THE POLITICAL PULSE

Magazine

Official E-Magazine

Aims for Political and Policy Analysis in:

- National Affairs
- Regional Affairs
- Global Affairs



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DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

Quaid-i-Azam Campus, University of The Punjab, Lahore, Pakistan



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THE GRAND ASPIRATION

Political Pulse is a dynamic e-magazine that features informed political discourse, critical analysis, and thought-provoking discussions. Our mission is to provide readers with insightful commentary, in-depth analysis, and diverse perspectives on local, national, and international political affairs. We strive to promote a well-informed citizenry by delivering fact-based, unbiased, and intellectually stimulating content

1. To enhance public understanding of key political issues, policies, and governance structures


2. To provide a platform for diverse political opinions and scholarly insights that encourage healthy debate and critical thinking

3. To connect academic research with practical policy discussions, making complex political theories accessible to a broader audience.

4. To bring forward perspectives from marginalized communities, fostering inclusivity and a holistic approach to political analysis

5. Use modern digital tools and platforms to create interactive political content and effectively reach a global audience.

Message from the Vice Chancellor



I would like to wholeheartedly congratulate the Department of Political Science on its new initiative of launching Political Pulse. I believe this English electronic magazine will be an indispensable tool for academic engagement, critique, debate, and so much more. I, as the President of this initiative, wish to appreciate the department for creating a niche where students, scholars, and even policymakers can interact with modern-day political and social phenomena. The University of the Punjab has always been the leader of the pack in academics and research. Political Pulse encompasses such vision by enabling an instantaneously responsive forum for the exchange of ideas that integrates the gap between the two and encourages scholarly writing on both national and international issues.

A magazine of such nature with the scope of covering policy and governance will undoubtedly provide beneficial perspectives that are needed to address the many scholarly issues in the world today. To the readers, contributors, and the editorial team of Political Pulse, I wish you and cherish every moment brought forth by this new initiative. I hope this step is continuously taken forward to help foster constructive critique, discourse, and help advance the realm of political science and other constituents of such an intricate field.

Prof. Dr. Muhammad Ali

Message from the Head of Department



Political Pulse is an electronic magazine dedicated to engaging your mind and facilitating meaningful debates on important political, economic, security, geographical, climate change, and other social issues. I am greatly excited to introduce it. This magazine is more than just a publication. It is a forum where your ideas, analysis, and perspectives can lead and participate in debates, help frame opinions, and bring a more comprehensive understanding of the world.

As students of political science and other fields, you are uniquely placed to relate to current issues, voice your opinion, and polish your writing and research skills. I urge all of you to contribute, be it in the form of articles, opinion pieces, fiction, book reviews, policy analysis, or interviews. Doing so will enhance the magazine's strength while simultaneously giving you academic and professional benefits.

Prof. Dr. Rana Eijaz Ahmad



> “Political Pulse strives to provide insightful perspectives, well-researched articles, and thought-provoking debates.”

Letter from the Editor-in-Chief

Dear Readers,

It is with great enthusiasm that I welcome you to Political Pulse, our university’s premier e-magazine dedicated to political discourse, analysis, and thought leadership. As the Editor-in-Chief, I am honored to lead a platform that amplifies student voices, nurtures critical thinking, and engages with the pressing political issues of our time.

In an era where politics shapes every aspect of our lives, Political Pulse strives to provide insightful perspectives, well-researched articles, and thought-provoking debates. Whether you are passionate about international affairs, governance, policy-making, or political theory, this magazine serves as a space for intellectual exploration and meaningful dialogue. I encourage you to contribute your ideas, challenge perspectives, and be an active part of this growing community. Let Political Pulse be the medium where your voice is heard, your opinions are respected, and your insights inspire change.

Prof. Dr. Rana Eijaz Ahmad
Editor-in-Chief

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“Reimagining Representation: Assessing Dr. Ameena Mohyuddin Zia's Seminal Study on Gender Quotas in Pakistan.”

Quotas do constitute an important institutional step forward in the story of women’s empowerment in Pakistan. However, quotas alone are insufficient. They do not constitute a substitute for substantive empowerment, transformative visionary leadership, empathetic politics, and a genuinely inclusive political and policymaking vision that truly and wholesomely caters to the needs of a country’s female cohort. In particular, the modern tendency to quantify everything often blinds us moderns to the qualitative dimension of things. Women’s empowerment, too, cannot be reduced to numbers. Statistics are, at best, only one side of the equation. Dr. Ameena Mohyuddin Zia’s Representation: A Study of Gender Quotas in the National Assembly of Pakistan (2025) is a book that takes its readers beyond quotas with a qualitatively profound philosophical paradigm. In fact, nothing could substitute for substantive outcomes. Quotas can only take women so far. Substantive outcomes are contingent on compatible cultural attitudes as well as certain structural prerequisites. Genuine empowerment essentially entails impactful institutional, structural, and cultural transformation. Leadership, empowerment, and inclusion are concepts that themselves need to be revisited and re-imagined in a way that they are not reduced merely to the domain of numbers. The book clearly brings out the “inability of a purely statistical approach” (Zia, 2025, p. 145) in arriving at a holistic understanding of the issues at hand. For women’s political participation to be genuinely meaningful and substantive, it needs to be reconceptualized, argues the author. Moreover, she herself presents a blueprint as to how such an exercise should be undertaken, laying the first, formative, and seminal—not final—brick for the proposed enterprise.

The book, indeed, represents “the beginning of the exploration of women’s substantive representation in Pakistan” (p. 146). And it does so by building on very strong foundations. As Thomas Hobbes says, “when men build on false grounds, the more they build, the greater the ruin” (Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, The Second Part, Chapter 24, p. 140, 1651). Similarly,

when women build on strong foundations, the more they build, the greater the glory. Her work goes far beyond critique; it is quintessentially constructive in character. It undertakes a critical assessment of worn-out analytical lenses, while also being constructive of novel imaginaries of leadership, revisiting the conceptualization of representation in the process. All construction must, of necessity, precede deconstruction in an over-, yet often poorly, constructed theoretical landscape. Her work coherently blends the themes of representation, identity, and the political economy of women in politics, where the blending of colours seamlessly transpires around the central thematic thread of quotas. Each colour (representation, identity, political economy) is employed to highlight a particular aspect of the quota system. With quotas, women may certainly come to occupy power, but they are still constrained, nonetheless, by pressures and restraints that prevent them from making effective use of their presence in these corridors of power, argues the author.

The American political scientist Mala Htun similarly argues in her Inclusion without Representation in Latin America (2016) that "Quotas gave women presence in power, but not the power to make effective use of their presence" (Mala Htun, Inclusion without Representation in Latin America, 2016). Thus, mere presence in the corridors of power does not necessarily mean genuine empowerment. It does not automatically translate into substantive outcomes. The book blends a longitudinal case study of gender quotas in Pakistan's National Assembly with an analytical investigation into the concept of substantive representation and its suitability for the former. The beauty of the book lies, in part, in the fact that while it liberally quotes statistical data, it also demonstrates a keen awareness of the limitations of such data, reminding us again and again that such data can only take us so far.

