

## **Re-Visioning Security beyond the Realist Security Paradigm - A Case Study of Pakistan**

**Syed Khwaja Alqama**

*Baha-ud-Din Zakaria University, Multan*

**Shahnaz Tariq**

*Baha-ud-Din Zakaria University, Multan*

### ABSTRACT

Most remarkable development of post cold war era is a change in the concept of state based on the Weberian notion of legitimate monopoly of use of force. The year 1989 marked a turning point in World history marked by the end of the Cold War and perhaps more fundamentally a change in the European state system. What emerged after 1989 is not a re-arrangement of the old system but an entirely new system based on a new form of statehood, which Cooper calls the postmodern state. With the emergence of the postmodern state, we now live in an international system comprised of three parts: the pre-modern world (for example, Somalia, Afghanistan or Liberia) where the state has lost its legitimate monopoly on the use of force and chaos reigns; the modern world where the classical state system remains intact, and; the postmodern world where the state system is collapsing and a new system is being born. These three divergent worlds have different concepts of emancipation, freedom, security, fear and insecurity. There is a need to understand the realities of these three different worlds existing on the same globe through different theoretical lenses rather than a Eurocentric hegemonic realist position. The world after cold War needs a "Subaltern Realism", in words of Mohammed Ayoob. Moreover there is a need to incorporate the experience of periphery in a discourse to redefine and rebuilding the conceptual archaeology of the world.

The primary argument of this paper is that the very notions of security and international order developed during the Cold War must be contested if they are to help us to understand the sources of today's regional conflicts and the prospects for their control. A notion of security rooted firmly within the realist tradition, and developed as an abstraction from the Eurocentric states system that emerged from the Peace of Westphalia, does not provide an adequate conceptual framework for understanding the security problematic of those states that entered the system at a later stage.

Most remarkable development of post cold war era is change in the concept of state based on the Weberian notion of legitimate monopoly of use of force. The year 1989 was a turning point in World history marked by the end of the Cold War and perhaps more fundamentally a change in the European state system. What emerged after 1989 is not a re-arrangement of the old system but an entirely new system based on a new form of statehood, which Cooper calls the postmodern state (Cooper, 2000:19-20).

With the emergence of the postmodern state, we now live in an international system comprised of three parts: the pre-modern world (for example, Somalia,

Afghanistan or Liberia) where the state has lost its legitimate monopoly on the use of force and chaos reigns; the modern world where the classical state system remains intact, and; the postmodern world where the state system is collapsing and a new system is being born. World is further divided on North/South lines. Further more it is divided on gendered categories. These divergent, intersecting worlds have different concepts of emancipation, freedom, security, fear and insecurity. Dialects are going on between Freedom from Wants and Freedom from Fear from those who still live in pre-modern world. There is a need to understand the security needs and fears of these different worlds existing on the same globe through different theoretical lenses rather than a Eurocentric hegemonic realist position.

Postmodernist rejects the 'preposterous certainty' of Realism (George, 1994). The reason is that Realism purports to provide a universal view of how the world is organized and what states have to do if they wish to survive. Postmodernist consider Realism a power discourse and statist ideology that is a main obstacle in efforts to establish a new and more peaceful hegemonic discourse based on the consent of different normative epistemic communities (*Ibid*).

In Social Constructivist view, the fundamental structure of International politics are socially constructed and changing the way we think about International Relations can help to bring about greater International security (Wendt, 1999).

Booth and Wynne Jones, argue that security can best be assured through 'human emancipation', defined in terms of freeing people as individual and groups, from the social, physical, economic, political and other constraints that stop them from carrying out what they freely choose to do. This focus on progress is designed to provide 'a theory of progress', 'a politics of hope' and a guide to 'a politics of resistance' (Booth, 1999).

Feminist writer argue that if gender is brought more explicitly into the study of security, not only new issues and alternative perspective be added to security agenda but the result will be fundamentally different view of international security. According to Jill Steans, 'Rethinking security, involves thinking about militarism and patriarchy, mal-development and environmental degradation. It involves thinking about the relationship between poverty, debt and population growth. It involves thinking about resources and how they are distributed (Steans, 1998, Smith, 2000).

The world after cold War needs a "Subaltern Realism", in words of Mohammed Ayoob (Ayoob, 1997). Moreover there is a need to incorporate the experience of periphery in a discourse to redefine and rebuilding the conceptual archaeology of the world. The dominant Realist Paradigm is flawed because

1. Its focus on the interstate level as the point of origin of security threats.
2. Its exclusion of non military phenomena from the security studies agenda.
3. Its belief in the global balance of power as the legitimate and effective Instrument of international order (Achariya, 1997).

The primary argument of this paper is that the very notions of security and international order developed during the Cold War must be contested if they are to

help us understand the sources of today's regional conflicts and the prospects for their control. A notion of security rooted firmly within the realist tradition, and developed as an abstraction from the Eurocentric states system that emerged from the Peace of Westphalia, does not provide an adequate conceptual framework for understanding the security problematic of the postcolonial states that entered the system at a later stage. While it is fashionable to view the contemporary international system, despite being geographically and culturally more varied, as an extension of the original Westphalian model, the experience of the latecomers constitutes a different set of realities that challenge the fundamental assumptions of realism.

"SECURITY", as discussed in the context of international relations, concerns the security of nations, seeking 'survival' in an anarchic environment. The State-system is characterized by this emphasis on the security of the State as the primary and paramount actor in international politics. Realism believes that one state's quest for security becomes a source of insecurity for another state while history reveals a contradictory fact that internal rather than external threats to state security are the essential features of Westphalian system planted and penetrated in Postcolonial world by European colonial Powers. The term 'State' as it is used in Westphalian context is inappropriate as these decolonized states were formed containing substantial linguistic, cultural or ethnic minorities with few ties to the state. The concept of national security is of limited utility in this context. Udo Steinbach points out that "the concept of 'nation,' introduced by colonial powers or by small elites who saw in it the prerequisite for the fulfillment of their own political aspirations, materialized in a way which went against territorial, ethnic, religious, geographical or culturo-historical traditions" (Steinbach, 1981). As a result, to quote Mohammed Ayoob, most Third World states lacked a "capacity to ensure the habitual identification of their inhabitants with the post-colonial structures that have emerged within colonially-dictated boundaries" (Ayoob, 1995: 9-10, 21). The most common outcome of this was conflicts about national identity, including separatist insurgencies whose peak was recorded in the 1960s.

The security dilemma for the postcolonial state constitute following factors.

- Intra-state strife tends to loom larger than inter-state threats.
- Political security is generally low because of 'weak states': with fragile support in the population, questionable legitimacy, little or no democratic traditions. Such weak states may even collapse completely, i.e. be reduced to 'virtual' or 'failed' states.
- Regime security is often sought by means of large military expenditures, mostly for internal purposes.
- The level of militarization tends to place great strains on the civilian sector of the economy, hence to jeopardize development.
- Economic underdevelopment causes or exacerbates communal conflicts.

This illustrates the basic fact that the State is not always a tightly homogenized entity, but is composed of groups with diverse and often conflicting

interests. Most Third World societies exhibited a lack of consensus on the basic rules of political accommodation, power sharing, and governance. Regime creation and regime maintenance was often a product of violent societal struggles, governed by no stable constitutional framework. The narrow base of Third World regimes and the various challenges to their survival affected the way in which national security policy was articulated and pursued. Thus, an examination of the concepts of "security" and "threat" should begin by raising two basic questions: Whose security, and security of what? Or, threat to whom and to what? Hence there is a need for an examination of actors and values. R.B. J. Walker finds "The state itself, far from being the provider of security as in the conventional view, has in many ways been a primary source of insecurity...it is difficult to see how any useful concept of security can ignore the participation of states in 'disappearances' and abuse of human rights in so many societies" (Walker, 1993:11). States traditionally does three main functions to complete their statehood namely War, Policing and Taxation.

The expansion and consolidation of the territorial and demographic domain under a political authority, including the imposition of order on contested territorial and demographic space (war);

The maintenance of order in the territory where, and over the population on whom, such order has already been imposed (policing);

The extraction of resources from the territory and the population under the control of the state essential to support not only the war making and policing activities undertaken by the state but also the maintenance of apparatuses of state necessary to carry on routine administration, deepen the state's penetration of society, and serve symbolic purposes [taxation] (Ayoob, 1995: 22-23).

In post cold war environment it is the tale of two worlds; Core and Periphery. In the core, economic interdependence, political democracy, and nuclear weapons lessen the security dilemma, while in the periphery that is in the early stages of state making due to late entry in the system and lack of evolutionary process of state making due to colonization. Roots of third world security problem arise due to lack of unconditional legitimacy for state boundaries, state institutions, and regimes; inadequate societal cohesion; and the absence of societal consensus on fundamental issues of social, economic, and political organization. These problems typically arise during the early stages of state building, when state makers attempt to impose order, monopolize instruments of violence, and demand the exclusive loyalties of their populations (*Ibid*). It was the lack of effective statehood, or "empirical statehood," in Robert Jackson's words, that was responsible for the emergence of "quasi-states" in the Third World. This situation has led Myron Weiner to conclude, "Hegemonic rather than accommodative ethnic politics characterize the new states. In country after country, a single ethnic group has taken control over the state and used its powers to exercise control over others. In retrospect, there has been far less 'nation-building' than many analysts had expected or hoped, for the process of state-building has rendered many ethnic

groups devoid of power and influence" (Weiner, 1987: 35-36). As a result of the gross inequalities in the sharing of political and economic power within most multiethnic states -- inequalities that are frequently perpetuated by deliberate state policy--ethnicity invariably becomes politicized, which frequently poses serious threats to the security of Third World states (Brown, 1988: 51-77). The issue of ethno national self-determination is connected to the failed states phenomenon.

Pakistan is the most important case study of the internal security dilemma because of country's inability to transform the state apparatus (hard ware) into effective soft ware of unconditional legitimacy and effective, participatory responsive institutions accommodating the demands of different ethnic groups.

At the dawn of new century the one word that was most audible in Pakistan was 'crisis' and not just one crisis, but a large number of crisis and fault lines in Pakistan's society, polity and economy naming a few : Crisis in economy, crisis of governance, of the judiciary, of participatory democracy, peaceful transfer of power and so on. The quasi state of Pakistan is now coming near to be rated in the category of failed states because there is a symbiotic relation between fascism and separatism (Ahmed, 2006:142).

Over the years Pakistan has developed rather overdeveloped only one institution, Military. From Partners of other overdeveloped state institution Bureaucracy till the decade of 70 it has become hegemonic at the dawn of new millennium.

Pakistan became the first victim of ethnic separatism because of this non representative fascist alliance. To give one past example of the fluid nature of ethnicity, in 1946 and 1947, during the last days of the British Raj in India, the Bengali Muslims defined their ethnic identity in ethno religious terms as Muslims rather than in ethno linguistic terms as Bengalis, even though Muslim Bengalis formed a clear majority in the British Indian province of Bengal. East Bengal, the predominantly Muslim part of Bengal, therefore, opted to become apart of the geographically divided state of Pakistan. Soon there after, the Muslim Bengalis became disenchanted with the predominantly Muslim state of Pakistan and began to stress their Bengali identity compared to the identity of the numerically inferior but politically predominant West Pakistanis, especially the Punjabis. This process culminated in 1971 with the separation of East Pakistan from West Pakistan and the transformation of the former into the sovereign state of Bangladesh (literally, the land of the Bengalis). In short, most East Bengalis defined their ethnic identity in 1971 in terms radically different from those they had used twenty-five years earlier because the political context had changed dramatically during the intervening period (Ayoob, 1995:172).

Overdeveloped state institutions: Military and Bureaucracy with colonial roots ruled the country after independence. After independence there was no Post colonial discourse between diverse ethnic groups of Pakistan. Pakistan military is not merely protector of Pakistan geographic borders. With the passage of time with further advance in political sphere, it claimed itself to be the protector

Pakistan's State, Nation, Domestic and Political arrangements as well. Along with this it became the sole guardian of Pakistan's ideological frontiers, defining what was permissible under its own interpretation of what Pakistan meant.

At the turn of the new millennium, democracy has emerged as a new norm and military dictatorships and authoritarian governments, had for the most part, been swept aside by the global wave of democratization. Pakistan is one of those very few countries which is still ruled by its own military and where democracy, in any meaningful and workable notion and sense of term, does not exist (Zaidi, 2006: 499). The question arises here that Is Military's role in politics and governance a natural extension of its organizational capacity and result of weakness of country's political leadership? Or Did Military deliberately acquire its multiple roles and weakened the state and its political institutions for its own interests?

Since Military has been in governance for many decades, it has also been a key player in the management of economy. As Ayesha Siddiqi argues: "The Pakistan Military as a major stakeholder in the economy has gradually moved from the traditional paradigm of claiming [the] state's resources from the traditional budget to a situation where it has built stakes in all segments of the economy such as agriculture, service and manufacturing industries" (Siddiqi, 2004 ).

The Third World states operate in an International Economic order that favors the powerful who are both rule makers and rule enforcers (Tickner, 1995:175-97). Denying the 'Human Security' of their respective citizens in non military terms of basic human needs, access to clean water, environmental and energy security, freedom from economic exploitation, protection from arbitrary violence by state institutions or a dominant ethnic group, security for these states of 'South' become a synonym with the preservation of International order

During Cold War years, The Third World's collective attitude toward superpower rivalry has important implications for realist international theory. A structural realist understanding of International Relations (as developed by Kenneth Waltz) would credit the Cold War and bipolarity for ensuring a stable international order. But this perspective was misleading insofar as the Third World was concerned. The Cold War order, instead of dampening conflicts in the Third World, actually contributed to their escalation. Although rarely a direct cause of Third World conflicts, the Cold War opportunism and influence seeking of superpowers contributed significantly to the ultimate severity of many cases of incipient and latent strife in the Third World. It led to the internationalization of civil wars and the internalization of superpower competition (Achariya: *op.cit*). It also contributed to the prolongation of regional wars by preventing decisive results in at least some theaters, including the major regional conflicts of the 1970s and 1980s—in Central America, Angola, the Horn of Africa, Cambodia, Afghanistan, and the Iran—Iraq War.

On the other hand militaries of third world countries motivated to enhance their organizational capacities and increase their arms piles (Both Conventional

and unconventional) tended towards the old colonial masters who thrusted to boost their respective War economies. Aysha Jalal views military political influence in Pakistan as a corollary of its alignment with foreign powers that are above mentioned as rule enforcer and rule makers of the game. The two States UK and US were drawn towards Pakistan Army because of their larger strategic objectives. The alignment was mutually beneficial because military wanted to outmaneuver its domestic competitors (Jalal cited in Siddiqa, 2007: 64). With a single dominant ethnic group in its composition and motivated to internally colonize the country no effort was made in the process of state making to assimilate different ethnic groups of the country.

The consequences of Cold War Years policy include alienation converted into active hatred among different ethnic groups; Sectarianism financed by Saudi as well Iranian (Two previous US allies); Economic instability leading towards unquestioned Structural Adjustment dictated by IMF. Huge amount of aid were paid back to war economies of donor countries to counter the external threat or constructed fear of India.

Fighting as frontline troop of Cold War Pakistan strategically justified its military activism as a means to attain strategic depth against India. Morally it took the cover of ideology of Jihad to fight Godless Communism.

In Pakistan the military has been central in nourishing the religious right. The military in fact built various militant organizations to serve its national cum international security commitments. The greatest beneficiary of the process is religious right, which seems to capture the imagination of common people, (who in absence of political forces responsible for political awareness of masses) are unable to comprehend the realities of post cold war world.

The end of Cold War resulted in what Barry Buzan called scenario one of uni polarized multi polarity; "multi polar in the sense that several independent great powers are in play, but uni polarized in the sense that there is a single dominant coalition governing international relations" (Buzan, 1991: 437). This situation seeks to "preserve unipolarity by persuading Japan and Germany that they are better off remaining within the orbit of an American-led security and economic system than they would be if they became great powers. The strategy of preponderance assumes that rather than balancing against the United States, other states will bandwagon with it." John Goldgeier and Michael McFaul have predicted, if not advocated, the emergence of a "great power society" in the post-Cold War world, because "rather than balancing, core states are seeking to bandwagon, not around a power pole but around a shared set of liberal beliefs, institutions, and practices" (Holsti, 1992: 38).

Post Cold War environment is a sequel of Cold War policies of Domination. The situation is viewed as Cold War II by some analysts. Replacing the communists new rival of Core is Islamic fundamentalists, American branded Jihadis. North South divide has taken the place of East West Divide. The question arises here that will this new Cold War be fought on the same old Realist rules of

power politics where the two dominant powers did not come to direct confrontation except in few cases? Will it become Selective Security for the states of North and new norm of Humanitarian intervention challenging the Realist rule of non intervention in actors internal matters take the form of powerful correcting the weak?

## **Conclusion**

Mohammed Ayoob relates Security to Vulnerability and threats, mentioning that there exists a continuum of vulnerability and problem becomes vulnerabilities when they threaten to have political outcomes that affect the survivability of states (Ayoob, 1995).

Various security threats in third world tend to exacerbate each other, locking the country in question into vicious circles of vulnerabilities.

- An emphasis on military security places great strains on the economy hence tends to undermine economic security.
- Economic problems tend to cause political instability as well as to contribute to a neglect of urgent environmental protection measures.
- Political instability tends to spur a search for 'scapegoats', more often than not in the form of external foes, hence may lead to further militarization. Pakistan after 9/11 has become vulnerable to multiple threats that are both the outcome of its Cold War Strategy and the new realities borne out of situation of Unipolar Multi polarity. At this crucial moment 'Trust' instead of military might be able to save Pakistan.

As there is a need of discourse between Different epistemic communities of the world there is also a need for a postcolonial dialogue between the diverse states of third world having same characteristics so that they will be able to survive domination in this Cold War II situation. The only way to save Pakistan is a Post Colonial Discourse between different ethnic groups.

## **References**

- Acharya, A. (1997). *The Periphery as the Core: The Third World and Security Studies*. In Keith Krause & Michael C. Williams, *Critical Security Studies Concepts and Cases*. London: UCL Press.
- Ahmad, E. (2006). *The Selected Writings of Eqbal Ahmad*. Karachi: Oxford University Press.
- Asley, R. K. (1984). Political Realism and Human Interests. *International Organization*, 38(2), 225-86.
- Ayoob, M. (1995). *The Third World Security Predicament, State Making, Regional Conflict and the International System*. London: Boulder Lynne Rienner Publisher.
- Ayoob, M. (1997). Defining Security: A Subaltern Realist Perspective. In Keith Krause & Michael C. Williams, *Critical Security Studies Concepts and Cases*. London: UCL Press.



- Booth, K. (1999). Three Tyrannies. In T. Dunne and N. J. Wheeler (Eds.), *Human Rights in Global Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Brown, D. (Spring 1988). From Peripheral Communities to Ethnic Nations: Separatism. In *Southeast Asia Pacific Affairs*, 61 (1), 51-77.
- Buzan, Barry, (1983). People, States & Fear; The National Security Problem. In *International Relations*. Sussex: The Harvester Press.
- Buzan, Barry. (1991). New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty First Century. *International Affairs*, 67 (3), July, p. 437.
- Cooper, R. (2000). *The Postmodern State and the World Order*. London, Demos: The Foreign Policy Centre.
- George, J. (1994). *Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical (Re) Introduction to International Relations*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
- Holsti, K. J. (1992). International Theory and War in the Third World. In Brian L. Job (Ed.), *The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of Third World States*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Siddiq, A. (2007). *Military Inc. Inside Pakistan's Military Economy*. Karachi: Oxford University Press.
- Smith, S. (2000). Wendt's World. *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 26 (1): 151-63.
- Steans, J. (1998). *Gender an International Relations: An Introduction*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Tickner, J. A. (1995). Re-Visioning Security. In Ken Booth and Steve Smith (Eds.) *International Relations Theory Today*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
- Walker, R. B. J. (1993). *Inside/Outside: International Relations as a Political Theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Weiner, M. (1987). Political Change: Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. In Weiner, M. and Samuel P. Huntington (Eds.), *Understanding Political Development*. Boston: Little Brown.
- Wendt, A. (1999). *Social Theory of International Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Zaidi, A. S. (2006). *Issues in Pakistan's Economy*. Karachi: Oxford University Press.

## **Biographical Notes**

**Prof. Dr. Syed Khawaja Alqama** is Chairperson Department of Political Science and Dean Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences at Bahauddin Zakriya University, Multan.

**Dr. Shahnaz Tariq** is an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science & International Relations at Bahauddin Zakriya University, Multan.

