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### **Jinnah's Personality Traits and their Relevance and Role in the Making of Pakistan**

#### **Abstract**

*Political Leadership is one of the most fascinating and, yet, an elusive, puzzling phenomenon in the study of Politics of any state or society. The problem always has been this: why some leaders emerge and indeed succeed rather than others. Hence, explanations abound since the classical antiquity and Middle Ages ranging from the 'personal' to impersonal, to 'heroic' to 'antiheroic', to the so-called 'great man' theory to the 'insignificant man' in history. In the process, of course, 'person' and 'situation' have become critical factors in the analysis of leadership, any kind of leadership, but with a warning that while certain personality traits are necessary for effective leadership, different group dynamics can highlight the benefits of different traits and the people who possess them at different times.<sup>1</sup>*

There is no denying that personality plays a crucial role in determining political leadership, with personality acting as the catalyst and final decider in every situation. It is difficult to understand, let alone explain, a political leader unless one examines their personality and particularly their political traits. The traits play a major role in their rise, fall, success, failure, indeed the whole span of their political life and career.

In an earlier, detailed book-length study of Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, *The Charismatic Leader*,<sup>2</sup> I had highlighted some of his political traits that helped him become a leader of the Indian Muslims, indeed their charismatic leader. These traits helped him all along, and particularly in the making of Pakistan. I did not try to diminish, much less deny, the importance of situational factors. In fact, I emphasized their significance in two lengthy chapters titled "The Muslim Situation," where I talked extensively about the difficult circumstances facing Muslims in India, especially in the years following World War II, as the country's Muslim majority, led by the Indian National Congress and its powerful leadership—particularly Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru—advanced towards independence and self-government, leaving the Muslims feeling helpless.<sup>3</sup> But the point I made then and would like to reiterate and expand here is that Jinnah's political traits were critical and indeed went on to boost his political leadership in the successful pursuit of his Pakistan demand and its ultimate realization in the new nation - state of Pakistan on 14 August 1947.

One can discern many political traits of Jinnah but, in my opinion, the most relevant were that of openness, initiative, self-confidence, adaptability, patience

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and tactfulness, creativity, perseverance, rationality, realism, strategic foresight, organization, articulation, single-mindedness, flexibility and compromise, capacity and, above all, integrity both regarding his person and principles. Although some of these traits appear overlapping, inconsistent or even contradictory to each other, it is primarily because of seeing them in isolation, separately, and for their own sake. Different situations and different objectives and goals bring forth different traits of a personality into the play. If a leader does not respond to the varying situations as they keep changing for whatever reason, and does not bring out corresponding, matching traits, he would lose out. He would lose his influence and power to pursue and achieve his goals. Leadership, after all, is a dynamic process, as it evolves and develops over time, to deliver. This was true for Jinnah too. Jinnah had to match, often replace one trait by another, to make the most of the ever-changing situation. In the end, of course, all his traits complemented and worked together harmoniously to help him perform as a political leader pursuing, successfully, his ultimate goal of Pakistan.

Let us begin with these traits one by one. Due to the limitation of the space, for there are many, and to cover them all to some extent, each trait would be illustrated with one instance or example mostly. The emphasis, of course, will be on the traits than the historical narrative for its sake.<sup>4</sup>

**Openness.** Jinnah always kept an open mind, open to ideas and eventualities. This was true in his entire political career. Indeed, this trait helped him progress from ‘Moslem Gokhale’ (following Gopan Krishna Gokhale, a senior leader of the Indian National Congress) to ‘Ambassador of Unity’ to the Quaid-i-Azam of Muslim India and Pakistan. His initial reaction to the question of "separate electorates" for Muslims (and some other Indian communities) was indicative of his openness to political ideas. He first objected to the Simla Deputation's demand for separate electorates, which was made on October 1, 1906, under the leadership of the Aga Khan. In fact, he signed a memo opposing separate electorates for Muslims that was sent to the Viceroy and supported by the Bombay Presidency Association.<sup>5</sup> He felt that Muslims and other communities were “equal”, and thus, “there should be no reservation for any class or community...”.<sup>6</sup> However, after a while and exposed to the mainstream Muslim politics, he realized that the community “felt keenly on the subject”, and thus changed his mind.<sup>7</sup> As he clarified to his Hindu colleagues, the demand for separate electorates is actually a necessity to support Muslims in actively participating in the political struggle for freedom and self-government rather than a matter of policy.<sup>8</sup> Naturally, he later supported the All-India Muslim League, which he joined in 1913 (at the time there was no restriction on Congress memberships), as well as the Congress's acceptance of the Muslim demand for separate electorates in the Lucknow Pact of 1916. The goal, as one author put it, was to eliminate the threat of Hindu and Congress resistance to separate Muslim electorates so that the government would be persuaded that there was no opposition from anyone in India regarding the matter of Muslim representation.<sup>9</sup> Jinnah was open to the idea of separate electorates in the Delhi Muslim Proposals in 1927, even though the British Government had granted the right to separate electorates under the 1909 Act and the 1919 Act, which reaffirmed it. However, Jinnah expected the Hindu-majority community, represented by the Congress leadership, to return the favor by agreeing to statutory majorities for the Muslims in their two Muslim-majority

