

Quest of Early American Trade with China, Geopolitics and Open Door Policy

Abstract

This paper examine an American perspective of Sino-American relations and discuss how different preferences, historical situation and geopolitical dynamics transformed American attitude towards China. This Paper covers a period of 1784 to 1922 when America developed from a new republic to great power and China declined from a authoritative empire to colonial exile. Actually, "Open Door" was just a hope for commercial equality, protections of American citizen and respect the integrity of china. It was not a part of any plan to attack the sphere of influence, challenge the existing structure of exploitation and monopoly of great power but expecting a guarantee of trade in peaceful way. It also discuss the US quest for commercial opportunity and explain those events which support and answer why "Open Door" and foreign policy of America in this era seemed to be ambiguous rather than clear and consistent.

According to Karl W. Deutschmark, "the foreign policy of every country deals first with the preservation of its Independence and security, and second with the pursuit and protection of its economic interest."¹ American foreign policy is the product of economic, racial, religious, political and geographical forces and role some individuals play really important role in its formation and people desire and expectation sometimes remain critical when economic decision are involved. Historical analysis of American foreign policy in China give us a prospect to understand the nature of US policy and guided us their overall attitude with rest of the world. Michal J. Mansfield guided a very simple but important component to dissect American foreign policy if we understand the objectives, patterns and techniques of her decision making. In this way, it's helpful to evaluate the basic characteristic to implement their foreign policy either with China or any other countries. President Frankline D. Roosevelt emphasizing American foreign policy objective as "to defend the honor, the freedom, the rights, the interests and the wellbeing of the American people." Again in the words of Mr. Roosevelt, "We seek no gain at the expense of others. We threaten no one, nor do we tolerate threats from others."²

From the dawn of the republic, American foreign policy concerns were territorial integrity and freedom of seas, and expectation of extraterritorial geographic area. Initially, American foreign policy is witness of these concerns for China and showed distaste from power politics and blubber for their commercial interest.³ After independence the basic principles and objectives had remained same, constant and indivisible and mechanism to achieve their objective

* Fawad Aslam, Ph. D. Scholar, History College, Nanjing University, Nanjing, China.

** Prof. Yu Wenjie, History College, Nanjing University, Nanjing, China.


has been flexible whether its belongs to Africa, Asia, Europe or South America. According to Michal J. Mansfield, "In contrast with the fixity and the universality of objectives, the pattern of American policy, which finds its most vivid expression in our great state papers, is gradually evolving. it is the broad blueprint for action which represents the accumulated wisdom of countless American minds. It is the product of the interest, the hopes, and even the fears, of our whole people."⁴ For evidence, it is to find such representations and replica ubiquitously like Monroe Doctrine for Latin America which represent a policy of non-interference, non-colonization and separation from European sphere of influence. As same in Asia and Europe, Isolations form the power struggle of European power and Imperialist agenda and kept focus for their national strength by find the commercial and trading opportunity only.⁵

In fact, objective "the honor, the freedom, the rights and interests and the wellbeing of the American people" of American foreign policy for China are same but the patterns are flexible and undergone a slow progression when it compared with Britain, France, Japan or Russia. The instruments and techniques of American foreign policy represents cultural, diplomatic, economic and political tools and military or use of war as instrument, threat or deterrence or acquisition of strategic basis as last resorts, for achieving the objectives within the define patterns of a specific frame of reference. Like in case of relationship with China till first world war, the patterns are "Open Door Policy", and territorial Integrity by using religion for step hold in China during early 18th century, cultural diplomacy by giving scholarship to Chinese students, dollar diplomacy by investment for infrastructure of railways and trade of silk and tea and coercive measure by using military deployment during second opium war, and Boxer rebellion for protection of their citizens, were instrument for protections of American objectives. According to Jack E.Holmes " American leaders have used what are today known as " Madison Avenue" techniques. emphasizing interests in terms like " Manifest Destiny," "Anti-Communism," and "Self-determination" has not only allowed pursuit of Interests, but has also produced popular slogans which have remained in the American mind after their usefulness has ended."⁶

