

## **Bertrand Glancy and Ministry Formation in Punjab in 1946**

### **Abstract:**

This paper attempts to investigate the response of Sir Bertrand Glancy, the governor of Punjab from 1941 to 1946, to the Muslim politics of Punjab. It also explores the response of Punjab political parties towards the actions and opinions of Bertrand Glancy who was against the division of India and the demand of Pakistan so he created hurdles in the creation of Pakistan. Although various factors were responsible for the situation in Punjab during 1945-1946 elections and the ministry formation in the province but the dictated policies, the anti-Pakistan moves and conspiracies of Bertrand Glancy created the main troubles. The secret reports and documents proved that Governor Glancy adopted the course of British imperialism to keep India united and he remained unfair in dealing with the provincial affairs. This paper discusses how he manipulated the elections of 1945-1946 and how he worked vigorously to prevent the formation of Muslim ministry. The Muslim League was denied its legal right to form the ministry in Punjab, even after it won the elections of 1945-46 and proved itself as the greatest party of the province.

**Keywords:** Punjab Politics, division of India, Bertrand Glancy's prejudice, Unionist, Elections of 1945-46.

### **Introduction:**

Bertrand Glancy was appointed as the Governor of the Punjab at the retirement of Sir Henry Craik, on 8<sup>th</sup> April 1941. He was supposed to carry on the policy of his predecessors. At the time of Glancy's arrival in Punjab, the Pakistan movement was gaining strength in Muslim masses. Jinnah claimed to be the unchallenged leader of the Muslims of India but the British government, Congress and Sikhs denied these claims. The Punjab governors controlled the people under their authority and encouraged the political groups who suited the British government. Glancy, in fact sensing the growing popularity of the Pakistan movement and seemingly results in favour of the Muslim League in the forthcoming elections in the Punjab, suggested the British Government to postpone 1945-46 general elections until a determined attempt had been made to clear up the Pakistan issue. Neglecting his earnest desire to deal with the Pakistan issue, the Labour Government decided to hold elections which had been due for many years owing to the World War II. Thus to side-line the demand for Pakistan, Glancy appears making alliance with anti-Pakistan forces like the Hindus and the Sikhs, who were perturbed over the growing popularity of the Pakistan Scheme in the Punjab.

Though Unionist Party Punjab was losing grounds, yet it could be useful for the British imperialists in the end-game to weaken the case of the Muslim League and the Pakistan movement. So Glancy, naturally, out of his hatred for the

Pakistan demand, supported the anti-Pakistan elements, however, it fell short as still he failed to stop the establishment of Pakistan. Jinnah's demand for Pakistan was a major issue in Indian politics since its adoption in March 1940. This demand was gaining strength in spite of the opposition of many forces united against him and his Pakistan demand. However, the more his opponents criticized Pakistan demand and created hurdles in its realization, the higher his stock rose among the Muslims. His followers were ready to secure for him a massive victory in the forthcoming elections. Now Jinnah's stand was not a question of a few seats in the Executive Council. Nor was Jinnah aiming to secure the exclusive right to nominate Muslim members in the Executive Council. Now the fundamental principle of Pakistan was in his sight and he could not agree to compromise the principle for the sake of a doubtful advantage in provisional arrangements. This was exactly what Jinnah had emphasized in his talks with Gandhi in September 1944 by asking him to 'accept the fundamentals of the Lahore resolution' first and then 'proceed to settle details'.<sup>1</sup> By this time Sir Chhotu Ram had also died, whose death was a great blow to the Unionist Party because he was the most experienced Unionist leader and a staunch opponent of the Pakistan scheme.<sup>2</sup> In May 1945 Wavell, the Viceroy, was in London and he wanted to get the ministerial support to take the main political parties into his new Executive Council. The Unionist Party requested Khizar Hayat to become representative in the new council. To this, the Viceroy wrote to Sir Bertrand Glancy:

Please explain my proposals to him (Khizar) in confidence and tell him. I have no intention of handing over central Government to any one party. If the conference comes off I shall hope for Khizar's advice and help. An interim Government of the kind proposed might prove a useful step towards inducing Muslims to abandon the Pakistan objective. At any rate Khizar knows me well enough to understand that I have the interest of the Punjab and its soldiers at heart.<sup>3</sup>

On June 23, Glancy and Khizar met the Viceroy and they emphasized the same point that Government was most apprehensive of the effect on the Punjab Ministry of appointment of such Executive Council in which the Unionist Party was not represented. He said the Ministry might resign and even if the Premier decided to carry on, danger of interference and pressure from the Centre would be real.

#### **Simla Conference 1945 and the role of Bertrand Glancy:**

The Viceroy's efforts finally resulted in a conference of Indian leaders at Simla on 25 June, 1945.<sup>4</sup> The main object of this conference was to by-pass the Pakistan issue and to get the parties working together in the Central Government in the hope that after some inside experience they could follow a more pragmatic approach. When the talks began, Jinnah claimed to nominate all the Muslim members in the new council of Viceroy. League tried to work on Khizar Hayat for accepting the Muslim's demand. In this meeting Jinnah described Unionist leaders as traitors to Muslim cause and that the Khizar ministry existed only by his sufferance.<sup>5</sup> This claim was acceptable neither to the Congress nor to the Unionist Party. The later was apprehensive of any Congress-League agreement, which it

anticipated would include substitution of a Congress-League ministry for the Unionist ministry in the Punjab.<sup>6</sup> The League also proposed Khizar that if he agreed to the League's claim to nominate all Muslims, Jinnah would nominate a Punjabi Muslim with Khizar's consent. Khizar did not agree to that proposal. The Premier and the Governor were against Jinnah's demands. The Governor, Bertrand Glancy advised the Viceroy not to accept Jinnah's demands and that he should postpone the conference putting the blame on Jinnah's hard attitude. He wrote to Wavell on 3<sup>rd</sup> July 1945:

