

Political Terrorism under the Flag of Media

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ABSTRACT

This analytical paper discusses the political terrorism and its influence on to be public opinion and political issues or to vie with political power. Media is considered a key driver in ensuring manipulation and promotion to the cause of terrorism and flourishes political gains that terrorists want to achieve. Political terrorists always design nationalistic aims because terrorism is what the enemies of a nation do. This paper further describes that the state-sponsored terrorist groups are directed to participate in the exercise and create terror in the minds of aliens. It reviews the terrorists' treatment to media and media octopus coverage to the insurgents. Media conglomerates direct and glorifies the acts of terrorists while political pundits set the cognitive level of the extremist groups.

Introduction

Political terrorism is the strong off-shoot of violent political behavior primarily planned to generate fear in the community, or a substantial part of it, for political purposes. The Political terrorism is distinguished from revolution for its immediate objective of terrorist acts which intimidate rather than the overthrow of the existing government. Terrorism is a form of political extortion. Positive theories of crime and extortion assume that individuals will act to maximize some objective function, subjected to existing social or legal restriction of liberty. However, there is no parallel to these positive approaches which aim directly at the subject of political terrorism. Political terrorism relies on violent acts to influence the public opinion on political issues or to vie with political power. Political terrorists sometimes harbor nationalistic aims but these motivations are more clearly considered as separatist terrorism. Political terrorism may be waged by extremist groups on either end of the political spectrum, more often described as "left wing" or "right wing" terrorist groups.

The term 'political terrorism' is often described by experts, as the use of violence by an established authority for political ends and it includes all uses of violence for the purposes of putting the public or a section of the public in fear.

Political terrorism can be another person's perspective of maintaining public order to achieve peace and harmony. Politicians and governments worldwide have expanded the war against terrorism by redesignating their own enemies as terrorists. Terrorism is what the enemies of a nation do.

Michael Stohl (1988) describes political terrorism as 'theater'. According to him, "it is profound and often tragic drama for which the world is stage. Violence, death, intimidation, and fear are the theatrical ingredients. The plot often involves hostages, deadlines, and high level bargaining. Tension and anxiety levels are immediately raised. National and international news media frequently monitor and broadcast terrorist events as they unfold. Law enforcement officials and sometimes insurgent terrorists are interviewed via on-the-scene mini cameras, and speculations abound about the nature of the response that we might expect from both the authorities and the terrorists."

Elements of Political Terrorism

Many scholars including academician, politicians, sociologists and thinkers have been given definitions to the term "terrorism" but so far has not found a single uniform definition. All of them are agreed on the following elements:

Action

It is a sort of threat of violent act. They may be criminal, unlawful, politically subversive, or anarchic acts, piracy, hijacking of aircraft and taking of hostages. Terrorists' action has been exaggerated politically, perhaps as a result of the media's adoption of international terrorism as a news issue. According to Crenshaw (1981), terrorism is an attractive method to use because it is relatively inexpensive.

Revolutionary Terrorist Groups

These types of terrorists are the domestic perpetrators. They control the domestic political circle and targeted regime in power through destructive activities. Terrorism is a form of warfare and can be perpetrated either by individuals or by governments (Mazrui, 1985).

Rational Thinking of Political Terrorism

Rational terrorist thinks in terms of co-efficient and correlation of lose and win. He makes analysis of achieving whether there are less costly and more effective ways to achieve his objective than terrorism. He measures the sustainability of continuous efforts.

Psychological Effects of Political Terrorism

Psyche is the tool which rotates the mental level of political effectiveness of terrorism. Psychological motives set the personal engagement and dissatisfaction with his life and Individuals are victimized. "Whether because of the intrinsic drama of terrorist violence or because of press and television hyperbole, hijackings, kidnappings, and other terrorist assaults have created large public concern," (de Boer, 1979).

Politics of Culture and Religion

Culture is the sign of identity. It differentiates the codes of life across the border. Muslims are "Ummah". An Islamic community is totally different from the rest of the communities of the World. Muslims do not believe in "Gesellschaft Thinking". The terrorists are politically motivated to take action against the other communities as a divine sanction.

