rehman had over the years exploited anti-Punjabi campaign which was multiplied manifold during the 1965 September war when East Pakistan was neglected in defence against any Indian aggression. This was coupled with the Agartala conspiracy, for the cessation of the Eastern wing of Pakistan from the country, concluded much earlier, waiting for the opportunity to be accomplished. RAW was active in East Pakistan and after the victory of the Awami League in the general elections of 1969, the six points of Mujeeb ur Rehman and some other demands particularly shifting of the Pakistan Capital to Dacca and its consequent reaction in West Pakistan, gave way to the hardliners in the two-wings. The military troops on petrol were targeted and their corpse mutilated by the mutineers so frequently that was telecasted alive in foreign media, much to the annoyance of G.H.Q. at Islamabad. The army action, however incorrect, was a natural corollary, which became a god-sent opportunity for India, ensuing the December Indo Pakistan War, ending with the creation of Bangladesh. Haqqani makes no mention of any of these events as they appeared to be against his interest. Haqqani has in particular noted Yahya Khan’s Martial Law Regulation No: 51(pp 56-57) without noting the factors which motivated this order. This Regulation was seven years rigorous imprisonment for any person who published, or was in possession of any book, pamphlet etc offensive to the religion of Islam’ (p.57) Qadyani’s in Pakistan had been active since the last days of Ayub Khan’s era which infuriated the orthodox Muslim, demanding that Qadriyani’s be declared non-Muslim. Their increased pressure later on obliged Bhutto, when in power, to
recognize this demand and the Qadyanis and Ahmadis were declared non-Muslim in 1973. Dr. Fazl-ur-Rehman’s interpretation of Islam was more on the text of the Holy Quran and amongst the already enough confusion on religious interpretation it could multiply the same at such a complex time, and therefore banned for a short period only as later on the book remained on sale throughout Pakistan.

Haqqani’s discussion on religious debates is based upon little religious knowledge. He observes “The military authorities had acquired for the government the right to censorship in the name of preventing religiously confusing material. Freedom of academic thought was severely curtailed and eventually led to the emergence of ideological vigilantes on campuses and the media. More significant, the regime opened Pandora Box on the question what was and was not Islamic”. (p 57). This is totally incorrect. During late sixties and early seventies, the main issue which remained in focus was Khatm-i-Nabowat and none of other Fiqhi differences between Muslim sects. This issue being one of the article of faith needed that all views published or unpublished should be banned and so it was the demand of the times. What later on Zia-ul-Haq did was to encourage and enforce one Fiqh of Muslims over others which enhanced sectarianism in Pakistan. In fact Haqqani’s efforts have been to create an understanding between army and religious groups which is also incorrect. Zia-ul-Haq had some personal contact with the Amir-i-Jamaat-iIslami, which he (the General) exploited to prolong his rule. No other religious group ever supported Zia-ul-Haq or his policies. I can say it with personal experience that teaching very sensitive topics on History and Religion I never had any difficulty or outside pressure throughout my academic career in the University (1958-2003). Of course some teachers, known as ‘leftists’ were retired from educational institutions. Perhaps Haqqani’s note was a reference towards them.
Not as a religious dispute, but Islam was being pushed up as a political force to create integration between East and West Pakistan, notwithstanding the truth that the differences between the two wings were more economic and being aggravated politically from bad to worse after Agartala. This emotional religious base for integration of the two culturally different societies could not possibly work. This is why the military efforts in Decca, ‘Shaukat-i-Islam’, despite enough propaganda, did not succeed. The Awami League won the 1969 elections single handed in East Pakistan, and the People’s Party winning as majority party in West Pakistan. What happened subsequently was just a political failure and a natural corollary of the factors leading to the creation of Bangladesh, rather that any religious or other basis.

Haqqani mentioning the authorities of the Pakistan army before the military option and after, spread up to more than 30 pages, does not in a single line mentions, how the stray Pakistani troops were hanged, butchered or killed in torture by the Bengalis, whether Mukti Bahini or the local rebels, and what was their number in hundreds or thousands? Media, both local and with the help of Indian media, foreign, projected such humiliation of Pakistani soldiers. But patience has a limit, and the strong does retaliate to whatever consequences. This was happened in East Pakistan before its independence. However unwise and unpolitical the military operation may be, East Pakistan was heading towards separation under a set planning as predicted by Abul Kalam Azad (India Wins Freedom).