In her work, one comes across a theoretically well-grounded, clear-headed, philosophically informed, pragmatic, and sociologically sensitive approach to the question of quotas and the limitations thereof. It is vivid in terms of the author's vision for Pakistan, yet that vision is not unmoored; rather, it is rooted in reality, and subsequently, seeks to derive its nourishment from reality as it is, while simultaneously seeking to transform it. In her book, the author, in a sense, evokes the imagery of the balanced scale that Sadequain paints to describe Ghazalian philosophy in one of his paintings. In a sense, her book brought back to me the memory of the days when I was researching the political philosophy of Ghazali, whose works represent a reality-informed, yet philosophically profound and principled discourse that, while navigating the dialectical interplay of the ideal and the real, seeks to strike a perfect balance between the real and the ideal, neither doing injustice to his philosophical principles nor neglecting the concrete realities of the then-contemporary political reality and institutions. A sense of "sober realism," to borrow the words of Charles le Gai Eaton, runs throughout the book—an attentiveness to facts. Such an "attentiveness to facts" is, in fact, "the foundation of effective action in the world" (Gai Eaton, King of the Castle, 1977).

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The deeply sociologically guided nature of the author's approach and engagement can clearly be discerned in statements like: "effective strategies for increasing women's political participation must be locally grounded" (Zia, 2025) and "the narratives that drive these changes must be crafted and supported within the local context" (ibid.). When principle becomes dogmatically rigid and rigidly dogmatic, it tends to become utopian. This is not the case with this work. Herein actually lies a great part of the beauty of the book, wherein the author treads the terrain by riding the Golden Horse of the Aristotelian Golden Mean in such a manner that all ideologically dogmatic propositions are pre-emptively evaded, which is quite rare in books and articles that treat the subject matter. This is one of the hallmarks of the present work.

"The Islamic Republic of Pakistan was founded on the concept of political representation," writes Ameena Mohyuddin Zia in the book (Zia, 2025). To be honest, I have not come across any single line that so succinctly and single-handedly captures the ideational imperative of Pakistan in so few words. My first reading of the book also coincided with the time when I was reading extensively about the Pakistan Movement. All my confusion melted away, as if in a single moment of epiphany, when I read this line. Also, the way it articulates the ideational imperative of Pakistan is unsurpassed. The author then draws upon the history of Pakistan—and that of the Women's Movement in Pakistan—to describe how many later events actually constitute a continuation of the same ideational imperative that animated the founding fathers' vision: to ensure that the concept of political representation is

turned ever more completely into a concrete reality. Pakistan's story is, at its heart, a story of representation.

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"When principle becomes dogmatically rigid and rigidly dogmatic, it tends to become utopian."

QAZI MUHAMMAD AHMAD QASMI



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“The Strait of Hormuz and Pakistan's Energy Dilemma.”

The Strait of Hormuz is strategically very important for trade and transportation, as it is a critical energy chokepoint, with roughly one fifth of the global oil and natural gas passing through it. On average, 20 million barrels of crude oil and petroleum products pass through the Strait of Hormuz daily, according to a U.S. Energy Information Administration report. Iran exercises significant strategic control over the Strait of Hormuz. It is a 21- to 60-mile-wide maritime chokepoint bordered by Iranian territory, particularly Hormozgan Province, which provides Iran with a significant strategic advantage, as it allows the Iranian navy to monitor shipping lanes. Qeshm Island, which serves as a missile base, forms a defensive arc—allowing the monitoring of shipping, the deployment of drones and missiles, and the projection of power; it acts as a "cork" in the strait. This island has the capacity to close and control Hormuz, as it features hidden tunnels, anti-ship missiles, and drones to ensure control of the Strait. Pakistan, which has been facing an energy crisis for the past two decades, suffers from a significant gap between supply and demand, and depends heavily on oil imported from Gulf countries that passes through the Strait of Hormuz. Pakistan relies on the strait for almost 85% of its oil imports, with 35% of its oil supply coming from Saudi Arabia and 53% from the UAE. Pakistan imports almost 100% of its LNG (Liquefied Natural Gas) from Qatar, and the UAE. These numbers show the importance of the Strait for Pakistan's energy security.

Under normal conditions, the Strait is strategically very significant, but during recent conflicts, delayed shipments, temporary blockades, and war-risk insurance premiums have made imports much more costly and highly challenging for fragile economies. Pakistan already faces huge duties on petroleum products due to tax collection adjustments and statistical revisions in tax collection data in light of budget goals set by the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR).). Oil import costs have increased significantly, as Pakistan is paying an additional $30 per barrel in taxes related to imports from Iran, which has burdened Pakistan’s oil

import bill. That is why we have seen greater panic in Pakistan's petroleum products compared to other Asian countries whose energy sectors also rely heavily on the Strait of Hormuz for their energy imports.

In Pakistan, the severity of the Hormuz crisis extends beyond petroleum prices; it ultimately leads to upward fluctuations in the inflation index, whereas the agricultural sector, which is highly dependent on high-speed diesel, faces broader consequences for food cultivation, growth, and harvesting. Another important factor is the long-term storage capacity of oil. The Secretary of Petroleum informed the Senate Standing Committee on Petroleum that Pakistan has crude oil reserves for only 11 days, diesel for 27 days, LNG for 9 days, and jet fuel (JP-1) for 14 days. During the crisis, the reserve levels decreased by half due to market panic and stock limitations by private companies and different stakeholders. The lower reserve levels also increase the significance of daily oil shipments from Gulf countries, as Pakistan relies heavily on Gulf oil that passes through the Strait of Hormuz.

The economic cost is too high for Pakistan's vulnerable economy, as its petroleum import bill is already nearly $11 billion annually, and the sustained increase of $10 per barrel adds billions of dollars to the country's trade deficit. To explore options other than the Strait of Hormuz, PARCO utilized some other routes during the peak days of the US-Iran confrontation. Alternative options that Pakistan can explore include the Saudi Red Sea route, namely Saudi Arabia's port of Yanbu on the Red Sea, and it is connected to eastern oil fields via the 1,200-km East-West pipeline, allowing exports to bypass the Strait of Hormuz completely.

Another option is the UAE's Fujairah route, which bypasses the bottleneck of the Strait. Pakistan has explored these alternative routes, as PARCO has arranged crude oil supplies via the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company through the Gulf of Oman, utilizing Saudi Arabia's East-West pipeline. By using these routes, PARCO has sourced 140,000 barrels of oil through these channels.

The closure or neutralization of the Strait of Hormuz is an immediate threat to Pakistan's energy security, macroeconomic resilience, price stability, and import cycle/patterns, as Pakistan depends on a single chokepoint for almost all of its oil imports. As every lock has a key, the crisis also serves as a lesson for Pakistan; it is time to review the national energy policy. Pakistan needs to explore new global oil markets, including Russia, Iran, and other suppliers beyond the Middle East, as well as alternative routes, such as the Red Sea. Moreover, it is high time for Pakistan to invest in domestic renewable energy sources to minimize dependence on imported energy.

