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## **Administration of Nawab of Kalabagh Malik Amir Muhammad Khan with Special Reference to Indo-Pak War of 1965**

### **Abstract**

Ayub Era (1958-69) has a great significance in political history of Pakistan. Some apologists justify his autocratic reign as a benevolent dictatorship. Able administrators like Nawab of Kalabagh Malik Amir Muhammad Khan (1910-67) and General Muhammad Azam Khan (1908-94) played a pivotal role in stabilizing his rule. Malik Amir applied result-oriented means to administer things in West Pakistan. He proved innovative in using civil service and the resources of his province. He arranged a landslide victory for Ayub Khan against Miss Fatima Jinnah in Presidential election of 1965. He set some targets in the fields like industry, agriculture, irrigation and transportation; and tried his best to achieve those. West Pakistan had to survive against the assault of gigantic Indian Army in 1965. Nawab supplied every necessity of life to the armed forces fighting on front. Public remained safe, calm and content during war. It is said that Nawab of Kalabagh led from the front and proved a tower of strength for nation by his stern but effective management. His tenure is still remembered for rule of law, peace, and stability despite his harsh dealing of the affairs. A common Pakistani, if not historians, considers him a legendary administrator of Pakistan.

**Key Words: Governance, Civil Administration, Bureaucracy, Indo-Pak War of 1965, Tashkent Accord.**

### **Introduction**

Nawab of Kalabagh Malik Amir Muhammad Khan was born on June 20, 1910 at Kalabagh, Mianwali. The scion of a feudal family acquired his education in the modern institutes of British India (1858-1947) and the United Kingdom. After the emergence of Pakistan, he carried on managing his estate Kalabagh and working for his landlord community. Before the coup of 1958, he had a lot of exposure and influence as an active parliamentarian. He had to accept official assignments in the

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regime of his intimate friend General Ayub Khan, new President of Pakistan. He served as Chairman of Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation and then of Food and Agriculture Commission. His performance made him famous as a fair, strict and able administrator. Ayub Khan, impressed with his administrative talent, entrusted him with Governorship of West Pakistan. He served in this capacity for almost six years which had been ‘the most important office next to that of President’ (Jahan Dad, 1999).

### **Style of Administration**

Malik Amir always admired the way British administered their colony of Indian subcontinent. He tried to imitate them and innovate a transparent and firm system of governance. But civil servants interfered time and again to make him annoyed (Rashedi, 2002). In 1955, three provinces and princely states were amalgamated to make One-Unit, West Pakistan. Nawab had to govern that large territory of diverse linguistic and ethnic groups. Such a heterogeneous society asked for peculiar managerial skills. He developed a result-oriented and unique but simple mechanism of administration. He always preferred to deal the district and divisional management directly. His military secretary Jahan Dad Khan observed that,

He ran his administration through the Commissioners, Deputy Inspector Generals of Police (DIGs), Deputy Commissioners (DCs), and Superintendents of Police (SPs), and dealt with them directly for all administrative functions (Jahan Dad Khan, 1999).

His engagement diary reveals that he was an early riser and his gubernatorial business started early in the morning. Chief Secretary visited him seven times between May 13 and May 30 of 1961 on 7:30 am each time. He did not place politicians of low caliber on key posts. He convinced Ayub Khan to sack Khurshid Ahmad, Federal Law Minister and replace by S. M. Zafar (b.1930) as the former had failed “in handling of the Constitution’s Second Amendment, 1964” (Roedad Khan, 2002). His criterion for assigning a responsibility reflects his feudal and high handed bent of mind. Deep deliberation was made to post or promote some officer. Service record, general reputation and family background were major parameters in this regard. Once, he said to his military secretary, Jahan Dad Khan, “While purchasing even a horse or selecting a dog, we are so conscious of their breed and pedigree. You ignore all these factors in the army when selecting leaders of the men.” His critics say that he used to post the officers either too weak to resist his orders; or very pious and upright ones (Munir, 1985). At first, he was very formal with renowned bureaucrat, Altaf Gauhar (1923-2000) so used to converse in English with him. Later, he became soft spoken to him after knowing his lineage and caste (Gauhar, 2003).

