Abstract: After December 1991 the United States emerged as the most preeminent state in the global hierarchy of power. Actually all the attributes of an imperium had developed since 1945. This imperial system is not in pursuit of colonies or annexation of new lands. In the absence of any countervailing power the United States is determined to remain a guarantor of international security, economic relations and trade patterns between states. The instruments of security are the NATO forces, five major commands (which envelop 191 countries and island states); and economic resources are the World Bank, the IMF, and the surplus of capital invested in other countries, and of trade is the World Trade Organization, which lays down the rules for international trade and commerce.

At the pinnacle of its economic and military power the United States feels threatened by: 1) Islamic militants, 2) the rise of China, 3) the emergence of the European Union. The first two developments have spawned the U.S. architecture of security in South Asia. The war against terror and the development of India as a countervailing force against China are being pursued in tandem with each other. India and China are perceived to be rivals in the achievement of a preeminent position in Asia, while China presents a much larger challenge of being a competitor for the position of another pole of power with a potential to eclipse the United States.

At this stage the U.S. policy toward China can be described as soft containment, while the U.S. would continue to remain engaged with China in terms of economic and trade relations, and discourage China from attempting to preempt the United States
in its pursuit of monolistic control of oil in the Middle East. Meanwhile, the United States has fundamentally altered its economic development; improve its military capability in order for it to face China. As a non-NATO ally Pakistan would be encouraged to seek rapprochement with India through settlement of the Kashmir dispute. Pakistan would also benefit from U.S. help in the improvement of its military and educational system, which was neglected since 1947. Pakistan’s help would be indispensable for war against the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. Whether or not this security design achieves the United States’ strategic objectives in relations with China remains to be seen.

In this article an attempt is made to examine the following issues:

1. The reality of the United States’ preeminent imperial system, and the United States’ asymmetrical relationship with other states.

2. The U.S. perceptions of its vulnerability, and potential challenges posed to its power by: 1) the rise of China as a countervailing force in Asia, and the emergence of a potential rival for power in Europe in the form of the European Union; 2) the spread of terrorism, initiated by the al-Qaeda movement, which led to the attacks on the U.S. Department of Defense (the Pentagon) and the World Trade Center in New York.

3. The United States’ response in military operations in Afghanistan with Pakistan’s assistance, and political response in developing a new strategic relationship with India, with an expectation that a new balance of power could be established in Asia to contain China’s power, and that Pakistan would play a subsidiary supportive role.
The fact that Pakistan is expected to play a subsidiary role in the architectural design of security arranged by the United States is not a new experiment. In the 1950s Pakistan had readily joined the Baghdad Pact, and SEATO, which were designed to contain Chinese influence in Southeast Asia, and the Soviet expansion in the Middle East.

In dealing with the United States power I have accepted the view that the United States is not just the sole superpower in the hierarchy of the states, but is in fact also an imperial system which regulates the affairs of the largest number of states in the world. However, I have maintained a distinction between the concepts of “imperial system,” and “imperialistic policy of conquest.” The latter policy led the European powers in the eighteenth century to conquer weak states in order to exploit their natural resources and capture their economies in order to dump their surplus of goods and invest surplus of their capital. The “imperial system” implies the role of a chief executive officer presiding over the management of a “world corporation,” with its designated board of directors, financial and political control, and maintenance of the armed forces to keep the refractory elements in control.

Since its establishment in 1776 the United States has steadily acquired all the assets of an empire, including: 1) extensive contiguous and noncontiguous territories, 2) a remarkably well developed economy and educated population, 3) highly developed scientific and industrial enterprises, and financial institutions that impact the economies of foreign states, and 4) a military command structure to guarantee security for the largest number of states in the world.