Pakistan should look to enhancing its oil storage capacity to survive future global disruptions. India maintains a petroleum reserve capacity of 65–70 days, and Pakistan also needs to elevate its oil storage capacity from weeks to months. To implement these policies, investment in infrastructure is needed alongside strong political and bureaucratic will.



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"MENA's Options for Integrating Counterintelligence: Start with the Gulf."

For the geopolitics of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), now is a time of great anxiety. With the non-Arab actors engaging in another tense series of regional infighting, coercive diplomacy and modern warfare have halted episodic interventions from the Arab counterparts. The MENA high-fliers have moved from their traditional stances of diplomatic arrangements, and prioritized military readiness instead in the current spiraling crisis. For decades, the dominant challenge for the Arab nations has not been Israel's aggression nor Iran's ambitions, but their inability to sustain collective agreement in coalitions. The MENA region has seen countless alliances fracturing over the years, resulting in a region without one superpower. If the Gulf states continue to rely on the United States' shapeshifting adventures in the Middle East, they will end up losing more than their economic potency and military confidence: the ability to shape and sustain the geopolitical chessboard. The trust deficit within the Arab world in synchronizing with its proximate neighbors has weakened the prospects of creating a counterintelligence structure in regional flare-ups. Decades down the line, is remaining mutually vulnerable to modern intelligence operations a mistake worth repeating in traditional alliances?

Consistent strategic differences in MENA are fracturing political reconciliation and strategic recalibration. Facing multiple power projectors, the shared security architecture has reshaped how this geography collaborates during political flare-ups. MENA's high-fliers see this geography as lacking a single dominant actor: this vacuum is yet to be filled, but complete dominance requires incremental layering, which Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkiye, the UAE, and Iran seek. The Gulf's current idea to combine deterrence with diplomacy has met some historical, geopolitical tests. From Kuwait (1990) to Bahrain (2011), this geography has had its fair share of regional adventures. The fear of exposing warfighting weaknesses has halted political adventures in MENA. Aside from weak engagements in Yemen and Syria, and confused performances with Israel and Iran, the geopolitical awareness

of the need to (re-)arrange the Middle East offers a complex silver lining. The ongoing crisis demands more than a cohesive bloc from the Gulf. Moving in line with other MENA actors invites multidimensional risks, gambles, and prospects in managing the evolving theatre of power.

The Arab nations prioritized active defense investments and air denial practices to prevent entanglements in spiraling crises. Systematic defense procurements have streamlined their multi-domain operations, but out-spying Iran's asymmetric warfighting or Israel's intelligence warfare remains a collective test. Israel's intelligence directives of movement profiling and persistent surveillance of the Supreme Leader highlighted the necessity to advance intelligence methodologies. MENA's defensive architecture requires an additional protective layer over deterrence: counterintelligence. Not synchronizing against a common enemy has several reasons: domestic fracturing, outdated doctrines, historical distrust, and interoperability gaps. Investing rapidly in modern war equipment has erased the Arab world's warfighting inferiority. Still, the mismatch continues to exist in indigenous production of air defenses, military intelligence, and technical expertise. Despite inter- and intra-regional strategic connections existing as a starting point, the factors underlying alliance fragmentation have increased.

Israel's versatile intelligence altered political entanglements for MENA. It introduced a hybrid wave of targeted psychological operations (PSYOPS) as a supplemental novelty. The open presence of Israel's intelligence has resulted in its neighbors' doctrinal fatigue. This 'eye in the sky' layering impacted the susceptibility, vulnerability, and recoverability of MENA's doctrinal postures. It pushed the Persian Gulf to enhance battlespace in three settings: Iran's predictive intelligence, the Gulf's threat assessment, and integrated weapons systems. Still, the absence of collective standardization of military intelligence and interoperability is glaring. To keep a watchful eye on regional aggressors, the Gulf adopted a threefold approach: formalizing passive defense, security clusters, and proactive diplomacy. With multiple doctrines, MENA struggles to succeed in collectively preserving power, let alone projecting it. Be it Iran or Israel, a common pattern in the Gulf Cooperation Council's (GCC) strategic behavior was observed: It preferred personalized military innovations and investments, while securing inter-regional strategic alliances. From the Levant to North Africa, the GCC to Iran, and Turkiye in the broader Middle East, this reality articulated the disconnected objectives. However, the Gulf's common direction to domestically upgrade remained constant, and it offers three scenarios.

First, become innovative by forming a layered intelligence coalition with regional military sectors in different geographical quadrants, making the Five Eyes a blueprint to align domains, departments, and systems. Second, continue investing in personalized, ad hoc security investments before active defense localization. In the current situation, this strategy provided the Gulf with ample psychological and operational confidence to fuse other arrangements together. Third, use the

previous geopolitical arrangements of MENA to innovate. The Middle East Strategic Alliance (MESA) was an initiative of the Trump administration to bring the Arab states together for a joint cause: unifying against Iran. The Qatar blockade and Egypt's withdrawal entered the equation, and MESA became a memory. Therefore, the prospects of coordination by cross-regional powers require a consensus.

In the current scenario, the urgency to upgrade counterintelligence structures is neither lacking incentives nor temptations. The urgency to innovate in multiple spheres of traditional power is a matter of strategic inevitability. MENA has found a cogently balanced geostrategy to maneuver in multidirectional geopolitical dimensions. Natural resources, chokepoints, and trade passages give significant bargaining chips to MENA; it has shaped its strategic profile to constructively depend on geostrategic positioning. Using traditional elements of power with natural commonalities and conditionalities offers alliance politics enough political and military space to maneuver. In a not-so-friendly neighborhood, finding a common ground remains the Achilles' heel. Bringing elements of confidence-building from inter-regional coalition lessons is one go-to strategy. By signing up Ukraine as a defense partner, the Gulf states appeared to have realized the limits of precision defenses in counteracting drone swarming and cluster maneuvering. This development underlines the necessity of change in the Gulf's security thinking. With partners stretching from Russia to Pakistan, from Greece to the UK, from China to South Korea, and now to



Ukraine, this actor diversification shows a proactive quest for military power. The Iran conflict could invite more defense investments in the region, broadening MENA's actor choices, weapons systems, and political strategies to navigate its way through the shifting geopolitical chessboard.

"With multiple doctrines, MENA struggles to succeed in collectively preserving power, let alone projecting it."

MUHAMMAD HAMZA



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"Super El Nino 2026: Why the Stakes are so high for Pakistan."

It has been predicted that El Niño will reappear in 2026 as the so-called Super El Niño, potentially becoming the most powerful in 140 years. El Niño is the warm phase of the El Niño-Southern Oscillation (ENSO), characterised by a weakening of trade winds over the central and eastern Pacific, resulting in chaotic global changes. During the second week of April, the World Meteorological Organization reported that the Pacific Ocean entered the El Niño phase, with the NINO3.4 index hitting +0.5 degrees Celsius. Some climate experts project temperature anomalies reaching +3.0 degrees Celsius by autumn. This editorial posits that the 2026 Super El Niño is a systemic risk that overshadows meteorology, evolving into a national crisis, one that demands an immediate transition towards institutionalized heat-protection measures to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe.