... Jinnah's claim to nominate all Muslims appears to me in light of League's measure hold on Muslim majority provinces to be outrageously unreasonable. If he is given three nominations out of, say, five Muslim seats he should account himself fortunate indeed ... He has approached Unionists through various agents to affect compromise but these advances have been nebulous and unsatisfactory. I agree with you that it would be in-advisable if Jinnah maintains his present attitude to attempt forming Council without League representation. This would place Congress in unduly dominating position. Muslim members apart from Unionist and Congress nominees would probably be of dubious value ... I consider it best that in event contemplated negotiations should be broken off and that it should be made abundantly plain that their interruption is due to Jinnah's intransigence.<sup>7</sup>

The Viceroy went ahead without the League and sent a list of names for the new council to the cabinet. The cabinet approved the list but only if the Viceroy could secure the acceptance of Jinnah and other leaders. The Viceroy therefore met Jinnah but Jinnah refused to compromise on principle. The Simla Conference failed to bring about a settlement ending the political deadlock in India but there was no denying that in Simla Conference Pakistan emerged as the main issue at the highest level. Penderal Moon writes that Wavell wanted to include a nominee of the Unionists, but Jinnah considered it a 'death warrant' and over this issue the conference broke down.<sup>8</sup> But Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru held Glancy responsible for failure of the Simla Conference. Writing to M.R. Jayakar on the failure of the Simla Conference on 20<sup>th</sup> July 1945 Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru said:

Glancy intervened at the last stage and although he was against Jinnah's claim that Muslim League alone could nominate Muslim members to the Executive Council, yet he also held that if the Muslim League was kept out of Government altogether The Muslims in the Punjab might combine together and break up Khizar Hayat's government. So as a matter of expediency they decided to drop it....<sup>9</sup>

The breakdown of the Simla Conference further underlined the opinion among the Muslims that from now – onwards the Muslim League would alone be considered the representative of Muslim opinion in Punjab. The Unionist was a party of the past, the League a party of the future and this was all with Jinnah's efforts. Jinnah's determination at the Simla Conference was a display of political genius.<sup>10</sup> The British and the Congress however unwilling had no other option than to attach significance to the Muslim League alone.<sup>11</sup> At this stage even the pro-Unionist Party newspapers admitted that this party had ceased to exist. A large

number of Muslim leaders from all parts of India, including the Punjab and the NWFP moved to join Jinnah's League. In the Punjab, the Unionists and anti-League leaders like Sir Mohammad Feroz Khan Noon (1893-1970), Syed Amjad Ali and Khizar Hayat Tiwana's own party members joined the League and gave statements in favour of Pakistan.<sup>12</sup> Indeed, big landowners in the Punjab such as the Noons, Daultanas, Hayats, and Dastis parted company with the Unionists because they knew that the future lay with the League. They addressed that the Muslim League was going to win the upcoming elections with a big majority. The Muslim League's non-Muslim opponents also acknowledged this fact that the Punjab Muslim League will increase enormously in the coming elections.<sup>13</sup> Bertrand Glancy, was most upset. He told Wavell, 'since Jinnah succeeded by his intransigence in wrecking the Simla Conference his stock has been standing very high with his followers and with a large section of the Muslim population. He has been hailed as the champion of Islam. He has openly given out that the elections will show an overwhelmingly verdict in favour of Pakistan.'<sup>14</sup> It was in this background that Glancy advised Viceroy to clear up the Pakistan issue before elections so that the League should not take advantage of the popularity of this main issue in the Punjab. Colville, the Governor of Bombay, wrote to Amery, the Secretary of State, on 14 May 1945:

... Governors have been consulted whether they would be seriously embarrassed by announcement that election would be held in Bengal next winter. Punjab is the only Governor to object ... In the Punjab Muslim League would intensify Pakistan propaganda and communal tension would increase. This would gravely prejudice process of return to normal conditions and resettlement of soldiers....<sup>15</sup>

Glancy pointed out the situation that the main issue for his province was the growing popularity of Pakistan demand. In order to counter Pakistan movement Glancy was in favour of highlighting economic and other consequences of the creation of Pakistan so that the Muslims could be steered away from the Pakistan movement. Glancy also suggested the Viceroy Lord Wavell to make it clear that the British were not going to force the non-Muslim majority areas of the Punjab to come under Muslim rule. He thought that if the Muslim supporters of Pakistan were told that Punjab will be partitioned, they will choose the Indian Union instead of creating Pakistan. On August 16<sup>th</sup> 1945, he wrote to Wavell:

Muslim Leaguers have been indulging in much propaganda, wholesale vilification of Congress and of the Unionist Government in the Punjab. Jinnah and his supporters are loudly clamouring for general elections, a matter about which Congress appears to be comparatively lukewarm. Since Jinnah succeeded by his intransigence in wrecking the Simla Conference, his stock has been standing very high with his followers and with a large section of the Muslim population. He has been hailed as the champion of Islam. He has openly given out that the elections will show an overwhelming verdict in favour of Pakistan. I must confess that I am gravely perturbed about the situation, because there is a very serious danger of the elections being fought, so far as Muslims are concerned, on an entirely false issue. Crude Pakistan may be quite illogical, indefinable and ruinous to India and in particular to Muslims,

but this does not detract from its potency as a political slogan. The uninformed Muslim will be told that the question he is called on to answer at the polls is – Are you a true believer or an infidel and a traitor?<sup>16</sup>

Governor Glancy and his premier Khizar also insisted that the British should announce a definite policy on the issue of Pakistan. He also suggested that the Cripps Offer of 1942 should be modified to make the creation of Pakistan more difficult. He wrote to Colville, the Governor of Bombay:

... In order to reassure Non-Muslims, and (b) to demonstrate to Muslims the suicidal folly of crude Pakistan the 'Cripps' offer should be clarified so as to make it abundantly plain that a province wishing to remain aloof from the 'Indian Union' does not necessarily mean a Province as now delimited, but that where there is a large contiguous area of the size of a division or more in which the majority of the inhabitants are against separation, such area will be free to remain within the 'Indian Union'.<sup>17</sup>

Glancy was in favour of a statement to counter what he called the doctrine of 'Islam in danger'. He expressed his fear that they had reached a point when anyone who preached unity in India was branded as embarking on an 'anti-Muslim' campaign and he called it a 'sinister omen'. He wrote:

... The possibility of some announcement by His Majesty's Government to the effect that the expression 'Province' occurring in the 'Cripps' offer does not necessarily mean a province as now defined. I still think very strongly that an authoritative statement of this kind would provide a most timely, and surely an entirely unexceptionable, corrective to the fanatical and highly dangerous doctrine of 'Islam in danger' that is now being preached by advocates of the League.<sup>18</sup>

The Punjab government, however, later agreed when the Viceroy told them that the elections were inevitable and also that if the Punjab elections were not synchronized with those of other provinces the chances of 'outside interference' in them would be greatly increased.