The third chapter Old and New Pakistan, begins with the effects of the separation of Pakistan’s Eastern wing which no doubt was a tragedy. But the people of Pakistan had sensed it much before, the 16th December 1971. It was shocking indeed and yet inevitable. The socio-political structure of the two wings was totally different. The economy of the Eastern wing, the trading and commercial activities apart, was mostly in hands of the non-
Muslim groups, more close to Calcutta and Delhi rather than Islamabad. The author of these lines had an opportunity to visit the Eastern Wing in January, 1963, visiting Universities, Provincial secretariat, and exporters. I noticed with surprise the hatred for the Punjabis, all over, and yet majority of the ministerial staff in various departments of the provincial secretariat from stenographers to section officers were from West Pakistan: Sindhi, Pakhtoons and Punjabis, though all of them were called there: the Punjabis. Since, I was on state business sponsored by the Ministry of Information, I had an opportunity to meet the Secretary, and the Joint Secretary of the Provincial Ministry of Information. The Personal secretaries of both the officers were from West Pakistan. The Secretary was slightly reserved and more so when I told him that I was from the Punjab University. He advised me to meet the Joint Secretary, who was a graduate in Journalism from the Punjab University. He welcomed me and had a long chat, revealing and intuitive. On a question, he told me that by temperament Bengalis were agitators; they shirked work, and were easy-going and yet desirous of lustful life. He did not deny Hindu political influence over the majority of people, for they had such a relationship from generations, though temporarily shattered during the days of Partition under religious pressure, more so because of the communal riots of Khulna and Dacca in 1946-47.

My visit to East Pakistan was more educative and an eye-opener. I had realized that the two different structures of societies could not live together for long. But what eventually happened was far from expectations. Ayub Khan's Round table conference (1968) did provide an opportunity for a loose Federation, but there, too, it was lost over to vested interest. I am not suggesting that a loose federation could easily work between the two wings, particularly in so wanting trust between the two people, except a chance for the success of political sagacity and wisdom.
Hammad’s view that “the prestige of the Pakistan army—called by General Sher Ali Khan, the invincible charisma...had been shattered” (p.87). This is only partly true. A great military setback, indeed, more so of about 93,000 P.O.W in Indian land, and the possibilities of their political exploitation, did give Pakistan a tough time. But the Pakistan army soon overcame her weaknesses. On the contrary Indian victory over Pakistan, both military and political, did not give enough confidence, India started building up her forces with sophisticated weapons, nuclear arsenals and all sorts of missiles. It is the psyche of the coward to manage and muster more and more arms. So much so that India initiated the nuclear race in South Asian exploding a nuclear device in 1974, ostensibly to intimidate Pakistan, infact to demonstrate India’s new power-vision, repeated almost a score of years later for five more Pokhran nuclear tests, followed by Advani’s statement, warning Pakistan of serious consequences, if she did not bow down before India. Pakistan’s reply of her six nuclear tests, the same month, stunned India and the extremist hardliners against Pakistan, extending a hand of friendship (Vajpayee’s visit to Lahore). Hammad criticizes Pakistan’s general view of the Muslim that they possess the strength of Iman, which keeps them in courage, standing against all odds. This was well demonstrated during the 1965 war. Hammad observes: “Over the years, Pakistani generals had popularized the view that one Muslim had the fighting prowess to five Hindus, and yet 70,000 of Pakistan’s regular soldiers and Para-military troops were prisoners of war in Indian hands, along with 12,500 civilian internes.” (p.87). Hammad does not mention that the laying of arms by General Niazi, was under instructions from the G.H.Q. under what pressures, not revealed ever.

Surprisingly Husain Hammad—a diplomat Journalist quotes a U.S. academic, then in Pakistan, on the authority of Christian Lamb (Waiting for Allah: Pakistan Struggle for Democracy, New Delhi Viking, 1991, p.42). It is observed that “Even the idea of Pakistan as the homeland for Muslims in South Asia, no longer
appeared valid. Many Pakistanis, especially those moving into positions of responsibility in government and business, are not as sure of the idea of Pakistan and its future as their fathers and older brothers. Disillusionment, uncertainty, cynicism and passivism are all adjectives which might appropriately describe the intellectual climate of the country.”. (p.88).

This is an echo of a statement made by Indira Gandhi, after the Fall of Dacca, that it was the end of the Two Nation Theory. The absurdity of the statement is evident from the fact that now two Muslim States existed on the Western and Eastern borders of India, instead of one before 1972. How could the creation of Bangladesh deny the precepts of Two Nation Theory? Of course if Mujib ur Rehman had announced merger of East Bengal with India, the claim had some justification, otherwise it was just a wishful thinking for Indira as much as for people like Husain Haqqani.