For Pakistan, it is likely to result in reduced summer rainfall, accompanied by extreme pre-monsoon heatwaves. This is not merely a projection. November 2024 recorded a national mean temperature anomaly of +2.89 degrees Celsius, the greatest deviation in 64 years of available data, with nighttime minimums deviating by +4.0 degrees Celsius. This matters because the night is supposed to allow the human body to recover from heat stress. When it no longer provides relief, and when most of the population lives in poorly ventilated homes, heatstroke risk compounds daily. The 2026 multifaceted pressures may amount to a contemporary "money famine," for Pakistan if existing fiscal tightening and disruptions from global conflicts are not addressed in time.

Heat stress in Pakistan reaches four intersecting breaking points: physiological, urban, agricultural and temporal. Physiologically, temperatures above 40 degrees Celsius reduce labour productivity by half among informal workers in Lahore, Karachi and Faisalabad—cities that offer a near non-existent safety net for daily wage earners. Urbanisation compounds the crisis through what can be called the "concrete trap": unplanned density keeps Karachi's temperatures up to 6 degrees Celsius higher than surrounding rural

areas, absorbing heat throughout the day and releasing it at night, the very hours the body needs to reset. Agriculturally, the Super El Niño's peak is expected to suppress the monsoon during the critical transition between wheat harvesting and Kharif sowing. This is a devastating blow given an existing water deficit and an 8.9% drop in wheat output last fiscal year, making imports increasingly likely. As an added economic pressure, fuel prices have surged while solar buyback rates have been slashed to Rs. 8.13, effectively politicising the very resource people could have used to cope during extreme summers.

The most significant impact will not be heat itself, but what it does to the South Asian monsoon, which provides 70–80% of Pakistan's annual rainfall. Agriculture contributes 19% of GDP and employs 38% of the workforce. When Punjab's wheat and Sindh's cotton crops enter their most water-sensitive growth phases in May–July, a 61% probability of El Niño should alarm governments far more than it does. What compounds this further is unpredictability: the 2026 climate outlook is not for a simple rain deficit but for violent fluctuations between heatwaves and localised extreme rainfall, making agricultural planning structurally impossible. Authorities have confirmed that heat above 35 degrees Celsius in early March already forced premature crop maturing, turning wheat from lush green to pale and crippling grain development across large areas of Punjab.

Those who point to La Niña as a counterargument raise a perspective not without scientific basis. Some climate scientists suggest it may follow or partially overlap with the 2026 El Niño cycle, moderating its extremes. But a country that lost a third of its landmass to floods in 2022, at a cost of over 30 billion dollars and displacement of 33 million people, cannot treat a possible moderating phase as reassurance. Fields scorched through a suppressed monsoon do not recover when rains arrive late and all at once, and irrigation infrastructure built for gradual seasonal inflow is not designed for the sudden excess a La Niña rebound can trigger. The government must immediately begin planning and public education to ensure this does not become a 'when it rains, it pours' situation for the people.

The National Disaster Management Authority's Summer Hazards Contingency Plan 2026 identifies Punjab and Sindh as ground zero—geographically the same regions devastated during the Great Famine of the 19th century. On paper, the plan encompasses cooling centres, hospital alerts, mobile advisories, and district-level response units. Yet it openly acknowledges coordination failures across multiple ministries, departments, and humanitarian partners. With increased petrol at Rs. 458 per litre, diesel at Rs. 520 per litre during wartime, and frequent power outages, cooling centres risk becoming heat-trapping spaces rather than relief. Most damning of all: Prime Minister Shehbaz ordered an investigation into an early climate warning system that was not even functioning. This is a stark illustration of how little has changed despite orders issued the year before. The NDMA plan appears more suited to managing routine heatstroke than responding to a cumulative thermal anomaly affecting 40 million workers with little to no savings.

Real data from April–May 2026 confirms temperatures surging to 45–50 degrees Celsius across Sindh, Southern Punjab, and Balochistan, producing a sharp rise in heatstroke cases among outdoor workers. NDMA has since claimed the situation is unfolding exactly as predicted three to four months earlier. This means the prediction existed. The preparation did not.

A daily wage worker interviewed by Amnesty International said plainly: "If I take a rest, I will not get salary. Whatever the temperature is, I have to work." A Super El Niño layered on top of this reality means the structural collapse of the only economic opportunity millions of Pakistanis have.

Thus, Pakistan cannot afford to treat a structural emergency like a seasonal inconvenience. The Super El Niño of 2026 will not wait for inter-ministerial coordination to sort itself out, nor will it spare those who never contributed to the emissions driving it. What is needed now is not another contingency plan filed under proactive response—but action on war footing: shaded rest zones and free drinking water for outdoor workers enforced by law, crop insurance disbursed before damage occurs, and a climate communication campaign that reaches the daily wage labourer before temperatures hit dangerous peaks.

Most of the population remains unaware of El Niño despite being most likely to suffer its consequences. The daily wage worker does not have the luxury to wait for the forecast to be confirmed. Neither does Pakistan.

"Heat stress in Pakistan reaches four intersecting breaking points: physiological, urban, agricultural, and temporal."

RIQQA SAEEDA



Nawa Abbas is a graduate of Political Science from the Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab, Lahore.

"Atmosphere as a Battlefield."

Within traditional military philosophy, the concepts of modernization and restraint are defined as virtues. An example of this is in the field of military strategic thought, where patience, taking time to plan and assess before action is taken, have all been regarded as hallmarks of smart statecraft. However, the ongoing war between Israel and Iran reveals the shortcomings of this assumption. It shows that such a notion of being patient is not true since there does not seem to be any patient build-up of forces. The use of force will increase immediately after the first encounters, and not only will geopolitical stability be worsened, but severe environmental degradation will also ensue. What is happening is not just war. It is rather an acknowledgement of an ecocide—the deliberate annihilation of environments due to human conflict. The battlefield did not limit itself to territory and ideology but extended to the atmosphere, water systems, and even the very conditions that make life sustainable.

Wars are always resource-consuming, but modern war is executed on such a large industrial scale that we, as ordinary people, find it hard to imagine its real impact. In the initial 14 days of the war between Iran and Israel, the total amount of carbon produced was equivalent to about 5 million tons. It is more carbon than is generated in a year by many smaller countries, as The Guardian reported. Every missile launched, every fighter jet flown, and every convoy mobilized adds to this growing carbon footprint. Military aviation —often excluded from discussions about climate change—produced many of those emissions. Nevertheless, this production remains mostly unchecked and underreported under global climate systems. The consequences of this are evident: war is not only a political crisis, but also a climate event. It hastens environmental change at a time when the global carbon budget is already under severe strain. Although the global effects of war can be seen in carbon emissions, the airborne pollutants produced from violent activities in a specific region are visible here and now. Strikes on oil refineries and fuel depots have resulted in thick plumes of smoke which have turned

industrial areas into a source of continuous environmental damage.

