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Bengali Separatism in East Pakistan: An Analysis of Six Point Formula

Abstract

This paper provides an analysis of Bengali separatism in East Pakistan, focusing on the Six-Point Formula. The Six-Point Formula, proposed by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the leader of the Awami League, called for greater autonomy and self-governance for East Pakistan within a federal framework. By examining the formulation, implications, and reception of the Six-Point Formula, this study sheds light on the aspirations and motivations of the Bengali population and their quest for self-determination. The analysis encompasses the role of political leaders, the response of the Pakistani government, and the subsequent events that ultimately culminated in the creation of an independent Bangladesh. The findings highlight the significance of the Six-Point Formula as a pivotal moment in the struggle for Bengali self-rule, and contribute to a deeper understanding of the complex dynamics of separatist movements in multi-ethnic and multi-lingual nations.

Key Words: Bengali, Separatism, Six-Point Formula, Political leadership, government

Introduction

Since the inception of Pakistan, the relationship between East and West Pakistan has been characterized by a notable strangeness. Over time, this peculiar dynamic evolved, leading to the emergence of radicalized expressions of Bengali demands and reservations. The events of 1965, particularly the Indo-Pak war and subsequent political developments in East Pakistan, brought to light the underlying issues that had been simmering for an extended period. The revelation of the Six Point Formula and other secessionist activities confirmed the determination of Bengali nationalist-separatist factions to achieve independence. Although the late 1960s witnessed a surge in Bengali separatist political sentiments, the inadequate and superficial responses from both military regimes (Ayub and Yahya regimes) exacerbated the situation, ultimately pushing the country towards an inevitable disintegration in December 1971.

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From historical perspective the present study deals with the shifting political patterns in East Pakistan in the second half of 1960s and how it prepared the ground for the separation of East Pakistan. The present research is conducted with descriptive/analytical approach. It is a library and archival research based on both primary and secondary sources. Kate L. Turabian's *A Manual for Writers of Research Papers, Theses, and Dissertations* is followed.

Impacts of Indo-Pak War 1965

During the war of 1965, Indian threat served as a binding force between the people of two wings. However, immediately after the war this harmony and unity faded away and sharpened the Bengali feeling about their insecurity and isolation. The idea that “the defence of East Pakistan lies in the West Pakistan” did not seem to be convincing. Bengali political elite apprehended that during the war they had been stuck between the devil and the deep sea. Meantime, the issue of provincial autonomy appeared a burning question in the political discourse of East Pakistan. The unflinching demands of the greater self-reliance in defence and economy bounced back and stirred the cause of provincial autonomy. The Bengali political elite was strongly convinced that political-cum-economic and military build-up in East Pakistan was utmost necessary for its defence. Thus, the war reinforced the ongoing movement for provincial autonomy.

Considering the situation suited enough to extend their agenda, the separatist elements started exploiting the isolated position of East Pakistan. Bengalis “resented the fact that they were exposed to the danger of virtual annihilation”. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman capitalized the situation and demanded the enhancement of military capability of East Pakistan.¹ Moreover, the provincial assembly had presented some extreme demands including complete provincial autonomy with separate economy and the establishment of the regional defence force in East Pakistan.² It was observed that if the situation would mishandle, it could “turn into a movement for complete separation”.³ Thus, the war proved as “a watershed in East Wing’s relations with the Centre”.⁴

The Tashkent Declaration was a positive development for Bengalis which dispersed the war clouds hovering over the region. However, the response to the Tashkent Declaration came from both the wings was sharply contrasted. In West Pakistan the declaration was out-rightly rejected and led to province-wide demonstrations and strikes against Ayub regime. While the Bengali political elite including Mujib & Bhashani welcomed it. Nonetheless, it did not mean that they supported Ayub Khan’s policies. Bengali political elite was mainly in favour of the normalization of relationship with India. They also started demanding the release of political prisoners, withdrawal of emergency and the grant of full-regional self-government.⁵

Six Point Formula: A Tool of Separatists Forces

At the end of 1965, the political activities of the opposition against the Ayub regime took a new turn. On 5 February 1966, the opposition parties held an All-Pakistan National Conference in Lahore. Opposition leaders from across the country were invited. During conference a deadlock emerged when Mujib

presented a tricky scheme for provincial autonomy popularly known as Six Point Formula. The Six Point Formula comprised of overarching grievances and reservations of Bengalis. The formula presented Pakistan a loose federation on the basis of Lahore Resolution by restraining federal government only to defence and foreign affairs. It incorporated two separate currencies and two separate economies ensuring complete fiscal power in the control of provinces. Moreover, it was included in the formula that East Pakistan would set up its own military force to become self-sufficient in defence.⁶