#### **Election Campaign and Bertrand Glancy:**

Despite the arrangements of the Punjab Government Muslim supporters of the Unionist Party were trickling towards the Muslim League. The Muslims were awakened that if Pakistan was refused they would be facing a permanent Hindu domination and tyranny. The League was prepared for the coming elections. It had distributed 30,000 copies of its manifesto in various cities and rural areas; a handsome amount (4 lac rupees) was collected for its election campaign; and its National Guards (Volunteers of Islam) were re-organized under Shaukat Hayat. The League was also boosted by the entry of a large number of Punjabi *pirs* during the years 1944-46.<sup>19</sup> Their role in the Pakistan movement was central for those who sought to define religious foundations for Pakistan. They provided a traditional channel of communication through which the League could reach illiterate rural voters. They took on vital significance, integrating into the structure of rural politics the ideal of Islamic community that had become so

central to the Pakistan Movement. The Punjabi Muslims were advised not to divide on the basis of Tribal or *Biradari* networking.<sup>20</sup> Some Fatwas were also issued. It was not only the Muslim League; the unionist Party also used religious appeals in their propaganda against the Punjab Muslim League candidates.<sup>21</sup> Muslim Leaguers were pursuing their election campaign fairly vigorously.

Khaksars<sup>22</sup> and Ahrars<sup>23</sup> had also entered the lists and were unrestrainedly critical about the Muslim League.<sup>24</sup> Although the Unionists Party had a huge fund (21 lac of rupees), it was running out of good candidates.<sup>25</sup> A Chief of Khizar's tribe and Khizar's closest Muslim private secretary Syed Amjad Ali had joined the League.<sup>26</sup> On 1<sup>st</sup> December Glancy wrote to Wavell and reported that nearly 80 percent of the Muslims had active League sympathies.<sup>27</sup>

The Unionist Party leadership was not capable to solve the situation and its leadership publicly stated that they supported the Pakistan Scheme so there was no difference between the League and the Unionist.<sup>28</sup> On the other hand Tika Ram stated that Congress and Unionist were not different because both opposed Pakistan scheme.<sup>29</sup> So the Unionist Party was very much confused.

The Governor of the Punjab, Unionist Party and the Congress, all were concerned about fast-growing campaign of the Muslim League for Pakistan. For Congress the time was fast running out. The lines were too clearly shown between a United India and Pakistan. The future of India now predominantly depended on the outcome of the Punjab elections.<sup>30</sup> The Congress attached a great deal of importance to the Punjab.<sup>31</sup> The Sikhs were also concerned about the growing popularity of the Pakistan scheme and they also, like Unionists, opposed every move which gave a share to the League in the centre.<sup>32</sup>

The Sikhs knew that the League was going to fight on the Pakistan issue and that its victory in the elections would have far-reaching effects on the future Constitution of India. The Sikhs also remained convinced that the Congress would concede to the League. Telling about the importance of Muslim League's success in Punjab, *Nawa-i-Waqt* reported:

... in the Muslim minority provinces, the Muslim League's success is hundred percent certain but as far the Punjab is concerned, Muslim League has to compete not only with Congress but also with the Unionist who are bent upon to make Pakistan scheme, a failure ... It has the support of the British government. It has 30 lac rupees, forcefully collected from the people, by the help of the British government. And with that money it wants to buy the hearts of the Muslims. Punjab is the corner stone of Pakistan ... If, the League remains unsuccessful here, its success in the rest of India would be meaningless.<sup>33</sup>

The Punjab League proceeded with its election campaign. Eight lakh of rupees were spent on its electioneering. In cities and rural areas, through newspapers, pamphlets, posters and conferences, a peaceful propaganda was started. The key to the League's success lay with the landlords and *pirs*. The League benefitted from the Punjab Muslim Students Federation, and a group of 270 Muslim students, of Aligarh was also invited to popularize the League's message, particularly in rural areas.

Unionists were also making their preparations for the elections. But these preparations were nothing but tuning up of the bureaucratic machine in order to intervene against the people's freedom to choose their own representative.<sup>34</sup> So far as the state apparatus was concerned, the Punjab presented a black picture. Governor Glancy had recklessly committed himself to a policy of tooth and nail opposition to the growth of the Muslim League. Muslim League was apprehensive of his partiality in the forthcoming elections. Glancy – Khizar group was making no secret of their intention to subvert official agencies, patronage and power to secure the success of their nominees in the forthcoming elections against the Muslim League.<sup>35</sup>

The elections had assumed great significance for the future of the province but they were to decide the destiny of the Muslims of India as well. In fact, these elections had become a matter of life and death for them. They knew that if they lost Punjab they would lose everything. And the Unionist ministry, in conjunction with its Governor was working to thwart the attempts of the Muslim League to sweep the polls. All sorts of illegal and unconstitutional means were being applied to prevent the League workers from conveying the message of Pakistan to every hearth and home. Meetings organized by Muslim League were being banned on one pretext or other. The sincere workers of League were being harassed by the district police authorities and every impediment was being placed in their way. These things were quite apart from the coercion and bribery being used by the officialdom against the League. All these activities were being carried on with the implicit sanction of Bertrand Glancy who had his own interests in getting the Unionist Ministry returned with good majority.<sup>36</sup> In the Congress circles, also, it was believed that the Punjab ministry was exerting pressure on the voters through its officials.

#### **Central Assembly Elections 1945 and the victory of Muslim League:**

The Punjab League proceeded with its election campaign, popularizing its message. Meanwhile League's success in the Central Assembly elections increased immensely its prestige in the Punjab, for the election results, at the end of 1945, revealed the Muslim League's rapid advance since 1944.