It has been given a religious duty. Politics in the name of religion can be especially a terror. Cultural invasion has been considered a damage to Islamic way of life and very carefully, the hints are exaggerated by the political religious leaders. It helps them to persuade the common Muslims for extremism and intolerance.

"Religion has re-emerged as a major component in the understanding of contemporary political development, especially in the Middle East, Asia and Africa. The return to religious roots and the mobilization of religious faith to reform societies is far from being limited to third world countries. The manifestation of this phenomenon and its symbolism varies from religion to religion and culture to culture but there are some parallels in the organization of religious groups and in the methods, used by activists to arouse a popular response" (Cameron, 1996).

Contribution of Political System to Increase International Terrorism

Modes of warfare become more and more sophisticated. States design the instrument of warfare more and more complex. All the states and non-state indulge in penetrating into the affair of the governments in terms of weakening. The strong suppress the weak in order to control the means of production. State-sponsored terrorist groups are directed to participate in the exercise and create terror in the minds of aliens.

The US policy regarding Palestine can be considered as a serious threat to the whole of the Muslim World. The political think tank has religiously motivated terrorism internationally. The Palestine vs. Israel conflict is not an international in nature rather it is local. But the Israel and America frame it into the international scene of terra phobia. Politics contribute a lot to increase the international terrorism.

Frustration and deprivation are the root causes of terrorism. Governments aggravate the phenomena and alien sentiments of unwanted grievances erupt. Many ethnic and religious groups emerge in developed and periphery countries where frustrated worn terrorists' garbs. Such situation yield tension and political fragmentation.

The Rationale

Media is considered to be a key driver in ensuring manipulation and promotion to the cause of terrorism and flourishes political gains that terrorists want to achieve. The idea has a simple fourstep logic rationale that proceeds along the following path:

- The political extremists employ terrorism as a communication strategy.
- Theoretically, media hype the mind reasoning and legitimize terrible actions.
- Media signifies the situation which boosts up the terrorists.
- What we see in the world, as terrorist events, are the consequences of violent expression of their ideas, what is propagated in general public through mass media.
- Empathic relationship between terrorists needs publicity and media organizations which seek chauvinistic stories to increase readership of "Likert Scale". Media men always remain in pursuit of getting "strongly agree" sentiments.

Literature Review

Many studies have investigated the relationships between mass media and terrorism. The most interesting conclusion, the studies revealed, was that this relation was very much symbiotic between terrorists on one hand and mass media on the other. Another important factor in this relationship was the attempt by terrorist organizations to use mass media reporting of terrorist events to achieve political objectives for these groups (Schmid and de Graaf, 1982, Schlesinger, 1991, Nacos, 1994, Lockyer, 2003, Norris, Kern and Just, 2004).

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Frey and Rohner (2006) explain the circumstances that terrorist groups aim to employ for their media effectiveness. Terrorists attack on big cities with a bulk of media organizations and during big events, such as G8 summit, Olympic Games, elections, or other national or international occasions. Nelson and Scott (1992) in their reviewing cases of the relationships between media and terrorist groups during the period 1968-1984, came to the conclusion that the media coverage did not lead to terrorism. But we should mention in this context, that media seek maximum audience through reporting of such events, especially tabloid-newspapers and sensational radio and television channels.

Governments seek media cooperation when dealing with terrorist events and issues, in order not to limit any harmony in the society (Perl, 1997). During a crisis, all social institutions become alert to disrupt the social stability. Government, as the guard of security in the society, tries to mobilize all possible efforts to support government actions. Media are not exception. The government seeks to separate the terrorists from the media, denying the terrorist organizations from using media as political platforms to communicate with public. Government pushes the media to name terrorists as criminals and their actions as crimes, in order to affect the perceptions of terrorists in the minds of the public (Perl, 1997).

The Indian government, at the very beginning of the terrorist incident, tries to ensure that people in the affected areas have access to media, to learn what the world thinks of the terrorists. It encourages those people to participate in media programs so that they can ventilate their grievances. The government works hard to counter wrong propaganda and disinformation by terrorist groups, and to make sure that the terrorist leaders do not become national icons in the eyes of citizens (Raman, 2003).