## **Pak-Afghan Relations Post 9/11: Prospects & Opportunities**

**Muhammad Saleem Mazhar**

*Centre for South Asian Studies, Lahore*

**Naheed S. Goraya**

*Centre for South Asian Studies, Lahore*

### **ABSTRACT**

Although Afghanistan shares a common religion, race, history, ethnicity and geography with Pakistan, yet the relations between both have never been smooth and remained estranged. The nature of Pak-Afghan relations saw many ups and downs in past decades and has always been flimsy and they are found in murky waters. Since Pakistan's independence, there have been concerns and determination to have jovial and friendly relations between both the countries. The relationships between the two neighbors can be described as challenging and complex. The detriments that mainly manipulate these relationships have been questionable and experienced ebb and flow for historical and geopolitical reasons with the exception of brief interludes. This distrust at times bordering on hostility continues to date although some has been done to improve the working relationship by third parties i.e., US and EU. In the changed regional context of post 9/11 developments carry hallmark significance in the world history as it has brought both the countries at the brink of major national disasters. The post 9/11 scenario provided an opportunity to Pakistan to renew its diplomatic ties and political relations with Afghanistan and to reconsider her Afghan policy.

This paper aims at discussing the core problems and highlights the future prospects of Pak-Afghan relations in post 9/11 scenario, as it brought a drastic change in world in generally and in this region particularly. It is a turning point in history when Taliban government was ousted as a result of American military action in Afghanistan. The study will explore and reveal its overall impact on both the countries with the existing diplomatic relations, areas of hostility and economic relations with making suitable recommendations for strengthening political stability in the region.

### **Introduction**

The history of the tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan goes back to the early nineteenth century, when Mr. Macnaughton, a British official was able to get the Lahore Agreement signed in July 1938 between the Sikh Government (Lahore Darbar) and an exiled Afghan Prince, Shah Shuja, and it was countersigned by the British-Indian rulers (Wakman, 1985: 33-34). Through this agreement, the Sikh Ruler got rights in those areas which are at present a part of Pakistan and are claimed by Afghanistan after partition of India in 1947. This claim was defended by the historical fact that Afghanistan, at one time in history ruled over this area.

## South Asian Studies 23 (2)

This demand was prompted by the Afghan desire to gain access to the Arabian Sea. The leadership in Afghanistan wanted to annex this area but was not in position to implement in practice. Since then issue of Pakhtunistan has remained major factor for tension between the two countries. Despite facing the thorny situations, there have been certain times when the relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan have been genial. The Pak-Afghan relations can be better assessed and reviewed in the following four phases of history.

### 1. 1947-1978

It was the period when Pak-Afghan Border remained the main issue. Ever since the emergence of Pakistan in 1947, Afghanistan's relations with Pakistan saw many ups and downs. As an independent State, Pakistan applied for the membership of United Nations<sup>1</sup> (UN); it was Afghanistan, which opposed Pakistan's membership.

- In 1948, these relations have been tensed and rifts led to the closure of Pakistan Afghanistan Border.
- In 1951, Pakistani Prime Minister Liaqat Ali Khan was killed by an Afghan national.
- Muhammad Daoud (A great supporter of Pakhtunistan) came to power as prime minister in 1953 and remained in office until 1963.
- Pakistan joined American military pacts, South East Asian Treaty Organization<sup>2</sup> (SEATO) and Central Treaty Organization<sup>3</sup> (CENTO) in 1954 and 1955.
- In March 1963, Daoud resigned due to introduction of new constitution which barred immediate members of King Zahir's family from participation in the government (Emadi, 1997:10) and the relations between both the countries became a little normal as Kabul's focus on Pakhtunistan issue was reduced.
- During the Indo-Pak War of 1965, Afghanistan sided with Pakistan.
- In 1968, King Zahir Shah visited Pakistan.
- On April 1, 1970, abolition of One Unit took place and that reinforced the growing enmity between Afghanistan and Pakistan.
- In 1971, war between Pakistan and India, Afghanistan remained neutral.
- In 1973, Daoud returned to power that was considered a pessimistic development as he had been a great supporter of Pakhtunistan. He took decision to activate the Afghan military for war games in Nangarhar province<sup>4</sup> near Pakistani border in the winter of 1974-75. This action coincided with the outbreak of armed insurgencies in Baluchistan and NWFP (Journal of Strategic Studies, 2002).
- In early 70's, an insurgency started in Balochistan. Pakistan initiated the military campaigns. During one such campaign, between May 1973 and

October 1974, Pakistan accused the Kabul government for its involvement (O'balance, 2002: 81). About 5,000 Afghans were trained in secret military camps during 1973-75 (Weinbaum, 1994: 5). Due to communist nature of the Daoud administration, the relations between the two countries have been ruthless. It was the time when Afghan coup had taken place. It was the time when economic pressure was built on Afghanistan and thus Daoud made efforts for reconciliation.

- In June 1976, the then Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto paid an official visit to Afghanistan after two months, Daoud also visited Pakistan. These visits helped to diffuse tensions between two countries over the issue of Pakhtunistan.
- In 1977, when Prime Minister Bhutto released Abdul Ghaffar Khan, the relations got a bit better shape.

## **2. 1978-1988**

During this period, threats emanating from the Soviet invasion complicated the security situation on Pakistan's border. This attack changed geo-political situation of the region and Pakistan became frontline state and fought this war with American aid without its direct involvement. Pakistan opened its borders in the spirit of Islamic brotherhood to help the Afghan in distress. Pakistan also provided shelter to 3.2 million refugees. In return, Pakistan suffered with Klashinkov, drug and crime culture in its society generated time when Pakistan's alliance with Taliban formed the most powerful external influence in Afghanistan. As a result, *Tehrik-e-Taliban* (The Taliban Movement) in Pakistan was created.

December 1979 was the period when Russian invasion took place in Afghanistan. It was considered as the geo-strategic threat not only to Pakistan but to the Persian Gulf also. This entire situation enhanced American interest in the region. Resultantly, Pakistan became a key player of this new drift. The Carter Administration offered \$ 400 million aid to Pakistan but president Zia rejected this offer as peanut. The reason was its small size by it satirically hinted to the business of Carter family in peanut. Pakistan also demanded security for its borders in the case of Soviet invasion. In 1981, President Clinton took power with his tough anti-communist stance. President persuaded Congress to authorize \$ 3.2 billion for a five-year military aid program for Pakistan (Kux, 1996: 18).

It was the period when Afghan Jihad remained dominant. The Central Intelligence Agency<sup>5</sup> (CIA) kept providing assistance to anti-Soviet forces through Pakistani secret services, in a programme, called Operation Cyclone.<sup>6</sup> Many Muslims from other countries volunteered to assist various Mujahideen groups in Afghanistan. In Northern Afghanistan, hundreds of Afghan mujahideen were involved in cross-border political armed operation. This was the prime time when Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence<sup>7</sup> (ISI) was involved in supporting these

Mujahideens. Another major reason for Pakistan's interest in Afghanistan was its 'strategic depth' against India and the neighbouring Central Asian States.<sup>8</sup> Thus Pakistan tried to increase its political influence in Afghanistan.

### **3. Soviet Withdrawal**

The UN made considerable efforts for peace and settlement in Afghanistan under the Geneva Accords of April 1988. The departure of the Soviet troops officially took place on May 15, 1988, when the last Russian soldier crossed Oxus River<sup>9</sup>. Pakistan achieved a major geo-political victory. America provided massive aid both economically and militarily to Mujahideens, as it was the top agenda in the American policy of national security. After Soviet withdrawal, the global situation changed not only in Afghanistan but also in Eastern Europe as Brezhnev Doctrine<sup>10</sup> was expired and the Cold War was over. American objective in Afghanistan was to weaken the Soviet Union and for that very purpose it supported the resistance through Pakistan. The end of the Cold War provided new incentives and opportunities to the international community to work for collective peace, security and economic development in general and the war-torn Afghanistan in particular. But Afghanistan became a mixture of different factions in its society. In the absence of a common threat, these groups turned against one another. It was the time when Zia-ul-Haq died and CIA reduced its interest in Afghanistan. The late Benazir Bhutto, the then Prime Minister of Pakistan was not in favor of giving free hand to ISI without US support but military wanted to have control over Afghanistan.

### **4. Post Withdrawal Era: Afghan Civil War**

When Russia was disintegrated, the Central Asia emerged as a greater economic market not only for Pakistan but also for Europe and America. Thus it helped in shifting Pakistan's strategy towards Afghanistan and regional progress. During the Cold War period, Pakistan had been focusing on the issues like Pakhtunistan and transit trade but the end of Cold War reduced tension and brought a long-term ally in Afghanistan. Pakistani President Zia-ul-Haq politicized Islam during this era.

After Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the country was caught up in the post-war fighting among various factions, which were not agreed on a durable power sharing arrangement. It also dawned upon Pakistan that Pan-Islamic Doctrine was no more successful. Pakistan recognized the Central Asian Republics (CARs) without any delay for its economic interests. The need of the hour was a friendly Afghanistan. During this crisis, a new force, the Taliban made an unexpected appearance and scored considerable victory. Pakistan vehemently

supported Taliban government in Afghanistan and it helped in the creation of *Tehrik-e-Taliban* (The Taliban Movement) in Afghanistan.

## **Diplomatic Relations**

Pakistan has always been in favor of good, peaceful and friendly relations with its western neighbor so that both countries could successfully meet their challenges. A great example in this regard can be seen after the invasion of Soviet Union in 1979. Pakistan had favored Afghanistan's membership in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation<sup>11</sup> (SAARC) but it was opposed by India. Currently the factors that brought Afghanistan into SAARC are primarily, the US and Indian support behind the scene (Spotlight on Regional Affairs, 2007).

After the fall of the Taliban regime, the interim government was established in Afghanistan on December 22, 2001 under Bonn Agreement, which was signed in Germany on December 5, 2001. This government was established under President Hamid Karzai, which was facing daunting task of rebuilding a land destroyed by war, hatred and hunger. Since that time, both Pakistan and Afghanistan have been engaged in diplomatic consultations. The official visit of President Hamid Karzai in February 2002, laid the foundation of renewed bilateral relations between the two countries and President Musharraf also paid a follow-up visit. Pakistan provided aid for reconstruction and rehabilitation of Afghanistan. Pakistan deployed its 80,000 troops along Pak-Afghan border in order to counter the terrorist elements and to secure the border areas as well as maintaining peace and stability in war-torn country.

## **Economic Relations**

Pakistan has been assisting land locked Afghanistan for its trade since 1947. Current Pak-Afghan bilateral trade stands at 1 billion dollar against 3 million dollars in 2002 (Pakistan Horizon, 2006). A Joint Economic Commission (JEC) was formed between Pakistan and Afghanistan in 2002 in order to re-examine their trade ties and make plans in order to strengthen their economic collaborations. Pakistan is one of the main trading partners of Afghanistan. During the Taliban regime, a Latin American company made efforts to start exploration of oil and gas from Turkmenistan. There are still possibilities existing for the feasibility of a gas pipelines through Afghanistan to Pakistan from Uzbek and Turkmen gas fields. A railway line from Chaman to Kandhar is also under planning.

Both countries are taking various steps in trade including the revival of Transit trade Agreement, signing of an investment protection treaty, and the Memorandum of Understanding<sup>12</sup> (MOU) for the construction of highways in Afghanistan, To open the branches of banks and starting construction of railway

## **South Asian Studies 23 (2)**

lines between Chaman and Spin Bodak and between Chaman and Kahndhar are also under consideration that would boost trade.

While Pakistan on its part had decided to reduce the negative list of six items under the Transit Trade Agreement converted to million dollars into aid; set up nine additional custom stations in the bordering areas and opening of trade route in Waziristan.

### **Areas of Hostility**

Although Afghanistan is a Muslim country yet a hostile policy was pursued by it in early years of independence. A major example in this regard can be viewed by the strong opposition of Afghanistan against Pakistan's membership in the United Nations. The second major opposition was reflected in unfriendly propaganda campaign against Pakistan through media. The major reason behind all this activity was to compel Pakistan to accede the demand of 'Pakhtonistan' and that was shared by both India and the Soviet Union. Many other areas of hostility that have adverse affects on the bilateral relations of both the countries are given below:

#### **1. Border Issue**

Pak-Afghan relations today are passing through a delicate phase of history. Whatever changes are obvious, in order to comprehend those, it is at the same time essential to understand its history of hundred years. This history starts when in 1893; Afghan Ameer Abdur Rehman signed an agreement with the British government to determine the boundaries and resultantly Durand Line<sup>13</sup> was formed. This historic line is there in the same state till date. The border issue is considered to be the first irritant in Pak-Afghan relations. No Afghan government has reconciled itself to admit the reality of the 2640 km long Durand Line as the official boundary line. The future of settling this dispute seems dejected as both parties have their own stance and their claims are based on different maps of the Durand line. Pakistan uses a British map while Afghanistan uses a Russian map drawn decade ago ([www.afghan.com](http://www.afghan.com)).

#### **2. Joining of Different Camps**

In the Cold war era, the Soviet Union and America built the roads and trained military officers in their respective sphere of influence. Afghanistan was under Soviet influence but Kabul got more than \$1 billion of economic aid from both Superpowers. Thousands of military officers attended military colleges in the Soviet Union while the number of the military officers got training in America (Rubin, 1996: 71). In these years, Pakistan became an ally of US and an active

member of American security alliance. It was the years of 1952 when Soviet Union that was already 'within gate' (Ma'arouf, 1990) enhanced its influence in Afghanistan and assisted in the exploration of oil. On the other side, the United States was determined to contain the expansion of communism in the world and particularly in South Asian region. Resultantly, it started developing diplomatic relations with those countries, which had geographical links with China and Soviet Union.

- a. The United States under its new policy in 1954 started giving substantial military assistance to Pakistan.
- b. In 1955, Pakistan converted its four provinces of West Pakistan into One Unit. Afghanistan showed its resentment over it and as a reaction, Pakistani embassy in Kabul and its Consulates in Jalalabad and Kandhar were attacked. Pakistan put ban on Afghan transit trade and closed its border with Afghanistan. This entire situation created Soviet interest in the region and it proclaimed aid to Afghanistan on Pakhtunistan issue. Thus Soviet Union made an attempt to have check on the American interest in the region that was thriving through CENTO and Regional Cooperation for Development<sup>14</sup> (RCD).

### **3. Indian Factor**

Afghanistan's friendship with India also has an impact on Pakistan's equation with Afghanistan. Even today India plays a negative role (Masood, 2007). Before 9/11, India was against the Taliban government and a great supporter of Northern Alliance. In order to build new relations in post-Taliban scenario, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh paid an official visit to Afghanistan in September 2005. (Pakistan Horizon, 2006). Thus India became an effective player in the post-Taliban Afghanistan. The nationalistic terrorist wave in Balochistan is found to have links with newly opened Indian consulates in Kandhar, Mazar-i-Sharif and Jalalabad. As a result, Pakistan asked the Afghan government not to allow India to open its consulates in the neighboring province of Pakistan.

### **4. Transit Trade Issue**

There have been massive cross-border operations, which were created under the Afghan Transit Trade Agreement between Afghanistan and Pakistan (ATTA).<sup>15</sup> Both countries signed this treaty in 1965 yet it has never been implemented. The reason lying behind is that the government has been trying to control the list of items that the Afghans can put through Pakistan due to "Widespread smuggling."

Afghanistan is encircled by mountains from all sides and its boundaries are joined with Pakistan and Iran on North South side. At the same time, it is a gateway to Central Asia. It was also known as Buffer State<sup>16</sup> between British India and Soviet Union during British rule in India. Thus it becomes very essential for



## **South Asian Studies 23 (2)**

Afghanistan to maintain good relations with her neighbors to maintain its supply line. In this connection, the then Afghan Prime Minister's role can not be brushed aside who lagged a crucial role for enhancing Soviet influence due two reasons:

- a. Transit question was to be dealt as a secondary issue.
- b. It would not be resolved unless the issue of Pakhtunistan is addressed.

The most of the trade of Afghanistan is carried out with Pakistan. Perhaps this is the main reason that both the countries are bound to develop good relations and this is the guarantee of the better future of both countries.

### **5. Drug Factor**

Still there has been a main obstacle that is deterring the progress of the relations between the two countries. The drug culture in Pakistan was introduced by Afghan refugees during the Afghan resistance against Soviet Union. Today's Afghanistan has acquired the 'Dubious Distinction' of being the largest narco-state<sup>17</sup> in the world after Colombia and South America (Nuri, 2007). Due to increased involvement of Pakistan in Afghanistan, the former has been facing an economic pressure. The emergence of the Golden Crescent<sup>18</sup> as the second largest opium producer in the world has caused the formation of the internationally organized drug trafficking and crime syndicates (Nojumi, 2002: 185). A counter Narcotics working Group, comprising the US, Pakistan and Afghanistan has been established to facilitate the discussion among three parties on the Narcotics issue.

### **6. Refugees Problem**

Pakistan is still providing shelter to 2.6 million refugees despite the downfall of Taliban regime. This problem has aggravated due to economic hardships. An agreement in 2003 was signed by United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees<sup>19</sup> (UNHCR) to repatriate Afghan refugees living in Pakistan but it has not been implemented so far.

### **7. Terrorism and Cross Border Infiltration**

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 changed the situation. These events brought global change and bound many countries to counter it. This date changed the global history and put the world under a new trial. The International system was challenged, as was the post-Cold War concept of global security (Nojumi, 2002: 221).

America turned towards Pakistan because Afghanistan was its door step neighbor and had much influence on Taliban regime and leadership. Pakistan agreed to a list of demands from US that included opening air spaces, ports and military bases for launching the possible attacks. "We stood with the United States, and we stand with the entire world, in opposing terrorism. Yet we face threats from within and without" (Musharraf, 2006: 222). Pakistan backed the US

because Washington made it clear that terrorism was a threat and neutrality would not be an option. For the first time in Taliban history, they faced enemies wherever they looked. The US attacked on Afghanistan on October 7, 2001. As a result of which, Taliban as political forces were eliminated by creating a room for an Interim government. Taliban practically lost their control of the whole country.

One of the effects of 11 September, however greatly increased insecurity not only in those countries suspected of being associated with terrorism, but also in all other states situated in the region. The US redefined her policy interest after 9/11. President Bush announced his policy which showed US interest to re-engage Pakistan. In post 9/11 era, US policy interest in region was to seek Pakistan's cooperation in hunting down those responsible of attacks. After 9/11 US was actively contacting Pakistan, so that American future design and strategy could be implemented. The US State Secretary Colin Powell made a telephonic call to Musharraf to discuss the situation and dictate what to do in Afghanistan. The US Ambassador Chamberlain presented this to President Musharraf on September 13, 2001. In this situation, Musharraf promised Pakistan's full cooperation in assisting the US for combating terrorism globally because 9/11 incident placed Pakistan between the devil and the deep blue sea. Pakistan had to change its policy towards the Taliban, viewing them as a strategic liability rather than an asset and that was clearly acknowledged by President Musharraf in his television address to the nation on September 19, 2001. He said that "At this juncture, I am worried about Pakistan only" and that "I give top priority to the defense of Pakistan. Defense of any other country comes later." Islamabad had to distance itself from Taliban ruled Afghanistan and agreed to provide help to Washington in "intelligence and information exchange" and American use of Pakistan "air space" for military action against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban controlled Afghanistan. Musharraf faced significant domestic risk. The campaign in the name of Operation Enduring Freedom<sup>20</sup> (OEF) made Pakistan a front line state in US led counter terror campaign. The factor contributed to Pakistan's renewed significance was not only its shared border with Afghanistan but it was also among the few countries, which had a formal diplomatic relations with a Taliban regime. Due to this policy, President Musharraf has been frequently criticized within Pakistan for cooperation too readily and conceding too much to the United States without adequate compensation. Instead of a one-item agenda focused on the war on terrorism, Pakistan is in the position to use the current situation of improved relationship to pursue a broad series of issues with Afghanistan. The policy pursued by the government of Pakistan is in the best interest of both countries in both the short-term and long-term interests. Operation against terrorists can be more successful by means of timely informed sharing between Afghanistan and Pakistan, while respecting one another sovereignty and values. Many of the top leaders of Al-Qaeda have been captured or killed by Pakistani security or law enforcement agencies based on the information provided by the U.S. intelligence. Conversely on some occasions US forces has acted unilaterally inside Pakistani territory. These incidents, which have mostly failed to achieve their intended objectives,

## South Asian Studies 23 (2)

often produce civilian casualties and loss of property on Pakistan's part. For example, on 13 January 2006, 13 innocent people were killed by a US air or missile attack (Dawn, 2006). America wanted to remain in the region due to its ambitions in energy of Central Asian Republics and is applying its military, diplomatic and economic powers to achieve it.