League had won all the seats which were to be filled entirely by Muslim votes. Jinnah logically announced that this was a clear verdict in favour of Pakistan and that the League was the sole representative of the Muslims of India.<sup>37</sup> The League celebrated the victory day and formed 20 new branches in Punjab.<sup>38</sup> Jinnah criticized Glancy-Unionist alliance and the British Government's involvement in the Central Assembly elections. He also declared that they had won the first round of the struggle and would succeed in the second by winning the Provincial Assembly elections.<sup>39</sup>

#### **Punjab Elections 1946:**

Muslims and Non-Muslims were busy in the electioneering propaganda. Muslim League had for all purposes replaced the Unionist Party in the minds of the Muslim masses of Punjab. After the Central Assembly elections, the second round started in Punjab on February 1, 1946 for the Provincial Assembly Elections. It ended on 20<sup>th</sup> February, 1946. There were 175 seats in all and about

550 candidates were contesting.<sup>40</sup> Elections were held and by 23 February 1946 all the results were known. League won a grand victory. It captured 75 of the 86 Muslim seats, winning all 11 of the urban and 64 of the 75 rural constituencies.<sup>41</sup> The Unionist Party was reduced to a rump of 18 members in the 175 strong Assembly. At this success Quaid-i-Azam congratulated the president of Punjab Muslim League and thanked to all those who supported and voted for the Muslim League candidates because the verdict had proved in favour of Pakistan.<sup>42</sup> Even more the voting pattern and the results further confirmed the fact that a deep wedge had emerged among different communities in Punjab.

Glancy wrote to Wavell:

The results of the elections have now been published ... the result has been a triumph for the League a greater victory than most of them appeared to have expected themselves ... towards the end the religious campaign was intensified ... The Leaguers are still complaining about official interference....<sup>43</sup>

The League fixed 1<sup>st</sup> March to celebrate 'the Day of Deliverance from the Unionist Ministry'.<sup>44</sup> Before the elections, Sir Glancy had strongly argued against any elections till an economic planning conference could be called to expose the potential dangers of Pakistan. He warned of the civil war in the Punjab unless the Muslim League could be steered away from the demand for Pakistan. He believed that immediate central and provincial assembly elections would strengthen the Muslim League position and thus would lead to the creation of Pakistan. Glancy was afraid that Punjab Muslim would vote for the sake of their religion, as they would be told to choose between a true believer and a traitor.<sup>45</sup>

Given the League's dominant position, it had been argued that Glancy should have found some way by which it could have been brought into power, even if that had meant a temporary period when the administration was run under Governor's rule. However this course was not followed. Under the leadership of the Governor Bertrand Glancy, Malik Khizar Hayat Tiwana and the remaining rump of the Unionist Party formed a coalition with the Akali Party and the Congress to salvage the foundations of the old system and to keep the Muslim League out of power.

### **Formation of Ministry in Punjab:**

Soon after the elections the communal divide influenced the claims that were put forth for the formation of the ministry in Punjab. The passion of the election days spilled over into the formation of the ministry. The Muslim League claimed its natural right, being the largest single party. The Akalis with 21 seats also held an important position. Initially both the League and the Akalis explored the possibility of forming a coalition government which however could not materialize because the League demanded Pakistan and the Akalis demanded Khalistan. The Sikh leaders, such as Tara Singh, Baldev, Ujjal and Kartar, all preferred Governor's rule.<sup>46</sup> By contrast, the Congress – Unionists – Akali talks progressed well. Maulana Azad was working to materialize this coalition. Sardar Patel supported Azad's view as also did Gandhi. Nehru was reluctant to enter into



this coalition but he had no other option. And the role of the Punjab Governor was again very important because the objective of the anti-League forces was to install an un-popular ministry in a predominantly Muslim Province. This most fateful decision was approved by the British Governor without realizing that the consequences of such a decision would be bad even for the Sikhs and the Congress. Governor Glancy believed very positively in a United India and could not see how Pakistan could work successfully.<sup>47</sup> He deprived the Muslim League of power by nailing together a coalition of rest of the parties, with Tiwana as its Chief Minister.

In a confidential note to Wavell, Glancy wrote about the details of the formation of Ministry. He had a fairly long interview with the Nawab of Mamdot on 6<sup>th</sup> March. Mamdot wrote two letters to the Governor (first on 5<sup>th</sup> March and the second on 6<sup>th</sup> March 1946). He wrote in the first letter that the Muslim League Party, as being the largest single party and also the representative of the Muslim majority in the province, should be given the right of being invited to form a Ministry; if this action were taken, they would be able to 'consolidate and stabilize the support of the majority in the Assembly. In the second letter the Nawab had written that the Muslim League Party had now risen to a total of 79 and that he had definite assurances of support from 10 non-Muslim members; he could thus definitely command a clear majority in the House.

Then Glancy saw the leaders of the Coalition group (Malik Khizar Hayat Khan, LalaBhimSenSachar and SardarBaldev Singh) twice in the course of the day. They claimed that they had a clear majority and put their numbers already at about 94 (Unionists 17, Congress 51, Panthic 23, Indian Christians 2, Independent 1). According to Glancy's note Muslim League Party and its adherents were 80 (Muslim 78, Scheduled Castes 1, Indian Christian 1) and the coalitionists were 90 (Unionists 15, Congress 50, Panthic 23, Independent 1, Indian Christians 1). From the remaining 5 seats 1 was European, 1 was Anglo-Indian and the other three were entailed by – elections. He wrote "I have accordingly invited the leader of the coalition group – this is Malik Khizar Hayat Khan..."<sup>48</sup> Glancy invited Nawab of Mamdot only when all the other party leaders were also invited for interviews (1 March 1946). In this brief interview Governor did not encourage him. After that Nawab of Mamdot was not invited until 6<sup>th</sup> March when the anti-Muslim League coalition had already been assembled. This group was constantly in touch with the Governor, whereas the League leader was informed nothing about the issue. Even on 6<sup>th</sup> March he was invited just to be informed about the tri-partite coalition and Glancy argued that Mamdot's claims were doubtful.<sup>49</sup>

Though Khizar had resigned after the elections,<sup>50</sup> yet Glancy asked him to carry on in the hope that if he formed another ministry some of the League supporters might also come in on the Unionist side.<sup>51</sup> Actually the anti-League forces had argued among themselves to keep the largest single party out of power in the Punjab long before the election results. Negotiations with the League were just a formality. On March 7, Khizar was asked to form his new ministry.