Media critics have documented and questioned the mass media's insatiable appetite for violence. There was no need to count broadcast minutes and measure column inches to establish the proportion of the total news that dealt with "Black Tuesday" and its aftermath. For the first five days after the terror attack, the television and radio networks covered the disaster round the clock, without the otherwise obligatory commercial breaks. There was simply no other news. Most sports and entertainment channels switched to crisis news. Many of them carrying the coverage of one of the networks, some suspending their broadcasts that suddenly seemed irrelevant (Brigitte, 2002).

All regimes invoke terror in one way or another. One could easily fall into the unhelpful ideological posture of labeling all regimes, states, or countries "terrorist"(Geras, 1976).Indeed, the sustainability, diversity of forms and sheer scale of state terrorist acts and campaigns is qualitatively greater and more dangerous than that of sub-state actors. Culpable states include Pakistan (in Kashmir and Afghanistan), India (in Kashmir and the Northeast), Russia (in Chechnya), China (in Tibet), Israel (in Palestine), Indonesia (in East Timor) and

a host of others, with the US itself the worst offender (Geras, 1990). The American record here is simply awesome to contemplate, both in numbers and scale. It includes the nuclear bombing of civilians in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the use of chemical weapons in Vietnam, where the US killed over two million civilians, and the use of sanctions since the Gulf War which have led to the deaths of 1.2 million Iraqis, of whom approximately 500,000 were children" (Bauhn,1989). Given the prevalence of state-executed terror, it is believe that it is necessary to make a distinction between terrorist regimes and democratic ones. The latter, by this reckoning, are not terrorist governments or states but they can and do carry out terrorist acts and campaigns internationally and at times domestically.

Domestic political terrorism is easy to recognize. It is carried out by domestic agents for domestic purposes. What about international political terrorism? Again, let us start off by first pointing out what is not meant by this. Simply the fact of outside support for domestic agents, does not make an act one of international political terrorism. If the February 1993, bomb blasts in Bombay, for example, were the handiwork of an outside agency, says the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan, then this would be an example of international terrorism (Bidwai et al, 1999). But if there was only ISI help for domestic agents perpetrating the act for domesticrelated purposes e.g., supposed retaliation for the police-abetted communal riots in Bombay in the aftermath of December 6, then this would not be a form of international terrorism. After all, one state can accept assistance from another and use it to carry out terrorist acts against its domestic population. One need only to think here of American support for the Somoza or Pinochet regimes in Latin America, the Shah of Iran, or Mobutu in Zaire. But those specific acts of brutality were nevertheless forms of domestic terrorism.

Neither do we mean by international political terrorism the mere fact that an act, say, the assassination of Kennedy, has international repercussions nor do we mean by international terrorism, the phenomenon of the increasing international spread of terrorism. It is, rather, the existence of any of the following properties that defines an act of international political terrorism. 1) It is carried out by "outside" actors, owing allegiance to, or residing in another country. 2) The cause to which the act is related is extra-national, i.e. the cause is to re-order the existing international system of states, as for example, in a war of national liberation. 3) The act is primarily directed against an external power or involves direct defiance of an external power or powers. This last category would apply to the US's bombing of Qaddafi's palace in Libya (killing his daughter) for his alleged (allegations subsequently shown to be false) role in an airplane hijacking and bombing during Reagan's first term as president. It would also apply to the famous 1979 US hostage crisis in post-Shah Iran when revolutionary guards declaring allegiance to Ayatollah Khomeini captured the US Embassy and held

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its employees hostage or the more recent hostage crisis involving the Japanese Embassy in Peru.

While the absence of acknowledged responsibility for the Sept. 11 attacks could suggest ambiguity about its 'status', it is difficult to see how this could have been motivated by anything other than an attempt to 'punish' the US for its foreign policy behavior. The chosen targets, symbolized US American military, political and economic might. What ever evidence's there about those who boarded and hijacked the planes, points to people of Saudi and Egyptian origin; few of whom were US citizens? The properties outlined in points one and three given above would seem to apply to the Sept. 11 attacks.

While not all forms of international political terrorism are linked to perceived (by one side) "wars of liberation," this is the most usual or frequent connection. That is to say, international political terrorist acts are quite often connected to wars declared or undeclared, wars small or large, "wars of liberation" on one side and "counter-insurgency wars" on the other (Brown et al, 1979). This connection provides important grounds for helping us to judge, both the efficacy and the ethics of international political terrorist act.