He was not ready to allow any sort of interference in his administrative affairs, not even from Center. He appreciated M.H. Shah, Commissioner Rawalpindi for not complying the presidential orders as those had been sent via Syed Fida Hussain, Principal Secretary to President of Pakistan. To him, Presidency should have adopted the 'proper channel' *i.e.* Governor Malik Amir (Jahan Dad, 1999). He used to guide every assignee with complete briefing and instructions. Officers were free to assert themselves within their jurisdiction so that they might deliver according to the expectations of their executive head. He sent Habib-ur-Rehman, Superintendent Police (later I.G) to Kohistan Tribal area to punish miscreants Kohistanis who had been challenging writ of state. His harsh dealing of the matter resulted in the death of eight Kohistanis. Habibur Rehman received a letter of appreciation from him as law and order had been restored completely (Shah, 2014). He always tried to keep them immune from the political pressure. He became furious at Sheikh Mas'ud Sadiq, Finance Minister in his cabinet, as he had sided with some political workers against provincial management. He advised government officials not to surrender before demands of politicians and their henchmen if found against rules. (Anjum, 1992) At the same time, he showed no tolerance for any member of his administrative team if found them involved in politics. He disliked his former Military Secretary Colonel Sharif for this kind of indulgence. Jahan Dad Khan remarked, "He had paternal rapport with all officials, particularly those who were clean and competent. They held him in high esteem as a firm, fair, and affectionate senior." Those protected officers were daring enough to adopt 'necessary and inevitable deviation' from rules and regulations but with consent of their Governor. Dishonest and incompetent officials remained in the fear of being spotted and punished. He was against nepotism and selection on the basis of recommendation. Only Captain Sher Muhammad, a son of his Atchisonian friend, was appointed as his aid-de-camp (ADC) on recommendation but was soon relieved of his duty as had been found sitting with an air-hostess during a PIA flight.

He had his own intelligence system to find out any corruption in provincial projects. He kept a vigilant eye on his family members so that they might not take any advantage of his official position but relatives of Ayub Khan had proved headache to him in that context. Nawab's policy about all those 'plot, rout permit and agency hunters' was that to 'give them a morsel but no more' (Jahan Dad, 1999). For check and balance, special inspection teams were "empowered to inspect any office or project or work, consult any record, and examine and associate any official in connection with their work." Government machinery was "directed to comply most promptly with any requisition made by inspection teams in connection to their work." Those teams had to assess 'performance against promise' especially actual expenses against the estimated ones (Dawn November 12, 1960). His strong decision power can be judged by his speedy file

and office work. His routine work was usually not put pending despite his fatiguing travels and tiring official visit. In his own words, "I don't put off my work because I am product of *desi ghee* and not of *Dalda*" (Jahan Dad, 1999). He often discussed the issue with concern officer and delivered a prompt order on spot or passed it on via telephone. His cabinet members and secretaries of different ministries were advised to adopt the same method to avoid delay and indecision.

Many times, he suggested apparently awkward but handy methods to handle the situations. Once, Salah-ud-Din Qureshi, I.G. Police, complained that some judges are too lenient in granting bails to habitual culprits which had emboldened them to carry on their criminal activities. I.G. was suggested by Nawab to detach the police posted on the security of court. Excuse was made before the judges that extra police had been needed to hunt down criminals and control the rapid increase in crime rate. Judges had to give a second thought to their policy and become harsh in giving bails (Shah, 2014). His successor, Musa Khan was troubled with dearth and insufficient supply of sugar in West Pakistan. Nawab who believed in quick disposal of the matters said to Muhabbat Khan, Deputy Commissioner of Mianwali, "Musa Khan is not capable to cope with this petty affair which can be solved with locking up two big stockists of sugar, one from Karachi, and other from Lahore." It seems that his trust in his officers and taking responsibility of all the consequences was key to his success. Chinese President Liu Shaoqi (1898-1969) visited Pakistan after the Indo-Pak War of 1965. People of Lahore welcomed him so warmly that provision of foolproof security to the guest looked impossible. Chinese started to think about the cancellation of remaining program if safety was not assured. The Pakistan Chief of Protocol, Major-General Shaukat Ali Shah, contacted to Military Secretary of Malik Amir and asked to convey the apprehensions of the visitors. MS took the full responsibility, on the behalf of Governor without even intimating him. Nawab was told the whole story after the guests had departed for China. He appreciated his confident MS and "Giving a twist to his moustaches said, "General Shaukat should have known that you are MS to Amir Muhammad Khan" (Jahan Dad, 1999).