The West Pakistani politicians rejected the formula. Even the leadership of West Pakistan Awami League (WPAL) dissociated themselves. While rejecting the formula, the president of WPAL assessed that it would “spell disaster” for the country and would lead to the secession of East Pakistan.⁷ Initially the leadership of Awami League itself hesitated to own the scheme. In order to create fissure in the opposition lines and to present Mujib as an Indian agent to make him politically dead along with to divert public opinion from the “Tashkent Fiasco”⁸ Ayub regime gave widespread unnecessary publicity to the formula. That ill-conceived and ill-timed notion of Ayub regime proved counter-productive and contributed in further amplification of Bengali separatist discourse.

In reaction to uncooperative attitude of West Pakistani leadership, AL withdrew from the conference. In a press conference at Dacca, Mujib vigorously pressed the demand of autonomy. He therefore, asserted that “the question of autonomy appears to be more important after the war”. He had declared that the “time has come for making East Pakistan self-sufficient in all aspects”.⁹ It is argued that politically ambitious Mujib “presented a veiled scheme of secession under the garb of demands for regional autonomy”.¹⁰ Consequently, the place where in 1940, the Pakistan Resolution was presented by a Bengali, after passing twenty-six years, another Bengali presented a document, to undo Pakistan. Mujib termed the Six Point as the natural outcome of the injustices done to the Bengalis since the creation of Pakistan.¹¹ The formula characterized as the “blueprint for Bengali right to live”.¹² This new gospel of autonomy also inspired Bhashani. Though he did not directly support the Six Point, yet sensing the change in political atmosphere he jumped to aboard autonomy band-wagon.

Six Point formula as a “Charter of survival” evoked tremendous enthusiasm in politically discontent and economically frustrated Bengalis.¹³ In this context Ayub opted for the policy of head-on collision. During his visit to East Pakistan in March 1966, he stated that the Six Point Formula was presented to achieve a “greater Bengal”. He therefore, disparately called to members of Council Muslim League that they should be prepared to face “civil war if forced upon them to protect the sovereignty and integrity of the country”.¹⁴ The statement was bitterly reacted by the Bengali political elite.

From March to May 1966, the Six Point movement got remarkable momentum and East Pakistan seemed in a grip of “mass revolution”.¹⁵ The momentum gathered behind Six Point could be gauged by Mujib’s interview in which he is reported to have said “I do not like to be a colony of anyone any more. Our government is fighting for a referendum in Kashmir. Let it have a referendum here on the six points and it will find eighty-five per cent of the people behind me”.¹⁶ It is argued that some of the government servants were also covertly

extending their support.¹⁷ Moreover, the Indian government and West Bengali Hindus played a key role in propagating obscure secessionist movement.¹⁸ Later on, it revealed that Mujib had been convincing his followers that once the flag of rebellion raised up, Americans would come to their assistance, who were waiting with several submarines in the Bay of Bengal.¹⁹ Rumours were circulating among his followers that there would be revolution in May and they should be ready for it.²⁰

At this crucial juncture, politically sensitive matters were mishandled, perhaps by overreacting to opposition demands. Defence of Pakistan Rules (DPR) was implemented. On seditious charges, Mujib along with some of his chief lieutenants was arrested. On 7 June 1966, on the call of AL a complete general strike was observed in Dacca. Highly mutinous slogans regarding uprising and open revolt were raised. The issue of Bengali and non-Bengali had become a serious matter. Even issues like refusal of inter-marriages between Bengalis and non-Bengalis turned situation volatile and provoked riots.²¹ To the extent that non-Bengalis were being openly insulted and their belongings were set on fire by the Bengalis. Government buildings including the MPs houses were attacked and stoned. Many police stations were not spared and attacked by the violent mob.²² In order to control the evolving semi-anarchic situation, police used force resulting into death of thirteen people.²³ However, mostly rural areas remained indifferent to what actually was going on in the urban centres. Mostly, Dacca, Chittagong and areas like Khulna had become the centres of frequent political agitation.²⁴ The draconian measures introduced by the governor seemed to be ineffective in panic atmosphere. The hostility of AL towards West Pakistan increased to the extent that it adopted a new tactic “to boycott all goods imported from West Pakistan” to boost the “mood of Bengali nationalism”. It was assessed that the impression of AL confirmed its ultimate “objective of secession” of East Pakistan.²⁵