How Terrorists Treat Media

- Terrorists want to get the attention of the public through the contents of media. Surely, not a single individual or a group can catch and buy it without the help of media. All the activities surrounding the terrorists are stuck in the eyes of media.
- Terrorists seek favorable remarks to justify their activities and media is a strong puller of their cause. Paradoxically, media is a paradise for them rather than a black box. They believe in understanding and once their acts and causes have been accepted, they use force as anecdote of all evils. Extremists are being portrayed in media on large scale which cultivates turn shift of encouragement.
- Terrorists seek friends in media organizations. Irrationally, they flourish seeds of favoritism among media practitioners. They can go in achieving the target through funds to control the news organizations.
- Terrorists work in columns. Ideology, military, and politics are the broad categories of their field of tactics. Very often, they motivate the closed circle of ideology to legitimize their activities. On the other hand, they feed these sentiments into the minds like of the two categories military and politicians to pave the path of terrorism.
- Press is cautioned to draw results of sympathetic viewpoints which fulfills the required fund rising. Media also provides cover for recruitment and travelling avenues to terrorists in terms of public opinion formation.

- Terrorists need exposure and methods of rescue operation. State sponsored terrorists are being more injected by hostile sentiments and close proximity to command centers and military bases. Prediction of success is made likely target through media. The frequency of terror attacks is a function of the potential political instrument media sponsored.
- The political reality is that states or groups that are dissatisfied with the status quo would do their utmost to change the rule. Terrorist organizations seek media coverage of terror attacks to increase to the level that causes damage to their enemy. It is clear that most incidents of political terror emanate from, or occur in states that have been involved in unresolved and long-standing regional conflicts. Media inject needle of loose faith in their government and state operates to enable to protect its masses and where political radicalism rises.
- Terrorists set their mind for change where undemocratic and oppressive regime arises. They launch their campaign against the illegitimate governments for which they need external support and to obtain this support, they orient their foreign policy to a direction that would be pleasing to the major power whose support is required.

Terrorism and the Mass Media: A Changing Curse

Media portray and shape our perception. Media is the food for thought to terrorists. Cultivation of evils creates evils and the sole damage is the blasting of innocent people. Media conglomerates directly and glorifies the acts of terrorists while political pundits set the cognitive level of the extremist groups. What media do, is infact the selling of war news?

Media bias simply cannot be forgiven when said media have the tools to record and deliver the objective reality of any given event so political affiliations must be cast aside.

Marshall McLuhan (1978) one of the most celebrated researchers on the social impact of the mass media, came to the relatively precocious conclusion that “without communication terrorism would not exist.” This short sentence holds a truth that has remained unchanged during the last decades. It is not uncommon to cite the relationship between the diffusion of terrorist messages and the existence of modern mass media. Terrorism, however, did widely exist before the mass media did. An example of this is the type of terrorism that promoted anarchy (an authentic plague for nineteenth century societies) utilizing assassinations and other types of attacks as a way to reach entire societies. The killing of important figures or other actions that took place in front of hundreds or thousands of witnesses, were effective means of ensuring that these events were made known during a time in which there was strong governmental control

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over information and the mass media acted within a limited scope. In the future, technological developments would allow terrorist attacks to be published in ways that were previously unimaginable. Terrorists found a powerful ally in the mass media that would help them in obtaining public attention for the group and its demands.

Michael Wievioska (2004), a French sociologist established four different models of behavior:

Complete indifference

The terrorists' goal is to terrorize their victims, without seeking to attain media attention for their acts. There is no expectation that the press will become involved. This French author does not hesitate to mention that this situation is highly unusual.

Relative indifference

The terrorists are not concerned with being on the news, even though they are conscious of the power that explains their cause which currently existing media can provide them.

A media-oriented strategy

The terrorists are not only aware that the press can expand the scope of their words and actions, they also perform a series of operations based on the knowledge that they possess on the dynamics and functioning and of news producers. After well thought manipulations, the news media becomes integrated in the terrorist group's actions.