His stern style of administering things could not bear mismanagement. Once, an officer on duty requested for diversion of his convoy to avoid the protest of mischievous students on the way to Governor House. Angry Nawab stared him and refused to deviate from his route. Fearing official had to manage by any means so no student was seen protesting on the way (Shah, 2014). He was against pomp and show in the name of protocol. His military secretary issued a letter on his behalf to all the Divisional Commissioners. The letter conveyed these instructions.

- The governor will not accept any official or un-official invitations to meal or reception.

- No flags, buntings or erection of gates are required.
- No crowd of students to welcome him.
- He will not like to wear garlands. (According to a cutting of newspaper provided by Malik Ammad Khan, grandson of Nawab of Kalabagh)

Nawab Asad Khan, son of Malik Amir, summed up the efficiency of administration of that time by saying,

One-Unit, the West Pakistan, was comprised of twelve divisions with twelve Commissioners and twelve Deputy Inspector Generals for the vigilance. Districts, 52 in number, were administered by fifty-two Deputy Commissioners and the same number of SPs. Provincial Cabinet consisted of eight ministers only. Each minister was given only one police constable for security. Azad Kashmir Government was run by a joint secretary. West Pakistan Rangers, established during the times of Nawab, served from Kashmir border to Karachi but in the command of a Brigadier. Frontier Corp performed its duty in the area stretched from Sakardu to Gawadar and was looked after by a Brigadier too. There was minimum staff but with maximum output (Shah, 2014).

### **Nawab of Kalabagh and Bureaucracy**

Nawab wanted to have a firm grip over bureaucracy. On the other hand, civil servants tried to get supremacy and convinced Ayub Khan that President should be approached through the Home Secretary. Malik Amir and his counterpart in the East Pakistan, Abdul Monem Khan (1899-1971) refused to adopt that channel. He, in a meeting, condemned bureaucrats for their sycophant nature. He remarked “If Ayub Khan is replaced with Ranjit Singh, they will flatter him in the same way” When Malik was told about the arrogance of B.A. Qureshi, Chief Secretary he said, “I can accept the Qureshi as a Governor and myself as his Chief Secretary but up till my Governorship he will have to be a Chief Secretary in true meaning” (Rokhri, 1994). Disciplinarian Governor very soon got rid of Qureshi, on the charges of corruption. Allegedly, stubborn officers were kept under his thumb by blackmailing them for their misdeeds and corruption. This tactic was coined as “*Kalabaghiana*”. Saeed Ahmad, General Manager of Gandhara Industries, shared an incident in the context of this term. Malik Amir wanted to dismiss an officer anyway. A member of Anti-Corruption Department was asked to file a charge sheet against that official. When that member said that he had found no evidence of his corruption, Nawab threatened him to be charged with the same accusation. Twenty-one charges were leveled against the unwanted officer by the same official of Anti-corruption in no time (Roedad, 2002). Soon, many of the bureaucrats started wearing *Shalwar Qamis*, Pakistan’s national dress, to please the

overbearing Nawab (Gauhar,2003).According to Malik Qadir Bakhsh, provincial minister for Food and Agriculture, it was made compulsory for Class I and Class II officers to learn local languages so that poor and illiterate public might communicate easily (*Daily Civil and Military Gazette*, February 7, 1963). When burglars broke into the Commissioner House of Qalat, furious Governor immediately suspended him saying, “if a Divisional head cannot secure his own home he does not deserve to retain his post” (Shah, 2014).

He consistently tried to curtail the power of civil servants. A constant rift between senior bureaucracy of Center and Malik was witnessed throughout his tenure because he had resisted all kind of interference in provincial administration. His personal intelligence system kept him informed about the intrigues and conspiracies. He used to speak openly about their misdeeds and irregularities even in their presence before Ayub Khan. It is said that, actually, he was the first person to cut the bureaucracy to size (Jahan Dad, 1999). Hamid Khan remarked about the moral position of bureaucracy of Malik Amir’s time, “The stories of their corruption, graft, and bribery could put to shame those of Byzantine rulers or the Kuomintang regime of China.” They became unbridled and power drunk after the resignation of Nawab and cared little for parliamentarians and ministers. In 1967, Ghulam Yazdani Malik, Commissioner Bahawalpur, openly abused and slapped an MPA from Bahawalpur (Hamid Khan, 2002).