Military expenditures in the U.S. are rising in absolute terms and as a proportion of total economic activity as measured by the GDP. Total Department of Defense expenditures grew from $281 billion in fiscal year 2000 to $425 billion in fiscal
year 2004. Let us also compare the U.S. military budget with the budgets of influential states.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Military expenditures - dollar figure</th>
<th>Date of Information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>$ 518,100,000,000</td>
<td>2005 est.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>$ 81,470,000,000</td>
<td>2005 est.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>$ 45,000,000,000</td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>$ 44,310,000,000</td>
<td>2005 est.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>$ 42,836,500,000</td>
<td>2005 est.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>$ 35,063,000,000</td>
<td>2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>$ 28,182,800,000</td>
<td>2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Korea, South</td>
<td>$ 21,050,000,000</td>
<td>2005 est.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>$ 19,040,000,000</td>
<td>2005 est.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>$ 18,000,000,000</td>
<td>2005 est.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Nine states’ combined budgets ($334,952) do not come close to what the United States allocates for its defense budget. Moreover the United States has the largest and most technologically powerful economy with a per capita GDP of $37,800. In July 2004 the U.S. population was 293,027,571 million, which makes it the world’s third largest country by population, after China and India, and by size after Russia and Canada.

The United States’ national security, trade and stability interests encompass four continents of the earth and extend to the known and yet to be discovered limits of outer space.
To deal with its almost unlimited earthly range of national interest, the U.S. established five Combatant Commands: Central Command [CENTCOM], European Command [EUCOM], Northern Command [NORTHCOM], Pacific Command [PACOM], and Southern Command [SOUTHCOM]) to police instability in 197 countries and territories encompassing all four continents and the world’s oceans and seas. (See Map I, Figure I and Figure II) In February 2007 President Bush directed the Department of Defense to establish a sixth command to oversee U.S. military operations in Africa, and to strengthen U.S. “security cooperation, and to bolster the capabilities of [U.S.] partners in Africa.” By September 30, 2008 the sixth command will start to function.

Map I


Figure I

**Combatant Commands**

[Diagram of Combatant Commands]

Figure II

United States Combatant Commands and Their Areas of Responsibility

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command</th>
<th>Area of Responsibility (AOR)</th>
<th>Size of AOR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(I) U.S. Northern Command</td>
<td>United States, Canada, Mexico, parts of the Caribbean, and the contiguous waters in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>NORTHCOM</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(II) U.S. Pacific Command</td>
<td>43 countries, 20 territories and possessions and 10 U.S. territories includes the world’s largest armed</td>
<td>Covers 105 million square miles; traverses 16 time zones</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>PACOM</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
forces:  
a) China, b) Russia, c) India,  
d) North Korea, e) South Korea  

Five of the seven worldwide U.S. mutual defense treaties:  

1) U.S. Philippines Defense Treaty, 1952  
2) ANZUS-Australian-New Zealand-U.S. Treaty, 1952  

(III) U.S. European Command  
**EUCOM**  

(1) 91 countries and territories  
(2) extends from the North Cape of Norway, through the waters of the Baltic and Mediterranean Seas, most of Europe, parts of the Middle East to the Cape of Good Hope in South Africa  

Covers 21 million square miles  

(IV) U.S. Southern Command  
**SOUTHCOM**  

32 countries (14 Central and South American and 13 in the Caribbean)  

Covers about 145 million square miles  

The region represents about one-sixth of the landmass of the world  

(V) U.S. Central Command  
**CENTCOM**  

25 nations, ranging from Egypt in the West to Pakistan in the East  

Covers more than 3,600 miles East to West, and 4,600 miles North to South  

Includes mountain ranges with elevations exceeding 24,000 feet  

Total Coverage  

197 Countries and Territories  

All of these commands together present the picture of a global imperium, unmatched by any great empire in the world’s history.

Modern international economic relations are largely determined by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (established in 1944), and the World Trade Organization. This was a historical development as the European states had been ruined by World War II. With the exception of the Soviet Union, no U.S. ally wanted to overwhelm Germany and Japan with reparations. During 1946-52 the World Bank’s lending activities expanded to less developed countries financing $9.8 billion of all exports from the industrial nations to these countries. About one-third of these exports were from the United States. Structurally the IMF is similarly dominated by the United States.