The air pollution resulting from these war activities is not simply blown into the air. Chemical reactions enable pollutants to revert to the earth as contaminated, tar-like precipitations, often referred to as black rain. This black rain is made up of particulates, sulfur-based chemicals, and carcinogenic residues. These precipitations contaminate soil, damage crops, and reduce the quality of fresh water sources. The Conflict and Environmental Observatory and Global Witness have repeatedly reported that war-related pollution harms the environment in ways that destabilize ecosystems and contribute to the emergence of new governance and advocacy organizations.


The impact of this pollution will continue to accumulate on a system that is already weak. The long-term effects may permanently alter certain ecosystems, or it may take decades before they fully recover. The significance of water goes well beyond soil and air. This is an aspect that will have the most consequences. The already-existing water stress in the region is intensified by the disruption of desalination plants and industrial infrastructure, creating a new source of vulnerability. Water systems are singularly delicate. Such destruction cannot be easily overcome, especially when aggravated by chemical pollutants. Bombed industrial facilities leak heavy metals and persistent pollutants into the immediate environment, seeping into groundwater stores and undermining drinking supplies. The resultant effect is systematic degradation alongside scarcity.

Consequently, water has now turned into a source of strategic vulnerability where it was perceived as a common resource. This shift is a movement toward what analysts term hydro-ecological insecurity—the state of being unable to isolate environmental resources from the dynamics of the conflict itself. The environmental impact of the Iran-Israel conflict confronts a traditional picture of security and political analysis, which generally sees environmental destruction as distant collateral damage of war, and thus of little analytical importance. This is no longer so. Ecocide is a re-branding of environmental destruction as a key effect of contemporary warfare. This is congruent with developing conceptual frameworks around climate security and the political environment, since environmental stress and the violence of conflict are interrelated.

Environmental degradation has been reported in outlets such as Wired Middle East and regional magazines such as the Friday Times as shaping the Middle Eastern strategic environment. Air pollution, unhealthy soil, and polluted water are no longer peripheral concerns. They are features of contemporary insecurity. The Iran-Israel war elicits such a crucial life-altering change in how we understand war. War can now be found in, and through, the very ecosystems that support life on earth.

The short-term political advantages of the loss of strategic patience have proven short-lived and have come at a far greater cost. The result of this conflict will be calculated not solely by shifts in geography and interstate relations, but also by the (see page 29)

volume of air pollution, damage to ecosystems, and the harm visited upon future generations in the aftermath of military action. In this regard, peace must be perceived differently. It is not entirely a political imperative, but also an environmental one. In its absence, the price of war will only keep increasing on and on.



"The short-term political advantages of the loss of strategic patience have proven short-lived and have come at a far greater cost."

NAWA ABBAS



Mirza Abdullah Baig is a student of 5th Semester International Relations at the Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab, Lahore.

"Power, not Principles, Governs the International System."

The way powerful governments talk about international order is fundamentally deceptive. They behave in accordance with their interests while speaking the language of international law, human rights, and multilateral conventions with remarkable fluency. It generally said that the liberal international order is a system of organizations and standards developed primarily after 1945, and is the result of principles triumphing over coercion. The purported framework of a rules-based society includes the United Nations, the International Criminal Court, and the WTO dispute settlement procedure. Their founding structures already encode hierarchy. However, a closer examination of these institutions' founders, major decision-making bodies, and the interests they constantly support reveals something less idealistic. The UN Security Council grants permanent veto power to five states, the five that won a war eight decades ago. According to_United Nations Security Council and the Iraq War, when the United States sought authorization for the invasion of Iraq in 2003, it withdrew the proposed resolution after it became clear that several permanent members would veto it, having secured at most four affirmative votes, well short of the nine required. The IMF and World Bank have historically operated through weighted voting structures that guarantee Western, and especially American, dominance. These institutions are not impartial arbiters of principle. They are instruments through which powerful states manage the international system on terms favorable to themselves.

Nowhere is this clearer than in the conduct of great powers when their interests collide with the rules they claim to uphold. According to a peer-reviewed study published in the_Taylor & Francis journal Cogent Social Sciences, the 2003 invasion of Iraq was conducted without UN authorization and in defiance of the UN Charter, a conclusion stated explicitly by the then-Secretary General Kofi Annan in September 2004, who said the war was waged outside the confines of international law. The international community protested, convened summits, issued statements, and watched it unfold.

No meaningful consequences followed. The pattern repeated with Russia. When Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, as reported by Brookings Institution, called it a clear violation of the United Nations Charter and the gravest threat to European security since the end of the Cold War. Sanctions and condemnation followed. Crimea remained Russian. In the South China Sea, China built artificial islands in disputed waters despite being legally bound by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. According to the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, on July 12, 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruled overwhelmingly in favor of the Philippines, determining that major elements of China's claims, including its nine-dash line and land reclamation activities, were unlawful. As reported by The Diplomat, the Chinese government has since repeatedly reiterated its policy of non-acceptance and non-recognition, with the Foreign Ministry referring to the award as "nothing but a piece of wastepaper." These are not aberrations. They are the pattern, and the pattern is one of structural realism in practice. Great powers absorb the costs of rhetorical condemnation while preserving their material gains.

One might object that powerful states generally do comply with international law. The standard counterargument is that strong states abide by many rules. But compliance with rules that serve your interests is not evidence that principles govern behavior; it is evidence that interests and principles occasionally align. The clearest test of whether principles constrain powerful states is what happens when a small state violates a norm versus when a great power does the same. Serbia was bombed for its conduct in Kosovo in 1999.

The R2P doctrine was invoked against Libya in 2011. According to CFR Education (Council on Foreign Relations), the United Nations authorized NATO to breach Libya's sovereignty to protect civilians from Gaddafi's forces, but the mission quickly evolved into a destabilizing regime change operation, leaving Libya in civil war until 2020. As noted by the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, some argued the Libyan intervention had been hijacked by partisans of regime change, while others maintained that all necessary measures were being used purely to protect civilians. The debate itself is telling: the principle of R2P, adopted at the UN World Summit in 2005 as a commitment never again to be passive spectators to genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity, has since been applied selectively enough to be nearly meaningless as a constraint on powerful states. It constrains the weak. This is precisely what offensive structural realism



predicts: norms exist, but their enforcement is a function of the power distribution in the system, not of their moral authority.

What we have, then, is better described as a system of managed power, in which principles serve as a legitimating layer over decisions driven by strategic interests. When principles are invoked sincerely, it is usually because they happen to coincide with what the invoking state wanted to do anyway.

And when principles do not align with interest, states reach for exceptions. They look for noble-sounding exceptions such as national security, self-defense, or humanitarian necessity when they clash with their interests. This is not lawlessness. It is something subtler. The vocabulary of principle is rich enough that almost any exercise of power can be dressed in it, and legitimacy still matters at the margins. States that act without any justification do pay reputational costs. But legitimacy is not the same as principle. A state that violates a norm and then constructs a legal argument for it is not governed by principle; it is governed by interest, using principle as a tool. As Thucydides recorded in the Melian Dialogue of 416 BC (History of the Peloponnesian War, Book 5), the Athenian envoys told the Melians: "right, as the world goes, is only in question between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must." Twenty-five centuries of institutional architecture have not changed the underlying logic. The modern international system is not lawless — but when principle meets the hard edge of power, it bends. Reliably.