provinces, Bengal and Punjab, and one-third representation for Muslims in the center. However, the Hindu Mahasabha had a strong influence on the Congress, which made them refuse to comply. As a result, Jinnah was forced to formulate his now-famous "Fourteen Points" (1929) and insist on separate electorates going forward. Naturally, the British included it into their final 1935 Act, which further expanded the system, and made it a crucial component of India's political electoral system.

**Initiative.** Jinnah's political life was full of initiatives, and, indeed, was reflected through the various political organizations he joined from time to time such as, the Bombay Presidency Association (of Pherozeshah Mehta), Indian National Congress, the All India Muslim League or, indeed, the Home Rule League (founded by Annie Besant), though in the end, he remained with the Muslim League and served as its President several times, and especially during the critical 1940-47 period leading to the partition and Pakistan. The purpose was to keep the political initiatives in his hands while responding to varying political situations as they came about. Regarding the Muslim community, some of his most significant efforts were the Lucknow Pact of 1916, the Delhi Muslim Proposal of 1927, which was previously mentioned, and the most significant of all, the so-called "Fourteen Points," which were also previously mentioned. The Quaid-i-Azam, as he was eventually known, was born out of the Fourteen Points, a comprehensive charter of Muslim demands for constitutional safeguards that could appease all segments of the Muslim community and included every demand that could be made of the [Hindu] majority community.<sup>10</sup> The main idea behind these proposals was to divide the country into five Muslim-majority provinces and six Hindu-majority provinces while maintaining provincial autonomy and a truly federal constitution for the good of both Muslim and Hindu populations. The goal, as articulated so well, was to guarantee "Indian unity at the top while giving Muslims a sense of participation and belonging<sup>11</sup>, indeed some share of the pie. Jinnah was ultimately forced to insist in March 1940 that the Muslims are a separate nation, indeed a nation according to any definition of a nation, and that they must have their homelands, their territory, and their state because Congress and the Hindu Mahasabha were unwilling to share power with them.<sup>12</sup> The final outcome of their historic struggle was the partition of India and the establishment of the independent state of Pakistan.

**Self-Confidence.** Jinnah was a self-confident person. Indeed, he was so confident about himself that, according to one British Governor who interacted with him often, it never occurred to him "that he might be wrong".<sup>13</sup> It was because of this incredible confidence and conviction that "he never courted popularity".<sup>14</sup> He once advised one of his political rivals to try to figure out what will make people happy before acting on that information. My approach is very different. I choose what is right first, then I act upon it.<sup>15</sup> At the tender age of twenty-four, he demonstrated his self-assurance as early as 1900 when, following a few months of service as a Presidency Magistrate, he declined the offer to serve in that capacity permanently. A monthly salary of 1,500 rupees was proposed to him, which at the time was a tempting sum for any budding attorney. However, Jinnah declined, stating that he anticipated earning that much money a day in the future based on his own practice. In fact, he started charging 1,500 rupees a day in 1936, making himself one of India's wealthiest solicitors in the process<sup>16</sup>