From ancient times, Chinese being ethnocentric, treated non-Chinese as barbarians and commercial relations had been regulated under the tribute system. After independence, American relationship with China was purely commercial in origin and there were no treaties, nor diplomatic relations between the governments of China and of the United States.⁷ So tribute system was imposed on American merchants to regulate further trade and merchants took their life in danger in quest of wealth and follow the policies and sovereignty of Chinese government. Ships from Philadelphia, New York, Boston, and Salem were the most active in the new China trade. The cargo ship, Empress of China sailed out of New York, went around Cape Horn and directly headed to Guangdong (Canton), China in 1784.⁸ It was also reinforcement towards new rout and advancement of oceanic civilization where traders move from Philadelphia and reach Atlantic ocean to buy and sell goods in Europe and then left from Europe to Africa and reach China via Indian Ocean. In 1810, from Turkey (Smyrna), traders & merchants of Philadelphia finds opium and reached China. In the mid-19th century, New York became the major port involved in the China trade. Trade

routes were well established from China to United States till 1830.⁹ Tea and silk were the most essential imported products Americans acquired from China through the end of the 19th century and took to China furs and cotton, lead and ginseng. Tea turn out to be the foremost products, expanding from around 36% of the total imports from China in 1822 to 65% in 1860. Opium did not become an important commodity in American trade with China until the 1830s when it made up approximately 1/4 of the total that Americans sold in China.¹⁰

Early American Trade routes to China.



http://teachingresources.atlas.illinois.edu/chinatrade/resources/resource1_5.pdf

Value of Goods sold by Americans at Canton in Selected years.

| Year | Furs | Opium | Sandalwood | Silver | Other |
|-----------|------|-------|------------|--------|-------|
| 1817-18 | 4.3% | 8.4% | 2.9% | 7.8% | 5.6% |
| 1823-24 | 4.3 | 2.1 | 1.1 | 64.9 | 27.6 |
| 1827-1828 | 402 | 13.9 | 3.7 | 42.5 | 35.7 |
| 1830-31 | 2.6 | 26.4 | 1.3 | 6.0 | 63.7 |

Early American Trade with China." Teaching Resource Atlas.

http://teachingresources.atlas.illinois.edu/chinatrade/resources/resource2_3.pdf

Total Value of U.S. Imports and Exports selected years, 1790 - 1900 (Dollars)

| Year | Total Imports | Total Export | Export to China | Imports from China |
|-------------|----------------------|---------------------|------------------------|---------------------------|
| 1790 | 23,000,000 | 22,205,000 | --- | --- |
| 1795 | 69,756,000 | 47,990,000 | 1,200,000 | 1,100,000 |
| 1800 | 91,253,000 | 70,971,000 | --- | --- |
| 1805 | 120,600,000 | 95,566,000 | 3,600,000 | 4,200,000 |
| 1810 | 85,400,000 | 66,757,000 | --- | --- |
| 1813 | 22,005,000 | 27,855,000 | --- | --- |
| 1815 | 113,041,000 | 52,557,000 | 2,500,000 | 4,200,000 |
| 1830 | 70,877,000 | 73,849,000 | 1,000,000 | 4,000,000 |
| 1850 | 174,000,000 | 144,000,000 | 2,000,000 | 7,000,000 |
| 1875 | 533,005,000 | 605,575,000 | 1,000,000 | 13,000,000 |
| 1900 | 929,771,000 | 1,499,462,000 | 15,000,000 | 27,000,000 |

Source: *Seybert, Statistical Annals, 93; US China International Trade Commission (http://dataweb.usitc.gov/scripts/user_set.asp)*

Edmund Roberts, in November 1832 was sent by Andrew Jackson administration to find commercial opportunities but he failed to develop better relations with local business community of China. But during first American missionaries visited China in 1832 and religious involvement inspired American desires to find a place for the Chinese in the Kingdom of God.¹¹