"Norms exist, but their enforcement is a function of the power distribution in the system, not of their moral authority."

MIRZA ABDULLAH BAIG



Maryam Masood is a graduate of Political Science from the Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab, Lahore.

"The Discursive Politics of Gender in Climate Governance."

Climate change has emerged as one of the most consequential issues that confront global governance in the twenty-first century, essentially reconfiguring the current patterns of environmental risks, human security and socio-economic development. Although it is a global challenge, the impacts thereof are not evenly distributed. Rather, climate vulnerability is unevenly distributed, and it operates through existing political, economic and social hierarchies that dictate the course of differentiated exposure, adaptive capacity and post-disaster recovery trajectories. Vulnerability in this sense is not only an ecological state of affairs but also a social product mediated by politics.

It is particularly true of Pakistan, which has consistently been ranked among the most climate-vulnerable states in the world in the Global Climate Risk Index. As the United Nations Development Programme puts it, not only were the disastrous floods of 2022 an ecological catastrophe, but they also served as a resounding message of structural inequality. These events did not create vulnerability in isolation; rather, they exposed and amplified already existing socio-political vulnerabilities through which risk and resilience are distributed.

Gender in this larger system, or architecture, of inequality functions as a central axis along which the effects of climate are both differentiated and governed. In Pakistan, the adaptive capacities of women are greatly limited due to ingrained differences in access to land, financial capital, education, mobility, and representation in politics. As the Global Gender Gap Report by the World Economic Forum continues to rank Pakistan among the lowest countries in global rankings on gender parity, it reflects systemic exclusions that directly intersect with the climate-related vulnerabilities. However, the marginalization of women cannot be adequately apprehended through material deprivation itself but is rather reproduced simultaneously through the discursive regimes of climate governance, which ostensibly claim to be neutral, but simultaneously, reinforce

gendered assumptions within their conceptual frames.

Climate governance is often framed in a technocratic manner that shuns the socio-political dimension of vulnerability. In this kind of discourse, women are mostly constituted as naturally vulnerable subjects who are disproportionately affected, economically dependent, and structurally constrained. Although empirically anchored in some material facts, this framing also runs the risk of reductionism. By confining women to discourses of victimhood, policy discourse in turn positions them as passive recipients of intervention, rather than active agents of adaptation and governance. This leads to what can analytically be defined as a state of recognition without empowerment, where presence in policy rhetoric is not accompanied by substantive empowerment.

The tension is reflected in the changing climate policy architecture in Pakistan, such as the National Climate Change Policy (2021), the Climate Change Gender Action Plan (2022), and Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC 3.0).These policy frameworks increasingly reflect a commitment to gender mainstreaming.
However, this alignment is mostly discursive. Although gender is formally recognized as a cross-cutting issue, it rarely gets operationalized through institutionalized mechanisms that are legally binding. Consequently, inclusion is often limited to consultative involvement, while decision-making remains highly centralized. This disjuncture between the policy rhetoric and institutional practice is highlighted in empirical evidence of the regions affected by global warming. The experiences of flood-affected communities in Northern Pakistan demonstrate that the mechanisms of disaster response, regardless of their scale, tend to disregard gender-specific needs, including access to reproductive health care, sanitation facilities and protection against gender-based violence. Women reported a deeper level of psychological distress, a greater burden of unpaid care labor, and insufficient access to recovery resources. They are not accidental, but rather are the structural effects of the system of governance, which assumes neutrality and systematically neglects differences. In this regard, the gender-blind policy design will inevitably produce gendered outcomes.

Recent policy tools, particularly the Climate Change Gender Action Plan and NDC 3.0, indicate an emergent shift, in which women are increasingly being framed not only as a vulnerable population but also as a source of climate adaptation, environmental stewardship and green economic transitions. But this extension of the concept has not been accompanied to any significant degree by institutional change. Without equal access to financial resources, the safe tenure of land and the official decision-making power, the expression of women's agency will not be more than an ideal. In this regard, therefore, empowerment remains a rhetorical commitment rather than an institutional reality.

Compared to the UNFCCC Gender Action Plan, Pakistan's policy framework shows normative convergence but high implementation deficits. Although

gender considerations are increasingly included in the policy discourse, there are still critical gaps in gender-responsive financing, institutional capacity-building, leadership representation and monitoring and evaluation systems. Of particular consequence is the lack of gender-responsive budgeting which makes policy commitments mostly declarative and not executable. In addition to this, lack of institutional coordination and weak accountability of institutions also undermine responsibility across governance levels and thereby undermining policy integration and coherence.

At a more analytical level, these dynamics bring out the constitutive nature of discourse in the decision-making pertaining to governance. Policy language is not merely a mirror of reality; it actively shapes the frames within which issues are defined and solutions are justified. By framing women as primarily vulnerable, the policy agenda focuses on protectionist approaches and at the same time limits the way to structural empowerment. Simultaneously, the corralling of women's experiential knowledge to the periphery of the entire decision-making process is only useful to support the technocratic models of governance, which fail to address the political and social dimensions of climate governance systems. To deal with these constraints, it is important to focus on substantive institutional transformation. Such a change would demand the implementation of enforceable mechanisms to represent women in climate governance systems, integrating gender-responsive budgeting mechanisms into national and subnational climate finance systems and the development of effective accountability frameworks that have the ability to monitor the results of implementation. It also requires recognizing the importance of heterogeneity of the intra-gender perspective, or the realization that the experiences of women as far as climate vulnerability is concerned are mediated by the aspects of class, geography and socio-economic positioning.

Finally, the main weakness of modern climate governance in Pakistan is not the lack of gender representation in the policy frameworks but rather its being operationally isolated and its reduction to rhetorical incorporation. Women are becoming increasingly visible in policy writings and are structurally marginalized in institutional apparatuses of power. This is a political disjuncture of the global climate governance wherein inclusion is articulated without any accompanying redistribution of power. It is not whether or not climate change is gendered—a proposition that has already been well established in the existing empirical literature—but whether or not governance systems are ready to face and change the power relations that produce and sustain gendered vulnerability. Without such transformation, gender mainstreaming is bound to merely remain an exercise in symbolic compliance as opposed to being a mechanism of substantive structural change. To this extent, the process of climate justice needs not only to be subjected to a process of thorough policy review but also to a process of reconfiguration of the discursive and institutional conditions under which the very process of inclusion is defined.



Umer Mukhtar is a student of 7th Semester Political Science at the Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab, Lahore.

"Democracy in Pakistan: Between Awareness, Institutions, and Structures."