**Adaptability.** Jinnah was always adaptable, ready to adjust to new conditions, and indeed willing to learn and apply new strategies and skills to get the better of the changed situations. While examples abound, I will confine myself to the most telling adaptability in his political career, that of adapting mass politics to mobilize and organize Muslims in the making of Pakistan. Essentially an elitist, and catering primarily to the Muslim educated, urban middle classes, Jinnah, by the late 1930's, came to realize that all his struggle for the Muslim cause, for promoting and securing Muslim rights and interests, will not succeed till he reached down to the masses, the bulk of the Muslim population and mobilized and won them over. That's precisely what his political adversary and the proponent of so-called Indian nationalism, Gandhi, had successfully tried and achieved to the benefit of his Hindu majority community. Thus, following a defeat in the most recent elections, he made his first significant attempt to address the Muslim masses as a whole in October 1937 at the Muslim League session in Lucknow. Dressed in *sherwani*, *shalwar*, and *karakuli* cap (henceforth called the Jinnah cap), displaying popular Muslim cultural identity markers, he called upon the Muslims to unite and organize themselves at the grass-roots level, for politics, he declared, "means power and not relying only on cries of justice or fair play or good will".<sup>17</sup> This Lucknow session not only saw "the declaration of a new faith"<sup>18</sup> but, indeed, the ushering of a new era in his long political career. As one critical analyst noted, it was "the transformation of the arrogant, proud, cold-blooded logician and lawyer into the charismatic Muslim leader of the nineteen-forties".<sup>19</sup> The enthralling reception he received due to his charisma were evident in the years that followed, particularly following the 1940 Pakistan demand and the Lahore Resolution. As he travelled the entire subcontinent promoting the League's demands, he drew even larger crowds than those witnessed during the peak of the [massive] Khilafat campaign. As the Pakistan movement gained momentum, hundreds of thousands of Muslims participated in processions, demonstrations, and strikes.<sup>20</sup> Indeed, Jinnah increasingly showed "remarkable qualities of mass leadership"<sup>21</sup>, surprising both his loyal supporters and fierce opponents in the political arena.

**Patience and Tactfulness.** Mindful of the weak, vulnerable position of the Muslim-community as a minority in India as a whole and even vulnerable in the Muslim majority provinces, including the Punjab and Bengal, with significant and influential non-Muslim communities, Jinnah always remained patient and tactful in dealing with his opponents, whether British, Congress, or even opposing Muslims for that matter. He waited for the opportune time to advance his cause, without diminishing or letting it go at any stage. The classic example in point was the reorganization of the Muslim League in the Punjab, after the adoption of the Lahore resolution. Given the almost non-existent presence of the League in the provincial assembly, having won only two seats in the 1937 elections (with one-member deserting soon after), Jinnah entered into a tactical pact with the powerful Unionist Muslim Chief Minister of the Punjab, Sikandar Hayat Khan (having joined the League in the 1937 Lucknow session), better known as 'Jinnah-Sikandar Pact', for the purpose. The pact stipulated that all members of the Unionist party will join the League. But many Unionists "refused to sign the membership forms"<sup>22</sup>. Indeed, ironically, Sikandar Hayat Khan made attempts to secure "the overlordship of Punjab Muslim League",<sup>23</sup> causing much anguish

among the provincial League leadership. The old Leaguers such as, Allama Muhammad Iqbal and Malik Barkat Ali, were not happy with the pact in the first place, convinced that Sikandar Hayat Khan was never sincere to the League or indeed faithful to the pact. But Jinnah was not moved. He badly needed support in the Punjab, “the corner-stone of Pakistan”<sup>24</sup>, to whatever extent he could get. He wanted to stay on the right side of the Unionists, the ruling coalition in the province, for the moment, to promote the League’s reorganization campaign without any commotion or challenge. He advised patience by saying that I assure you that if you people have a little patience these small matters of detail will be adjusted fairly and justly and primarily in the interest of the cause for which we stand, he said to Malik Barkat Ali, the only Leaguer in the provincial assembly<sup>25</sup>. The League eventually underwent a significant and successful reorganization, and in the 1945–46 elections, it decisively won all thirty Muslim seats in the Central Legislative Assembly as well as 75 of the 86 Muslim seats in the provincial assembly. And when Sikandar Hayat Khan’s successor Chief Minister, Khizar Hayat Khan Tiwana, tried to maneuver and indeed take advantage of the pact, Jinnah retorted: “How could there be a pact between a leader and a follower?”<sup>26</sup> Indeed, the Punjab now belonged to the Muslim League. Jinnah’s patience and tactfulness had paid off big.