And for the first time in the history of the Unionist Party since its creation, the ministry formation was a very difficult job for them to enlist the support of the members of Punjab Legislative Assembly. Even the sitting ministers

before the elections had started crossing floors to join the Muslim League opposition of the Unionist Party. As a matter of fact, the party in power was reduced to only half a dozen of elected Muslims when elections were held. The Government of Punjab's own secret reports pointed out that the Unionist Party had been practically eliminated by the Punjab Muslim League. It was for the first time that with a very weak base, the Unionist Party and its allies began to challenge the most organized and single largest party in the Punjab that had been given a very heavy mandate by the majority community in the province. During the period between the declaration of the election results and the invitation to form a ministry, the Governor of Punjab following imperialist policies made no attempt to form a truly representative ministry or for that matter to bring any settlement between the Sikhs and the League.<sup>52</sup>

In British India the role of British governors had always been important in mending fences and building bridges between the opponents but in Punjab, Governor Glancy preferred to work behind the scenes. It is usually contemplated by historians that Glancy did not encourage the formation of Muslim League ministry in the interest of avoiding communal violence.

Several factors were responsible for this imperialist role played by Glancy. First of all, Glancy opposed the Pakistan scheme. Secondly, he was in favour of United India. Thirdly, he was soon going to retire and at that time he did not want to take that fateful decision by which Muslim League may come to power and thus to diminish the remaining chances of the Indian Unity.<sup>53</sup> So Glancy formed the ministry with Congress–Akali–Unionist coalition. The swearing in of the new ministry on 11 March 1946 could not have come at a more inappropriate time. Apart from Khizar Hayat, as Premier, the ministry included BhimSenSachar, Congress (Finance), Ch. Lehri Singh, Congress (Public Works), SardarBaldev Singh, Akali (Development), NawabMuzzar Ali Khan Qizilbash, Unionist (Revenue) and Muhammad IbrahimBarq, unionist. The highly opportunistic character of the coalition defied ideological reasoning and was destined to chaos and confusion from the very beginning. There was total lack of understanding between the legislative groups of the parties both on the floor of the house as also off it. This decision of British imperialism was a great political setback for the Muslim League. Thus the Governor of the Punjab practically proved the theory of imperialism by controlling the effective political sovereignty of Punjab Politics. He achieved it by political collaboration with the anti-Pakistan Movement forces and depriving the Muslim League from its natural right to form the ministry and creating hurdles in the creation of Pakistan. It was the impact of the policy adopted by Glancy that the relations between the Muslims and the non-Muslims became further embittered. The League in spite of being the single largest party in the Assembly felt deprived and cheated.<sup>54</sup> Quaid-i-Azam greatly condemned this unconstitutional act of the Governor and said:

Maulana Azad and Malik Tiwana have compromised over all principles and have tried to show to the world that they have saved the province from the article 93. The attitude of the Sikhs has been deplorable. The Congress and the Unionist both are used to make such promises which they never even try to fulfill. The present coalition has

been made against the League. Sir Robert Glancy has once again used his authorities illegally when he was about to leave.<sup>55</sup>

AbdurRabNishtar wrote to Jinnah on the March 1946.

... People may consider it a mere unjust act on the part of a Governor whose enmity with the League is well known; but let me respectfully say that the step has far more serious implications. At Simla, even in connection with the reorganization of a nominated body, the Government did not dare by – pass the League. In the Punjab where Muslims are in majority, their verdict is ignored and the government is practically handed over to non-Muslims and in order to throw dust in the eyes of the Muslims, Khizar has been made a puppet – premier. This seems to be a clear challenge to test our mettle. If we do not meet it successfully then I am sure that the Muslims will be injured and the government in conspiracy with the Hindu Congress and a few quislings amongst the Muslims will enforce upon us its scheme of a federation of Akhand Hindustan. I suggest ... working committee ... Lahore will be best suited for the meeting ...<sup>56</sup>

This abhorrent act of the Governor and Tiwana's open stand against the Muslim League created great resentment among the rank and file of the Muslims in Punjab. Thus, in order to record its fury, the Punjab rose to the occasion and called for a total strike at Lahore as a preliminary step against the Governor's machinations. As a mark of protest and in demonstration of deep resentment against the 'Glancy – Khizar Axis', the Muslims of Lahore observed a total strike on March 6, 1946.<sup>57</sup>

A procession of Muslim students, mainly of Law College, Government College and F.C. College, Lahore, marched from the Punjab University towards the Assembly Chambers where they held a protest. The demonstrators were successful in reaching the Premier's residence. They shouted slogans such as 'Khizar-Glancy Alliance *Murdabad*'. Meanwhile, the students of Muslim High School, Islmia High School Bhatti Gate and Shairanwala Gate and those of Iqbal High School, GarhiShahu, Lahore, also staged demonstrations. The students of Islamia College, Lahore, went round the whole city, making the strike most successful.<sup>58</sup> On 9 March 1946, a 'Traitor's Day' was observed by the Muslims of Lahore in order to register their protest against the coalition ministry, condemning Khizar's treacherous role in the whole affair.<sup>59</sup> The Premier's treachery led to bloodshed on this day, when at least 11 casualties occurred by police firing and one death at the hands of the Hindu students.<sup>60</sup> At the death of a student Muhammad Malik, a widespread resentment prevailed in the province and the burial ceremony was attended by over one lakh people. On March 11, 1946, the working Committee of the Punjab Provincial Muslim League took serious notice of Malik's martyrdom and passed a resolution to this effect. It also condemned the Governor's decision.<sup>61</sup>

The Provincial Women's Sub-Committee held a meeting on 8 March 1946 at Lahore and passed a resolution condemning "the unconstitutional and unjust action of the Governor in attempting to impose a non-Muslim ministry in the Muslim majority province of the Punjab."<sup>62</sup> Later they brought out a peaceful

procession of over 500 Muslim women and girl students which assembled outside the residence of Malik Khizar Hayat Tiwana and shouted anti-imperialist and anti-KhizarGlancy alliance slogans.<sup>63</sup>