Opium trade dominated by English merchants through military support of British government.¹² It was not until 1842, following the "Opium war" with Great Britain, that Canton, Amoy, Nangpo, Foochow and Shanghai were formally opened to British Trade.¹³ Although the United states did not engage in the war, but only demanded and gained in 1844 equal standing with the British in respect to the treatment to be accorded her citizens.¹⁴ Formal diplomatic relations between the United States and the Chinese Empire began about June 16, 1844 when Wangxia treaty "Peace, Amity and Commerce Treaty" signed between Qiyin and Caleb Cushing at Macao (Wangxia village). According to Arnold Xiangze Jiang "The Treaty of Wangxia imposed on China more concrete and harsher obligations in regard to extraterritoriality, fixed tariff duties, unilateral most favored nation treatment, revision of the treaty after twelve years and permission for American warships to enter China's ports."¹⁵ This treaty represented American as emerging power on Far-eastern lands and effectively ended the era of the Old China Trade. The Americans, without any coercive measure and aggressive attitude were able to find a reasonable place for expansion of their commercial activities and business.

Europe had been remained center of balance of power throughout 19th century and Japan and China play a very limited role in world affair until China-Japan war 1894 which got attention and Japan recognized its military capability. For commercial and trade purpose, Europe was the first priority for American in this era. American most of the trade and commercial interest related to Europe in particular Britain and American usually follow the pattern of Britain for commercial and strategic planning, techniques of diplomacy and political control. Several historical have labeled it "jackal Diplomacy".¹⁶ In 1856, American commissioner to China Dr. Peter Parker suggested for capturing Taiwan as same as British possession of Hong Kong for expanding naval operations for trade security.¹⁷ In June 1859, American neutrality was compromised by supporting British sailing craft into the line of battle when War occurred between China and the alliance of Britain and France.¹⁸ Humphrey Marshall, the American Commissioner believed that the American government had to support the emperor of and avoid the division of China between Britain and Russia. On October 18, 1860 Tientsin Treaty was signed among other terms, that along with Britain, France, and Russia, the United States would have the right to station administrative offices in Beijing.¹⁹

In 1867, Burlingame, retired American minister was selected by China for diplomatic mission for America and Europe. He was able to signed a treaty "The Burlingame-Seward Treaty, 1868" stated that American provided an assurance to Chinese government for non-interference in internal affairs of China and expecting from European nations for this kind of developments. This treaty also reinforce American trade interest with China under the principle of most favor nations and also accepted the steady flow of low-caste Chinese immigrant workers to work in U.S firms²⁰. In 1870s period, the ethnocentrism in America soon turned into racism against the Chinese. In California, violence against the Chinese immigrants was got extensive due to overflow of Chinese worker in factories. The 1880s, anti-Chinese agitation grew more violent, as lynchings boycotts, and mass expulsions gave witness to racism in America, which came to be one of the "darkest chapters in Chinese-American relations."²¹ A new treaty signed in 1880 revised the Burlingame-Seward agreement, and the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 abrogated its free immigration clauses altogether. The prejudice demonstrate the big difference between the theory and practice of American principles. The immigration matter turn out to be a invariable annoyance in Sino-American relations,²²

Population Of Chinese In The United States 1860-1940

| Year | Total Number of Chinese in U.S | Resident Aliens | Citizen* | Total U.S population |
|------|--------------------------------|-----------------|----------|----------------------|
| 1860 | 34,393 | 34,933 | --- | 31,443,321 |
| 1870 | 63,199 | 55,396 | 7,803 | 38,558,371 |
| 1880 | 105,465 | 89,023 | 16,442 | 50,155,783 |
| 1890 | 107,488 | 94,987 | 12,501 | 62,947,714 |
| 1900 | 89,863 | 80,853 | 9,010 | 76,212,168 |