**Creativity.** The demand for Pakistan, through the Lahore Resolution of 23-24 March 1940, was the most telling proof of Jinnah’s trait of creativity and needs no further argument. There were several schemes – zonal schemes, partition schemes etc. – to free the Muslims out of the stranglehold of the Hindu majority community in India including ‘the Confederacy of India’, ‘the Aligarh Professors’ scheme’, ‘Outline of a Scheme of Indian Federation’, and more known Chaudhri Rahmat Ali’s ‘Now or Never, Are We to Live or Perish Forever?’ and ‘the Millat of Islam and the Menace of “Indianism”’, and of course, Allama Muhammad Iqbal’s famous Allahabad Address of 1930, demanding “a consolidated North-West Indian Muslim State”, comprising the Punjab, North-West Frontier Province (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), Sind (Sindh), and Baluchistan (Baluchistan).<sup>27</sup> Bengal was later added by him, especially in his June 21, 1937, letter to Jinnah.<sup>28</sup> But while Iqbal was still pressing Jinnah in his letters to declare as clearly and as strongly as possible the political objective of the Indian Muslims as a distinct political unit in the country<sup>29</sup>, indeed, eventually, a “separate federation of Muslim provinces”<sup>30</sup>, Jinnah insisted upon a complete split, partition of India, and a separate homeland. He firmly believed that this was the Muslims’ only option. He insisted on Pakistan becoming its own independent state. That’s what Gandhi found to his consternation in his talks and simultaneous correspondence with Jinnah during their September 1944 Talks: “But if it [Pakistan] means utterly independent sovereignty so that there is to be nothing in common between the two [Pakistan and India], I hold it is an impossible proposition”<sup>31</sup>, though, much to his chagrin, and through the Partition Plan of 3 June 1947, India was indeed partitioned on 14 August, and Jinnah was “capped by a lasting achievement, namely the creation of Pakistan”<sup>32</sup>.

**Perseverance.** Jinnah’s perseverance could be gauged from the simple fact that all through his political career, and a long one of course, he persistently pursued Muslim interests and demands and under all circumstances. No wonder, as late as 24 March 1947, the incoming Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten, in his very

first introductory meeting, found him “hell bent on his Pakistan”<sup>33</sup>. In fact, Jinnah never gave in at any point, regardless of whether he initially belonged to the Congress or the Muslim League. Whether he opposed or supported the separate electorates, whether he joined the Congress in 1906 or left it in 1920, whether he organized the League in support of it or in opposition and separately, for its own sake, whether he helped formulate the Lucknow Pact of 1916 or the ‘Lucknow Pact’ of 1937 bringing together all representative Muslim political leadership including the chief ministers of the Muslim-majority provinces, Sikandar Hayat Khan of the Punjab included, whether he advanced the Delhi Muslim Proposals of 1927 or offered his ‘Fourteen Points’ of 1929, or whether he castigated the Congress for its indifferent, hostile provincial rule of 1937-39 years or entered into negotiations with its leadership to settle the perennial Hindu-Muslim problem, or, indeed, pursued the Pakistan demand in the crucial 1940-47 years, the aim and objective was to preserve, promote, and project Muslim rights and interests. He never wavered or faltered in the pursuit of this objective. He changed his tactics, at times, depending upon a given situation, but never lost sights of the ultimate goal of securing Muslim Interests.<sup>34</sup> This perseverance remained with him even during his lean period, when he was sidelined during the Khilafat-non-cooperation movement in the early 1920s or again during the early 1930s when, disappointed with the attitude of both Muslim and Hindu delegates at the Round Table Conference in London, he decided to settle down in London. He remained “in touch with India”.<sup>35</sup> He was unable to separate himself from the Muslims' plight. After a few years, he went back to his hometown and expressed his sentiments in a concise manner: "I discovered that the Musalmans were the most vulnerable." I decided that I could not accomplish anything from London and that I should return to India.<sup>36</sup> He returned in order to ensure that Muslims received their "proper and effective share" in the newly formed polity, which was being withheld from them.<sup>37</sup>

**Rationality.** Unlike many Muslim leaders who were emotional, rabble-rousers, and even demagogues, Jinnah was a calm, collected leader. But he "avoided the display of emotions in public" and "was never the demagogue," in fact "averse to the politics of symbolism."<sup>38</sup> Jinnah was, in fact, "quite self-consciously, a modern man" who "valued" and "practiced" "reason" and rationality, which set him apart from his great political contemporaries, both Hindu and Muslim leaders.<sup>39</sup> This is not to suggest that he had no passions. Yes, he did, and he had a strong belief in his cause. As one writer so eloquently put it, he ultimately intended to speed his own demise in support of a cause to which he devoted his will and reason, just as Gandhi inspired his followers with his fervor and intuition.<sup>40</sup> Obviously, his Pakistan was the cause. His entire passion was focused on making it happen. However, he was always willing and ready to temper his irrational feelings with logic. That clarified why, in the end, he chose to have "a truncated and moth-eaten Pakistan" rather than no Pakistan at all, considering the forced division of the Punjab and Bengal.<sup>41</sup>