### **Achievements: An Overall Assessment**

It will be better to have a gist of what his governance brought for the people of West Pakistan. Briefly, following facts and figures may highlight his contributions in different fields:

- He worked as chairman of PIDC from December 9, 1958 to May 24, 1960 and made it a success story. Heavy chemical units were installed to produce caustic soda, sulphuric acid, DDT and superphosphate. In his native area, Daud Khel Industrial Estate was setup to establish Maple Leaf Cement, Pak American Fertilizer, Pak Dyes and Chemicals and Penicillin Factory by the cooperation of different countries.

There was a marked improvement in the operating results of the PIDC’s completed projects during the year 1959-60 when their total value of production stood at Rs. 58.37 *crores* as against Rs.48.34 *crores* in the previous year, showing a significant increase of 20%...Better production results were obtained in commodities like jute products, board paper, fertilizers, natural gas, sugar, cement, rosin and turpentine, and cotton yarn (*Dawn*, October, 1960).

- Food and Agriculture Commission, under chairmanship of Malik Amir, was setup to have a probe to solve agricultural problems. He, as an

agriculturist and land lord, was a suitable person for this purpose. Report of that commission suggested some innovative solutions like bifurcation of Agriculture Development Corporation, establishment of agriculture universities and research centers, use of machinery and cooperative farming. According to Prof. Atwar Hussain of Dacca University, the report is 'the most comprehensive official study of the problem of food and agriculture undertaken in Pakistan since independence' (*Dawn*, November 30, 1960).

- Conduction of 2<sup>nd</sup> Decennial Population Census was his first huge administrative task which was successfully accomplished in January of 1961.
- Health department of his times worked hard to control epidemics with the aid of agencies like WHO and UNICEF. Successful plans were made to control Malaria, trachoma, T.B and small pox. A leper hospital and a leper colony for 500 patients were setup in Karachi. Life expectancy rose from 38.9 years in 1950-55 to 45 years in 1960-65. Total Fertility Rate increased from 6.5 to 7. Death rate in per 1000 children decreased from 28.5 in 1950-5 to 21.6 in 1960-5. Mortality decreased from 190 to 155 for same period (Raza, 1997).
- His government 'preferred progress in Agriculture after Defense so that country might become self-sufficient in food' (*Nawa-i-Waqt* Dec.22, 1965). West Pakistan Agriculture Corporation worked vigorously according to suggestions of Food and Agriculture Commission. 12000 Primary Credit Cooperatives were providing 45 million rupees per annum in 1960 with the aim to enhance their number to 50000 with budget of 500 million rupees in 1965 (*Dawn*, December 21, 1960). Up-gradation of Agriculture College Lyallpur to an autonomous university, establishment of National Training Center on Wheat and Barley at Tando Jam, three seed testing laboratories in Peshawar, Lyallpur and Tando Jam and Seed Syndicate for production, procurement and distribution were projects that paved the way for research in agricultural field. Nuclear Research Center for Agriculture Tando Jam prepared healthy seeds. Malik encouraged local foundries to imitate imported farm machinery so that mechanized farming might flourish. Use of chemical fertilizers increased rapidly; from 58000 tons in 1962 to 3.5 lac next year (*CMG* Feb. 9, 1963). Horse and cattle and Horticulture shows were conducted regularly for healthy competition among farmers. Growth rate in agriculture remained 3.4% per annum during 1960-5; quite high as it had been 1.3% annually since 1947 (Hamid Khan, 2002). Tube wells were installed on a huge scale by the aid

of Yugoslavia and America which helped in solving the problem of water logging and salinity. In West Pakistan, 'introduction of high yielding variety of seeds of wheat, rice and cotton and supplies of fertilizers and pesticides brought about the 'green revolution' which helped expansion in agro-based industries (Yusuf, 1998).