Since its creation Indians press had been maligning Pakistan through poisonous propagandas. Absolutely false reports were being broadcasted to sensationalize the situation. For instance, such as the “opposition groups had set up a shadow cabinet at Dacca” aired just to infuriate Bengalis. These reports through organizations such as All India Revolutionary Council and Autonomous East Pakistan Front watered the secessionist feelings.²⁶ Bengali intelligentsia believed that “if the East is made autonomous in everything except foreign affairs, defence and currency, *which is all Mujib wants*; Pakistan would work more smoothly as a whole than in the present situation, where they (West Pakistanis) have chained us to their wheels”.²⁷ Mujib claimed that the Six Point formula would make Pakistan “stronger, united and vigorous”.²⁸ He convincingly pointed out the Six Point formula as against the “vested interest” of West Pakistan and not against its people.²⁹ Nevertheless, the formula incorporated the long standing Bengali issues with a disastrous way out.

The Six Point formula of Mujib was actually “Aladin’s Magic Lamp” for separatists. Mujib polished it and brought out a “Great Giant” which bestowed upon him the honour of the “Father of the Nation”.³⁰ By taking advantage of the public response, Mujib presented his formula in a booklet form i.e. *Six-Point Formula: Our Right to Live*. The Bengali intelligentsia greatly favoured the scheme and large numbers of copies were distributed. In booklet Mujib tried to

convince Bengalis that he owned the Lahore Resolution while Unitarists were against it.³¹ Another booklet, *Regional Disparity in Pakistan* questioned that how East Pakistan has been exploited by the ruling junta with an attempt to convince the young generation that “only a firm resistance on the part of Bengalis could yield a solution”.³²

The Six Point formula was an effective tool to get a massive Bengali Public support in which AL greatly succeeded. As Syed Humayun argued that East Pakistan particularly the “urban centres seemed to be in the grip of mass revolution”.³³ Thus, Six Point created a kind of a “Frankenstein monster”.³⁴ As a bargaining tactic Mujib set the condition of shifting the federal capital to East Pakistan in order to compromise on Six Point.³⁵ Ayub also admitted about bargaining tactics and wrote that “the provincialists and secessionist have combined to blackmail the Centre a sow discord between East and West Pakistan”.³⁶

To intensify his campaign by stirring up Bengali sentiment, Mujib demanded nation-wide referendum on Six Point. He applied anti-West Pakistan rhetoric such as East Pakistan was being “despoiled and robbed of its due share in order to feed West Pakistan”.³⁷ His frequent arrest and subsequent release made him “veritable symbol of Bengali nationalism”.³⁸ In May 1966, he was charged with serious allegations and arrested under the Defense of Pakistan Rule. Later on, in 1967, he was convicted by the court on the basis that his speech was likely “to excite dissatisfaction towards government and to promote feelings of enmity and hatred between the people of the two Wings”.³⁹ Mujib was reported to have said:

We are being oppressed. We have reached the climax of oppression. The government is doing nothing for East Pakistan. ...During the last September War God has saved us. No soldier could come from West Pakistan. Here there were only a broken plane and one Division of soldiers....You will be amazed to hear about the defense of Bengal. I know Ayub Khan Saheb will destroy us at the roots....He will send us to jail. You be prepared for struggle. You be prepared for sacrifice.⁴⁰

In the absence of Mujib, Taffazal Hussain, the editor of the daily *Ittefaq* took the task of preaching Six Point to Bengalis. Through his emotional writings like Mujib’s furry speeches he created “frantic climate of Bengali nationalism”.⁴¹ That is why Ayub regime considers him as no fewer secessionists than Mujib.⁴² To raise anti-West Pakistan sentiments, leaflets and pamphlets consisted of highly treasonable material and exaggerated accounts of the political prisoners were published and distributed. In July 1966, a leaflet entitled “Do You Know” widely circulated having exaggerated accounts of the arrestees and police atrocities just to provoke Bengali sentiment. For instance, it claimed that “Twenty East Pakistanis have been killed due to police firing, hundreds have been wounded. 1200 have been imprisoned. Hundreds of patriots are on the death-bed in jails without trial for any offence” except demand of autonomy for East Pakistan.⁴³ West Bengal separatists were approached for joint struggle to establish “United States of Bengal”. Language, geography and history were considered the cementing forces