**Realism.** Jinnah was a realist in politics from the day he formally joined politics in 1906, accepting realities involved and dealing with them accordingly. Whether it was the nature of British rule in India, the Hindu-Muslim communal problem, the Hindu majority-Muslim minority syndrome, or the constitutional advance in India, he accepted the given situation as it was. He assessed it

realistically and objectively and tried to make the most of it for the benefit of his community, the Muslims. For example, take the case of Cabinet Mission Plan of 1946, a plan that denied him his demand for a larger and 'sovereign' Pakistan although he had, before the high-ranking Cabinet Mission, as they themselves acknowledged, "made a fairly good case for Pakistan on cultural and religious grounds".<sup>42</sup> Furthermore, the Muslim League's demand for an independent Pakistan helped them win the 1945–46 elections handily. Thus, in the view of one writer, Mr. Jinnah's Pakistan was sentenced to death by the Cabinet Mission Plan.<sup>43</sup> Jinnah was obviously most disappointed by the outcome. He revealed to M.A.H. Ispahani, his confidant, "Naturally, I have not slept very much over the last week." My mind was constantly working. I have tossed in bed from one side to the other, thinking and worrying about what we should do?"<sup>44</sup> And what did Jinnah do and how?

He fell back upon realism, his realistic attitude to politics, no matter what the situation was. Much to the chagrin of some prominent Leaguers, he accepted the plan and for good, realistic reasons. First, the war (Second World War) was over, and it was no longer easy to reject the British proposals at will. The British were not obliged to woo the League anymore. In addition, the Congress had re-entered mainstream politics by now, with a warm relationship with the British Labor Government of Prime Minister Attlee. As events turned out, the British government had been hoping that Jinnah would reject the Cabinet Mission Plan because of his demands for an independent Pakistan, which would have allowed the Congress to form an independent interim government in India apart from the League. Second, Jinnah believed that the plan already included the fundamentals and foundation of Pakistan.<sup>45</sup> Sections B and C, which included the entire provinces of Bengal and Punjab and the areas with a majority of Muslims, made sure they could accomplish our objective and create Pakistan.<sup>46</sup> Lastly, and thirdly, Jinnah was certain that the Congress would not implement the plan in its entirety, including the crucial "grouping" clause. Gandhi was vehemently against the inclusion of Assam and the NWFP in the Pakistan group.<sup>47</sup> That is precisely what transpired in the end, as the two primary Congress leaders—Jawaharlal Nehru and Gandhi—opposed and contested the organization, undermining the plan from within. For both Jinnah and Pakistan, the day was saved by his audacious and practical response to the Cabinet Mission Plan. With Jinnah's extraordinary call for "Direct Action" to wrest Pakistan, after the plan failed, there was no stopping Pakistan.

**Strategic Foresight.** One of his harshest critics reluctantly acknowledged that among Indian politicians, Jinnah was one of the most astute strategists<sup>48</sup>. This was most evident during the war years of 1939-45 in India. While he fully grasped the significance and value of the war for the British, other politicians, especially in the Congress, were clueless. Gandhi, for instance, a protagonist of 'non-violence', opined that "the best way to counter Hitlerism was for Great Britain to disarm and welcome the German invaders as Vichy France had done."<sup>49</sup> In fact, he informed the astonished Viceroy, Lord Linlithgow, that the British should fight Nazism without using force. Allow Signor Mussolini and Herr Hitler to seize whatever they desire from your belongings. Should these gentlemen decide to live in your houses, you will have to leave them. You will permit yourself to be killed, along with every man, woman, and child, if they do not grant you free exit.<sup>50</sup>

Jinnah, of course, understood what the war meant and what it meant to the British rulers who would do whatever they could to win the war, and they will look for support of India, especially its main political parties, the Congress and the Muslim League. But, given the poor understanding of its leadership (including Nehru), and influenced by their early setbacks, the Congress declared a sort of war on the British in India. First, they resigned their ministries all over India. Secondly, they refused to help with the British war effort, and indeed launched their civil disobedience, later agitational 'Quit India', movement. And, finally, when Stafford Cripps, a minister and one of their old friends, came to India and offered them conciliatory 'proposals', known as Cripps Proposals, leading to 'a new Indian Union' after the war, indeed a 'Dominion' status, they turned them down as "a post-dated cheque", advising him to take the "first plane home".<sup>51</sup>