The World Trade Organization (WTO) was established in 1995, and in April 2003 its membership had increased to 145 countries. In the WTO a fierce battle raged between the United States and China. In public the U.S. declared that China must join the WTO on “commercially acceptable” terms. The agenda behind this term was purely political. The liberal view on China, that advocates the policy of engagement with China, is that accelerated internal economic changes in China would weaken the Communist Party’s hold over the countries’ rapidly growing economy.

With the Soviet Union’s demise in December 1991, the American imperium replaced the balance of power, which had emerged in 1945 and the contemporary hierarchy of the states became solidified; which looks like a pyramid, where the top position is occupied by the United States. Three other categories of states are 1) major regional powers, 2) secondary regional powers and 3) small powers.
Clearly the United States’ relations with the rest of the states would remain asymmetrical. But relations with China are of a different nature: if China is not equal of the United States’ power, it certainly is not a subordinate state. China is a rival in the making. By the dawn of the twenty first century China had emerged by far the strongest power in Eurasia. Actually China’s rise in political prestige began in the late 1970s when the United States withdrew diplomatic recognition from its loyal protégé Taiwan, and agreed to the one China policy that was reconfirmed by subsequent communiqués issued by both the U.S. and China. Yet as a hedge, the U.S. Congress passed the Taiwan Act in 1979, which obligated the United States to protect Taiwan, and made it exceptionally difficult for China to achieve unification with Taiwan as section 2a(5) of the Act states that it is the
responsibility of the United States to “provide Taiwan arms of 
defensive character.”

This very double-minded policy of the United States remains a stumbling block in the improvement of relations between China and the United States. Now China’s economy is doubling in size every ten years, and personal incomes have been rising steadily. China’s trade with the United States played a major role in China’s growth. As a mark of high confidence foreign direct investment in China during 1979-1993 came to $221 billion. China needs prosperous America with economic policies that avoid protectionism. However, five issues remain in U.S. relations with China, where serious differences continue to exist: 1) Taiwan, 2) Tibet, 3) quest for sources of energy, and 5) trade related problems of imbalance.

The U.S. government’s suspicion of Chinese intentions is reflected in its claim that China’s military budget is not transparent. In 2006 China announced that it would increase its publicly disclosed military budget by 14.7 percent, to approximately $35 billion. The U.S. Department of Defense finds “the officially published figures substantially under reported actual expenditures.” In reality the U.S. maintains China is spending “between $70 billion and $106 billion in 2006 – two to three times of the announced budget.”

China’s spectacular economic development and lack of transparency in the budget for military allocations fuel the fires of suspicion in the United States. In addition China’s global activism is truly impressive. Four motivations can be identified: 1) securing inputs for the economy, 2) protecting against a potential U.S. containment strategy, 3) expanding Chinese political influence, and 4) preserving Chinese commercial interests.²

In regard to energy, the U.S. suspects that China is intruding into areas which were until recently within its economic and political orbit. This feeling was further strengthened when in January 2006 King Abdullah of Saudi
Arabia visited Beijing, and in April President Hu Jintao made his first state visit to Saudi Arabia, and agreed to hold more regular political conversations. In 2005 Saudi oil sales to China accounted for almost 17 percent of China’s oil imports, while trade between the two states exceeded $15 billion, having grown from zero to an average of 41 percent a year since 1999.

U.S. anxieties were deepened in 2005, when China National Offshore Oil Corporation made an unsolicited $18.5 billion bid for Unocal, which had agreed to be sold to Chevron for $16.4 billion.

To contain the U.S. anxieties and lessen the possibility of a U.S. containment policy China has deliberately made its economy interdependent with that of the United States. China’s foreign exchange reserves in 2005 were nearly $750 billion, and were heading for a trillion dollars – mostly in U.S. treasury bonds. This development is a very substantial restraint on U.S. policy toward China, because the U.S. economy would suffer enormously if China sold its notes in a short order.

China’s second motivation is identified as the plan to deny the United States the ability to contain China. This plan may be described as the preemptive counter-containment strategy, which has focused on Eurasia, including Russia, India and possibly Iran. China has continuously improved its bilateral relations with Russia: 1) In 1996-1999 the two states signed the border agreements, and the border areas were demilitarized, 2) similar agreements were signed with the Central Asian states, 3) the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was founded, 4) they jointly issued a ringing denunciation of the United States seeking unilateral advantages with a missile defense plan that would violate the Antiballistic Missile Treaty and demanded the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Central Asian.