### Bonn-Conference

A conference was held at Bonn on 27<sup>th</sup> November 2001 under the UN drafted framework for the transition to democracy in the war-ravaged Afghanistan. The power was transferred from Northern Alliance to the Interim Administration. The Bonn Agreement acknowledged the right of the people of Afghanistan to freely determine their own political future in accordance with the principles of Islam, democracy, pluralism and Social Justice.

In Kabul, from 13 to 16 June, 2002, the elections of delegations to the Loya Jirga were organized. King Zahir Shah had returned to the country and was offered as the nominal head of the state. But he renounced any official role and Hamid Karzai was elected as Head of the State. These developments had important implications for the future of Afghanistan.

- a. Monarchy's political rule was ended apparently.
- b. The uncompromisingly Rabbani remained no more applicable or became obsolete and this political demise signified the devastation of political Islam. The expulsion of Taliban had discarded the Islamic fundamentalism.

Having all these changes on both sides, Pakistan and Afghanistan once again became a frontline state and a key ally in the global coalition against terrorism. Pakistan strengthened its security arrangements on Pak-Afghan border. Gradually, Pakistan started penetrating its Tribal Area by Pakistani Army and Mohmand Agency was the last Tribal Area that was directly penetrated in 2003 (Rizvi, 2003). All this situation is bringing benefits to few people like:

- Those among Northern Alliance who are included in Afghan Government have got so many suspicions about Pakistan as before 9/11, Pakistan has been a supporter of Taliban.
- Tajiks and Uzbeks because greater Pakistani influence with the Afghan Government might work at the advantage of Pakhtuns.

These elements being the opportunist are demonstrating the resentment against Pakistan in Afghanistan. They are in fact pressurizing the clashes observed in the recent times in Mohmand Agency reminds the pre-1979 period of Pak-Afghan Relations. The bitter reality that makes one surprised is that the Afghan President Hamid Karzai openly blames Pakistan for all the disturbances in the region. At times, the hostility shown towards Pakistan is unprecedented. Afghan tribal leaders are also

playing their negative role and deteriorating the relations between both the countries.

The visit of Hamid Karazai to United Kingdom in November 2008 and meeting with British Prime Minister Gordon Brown seems to be a good hope for future. President Karazai has asked to invite Pakistani President Asif Zardari and former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif with the patronage of Saudi King Abdullah for the secrets ongoing talks with Taliban. These secret talks are aimed at ending violence and involving borders.

## **Prospectus and Opportunities**

It is said about Afghanistan that if you want to have peace in the world, then maintains peace in Afghanistan. From Iqbal to the contemporary historians, all admit that Afghanistan is the heart of Asia and when the heart will be in order then the whole body shall be energetic and strengthened. The events of 9/11 proved to be a turning point for both Afghanistan and Pakistan along with the globe. Pak-Afghan trade has been unabated and Pakistan has been providing the transit trade facilities to the landlocked Afghanistan through its seaports. Based on India-Pakistan experience, the need of the hour is to initiate the Confidence Building Measures<sup>21</sup> (CBMs) between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Those should be in the areas of peace, science, political, cultural issues, trade and economic matters.

While having discussed the factors of hostility, it is found that the ground reality is quite different with Taliban, now creating in reverse as 'Ideological Depth' in Pakistan (Masood, 2007). If Pakistan is not involved in the creation of Taliban, it at least helped much in strengthening them. Having analysed the contemporary situation and scenario, it is found that the contradiction between the two countries is due to the reason that Afghanistan is making allegations that Pakistan supports cross-border infiltration. Thus in this kind of scenario, both the countries are facing serious challenges to their integrity and future prospects. Pakistan's role in Afghanistan can largely be determined by stabilizing its own tribal belt, Federally Administered Tribal Area<sup>22</sup> (FATA) and improving governance in NWFP & Balochistan. But the question arises, how this vision for the region can be achieved. The answer is very simple:

1. Economic and political linkages should be developed as the geographical locations of both the countries can become the hub of economic activities in all over Asia.
2. To win the battle of hearts and minds is crucial. The vast dwindling control of tribal minds has to be restored. Pakistan must launch some aid projects like India has made, such as Road, Building, Indira Gandhi Hospital, Habiba College in Kabul and Afghan National Parliament.
3. Repatriation of 2.6 million Afghan refugees.

## South Asian Studies 23 (2)

4. The foreign funds from few Gulf countries to Afghanistan and to the tribal regions of Pakistan should be abandoned.
5. There is a dire need to watch out certain foreigner countries that are trying to fish in troubled waters. India's consulates in Eastern Afghanistan are found to be indulged in anti-Pakistan activities. But Afghanistan government claims that Indians are merely involved in reconstruction. It must have to be dealt seriously and the role of Indian consulates must be curtailed.
6. Media on both sides should play its positive role in order to minimize the distrust between the two countries.
7. Dialogue on multiple tracks must be started as like the recent Pak-Afghan peace Jirga. According to the Governor of Maiden-Wardag, Abdul Jabbar Naeemi, "Joint Peace Jirga would emerge as a milestone in the regional history as for the first people's representative from both the neighboring countries is assembled on roof whereas they discussed joint and common issues" (Daily *The Nation*, 15<sup>th</sup> August 2007).
8. China being an observer of SAARC can also play a role of mediator in overcoming the ongoing mistrust between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

## Conclusion

The study of the post 9/11 scenario pointed that Pakistan has always been in favor of having cordial relation with Afghanistan so that both countries could meet their challenges. Pakistan being a very active & significant neighbor of Afghanistan has a greater influence to maintain peace and stability in Afghanistan. During the Soviet Intervention, Pakistan provided all kinds of support to sustain the Mujahideen movements and basis for their training. After Soviet withdrawal, Pakistan succeeded in having a regime of her own choice.

There are several reasons of having Pakistan's influence on Afghanistan:

1. Geographically, Pakistan is very important for the transportation of every resource of Central Asian Republics (CARs).
2. America's political and strategic interests are observed in order to prevent Russian hegemony of expanding southward to contain Iran and a counter balance China.
3. Pushtuns of Afghanistan and Baluch live adjacent to NWFP and Balochistan provinces of Pakistan respectively. Same kind of ethnic groups are present on Pakistani side of border.
4. If a conflict occurs between India and Pakistan, friendly Afghanistan can play a vital role for the two. Thus it gives Afghanistan a strategic depth.
5. The Durand Line being porous allows the free movement of people on both sides. At the same time, NWFP Province is being claimed as their

own by Pushtuns. It signifies that cordial and congenial relations between two countries are the need of the hour to keep this problem in check.

6. Refugees must go back; otherwise it will certainly lead towards aggravating the situation of Pakistan's internal stability.

There are areas where strategies remain strategies and do not personify in the form of action. In a gesture of boosting coordination, Karazai turned down 500 scholarships for Pakistan (Pak-Afghan Relations, Attempts to improve it, <http://sanjar.blogspot.com/2007/06/pak-afghan-relation-attempt-to-improve-it.html>). The analysis shows that the future of Pak-Afghan peace process is yet a far cry. Pak-Afghan relations will pose a serious threat and create enormous problem for policy makers in a foreseeable future. It can only be hoped that vision and sagacity will guide the policies of both the countries that will definitely support their national interests and promote stability in the region because peace and stability in Afghanistan and cordial relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan are in the best interest of the Afghanistan and the whole region.

## Notes

1. It is an International Organization, found in 1945 after World War II. It was established to replace the League of Nations and to stop wars between the countries and to provide a platform for dialogue.
2. It was established on September 8, 1954 in Manila. Its member countries were Britain, America, France, Australia, Newzeland and Thailand. The purpose of the organization was to prevent communism from gaining ground in the region.
3. Its original name was Middle East Treaty Organization or METO, also known as the Baghdad Pact. It was adopted in 1955 by Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. It was dissolved in 1979.
4. It is one of the thirty-four provinces of Afghanistan. It is administratively subdivided into 21 districts. It lies in the east of the country. Its capital is the city of Jalalabad. It shares a border with Pakistan, and the two regions share very close ties, with large amounts of migration either way. Most of the province still uses Pakistani currency rather than Afghan money for commercial transactions.
5. It is a civilian intelligence of the United States goovernment. Its primary function is to collect and analyse information about foreign governments, corporations and persons in order to advise public policy makers.
6. It was the code name for the United States Central Intelligence Agency program to arm the Afghan during the Soviet war in Afghanistan (1979-1989). It was the longest and most expensive covert CIA operations ever undertaken.
7. It is the largest and most powerful Intelligence Service in Pakistan. It is one of the three main branches in Pakistan Intelligence Agencies.
8. Geographical region covering the territory of five nation-states: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. These republics were part of the Soviet Union before gaining their independence in 1991.
9. It springs up in the Pamir Mountains (Western Asia), runs West through what was once Balochistan and forms part of the border what is now Afghanistan. Its present day name is Amu Darya (Amu River). This river of the Greeks has been known to the historical record for literally thousand of years.
10. It was a Soviet foreign policy, first and most clearly outlined by S. Kovalev in a September 26, 1968. This doctrine was announced to justify the Soviet invasion of

## South Asian Studies 23 (2)

- Czechoslovakia in August 1968 to terminate the Prague Spring, along with earlier Soviet military interventions, such as the invasion of Hungary in 1956. In practice, the policy meant that limited independence of communist parties was allowed, but no country would be allowed to leave the Warsaw Pact, disturb a nation's communist party's monopoly on power, or in any way compromise the strength of the Eastern Block.
11. Its Charter was formally adopted on December 8, 1985 by the heads of Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri-Lanka. It was the brain child of late Zia-ur-Rehman, the then president of Bangladesh. It was to provide a platform for the people of South Asia to work together in a spirit of friendship, trust and understanding. It aims to accelerate the process of economic and social development in member states.
  12. It is a document, describing a bilateral or multilateral agreement between parties. It expresses a convergence of will between parties, indicating and intended common line of action.
  13. It is a boundary line between Afghanistan and Pakistan, having a length of 2,640 Km. This line is remembered with the name Sir Mortimer Durand, the Foreign Secretary of the British Indian Government. It was demarcated by the British and signed into a treaty in 1893 with the Afghan ruler Amir Abdur Rehman Khan. The treaty was to stay into force for a 100-year period.
  14. The first transit trade agreement was signed between Pakistan and Afghanistan in 1965 under which both countries agreed to grant each other the freedom of transit to and from their territories. Under the ATTA, five routes were identified including those of Peshawar-Torkhum and vice versa, Chaman-Spin Boldak and vice versa, Ghulam Khan Kelli, Port Qasim and Karachi Port.
  15. It was a multi-governmental organization which was originally established in 1962 by Iran, Pakistan and Turkey to allow socio-economic development of the member states. In 1979, this was replaced by Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) in 1985.
  16. A buffer state is a country lying between two rivals or potentially hostile greater powers which by its sheer existence is thought to prevent conflict between them. Buffer states when authentically independent typically pursue a neutralist foreign policy which distinguishes them from satellite states.
  17. An area that has been taken over and is controlled and corrupted by drug cartels and where law and enforcement is effectively non-existent.
  18. It is the name given to one of Asia's two principal areas of illicit opium production, located at the cross roads of Central, South and Western Asia. This space overlaps three nations, Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan whose mountainous peripheries define the crescent.
  19. It was established on December 14, 1950. It is a United Nations Agency mandated to protect and support the refugees at the request of a government or the United Nations itself and assist in their voluntary repatriation, local integration or resettlement to a third country.
  20. It is the official name used by the US Government for its contribution to the war in Afghanistan, together with three smaller military actions, under the umbrella of its Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). It was originally called, Operation Infinite Justice.
  21. These are agreements between two or more parties regarding exchanges of information and verification, typically with respect to the use of military forces and armaments. They aim to lessen anxiety and suspicion by making the parties' behavior more predictable.
  22. The Federally Administered Tribal Areas in Pakistan are the areas, outside the four provinces bordering Afghanistan, comprising a region some 27, 220 km<sup>2</sup> (10, 507 Sq. miles)

## References

- Edgar, O'balance. (1993). *Afghan Wars-Battles in a Hostile Land (1839 to the Present)*. UK: Brassey.
- Emadi, H. (1997). *State, Revolution and Superpowers in Afghanistan*. Karachi: Royal Books.
- Interview of Governor of Maiden-Wardag, Abdul Jabbar Naeemi. (2007, August 15). *The Nation*.
- Journal of Strategic Studies*. (2002). xxii, winter No. 4. The Institute of Strategic Studies.
- Kux, Dennis. (2000). *The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies*. Baltimore: John Hopkins.
- Ma'arroof, M. K. (1990). *Afghanistan and Superpowers*. New Delhi: Common Wealth Publishers.
- Masood, T. (2007, August 21). Building Bridges with Afghanistan. *Dawn*.
- Musharraf, P. (2006). *In the line of fire-A Memoir*. UK: Simon & Schuster limited.
- Nojumi, N. (2002). *The Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan: Mass Mobilization, Civil War and The Future of the Region*. New York: Palgrave
- Nuri, M. H. (2007, August 18). Pak-Afghan Relations: Way Out of Impasse. *Dawn*.
- Pakistan Horizon*. (2006, January). The Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, 59 (1).
- Rizvi, H. A. (2003, November 8). Strained Pak-Afghan Relationship. *Daily Times*.
- Rubin, B. R. (1996). *Fragmentation of Afghanistan*. Lahore: Vanguard Books.
- Saddique, S. (2008, January 20). Pak-Afghan Ta'l'lukat Behri ke Taraf Gamzan. *Jang Sunday Magazine*.
- Spotlight on Regional Affairs*. (2007, July). Vol. xxvi No. 7.
- Wakman, M. Amin. (1985). *Afghanistan at the Cross Roads*. New Delhi: ABC Publishing House.
- Weinbaum, Marvin. (1994). *Pakistan and Afghanistan: Resistance and Reconstruction*. Lahore: Pak Book Corporation.

## Biographical Notes

**Prof. Dr. Muhammad Saleem Mazhar** is Dean Faculty of Oriental Learning and Director Centre for South Asian Studies at the University of the Punjab, Lahore.

**Naheed S. Goraya** is a Senior Research Fellow and a Ph.D candidate in the Centre for South Asian Studies at the University of the Punjab, Lahore.



## The Kargil Conflict: Comparing Indian and Pakistani Newspapers' Editorial Treatment

Muhammad Rashid Khan

*University of The Punjab, Lahore*

### ABSTRACT

This study analyzes Indian and Pakistani newspapers' editorial treatment of the Kargil conflict. A content analysis of *The Hindustan Times* and the *Dawn* during the year 1999 recognizes that the editorial policy adopted by both the newspapers was a representation of their nationalist press of the time as a whole. The press remained a vocal advocate of the policymakers of their respective countries on the Kargil conflict. The print media by its manner of reporting events and issues kept its bias alive and heightened the hostilities among the two states. Moreover, the ethics of press and its role in sensitive issues have raised questions about objective coverage.

KEY WORDS: India; Pakistan; Kargil conflict; newspaper editorials; treatment

### Introduction

In the words of S. V. Sista and Jagdish Rattanani (2006: xiii): 'Treating news media offerings like soap does not enhance their value...is our [Indian] media as it stands now really exercising its role and responsibility to society, people and the country? Jeffrey D. Sachs adds: '...our safety, our security and our very humanity depend on taking seriously the lives and fates of others. The question is whether we are getting any thing like this discourse through the media' (Sachs in Mathur, 2006: xiv).

Manoj Joshi (2006:146) points out that the simple rule-of-thumb for the media in times of open war is to shed the even-handed and often oppositionist posture it has in times of peace, and become 'patriotic'. 'War is a situation when national feelings are heightened, and most newspapers will not buck this trend, for crassly commercial reasons if nothing else'. Joshi further comments: 'security of information is a vital concern of governments, as indeed is their desire to use psychological warfare and information management to further their own war aims, as well as to hide failure under the garb of national security' (p.147).

This paper attempts to explore media's treatment of the Kargil conflict between India and Pakistan and takes a good hard look at the use of the media as an instrument of warfare by its tailored presentation and to manufacture consent.

Pakistan-India relations hold key to peace and stability in South Asia with implications on the international scenario. This relationship also constitutes an important aspect of foreign policies of India and Pakistan particularly. The study analyses as to what kind of relationship exists, if any, between foreign policies and the policies of the newspapers of India and Pakistan. It also assesses as to how Indian and Pakistani press present images of each other's countries. K. Subrahmanyam (2006: 98) opines: 'It is a matter of common agreement that in India the media was not encouraged to adequately cover the area of defense in times of both peace and war. This is partly due to the generalist nature of our military and civilian bureaucracy and partly to our media apathy.' The Kargil war established extensive media deliberations with scores of reporters filing daily reports through visuals and words. However, the ethics of press and its role in sensitive issues have raised questions about objective coverage. Do we have different standards for judging our enemies and ourselves? (Sharma, 2000: 177).

## **The Backdrop**

The relationship between India and Pakistan assumed tremendous importance towards the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. The most serious issue that drew the attention of the whole world towards this region was the Kargil conflict.

Shireen Mazari (2003:15) recognized Kargil as 'The first publicized limited military exchange between Pakistan and India after the nuclearisation of South Asia.' M. Siddique-ul-Farooque<sup>1</sup> (2006:22) pointed out: 'scarcely had the ink of the Lahore Declaration (signed between Muhammad Nawaz Sharif and the then Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee on 21<sup>st</sup> February 1999) dried off when Pervez Musharraf launched the Kargil operation on May 8, 1999. Farooque believes that the Indian leadership knew about the plan long before it was put into practice and had made all necessary preparation to trap Pakistan and the Kashmiri *mujahideen* and extract maximum political, diplomatic and economic benefits (p.15). He opines that 'When India occupied Siachen during the rule of the late president and chief of army staff General Ziaul Haq, he had made a planning to occupy Kargil to avenge the Siachen loss' (p. 21).

Sharma et al. (2000: 54) state that the Pakistani Army had planned the invasion of the Kargil-Drass<sup>2</sup> region 14 years ago to cut off India's road connection to Siachen, according to the weekly *Takbeer*, brought out by Jammāt-i-Islami.' They extend their comments saying that:

'The brain behind this strategy was Brigadier Azizuddin, who was given charge of the Pakistan brigade in PoK (Pakistan occupied Kashmir) in 1985, the year India and Pakistan held talks on a no war pact proposed by Pakistan and a treaty of peace and friendship proposed by India. In its latest issue, the weekly says that the brigadier conceived the invasion plan after

an intensive tour and study of the topography of PoK but was called back to Rawalpindi before he could implement it.'

Former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto disclosed that President Pervez Musharraf had brought the Kargil plan to her when she was prime minister and he (Musharraf) was Director General of Military Operation. 'Kargil was an absolute disaster,' Benazir said in an interview with the Third Eye Television (Farooque, 2006: 21).

'I [Benazir Bhutto] asked Gen Musharraf what would happen after execution of his plan. He said he would hoist the flag of Pakistan atop the Srinagar Assembly. 'I vetoed the plan because I knew we would have to surrender the territory when it would come to the international community and that's exactly what happened. 'So, I wish he had listened to me and not got lost in the brilliance of the military strategy,' she said (Farooque, 2006: 22).

Farooque (2006: 30) argues that with the opening of the Kargil front, bitter facts began to unfold through national and international media and the knowledgeable sources of the country, raising two serious questions: 'Had the generals sought the permission of the chief executive? Why Pakistan opened this front after the signing of Lahore Declaration?

According to Bruce Reidel<sup>4</sup>: 'Pakistan denied its troops were involved, claiming that only Kashmiri militants were doing the fighting - a claim not taken seriously anywhere.' According to Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, 'General Musharraf told me that Mujahideen were fighting in Kargil but it was not true (cited in Farooque, 2006: 30).'

Ch. Nisar Ali Khan (then federal minister) argued that if Nawaz had been aware of the Kargil adventure, he was not so foolish to invite Indian Prime Minister to Lahore (p. 39). Ishaq Dar (then Finance Minister) demanded a judicial commission should be set up where he would give all the inside information and details that would shock the entire country (P. 40).

Responding to all allegations President Pervez Musharraf (2006) in his memoir *In the Line of Fire* details the Kargil conflict. He recognizes that:

'As a backup to understanding the Kargil conflict it needs to be stressed that Kargil was not a one-off operation, but the latest in a series of moves and countermoves at a tactical level by India and Pakistan along the Line of Control in the inaccessible, snowbound Northern Areas. India would capture a location where they felt that our presence was thin, and vice-versa. This is how they managed to occupy Siachen (ostensibly without clearance from the Indian government). This is how the Kashmiri freedom fighting mujahideen occupied the Kargil heights that the Indian army had vacated for the winter' (p.87).