Jinnah, on the contrary, decided to cooperate with the British in a subtle manner, that is, cooperation in the provinces, but not at the centre, unless the British agreed to his Pakistan demand. Cooperation in the provinces helped the British with recruitment of Muslims in the military and, eventually, deployment abroad in various war theatres. The Muslim League, of course, went on to form ministries in all the Muslim-majority provinces (Punjab already allied through the so-called Jinnah-Sikandar Pact), helping them secure support for the Pakistan demand. Eventually, the British were affected with the turn of events, acknowledging this demand through the August Offer (1940) and the Cripps Proposals (1942), indeed conceding that Pakistan was "the first and foremost issue"<sup>52</sup> in Indian politics. This, of course, did not mean that they had accepted the demand itself. On the contrary, they felt that "a considerable amount of work will be done on the Muslims if they are to be weaned away from Pakistan idea".<sup>53</sup> But then, by the time the war was over in 1945, Jinnah had reorganized the Muslim League and mobilized the Muslims for Pakistan to an amazing extent which was reflected in the League's overwhelming victory in the 1945-46 elections. Incredibly, Jinnah had predicted in 1943 that "the war would last another three years or so", and, in the end, the British will be "in a state of exhaustion", and, thus, all they had to do was "to wrest our ideal" from the "unwilling hands".<sup>54</sup> That is exactly what Jinnah did after the end of the war, wresting Pakistan. This, according to a noted political scientist, was "one of the greatest triumphs that Jinnah had achieved through his brilliant strategy" during the war years.<sup>55</sup>

**Organization.** Jinnah was an organization-man. A host of contemporary observers, colleagues, and friends have vouched for it. Both in private and public life, he "was consistent in his methodical, business-like handling of affairs"<sup>56</sup>. Everything had to be carefully planned and executed. In politics, he once claimed, "one has to play one's game as on the chessboard"<sup>57</sup>. Nothing could be taken for granted. His 'camp', always, was a political party, an organization. He never worked outside the party routine and discipline. His entire political life and career revolved around party activity whether as a member of the Congress, Home Rule League, or indeed the Muslim League at the end. While some of his critics charged that he "never belonged to a party unless he himself was the party"<sup>58</sup>, the fact of the matter was that elected its "Permanent President in 1919, Jinnah stayed with the League to the very end, however fitful and adverse were its fortunes"<sup>59</sup>. The result of this long and abiding commitment was that, in his efforts to mobilize the Muslim masses around the League, "he emerged as a legendary organization-



man keeping communications open between Muslim minority and majority provinces, between feudal lords, commercial interests and urban middle classes, and between constitutional debates and ideological standpoints".<sup>60</sup> It was only because of his knack for organization that the League was transformed into "a new kind of party with one foot in the countryside and the other in the town"<sup>61</sup>. This, of course, helped the League win so convincingly in 1945-46 elections, setting the stage for the achievement of Pakistan.

**Articulation.** Jinnah was once a master at expressing his thoughts and doing so in a clear, succinct, and effortless manner. He was the only Muslim leader, according to one of his contemporaries, who knew how to express the stirrings of their minds in the form of concrete propositions.<sup>62</sup> Another writer noted that he was especially skilled at "orchestrating the common anxieties of desperately divided groups and parties hitherto engaged in parochial and local politics, and to give them an overriding sense of direction"<sup>63</sup>. This largely explains why the traditional Muslim political leaders were "hard put to presenting an alternative programme to Pakistan demand, and some of them had no choice but to swear by [the] Pakistan goal"<sup>64</sup>, in public, at least. Even the so-called nationalist Muslims who were pro-Congress were forced to water down their opposition to the Lahore Resolution and qualified their support for the Congress by demanding protection from Hindu domination<sup>65</sup>. In the end, the siren calls of the Pakistan slogan drew the pro-Congress Muslims closer to the League until there was very little to differentiate them<sup>66</sup>. When Jinnah made his declaration, the notion of a Muslim homeland or, for that matter, of two "nations" in India—Hindus and Muslims—was not novel. The difference was entirely in Jinnah's articulation of the demand for the creation of a distinct nation-state in Pakistan, which was more concrete, tangible, and explicit. He also insisted on the complete and total partition of India.