- Irrigation department was restructured on February 28, 1962. Provincial government of Nawab assisted WAPDA in construction of Mangla Dam and Guddu Barrage. Tanda Dam in Kohat and Habb Dam in Karachi were constructed during his tenure as well. Farmers were encouraged to install tube wells by paying 25% of cost in advance and remaining 75% in twenty installments (*CMG*, March 3, 1963).
- Bureaucrats like Altaf Gauhar and Qudratullah Shahab have portrayed Nawab of Kalabagh as a typical feudal averse to education. But facts do not ratify this impression. 'Drive against illiteracy' was launched and primary schools were setup in the mosques of rural areas for that purpose (*CMG*, Feb 5, 1963). First Five Year Plan reserved 440 million rupees to open and upgrade educational institutes, scholarships and teachers' training. Malik Amir's government allocated 1150 million for the same purpose for next Five-year plan, a bulky increase of 161%. Government schools and colleges were overcrowded due to high standard education and low tuition fees (*Dawn*, August 29, 1965). He does not seem an ardent supporter of female education rather he wanted girls to be 'good wives and mothers' (*Dawn*, Oct 18, 1960).
- West Pakistan Road Transport Board, later WP Road Transport Corporation, flourished during his governorship. Rs. 1000 million were spent on construction of new roads and maintenance of older ones in 1960-5 (*Dawn*, Feb 2, 1965). West Pakistan Railways started many swift trains. Germany aided in construction of Railway Coach Factory with cost of 782 millions.
- Mega housing projects like Korangi Township and Kot Lakhpat Housing Scheme were completed to facilitate low income public. He oversaw the construction of two national monuments *i.e.* Tomb of Quaid-i-Azam and Minar-i-Pakistan.

### **Presidential Election of 1965**

Despite all the above mentioned achievements on his credit, his role in the Presidential Election of 1965 gave birth to lot of controversies. It brought him nothing else but notoriety. He connived at all the irregularities done in the election of Basic Democrats in November, 1964. Later, Miss Fatima Jinnah appeared as the



unanimous candidate of Combined Opposition Parties to contest against Ayub Khan in Presidential Election of 1965. It is alleged that provincial government of Malik Amir used many tactics to ensure the victory of Ayub;

- i. Name of 'disloyal' BDs were omitted and fake names were added into the voter lists (Hamid, 2002).
- ii. Election Commission appointed Presiding Officers from Executive and refused to take them from Judiciary despite COP's request.
- iii. In the words of Miss Jinnah, "the most unfortunate aspect of the present condition is that administrative machinery of the country is identified with Mr. Ayub Khan's election campaign"
- iv. Allegedly, Radio Pakistan served as the mouthpiece to ruling party and blocked the viewpoint of Miss Jinnah.
- v. Police and CID were used to harass and tame BDs in favour of governmental candidate. Deputy Commissioners canvassed for Ayub in meetings with BDs of their respective districts. (*The Pakistan Observer*, Dec.7, 1964)
- vi. It is alleged that Nawab of Kalabagh used his influence to convince the land owning gentry of West Pakistan so '*pirs, makhdooms, maliks and waderas* of Sind and southern Punjab, safeguarding their self-interest', had enlisted themselves with government and helped it in gathering pro-government votes. Many BDs were bribed with money, licenses and government jobs.
- vii. Politicians who sided with Fatima Jinnah were targeted and teased in different manners. Mazaris of Sherbaz Khan's area were entangled in fake cases of dacoity, killing and abduction.(Mazari, 2000). Sirdar Shaukat Hayat (1915-98) has blamed Nawab's government for abducting his 16 years old son and sending him to madhouse (Shaukat, 1995). Sardar Abdul Hamid Dasti was denied canal water to his land (Munir, 1989).

Despite all these facts, Nawab of Kalabagh showed no disrespect to Miss Jinnah. Abdul Wahid Khan, General Secretary of Convention Muslim League, told that Nawab had criticized and opposed a letter of Ayub to Miss Jinnah because its content was contemptuous. He advised Ayub to create a working relationship with his rival on the basis of honour. He allowed saloon of Miss Jinnah to be parked in Governor's yard and permitted her to stay in any government rest house (Weekly

*Zindagi* June, 1970). Rashedi remarked that he did that unpleasant job for his friend 'unhappily and with a heavy heart' (Rashedi, 2002).

### **Indo-Pak War of 1965**

It is said that some ambitious colleagues of Ayub Khan and civil servants devised a fanciful plan to liberate Kashmir from Indian occupation. Allegedly, Ayub Khan fell a prey to the temptation. For this purpose, Operation Gibraltar and Operation Grand Slam were launched by Pakistan Army in July-August of 1965 respectively. Plan to infiltrate Indian Occupied Kashmir and provoke the insurgency was failed because of poor coordination. Infuriated Indian army assaulted West Pakistan on September 6, 1965. Allegedly, that full-fledged war was imposed to conquer Lahore and teach Pakistan a lesson for her 'malicious' interference in Indian Occupied Kashmir. Golam Wahed Choudhury (1926-98) remarks that the War was 'the biggest mistake of Ayub Khan's rule' (Yusuf, 1980).