The Chinese Experience in America ." Teaching Resource Atlas. 2006.http://teachingresources.atlas.illinois.edu/chinese_exp/resources/resource_2_9.pdf

By 1899, the United States had listed herself a great industrial nation due to her military capabilities and great power acknowledge her stability. Theories of militarism and expansionism were received central attention of decision makers. Administration of President McKinley had showed more serious concerns over Far-Eastern balance of power due to Philippines issue during Spanish American war.²³ When the defeat of the Spanish fleet at Manila in 1898 provided the opportunity to take control of the Philippines, American business lobbied for American rule there. They believed that an American presence in the Philippines would help American businessmen compete in China where foreign countries were increasingly carving out areas of economic dominance (spheres of influence).

Western Power Spheres of Influence in China



Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/7/73/KCRC_China_spheres_of_influence.jpg

Before this development, China had been defeated by Japan in the war of 1894-5. In 1895, the Treaty of Shimonoseki was signed between the two countries which allowed foreign to develop their own enterprises, abolishing some of internal taxes, more rivers and ports were open for Japan.²⁴ Russia had occupied Port Arthur in Manchuria, Germany had obtained a foothold in Shantung, England had secured Wei-hai-wei and was strong in the Yangtse valley, France was in control of Kwang-chow-Wan in South China, and Italy was endeavoring to gain a position on the Chinese Coast. Each of these areas was the center of a "sphere of influence" or "interest" which seemed likely to be made the exclusive province of the traders of one nation. pressure on the U.S. government finally resulted in the presenting of the Open Door Policy in 1899. when many European Power were intent on "slicing the Chinese melon," it appeared improbable that Secretary Hay's bold move would be thriving or not.

This was the inception of the idea that the united States should not only respect Chinese autonomy but should vigorously facilitate China to save herself for possible chaos. While the Open Door Policy in China guaranteed to Americans equal commercial rights even in the areas where the other Great Powers had "spheres of Influence". It has been long been desired of American or other countries to find peaceful conditions for trade where no "spheres of Influence" had exist and healthy competition can replace the exploitation of colonial mindsets. For this purpose, custom and trade managements should be in the control of the local community for better facilitation Raymond A Esthus describes the Hay's idea, "The open door policy as applied by Hay over period of Some six years was bases upon a realistic appreciation of the limitations of American policy. He did not undertake to attack the spheres of influence; he felt that it was hopeless to try to bring those structures tumbling down through note writing and that the American public would not support a policy based upon the use of force, even if the military power were available. He therefore fought a limited campaign rights and interests. His support of China's integrity was an exceedingly qualified one. He supported it to the extent of opposing complete partition, but he never supported it to the point of attacking the spheres of influence, though the spheres themselves were undoubtedly an infringement of China's integrity."²⁵

He, consequently, on September 6,1899, send notes to great Britain, Germany and Russia, and next to Japan, Italy and France. In his open door notes of September , 1899.. "He asked therefore, only for the minimum guarantees necessary for commercial equality: no interference with the treaty ports, equitable administration of the Chines customs tariff, and no discriminatory railroad rates or harbor dues."²⁶

COMMERCIAL RIGHTS IN CHINA
("OPEN DOOR" POLICY)

*Declarations by France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, Japan,
and Russia accepting United States proposal for "open door"
policy in China, September 6, 1899-March 20, 1900*

1899 For. Rel. 128

CORRESPONDENCE WITH FRANCE

*The Secretary of State (John Hay) to the American Chargé d'Affaires
at Paris (Henry Vignaud)*

No. 664.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, September 6, 1899.

SIR: I have to inclose, for your confidential information, copies of instructions I have sent under this date to the United States ambassadors at London, Berlin, and St. Petersburg in reference to the desire of this Government that the Governments of Great Britain, Germany, and Russia make formal declaration of an "open-door" policy in the territories held by them in China.

I am, etc.,

JOHN HAY.

Inclosures.