On a question that the operation was launched without the army's taking the political leadership into its confidence. Musharraf makes clear that there was no deliberate offensive operation planned, and moving to the unoccupied gaps along the line of control was not a violation of any agreement and was well within the purview of the local commander. Musharraf writes that the PM Nawaz Sharif had been briefed about the situation several times i.e., on January 29, February 5, March 12, May 17, June 2 and 22, in 1999 (Musharraf, 2006: 96).

About cease-fire Musharraf note down:

'The prime minister (Nawaz Sharif) asked me several times whether we should accept a cease-fire and a withdrawal. My answer was the same: the military situation is favorable: the political decision has to be his own. He went off, and decided on a cease-fire. It remains a mystery to me why he was in such a hurry (p. 97).'

Musharraf emphatically states that whatever movement has taken place so far in the direction of finding a solution to Kashmir is due considerably to the Kargil conflict (p.98).

## **Significance of the Newspapers**

Two leading English language newspapers each one from India and Pakistan i.e., *The Hindustan Times* and the *Dawn* have been chosen for this paper to analyze their stance on the Kargil conflict. K. Subrahmanyam (2006:103) writes that India is an English speaking country, and there is a vast global English-speaking audience. 'Over the next two or three decades, as the Indian middle class gets educated in English, India may have the largest numbers of consumers for English language media products.'

*The Hindustan Times* is considered India's largest English daily newspaper. Similarly *Dawn* also enjoys nation-wide influence and is read by policy and decision makers and by the majority of Pakistan's English reading newspaper public.

The flagship publication of the group, *The Hindustan Times* (Delhi edition) was launched in September 1924. Mahatma Gandhi inaugurated it and Shri K.M. Panikkar took over as the first editor (Khan, 2000).

The *Dawn* was founded by Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah as a weekly paper on October 26, 1941 to serve as a mouthpiece for the Muslims of the India sub-continent. The weekly became a daily on October 12, 1942, with Pothan Joseph as the editor (Khan, 2000).

The two newspapers are considered 'elite newspapers' because of their eminence and persuasive approach. Both are playing an important role in the formulation of public opinion on national and foreign policy issues. Both the newspapers appeared regularly during the period under consideration (1999).

### **The Rationale for Selecting Editorials**

This study examines editorial treatments of the *Dawn* and *The Hindustan Times* on the Kargil conflict for the reason that the editorials are considered the institutional opinion of newspapers. Meltzer (2006: 86) states that the editorial board is ideally supposed to maintain its autonomy from the publisher's influence and from the reportorial arm of the paper. According to van Dijk (1996: 13) the main function of editorial is 'the expression and persuasive communication of opinions.' van Dijk recognizes editorials along three schematic categories. They define the situation and give a summary of the news event. They present an evaluation of the situation - specifically of actions and actors. They advance pragmatic conclusions in the form of expectations, recommendations, advice, and warnings (van Dijk in Izadi, 2007). The study will see how far these newspapers endorse government policy or maintain independent stance, as according to McQuail (1987) media of a country is deeply attached with the external affairs and it favors the foreign policy of the country in which it operates during times of crisis or war.

### **Research Questions**

To explore media's treatment of the Kargil conflict between India and Pakistan and to assess the portrayal of elite English newspapers in shaping images of each other's countries, this paper sets its sights on answering the following research questions.

*Research Question 1:* How did *The Hindustan Times* treat the Kargil conflict in its editorials?

*Research Question 2:* How did the *Dawn* treat the Kargil conflict in its editorials?

*Research Question 3:* What was the relationship between the policies of the newspapers and the official foreign policies of the two countries about the Kargil conflict?

*Research Question 4:* Did the policy of the two newspapers deviate from the official policy during the Kargil conflict?

*Research Question 5:* What were the similarities and differences between the editorial coverage of the two newspapers with special reference to the Kargil Conflict?

### **Literature Review**

There have been studies of newspaper editorials covering political, economic, social, and foreign policy issues. This is viewed as one of the ways to examine the exposition of important sections of public opinion towards issues and problems. A vast body of literature is also available on the different aspects and phases of the

Kargil conflict between India and Pakistan. However, the material most reflective upon the study has been included to understand the current study.

### **Review of Newspaper Studies**

Kim (2000) examined *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* news coverage and US foreign policy decisions concerning the Kwangju movement in South Korea and the Tiananmen movement in China, the two similar East Asian political movements in the 1980s. His study found that prestigious US newspapers used more harsh terms to report the Chinese government's repression of the Tiananmen movement as compared to the Korean government reaction to the Kwangu movement. The author suggested that the elite press treated the two similar international events in a diametrical manner, as Herman and Chomsky (1998) in their propaganda model termed 'dichotomized treatment' (Kim in Pu, 2006: 169).

In a case study of press reactions to the 1973 Arab-Israeli war conducted by Zaremba (1988), newspaper editorials and articles akin to editorials from six different newspapers (*Daily Graphic from Ghana, Times of London, Asahi Evening News from Japan, Straits Times from Singapore, Moscow News, and New York Times*) over a two-month period (October 6, 1973 through December 8, 1973) were content analyzed. Overall, the analysis showed there were considerable differences in the nature of the information being disseminated about the fighting, and of the events leading up to the fighting. Not only did subjective attitudes vary regarding who was right and who was wrong, but the events themselves were described with dramatic differences.

While conducting a survey of the newspapers' editorials and editorial pages, Hynds (1984) noted that there are fluctuations in the image of various nations in another country's press. A four-page questionnaire comprised mostly of multiple choice and short-answer questions was mailed, together with a short cover letter, to 25% of the nation's daily newspapers, which were selected randomly from the *Editor & Publisher International Yearbook*. Analysis of the 186 usable responses (a 45% return rate) revealed that most newspapers continue to take institutional stands on issues and provide a forum for the exchange of information.

### **Studies Related to the Kargil Conflict**

Mazari (2003) noted that when India published its official inquiry report, *The Kargil Review Committee Report*, the Western audience, particularly its media and academics, saw this as the factual report on Kargil— especially since Pakistan did not publish its official version of what Kargil was all about. She highlighted the dangers of ignoring the Kashmir issue. The methodology used is premised on interviews, military documents and reports as well as open literature on the subject.

## South Asian Studies 23 (2)

The focus of the study is limited primarily to understanding the military aspects of Kargil and its political dimension.

Farooque (2006) in his white paper argued that when inquiry committee ordered by Muhammad Nawaz Sharif exposed the people responsible for the Kargil defeat, the generals toppled the elected government to save their skin and continued to portray them as heroes and the Prime Minister (Nawaz Sharif) as villain. The author stated that Kargil debacle led to the death of over 3,000 officers and Jawans of the NLI (Northern Light Infantry) and *mujahideen*. This loss was huge than the country had suffered during the 1965 war.

'*Dateline Kargil*' is an account of the author's nine-week-long stay in the Kargil theatre of war. In his work Sawant (2000) perceived that Indian army was not aware of the magnitude of the crises. He stated that in the Kargil war 524 Indian soldiers were killed, 1,363 injured and Rs. 1,984 crore spent and that the Rs. 20 crore a day which were being spent in sustaining troops at those altitudes round-the-year plus the cost of health is much higher.

Sharma et al. (2000) in their book highlighted India's politico-military supremacy over Pakistan and the views concerning future of politico-military relations between India and Pakistan.

Sharma, S. R. (2000) commented on the war ethics. The writer argued that the unprecedented possibility of human self destruction on a global scale poses a direct question to assumptions of the humanity today especially the capacity of human beings to conduct their affairs in the light of reason. The book examines the recent conflict in Kargil between the two neighbors, India and Pakistan in the light of the theoretical assumptions to conduct the affairs of war.

Having reviewed the work that focused on the relationship between the policies of the newspapers and the official foreign policies, similarities and differences between the editorial coverage of newspapers, it was analyzed that there were considerable differences in the nature of the information and events themselves were described with dramatic differences. The editorials reflect that there are fluctuations in the image of various nations in another country's press and the studies on the Kargil conflict highlight the dangers of ignoring the Kashmir issue.

## Hypothesis

Based on the assumption that both the newspapers would support the foreign policy decisions and actions of their own government regarding the Kargil conflict during 1999, following hypotheses are proposed:

*Hypothesis 1a: Indian and Pakistani newspapers made greater use of positive opinions (pro-govt.) to portray the Kargil conflict.*

*Hypothesis 1b: Indian and Pakistani newspapers made greater use of negative opinions (anti-govt.) to portray the Kargil conflict.*

*Hypothesis 2a: Indian and Pakistani newspapers use harsh terms to criticize their governments to portray the Kargil conflict.*

*Hypothesis 2b: Indian and Pakistani newspapers use moderate terms to criticize their governments to portray the Kargil conflict.*

## **Methodology**

Methodology employed for this research work is content analysis. Both the quantitative and qualitative techniques of research have been used for the study conducted in following discrete stages.

### **The Universe**

This study considers the editorials of the *Dawn* and *The Hindustan Times* from January 1 to December 31 of the year 1999.

### **Sample**

The editorials of both the newspapers on the Kargil conflict between Pakistan and India during 1999 are selected as the sample of the study.

### **Unit of Analysis**

In this study the unit of analysis is the editorial of each newspaper.

### **Category for Analysis**

For analyzing the present study the comparative topical coverage and direction of the editorials of the *Dawn* and *The Hindustan Times* on pre-Kargil conflict, during Kargil conflict, and post-Kargil conflict in the year 1999 has been categorized into one broad category 'Kargil conflict.'

### **Coding**

Placing a unit of analysis into a content category is called coding (Wimmer & Dominick, 2003). To identify the issues and direction of the contents of the study two coders were assigned from M.Phil Program of the Institute of Communication Studies, University of the Punjab, Lahore. The sum total of coverage was calculated by counting the number of editorials on the Kargil conflict in the



respective newspapers of both the countries. This helped fulfilling the quantitative side of the study.

### **Measurements**

To calculate inter-coder reliability Holsti's (1969) formula was used for determining the reliability of nominal data in terms of percentage agreement.

$$R = \frac{2M}{N1 + N2}$$

Where R stands for reliability M is the number of coding decisions on which 2 coders agree and N1 and N2 refer to the total number of coding decisions by the first and second coder respectively.

The researcher analyzed and coded the tone of the editorials in terms of whether they were pre-dominantly positive, negative or neutral. The researcher mainly relied on the totality of impression or the over-all tone of the editorial to determine the direction or stance of the article. To gauge the impression of the editorials' different phrases were studied. This is in consonance to the method of direction of Berelson (1952) called the total problem or the totality of the impression. For qualitative analysis, the specified editorials were distributed among the trained coders who determined the overall tone and direction by giving positive (+), negative (-), and neutral (0) signs. For this purpose a coding sheet well prepared to accommodate all possible coverage of various categories was provided to the coders. It is attached as 'Appendix A'. In order to fill the category appropriately the coders were acquainted with the foreign policies of the respective countries on the issue under study:

### **The Kargil Conflict**

*India called the Kargil conflict a proxy war remotely controlled by intelligence services and alleged that Pakistan's regular forces are involved in the operation. It also insisted that LoC was inviolable. Pakistan denied any involvement and insisted that Kargil operation was conducted entirely by Mujahideen. As regards Indian stand on LoC, Pakistan maintained that LoC was a temporary agreement pending the final settlement of the Kashmir issue (Arif, 2001:53).*

An editorial which supports the policies of India and Pakistan, would be positive (+), while an editorial not in accordance with the official stand point would be negative (-), and an ambiguous editorial having no explicit meaning would be termed as neutral (0).

## Findings

Finding of this study comprises quantitative and qualitative data. Quantitative findings show comparative topical coverage of the editorials of the *Dawn* and *The Hindustan Times* on the Kargil conflict during January 1 to December 31 of the year 1999. While the qualitative findings show the comparative topical direction of the editorials of both the newspapers during the period of the study. Two tables for each analysis along with the figures have been compiled in this regard to compare Indian and Pakistani newspapers' editorial treatment of the Kargil conflict.

### Quantitative Data

Table 1 illustrates that a total numbers of 92 editorials were published by both the papers during 1999. Out of them *Dawn* published 27 editorials while *The Hindustan Times* 65. The *Dawn* gave 29.34 % coverage while *The Hindustan Times* wrote 70.65 per cent. Overall, *The Hindustan Times* discussed the Kargil conflict more frequently than *Dawn* did in 1999.


**Table 1**  
**Comparative Topical Coverage of the Editorials of**  
***Dawn* and *The Hindustan Times* on the Kargil Conflict**  
**During January 1, 1999 to December 31, 1999**

<b>Month</b>	<b><i>Dawn</i></b>	<b><i>Hindustan Times</i></b>	<b>Total</b>
<i>January</i>	0 0%	1 100%	1
<i>February</i>	1 50%	1 50%	2
<i>March</i>	0 0%	3 100%	3
<i>April</i>	0 0%	3 100%	3
<i>May</i>	3 30%	7 70%	10
<i>June</i>	8 29.62%	19 70.37%	27
<i>July</i>	7 30.43%	16 69.56%	23
<i>August</i>	3	5	8

**South Asian Studies 23 (2)**

	37.5%	62.5%	
<i>September</i>	3 33.33%	6 66.66%	9
<i>October</i>	1 33.33%	2 66.66%	3
<i>November</i>	1 50%	1 50%	2
<i>December</i>	0 0%	1 100%	1
<b>Total</b>	27 29.34%	65 70.65%	92

**Figure 1**



**Qualitative Data**


Table 2 shows the final comparative topical direction of the editorials of the *Dawn* and *The Hindustan Times* on the Kargil conflict during 1999. According to this table the *Dawn* adopted positive stance by giving 20.65% coverage to the Kargil conflict. *Dawn* remained neutral by giving 8.69% coverage, whereas the *Dawn* did not write a single editorial against the policy of the government on the specific issue discussed in the study. In comparison to it *The Hindustan Times* gave 51.08% positive coverage to the Kargil conflict. *The Hindustan Times* was neutral by giving 13.04% coverage, whereas it looks critical by giving 6.52% negative coverage to the Kargil conflict. The table shows that only *The Hindustan Times* has criticized its country on the Kargil conflict.

**Table 2**  
**Comparative Topical Direction of the Editorials of**  
***Dawn* and *The Hindustan Times* on the Kargil Conflict**  
**During January 1, 1999 to December 31, 1999**

Month	<i>Dawn</i>			<i>Hindustan Times</i>			Total
	+	-	0	+	-	0	
<i>January</i>	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
<i>February</i>	1	0	0	0	0	1	2
<i>March</i>	0	0	0	1	0	2	3
<i>April</i>	0	0	0	0	2	1	3
<i>May</i>	1	0	2	7	0	0	10
<i>June</i>	7	0	1	15	1	3	27
<i>July</i>	6	0	1	11	2	3	23
<i>August</i>	2	0	1	5	0	0	8
<i>September</i>	2	0	1	5	0	1	9
<i>October</i>	0	0	1	1	0	1	3
<i>November</i>	0	0	1	1	0	0	2
<i>December</i>	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
Total	19	0	8	47	6	12	92
	20.65%	0%	8.69%	51.08%	6.52%	13.04%	

+ = Positive  
 - = Negative  
 0 = Neutral

**Figure 2**



## Analysis

*The Hindustan Times* and the *Dawn*'s editorial treatment of the Kargil conflict during the course of study (1999) has been analyzed in the following paragraphs.

### ***The Hindustan Times*'s Editorial Treatment of the Kargil Conflict**

*The Hindustan Times* criticizes Pakistan for its role in the Valley. Its editorial ('Reality in Kashmir', 1999) reads, "The responsibility in this respect is more on Pakistan since it played a major role in fomenting unrest in the Valley in the last 10 years by sending mercenaries across the border to create trouble."

In yet another editorial ('No "Azad" in PoK', 1999) on Kashmir it opines, "In the process, the international community consistently failed to take notice of the contradictions between denying basic rights to the people of Gilgit and Baltistan and demanding the right of self-determination for the people of the State as a whole. That perhaps should not be surprising at a time when so much of the human rights debate is influenced by considerations of real politics. What is more surprising is that New Delhi should have failed to make adequate use of these facts in the projection of its position on Kashmir."

*The Hindustan Times* suggests a viable course of action to the government in the editorial ('The right response', 1999) which writes, "Our first and foremost objective will have to be to drive out the mercenaries by inflicting such a punishment that they will deeply regret ever having undertaken their ill-conceived venture."

*The Hindustan Times* in its editorial ('Gains for India', 1999) seconds India's action in Kargil. It writes, "As the Indian forces continue their successful operations against the Pakistani infiltrators in the Kargil sector, there have been several positive developments in the diplomatic field. One of these is the apparent realization in the world capitals that it is Pakistan which is the main culprit."

Kashmir intrusion by Pakistan has been labeled as misadventure in an editorial ('First things first', 1999) saying, "Not only that, Islamabad has engaged in its misadventure at a time when India had gone more than half the distance to seek friendly relations. But Pakistan has shown that instead of working towards peace, it is more interested in converting the decade-old proxy war it had been conducting in Kashmir into a virtual war in which its soldiers are participating along with Afghan and other terrorists."

The editorial captioned as 'Indefensible' (1999) *The Hindustan Times* criticized its own Defense Minister for issuing a statement that blamed the ISI while showing Nawaz Sharif the least responsible. It reads, "Not content with issuing an unsolicited clean chit for the Nawaz Sharif Government and its killer outfit, the ISI, the Defense Minister has followed that up with an offer to "consider safe passage of exit" for Pakistani militants who have dug themselves in on the Indian side of the Line of Control. If this is what the Indian Government wants – it

is not, says the Prime Minister – what was the need for launching sustained air strikes and ground operations to flush out the Pakistani elements from the Kargil area of Kashmir at not only an enormous financial cost but also of precious young lives?”

In ‘The game is up’ (1999), *The Hindustan Times* appreciates the US government stand that goes in favour of India. It reads, “US President Clinton’s advice to Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to “respect the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir” is a clear message that the US would not help in pressurizing India to stop its air strikes in Kargil until Pakistan actually withdrew its forces back to its own side of the Line of Control.”

In its editorial (‘Unambiguous stand’, 1999) the paper writes, “Islamabad’s initial game plan must have been to provoke a brief border skirmish to draw the world’s attention to the plight of the “freedom fighters’ and the possibility of a wider conflagration to persuade the international community to focus only on peace talks.”

The newspaper writes an editorial in which it deals with the Pakistan’s internal affairs, including economy. *The Hindustan Times* relates the Kargil event with the diversion of public attention in Pakistan from core problem of poor state of economy. Editorial quotes (1999, July 5) “Despite increasing unemployment, a big dip in export growth and drastic economic slowdown, ordinary Pakistanis will be asked to make bigger sacrifices in the form of various surcharges when fighting India. But the grim realities are sure to surface and precipitate an internal crisis.”

As per Indian policy, *The Hindustan Times* blames Pakistan as renegade to observe and honour the international commitments. It shows that it’s the counterpart of India i.e. Pakistan that particularly violates the LoC. Editorial (1999, July 9) says, “The invention of an Indian violation of the LoC in Siachen and its linkage with the Pakistani violation in Kargil is a measure of the Nawaz Sharif regime’s desperation. India has rightly rejected this linkage but it should suit this country if Pakistan were to delay the withdrawal of its troops. It gives India the time and chance to drive the intruders back to the Pakistani side of the LoC by decisive victories on the battlefield. That is a consummation to be devoutly wished for.”

The newspaper holds Pakistan responsible for Indian internal strikes and problems. An editorial (‘Back to proxy war’, 1999) reads, “According to a report with the National Human Rights Commission, in 10 years of proxy war with India in Kashmir, over 17,000 people were killed including 1,416 security personnel. As many as 125 politicians including 15 top leaders fell victim to Pak-backed militancy and the Valley saw the exodus of the entire Hindu population.”

In ‘Costs of victory’ (1999) the paper has criticized the victory at Kargil of Indian forces on the basis of the Defense Minister’s statement and other relevant facts. “The official death toll India suffered in fighting the enemy in an exceptionally high-altitude theatre of war that has, in the Defense Minister’s words, “no parallel anywhere in the worlds” is close to one-third of the 1962 Chinese assault.”

The paper extends its comments saying that India should not get carried away by its triumph over Kargil, which has come at enormous human and financial cost

to the country. "It is thus both silly and dangerous of the Foreign Minister to publicly hail Kargil as a 'bigger victory' than 1971" adds *The Hindustan Times*.

The paper criticized the intelligence service of India through 'Evasive action again' (1999). It writes, "His (George Fernandes) statement in Calcutta clarified that the conflict was the result of a "breach of trust rather than an intelligence failure. That itself is an amazing admission of a failure. Trusting Pakistan not to violate the Line of Control is to go against half-a-century of history."