Though the Governor Glancy had formed the ministry but it was hardly in dispute that this 'ill-assorted conglomeration'<sup>64</sup> would not last long. Even the pro-government press had warned clearly that the ministry in future would be in very awkward and uncomfortable position. The Viceroy held the same opinion about Khizar's ministry.<sup>65</sup>

Thus the Punjab League leaders were furious at having defeat snatched from the jaws of the victory. They hardened their attitude to the minority communities and scarcely concealed their enmity towards the British. The likelihood increased that there would be future violent confrontation within the region. The British Government sent a fact finding mission under the Chairmanship of Professor R. Richards, known as the Parliamentary Delegation. This delegation concluded that the creation of Pakistan could hardly be prevented and suggested that it be circumvented instead. Resultantly, a high-powered delegation was dispatched to India that came to be known as the Cabinet Mission.<sup>66</sup> However, for the moment the League's agitation and anger against the Coalition Ministry subsided with the arrival of the Cabinet Mission in India. The leading figure in this British effort was sir Stafford Cripps. In March 1946, almost exactly four years after his previous abortive mission, he flew out once again to India, accompanied this time by two other Cabinet Ministers – Mr. A.V. Alexander and Lord Pethik Lawrence. British Government sent this mission with the object to make arrangements under which power could be transferred to the Indians. The creation of Pakistan now largely depended upon the Cabinet Mission.<sup>67</sup> The Mission arrived to force Jinnah to choose between his concept of a sovereign Pakistan, restricted to Muslim – majority areas and a larger Pakistan which would come into a central federal nexus. As early as 7 February 1945 Wavell wrote Pethik Lawrence, 'if compelled to indicate demarcation of genuinely Muslim areas I recommend that we should include: (a) Sindh, North West Frontier Province, British Balochistan, and Rawalpindi, Multan and Lahore divisions of Punjab less Amritsar and Gurdaspur (b) In Bengal, the Chittagong and Dacca divisions, the Rajshahi division, Murshidabad and Jessore district of Presidency division; and in Assam the Sylhet district.' In the Punjab, he wrote, the only Muslim majority district that would not go into Pakistan under this demarcation is Gurdaspur (51 percent Muslim). And he suggested that Gurdaspur must go with Amritsar for geographical reasons and Amritsar being the holy city of the Sikhs, must stay out of Pakistan. But for this case, he added, based on the importance of Amritsar, demarcation in the Punjab could have been on divisional boundaries.<sup>68</sup> The British Government was of the opinion that Jinnah would not accept this offer and ultimately he would agree on the union of India.

During their stay in India (from 24<sup>th</sup> March 1946 to the end of June 1946) the Cabinet delegation discussed with various Indian Political leaders and elected representatives ways of speeding up the transfer of power to the Indians.<sup>69</sup> The League claimed the whole of the Punjab for its proposed Muslim state, which was extremely difficult for the Mission to accept. The Non-Muslims and the Governor

Glancy was strongly against the Pakistan scheme. The Cabinet Delegation was in process of its meetings when Glancy retired.

The paper ministry formed by the Governor Glancy, however, despite its flaws and weakness continued to exist for a year, until ousted by the League's agitation. And during its tenure, official and unofficial reports confirmed that the ministry was formed only to keep Muslim League out of the power.<sup>70</sup> The ministry was extremely weak in legislative as well as in executive matters. Bertrand Glancy was mainly responsible for creating a ministry which did not command the confidence of the Punjab Muslims, not only the Muslim League but the whole Muslim community felt outraged and to their opinion this ministry was a disaster; and for Khizar personally it was political suicide. Pendra Moon argued:

His (Glancy) apologists have certainly taken this plea and pointed out that since Khizar was willing and able to form a Ministry, he had no option, as a constitutional Governor, but to let him do so. True, yet utterly removed from the real truth. For Khizar was no stronger with whom it might be necessary for him to stand on ceremony. From the day he assumed office as Governor in April 1941 he and Khizar had been in almost daily contact. Though as a constitutional Governor he was bound in the last resort to let Khizar form a Ministry if he so insisted, there was nothing to preclude him from talking to Khizar as man to man throwing all the weight of his influence and advice against such a course ... The Governor took the easy, strictly constitutional line of least resistance and left his successor, who took office a few weeks later, and the province at large to reap the consequences.<sup>71</sup>

Even if the tripartite alliance and the League were given equal chances of success, The League, being the largest single party should have been given the opportunity to form the ministry. Whether Glancy liked it or not, League's power, as a major Muslim force, was a reality. Now almost all the leading tribes and the leading religious leaders of the Punjab were united with the League. Had Glancy recognized this fact, there would have been little trouble. Due to the imperialist policies of Glancy, Punjab was divided and resultantly communal violence occurred on a large scale at the time of the partition of the Punjab. If Glancy had not applied his imperialist policy, had not intervened officially in the Punjab politics, had the Muslim League been allowed representation in ministry making in 1946, there would not have been so great tragic effects on the community of the Punjab in the transfer of power to the Indians. The irony of the fact was that British interest was in the United India so the British Government was against the Pakistan demand and when this demand became a reality and British imperialist policies could not stop the establishment of Pakistan; it tried to damage its cause by the partition of Punjab. And all these conditions were the outcome of the policies and practices of Sir Bertrand Glancy who shamelessly, first interfered in the elections of 1945-46 and after his failure to prevent the great success of the Muslim League; he produced tripartite (Congress – Unionist – Akali) alliance against the winning party, the Muslim League. In the utmost attempt in chalking out the plans that could guarantee retain Indian union and bypass the demand for Pakistan. British imperialist policy failed to stop the creation of Pakistan.