Ayub Khan advised Malik Amir to stay at Nathia Galli and not to leave for unsafe and under-attack Lahore. Malik said, "It would be better to go overseas and leave my people dying in Lahore." He bequeathed in his will, written that very night, "If I am killed, my corpse should be buried on top of Governor House's hill rather taking it to Kalabagh" (Rokhri, 1994). According to Pir Ali Muhammad Rashedi, Malik found his officers and staff lying on their stomach under the tables to avoid bombs. He scolded them for that timidity and ordered to do their job. He expressed his resolution, "the enemy will have to lift my corpse from the stairs of the Governor House" (Rashedi, 2002). Very next day, a broadcast message by Governor West Pakistan went on air, "Victory will be ours". He admired the bravery of his people particularly of Lahore. He resolved to maintain "the supply line, in the fields, in the factories, in the offices, in the trade and in the day to day administration" (*Dawn*, September 8, 1965). Muhammad Musa Khan (1908-91), the then Commander in Chief of Pakistan Army remarked, "In West Pakistan, under the dominating personality of Nawab Amir Muhammad Khan, the then governor, the civil administration played an impressive part in the war" (Musa, 1983).

### **Arrangements by Provincial Government**

As a Governor West Pakistan, Nawab of Kalabagh made efforts to get maximum benefit of resources at his disposal. Government employees were assigned different tasks with complete guidance and minute detail. It is better to share some of the steps taken by his government;

- Department of civil defense was activated immediately for public safety. Different kind of training sessions and exercises were conducted to enhance

expertise of staff. For public awareness, print and electronic media was used to explain different terms of civil defense.

- Stockpiling and high pricing was checked by strict measures. Colonel Sharif, MS to Malik Amir, sent for big traders of Lahore. Governor advised them not to indulge into hoarding and profiteering as it had been time to sacrifice for country. He further warned them in a threatening manner of grave consequences in case of disobedience, “Your shops will be closed forever and stock be distributed among the public without paying a penny” (Shah, 2014).
- First Aid centers were setup in all the big cities and the War hit places. Thirty Casualty Centers were functioning in Karachi alone.
- For civil hospitals, help of volunteer medicos was requested via media.
- Provincial government appealed to fire fighters, social welfare workers and technicians for assistance.
- Proposal was made to setup anti-paratrooper squads to tackle with aggressors in case of need (*Dawn*, September 9, 1965).

### **National Defense Fund**

Governor appealed to public of West Pakistan on 13th of September for donations, in a motivating speech,

Quaid-i-Azam, by grace of Allah, gave us Pakistan and it has fallen on our lot to defend and protect it. This is the time for making sacrifices-big sacrifices. Let us demonstrate to our valiant brothers at the front that we will do everything humanly possible to back up their heroic actions (*Dawn*, September 14, 1965).

Governor donated his full pay of one month to National Defense Fund, all the ministers Rs. 1000/= each; government servants receiving Rs.2000/= or more 10% of their pay; those receiving less than Rs.2000/=, 5% of it; and Class IV employees contributed their one day salary. These deductions continued till the end of emergency (*Nawa-i-Waqt*, Feb. 14, 1966). Efficacy of his appeal can be judged by the fact that lion-share of Defense Fund came from his province. A statement issued by central government, on December 7, 1965 said that out of total 350 million rupees of National Defense Fund, 270 million were raised in West Pakistan (*Daily Imroze* (Lahore), Dec. 8, 1965).

### **Maintenance of Supply Line**

During war, provincial government made full effort to maintain supply lines to soldiers in battlefield and public in homes. Malik Amir said in his mid of the month broadcast from Lahore Radio Station,

Present day war is not fought only on the battle ground but at every level and on all fronts. It is duty of every citizen irrespective of his position and nature of his work to discharge his duty and maintain supply line (*Dawn*, September 17, 1965). Private trucks and their civil drivers were requested to help for uninterrupted supply which they had done with both enthusiasm and discipline (Musa, 1983).