The editorial captioned 'Return to the table' (1999) mentions, "So far as Pakistan is concerned, its misadventure in the Himalayan heights must have convinced at least the sensible elements in the ruling establishment that there is no alternative to seeking a solution to what it regards as the Kashmir "problem" except through the process of dialogue, having tried the military approach and failed miserably."

### ***Dawn's* Editorial Treatment of the Kargil Conflict**

Hoping normalizations of relations between Pakistan and India, *Dawn* in an editorial ('Before it gets any worse', 1999) comment on the Kargil conflict in these words: "It is pity that right at a time when these sub-continental neighbors were making a concentrated effort to normalizes their relations, the tensions between the two sides should have boiled over."

The editorial adds, "The two governments which are moving to an eyeball-to-eyeball position need to be advised that they should pull back at once in order to avert a war. The need is indeed for the governments of Islamabad and New Delhi to see reasons. The time has also come for active diplomatic intervention by outside powers."

On the role of Indian Army during Kargil conflict, *Dawn* comments in its editorial ('Poised on the brink', 1999) in these words, "Indian planes, whether by design or accident can stray across the Line of Control, thus compelling Pakistan to take defensive measures as it did two days ago. Indeed, India should be under no illusion that any act of aggression on its part would not invite an appropriate response from Pakistan."

*Dawn* invites the attention of both the sides to be realistic and try to understand the matters solution in a mature way. In an editorial ('Playing with fire' 1999) it comments "Politicians and generals in both countries should not allow themselves to become prisoners of such notions which gave birth to rigid and irrational behaviour".

It adds, "If therefore some Kashmiri groups are giving the Indian army a tough time of it in the Kargil area, how is Pakistan to blame for it? It is easy to say that Pakistani regular soldiers are aiding the freedom fighters, easy to say but hard to substantiate.

The Kargil type of skirmishes will benefit none of the parties. The editorial ('Time to halt the escalation', 1999) goes like "If India is prevaricating to enable

its army to secure its military objective in the current campaign, it is a dangerous game to play.”

Through its editorial (‘Defusing the crises’, 1999) *Dawn* tried to portray the picture of the conflict. It reads, “The Indian army, backed up by the air force, continues to pound the mujahideen but with little success. The Indians themselves have admitted that the going was tough because of the difficult terrain and the snow in which they have to operate. Even though an Indian Army spokesman has claimed successes and said, “We are slowly reaching our goals,” he also admitted that the fighting was ‘bitter’. An indication of Indian ‘success’ in the heavy casualties they have suffered. While officially the Indians have admitted, “48 dead and 175 wounded,” foreign wire agencies quoting field officers say the Indian losses run into ‘hundreds’.

In the editorial (‘Talks at last’, 1999) *Dawn* writes, “The military operations in occupied Kashmir have been continuing for more than a decade now, and there is nothing new about them. If at all there is anything new, it lies in the level of force India is using to crush the freedom movement.”

*Dawn* criticizes the Indian policy on Kargil conflict in the editorial ‘Will the G-8 act? (1999). It reads, “Pakistan is interested in a peaceful resolution of the Kashmir dispute, a settlement based on the UN resolutions and which takes into account the wishes of the Kashmiri people. It is not interested in adventure or war, something, which for whatever reason, India is finding difficult to understand.”

*Dawn* suggests a permanent solution to the Kashmir issue, which is vital to stop such exercises as Kargil in future. The editorial titled ‘one-sided approaches’ (1999) reads, “Kashmir has seen the cause of two wars between Pakistan and India. Without balm being applied to the wounds on its soul, it could yet be the flashpoint for a third.” *Dawn* believes that India has followed a provocative policy along the LoC throughout and its aggression in Siachen is there for the world to see. It writes that without settling the fundamental problem in accordance with the wishes of the Kashmiri people, the threat of war will always remain.

*Dawn* also expects a healthy response from India. The editorial (‘Waiting for an Indian response’, 1999) says, “Without an end to active hostilities, how can Pakistan ask the Mujahideen to come down and be picked off like sitting ducks by the Indian artillery? It is obviously vital that the Indians could realize that the Pakistan Government has run a political risk in agreeing to the present course, and unless a positive response is forthcoming from their side, position here may harden again.”

The role of media has been criticized by the *Dawn*. The editorial (‘For a positive climate’, 1999) writes, “It is equally important that they agree on a code of conduct requiring them to tone down the propaganda war they have been waging against each other over the last several years. Even some softening of the media hype and bluster on Kashmir on both sides would help create a positive climate for a peace dialogue in the subcontinent.”



*Dawn* realizes the utility of talks between the two countries. Its editorial ('The inevitable rider', 1999) writes, "Both countries are now nuclear powers and obsessed with questions of security. If these are not sufficiently compelling reasons for a sincere attempt at dialogue, one wonder what else can be. At the same time, talking for the sake of talking is a recipe for greater frustration."

## **Conclusion**

The findings of the study reveal that both the newspapers were supporting the foreign policies of their own countries proving the hypothesis, '*Indian and Pakistani newspapers made greater use of positive opinions (pro-govt.) to portray the Kargil conflict*'.

An in depth analysis shows that the *Dawn* fully endorsed Pakistan government's policy on the Kargil conflict and did not criticize it all. *The Hindustan Times*, however, use more harsh terms to criticize their governments while portraying the Kargil conflict.

*The Hindustan Times* held Pakistan responsible for playing major role in fomenting unrest in the valley. It criticized Pakistan for sending 'mercenaries' across the border to create trouble. It accused Pakistan of interfering in the internal affairs of India through Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligent (ISI). It also alleged that the ISI was involved in the subversive activities of terrorism and bomb blasts in Kashmir and by providing money, pumping counterfeit currency notes and arm support to various insurgent outfits. Side by side, it also criticized the role of the Indian government in maintaining peace and tranquility in the Valley. While the *Dawn*, adjudged the Kashmir issue as the sole factor of sour relations between India and Pakistan. It contended that the root of the crises is India's refusal to honour its commitments and grant the right of self-determination to the people of Kashmir. It was of the view that by making Kashmir a garrison state, India simply cannot hope to resolve the problem in its own way. The *Dawn* stresses on the utility of talks between the two countries to solve this issue.

*The Hindustan Times* held Pakistan responsible for initiating the Kargil conflict. The Indian newspaper has been vehemently and harshly discussing Pakistan's role in the conflict. It used words like 'militants', 'infiltrators,' and 'mercenaries'. It alleged Pakistan as the 'main culprit' of the Kargil conflict and termed the Kargil conflict a 'misadventure' and a 'proxy war'. It wrote that Pakistani soldiers are participating along with Afghan and other terrorists. It suggested initiating a process of dialogue to overcome this conflict. It criticized Pakistan in the words that Kargil flare up is a sure way of diverting the attention of the common people from the acute economic problems which they are facing. *The Hindustan Times* said the Indian military should be allowed to pursue a strategy to fight on its own terms with a goal of not only recovering the lost territory but proving the Pakistani aggression a costly adventure unsuitable for replication in

future. It urged on Indian armed forces to trounce Pakistan on the Kargil heights. It said Pakistan should not be allowed to create “more Kargils.” It also showed concern about the heavy losses of Indian troops besides economic disaster. It said Kargil triumph came at enormous human and financial cost to the country. It also criticized the statements of the Indian defense minister who was claimant of out of proportion gains in the Kargil conflict. It said the official death toll India suffered in fighting the war is exceptionally high and had “no parallel anywhere in the world and is close to one third of the 1962 Chinese assault”. It also criticized the Indian foreign minister in the words “silly and dangerous of the foreign minister to publicly hail Kargil as a bigger victory than 1971.” It has castigated the Indian intelligence agencies for their ignorance of Kargil action.

On the Kargil issue, the *Dawn* advised India and Pakistan to avoid another war, saying it was no solution to their disputes. It suggested that talks were the only way to resolve all the issues of the two countries because an armed conflict does not resolve any problem. It called for an active diplomatic intervention by the outside powers.

The daily *Dawn* took a view of the Kargil conflict in a broader perspective and then suggested solutions while *The Hindustan Times* discussed the issues in Indian perspective and in an inimical tone. The daily *Dawn* used moderate terms to portray the Kargil conflict through its editorial writings. Nevertheless, the Kargil war for the first time brought the Indian media into its own to match the western media in playing the role of ‘hero, propagandist, and myth maker’ (Joshi in Mathur, 2006: 155).

The researcher found that the editorial policy adopted by both the newspapers was a representation of their nationalist press of the time as a whole. The press remained a vocal advocate of the policymakers of their respective countries on the Kargil conflict during 1999. The print media by its manner of reporting events and issues kept its bias alive and heightened the hostilities among the two countries rather than suggesting measures to cool down passions in the interest of ensuring an era of durable peace and amity.

An analysis of the role of press as a relatively independent medium of communication suggests that the newspapers should play more constructive and developmental role to promote peace and harmony by guarding the sanctity of editorial columns keeping it free from the influence of political interests (Sanjay, 2006: 22).

## Notes

- 1 M. Siddique-ul-Farooque was Central Information Secretary of The Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz).
- 2 Drass is a small town at an altitude of 10,660 feet, the second coldest inhabited place in the world.
- 3 Bruce Reidel was Special Assistant for Near Eastern and South Asia Affairs at the National Security Council to the Former US President Bill Clinton.

## References

- Arif, Mohammad. (2001). Pakistan-India Relations: An Issue Oriented Chronology (1998-2000). *The Journal of the Research Society of Pakistan*, xxxviii (2). Lahore: University of the Punjab.
- Back to proxy war [Editorial]. (1999, July 15). *The Hindustan Times*.
- Before it gets any worse [Editorial]. (1999, May 27). *Dawn*.
- Berelson, B. (1952). *Content Analysis in Communication Research*. New York: Free Press.
- Costs of victory [Editorial]. (1999, July 19). *The Hindustan Times*.
- Defusing the crises [Editorial]. (1999, June 5). *Dawn*.
- Editorial. (1999, July 5). *The Hindustan Times*.
- Editorial. (1999, July 9). *The Hindustan Times*.
- Evasive action again [Editorial]. (1999, July 27). *The Hindustan Times*.
- Farooque, M. Siddique-ul. (2006). *White Paper Kargil: Adventure or Trap*. Lahore: Sagar Publishers.
- First things first [Editorial]. (1999, June 2). *The Hindustan Times*.
- For a positive climate in South Asia [Editorial]. (1999, September 28). *Dawn*.
- Gains for India [Editorial]. (1999, June 1). *The Hindustan Times*.
- Holsti, Ole R. (1969). *Content analysis of the social science and humanities*. Reading, MA: Addison Wesley Company.
- Hynds, E.C. (1984). Editorials, opinion pages still have vital roles at most newspapers. *Journalism Quarterly*, 61(3).
- Indefensible [Editorial]. (1999, June 3). *The Hindustan Times*.
- Joshi, Manoj. (2006). Media in Times of Conflict. In Mathur, AshaRni (ed.). (2006). *The Indian Media: Illusion, Delusion and Reality; Essays in Honour of Prem Bhatia*. New Delhi: Rupa Co.
- Kim, S. T. (2000). Making a difference: US press coverage of the Kwangju and Tiananmen pro-democracy movements. *Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly*, 77 (1), 22-36. In Pu, Li. (2006). One Event, Two Treatments, Comparing US Press Coverage on China's Olympic Bids in 2000 and 2008. *Media Asia, an Asian Mass Communication Quarterly*, 33 (3&4).
- Mathur, AshaRni (Ed.). (2006). *The Indian Media: Illusion, Delusion and Reality; Essays in Honour of Prem Bhatia*. New Delhi: Rupa Co.
- Mazari, Shireen. M. (2003). *The Kargil Conflict 1999: Separating Fact from Fiction*. Islamabad: Institute of Strategic Studies.
- Mc Quail, Dennis. (1987). *Mass communication Theory*. London: Sage.
- Meltzer, Kimberly. (2006). Newspaper editorial boards and the practice of endorsing candidates for political office in the United States. *Journalism: Theory, practice and criticism*, 8(1).
- Musharraf, Pervez. (2006). *In the Line of Fire A Memoir*. London: Simon & Schuster.
- No "Azad" in PoK [Editorial]. (1999, April 13). *The Hindustan Times*.
- One-sided approaches will not work [Editorial]. (1999, June 26). *Dawn*.
- Playing with fire [Editorial]. (1999, May 30). *Dawn*.
- Poised on the brink [Editorial]. (1999, May 29). *Dawn*.
- Reality in Kashmir [Editorial]. (1999, March 12). *The Hindustan Times*.
- Return to the table [Editorial]. (1999, September 6). *The Hindustan Times*.
- Sanjay, B. P. (2006). Press History in India: A Perspective. In Mathur, AshaRni (Ed.). (2006). *The Indian Media: Illusion, Delusion and Reality; Essays in Honour of Prem Bhatia*. New Delhi: Rupa Co.
- Sawant, Gaurav C. (2000). *Dateline Kargil: A Correspondent's Nine-Week Account from the Battlefield*. New Delhi: Macmillan.

- Sharma, R. N., Sharma, Y. K., and Sharma, R.K. (2000). *The Kargil War: A Saga of Patriotism*. Delhi: Shubhi Publications.
- Sharma, Sita Ram. (2000). *War Ethics and the Kargil Crisis*. Jaipur: Book Enclave.
- Subrahmanyam, K. (2006). Media and Strategy in the Globalizing world. In Mathur, AshaRni (Ed.). (2006). *The Indian Media: Illusion, Delusion and Reality; Essays in Honour of Prem Bhatia*. New Delhi: Rupa Co.
- Talks at last [Editorial]. (1999, June 10). *Dawn*.
- The game is up [Editorial]. (1999, June 7). *The Hindustan Times*.
- The inevitable rider [Editorial]. (1999, November 24). *Dawn*.
- The right response [Editorial]. (1999, May 27). *The Hindustan Times*.
- Time to halt the escalation [Editorial]. (1999, June 3). *Dawn*.
- Unambiguous stand [Editorial]. (1999, June 9). *The Hindustan Times*.
- Van Dijk, T. (1996). *Opinions and ideologies in editorials*. International Symposium of Critical Discourse Analysis, Language, Social Life and Critical Thought, Athens. In Izadi, Foad . (2007). *Journal of Communication Inquiry*, 31(2).
- Waiting for an Indian response [Editorial]. (1999, July 11). *Dawn*.
- Will the G-8 act? [Editorial]. (1999, June 20). *Dawn*.
- Wimmer, R. D. and Dominick, J. R. (2003). *Mass Media Research: An Introduction (Seventh Edition)*. Belmont, USA: Wadsworth/Thomson.
- Zaremba, A.J. (1989, December). Mass communication and International politics: A case study of press reactions to the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. In *Communication Abstracts*. London: Sage Publications.

## Appendix A

### Contents analysis coding sheet

1. Coder
2. Name of the Newspaper
3. Date and Year
4. Headline/Title of the Editorial
5. General Idea of the Editorial
6. Category Topic – Kargil Conflict
7. List of Key words, Adjective, Metaphors, Frames
8. Direction of editorial contents pertaining to democratic process.
  - a. Positive (+) .....
  - b. Negative (-) .....
  - c. Neutral (0) .....
9. Remarks

**Biographical Note**

**Muhammad Rashid Khan** is a Senior Public Relations Officer at the University of the Punjab, Lahore. His research interests are in comparative analysis of political communication and journalism.

## **Provincial Autonomy under Stress in Pakistan**

**A. Q. Sial**

*The Islamia University of Bahawalpur*

### **ABSTRACT**

This article contemplates issues of provincial autonomy in Pakistan. It describes historical background and rationale of federal character of the state. The nature of Indian Administrative Acts founding basis of provincial settings in the Sub-continent has been reviewed. The revision further examines articulation and expansion of the subject matter in constitutional documents of the country. Centralization of the state political system by dictators and consequent demolition of constitutional guarantees for federating units form part of the study. The study keeping in view the observant findings of state judiciary proposes resolution of the issues for strengthening federal framework of the state.

### **Background**

Pakistan under the Constitution of 1973 is a federal state, comprising of four provinces. Constitution of the country although contains provisions of federal character but provinces have a lot of grievances mostly against federal government regarding incorporation and implementation of constitutional obligation. Provincial autonomy is a very important feature of federal political system. The demand of provincial autonomy by federating units of Pakistan is an accepted phenomenon. It has a protracted background. Federal system in the country may also be considered an outcome of conscious understanding of national and provincial leaders and also originating from a common religion, ethnic and cultural dissimilarities. Federal form at the earliest stage was approved in recognition of existence of plural society and was subsequently retained in all the constitutions of Pakistan. The state political system experienced many twists as it firstly consumed a lot of time to formulate its Constitution of 1956. When the Constitution was framed it lacked essential federal characteristics. The President illegitimately abrogated the Constitution in 1958. The abrogation produced fatal consequences in the years to come. The provinces remained dissatisfied with the languish situation and federation is facing reaction of the provinces on issues of provincial autonomy.

## Lahore/ Pakistan Resolution 1940 & Objectives Resolution 1949

Besides geographical and cultural background the 'Lahore Resolution' and 'Objective Resolution' furnished initiatives for adoption of federal system of government in the country. History equally played role for this unification because during British rule Muslims of India had demanded provincial autonomy to form their own government in those provinces where they constituted a majority. Lahore Resolution provided that the area in which Muslims were numerically in majority as in the North Western and Eastern Zones of India, should be united to constitute independent states in which the constituent units would be autonomous and sovereign (Allana, 1968: 228).

State is a living organism, which must adapt itself to its environment, and its success will depend upon the ease with which that adaptation can be made (The Law Quarterly Review, 1920:163). After independence government of Pakistan worked within the parameters of federal scheme of Government of India Act 1935 as a provisional system. When the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan adopted the 'Objectives Resolution of Constitution of 1956, it had in its contents the basis of federal system for the society of Pakistan. In the course of constitution making process members of the Constituent Assembly demanded more powers for the provinces by asserting that Lahore Resolution guaranteed provincial autonomy (Constituent Assembly Debates, 1954). In post independence era the adoption of Objectives Resolution is a significant development. It is a document of historical importance. In the objectives resolution it was held that:

“Wherein the territories now included in or in accession with Pakistan and such other territories as may hereafter be included in or accede to Pakistan shall form a Federation wherein the units will be autonomous with such boundaries and limitations on their powers and authority as may be prescribed:

Now, therefore, we, the people of Pakistan; conscious of our responsibility before Almighty Allah and men; cognizant of sacrifices made by the people in the cause of Pakistan; Faithful to the declaration made by founder of Pakistan, *Quaid-e-Azam* Muhammad Ali Jinnah, that Pakistan, would be a democratic state based on Islamic principles of social justice; dedicated to the preservation of democracy achieved by the unremitting struggle of the people against oppression and tyranny;

Inspired by the resolve to protect our national and political unity and solidarity by creating an egalitarian society through a new order; do hereby, through our representatives in the National Assembly, adopt, enact and give to ourselves, this constitution.”

Federal political system maintains peculiar features. The system is designed under a political compulsion and is not a preferred choice. No entity would have a federal constitution if it could possibly avoid it (Jennings, 1953: 55). It is a system of partnership among political entities desirous of joining a system of government meeting reciprocal demands. Its spirit lies in the co-ordinate status of both federal and provincial governments as well as independence of both in their own spheres. In this system of political organization no level of government is accepted with unilateral right of performing acts like to change the constitutional provision on division of respective powers assigned under the constitution. Division of power between federal and provincial units on equitable basis is a fundamental principle of federalism. No government is deemed wholly dependent on the other unit. In the system central and local authorities are united in a mutually interdependent political relationship. Balance of powers is maintained under the system so that neither government becomes dominant to the extent that it can dictate the decisions of its own choice to the other partner. But each can influence, bargain with, and persuade the other in a co-ordinated manner as designed or agreed otherwise by mutual consent.

## **Background in Indian Acts**

British Government introduced a highly centralized federal system in the sub-continent to deal administrative functions of United India. In the prevailing forces of unity and diversity, federation appeared feasible mechanism in binding together different cultural groups under one government. The system of 1935 grew through implementation of various Indian administrative Acts in a large span of time. Indian Act gradually developed rudimentary basis of federal structural system. The Indian Council Act 1892 allowed Legislatures of the provinces to repeal and amend the Laws of the province (The Indian Council Act, 1982, Section No. 5). The Indian Council Act 1909 provided re-composition of the Provincial Legislative Councils. It was laid down that there would be no official majority in the Provincial Legislative Councils but such majority was retained in the central legislative body.