Afghanistan so close to India since 1947, had never been quite friendly to Pakistan. Foreign intervention in Baluchistan and the tribal belt had increased with the Soviet Plan to enter the hot waters of Arabian Sea, after physical occupation of Afghanistan and northern Baluchistan. The Soviets failed in Afghanistan, and her subsequent disintegration later on, made the physical possession of northern Baluchistan impossible though their contacts with the local chieftains (Sardars) continued, now, with the Indian help. Haqqani disbelieving such interference quotes Nixon, meeting Bhutto on his official visit to the U.S. He said: “we do not perceive the threat to Pakistan with the same alarm as Pakistani officials do. In short, neither the Soviets nor the Indians have designs on the integrity of Pakistan”. (p.104). But Nixon did not deny that unstable Pakistan may invite pressures from Afghanistan, the Soviets and India (ibid).

Haqqani highlights Bhutto’s failure in borrowing enough military assistance from the U.S., despite his political sagacity and
eloquence with convincing capability. But he was able to square up with the army, with the passage of time, increasing army's budget. According to him Bhutto won the 1970 general elections with the support of Ahmadis/Mirzais, since the PPP had declared the manifesto ‘secular and liberal’ against the professed agenda of the orthodox religious parties. Bhutto eventually yielded to their pressure moving a bill in the National Assembly declaring Ahmadis as non-Muslim minority. (p.107). Haqqani thinks that Bhutto's Islamic Conference in Lahore, 1974, was a multipurpose move but apart from the prominence which Pakistan obtained in the Arab/Muslim World, Bhutto was inspired to utilize Arab affluence to fund his nuclear program which was imminent after India's explosion. (pp 107-108).

The rest of this chapter is a brief explanation of how Zia-ul-Haq managed to execute Bhutto after a judicial trial and prolonging his rule for eleven long years with the help of Jamat-i-Islami, which patronized Zia's Islamization efforts etc. The fourth Chapter, too, is spread up on Zia's efforts implementing Islamic public law, apart from Nizami-Salat and Zakaat, besides Hudud Ordinance. The fifth chapter on Afghan Jihad has nothing substantial. It is based upon the already published material of the print media without mentioning at the end what motivated U.S. to impose Presler's amendment upon Pakistan, despite immense sacrifices that Pakistan had made in U.S. interest, throughout, against the U.S. enemy No: 1, the Soviet Union, defeated.

The conclusion: From Ideological to Functional State, is based upon certain presumptions. Haqqani observes: “In an effort to become an ideological state guided by a practionian military, Pakistan has found itself accentuating to disfunction, especially, during the past two decades.” (p.311). Haqqani is well aware of the fact that Pakistan was made by a politician, not army, shere through a political process. But unfortunately, the structuring of the Pakistani society was mostly feudalistic, unlike that of India, where such a class did exist but in a low percentage. When Nehru
abolished Indian feudalistic structure in early sixties, its reaction soon subsided. Even in Bangladesh, after its creation in 1971, feudalist structure was destroyed by Mujeeb, a year later, to let the middle class erupt as a political force. Pakistan is the only county today, throughout the world, where feudalist culture is grown up, sustained, and with all its shortcomings and evil influence in politics and socio-economic life, it is difficult to do away with it. Even the frequent military rulers, strong as Ayub Khan or Pervaiz Musharraf, were bowed down before the feudalists; for the army, too, was attracted to the affluence, behind the landed aristocracy - a great promise for their future, and that of their progeny. The military training in Pakistan at Kakul and elsewhere had been exceptional, grooming up army officers, more so during service. The disciplined military life distinguished them from the rest of the people, even gaining some edge over the very small educated class, very few of which entered the civil services. The rest, some professionals like lawyers, University teachers, bankers and scientists were in such a small number, and yet not many of them, with a few exceptions, spark out in their expertise. Education is truly considered as an enemy to feudalism and it is therefore never encouraged throughout the existence of Pakistan. This was coupled with two more factors. Firstly, the landed aristocracy was keen to educate their children in schools such as the Aitcheson College or alike in other big towns, existing since the pre-partition days, founded by the English. The army schools and colleges, in different cantonments, were also promising and prepared the children of the army-personnel for the elite class, alike the landed aristocracy. Bureaucracy, too, was power oriented section of the society. Their children had opportunity to study abroad. The rest of the people whether in towns or rural areas were deprived of better educational facilities. With few exceptions, teachers in schools, despite educational-training, were mostly wanting dedication to learning and teaching. The vision, alone was and still is, preparation for the examination through cramming the set question answers provided in the guides or such material available.
in the market. There was yet another section of the society – the religious society. Their children joined the madrasas along with the local mosques for memorizing the Holy Quran, where from they had an opportunity to join the big madrasas managed with free boarding and lodging, by religious societies on sectarian basis. At the birth of Pakistan such madrasas were not many. But they multiplied with the passage of time. Today these madrasas all over the county is the largest educational system in hundreds and thousands, imparting religious education to not less than five millions, with big campuses, more affluent than the government schools and colleges.