To London, No. 205, September 6, 1899.
To Berlin, No. 927, September 6, 1899.
To St. Petersburg, No. 82, September 6, 1899.

Source: Library of Congress: Open Door Policy
<http://www.loc.gov/law/help/us-treaties/bevans/m-ust000001-0278.pdf>

In writing with American ambassador Mr. Joseph H. Choate (London) Alfred E. Buck (Tokyo), William F. Draper (Rome), Berlin Andrew D. White (Berlin) Paris, Mr. Horace Porter (Paris) Mr. Hay elaborated his stance on Open Door policy as follow...²⁷ "The present moment seems a particularly opportune one for informing her Britannic Majesty's Government of the Desire of the United States to see it make a formal declaration and to lend its support in obtaining similar declaration from the various Powers claiming "Spheres of Influence" in China, to the effect that each in its respective spheres of Interest or influence....

First, Will in no wise interfere with any treaty port or any vested interest within any so-called "sphere of interest" or leased territory it may have in china .


Second. That the Chinese treaty tariff of the time being shall apply to all merchandise landed or shipped to all such ports as are within said " sphere of interest" (unless they be "free port), no matter to what nationality it may belong, and that duties so leviabie shall be collected by the Chinese Government.

Third. That it will levy no higher harbor dues on vessels of another nationality frequenting any port in such " sphere" than shall be levied on vessels of its own nationality, and no higher railroad charges over lines built, controlled, or

operated within its " Sphere" on merchandise belonging to citizens or subjects of other nationalities transported through such "sphere" than shall be levied on similar merchandise belonging to its own nationals transported over equal distances. "

The provision of the agreement applied to all nations gave each an interest in checking the growth of monopoly privileges. Consent from the other Powers finally came. In 1900, during the Boxer Revolutions, United States had to adopt coercive measure when Chinese court declared war against all foreign power, siege against the Foreign legations in Beijing, and slaughter of missionaries after the murder of German minister killed by Chinese soldier. Open Door policy faced a directed threat because US had to deploy troops to join in the expedition to lift the siege of Legations. Among the joint operation of eight troops for the protections of missionaries and diplomats in Peking, President McKinley declared to others power that their intentions for interventions were to restore peace and order in China. The Boxer resolution in 1901, provided an opportunity for American troops with other foreign power to stay in Beijing, Tientsin and Yangtse River for the protection and security of foreign citizens and property. The powers ultimately agreed on an enormous sum, equivalent to more than \$300 million, of which the United States got \$25 million and this money was spend on scholarship of Chinese students in America.²⁸ Soon after the war, European powers like France, Germany, Russia and Britain expanded their spheres of influence in China, with mining and railroad development privileges—new sorrows for a powerless China—and cause for anxiety among Americans concerned with markets and with the balance of power in East Asia.²⁹

Conflicting interest of Japan and Russia to control Manchuria brought another war in 1904 when Japan suddenly attack the Russian fleet at Port Arthur. Given the limits of American interests in Manchuria, Hay and Roosevelt sought merely Russian assurances of fair treatment for American trade.³⁰ Roosevelt's disrespect for China was a failure to defend themselves against imperialism by supporting Japan due to strategic location of Philippines for , British support for Japan Against Russia, and military capability of Japan led to another disappointment for Chinese. It was not any interest in China was worth the risk of antagonizing Japan because Japan and Britain had spent more investment in China as compared to America and till 1930s, American financial investment was get more closed to these empires.³¹



Source: Samuel Flagg Bemis, *A diplomatic history of the United States*, (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc. 1965), p 499