Complete breakaway

This is case of terrorists that see journalists and reporters as enemies that must be destroyed, putting them on the same level as other direct adversaries. The press ceases to be an entity that should be cynically manipulated (as democracy's Achilles' heel). It is instead viewed as the appendix of a system that must be destroyed.

The relationship between media and terrorism is quite precarious. The interplay between media reporting and the use of violence by extremist movements has always been an interesting field of study. It has been observed that violent extremists understand the capacity of the present day media network to disseminate information through satellite and digital technology and to present the events 'live' or graphically and to cater to the global audience. This instantaneous media exposure brings forward their grievances and facilitates

them in garnering larger audience. Keeping in view the media point, they have their 'own incentives to report major terrorist incidents' (Gus, 2003).

Hypothetical Assumptions and Legitimization of Political Terrorism

Theoretical Stance	Legitimization of Political Terrorism
High is the rate of attack on beliefs and threat to national identity, high is the frame of reference to political actors	Feelings of disposition to violence within the deprived nations, groups and states of the world would begin.
The greater is the intervention strike of the enemy to the dehumanization, the greater is the threat to murder and destruction	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Counter attacks are the result of imperial order• Prepare a framework for political activists• Portray the perpetrator as evils• Vision is broadening for revenge
The more is the real picture social linkages, the more is the acknowledgment of terrorists	Terrorists are being considered the custodian of the community
Preaching of collective goals more likely give violent action	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• It is the political vibration• It is the religious extremism• It is the social abnormality

Indo-Pak Crisis and the US Political Terrorism in New Garb

America very tactfully uses the Mumbai attacks for her own ends. US managed Mumbai crisis for proxy diplomacy. It has opened the gates for US think tanks to fuel tension in the region. The Pakistani intelligentsia believes that Pakistan is at cross roads. The success against terrorism can steer Pakistan into a direction of political stability, economic growth and increased democratic freedoms and civil liberties. Failure means a fragmented state, society, institutions with crippled confidence among the citizens. The failure can be detrimental to the role that Pakistan may keep playing in the global war against terrorism. But US desires to engage Pakistan on both, east and west borders. This triangle umbrella can protect the US ends.

“The crisis with India produced an opening for the United States. Eager to get India to stand down from the crisis, the Pakistanis looked to the Americans to mediate. And the price for U.S. mediation was increased cooperation from

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Pakistan with the United States. The Indians, not eager for war, backed down from the crisis after guarantees that Islamabad would impose stronger controls on Islamist groups in Kashmir.

In 2001-2002, the Indo-Pakistani crisis played into American hands. In 2008, the new Indo-Pakistani crisis might play differently. The United States recently has demanded increased Pakistani cooperation along the Afghan border. Meanwhile, Elected President Barack Obama has stated his intention to focus on Afghanistan and pressureize the Pakistanis.

Therefore, one of Islamabad's first responses to the new Indo-Pakistani crisis was to announce that if the Indians increased their forces along Pakistan's eastern border, Pakistan would be forced to withdraw 100,000 troops from its western border with Afghanistan. In other words, threats from India would cause Pakistan to reduce its cooperation dramatically with the United States in the Afghan war. The Indian foreign minister is flying to the United States to meet Obama. Obviously, this matter will be discussed among others.

We expect the United States to pressurize India not to create a crisis, in order to avoid this outcome. As we have said, the problem is that it is unclear whether politically, the Indians can afford restraint. At the very least, New Delhi must demand that the Pakistani government take steps to make ISI and Pakistan's other internal security apparatus more effective. Even if the Indians concede that there was no ISI involvement in the attack, they will argue that ISI is incapable of stopping such attacks. They will demand a purge and reform of ISI as a sign of Pakistani commitment. Barring that, New Delhi will move troops to the Indo-Pakistani frontier to intimidate Pakistan and placate Indian public opinion.

That will set the stage for another Indo-Pakistani confrontation. India will push forces forward all along the Indo-Pakistani frontier, move its nuclear forces to an alert level, begin shelling Pakistan and perhaps-given the seriousness of the situation-attack short distances into Pakistan and even carry out airstrikes deep in Pakistan. India will demand greater transparency for New Delhi in Pakistani intelligence operations. The Indians will not want have to occupy Pakistan rather they will have desire to occupy Pakistan's security apparatus.