On 7<sup>th</sup> April 1946, Glancy retired and on 8<sup>th</sup> April 1946, the new Governor of the Punjab Sir Even Jenkins reached in India.<sup>72</sup>

**Conclusion:**

In the 1945-46 elections Glancy used the official machinery and in the formation of the ministry he helped the Congress-Unionist-Sikhs alliance (March 1946). The Muslim League was deprived of its genuine right to form the ministry in the Punjab. The League started protests over this injustice. The Cabinet Mission arrived in March 1946, Glancy met with the delegation to express his feelings against the Pakistan and in favour of the United India. Jinnah was asked to accept the division of Punjab by the Cabinet delegation. When the League leaders were arrested for holding processions and their political activities were banned, they started the Civil Disobedience Movement. It further flared up the emotions of the Muslim League. The British government had to release the League leaders and the transfer of power became inevitable. And in the consequence of Bertrand Glancy's moves, Punjab was also divided with the division of India which further led to the communal riots in Punjab.

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<sup>1</sup>Jamil-ul-Din Ahmad, ed., *Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah*, Vol. II (Lahore: Sheikh M. Ashraf, 1964), 124.

<sup>2</sup>Wavell to Amery, 23 January 1945, in Mansergh, ed., *The Transfer of Power*, Vol. V (Delhi: Orient Longmans, 1957), 448.

<sup>3</sup>Viceroy to Governor, 8 June 1945, *Ibid.*, 1104.

<sup>4</sup>The Conference assembled in the Viceregal Lodge, Simla, at 11 am. On 25 June. There were twenty – one invitees. The members of the Conference were as follows: (i) AbulKalam Azad, President of the Congress; (ii) P.N. Benerjee, Leader of the National Party in the Indian Legislative Assembly; (iii) Bhula-bhai Desai, Leader of the Congress Party in the Indian Legislative Assembly; (iv) Sir GhulamHussainHidayatullah, Premier of Sind; (v) Hussain Imam, Leader of the Muslim League Party in the Council of State; (vi) M.A. Jinnah, President of the Muslim League; (vii) Liaquat Ali Khan, Deputy Leader of the Muslim League Party in the Indian Legislative Assembly; (viii) Khizar Hayat Tiwana, Premier of the Punjab; (ix) B.G. Kher, ex-premier of Bombay; (x) G.S. Motilal, leader of the Congress Party in the Council of State; (xi) Khwaja Sir Nazimuddin, The Premier of Bengal; (xii) GovindBallabh Pant, ex-premier of Orissa; (xiii) C. Rajagopalachari, the Premier of Madras; (xiv) Sir Henry Richardson, Leader of the European Group in the Indian Legislative Assembly; (xv) Sir Mohammad Saadullah, Premier of Assam; (xvi) Dr. Khan Sahib, Premier of the North – West Frontier Province; (xvii) Ravi Shankar Shukla, ex-premier of the central provinces; (xviii) Master Tara Singh (xx) Sri Krishna Sinha, ex-Premier of Bihar; (xxi) N.Sivaraj (Scheduled Castes). inMansergh, ed., *Transfer of power*, Vol. V , 191.

<sup>5</sup>Viceroy to Secretary of State, 25 June 1945. *Ibid.*, 1153-54.

<sup>6</sup>Viceroy to Secretary of State, 27 June 1945. *Ibid.*, 1165-67.

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- <sup>7</sup>Glancy to Wavell, 3 July 1945, in Mansergh, ed., *Transfer of Power*, Vol. V, 1195-96. Also in Lionel Carter, ed., *Punjab Politics 1 January 1944-3 March 1947: Last Years of the Ministries* (New Delhi: Manohar Publishers, 2006), 135-136. Also in Waheed Ahmad (ed.), *The Nation's Voice* (Karachi: Quaid-i-Azam Academy, 2000), 890-891.
- <sup>8</sup>Penderel Moon, *Divide and Quit* (London: Chatto&Windus, 1962), 41.
- <sup>9</sup>B.N. Pandey, ed., *The Indian Nationalist Movement 1885-1947: Selected Documents* (London: Macmillan, 1969), 85.
- <sup>10</sup>RaghuvendraTanwar, *Politics of Sharing Power: The Punjab Unionist Party 1923-1947* (New Delhi: Manohar Publishers, 1999), 175.
- <sup>11</sup>Ian Talbot, *KhizerTiwana: The Punjab Unionist Party and the Partition of India* (Surrey: Curzon Press, 1996), 137-40.
- <sup>12</sup>*Ibid.*, 28 August 1945.
- <sup>13</sup>*Ibid.*, 2 November 1945.
- <sup>14</sup>Note on an interview with Mr. Jinnah, 18<sup>th</sup> March, 1946. *The Transfer of Power*, Vol. VI, 17.
- <sup>15</sup>Colville to Amery (Tgm), 14 May 1945, in Mansergh, ed., *The Transfer of Power*, Vol. V, 1028-1029.
- <sup>16</sup>Glancy to Wavell, 16 August 1945, in Carter, ed., *Punjab Politics 1 January 1944 – 3<sup>rd</sup> March 1947*, 140.
- <sup>17</sup>Glancy to Colville, 1<sup>st</sup> September 1945, *Ibid.*, 144.
- <sup>18</sup>Glancy to Wavell, 27 October 1945, *Ibid.*, 151.
- <sup>19</sup>Ian Talbot, *Provincial Politics and the Pakistan Movement: The Growth of the Muslim League in North – West and North - East India 1937-47* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1988), 97.
- <sup>20</sup>David Gilmartin, *Empire and Islam: Punjab and the Making of Pakistan* (London: IB Tauris& Co. Ltd., 1988), 211-16.
- <sup>21</sup>MussaratAbid and Qalib-i-Abid, "Unionist – Muslim League Relations and the Punjab Administration," in *History, Politics and Society: The Punjab* (Lahore: Pakistan Study Centre, 2009), 186.
- <sup>22</sup>Introduced in 1931, in RafiqueAfzal, *Political Parties in Pakistan*, Vol. I (Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 2002), 44-48.
- <sup>23</sup>Founded on 29 December, 1929, *ibid.*; 40-44.
- <sup>24</sup>Muhammad IqbalChawla, *Wavell and the dying Days ofRaj: Britain's Penultimate Viceroy inIndia* (Karachi:Oxford University Press,2011),37-41.