The Government of India Act 1919 (part (ii), Art. 17) set-up a bicameral legislature at the center against the Imperial Council of one chamber. One House was named as Central Legislative Assembly and the other the Council of States. The Central Legislature had the powers to make Laws for all British India. The Act provided two lists of subjects for legislation, which were called central and provincial lists. The peculiar system of administration (diarchy) was introduced in provincial management. This was a system of governance in which the subjects to be dealt with by the Provincial Government were partitioned i.e. transferred and reserved. The reserved subjects were to be conducted with the help of the



## South Asian Studies 23 (2)

executive council and the Governor had to deal with the transferred subjects through ministers (The Government of India Act, 1919, part (ii), Art. 17).

The Government of India Act 1919 affirmed the policy of British Parliament to provide increasing association of Indians in every branch of civil administration. It provided for the development of self-governing institutions with progressive realization of responsible government in British India. It was also provided that with gradual development of self-governing institutions in the provinces it had become expedient to introduce limited provincial autonomy. In the provincial affairs as much independence of government was given as was compatible with due discharge by later of its own responsibilities. The Act however, did not endow with requirement and expectations of the people of India. The basic demand of fully responsible government at all level still seemed far away. The system of diarchy was unfair, faulty and in opposition to political theory and practice therefore against federal principles.

As described earlier that important enactment containing rudimentary form of provincial autonomy is Act of 1935. Around 1933-35 the British Government realized the need of extensive political reforms. Simon Commission developed practical proposals in the light of demands of political parties. Report of the Commission was published in May 1930. Deliberations on issues were made in Round Table Conferences (1930-31) held in London. In April 1933, a Joint Select Committee consisting of 16 members each from the House of Commons and the House of Lords was appointed to examine and report on the Government proposals on constitutional reforms. The report of the Joint Select Committee was submitted to the government on 22<sup>nd</sup> November, 1934. A Bill was accordingly introduced in the House of Commons on 5<sup>th</sup> February, 1935. The House of Commons passed the Bill on 4<sup>th</sup> June, 1935. The Bill was then introduced in the House of Lords on 6<sup>th</sup> June, 1935, which was passed in July 1935. The Bill received the Royal Assent on 2<sup>nd</sup> August, 1935 and brought into being the famous constitutional document 'The Government of India Act 1935.' On introduction the Act was criticized mainly because of its spoiled federal features. Nevertheless it founded the base for constitutional structure of the Dominions in future. British India got self-rule under the shadow of controversial Act. Pakistan although attained sovereign status. People of Pakistan have yet to get freedom from the fabrics of Imperial Act 1935.

The Government of India Act 1935 (Section 5) provided 'All India Federation' and a bicameral Federal Legislature with division of legislative functions between Federal and Provincial governments. The bicameral Federal Legislature was to be consisting of the King, Federal Assembly and the Council of states. The act provided three lists for legislation 1; federal list 2; provincial list, 3; concurrent lists. The Act outlining basis of provincial autonomy for the provinces established diarchy at the center under which the administrative functions with respect to defense; foreign relations etc were to be performed by the Governor General at his discretion with the assistance of his councilors. All other executive

functions were to be performed with the help and advice of the council of ministers subject to the exercise of special powers and responsibilities for which the Governor General was to appoint advisors. The Governor General and the Governors of the Provinces could subject to certain limitations direct the legislatures not to proceed or stop proceeding on any matter pending or coming for their actions (The Government of India Act, 1935, Section 5).

The Government of India Act 1935 was the multipurpose encyclopedic document enforced to appease Indian population with fully sustaining the colonial arrangement. Pattern of modern monarchism was introduced through the statute, which had 321 sections and 2 schedules. Mohammad Ali Jinnah observed the scheme of the Government of India Act 1935 “thoroughly rotten, fundamentally bad and totally unacceptable.” Dr. Keith observed the Act introducing ‘bastard federalism.’

After the freedom in 1947 it was observed that unsystematic scheme of governance under the Indian Acts did not facilitate smooth working of the state system. Central governments tried to dictate its policies over provincial affairs. Powers were usurped through enforcement of emergencies in the provinces. Emergency provisions most of the times were used to obstruct regular political course. State machinery was used to materialize undue interest of people in power not otherwise maintainable by conventional means. In order to pursue such policies Constituent Assembly made amendments in Section 102 of the Government of India Act 1935 in 1947, 1948, and 1950. The draft constitution proposed by first Constituent Assembly contained provisions on different types of emergencies. First Constituent Assembly was criticized for enacting controversial emergency provisions. Curiously enough, the second Constituent Assembly in which those political groups had opportunity to redraft the Constitution retained all these emergency provisions in Part IX (Articles 191–196) making them even stronger in some respects (Choudhury, 1995:112).

## **Critical Issues**

Misuse of constitutional provisions by federal governments against the provinces badly affected provincial autonomy. Use of emergency provisions in provincial affairs on excuse of breakdown of constitutional machinery is uncharacteristic. Its origin may be found in the Government of India Act, 1935, which had provisions on emergency due to failure of constitutional machinery, both at the center and in provinces (The Government of India Act 1935, Section 5). But there was notably no provision in the 1956 constitution relating to the breakdown of constitutional machinery at the center. It however retained provisions to meet constitutional crisis in the provinces (Choudhury, 1995: 114).

Constitutional history shows gloomy picture of federation versus province relationship of early stage in the country. The Federation using emergency powers

## **South Asian Studies 23 (2)**

against the provinces unilaterally and repeatedly intervened in provincial affairs. Following are more than enough example of these occasions.

1. Proclamation by the Governor General on 24<sup>th</sup> January, 1949 under section 92-A of the Government of India Act, 1935, assuming powers in the Province of Punjab (Constitutional Documents of Pakistan, Ministry of Law and Parliamentary Affairs, Law Division, Volume IV B, Orders and Proclamations, p. 1823).
2. Proclamation by the Governor-General dated 29th December, 1951, under section 92-A of the Government of India Act, 1935, assuming powers in the Province of Sindh (Ibid, p.1827).
3. Proclamation by the Governor-General on 14th March, 1954, under section 92A of the Government of India Act, 1935, assuming powers in East Bengal (Ibid, p.1831).
4. Proclamation by the Governor-General, 29th May, 1954, under section 92A of the Government of India Act, 1935 assuming powers in East Bengal (Ibid, p.1834).
5. Proclamation by the President, 26th May, 1956, under Art. 193 of the Constitution assuming powers in East Pakistan (Ibid, p.1839).
6. Proclamation by the President, 31st August, 1956, under Art. 193 of the 1956 Constitution assuming powers in East Pakistan (Ibid, p.1843).
7. Proclamation by the President, 21st March, 1957, under Art. 193 of the 1956 Constitution assuming powers in East Pakistan (Ibid, p.1847).
8. Proclamation by the President, 25th June, 1958 under Art. 193 of the 1956 Constitution assuming powers in East Pakistan (Ibid, p.1854).

The above instances are glaring examples of federal versus provincial controversies at the earliest stage of independence. These emergencies were imposed prior to or close to promulgation of the first Constitution of Pakistan 1956.

## **Autonomy under 1956 Constitution, Controversies on Constitutional Proposals**

During the course of constitution making, mode and extent of provincial autonomy for the units remained central issue before the Constituent Assembly. Prior to adoption of 1956 Constitution text of the 'Objectives Resolution' had enough inspiration for the nation on fundamental principles. The provisional system under the Act of 1935 had contents for gratifying aspirations for provincial autonomy. Differences between provinces became prominent on presentation of first constitutional proposals compiled by Basic Principles Committee. The Basic Principles Committee presented its interim report to the Constituent Assembly in September, 1950. The report had recommended a bicameral federal legislature with equality of power for both the Houses. The upper house was to be known as House of Units consisting of equal number of members from all units, whereas the

Lower House was expected to give representation on population basis (Mehmud, 1990). Subjects of representation in Legislature, quantum of authority between center and provinces were at the top (Maluka, 1995: 4-5). The proposal made by the government of Liaqat Ali Khan brought controversy. Khawaja Nazimuddin presented the consolidated report of Basic Principles Committee on 22 December, 1952. In the recommendations, central legislature was proposed to consist of two Houses; the House of units and House of people. Former was consisting of 120 members and the later 400 members. Both Houses had to provide equal representation to two wings of the country with equal powers except on money matters.

The prime minister had proposed a compromised formula of parity as basis for resolving the conflict of representation between East and West Pakistan. Parity formula was seen as violation of the principle of universal franchise. Political parties in East Bengal criticized its undemocratic character. Four per cent majority of East Pakistan was being utilized to arouse provincial animosities and rivalries. Position of East Pakistan in central legislature was brought parallel to number of seats with combined strength of all the units and areas comprising West Pakistan. It was provided that in the House of people there should be 200 members from east and 200 from nine units of East Pakistan. Regarding the house of units the proposal provided that there should be 60 from the west and 60 from the other units of the West Pakistan. This position was equal to partition the country in two parts by de-recognizing the principles of federal system.

Delay in constitution making further complicated the nature of constitutional issues inclusive of issue of provincial autonomy. The state authorities failed to resolve reciprocal conflicts. Provincial governments and assemblies suffered instability. In early days of independence when unjustified pattern for dismissal of provincial governments was adopted the provincial administration stood destabilized. Provincial elections in 1953 also failed to root out the controversies. In the province of Sindh Chief Minister Pirzada Abdus Sattar's government had to go out simply because he was not fully cooperating with central government. The Assembly of Bahawalpur was dissolved along with dismissal of its ministry in November 1954. The ruler of Bahawalpur State in its overwhelming love for Pakistan announced cession of his state coupled with the gift of huge amount in cash to support the dying economy of Pakistan. This was the act of generosity at a critical moment of independence. Outcome to people of the state for this love was denial of their constitutional rights and deprivation of their autonomous status in the Federation. The state had held the status throughout the period of imperial rule and retained that until amalgamation of West Pakistan. State population had to launch movement for its restoration but failed to attain its previous status as an autonomous component of federation. The Province of Sindh also faced crises when the ministry of Pirzada Abdul Sattar was routed out. Both the ministries were reluctant to be integrated into 'One Unit'. In May 1955 the same act was repeated for Noon ministry in the Punjab. Two months later the ministry of Abdul

## **South Asian Studies 23 (2)**

Rashid in North Western Frontier Province was targeted. Governor's rule was repeatedly imposed in the provinces without any justification under the constitution (Hamood Rehman Commission Report declassified by government, published by Vanguard Books, p. 37).

The decision of Dacca High Court regarding dismissal of Chief Minister Abu Hussain Sarkar, by Governor Hamid Ali, just few minutes after his becoming Governor of East Pakistan, substantiated the fact that tenure of office of a provincial chief minister under the 1956 constitution was no safer than under the Interim Constitution. Stability of cabinet governments and sanctity of parliamentary system depends not on wording of the constitution but on growth of democratic conventions and parliamentary spirit existing in the society.

### **Amalgamation of Provinces in One Unit**

The most unpopular event against the federal norms happened in the history of Pakistan in 1955. The Second Constituent Assembly of Pakistan on 30 September passed a most highly controversial Act Establishment of West Pakistan Act 1955 (PLD, 1955, Central Acts and Notification 273) amalgamating all federating units of the country. The newly composed territory of West Pakistan formerly comprising of three Governors' provinces, one Chief Commissioners' province, a number of states and large tribal areas were now stuffed in one unit. There were made many claims by the executive in favor of anti-autonomous act of the Assembly but it was obtained to resolve federal constitutional issues against prevailing realities. The states and provinces opposed the move. The motive behind the Act was to deny the provinces power sharing in federal structure under the new constitution. Reaction of the units was severe due to many reasons. First of all it was implemented by executive order 'Establishment of council for administration of West Pakistan Order 1954 (PLD, 1955, Central Acts and Notification 5). Moving further the executive authority initiated to create new province of West Pakistan. But the unpopular scheme was blocked by the decision of Federal Court (Usif Patel v Crown. PLD 1955, F.C. 387). The federal government dismissed three provincial ministries who opposed the move. In preparation of that Bahawalpur State suffered the worse when its ministry was dismissed and legislature dissolved in 1954. Amid mix reaction from different states of the country on the issue the executive managed to merge them for obtaining a compromised constitution.

The Constitution of 1956 was one of the lengthiest constitutions of world at the time of its promulgation. Greater part of the 1956 Constitution consisted of provisions similar to those contained in the Government of India Act 1935. Unlike other federal constitutions it provided unicameral parliament to the country and did not provide any second chamber. Structure of the constitution of 1956 was federal but allied principles of federation had no sound place in its provisions. It

empowered the federal government certain functions such as emergency powers and powers of directing provincial government on certain issues. Central government had jurisdiction to appoint the provincial governors to head the provincial administration. The Governor should hold office during the pleasure of the President. In case of emergency, internal disturbance or constitutional deadlock, governor at the discretion of the president might assume all powers of the provincial government. These functions reduced the autonomy of provinces. The scope of provincial autonomy introduced under the Act of 1935 to some extent stood reduced. The Constitution revealed general pattern of center province relations as was in the Government of India Act, 1935. The 1956 Constitution was therefore not a perfect federal Constitution. Therefore political system failed to initiate structural development for promotion of federal democratic polity in the country.

Adoption of sound federal parliamentary system of democracy in Pakistan may have been an exalting experience provided necessities of the system as earlier noted had been owned in good faith for practice. The nation had deep historical mutual commitments. People of united Pakistan were composed of different customs, cultures, languages, environments and even on practice of religion. Although people deeply united on national level remained equally divided on provincial levels for maintaining their conventional wisdom. Geographical composition of the state required development of federal system and state units had to be combined in the federation. This was right of the units to claim provincial autonomy in federal system. Limited autonomy was experienced in colonial system the increase in which had been an expected endowment in the constitution to be framed. Provincial autonomy is as much relevant character of federal state as sovereignty for independence of the state. Right of autonomy must be available to federating units in a federal state in such a manner as sovereignty of the federal state over the units of state. Consent of units brings into being federal state. Subsistence of federal state is dependent upon comprising of composing units. It is created under mutual trust. Circumstances in Pakistan twirled and trustee (the Federation) turned out beneficiary against ideological commitments. Mohammad Ali Jinnah and Muslim League had predicted what Pakistan would stand for on the subject of provincial autonomy or federal structure of the state. Commitment on provincial autonomy for the federating units was evident. On November 8, 1945, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, while explaining the 'theory of Pakistan' said that it guarantees that the federated units of the national government would have all the autonomy that you will find in the Constitutions of the United States of America, Canada, and Australia. But certain vital powers will remain vested in the central government such as the monetary system, national defense and other federal responsibilities (Ahmed, 2005).

In historical perspectives there was harmony among the people of India on the issue even before the constitutional reforms of 1919. They wanted federal form of government in India. From Muslim League's point of view, it was argued that full

provincial autonomy was in the interest of the Muslims. Moreover, the demand for more Muslim provinces in the country was also due to the expectation amongst Indian Muslims that they would have majority share in government and law making in these provinces (Ahmed, 1990: 24).

### **Centralization under Dictatorial Regimes**

The Constitution of 1962 a dictatorial formula, further centralized the state system. The scheme introduced under the autocratic constitution was neither parliamentary nor presidential. An individual along with his marionettes for their arbitrary actions squeezed the state functions. Under the 1962 Constitution there was only one legislative list, namely the federal list. This was over-centralization of the system under Ayub Khan that transformed the semi-federal system in to unitary form of Government. It failed to maintain existing federal character rather reduced it beyond Government of India Act 1935. Political leadership emphasizing provincial autonomy was termed by the government as traitors. The Government promoting the strong centre argued that in view of threat from India due to considerable distance between the two wings, a strong centre was necessary. When political parties demanded provincial autonomy from Ayub Government, his Law Minister warned the people that calling for greater provincial autonomy would be considered a treasonous act and the central characters to be crushed and destroyed. Centralism was declared eminent to hold the country together and to ensure uniform economic development. The argument however proved counter-productive as East Pakistan separated from Pakistan largely because the ruling elite was not prepared to base the political structure of the country on generous provincial autonomy (Ali, 1992: 66).

Trends of centralization introduced by the regime of Ayub Khan damaged basis of federation. Curious element in the demand of provincial autonomy was that demand came from East Pakistan, which had largest population strength. This demand was unusual because people of East Pakistan should not have any fear of dominance of rest of the units. But East Pakistan had justification of this demand as no balance of power existed between the centre and provinces. Reservations were mainly economical as East Pakistan continued to be a neglected area. The first five-year plan published by the central government in May 1956 admitted the fact in a policy statement (Chaudhry, n.d). Provincial autonomy was not an unusual claim of East Pakistan. The Indian Act 1935 had already incorporated it by giving governors of the provinces the required autonomy. Government of India Act 1935 conferred provincial autonomy under its part III that came into force on 1<sup>st</sup> April, 1937. Governor's Provinces were created as autonomous units. The Governor had the same authority as the Governor-General had at the centre (Baz, 1995: 1). Contrarily post independence era boosted centralization process and deprived a large portion of the nation from its political legacy.

Denial of federal constitutional rights to the people of eastern wing who initiated the process of independence movement was injustice. Post-partition period supports the fact that leaders of East Pakistan with moderate political approach continued to accept and cooperate with the central governments. Some leaders of Eastern wing suffered the loss of public confidence for the sake of their approach of reconciliation. Deterioration in political process originally started due to non-appreciation of federal parliamentary standards. Twenty-two years long compromise of population of East Pakistan over fundamental principles harmed the option of federal harmony. There appeared reflection of revolt in 'six points of *Awami League*' which were reaction of Eastern wing over policies of central government. Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rehman had raised the impression that standard federal code from political order of the state had disappeared.

### **Autonomy under 1973 Constitution/ Dissolution of Provincial Assemblies/ Emergencies**

Constitution of 1973 in its original form was believed to be a promising symbol for resolution of the issue. It although had the provisions contrary to federal scheme of governance. Yet the provinces wanted further steps for enlargement of the autonomy. Provincial structure under the constitution has no required autonomy. Governor of the province is appointed to execute federal policies as subservient federal agent and monitor the interest of federation in provincial affairs. Provincial representative assemblies are dissolved along with National Assembly. Provincial governments are also dismissed when federal government is dismissed unconstitutionally. The roots of most of the ills are found in frequent enforcement of provisional constitutional orders by suppressing regular legal system in the country.

There are several outstanding issues relating to legislative functions between federation and provinces. The most prominent issue is subjects of legislation in three lists. Federal system has certain intrinsic limitations that spring from the division of powers between federal and composing units (Dicey, 1964: 125). Pakistan has failed to resolve such an important issue which has prevented necessary legislative requirement of the provinces. A Bill seeking reforms regarding controversies over legislative lists was moved in the Senate in 2004. The senator who introduced the Bill deplored that in the 1956 Constitution the federal legislative list contained 30 subjects while 19 were included in the concurrent list. He regretted that in the 1973 Constitution there were 47 subjects in the Concurrent Legislative list and 67 in the Federal Legislative list. He said that non-transfer of these subjects to the provinces was causing disharmony among the federating units. He lamented that instead of giving autonomy to the provinces the ruling party had put a larger number of subjects in the Schedule six of the Legal Framework Order 2002 on which even the federal government could not legislate



## South Asian Studies 23 (2)

without consent of the president. He said that more than 150 subjects were included in the federal legislative list and the hands of the provinces had further been tied. The senator argued that presently provinces were looking toward the centre for legislation on some important issue like '*Karo-kari*' (a heinous social crime). He said the time had come to fulfill the promise made years ago with the people of Pakistan. Opposing the bill, the State Minister for parliamentary affairs said the Constitution granted equal rights to provinces and there was no need to amend it. This state of affairs reflects lack of interest of political parties in general and ignorance of people in power in particular on outstanding constitutional issues of Pakistan which need immediate resolution.

The Constitution of 1973 contains provisions of emergency more or less on a pattern similar to earlier constitutions. Article 234 deals with subject of emergency and has been in recurrent use for purposes other than those contemplated therein. Provincial governments have been frequent victims of the emergency provisions. Lahore High Court in a constitutional petition painstakingly examined backdrop of emergency. The court in the case in which the Federation unnecessarily used provisions of emergency fixed useful direction. The Court taking note of the abuse of such provisions observed that the division of powers between federation and its units must yield to supreme interest of unity and solidarity of federation. In the event of emergency or calamity like constitutional breakdown federation must possess necessary power to intervene in provincial affairs. But this power, besides being drastic, constitutes an inroad into the provincial autonomy and if not properly used, can destroy the equilibrium between federation and federating units. Besides leading to serious repercussions, it also causes sense of deprivation in the units, which is not a healthy sign for a federation. When a proclamation of emergency is enforced, the federal character of polity gets transformed into unitary form and the national government becomes the paramount authority within the country (Manzoor Ahmad Watoo vs Federation, Lahore, PLD, 1997, p. 60).