**Single-mindedness.** Jinnah, after the adoption of Lahore Resolution in March 1940, had only one aim or goal, Pakistan. He pursued this goal with incredible determination and dedication. In fact, nothing explained more the failure of his opponents to thwart his pursuit than to grasp his "single-minded dedication to the cause he made his own"<sup>67</sup>, that is Pakistan. In this "single minded dedication" he was helped by a related invaluable quality for the success of a leader, "concentration"<sup>68</sup>. His power to concentrate and a sense of "detachment" saved him from "ignoble strife" between individual leaders and groups among the Muslims and particularly in the Muslim-majority provinces which would have cost any leader dearly.<sup>69</sup> He could stay above the fray and concentrate on his Pakistan demand, especially in his intricate negotiations with his opponents, both Congress and British, whether Gandhi, Nehru or Lord Linlithgow, Lord Wavell or indeed Lord Mountbatten, the successive Viceroys of India in the end. Mountbatten, in fact, got so frustrated with him that he went on to call him a "Psychopathic case... hell bent on his Pakistan", as he reflected upon his very first meeting with him after assuming the office of the Viceroy in early 1947.<sup>70</sup> Though a highly inappropriate and indeed uncalled for remark, and especially from someone from the royalty (great-grandson of Queen Victoria), it affirmed, beyond any shadow of doubt, Jinnah's single-minded dedication to Pakistan. Years later, of course, in 1975, when Mountbatten came to know of Jinnah's grave illness at the time, he, incredulously, went on to lament that it was "a horrifying thought that we were never told (about his illness) ... that I was not told was almost criminal since, as

long as he was alive, nothing could be done... because he was the only, I repeat, the only stumbling block".<sup>71</sup> Indeed, Pakistan came into being because of this 'stumbling block', this single-mindedness of Jinnah.

**Flexibility and Compromise.** In British colonies, as was the case in India, political leader challenged their powerful, authoritarian, colonial rulers for self-government and freedom. But they had no instruments of power at hand, given the very nature of the colonial state. Thus, they treaded weary paths in compelling their rulers to concede their demands. And when they succeeded through whatever means, constitutional, extra-constitutional or agitational, invariably the actual gains fell short. This happened to be the case with the Indian leadership too, including with Jinnah. He could not always get what he wanted. He had to be flexible and indeed compromise at times to save the situation for his party, the Muslim League, and his cause of Pakistan. However, what was apparent in his case was to remain flexible with tactics and not with the strategy overall. This, as pointed out earlier, was evident in the acceptance of the Cabinet Mission Plan (within the Indian Union) without conceding the strategic goal of Pakistan. Indeed, as soon as he found out that the plan was a non-starter, thanks to Gandhi's intransigence over the grouping clause, he not only rejected it outright, but hastened to seek the attainment of his strategic goal of Pakistan, with full force, through his 'Direct Action' campaign.

Jinnah did, however, also make one significant concession, albeit this time it was a compromise on specifics rather than values. In order to preserve his bigger, more significant objective of Pakistan, he consented to the partition of the Muslim-majority provinces of Bengal and Punjab. This division, indeed, was meant to be "a red herring" to frighten Jinnah out of the demand for Pakistan.<sup>72</sup> The idea was "to convince the Muslims that they could only get a truncated and moth-eaten Pakistan which would not be worthwhile".<sup>73</sup> Jinnah, of course, did his best to woo the Sikhs to stay in the united Punjab. He even agreed to the idea of a 'United Independent Bengal'. But the Congress leadership, in connivance with Mountbatten, subverted all such efforts. Mountbatten himself went on to charge: "I simply could not visualize being so inconsistent as to agree to the partition of India without also agreeing to partition within any province in which the same problem arose".<sup>74</sup> The division of Punjab and Bengal, thus, was made an integral part of the 3 June 1947 Partition Plan. Knowing that his ultimate goal of Pakistan was there, no matter, how much 'truncated', Jinnah finally accepted the plan as 'a compromise' (not a 'settlement').<sup>75</sup> The Congress leadership, of course, protested this notion of compromise (and not settlement), and Sardar Patel indeed wrote to Mountbatten about it, but to no avail.<sup>76</sup> The plan remained a compromise. In the process, Jinnah had a Pakistan.

**Capacity.** Jinnah had the right, relevant, and realistic capacity for political struggle against the British rulers. The British had introduced a legal-constitutional order in India, though not quite like the system at home in Britain. Still, rules of the game were clearly constitutional, based on the elective principle, and representative system of government. Of course, the Congress, especially after it was led by Gandhi, after its Nagpur session of 1920, often resorted to extra-constitutional, agitational, and non-cooperation methods to press for their demands. But then, it represented the majority Hindu community and thus could afford to

bear the cost. The Muslims, a minority community, could not afford. Indeed, they were the most vulnerable party in the three-party contest. Their loss against their two strong adversaries, the British and Congress, could have been a loss beyond redemption.