Democracy is often called the best system of government. It gives people the power to choose their leaders and shape their future. However, in Pakistan, the functioning of democracy reflects a complex interaction of institutional, social, and political factors, and has not evolved as smoothly as its formal democratic framework suggests. Elections are held, governments are formed, but still the system appears weak and unstable. This raises an important question: why is democracy struggling in Pakistan? To understand this, we must first understand that democracy is not just about voting. It needs certain conditions to grow. It needs education, political awareness, strong institutions, and a culture where people make independent and rational decisions. Without these conditions, democracy becomes weak in practice.

Individual decision-making is often influenced by a range of social and contextual factors. In many contexts, voting behavior is shaped by social affiliations such as family networks, biradari structures, and community ties, alongside political preferences and policy considerations. However, this pattern is not uniform, as urban voters, younger populations, and politically engaged groups increasingly demonstrate issue-based and performance-oriented voting behavior, particularly in more competitive political environments.

Another contributing factor in shaping political participation is the level of literacy and political awareness. Pakistan's literacy rate is estimated to be in the mid-60 percent range, according to various national and international reports, indicating that a significant segment of the population may face challenges in accessing or interpreting complex political information. As one famous quote says, "Democracy cannot succeed unless those who express their choice are prepared to choose wisely." This idea clearly applies to Pakistan. Without awareness, the power of vote loses its real value.

Political culture is also an important factor. Political scientists often analyze democratic participation through the

concept of political culture, which is commonly classified into parochial, subject, and participant orientations. In Pakistan's early political development, elements of parochial and subject orientations were more visible, particularly in terms of limited public engagement with institutional politics.

Another major challenge is political fragmentation. Pakistan is a diverse country with a wide range of ethnic, linguistic, and regional identities. This diversity has contributed to a complex pattern of political representation and competition in the country. As a result, many political parties have developed regionally concentrated support bases, influenced by local governance issues, historical alignments, and provincial political dynamics. This has led to a pattern of regional political variation in electoral behavior rather than a uniform national voting pattern. Political parties often have strong support only in specific provinces. For example, some parties are stronger in Punjab, others in Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, or Balochistan. This makes it difficult for one party to gain a clear national majority.

Coalition governments are a common feature in parliamentary systems where no single party secures a clear majority. In Pakistan's context, coalition arrangements have, at times, faced challenges pertaining to party fragmentation, shifting political alliances, and governance pressures. Minor disagreements can lead to major political crises. In Pakistan's parliamentary history, the vote of no confidence has been used to change leadership, illustrating a constitutional process through which parliamentary systems ensure executive accountability to the legislature. Such mechanisms are part of broader democratic frameworks in which governments remain answerable to elected representatives. This instability weakens governance and slows down decision-making.

In Pakistan's electoral history, several elections have been followed by political parties raising concerns or allegations about the electoral process. In recent electoral cycles, discussions surrounding procedural documentation, including result forms such as Forms 45 and 47, have contributed to public debate regarding electoral transparency. While it is common in many democracies for contesting parties to raise concerns after electoral outcomes, sustained disputes can influence public perceptions of electoral legitimacy. Public trust in electoral processes is widely considered an important factor in the legitimacy and stability of democratic systems.

A comparative perspective highlights differences in the democratic trajectories of Pakistan and India. Democratic continuity in India has been supported by factors such as institutional development, electoral administration, and administrative decentralization, along with broader socio-economic and political processes. Higher literacy levels may contribute to greater political awareness, although democratic participation is shaped by multiple additional factors beyond education alone. This comparison illustrates that democratic outcomes are influenced by a combination of historical, institutional, and socio-economic

conditions rather than a single determinant. Similarly, Indonesia provides an example of a country that transitioned from authoritarian rule towarda democratic consolidation through gradual institutional reforms, including decentralization and electoral strengthening. Indonesia demonstrates that democratic consolidation is a gradual process driven by institutional reform.

Another important point is the role of the educated class. Patterns of political participation among segments of the educated population also vary across different social and political contexts. While political engagement is often relatively higher among educated groups, participation is not uniform and may differ based on factors such as age, political interest, and trust in institutions. In some cases, lower electoral participation may be associated with perceptions of limited political efficacy, dissatisfaction with available political choices, or broader institutional distrust. This suggests that political participation is shaped by a combination of individual perceptions and structural conditions rather than education alone. In Pakistan, many educated people do not vote because they believe their vote does not matter. This thinking is harmful. Democracy becomes weak when informed people step back. Every vote has value, and change comes slowly through consistent participation.

Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah once said, “The foundation of democracy is the rule of law and the protection of rights.” This reminds us that democracy is not just about elections. It is about justice, fairness, and equal opportunities. So what can Pakistan do to improve its democratic system? Strengthening the democratic system in Pakistan requires a multi-dimensional approach involving both institutional reforms and improvements in civic participation. Institutional strengthening remains central, particularly in ensuring the independence, transparency, and effectiveness of electoral bodies, the judiciary, and accountability mechanisms. Political parties also play a key role in shaping democratic culture and should emphasize policy-based competition, internal democracy, and inclusive national narratives rather than relying primarily on identity-based mobilization. Media institutions influence political perceptions and can contribute to informed public debate through balanced reporting, fact-checking, and shunning sensationalism. At the same time, citizen engagement remains important, particularly in encouraging informed participation and greater awareness of political and policy issues.

Ultimately, democratic strengthening depends on the interaction between institutional performance and civic engagement, rather than on any single actor alone. Democracy in Pakistan should be understood as an evolving system shaped by both progress and persistent structural challenges. Its development reflects the interaction between institutional evolution, political practices, and socio-economic conditions rather than a single underlying factor. Sustained democratic improvement depends on parallel progress in institutional strengthening and civic engagement. In this sense, democratic consolidation is a gradual process that requires long-term institutional stability alongside political awareness and participation.

The Political Pulse Magazine

- STUDENT ACHIEVEMENTS
- DEPARTMENT INITIATIVES
- ANNUAL EVENTS
- CONFERENCES



DEPARTMENTAL ACTIVITIES

Orientation Ceremony






Undergraduate Students, September 2025

The Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab, Lahore, hosted a warm Orientation Ceremony to welcome its incoming batch of undergraduate students. The event aimed to familiarize newcomers with the Department's academic environment, faculty, curriculum, and available resources, helping ease their transition into university life. Faculty members extended heartfelt greetings, offering guidance on academic expectations and encouraging active participation in departmental activities. Senior students and society representatives also shared valuable insights and words of encouragement. The ceremony fostered a welcoming and inclusive atmosphere, reflecting the Department's commitment to nurturing a supportive academic community from day one.

EVENT HIGHLIGHTS



"Think Peace for Humanity"



On April 22, 2026, the Department of Political Science convened a compelling roundtable conference themed "Think Peace for Humanity," centering on the evolving Iran–USA dialogue.

Scholars, policy analysts, and students gathered to dissect the diplomatic nuances shaping this critical bilateral relationship, exploring pathways toward de-escalation and sustainable peace. Speakers offered incisive perspectives on regional stability, negotiation dynamics, and the broader implications for global security architecture.