## Critical Analysis

The essence of federalism is that neither level of government is deeply dependent on the other. Rather they are united in a mutually interdependent political relationship (Vile, 1961: 197). In order to balance provincial interests Constitution of 1973 provides institutions, which integrate provincial interests within federal organization. Under Article 153 it provides Council of Common Interests (C.C.I). The Council formulates and regulates policies in relation to matters in Part I of the Federal Legislative List and, in so far as it is in relation to the affairs of Federation to exercise supervision and control over related institutions. The Council is an important constitutional institution, which irons out differences, problems and irritants between the provinces and provinces and federation in respect of matters specified in Art.154 (Amin Ahmad, Ministry of Production, Government of

Pakistan, Islamabad, PLD, 1996, Karachi, 27). But federal governments in due course of time observed no regard to the provisions of the constitution. When President exercised his powers under Article 85 (2) (b) to dismiss federal government in 1993 improper working of CCI was one of the grounds. Although Supreme Court in 1993 did not find it convincing that the performance was not in accordance with the Constitution hence cannot be made a ground for presidential action (Muhammad Nawaz Sharif vs President of Pakistan, PLD, 1993, Supreme Court 473). Supreme Court however explained that Articles 153, 154, 155, 160 and 161 of the Constitution provide in-built self-ad-judicatory and self-executory mechanism in the constitutional set-up. The object seems to generate sense of participation among the federating units. CCI was to ensure equitable distribution of federal taxes among the federating units and resolving other financial issues (Messrs Gadoon Textile Mills vs WAPDA, 1997, SCMR, 641).

Another controversy frequently disrupting federal system is regarding the working of National Finance Commission. National Finance Commission is constituted under Art. 160. The Government of Benazir Bhutto purposely delayed the reconstitution of National Finance Commission till the budget had been passed. This created tension and confrontation between the centre and provinces of Balochistan and Punjab. The President of Pakistan dismissed the Government of Benazir Bhutto along with dissolution of National and Provincial Assemblies. Governors of the provinces took same action against the provinces. One of the grounds of dissolution was that the National Finance Commission was never called to meet and allowed to function, thus, blocking process of mandatory provision. The dissolution of Sindh Assembly was challenged in Sindh High Court through constitutional petition, which was dismissed. The Court said that the material produced before court fully established that in spite of insistence by the federating units for convening the meeting of these two important constitutional institutions and concern conveyed by the President in this behalf, the government of federation was not only avoiding convening of the meeting of these institutions but showed no respect to the request of provinces for constitutional obligation (Khalid Malik vs Federation of Pakistan, PLD, 1991, Karachi, 1).

Contours of provincial autonomy were although redesigned under the Constitution of 1973 yet, the autonomic status was not furnished the environment to take root. Article 112 of the Constitution of 1973 was arbitrarily amended several times to stretch federal authority over the provinces under imprecise conditions. Therefore provinces have been frequent victims of such discretionary actions sponsored by federal executive. Structure of provinces was repeatedly smashed under the provisions of emergency just for maintaining federal monopoly over the years. Dismissal of the Provincial Government of Balochistan and forced resignation of the Provincial Government in North Western Frontier Province happened very close to promulgation of the Constitution. Besides dismissing the ministries constitutionally entitled to continue or installation of ministries without constitutional mandate, people in power observed clear disregard of mandatory

and indispensable obligations under the Constitution. Several episodes may be referred for the assessment of interference of federal government in provincial affairs.

In Balochistan, Jam Ghulam Qadir, a member of Muslim League (Qayyum group) was sworn in as the Chief Minister of the province on 27 April, 1973. Under the Constitution he had to prove his majority in the Provincial Assembly. He claimed that his Government commanded the required majority in the Assembly. To contradict the claim of Chief Minister, *National Awami Party* on the day when Jam Ghulam Qadir was administering oath, held a demonstration in Quetta. *National Awami Party* presented to the audience 11 out of the 21 members of the Assembly. Undeterred by the complete exposure of its false claims, the Central Government on 29 April, 1973 installed Inayatullah Khan Gandapur as Chief Minister of the North Western Frontier Province (Maluka, 1995: 248).

On 15 December, 1988 Governor dissolved Balochistan Assembly on the advice of Chief Minister who was in fear of losing office on account of vote of no confidence likely to be passed against him. The order of dissolution was challenged in Balochistan High Court. In the constitutional petition it was contended that the Chief Minister could not advice for the dissolution as not being Chief Minister in the meaning of Article 112 of the Constitution of 1973. Full Bench of the High Court accepted the petition holding that until the Chief Minister had obtained vote of confidence under the constitution from majority of total member, could not advice dissolution of the Assembly. It was not an act of ignorance rather initiated by the Chief Minister and passed by the Governor with particular intention to take advantage of constitutional position not specifically provided.

Amir Gulistan Janjua the Governor of North West Frontier Province on 6 August, 1990 dissolved the Provincial Assembly. The Provincial Cabinet consequently, stood dissolved due to dissolution of the Assembly. The Governor had alleged that situation had arisen in the Province in which Government of North West Frontier Province cannot be carried on in accordance with provisions of the Constitution and an appeal to electorate was necessary. Aftab Ahmad Khan Sherpao, the ousted Chief Minister of NWFP, challenged the order of dissolution before the Peshawar High Court. A full Bench of Peshawar High Court, by a majority of four to one, accepted the constitutional petition and declared the impugned order of dissolution of NWFP Assembly and dismissal of provincial cabinet as *ultra vires* of the constitution, without lawful authority and, therefore, of no legal effect. The Court directed restoration of NWFP Assembly along with government of the Province (Aftab Ahmad Khan Sherpao vs The Governor of NWFP, PLD, 1990, Peshawar, 192).

Ghulam Ishaq Khan dismissed at least four federal governments by his proclamation, which resulted in consequent dismissal of provincial governments. His claim using the powers under the Constitution became more apparent when he dissolved the Punjab Assembly within seven minutes of its restoration by Lahore

High Court. Without slightest compunction about committing an unlawful act, Ishaq Khan was determined to strangle the fragile democracy and political order of Pakistan for the sake of defeating the imperatives of the Court's verdict (Maluka, 1995: 292).

In 1993 the affects of the dismissal of Federal Government should have been confined to sphere of federation. The smooth functioning of provincial government would have been encouraged. Contrarily political situation of the Province of Punjab was given desired effects. The President as custodian of the seal of federation and representative of unity of republic had to keep provincial affairs intact and unaffected. Provincial matters should have been free of interference from the President. The President not observing patience assisted ouster of Chief Minister of Punjab. Desired candidate was installed as substitute chief minister in consequence of the unpopular movement of the President. On restoration of the Government of Nawaz Sharif by Supreme Court the Judgment was not honestly accepted. The Federal Government launched a campaign against the Provincial Government. The Chief Minister on May 29, 1993 tendered advice of dissolution of the Punjab Assembly to Governor of Punjab. At the same time notice of no confidence against the Chief Minister was also put into process. The dispute regarding putting in motion the two mutually conflicting acts of rival parties erupted. The controversy became irresolvable and matter was filed through writ petition before Lahore High Court (Ch. Pervez Elahi vs Province of Punjab, PLD, 1993, Lahore, 595). The judgment of the Court was rendered unsuccessful by misuse of provisions of the constitution. The President bound to ensure compliance as custodian of the seal of federation failed to add strength to provincial autonomy. There was no intention on either side to resolve the issues under the constitution. The constitution was being resolved under the issues by federal authorities of state.

In 1994 coalition government of Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) and (ANP) in NWFP was not ally of the Federal Government. Government of the Province although had the required majority in the House. Federal Government tried to win over members of the coalition to establish their own government at every cost. On failing to do so the government tried the constitutional formula under Article 112. The Presidential Proclamation was issued on 25 February, 1994 stating that the situation had arisen in which the Government of the North-West Frontier Province could not be carried on in accordance with the provisions of Constitution. Therefore, in exercise of the powers under Article 234 the Constitution, the President directed the Governor of the North-West Frontier Province to assume functions of government of the province. All powers of the Provincial Assembly were brought under the authority of Parliament. The Chief Minister and provincial ministers ceased to hold office. The Order unless revoked earlier had to remain in force for a period of two months (Presidential Proclamation, 25 February 1994, PLD, S.C., 1994, P. 754). Leader of the House, the outgoing Chief Minister Sabir Shah challenged validity of the Proclamation before Supreme Court of Pakistan

## South Asian Studies 23 (2)

under article 184 (3) of the constitution. In response to submissions of the Petitioner Sabir Shah the Court ruled as under.

The Court observed that though Article 234 of the constitution was contained in Part X of the constitution, which relates to emergency provisions, but it cannot be equated with Article 232 which can be invoked when the President is satisfied that a grave emergency exists in which security of the country, or part thereof was threatened by war of external aggression or by internal disturbance beyond the power of the provincial government to control (Sabir Shah vs Federation of Pakistan, PLD, SC, 1994, P. 792). There was nothing in the language of Article 234, which could justify the conclusion that the President while exercising power under this Article can dissolve the provincial assembly or dismiss the provincial cabinet. The framers of the Constitution having specifically mentioned under Article 112 of the Constitution, the circumstances under which a provincial assembly can be dissolved, Court cannot on any known principle of interpretation read in to Article 234 of the Constitution which does not deal with the dissolution of assembly, the power of the President to dissolve the provincial assembly. As the Proclamation issued by the President under Article 234 was only a temporary measure, which lasted only for the period specified in the Constitution, dismissal of the Provincial Assembly by the President through Proclamation under Article 234 cannot be treated within the scope of incidental and consequential measures contemplated in Article 234(l) (c) of the Constitution.

The Court observed that a reference to the other relevant provisions of the Constitution makes it abundantly clear that sub-clause (c) of clause (1) of Article 234 of the Constitution is not intended and designed to be pressed into service for dismissal of the chief minister and his Cabinet. In the opinion of the Court the actions contemplated under sub-clauses (a) and (b) of Article 234 of the Constitution were of temporary nature. They were to last for a period of two months unless before the expiry of the above period, they were approved by resolution of the joint sitting and extended in terms of clause (3) of the Article. If the orders under sub-clauses (a) and (b) were to operate for a period of two months, the Chief Minister and his Cabinet could have been suspended for the period of two months but they could not have been removed from the office without pressing into service the mechanism provided in the Constitution.

The Court added that where the Proclamation under Art. 234 declared that Chief Minister of the Province and his Cabinet should cease to hold office beyond the period of the Proclamation, such Proclamation being in excess of the powers contained in Art. 234 of the Constitution, Chief Minister of the Province could not be denied relief by the Supreme Court under the Article 184 of the Constitution. The Proclamation under Article 234 of the Constitution could not operate for more than two months in the absence of approval and extension by the joint session of the Parliament in terms of clause (3) of Article 234. Chief Minister and his Cabinet could not have been dismissed nor could have been treated as having ceased beyond the period of two months. The Proclamation to the above extent was

beyond the purview of Article 234(1) and, therefore of no legal effect. The part of Proclamation directing the Governor to assume the functions of the Government and declaring that all powers of the Provincial Assembly shall be exercised by or under the authority' of Parliament was clearly in excess of the authority vested in the President under Article 234 of the Constitution and, therefore of no legal effect.

President Farooq Khan Laghari issued Proclamation on September 5, 1995 by involving emergency provisions to replay another conspicuous occasion of the same kind. The occasion again described the situation in which the affairs of the Province could not be carried out in accordance with provision of the Constitution. The action was challenged in the Court of law. The Court held that the power granted to the President to issue Proclamation is not uncontrolled but is circumscribed by two conditions. The President must be firstly satisfied and secondly the satisfaction must be that the affairs of the province cannot be run in accordance with the Constitution (*Manzoor Ahmad Watoo vs Federation, PLD, 1997, Lahore, P. 63*). The Court said that record did not show that on account of resignations of the Ministers a constitutional breakdown had occurred. It cannot constitute a situation in which the affairs of the Province cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. In law it has no relevance for the purpose of determining whether such situation exists. The Lahore High Court ruled the whole exercise unconstitutional and pointed out the requirements of the enforcement of emergency and termed the act of the President detrimental for the Federation.

The above-sited sequence of events is the gloomy picture of state federal system. Provincial governments were treated as puppets in the hands and for the benefit of the Federation. Whenever establishment targeted federal government the provincial governments were dismissed under punitive actions mostly because of their democratic association with the federal government. The provincial assemblies and their governments were seen from federal perspectives by triangular of the establishment, government and opposition.

The government of General Musaraff tried a fresh approach on local administration system disregarding constraints of provincial autonomy. The proposals and objections of provincial administrations were kept out of sight. Speakers at the seminar organized by Pakistan institute of legislative developments and transparency for members of provincial assemblies and district Nazism assessed the viability of the new system. The speakers of the seminar feared that the new local government system-introduced by military regime was a move towards restoration of one-unit system and encroachment upon provincial autonomy of the provinces of federation ('L B system', 2003).

## Strategy for Improvement /Sanctity of Constitution

The federation although needs to do a lot with cooperation of the provinces in the areas of legislation, administration and division of state resources. But that may need further deliberations of each side. The emphasis of the study is on fundamental requirements of federation. As for formation of federal structure it is created under the constitution. The Supremacy of constitution is first requirement of federalism. A law according to Alexander Hamilton, by the very meaning of the term, includes supremacy. It is a rule, which those to whom it is prescribed are bound to observe. If political entities or individuals enter into a status of federal society, the laws of that society must be supreme regulator of their conduct. If a member of political society enters into a larger political society, the laws that the latter may enact, pursuant to the powers entrusted to it by its constitution must necessarily be supreme over those societies and individuals of whom they are composed (Ahmed, n.d).

There is a certain indispensable body of recognized federal principles, which govern federal structure. A great urge of compliance of obligations relating to federal system amongst the entities is required to make the system a success. Implementation of federal obligations concerning grievances of provinces is the real issue. Constitution reflects aspiration of the composing units and provides for the system of governance not only in the present but also for future. It can be changed but its fundamentals are rarely changed as intended to remain operative for centuries. Constitution as fundamental law of the land establishes the character and style of its government laying basic principles to which its internal life has to be conformed. It organizes state organs and departments by prescribing the extent and manner of exercising the sovereign powers (Black Law dictionary, 4th ed.).

First of all at the stage of formulation of constitution it is supposed that it should contain principles of federalism comprehensively. But it does not happen all the way as presumed by its makers. Constitution, governing the federation must be flexibly made but rigidly followed. There is however deemed a defect inherent in the federal type of constitution, which the peculiar circumstances can unduly exaggerate and intensify. That defect is constitutional rigidity. It is this rigidity, inherent to a greater or lesser degree that every Federal Constitution, as Professor Dicey has pointed out, gives to the system one of its chief defects, the defect of conservatism (Dicey, n.d). But this has certain merits for federalism. Every person or institution exercising executive, legislative or judicial power must derive its authority from the Constitution. It must be set down in writing as clearly and unambiguously as possible, in order that there may be minimum of misunderstanding concerning its terms; and above all, to ensure that the important division between federal and local affairs shall not be left open to easy encroachments (The Law Quarterly Review, 1920).

The procedure of amendment of the Constitution must have specific involvement of federating units. Contrarily in Pakistan the most sacred document

holds less deference position. It was amended in a manner that produced detachment between the federation and its components. In certain cases Superior Courts allowed amendment in the constitution. Courts are not empowered to amend the constitution. Even a comma or a semi-colon could not be added or deleted by any court.

Irregular process of amendment in the Constitution of 1973 by military regimes has boosted issues of provincial autonomy. Amendments so made being subjective in nature may be described to have opened the way for further decomposition of the constitution. Such amendments made with spirit and procedure alien to its fundamentals have ruined its essential features of federal principles. Making and amending constitution is prerogative entitlement of the people of state. People of the state exercise these functions through representative parliament truly representing and safeguarding inalienable rights of federating units. The chief defect is the body of provision introduced in the Constitution of 1973 through irregular amendments that have taken away inalienable rights of the provinces. The amendments have centralized the state political system. These demerits need special attention of presently elected representative parliament to address issue of division of legislative powers, extent of federal governing system in provincial spheres along with equitable distribution of state resources. If representative assemblies address these issues democratically with the assurance that sanctity of the Constitution shall be maintained at all level, it can reinforce the bond of unity between federation and federating units.

## References

- Ahmed, S. J. (1990). *Federalism in Pakistan: A Constitutional Study*. Karachi: Pakistan Study Centre, University of Karachi.
- Ahmed, S. J. (2005, March 23). *Daily Dawn*. Lahore.
- Ali, M. (1992). *Understanding Pakistan*. Progressive publishers.
- Baz, Mohammad. (1995). *Constitution making in Pakistan 1947-1985*. Karachi: Royal Book Company.
- Chaudhri, G.W. (n.d). *Pakistan transition from military to civilian rule*. Scorpion publishing.
- Choudhury, G.W. (1995). *Constitutional Development in Pakistan*. Lahore: The Ideal Book House.
- Constituent Assembly Debates* (1954, September). Vol XVI, No, 31-21, pp 552-553.
- Dicey, A. V. (1964). *Introduction to the study of law of the constitution (10<sup>th</sup> ed.)*. London.
- G. Allana, G. (1968). *Pakistan Movement, Historic Documents*. Karachi.
- Jennings. (1953). *Some characteristics of the Indian Constitution*. Madras.
- L B system affects provincial autonomy [Bureau report]. (2003, August 29). *Daily Dawn*, p 22.
- Maluka, Z. K. (1995). *The Myth of Constitutionalism in Pakistan*. Karachi: Oxford University Press.
- Maluka, Z. K. (1995). *The Myth of Constitutionalism in Pakistan*. Karachi: Oxford University Press.
- Mehmud, S. (1990). Constitutional Foundations of Pakistan. In *daily Jang*. (1989). Lahore, p. 11.



## **South Asian Studies 23 (2)**

*The Law Quarterly Review.* (1920). Vol.36, p.158. London: Stevens & Sons limited.

*The Law Quarterly Review.* (1920). Vol.36. London: Stevens & Sons limited.

Vile, J.C. (1961). *The Structure of American Federalism.* Oxford.

## **Biographical Note**

**Dr. A.Q. Sial** is Head of the Department of Law at The Islmia University of Bahwalpur.

# **China and Economic Development in South Asia: A Case Study of Balochistan**

**Musarrat Jabeen**

*University of Balochistan, Quetta*

## **ABSTRACT**

Sino-Pak economic cooperation is logical, as both are physical neighbours. To approach China there is no need to take toll of 7000 nautical miles. The Chinese expertise has carried out mega projects in her northern part Balochistan. Above all she remained with Pakistan in odd and even times. In globalized world each state has to prove her metals at economic front, Pakistan a Third World country is no exception to this motivation. It implies that the economic development in regions like Pakistan particularly in Balochistan is dependent on external factors (the provision of capital and know how).

China (the fastest growing economy of the world) and South Asia have symbiotic relations. Her existence is a balancing factor when South Asia is looked upon by international community favoring some states e.g. trade and civil-nuclear deal between India and America creating inequity with in the region.

The question that why the Chinese investors and experts are targeted in Balochistan? This question is important to address as the economic development in Balochistan is dependent on external resources and is vital for the development of Pakistan. This study intends to manage the dynamics of economic cooperation versus obstruction politics for the greater development of Balochistan vis-à-vis Sino-Pak economic cooperation.

**KEY WORDS:** Economic Development; Conflict

## **Introduction**

“China does not seek selfish gains in South Asia and is ready to play a constructive role for peace and development in the region.”

(Chinese President Hu Jintao, 2006)

International relations have three dimensions: conflict, competition and cooperation. Cooperation between two states leads to competition and conflict with other states as well. The economic intimacy is shaped by the structure, process, and benefit of economic development. Who is getting what and why, out of economic development? The query is not raised only by the components of relative structure (the structure in this study is China-Pakistan-Balochistan) but by the external features to the structure as well. The process of cooperation is impeded by competing and conflicting trends in and around the structure.

Economic cooperation is based on sharing competencies and cooperates to maximize efficiency. Economic cooperation between China and Pakistan signifies

interdependence much needed for regional stability. This study is carried on in assumption that the economic cooperation may be fulfilled by reconciling the adverse trends at local and international level vis-à-vis economic development in Balochistan.

The study premises are; economic cooperation affected by the problem of political inconsistency at local and regional level and its impact on economic choices available to the region. The fundamental idea is to reconcile the adverse trends affecting the objective of economic cooperation between China and Pakistan - Balochistan. The following questions are taken in study:

1. How central is economic development of Balochistan to make it a supporting component of regional and international development?
2. How does local-national-international politics interact and inflate complexity in the process of economic development in Balochistan?
3. How to add new values to manage economic development in Balochistan supported by China to deal with the contemporary challenges?