### **High Morale and Situation of Law and Order**

Nawab reminded all the Deputy Commissioners and Superintendents of Police of their duty to maintain law and order by any means in that time of trouble. Bureaucrats were warned to abstain from wine and woman (Shah, 2014). Public was asked to follow the rules strictly so that panic and chaos could be avoided. Crime rate remained almost negligible in those 17 days of war (Musa, 1983). It seems that Nawab Kalabagh led from front and won the trust of both soldiers and public. He became injured when his car was hit, accidentally, by a jeep of Pak Army near Ravi Bridge. He forbade his MS, Colonel Sharif, to scold the soldiers, "Let them go because they are doing more important duty than ours." Moreover he denied to be treated in the hospital as any kind of rumours might demoralize his peoples. On Wahga border, General Sher Ali saw him, from his helicopter, distributing biscuits among the soldiers (Shah, 2014). High morale of public was manifested in different ways,

- Shopkeepers avowed to abstain from high pricing and profit (*Dawn*, September 19, 1965).
- Blood donors, in large queues were seen. Only Lahorites donated twenty-eight *munds* of blood in a single day (*Nawa-i-Waqt*, November 12, 1965).
- Artists like poets, writers, composers and painters were inspired enough to create masterpieces of all time.
- No hoarding was done so markets and prices remained stable. Almost no anti-social incidents were reported during those days. (Musa, 1983).

### **Ceasefire or War? Nawab of Kalabagh's Opinion**

Though the War lasted for two and half weeks but United Nations had started to stop it from first day. It is said that Nawab was 'dove' so was in favour of

ceasefire. The 'hawkish' group led by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (1923-79) insisted on war till victory (Jahan Dad, 1999). International community put pressure on Ayub government to do away with the course of war. A meeting was called by Ayub on September 21, 1965 to discuss the issue and take decision. Specially invited Malik Amir eagerly favored the idea of ceasefire and advised Ayub to accept the resolution of UN Security Council because the soldiers, fighting and dying in battlefield, belonged to his (Malik Amir's) area (Gauhar, 1994). Nawab, General Musa Khan and Air Marshal Malik Nur Khan (1923-2011) played a vital role to convince Ayub who was not in a position to face further pressure of war. Actually, Malik Amir apprehended that further war might collapse social structure of country. (Asghar Khan, 1979)

### **Reason behind War: Assessment of Nawab Kalabagh**

It is said that Nawab of Kalabagh had some serious suspicion about 'ambitious' Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. According to S.M. Zafar in the Foreword to *Pakistan: Leadership Challenges*, Nawab thought that Ayub Khan was trapped through enticing war with India on the issue of occupied Kashmir. Bhutto with his 'accomplices' did so to get rid of Ayub and 'reach the pinnacle of power himself' (Jahan Dad, 1999). Nawab disclosed before Qudratullah Shahab (1917-86), "Dear Shahab! General Akhtar Hussain Malik, Mirza Muzaffar Ahmad, Bhutto, Aziz Ahmad and Nazir Ahmad were behind the war to put Ayub Khan into quagmire and, for this, they had not hesitated even to jeopardize the integrity of Pakistan" (Shahab, 1994).

### **Rehabilitation of the War Affectees**

Many people especially of border areas were displaced due to war. After the ceasefire, government provided them with transport to go to their native areas. Construction material, food stuff or *guzara* allowance for six months and easy loans for farmers were given to rehabilitate themselves (*Nawa-i-Waqt*, February 17, 1966). Agriculture Development Corporation helped Kashmiri migrants and destitute war-hit person to settle in Thal. Camps were setup in union councils to provide shelter to 0.125 million Kashmiri (*Nawa-i-Waqt*, Dec 22, 1965). Ninety million rupees were allocated by provincial government on March 10, 1966 for the dislocated and homeless people of Sialkot sector (*Jang*, March 11, 1966).

### **Acknowledgments for Malik Amir's Administration during War**

Ayub Khan wrote a letter of appreciation on February 10, 1966 to Nawab Kalabagh for his efficient administration during war days,

I have been apprised of the prompt and timely support and assistance rendered by the officials of the West Pakistan Government to the Armed Forces during the war

with India in September last under your instructions in different directions *e.g.* raising of additional force for West Pakistan Rangers, additional police staff for the protection of key points, maintenance and improvement of communication, clothing and equipment for Mujahid Force and relief operation. Considerable expense was, doubtless, incurred by the Provincial Government on several items including minor and major works without entering into lengthy correspondence with the Central Government.

Commander-in-Chief General Musa Khan, too, admired his managerial skills in a letter of February 9, 1966,

If I may say so, during the war, we all found you a tower of strength. You stood like a rock in the midst of bitter fighting next door to you. In a way, you were in the battle-field. The residents of LAHORE were greatly encouraged by your presence there throughout the hostilities and did not vacate the city...Our attention was not diverted to the kind of problems panic among civilians creates.