The session fostered rich intellectual exchange, encouraging participants to critically engage with contemporary geopolitical challenges. The event underscored the Department's continued commitment to fostering informed discourse on pressing international affairs, reaffirming academia's vital role in advancing the cause of peace.



NAVEED AMAN

Launch of the Peace magazine

"Naveed Aman" is a marker of hope and constructive engagement, reflecting the Department's continued efforts to promote peacebuilding and youth empowerment by supporting local leaders, encouraging civic participation, and delivering practical opportunities for growth and reconciliation.



The Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab, Lahore, in collaboration with the National Dialogue Forum, Islamabad, proudly launched the youth peace magazine "Naveed Aman." This landmark initiative aims to provide a platform for young voices to engage with themes of peace, tolerance, and social harmony through thoughtful writing and creative expression.

The launch ceremony brought together students, faculty, and forum representatives who highlighted the magazine's role in nurturing a culture of dialogue and understanding among youth.



BUILDING CONSENSUS:

Political Parties' Dialogue on Effective Local Governance.

On May 5, 2026, the Pakistan Study Center, University of the Punjab, Lahore, hosted a thought-provoking roundtable titled "Building Consensus: Political Parties' Dialogue on Effective Local Governance. “From Department of Political Science Chairman Rana Ejaz Ahmed participated. The Event brought together representatives from various political parties, policy experts, and academics to critically examine the Punjab Local Government Act 2025. Discussions centered on strengthening grassroots democracy, enhancing administrative efficiency, and addressing implementation challenges at the local level. Participants exchanged diverse perspectives, striving toward consensus-building for more effective governance structures. The roundtable reaffirmed the importance of inclusive political dialogue in shaping robust, participatory local government systems across Punjab.



TRAINING SEASON FOR DEVELOPMENT

1 Professional Skills

Guided by the Head of the Department of Political Science, students gained the skills to grow and succeed professionally.



2 Employability Skills

To excel in their careers, students receive mentorship from Prof. Rana Eijaz Ahmad, Head of the Department of Political Science.

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Professional Training

On October 27, 2025, the Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab, Lahore, in collaboration with the National Dialogue Forum, Islamabad, organized an engaging session on Professional and Employability Skills. The session aimed to equip students with essential competencies for career readiness, covering areas such as workplace communication, resume building, interview techniques, and professional

PROF. DR. RANA EIJAZ AHMAD

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Sports Gala 2026

The Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab, Lahore, organized a spirited Sports Gala from February 9 to 13, 2026, promoting physical fitness, teamwork, and healthy competition among students. The four-day event featured a variety of sporting activities, drawing enthusiastic participation from students across different sessions. The gala fostered a vibrant atmosphere of camaraderie and sportsmanship, offering students a refreshing break from academic routines while strengthening peer bonds. Faculty members extended their support, encouraging active participation and celebrating the spirit of friendly competition. The event underscored the Department's commitment to holistic student development, balancing academic excellence with recreational and extracurricular engagement.







NOVEMBER 9, 2025

Annual Dinner

Thanks to the efforts of organizers Muhammad Atif, Ahtisham Tahir, Muhammad Abdullah Eijaz, and Arsal, the annual dinner was a memorable event for all department students, featuring impressive student performances and a standout Qawwali.





Visit by Qasim Ali Shah

TO THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

The Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab, Lahore, welcomed renowned motivational speaker and author Qasim Ali Shah for an inspiring interactive session with faculty and students. During his visit, he engaged in a warm and thought-provoking dialogue, sharing insights on personal development, leadership, and purposeful living. As a memorable gesture, Qasim Ali Shah presented a copy of his book to Chairman Department of Political Science Rana Ejaz Ahmed, symbolizing mutual respect and academic goodwill. The visit left a lasting impression on attendees, encouraging students to pursue self-growth and positive change. The event reflected the Department's continued efforts to connect academia with inspirational public figures.













YOUTH ENGAGEMENT FOR PROMOTION OF GOOD

Local Government

The Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab, Lahore, organized an engaging session on "Youth Engagement for Promotion of Good Local Governance," focusing on the theme "Issues Surrounding the Local Government System in Punjab." The session brought together students, faculty, and experts to critically examine the structural and administrative challenges facing local governance in the province. Discussions highlighted the importance of youth participation in strengthening democratic institutions at the grassroots level. Participants explored practical reforms and civic engagement strategies to enhance transparency and accountability. The event reaffirmed the Department's dedication to fostering active youth involvement in shaping effective local governance.





SEMINAR ON

Drug Abuse Awareness in Universities

On January 22, 2026, the Department of Political Science organized an insightful awareness seminar addressing the growing concern of drug abuse within university campuses. A resource person from the Counter Narcotics Force led the session, sharing expert knowledge on the causes, consequences, and warning signs of substance abuse among youth.

The presentation shed light on preventive strategies and the role of institutions in combating this social menace. An engaging interactive segment followed, allowing students to raise questions and voice concerns directly to the expert. The seminar reflected the Department's proactive stance on student welfare and community responsibility.











ROUNDTABLE CONFERENCE

The Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab, Lahore, organized a one-day Roundtable Conference on the 27th Amendment and Its Impact on Pakistan. The conference brought together scholars, legal experts, and political analysts to critically examine the constitutional, political, and institutional ramifications of the amendment.

Discussions centered on its implications for governance structures, the balance of power, and democratic continuity within the country. Participants engaged in a rich exchange of perspectives, offering nuanced analysis of the amendment's broader significance. The event highlighted the Department's continued role as a platform for informed debate on Pakistan's evolving constitutional and political landscape.

27th Amendment and Its Impact on Pakistan

AssemblyxMUN , GCU 2026

AssemblyxMUN, GCU, Best Delegation Award, July 2026

Punjab University proudly took home the BEST DELEGATION award at AssemblyxcMUN in July 2026. The delegation, drawn from the Department of Political Science, impressed judges with strong arguments, collaborative strategy, and standout public speaking. Team members: Abdullah Eijaz, Mirza Abdullah Baig, Laraib Zahra Sial, Fatima Faisal, Ali Ahsan, and Rabia Tanveer.





JULY 2026
VOXMUN Edition 3

Hosted by the Department of Political Science



The Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab, Lahore, proudly hosted VOXMUN Edition 3, a dynamic Model United Nations conference that brought together talented young diplomats for spirited debate and diplomacy. The event showcased students' skills in negotiation, critical thinking, and global awareness through simulated crisis committees and council sessions. Laraib Zahra , representing the Department of Political Science, earned the prestigious Best Delegate award in the Crisis Cell, reflecting exceptional diplomatic acumen. VOXMUN Edition 3 stood as a testament to the Department's vibrant student engagement and leadership development.

Thank You for Reading!

We hope you enjoyed this edition of Political Pulse. As we wrap up this issue, we're already working on the next one, packed with more insightful analysis, thought-provoking commentary, and in depth features.

Get Involved

Join the conversation and help shape the future of Political Pulse. We value your feedback and opinions! Share your thoughts on our social media channels or email us at:



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PUNJAB UNIVERSITY POLITICAL SCIENCE VISION

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DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE OFFICIAL

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