To broaden its diplomatic and security reach the SCO has admitted India, Iran and Pakistan into its deliberations as observers.
The third motivation of China is the natural power impulse to gain influence by persuasion rather than coercion or display of military might. China is allocating substantial resources to promote the Chinese language and culture. Foreign student enrollment in Chinese universities has increased from 85,000 in 2002 to 110,000 in 2004. About 75 percent of foreign students are from Asian countries. China has also established Confucius Institutes to promote the teaching of the Chinese language and cultural values.

China’s commercial interests are the fourth important rationale for Chinese global involvement. In order to seek technology China has signed technology sharing agreements with more than 52 countries, including Russia and Israel, and established strategic partnerships with major countries – Brazil (1993), Russia (1996), France (1997), Saudi Arabia (1999), and Iran (2000), ASEAN (2003), the European Union (2003), India (2003), the United Kingdom (2004), and Germany (2004).

Finally a question may be asked: would China be a stakeholder in the U.S. created imperial system or challenge it with an alternative system? A view is projected that in structuring the architecture of an alternative system, China will not challenge the U.S. power until the middle of the twenty first century. Until then Chinese policy will remain relatively peaceful. This timeframe is postulated by Zheng Bijian, a well-known and respected thinker, who was for some years a Deputy to President Hu Jintao of China.

Zheng crafted the view of a “peaceful rise” of China, as China confronts: 1) resource shortages, 2) pollution, 3) corruption, 4) the need for a rule of law, and 5) uneven socio-economic development. Internationally China faces established western powers – most notably the United States – which have their own economic and political interests, which are not necessarily in harmony with Chinese concerns. Zheng estimated that “China will basically realize modernization in the mid twenty first century, reaching the level of a moderately developed country.”

In other words internal development imperatives mandate a peaceful period of at least 45 years. Who knows what the Chinese policy will be after nearly half a century? Intentions change with the development of resources. These dark areas of uncertainty about China inspire the soft containment policy of the United States.

While China looms very large on the political horizon of the Untied States, Europe is another area, where the United States would remain concerned during this century. The European Union could be a serious pole of power, if it becomes the United States of Europe. The leading European powers have already started in subtle ways to check the U.S. power. France, Germany and Russia jointly opposed the United States from obtaining a U.N. Security Council Resolution to authorize the invasion of Iraq.

In his usual unsubtle way President Bush has remained skeptical of the European Union’s progress toward unity. In 2001 Bush startled some visitors to his oval office with a rhetorical question: “was the drive toward European unity good for the United States?” As the United States got bogged down in Iraq, the U.S. would not dream of raising this issue loudly. To Bush’s surreptitious delight the European Union’s constitution for the enlarged union of 25 states was knocked off course, when France and the Netherlands rejected it in referendums in May and June 2005. So far, 14 countries have fully ratified the constitution, two of them by referendum. The proposed constitution commits the EU to a common foreign policy, and says it should develop a common defense policy.

The 25-nation European Union weighs in with $11 trillion in economic output, roughly on par with the United States. European currency, the Euro is so strong that it may one day replace the dollar as the principal means of exchange. In the conservative elements in the Bush administration, especially the Department of Defense and the office of Vice-President Dick Cheney, fear remains strongly that the new Europe is not always in tune with American imperium’s objectives. Actually all
successive administrations since the 1950s supported European integration in general, “none was willing to risk the possibility that Europe might become independent of American leadership, and none was able to resist the temptation to use the British as an agent of American influence in Europe.”

Clearly the logic of imperium does not encourage the Untied States to create a formidable rival!!

In the steady erosion of U.S.-China relations early in the first term of President Bush, as the U.S. strategic architecture was fleshed out, the United States policy was bound to tilt in the direction of India and Taiwan. Relations with Pakistan were to be downgraded, as it happened under Clinton and Bush before the tragedy of 9/11. This tragedy’s impact was so overwhelming that strategic planning had to be redirected partially in the favor of Pakistan—but not for very long.