Jinnah was a keen constitutionalist and, above all, had a superb legal mind to help the Muslims secure their freedom from the British. In fact, Jinnah was well qualified for a constitutional role from the start having done his Bar-at-Law from London (Lincoln Inn) and then trained in constitutionalism at the hands of political mentors such as Dadabhai Naoroji, Gopal Krishna Gokhale, and Pherozeshah Mehta among other constitutionalists at the time. He was convinced that constitutional way was the only way to secure freedom. His experience also suggested to him that the "armed revolution was an impossibility, while non-cooperation had been tried and found a failure".<sup>77</sup>

In following the constitutional way, Jinnah, of course, was helped by his immense knowledge of law and legal practice. Unlike Gandhi who, in spite of being a barrister, like him, had no interest in constitutional matters confessing, in 1942, to a shocked Viceroy (Linlithgow) that he had not read the 1935 Act.<sup>78</sup> While he also never was member of any Indian legislature, Jinnah was a part of almost all constitutional deliberations whether inside the assembly or outside, whether between the League and the Congress or between the League, Congress, and the British all together. His knack for legal-constitutional details made him "a hard and shrewd negotiator"<sup>79</sup> with the British leaders. In fact, as one British writer acknowledged: "His lengthy and successful legal career suited him for this task, as did his dogged determination which so exasperated British officials from Lord Mountbatten downwards"<sup>80</sup> in the transfer of power negotiations in its final phase in 1947. The Muslims couldn't have asked for more.

**Integrity.** Jinnah's friends and foes, supporters, detractors, or haters agreed on one thing, his integrity. He could "neither be bought nor cajoled, neither be influenced nor trapped into any position that he had not himself decided upon".<sup>81</sup> Having once decided upon Pakistan, for instance, nothing deterred him. Not once even the possible loss of the support of his 'right-hand man', Liaquat Ali Khan, Secretary Muslim League. He disapproved of the 'Desai-Liaquat Pact' supposedly reached between Liaquat Ali Khan and Bhulabhai Desai, leader of the Congress party in the Legislative Assembly, in early 1945.<sup>82</sup> The pact stipulated the formation of an interim government at the centre before the settlement of the long-term Pakistan issue.<sup>83</sup> Subsequently, of course, Liaquat Ali Khan denied that there was any such 'pact' made.

Both Hindu leaders and nationalist Muslims who opposed his Pakistan demand agreed that Jinnah had no personal axe to grind in the struggle for Pakistan. A contemporary Hindu writer described Jinnah's character as "impeccable". He argued: "None can wheedle him into acquiescence by holding out bait to him. Title, rank, designation, he will simply brush aside, and will not let them interfere with the line of action he has marked out for himself".<sup>84</sup> In a similar vein, Dr. Syed Hussain, a nationalist Muslim swore publicly: "Though I am opposed to Pakistan, I must say that Mr. Jinnah is the only man in public life whose public record is most incorruptible. You cannot buy him by money or by offer of post. He has not gained anything from the British. He is not that kind of

man.... The Muslim masses know that Mr. Jinnah is the only man who is not in need of money and who has no lust for power”.<sup>85</sup> As for the money, there is no gainsaying that he was one of the wealthiest political leaders of India. His “fortune” in 1947, on the eve of independence of Pakistan, was around 6-7 million rupees, “a fabulous sum” those days, mostly earned from the legal practice.<sup>86</sup> One particular instance of his personal integrity was that, after becoming Governor General of Pakistan, he soon resigned from the presidency of the Muslim League, the ruling party, saying that “as a constitutional Governor General he had to maintain fairness among the political parties”,<sup>87</sup> a political gesture hardly followed in the history of Pakistan.

All these political traits, together, in tandem or separately, contributed to Jinnah’s personality in the making of Pakistan and some, of course, helped more than others, as the above discussion would bear out. But all traits helped Jinnah, in spite of all the major handicaps he had, of not leading from a Muslim-majority province, not conversant in Urdu (lingua franca of the Indian Muslims), and not belonging to the dominant Muslim socio-political feudal class, to become the undisputed leader of Muslim India (charismatic leader), maker of Pakistan, and indeed its first Governor General, and officially declared by its Constituent Assembly as the *Quaid-i-Azam* (Great Leader).

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