### **Tashkent Accord and Public Reaction**

Ayub Khan was compelled to seek the diplomatic help of Soviet Union because lukewarm attitude of America and Europe had disappointed him a lot. Before leaving for Tashkent, Ayub Khan had a meeting with his cabinet, General Musa, Abdul Jabbar Khan (speaker of National Assembly) and Governor West Pakistan Malik Amir on December 31, 1965 in Rawalpindi. Nawab of Kalabagh was not optimist about the talks going to be held in Tashkent. To him, the Indian politicians “who had been talking in terms of a peaceful settlement of Kashmir, certainly did not represent the mainstream of Indian opinion” (Gauhar, 1994). Negotiators ignored ground realities and assured the public that in table talk with India “there shall either be a solution of Kashmir problem or Pakistan army would not withdraw.” But in joint statement, released at Tashkent on January 11, 1966, Kashmir was mentioned only in the preamble and that too ‘obliquely’. National Awami Party and almost all political parties from East Pakistan welcomed Tashkent agreement but in West Pakistan it acted as ‘ice-cold water upon the feelings’ (Zafar, 1970). Executive Council of pro-Moscow NAP, West Pakistan faction, expressed satisfaction on revival of peace through agreement (*Nawa-i-Waqt*, Jan 30, 1966). Mawlana Syed Abu'l A'la Maududi (1903-79) became furious when government tried to justify and declared Tashkent Accord as *Sulah Hudaibiah* (*Nawa-i-Waqt*, February 7, 1966).

Resentment erupted in the form of protests and strikes all over West Pakistan. Provincial government imposed Section 144 and dealt protestors severely. Sardar Shaukat Hayat, Muhammad Hussain Chathha (1914-2001) and Khwaja Muhammad Rafique (d.1972) with many political workers were put behind bar.

Allegedly, students were oppressed even more brutally. Police killed two students in Lahore on January 13, 1966 so all educational institutions were closed for undetermined period. (*Nawa-i-Waqt*, Jan. 14, 1966). According to Shaukat Hayat, ground glass was mixed with his flour on the behest of Nawab Kalabagh. Later, he was poisoned via a medicine which took him to death bed in Mayo Hospital Lahore. (Shaukat, 1995) Many politicians intentionally breached section 144 and were imprisoned for two months under the Defense of Pakistan Rules. Allegedly, detainees were refused to see their lawyers and family members (*Nawa-i-Waqt*, February 22, 1966). Though provincial government of Malik Amir gradually succeeded in suppressing the opposition to Ayub Khan but it paved the way for his consequent downfall as well.

## **Conclusion**

Malik Amir Muhammad Khan managed the affairs of his estate Kalabagh successfully. Martial Law of 1958 proved a turning point in his political career. Ayub government provided him with a chance to display his talent of administration in a vast territory *i.e.* West Pakistan. As chairman first of PIDC and then of Food and Agriculture Commission earned him fame of a good planner who was thrifty and meticulous in using public money as well. He served as governor of West Pakistan for almost six years. Self sufficiency in food was his main goal. For this, he worked hard to complete some mega projects of irrigation. Efforts were made to overcome the problems like water-logging and salinity. New roads were constructed and swift trains were run for better transportation. With the help of international agencies, health sector worked to get control over epidemics. Education sector flourished and remained far ahead of private sector. During his tenure, Ayub government was able to survive through some formidable crises like Presidential Elections and Indo-Pak War in 1965. His talent of political maneuvering and tactics to use state machinery brought victory to Ayub against Miss Fatima Jinnah in Presidential Election. Indian attack of 1965 jeopardized safety and integrity of West Pakistan. Gigantic Indian Army had large resources at its disposal against Pak Army which had been less in number and not well-equipped. Unbroken chain of supply to both civilians and soldiers was maintained. Public remained safe, calm and content during war. Most of traders did not indulge in hoarding or profiteering. Negligible crime rate and high morale was recorded. Protest against Tashkent agreement was crushed by using strict measures like arrest and harassment. Nawab of Kalabagh, despite his harsh and authoritarian outlook, is still remembered as an upright, successful and efficient administrator; a hard taskmaster, who evolved a model of result-oriented governance. After his resignation, layman used to talk about low crime rate, corruption free system, low prices of commodities and better situation of law and order in a nostalgic way. The President of Pakistan acknowledged his services for

the country and awarded him *Hilal-i-Pakistan* on August 13, 1963(Razi & Shakir, 1997).



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