and “religion must not stand in the way” for achieving the goal.⁴⁴ Printed highly subversive bulletins were circulated reflecting Bengali aspirations being supported by the other side of border. Secessionists strongly believed that the partition of Bengal was a great historical error that should be rectified and Six Point formula was considered the “first stage in the plan to unite East Pakistan with West Bengal”.⁴⁵

In December 1967, another leaflet was circulated advocating the breakup of Pakistan. The leaflets questioned “Why Bengali officers are held under custody these days? Produce Moazzam (Navy), Samad, Mujibur, Sultan and Kamaluddin (Navy) before the police. The horrors of the Ayub Government are at the climax. The East Pakistani Public is against such cruelty of the government”. It was pledged that Bengalis would resist this cruelty. It further misinformed in these words:

Friends! Ayub government’s cruelty is at its zenith. Their horrors are hovering over East Pakistan. The horrors of 1958 fell upon all the people of Pakistan but today these are being perpetuated upon the Bengali Army personnel who had saved Pakistan against the Indian aggression during the Indo-Pak war. East Pakistanis will never tolerate this. Till today many politicians, leaders, Naval, Army, CSP and EPCS officers-supporters of Bengal freedom Movement-have been arrested.

During this severe winter *they are being stripped naked and tortured by electric shocks*. Some of them have been shot dead while others are being starved to extract information out of them. The only high ranking officer Moazzam has been shot dead. Samad, Mujibur, Sultan and Kamaluddin, are waiting their turn to face the firing squad. They are in trouble because they love East Pakistan. They wanted to get rid of the cruel Punjabis and provide food and clothing to East Pakistanis. However, we East Pakistanis will not let the matter end here. We will free our patriots or shed more blood for our Freedom Movement.

....For the loss of one Bengali we will take the lives of hundred Punjabis. We will create a new history in revolution. History shows that revolutions have never been in vain. Bengalis will not allow spilling of their blood. We will dig the graves of Punjabis. Bengal will gain a new life. Therefore, Bengali Public, students, labourers and cultivators get ready to meet the challenge. You should take an oath not to deposit money with the Punjabi banks and patronize their shops. We will burn them and banish them from this wing. Get ready to shed blood, as long as we live we will not allow them to blemish the glory of Bengal.⁴⁶

The Military Intelligence reported that AL's leadership only believed in Bengali nationalism and they would like to have nothing to do with West Pakistan.⁴⁷ These tendencies greatly distressed one Bengali member of Ayub cabinet who decided that he would sell his property in Dacca and settled in West Pakistan before Bengalis take apart.⁴⁸ Ayub himself was seemed to be very frustrated and complained that "God has been very unkind to us in giving the sort of neighbours and compatriots we have. We could not think of worst combination. Hindus and Bengalis".⁴⁹

The pervasive chaotic situation in East Pakistan emerged like a powder-keg and radicalized the political atmosphere. In 1967, Muslim Brotherhood- a revolutionary organization was established and financial assistance, arms and ammunition were sought out from the US to establish independent East Pakistan by overthrowing Ayub regime. Abu Sayeed, a Bengali novelist the chief architect of this plot maintained that he had supported by a well-knit provincial leadership. His appeal was submitted to the US concerned authorities.⁵⁰ However, at the end of 1967, the whole plan was detected by the security agencies. According to the plan, after assassinating Ayub, through a *coup d'état* East Pakistan would have been declared an independent state. The conspirators were including members of AL, employees of PIA and some ex-naval officers.⁵¹ The plot was supported by India as a loaded motor launch of arms was caught up which was being smuggled from West Bengal to East Pakistan.⁵²

The Six Point formula was actually the net aggregation of the prolong grievances of Bengalis. Various sources provide different authorship of the formula. An international conspiracy and the USSR were also seemed to be the authors of formula. It is also argued that Ayub himself asked Altaf Gauhar to draft the formula to divert the oppositions' attention from Tashkent Declaration in order to disrupt the conference.⁵³ However, G. W. Chaudhury viewed it as "a joint product of several intellectual advisers and associates of Mujib".⁵⁴ Yet despite Altaf Gauhar's denying, the Hamoodur Rehman Commission concluded that draft was framed by Altaf Guhar on the insistence of Ayub to wreck the All Parties Conference.⁵⁵ In this way the more convincing argument seemed to be that the Six Point was drafted by a combination of Bengali economists and Political scientists.⁵⁶ Nevertheless, most of the leaders of AL were unaware when Mujib presented the formula at the conference.