In 1909, former governor of the Philippines, William Howard Taft became President of the United States. He adopted a diverse strategy in favor of China which was a sharp departure of previous practices and strengthens economic position at the next level and criticized that American pacifications for Japan during Roosevelt's governments was imprudent that weakened our position in Far East Asia over all policy. He preferred a "dollar diplomacy" of "share for American corporations henceforth in China's foreign loans and big construction contracts and found banking support for china and financial circles of United states were³² The Taft administration believed that "Open Door" policy was gate way to guarantee Americans equivalent prospect for investment all over China. Financial circles in the United States were looked passionate about investment opportunities in China. Others powers looks offensive due to empowering strategy of China by American and in 1912, Taft's administration recognize the new Chinese republic and Sun Zhongshang (sun Yat-sen) Provisional President after successful revolution and China hoped such support and investment could be encouraging for offset Russian and Japanese influences in Manchuria.³³

British Japanese Alliances in the beginning of 20th century, allowed Japan to become the sea power of West Pacific due to British withdrew major part of Asiatic waters. Japan control Manchuria, seize Korea in 1910, and control German possession and reached Shantung peninsula (holy land of China, home of Confucius and railroad of her capital Tsinan-fu connecting Shanghai and Peking)³⁴ Japan also be familiar with the engagement of European power in WWI provided an opportunity to Japan for exploitation of Asia . In January 1915, the Japanese minister to China presented Yuan Shikai with the notorious "Twenty-One Demands", with terms that Japan intended to have China "directly under the control of Tokyo" and guarantee for complete support of Open Door Policy. Due to European power involvement in World war I, left Japan a most exploitative power for Asia and strong China was not in the favor of Japan. President Woodrow Wilson administration had no option except to protect the commercial and trade interest on top priority and disappointing to secure the sympathy of Chinese and counter balancing due to absence of European power .³⁵ The Lansing-Ishii agreement 1917 between United States and Japan pledged to uphold the open door policy, respect of territorial and administrative integrity of China

appeared a great work for protection of American and Chinese Interest but Chinese were not reassured and in complete mode of despairing.³⁶

1922 Internationalization of Open door doctrine was the next destination which was assured in Washington Conference of 1922. China was viewed as a potential source of friction among nations, its weakness a temptation to adventurism. Ultimately, in the Nine-Power Treaty, the participants in the Conference agreed not to interfere in the internal affairs of China; to allow the Chinese to solve their domestic problems, unify their country and modernize it, in their own way and at their own pace. The first article of the treaty involved four principle that intended to congeal rather than to amend the status quo in China. The Nine Power Treaty, the United States, Belgium, the British Empire, Republic of China, , France, Italy, Japan, , the Netherlands, and Portugal signed and agreed on "To respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China; To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government; To use their influence for the purpose of effectually establishing and maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all Nations through the territory of China; To refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly States, and from countenancing action inimical to the security of such States. Other clauses in the Agreement pledged the signatory Powers to respect the Principle of equal opportunity of trade".³⁷ China was insistent that shantung be returned to its sovereignty and the United States was deeply sympathetic and so also was great Britain. Satisfactory solutions was required for Shantung question otherwise the result of the conference would be negative. The four power treaty dissolved this issue.

Conclusion:

Open door policy placed American on a high moral position where other great power display power politics. It led American to new sense of humanity and equality in a pure anarchic period. American decision makers had been oscillation between a recognition of unsympathetic veracity of time or implementation of open door policy principals during this era. These principles not only survived but also expanded to towards equal investments, equal commercial opportunities and conditional for futurist development in China. Initially it was just a hope for commercial equality, protections of some rights and interest. It was not a part of any plan to attack the sphere of influence, challenge the existing structure of exploitation and monopoly but expecting a guarantee of trade in peaceful way, support of Integrity of China and follow the American objectives.