**New Security Architecture**

Very vigorously Bush explained early in his first term the national missile defense system (NMD), and the strategic thinking that underscored it. The plan was to transform the strategic parameters within which the Cold War strategic architecture was built. It implied that the doctrine of mutually assured destruction would be abandoned. On the positive side the new concept suggested that a new cooperative global security regime would be created, and targets would be the so-called rogue states, and terrorists. These new threats, replacing the Soviet threat are the disruptive elements openly challenging the concept of global power distributions, which might be established through negotiations or the threat of force generally accepted when couched in diplomatic terminology. Naturally this new distribution of power would reflect each state’s rank determined by its economic resources, industrial and technological development, territory, population and commitment to human rights and democracy.
The Indian reaction to Bush’s concept of new world order was enthusiastically supportive; Europe’s was cool, and the Chinese opposition was loud and clear. They saw that the implications of this strategic design were directed to inhibit their growth as a military superpower. Why was India so enthusiastic about Bush’s new initiatives? Several explanations can be offered: 1) India wanted the U.S. to lift sanctions imposed over nuclear explosions; 2) India wanted U.S. support to gain a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council; 3) India was keen to replace Pakistan as Washington’s strategic partner in South Asia; 4) India desired to capitalize on growing economic ties between the two countries, driven by the increasing contributions of Indian-Americans’ engineers and entrepreneurs in the high-technology sector.

By June 2001 the Bush Administration had taken significant steps to improve the relationship with India. In the military to military dimension the U.S. initiated one joint military exercise or engagement each month. These exercises covered a wide range of military skills and attempted to improve the capacity for combined military operations across the board – by Special Forces against terrorists, maritime interdiction, search and rescue, airlift support, logistics transport and airborne assault. In June and July 2002, the Indian Navy ships Sukanya and Sharda conducted escort patrols for American ships through the Malacca Straits, in support of Operation Enduring Freedom Afghanistan. American warships began to refuel in Chennai and Mumbai and the largest ever U.S.-India naval exercise was conducted in September 2002. In 2003 more than 180 high-ranking leaders from the Indian security community attended conferences sponsored by the U.S. Department of Defense.

Delivering a luncheon address before the Confederation of Indian Industry in New Delhi, the U.S. Ambassador Robert D. Blackwill paid the most flattering compliment to the Indian military: “Indian and American soldiers are warriors. Their central mission is to fight and win wars. How many armies can one say that about today?” While during 2001-2002 many Pakistanis were deported from the United States; during the same
period the U.S. consular offices in four Indian cities issued more than a half million business and tourist visas to Indian citizens. The visa issuance rate for India was the same as it was before 9/11.4

In May 2001 Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, to add insult to injury to Pakistan, just barely stopped short of directly naming Pakistan as a rogue state in a press conference in India. Asked to name rogue states, he referred to Libya, Iraq, North Korea and other countries “in your neighborhood.” When pressed to elaborate, he said: “We have questions about Pakistan which are well-known.”5

“False Relationship” with Pakistan

It was left to Armitage to articulate the new relations with Pakistan. He did so with his customary bluntness. In an interview to an Indian correspondent he stated: “For years we had an unbalanced policy in South Asia...People would look at it superficially and say we had a great relationship with Pakistan, but it was in a way a false relationship because in the first instance it was built against the India-Soviet Union axis, and then latterly it was against the Soviet occupation in Afghanistan...So we didn’t have a policy for Pakistan, we had a policy with Pakistan directed at something else...what we are desirous of is for our Pakistani friends to try to develop a relationship about Pakistan.”6