Conclusion

In conclusion, this analysis of Bengali separatism in East Pakistan, focusing on the Six-Point Formula, has shed light on the historical, socio-political, and economic factors that contributed to the rise of this movement. The Six-Point Formula, proposed by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, represented the aspirations of the Bengali population for greater autonomy and self-governance within a federal framework. It became a pivotal moment in the struggle for Bengali self-rule and highlighted the deep-rooted grievances and desires for independence among the Bengali people.

The oddness in relations between East and West Pakistan following the creation of the country played a significant role in exacerbating the demands and

reservations of the Bengali population. The Indo-Pak war in 1965 and subsequent political developments further exposed the growing rift and confirmed the determination of Bengali nationalist-separatist forces. The inadequate response from the military regimes of Ayub and Yahya underestimated the gravity of the situation and ultimately led to the disintegration of Pakistan in 1971.

The Six-Point Formula and its implications contributes to a deeper understanding of separatist movements in multi-ethnic and multi-lingual nations. It underscores the importance of addressing legitimate grievances and aspirations of marginalized regions and populations within a unified state framework. The case of Bengali separatism in East Pakistan serves as a significant historical example that policymakers and leaders can learn from to ensure the stability and inclusivity of diverse nations.

It is crucial to recognize the importance of dialogue, inclusivity, and power-sharing arrangements in addressing the concerns and aspirations of different regions within a country. By acknowledging and accommodating the diverse needs of various ethnic, linguistic, and cultural groups, nations can strive towards a more harmonious and equitable society. The lessons learned from the Bengali separatist movement should guide future efforts in fostering national unity while respecting the rights and aspirations of all citizens.

Notes & References

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²Bhuiyan, *Emergence of Bangladesh and Role of Awami League*, 98-99.

³Roedad Khan, ed., *The British Papers: Secret and Confidential India, Pakistan Bangladesh Documents 1958-1969* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2002), 506.

⁴Rounaq Jahan, *Pakistan: Failure in National Integration* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), 166.

⁵Jayanta Kumar Ray, *Democracy and Nationalism on Trial: A Study of East Pakistan* (Simla: Indian Institute of Advanced study, 1968), 352-353.

⁶Syed Humayun, *Sheikh Mujib's 6-Point Formula: An Analytical Study of the Breakup of Pakistan* (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1995), 243-244.

⁷*Morning News*, 13 September 1967.

⁸Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, *The Great Tragedy* (Lahore: Classic, n.d, 8.

⁹*The Ittefaq, Dacca*, 15 February 1966. Quoted in, Bhuiyan, *Emergence of Bangladesh and Role of Awami League*, 100. See also, Syed Humayun, *Sheikh Mujib's 6-Point Formula: An Analytical Study of the Breakup of Pakistan* (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1995), 278.

¹⁰G. W. Choudhury, *The Last Days of United Pakistan* (London: C. Hurst & Company, 1974, 22.

¹¹Bhuiyan, *Emergence of Bangladesh and Role of Awami League*, 102.

¹²*Ibid.*, 100.

¹³Talukder Maniruzzaman, *Group Interests and Political Change: Studies of Pakistan and Bangladesh* (New Delhi: South Asian Publishers, 1982), 68.

¹⁴Humayun, *Sheikh Mujib's 6-Point Formula*, 280. See also, Lawrence Ziring, *The Ayub Khan Era: Politics in Pakistan 1958-1969* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1971), 43.

¹⁵The urban educated middle class had been a major strength and a source of AL for effective implementation of its policies. When Mujib presented the Six Point formula, within a short span that educated middle class showed unparalleled devotion. Maniruzzaman, *Group Interests and Political Change*, 69.

¹⁶*The London Observer*, 24 April 1966. Quoted in, Safdar Mahmood, *Pakistan Divided: Study of the Factors, Leading to the Breakup of Pakistan in 1971* (Lahore: Institute of Islamic Culture, 1989), 47.