No sincere effort was ever made to provide uniform educational system in the county because the feudal ruling elite did not take educational issues seriously. The system divided the society with agrarian, religious sectarianist, and parochial interests creating ideological and cultural gulfs – a great hindrance in developing national interests and national outlook.

Haqqani’s view that “since Pakistan’s independence in 1947, focus of the state on ideology, military capability and eternal alliance weakened Pakistan internally”, (p. 313) is totally incorrect. Pakistan’s weaknesses were inherent, created by a hostile power. She was born in a situation, totally different form India, without any political, economic structure or secretariat, without any military organization except some six to seven regiments scattered around India, since the end of the World War II, disallowed to reach the land, under the instructions from Baldev Singh the Defence minister of the Interim Government. Indian threats to Pakistan, at this stage, to run over the country on Kashmir war, there remained little choice for Pakistan, except foreign alliances for securing national integrity. Haqqani makes no mention of India’s hostility against Pakistan, regretting Pakistan’s attention to her military buildup.
Haqqani observes: “The dominance of the military in Pakistan’s internal affairs is a direct outcome of the circumstances during the early years of statehood.” (...313). This is true only partly. Indian frequent threats, particularly, from the hardliners in the government, did not stop, rather this had been constant and regular even in the 21st century. Haqqani does concede to this views (P.312) and also of the incapable politicians, engaged in self-seeking, considering attaining powers to build up personal assets and resources for themselves and their progeny – a craze which spread with the passage of time, with poisoning effects, upon all sections of society, including army and bureaucracy (pp. 213-15).

But Haqqani’s views that religious groups were given special status by the army (p. 315) may not be true. Amongst the religious groups, Jamaat-i-Islami was the most organized party since fifties, which had the courage to stand against Ayub Khan’s martial Law in 1958. (Maulana Moududi remained in confinement, under Ayub’s rule for some time and later on they contested elections of the President, nominating Fatima Jinnah as their candidate. The other religious groups under Shah Ahmad Noorani, or of Mufti Mohamud (Father of Fazl ur Rehman) (J.U.P. and J.U.I) became active only during the last years of Bhutto’s government under MMA. But they well planned in managing their sympathies to enter military, naval and air force administration, even in active services, which proved helpful in their subsequent ambitions to power. The Jamaat-i-Islami, cleverly managed similar entry in educational institution, school, colleges and the universities, but their voting bank could not be build up because the Jamiat students belonged to different constituencies and lacked the training of working for the Jamiat individually. At the same time the Jamaat produced politicians of great capability, who still shine prominently in the religious party. The parochial interests in Pakistan had grown up with the passage of time, initially as an over centralisation in shape of One Unit, and later on, after its breakup, following the independence of East
Bengal, the cessionists in Sindh, Baluchistan and Frontier saw in their activity greater opportunities to attain power, and the foreign agencies, working to destabilize Pakistan, particularly, RAW, managed to support the cessationist elements—a process which still continues. This is also true that in the absence of nationalist perceptions, and any defined policy to build up nationalism, religion is considered the only force which could emotionally bind Muslims with one another. The army in power, also thought likewise, as the politician. But Haqqani’s view that, Radical Islamic groups, which portray themselves as the guardians of Pakistan’s ideology, have been granted special status by the military civil bureaucracy that normally governs Pakistan”. (p.315). This is incorrect. With the only exception of Zia ul Haq’s rule in Pakistan, others remained liberal and moderate, under or without the working of 1973 constitution.

Haqqani recommendations that “Pakistan civil and military elite...must understand how their past paradigm for state and nation building has let Pakistan from one disaster to the next. Pakistan was created in a hurry and without giving detailed thoughts to various aspects of nation and state building. Perhaps it is time to rectify that mistake by taking a long time view. Both Pakistan’s elite and their U.S. benefactors would have to participate in transforming Pakistan into a functional rather an ideological state”. (p.329). Here the cat is out of the bag. Haqqani wants that Pakistan should leave political guidance to the genius of the United States to develop a secular power—what a wishful thinking. One thing is now clear that the three reviews of Andres J. Baevich, Owen Bennet Jones and Teresita Schaffer, given at the beginning of the book as ‘Praise of Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military, seems so meaningful and mechanized.