If false relationships were to be replaced by the positive content of bilateral relations, what were they supposed to be? Some of these dots were connected by the Assistant Secretary of State, Christina Rocca who highlighted some positive and some negative aspects of U.S. relations with Pakistan. One the positive side she did not fail to underline the geostrategic significance of Pakistan as “a central place at the crossroads of Asia.” Actually, it is the strategic importance of Pakistan’s real estate, which draws the United States (and China) to close relations with Pakistan, despite its chronic political instability, and lack of democracy. Rocca added two more attributes to Pakistan’s
Moreover Pakistan is a bridge to Afghanistan, which connects the Asian land mass to South Asia and the Persian Gulf. These attributes are the permanent factors contributing to Pakistan’s significance in world politics. In reality all states acquire strategic significance, especially for the grand strategies of major powers, by virtue of their geography, and natural resources. As a functionary of diplomatic practice, Armitage probably never carefully studied the craft of statesmanship, which would have made him sensitive to the intrinsic value of geography. Indeed the bitter lesson of 9/11 brought home to the United States the strategic importance of Pakistan (once again).

The post 9/11 U.S. policy toward Pakistan and India is designed to “groom” India as a countervailing force against China in Asia and a fighter against Islamic fundamentalism and terror in the Middle East. Pakistan is expected to settle its problems with India, settle the Kashmir problem on its own, and join the balance of power system designed to contain China.

To entice India to play this new role the United States repudiated its own nuclear policy of non-proliferation and invited India to join the ranks of China, France, Russia, Britain and the United States as a legitimate nuclear power. President Bush refused to accord the same treatment to Pakistan. This was the major accomplishment of President Bush, when he visited India in March 2006, but it became a sore point for Pakistan, which insisted upon parity in her relationship with India and the United States. When the new U.S.-India nuclear deal was debated in the 50-member International Relations Committee of the House of Representatives on June 5, 2006 the co-chair of the Indian caucus in the House, Gary Ackerman responded to Pakistan: “If you want to be treated like India, be like India.” Congressman Dan Burton, a traditional supporter of Pakistan, commented that the nuclear deal with India “has a lot of merit and that India would be a greater ally of the United States and a good partner down the road.”
Former Assistant Secretary of Defense in the Clinton Administration, and currently a faculty member at Harvard University, Ashton B. Carter states that “under the terms of the deal the United States commits to behave, and urge other states to behave, as if India were a nuclear weapons state under the NPT, even though India has not signed the treaty and will not be required to do so…Washington has also undertaken to stop denying civil nuclear technology to India and has determined to require India to apply the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) only to nuclear facilities it designates as being for purely civil purposes. India is now authorized to import uranium, the lack of which had long stalled the progress of its nuclear program.”

Undoubtedly Indian diplomacy has succeeded brilliantly. They have supported the United States on missile defense, the International Criminal Court, facilitated U.S. operations against Afghanistan in 2002, and voted in 2005 and 2006 with the U.S. against Iran at the IAEA. When Pakistan proposed China as an observer in (2005) in South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, India skillfully brought in Japan, South Korea and above all the United States for the same position.

Despite these diplomatic games an ultimate question about India’s role as a player for the United States against China remains to be answered. By the middle of the twenty first century Indian diplomacy may opt for the role of a balancer between the three major powers, China, Russia and the United States, and Pakistan would side with the power which would contain India.

In Afghanistan the United States and its allies remain committed for at least five years under the terms of the Afghanistan Compact signed in London on January 31, 2006. The blueprint requires the restoration of the country’s security, building a functioning economy, and countering the rapidly expanding narcotics trade, and crushing the Taliban’s resurgence in the battlefield. Along with its goals of strengthening democracy the Afghan Compact aimed to eliminate illegal armed
groups by 2007 and to construct an Afghan national army of 70,000 troops by 2010. NATO is expected to be deployed in Southern Afghanistan, enabling the United States to reduce its troops by 2,500 to 16,500. Afghanistan is expected to remain under the United States’ umbrella of protection for at least 10 years.
References and Notes

*  This article was adapted from my upcoming book, *U.S. Relations with Afghanistan and Pakistan: The Imperial Dimensions*, scheduled to be published in 2008 by Oxford University Press, Karachi. Paper Presented at the International Conference on Religion, Politics and Society in South Asia, the Punjab University, Lahore, Pakistan, 19 – 20th February 2007.