Naturally, the Pakistanis will refuse that. There is no way that they can give India, their main adversary, insight to Pakistani intelligence operations. But without that access, India has no reason to trust Pakistan. This will leave the Indians in an odd position. They will be in a near-war posture but will have made no demands of Pakistan that Islamabad can reasonably deliver and that would benefit India. In one sense, India will be gesturing while in another sense, India will be trapped by making a gesture on which Pakistan cannot deliver. The situation thus could get out of hand.

In the meantime, Pakistanis will certainly withdraw forces from western Pakistan and deploy them in eastern Pakistan. That means that one leg of the Petraeus and Obama plans would collapse. Washington's expectation of greater Pakistani

cooperation along the Afghan border will disappear along with the troops. This will free the Taliban from whatever limits Pakistani army had placed on it. The Taliban's ability to fight, would increase while the motivation for any of the Taliban to enter talks-as Afghan President Hamid Karzai has suggested-would decline. U.S. forces, already stretched to the limit, would face an increasingly difficult situation, while pressure on al Qaeda in the tribal areas would decrease.

Now, step back and consider the situation which Mumbai attackers have created. First, the Indian government faces an internal political crisis, driving it towards a confrontation, it had not planned on. Second, the minimum Pakistani response to a renewed Indo-Pakistani crisis will be withdrawing forces from western Pakistan, thereby strengthening the Taliban and securing Al-Qaeda. Third, sufficient pressure on Pakistan's civilian government could cause it to collapse, opening the door to a military-Islamist government-or it could see Pakistan collapsing into chaos, giving Islamists security in various regions and an opportunity to reshape Pakistan. Finally, the United States' situation in Afghanistan has now become enormously more complex.

By staging an attack, the Indian government can't ignore that the Mumbai attackers have set in motion an existential crisis for Pakistan. The reality of Pakistan cannot be transformed or trapped, as the country is between the United States and India. Almost every evolution from this point forward benefits the Islamists. Strategically, the attack on Mumbai was a precise blow struck to achieve uncertain but favorable political outcomes for the Islamists.

Rice's trip to India now becomes the crucial next step. She wants Indian restraint. She does not want the western Pakistani border to collapse. But she cannot guarantee what India must have, i.e; assurance of no further terror attacks on India originating in Pakistan. Without that, India must do something. No Indian government could survive without some kind of action. So it is up to Rice, in one of her last acts as secretary of state, to come up with a miraculous solution to head off a final, catastrophic crisis for the Bush administration and a defining first crisis for the new Obama administration. Former U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld once said that the enemy gets a vote. The Islamists cast their ballot in Mumbai" (Friedman, 2008).

Conclusion

Media is the lifeline of activities. All activities are the audio-video scene of media portrayal. Both bad and good is the product of human minds. Humans are acting on these two platforms. Media organizations have both the categories of good and bad people. The relation between and within the fifth column depends on characters displayed by media. Media disseminates the outcomes and shapes the picture accordingly.

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Political issues circling around the environment of the above mentioned categories are what is the situation and why it developed? Who involved and to whom the benefits goes? How the situation can be disturbed? All can be easily done through media. Those are the winners who control the insurgent flow of information. Western media is the strong weapon of molding public opinion. It is a deliberate and sustained effort of western media to portray the weak negatively. The political wing in the media organizations creates misunderstanding and misperception. Media legitimize the crusaders and their violent action. Political terrorism is the production of media conglomerates. The multinational media corporations protect the emergence of an outlet that is radically being transformed in favour of west.

The Coming researchers should explore the variables of relationships between the terrorists and media. How media facilitate the terrorist groups. What type of guarantees are being provided to the journalists? What is the mechanism of fund raising? Which political groups are involved in this harbor legacy? Media build images and can spoil the characters of political activists. Media has passed through different phases. Its different perceptions and the ways in which this terrorist group has attempted to utilize the mass media, are really the results of estimated media impact and have much less to do with ideological or religious interpretations. Media certainly can break the spiral of silence. The world can be saved and the cry of the innocent can be changed in smile if the media plays the role of a judge.

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