Notes & References

-
- ¹ Jack E. Holmes, *The Mood/Interest Theory of American Foreign Policy* (University Press of Kentucky,1985), 71. Accessed 14 June 2016 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt130jgx9.9>
- ² Michal J. Mansfield, " The Chinese Policy of the United States." *The Academy of Political Science* 22, no. 4 (1948): 363, accessed June 13,2016 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1172864>
- ³ Holmes, *The Mood/Interest Theory of American Foreign Policy*. 72-73.
- ⁴ *Ibid.* 363-364.
- ⁵ *Ibid.* 364.
- ⁶ Holmes, *The Mood/Interest Theory of American Foreign Policy*. 74
- ⁷ Walter H. Mallory, "The open Door in China: A Reappraisal" *Foreign Affairs* 26, no.1 (1947): 158. accessed June 13, 2016 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20030095>
- ⁸ "Early American Trade With China." *Teaching Resource Atlas*. 2006. <http://teachingresources.atlas.illinois.edu/chinatrade/>
- ⁹ *Ibid.*
- ¹⁰ *Ibi*
- ¹¹ Thomas A. Bailey, *A Diplomatic History of the American People*, *Meredith Corporation*, New York, 1968, p302
- ¹² (49) Kenneth W. Rea, *Early Sino-American Relations, 1841-1912*, *Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado*, 1977, p56.
- ¹³ Mallory, "The open Door in China: A Reappraisal" 158
- ¹⁴ *Ibid.*
- ¹⁵ Arnold Xiangze Jiang, *The United States and China*, *The University of Chicago Press*, Chicago, 1988.p5
- ¹⁶ Warren I. Cohen, *America's Response to China*, *Columbia University Press*, New York, 1990, p24.
- ¹⁷ *Ibid.* p13.
- ¹⁸ Thomas A. Bailey, *A Diplomatic History of the American People*, *Meredith Corporation*, New York, 1968, p305. 55, *Ibid.* p306.
- Arnold Xiangze Jiang, *The United States and China*, *The University of Chicago Press*, Chicago, 1988, p14.
- ¹⁹ *Tientsin Treaty*
- ²⁰ Charles. R. Kitts, *The United States Odyssey in China, 1784-1990*, *University Press of America*, Lanham, N.Y., 1991, p36. <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1866-1898/burlingame-seward-treaty>
- ²¹ Foster Rhea Dulles, *China and America, The Story of Their Relations since 1784*, *Kennikat Press, INC. N.Y.*, 1946, p78
- ²² Thomas G. Paterson, J. Garry Clifford, Kenneth J. Hagan, *American Foreign Policy*, *D.C.Heath and Company*, Lexington, Massachusetts, 1977, p173.
- ²³ Robert H. Ferrell, *American Diplomacy*, *W.W. Norton & Company*, New York, 1975, p374.

- ²⁴ Arnold Xiangze Jiang, *The United States and China*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1988, p20.
- ²⁵ Raymond A Esthus, "The Changing Concept of the Open Door, 1899-1910" *The Mississippi Valley Historical Review* 46,no 3 (December 1959):437.accessed June 13, 2016 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1892268>
- ²⁶ Ibid.
- ²⁷ Mallory, "The open Door in China: A Reappraisal" 157
- ²⁸ Warren I. Cohen, *America's Response to China*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1990, p49.
- ²⁹ ibid.
- ³⁰ Robert H. Ferrell, *American Diplomacy*, W.W. Norton & Company, New York, 1975, p51, p378.
- ³¹ Samuel Flagg Bemis, *A Diplomatic History of the United States*, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, INC. New York, 1965, p498.
- ³² Samuel Flagg Bemis, *A Diplomatic History of the United States*, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, INC. New York, 1965, p498
- ³³ Jerry Israel, *Progressivism and the Open Door, America and China, 1905-1921*, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1971, p100.
- ³⁴ J.Q.Dealey," The policy of the United States in the Pacific" *The southwestern Political and social science* 10, no 3 (December 1929):294 accessed on 15 June,2016 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/42880823>
- ³⁵ Robert H. Ferrell, *American Diplomacy*, W.W. Norton & Company, New York, 1975, p51, p384.
- ³⁶ Warren I. Cohen, *America's Response to China*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1990, p78.
- ³⁷ Michael D. Gambone, *Documents of American Diplomacy*, Greenwood Press, Westport, Connecticut, 2002, p200