- <sup>25</sup>Glancy to Wavell, 29 September 1945, Carter (ed.), *Punjab Politics 1<sup>st</sup> January 1944-3 March 1947*, 148.
- <sup>26</sup>Qalib-i-Abid, *Muslim Politics*, 292.
- <sup>27</sup>Glancy to Wavell, 1<sup>st</sup> December 1945, in Carter, ed., *Punjab Politics 1<sup>st</sup> January 1944 – 3 March 1947*, 158.
- <sup>28</sup>*The Civil and Military Gazette*, 28 October 1945.
- <sup>29</sup>Ibid., 16 November 1945.
- <sup>30</sup>Stanley Wolpert, *Nehru: A Tryst with Destiny* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1996), 345.
- <sup>31</sup>*Civil and Military Gazette*, 26 to 29 August 1945.
- <sup>32</sup>Wavell to Amery, 5 February 1945, in Mansergh, ed., *The Transfer of Power*, 527-528.
- <sup>33</sup>*Nawa-i-Waqt* (Lahore), 23 August 1945. In Sarfraz Hussain Mirza, *Tehrik-i-Pakistan Nawa-i-Waqt Ke Idarion Ki Roshni Mein* (Lahore: Pakistan Study Centre Punjab University, 1987), 460. And also in Muhammad Iqbal Chawla, *Wavell and the Dying days of Raj: Britain's Penultimate Viceroy in India* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2009), 44-45.
- <sup>34</sup>Daniyal Lalifi (Acting Officer Secretary, Punjab Muslim League) to M.A. Jinnah, 28 August 1945, in Z.H. Zaidi, ed., *Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah Papers*, Vol. XII (Islamabad: Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah Papers Project Culture Division Government of Pakistan, 2005), 68-69.
- <sup>35</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>36</sup>Iqbal Masud to M.A. Jinnah, 24<sup>th</sup> September 1945, Ibid., 152.
- <sup>37</sup>*Civil and Military Gazette*, 1 January 1946.
- <sup>38</sup>Ibid., 12 January 1946.
- <sup>39</sup>Ibid., 15-16 January 1946.
- <sup>40</sup>Mohammad Asif Rizvi, "Quaid-i-Azam and The Punjab: 1936-46," in Riaz Ahmad, *Pakistani Scholars on Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah* (Islamabad: Quaid-i-Azam Chair (NIPS) Quaid-i-Azam University Islamabad, 1999), 114.
- <sup>41</sup>*The Civil and Military Gazette*, 1 January 1946.
- <sup>42</sup>*Dawn* (Delhi), 25 February 1946. Also in S. Qaim Hussein Jafri, ed., *Quaid-i-Azam's Correspondence with Punjab Muslim Leaders* (Lahore: Aziz Publishers, 1977), 230.
- <sup>43</sup>Glancy to Viceroy, 28 February 1946, in Carter, ed., *Punjab Politics 1<sup>st</sup> January 1944 – 3 March 1947*, 172-173.
- <sup>44</sup>*The Civil and Military Gazette*, 26 February 1946.



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<sup>45</sup>Proceedings of Governor's Conference, 1 August 1945, in Mansergh, ed., *The Transfer of Power*, Vol. VI, 6.

<sup>46</sup>*The Civil and Military Gazette*, 5 March 1946.

<sup>47</sup>Meeting between Cabinet delegation and Wavell, 28 March 1946, in Mansergh, ed., *The Transfer of Power*, Vol. VII, 25.

<sup>48</sup>Glancy to Wavell, 7 March 1946, in Carter, ed., *Punjab Politics 1<sup>st</sup> January 1944 – 3 March 1947*, 175 – 179.

<sup>49</sup>S. Qalib-i-Abid, *Muslim Politics*, 301.

<sup>50</sup>Glancy to Wavell, 28 February 1946, in Carter, ed., *Punjab Politics 1 January 1944 – 3 March 1947*, 174.

<sup>51</sup>Ibid.

<sup>52</sup>Qalib-i-Abid, *Muslim Politics*, 301.

<sup>53</sup>Ibid., 302.

<sup>54</sup>Talbot, *KhizerTiwana*, 149.

<sup>55</sup>*Nawa-i-Waqt* (Lahore), 9 March 1946.

<sup>56</sup>Abdul RabNishtar to Jinnah, Z.H. Zaidi, ed., *Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah Papers*, Vol. XII (Islamabad: Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah Papers Project Culture Division Government of Pakistan, 2005), 639-640.

<sup>57</sup>*Nawa-i-Waqt* (Lahore), 7 March 1946.

<sup>58</sup>*The Eastern Times* (Lahore), 9 March 1946.

<sup>59</sup>*Dawn* (Delhi), 10 March 1946.

<sup>60</sup>Ibid.

<sup>61</sup>*Nawa-i-Waqt* (Lahore), 13 March 1946.

<sup>62</sup>*The Eastern Times* (Lahore), 9 March 1946.

<sup>63</sup>Sarfraz Hussein Mirza, *Muslim Women's Role in the Pakistan Movement* (Lahore: Research Society of Pakistan, University of the Punjab, 1969), 85-86.

<sup>64</sup>Glancy to Wavell, 15 March 1946, in Carter, ed., *Punjab Politics 1 January 1944 – 3 March 1947*, 178-179.

<sup>65</sup>Viceroy to Secretary of State, 12 March 1946, in Mansergh, ed., *The Transfer of Power*, Vol. VI, 1163-64.

<sup>66</sup>Mohammad IqbalChawla, "Wavell and the Cabinet Mission Plan: 1946," *Journal of the Research Society of Pakistan* 44 (December 2007): 72.

<sup>67</sup>Ibid., 73.

<sup>68</sup>Mansergh, ed., *Transfer of Power*, Vol. VII, 1181.

<sup>69</sup> Muhammad IqbalChawla, “Wavell and the Cabinet Mission Plan: 1946”, 74.

<sup>70</sup> Muhammad IqbalChawla,” Wavell and Muslim Politics in Punjab-Expulsion of Khizar Hayat Tiwana from the Muslim League:1944,” *journalof Research Society of Pakistan* 46 (Jan-June2009)155-174.

<sup>71</sup>Penderal Moon, *Divide and Quit* (London: Chatto&Windus, 1962), 72-73.

<sup>72</sup>*Inqilab* (Lahore), 8 April 1946.