¹⁷Khan, ed., *The British Papers*, 506.

¹⁸Agha Shahi was an additional foreign secretary in 1966 revealed that the Indian in West Bengal through clandestine Radio had been promoting subversive campaign for the separation of East Pakistan. Khan, ed., *The British Papers* 468. See also, Mahmood, *Pakistan Divided*, 45-46.

¹⁹Craig Baxter, ed., *Diaries of Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan 1966-1972* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2007), 88.

²⁰Baxter, ed., *Diaries of Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan 1966-1972*, 88.

²¹In Chittagong when a Memon girl was prevented by her family from marrying a Bengali boy, it led to rioting by Bengalis. Khan, ed., *The British Papers*, 535.

- ²²Khan, ed., *The British Papers*, 582-585.
- ²³Maniruzzaman, *Group Interests and Political Change*, 69.
- ²⁴Khan, ed., *The British Papers*, 537.
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- ²⁷Dom Moraes, *The Tempest Within: An Account of East Pakistan* (New Delhi: Vikas Publications, 1971), 49.
- ²⁸*The Bangladesh Papers: The Recorded Statements and Speeches of Z.A Bhutto, Mujib-ur-Rahman, General Yahya Khan and other Politicians of United Pakistan 1969-1971* (Lahore: Vanguard Books Ltd, n.d), 32-33.
- ²⁹Bhuiyan, *Emergence of Bangladesh and Role of Awami League*, 102.
- ³⁰Humayun, *Sheikh Mujib's 6-Point Formula*, 278.
- ³¹*Bangladesh Documents*, (New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs, n.d), 24. See the whole text of the Booklet page, 17-33.
- ³²Ray, *Democracy and Nationalism on Trial*, 354.
- ³³Humayun, *Sheikh Mujib's 6-Point Formula*, 280.
- ³⁴Bhutto, *The Great Tragedy*, 8.
- ³⁵Bhuiyan, *Emergence of Bangladesh and Role of Awami League*, 104. See also, Humayun, *Sheikh Mujib's 6-Point Formula*, 280.
- ³⁶Baxter, ed., *Diaries of Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan 1966-1972*, 100.
- ³⁷Humayun, *Sheikh Mujib's 6-Point Formula*, 281.
- ³⁸ Talukdar Maniruzzaman, *The Bangladesh Revolution and its Aftermath* (Dacca: Bangladesh Books International Ltd., 1980), 24.
- ³⁹*The Pakistan Observer*, 28 April, 1967.
- ⁴⁰*The Pakistan Observer*, 28 April, 1967
- ⁴¹Humayun, *Sheikh Mujib's 6-Point Formula*, 283.
- ⁴²Bhutto, *The Great Tragedy*, 67.
- ⁴³Mohammed Abbas Ali, *Salvation of East Pakistan* (Sialkot: 1971), 16.
- ⁴⁴Ali, *Salvation of East Pakistan*, 17.
- ⁴⁵Ali, *Salvation of East Pakistan*, 19-20.
- ⁴⁶Ali, *Salvation of East Pakistan*, 22-24.
- ⁴⁷Baxter, ed., *Diaries of Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan 1966-1972*, 136.
- ⁴⁸Baxter, ed., *Diaries of Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan 1966-1972*, 145.
- ⁴⁹Baxter, ed., *Diaries of Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan 1966-1972*, 145.
- ⁵⁰Roedad Khan, ed., *The American Papers: Secret and Confidential India-Pakistan-Bangladesh Documents, 1965-1973* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999), 239.
- ⁵¹Khan, ed., *The American Papers*, 243. See also, Choudhury, *The Last Days of United Pakistan*, 22-23.
- ⁵²Khan, ed., *The American Papers*, 244.

⁵³S.M. Zafar, *Through the Crisis* (Lahore: Book Centre, 1970), 35.

⁵⁴Choudhury, *The Last Days of United Pakistan*, 134.

⁵⁵*The Report of the Hamoodur Rahman Commission of Inquiry into the 1971 War* (Lahore: Vanguard, n.d.), 48. Hereafter referred to as *Hamoodur Rahman Commission Report*.

⁵⁶For the detail discussion regarding the different authorships of the six-point, see, Humayun, *Sheikh Mujib's 6-Point Formula*, 230-237.