The momentum set by burgeoning population, demand for economic development, and international instability have increased the complexity in management of economic relations. Therefore this paper intends to manage economic development in the contested area of Balochistan. This study focuses Balochistan; an area exposed to economic development politics, where the nation state systems are at the height of competition to manage economies while dealing simultaneously local and global challenges. Balochistan lacks the genetic muscle to absorb the economic development projects propelled by national-regional, and international motivations.

The study is divided into five sections, following introduction; section II focuses on, “Motivating Factors of Economic Development and Balochistan”, section III dilates, “Obstacles to Economic Development in Balochistan”, section IV proposes, “3-D strategy to manage the Economic Development in Balochistan” and section V is the learning statement.

There is a multilateral growth of economies to cooperate in international system depending on the power of participating states in economic development with international or regional dynamics. (See Table. 1) There are two types of states; one already having eager status in international economic system’s decision making of World Bank and IMF, e.g. The United States of America couching G-8 forum simultaneously to uphold the status quo. The other is in the process of cooperation at regional and international level e.g. Chinese economic aspirations in Balochistan with a lesser status in international financial institutions.

**Table 1**

**Index of Dynamic Linkages of Economic Development**

This index analyses the dynamic linkages of Economic Development. Following are the indicators:

<b>Dynamic Linkages</b>	<b>Indicators</b>
1. Core linkages of Economic Development	The economic development is established via peaceful coexistence.
2. Overwhelming linkages of Economic Development.	It overwhelms the world economics as each nation state visions the economic development.
3. Cohesive linkages of Economic Development	It is performed by forging links with civil society as donors or strategic partners.

(Source: Self made)

China has made giant strides in South Asia on economic front. She has ‘Free-Trade Agreement’ (FTA) with Pakistan and has emerged as the largest trading partner of Bangladesh. She is preferred trading partner by Pakistan in the west, through Nepal in the north and Bangladesh in the east to Sri Lanka in the south across Indian status in the region.

Sino Pakistan relations have comprehensive nature which took its apex during the Chinese president visit to Pakistan in Oct 2006. The 18 agreements ranging from defense cooperation to energy included a free-trade agreement (FTA) that is expected to boost bilateral trade from US\$ 4.26 billion last year to \$15 billion within five years. The two countries are also agreed on a five-year plan to boost economic ties. Besides, Chinese and Pakistani companies have finalized 13 joint-venture agreements worth \$3 billion. And Hu inaugurated a special economic zone near Lahore, which has been set up for Chinese business. With regard to civilian nuclear energy, China has already helped build a 300-megawatt nuclear plant and is building another. It reaffirmed the commitment to “continue to carry out such cooperation.” Indeed the relationship has been an “all-weather friendship”, having survived the region’s turbulent politics as well as major realignments in international politics. Pakistan sees China as its most dependable ally. It has contributed significantly to the country’s economic development. It is partnering in the constitution of a port at Gwadar, contributing technical expertise and the bulk of the funding for the project. For China, Pakistan is a useful counterweight to India. This is behind its efforts at building the country’s economic and military muscle. Pakistan also provides China with a link to the Muslim world (Asia Times, 2007).

## **II - Motivating Factors of Economic Development and Balochistan**

We found in section I that economic cooperation between China and Pakistan for development is imperative to compete in international economic system. In section II we go through the motivating factors in and around China & Pakistan-

Balochistan for economic development, whereby the cooperation must exist to increase the efficiency of resources.

Balochistan confluences South – Central Asia and Middle East and her geo economic valuation is dual; economic potential with in Balochistan and its value to link the economies around. In Geo-economic terms Balochistan has remained strategic vocal in history also, between British and Russian hegemonies. From 16-18 centuries Gadani port was used for trade purposes to and from Central Asia but later the British stopped it as to determine the regional development (Kundi, 2005).

Turkey, Iran and Pakistan signed Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD) in 1964 and a road link was built through Balochistan to link the three countries. This arrangement of relations has now taken the shape Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO).

Since the discovery of gas in Sui in 1952, Pakistan saved foreign exchange worth over two billion a year as natural gas was used as an import substitute for decades. Balochistan fulfills almost 40 per cent of energy needs of Pakistan. In regard to untapped and unexplored resources, there are indicators that Balochistan has very bright prospects to meet the future needs of whole of Pakistan. Pakistan has issued licenses to score of companies for exploring oil and gas in vast areas of Balochistan, including the offshore prospects near Pasni Coast (Shahid, 2005). Gas and oil hydrates are also found on ocean floor in Gwadar and Pasni.

In order to support Pakistan's growing economy, both supply and demand for oil and gas have been on the rise. During FY'04 country's primary energy supplies increased from eight per cent to 50.8 million (tons of oil equivalent) from 47.1 million than the year before (Hussain, 2005). The present policy of government for power generation is backed by gas fired and hydel power plants, and because of drought conditions it will be more focusing on gas fired projects.

The management of economic development in Balochistan is vital because of following reasons:

- Energy has become the defining factor of international as well as national politics
- 9/11 and war on terrorism----Pakistan has emerged as the non-NATO ally-the conflict trends may be dealt by generating economic activity via management of economic development.

Pakistan may locate a capable place in global community by exploring new avenues of raw materials and economic activity in the province of Balochistan. The area of Balochistan may open new vicissitudes of prosperity for Pakistan. The province of Balochistan has become the center of attention because of following reasons and opportunities: -

1. The disintegration of USSR and economic independence of Central Asian States have created a huge economic opportunity. Balochistan is a gateway to Central Asia.
2. The economic potential in Balochistan:
  - Large coastal line of Balochistan of 770 km from the mouth of the Hub River in the east to the Iranian border in the west.

- Enormous mineral resources; as it sits on geological belt with world-class mineral deposits. For example, Sarchashma in neighboring Iran has reserves of 1.2 billion tons of copper and other mineral ores, the Chaghi metallurgical belt, 480 kilometers long and 50 kilometers wide, offers the prospect of a similar potential in Balochistan (Haque, 2004).
- Interest of foreign investors particularly from China and of international institutions, bilateral donor agencies, and International non-governmental organizations in Balochistan because of above given strategic and commercial qualifications.

The development projects in Balochistan include Gwadar Port (China), Mirani dam, Kachi canal, Coastal Highway, Subakzai dam, Greater Quetta Water Scheme, Zob-Dera Ismail Khan Scheme, Saindak (China) - Rekodiq (Australia). The quantum of foreign investment has ranged between 200-300 million dollars per annum in preferred sectors like oil and gas. The projects will bring employment.

Gwadar deep-sea port phase - 1 of the project has been completed by April 2005. Work on phase - 2 has been started in May 2005 at a cost of \$865 million. Mirani dam project in Makran is being constructed across the Dasht River at its confluence to Kech and Nihang rivers, some 30 miles west of Turbat city. The project forms part of the gigantic “National Water and Hydro-power Resources Development Programme: Vision 2025” to bring the underdeveloped areas at par with the developed ones. All these projects are assessed as pre-requisite to development of Gwadar port. Karachi port handles nearly 50million tones of cargo annually and with Pakistan’s economy expected to grow at a minimum of six per cent annually, the volume of trade is projected to be around 75 million in the year 2015. The government has undertaken expansion programmes at both ports to enable them meet the growing demand of trading and commercial activities because of overflow of incoming and outgoing sea cargo to cater the transit traffic flowing from Central Asian states and Afghanistan. The Gawadar project came about as a result of a Sino Pakistan Agreement in March 2002. Beijing has provided \$198 million for the first phase of the project and Islamabad’s contribution has been \$ 50 million. By virtue of location Gawadar is visualized to become a regional hub serving incoming and outgoing commercial traffic of the Middle Eastern and Gulf countries, the Xinjian province of China and Bangladesh and India in South Asia. Its location at the mouth of the Gulf and at the opposite end of the strategic choke points of Straits of Hormuz and the Gulf of Oman enhances its strategic importance. Its development could favorably influence the geo strategic environment of the region and have an overall beneficial impact on Pakistan. Additionally the port may facilitate efficient exploitation of the exclusive economic zone of Pakistan, which so far has remained largely unexplored. The area is rich in fisheries and if the long coastal line is fully exploited it could give a big boost to fish and crab exports and promote food –processing industries. Lying

## South Asian Studies 23 (2)

in the vicinity of oil-rich Gulf States, Gawadar could also be a potential source of offshore gas and oil exploration. The existing highways on the Afghan border, connecting the border towns of Chaman and Qandhar provide the shortest all weather road links to Gawadar.

The share of Balochistan in national wealth is attributed to her geo-economic status in national and international realities, as she remained in focus for either it was the pursuit of hot waters by Russia or now it is pursuit of oil discovered in Central Asia. Her location in international geo-economic system abounds her in national economy.

China may reduce dependency of Pakistan in know how and capital for economic development. China has great stakes in emerging energy map of Asia, where Pakistan may become the corridor and China the beneficiary. Both the states have common policy not only in the fight against terror but also to bring reforms in the UN structure. This regional vision gives the avenue for greater economic valuation of current challenges.

China since 1978 mainly focused on its economy and sustainable development. With an average growth of 9.5 per cent for almost three consecutive years, china has not only proved to be an emerging political, military and economic giant, but also lifted up a huge part of population from the vicious cycle of poverty. According to Alliance Trust, an investment company, China will be the second biggest economy in 2050, second to US with India taking third place (Khan, 2005).

China favors and believes strongly in the open and free trade with the world. China became the member of WTO in 2002, and she entered in real economic competition and exporting too many elements to too many countries around the world to keep its economic muscles strengthened. The collapse of various corporations and joblessness to about 20,000 in the US indicates the high economic boom and quality export level of the China whose goods are appreciated and used everywhere irrespective of any state (Ibid). China is in need of oil badly. Therefore, it is struggling to import much oil from Middle Eastern States particularly from Iran.

China is struggling to get a direct oil- pipeline. China's state owned oil company CNOOC gave a bid of \$18.5 billion to buy US UNOCAL Oil Company but US Congress has obstructed the move. China also faces restrictions of getting oil from Caspian Sea region that is counterfeited by the US at present.

As WTO does not allow China to consume much of the coal that is hazardous to the environment, China is thinking of alternatives to explore the oil resources in the continental shelf by using the "Exclusive Economic Zone" of the sea. This is possible through remote-guided submerge sable. China, in this context, has become successful in making such a scientific device that can merge into sea for about 20,000-30,000 feet that previously was only 10,000 feet. These all indicators show the seriousness of China in focusing much more in strengthening its economy (Ibid).

China and Pakistan relations, despite the US imperialistic hegemony in the region, should not be affected. Pakistan, because of its strategically important locations, still provides the outlet to China especially to its western part, with easy access to Arabian Sea and vast oil and gas resources of the Middle East. This convergence of Strategic and economic interests, more than anything else, provides sound basis for futuristic development between the two states. Despite the displeasure of India about China's interest coming into the SAARC organization, China might be given the permanent membership in the near future as Afghanistan has already been accepted by the 8- SAARC member states on the 13<sup>th</sup> SAARC conference held in Dhaka in 2005. However, she enjoys the "observer status" (*Ibid*).

Pakistan-US relations have their own importance for Islamabad. However, it is important to note that US has walked away from Pakistan several times after seeing its interests. There is no guarantee that this would not happen again. Furthermore, the US strategic interests with India, in the form of 10 - year defense pact signed on June 28, 2005, has created many hurdles due to which Pakistan suffered from serious limitations and uncertainties while Pak-China relations remain time-tested and everlasting.

Iran and Pakistan are two states where China is making heavy investment in the modernization of the rail and road network to seek a connection and build linkages for its south west. As these linkages develop, China's reach to the Persian Gulf (Gawadar) and the Indian Ocean becomes a reality. Since 1978, US-Iran trade has declined from 21 per cent to about one per cent in 2003. In 2003, while the China-Iran trade has raised from one per cent to eight per cent by 2003. In 2003, China imported oil from Iran worth \$2.6 billion, and Iran imported civilian machines, electrical equipment and appliances, vehicles, aircraft and instruments worth of \$1.1 billion from China (Garver, 2005). China also continues to support Iran's role as a regional power in the Gulf while the US opposes it. China and Iran have a shared strategic objective in demanding withdrawal of all foreign troops from the Gulf making it a zone free of great power influence. Pakistan has the potential and opportunity to play the role of a strategic partner in the emerging China-Iran equation. Gas pipeline planned among; Iran-Pakistan and India through Balochistan impacted upon the US relations with all the three countries. Then the foreign investment in Balochistan is a matter of concern for UAE coastal economies as well. The Gwadar project and the unrest in Balochistan must be understood and analyzed in that larger regional context.

### **III-Obstacles to Economic Development in Balochistan**

Section I and II of this study deliberate that economic development is bound to happen in Balochistan vis-à-vis regional and international emerging economic system. In section III the question is posed which are the obstacles to economic



## South Asian Studies 23 (2)

development being processed referred to economic cooperation between China & Pakistan in Balochistan?

Development of Balochistan as coastal economy seems different and complex when it is compared to coastal economy of Dubai, as development of Dubai is evolutionary, the international community was not vigilant rather, one may say, contesting on its development. The development of Balochistan is complex because:

- Globalization has induced the countries to contest for resources where ever they are available due to better communication system and Balochistan, rich in mineral resources, is no exception to this.
- Economic geography has taken the lead over other factors of power.
- International power structure deems important the economic development in Balochistan for the existing conflict management strategies vis-à-vis war on terrorism.
- The national power structure “The Pakistan army” (its traditional status in the politics of Pakistan referred to three Martial Laws in Pakistan) insulated the security of economic development in Balochistan. People at the helm of affairs are now poring over internal challenges and external accountability.
- Center province disharmony remains juvenile.
- The local component for development is weak as the literacy rate is abysmally low in Balochistan.
- Existing socio-political set up of Balochistan is not committed to development to disjuncture the old set up.
- The capacity of natural resources, e.g. water, may not match the mega development projects.

Conflict in Balochistan has been prompted; as contenders are seeking to possess the economic resources, and to occupy the same exclusive position; while playing incompatible roles through incompatible means. The wholesale cry about the province by the natives and the center is always that the province is deprived and poor. The center utilizes it to format a pretext to interfere in the provincial matters and the natives try to acquire more and more benefits from the center. Dependency, disharmony between center and the province, mistrust between the government and the people, regional and international factors are the dimensions of conflict.

Balochistan is dependent on center, because of myriad of factors. Balochistan is 43 per cent area wise but only 5.8 per cent of the population. The national resources are divided on the basis of population. No federation follows, in the world, population as the sole bases for distribution of revenues among the federation units except Pakistan. The Balochistan position paper declares in clear words while giving examples of revenue distribution criteria of three federations of the world---India, Australia and Germany. In all the three federations population has been given 10 to 11 per cent ratio while other factors have been

given much more weight age (Ghausi, 2005). The other indicators in case of Balochistan can be included are backwardness, the share of provinces in national wealth, and inverse population density. Balochistan also receives direct transfers from the federal government on account of its ownership of gas. It is fixed at the rate of 12.5 per cent of the gas sold and valued at the well-head price. The well-head price has been pitched at a low level for the gas fields in Balochistan; those discovered recently have higher well-head prices. Balochistan only contributes around six per cent of revenues and receives federal transfers as 94.5 per cent for provincial expenses (Kardar, 2005).

Mistrust existed between civil-military bureaucracy and the people of Balochistan. At the root of the discontent were under-development and widespread poverty and the fear that the mega projects would provide a cover for the induction of outsiders into Balochistan, making the Baloch still more deprived and impoverished. Incompatibility between contemporary rights, talks and the historical processes through which rights came to be framed: Balochistan is an unending tale of our political and socio-economic lapses. Balochistan politics needs to be looked upon as a part of Pakistan. It has always been facing the crisis of political development: these can be elaborated as Binder (Leonard, 1963) explains in, "Religion and Politics in Pakistan" The crisis of *identity, legitimacy, representation and penetration*. The federal development program includes not only Gawadar, the coastal highway and the Sandak project but also the construction of provincial roads (like those connecting Chaman and Quetta and Quetta and Kila Saifulla), which should be implemented by the provincial government, essentially because some of them, even under the flawed Constitution, fall entirely within the purview of the provincial and local governments.

In Gwadar Housing Scheme the land Mafia residing in Karachi has manipulated the land record in their favor with the help of government machinery and now the per acre land prices have gone from thousands to millions (Haqani, 2005). The plan to build cantonments in Gwadar, Dera Bugti, Kohlu and Khuzdar in Balochistan are aimed at ensuring full control over the resources. The issue of Dera Bugti has become complicated as the government mobilized armed forces, thus creating a situation of armed conflict. The Baloch people think that subjugation and colonization is taken in the name of development. The provincial government seems unable to manage the potential of local political system in larger interest of the country.

In British times Balochistan was divided as British Balochistan, and Native Balochistan. The British Balochistan was 25 per cent and mostly comprised of Pathan belt. The rest included mostly the Baloch areas. The 75 per cent of native Balochistan was led by Khan of Kalat, as the small tribes were paying royalty to Khan of Kalat and he was paying it to British government. This tribal system suppose to interject the people and the government, always fulfilled their own interests rather than to embark upon real social and economic development. *Sardars* are like demigods to their people who are their bonded subjects. They

hold sway over their life and death. How could any one dare vote against them in an election? The *sardars* become chief ministers and ministers through the electoral process. On being elected they wield unbridled state power; which is otherwise not available to them.

Afghan conflict caused the growth of militancy in Balochistan, the low-intensity conflict between the Soviet/Afghan forces and mujahideen, the emergence of Klashnikov culture, and availability of advanced weapons made a large number of tribes militant and violent (Dunken, 1989). It is particular in case of many tribes such as Marri, Bugti, Rind, Mengal, Acakzai, Raisani tribes. Marri tribesmen; who had been involved in a large scale insurgency in 1973-74, fled to Afghanistan, and returned 18 years later, are more violent and militant today than were then.

It is important to note that if Balochistan serves American international vision in present condition, she will not promote its development, and if China views its development necessary for the region, it will cooperate with Pakistan in this respect.

Gwadar port is being developed with full assistance from the Chinese. There were reports in the American press expressing concern over the Chinese interest in some ports including Gwadar. It was suggested that the Chinese were trying to seek bases all along the oil route. Also there are people in the White House who are all for military action against Iran. Preparations for invading Iran are afoot, similar secret preparations were ordered for Iraq before its invasion. Americans are building a base in Herat of Afghanistan to encircle Iran. A request for NATO logistics hub in Karachi has already been conveyed to Pakistan (Syed Shahid Hussain, op cited). That is where Balochistan would offer a tempting target for international intrigues.

#### **IV-3-D Strategy to Manage Economic Development in Balochistan**

*“If world poverty were simply an economic problem, we would be closer to a solution by now. But development is a web of economic, political, institutional, ethnic, and class-related connections with persistent historical roots.”*

(Robert M. Professor Emeritus, MIT, and Nobel Laureate in Economics, 1987)

There should be a political commitment for economic development of Balochistan. The process requires a prerequisite sense of urgency. More complex analysis of both the causes and symptoms of conflict in Balochistan can be directed as follows:

- Move from discrete projects in particular areas to looking more at other parts of Balochistan.

- More strategic engagement with tribal system at different levels to try to ensure that they have both the capacity and the political will to uphold their responsibilities to protect the right of economic development.
- More collaborative work with other, social movements and networks at different levels; moderate and progressive political leaders.

This study presents three strategies to manage the economic development in Balochistan. It also includes the views of prevalent political structure of Balochistan, just to light the other perspective of the picture to reach some solution to existing situation.

## **Management of Local Component for Economic Development**

The right to development is human right as declared by UN declaration of 1986 and focused by UNDP Human Development Index 1990. The rights based approach emphasizes that development should be based on recognition of the equal rights of all citizens to the resources required for material well being and social inclusion with a predetermination of development where in the contribution of state is given prominence. Legitimate political institutions can embark upon socio-economic development; if they are willing for change to improve the social capital. In Balochistan the political institutions drive and affect the economic process, because there are no agile economic institutions within the political network.

Specific education is required to bring changes in decision-making support system over which the socio political structure seems dependent. Some revolutionary steps can be taken like in 1949 India passed a political order to dismantle the previous political structure having 525 states and instead 22 provinces were created. Constitutional amendments should be made to manage the conflict in Balochistan. Economic development may be interjected with society by building required knowledge economy to promote economic development. Moreover the social services should be enhanced in the province.

A lot is required to promote labor-intensive, small and medium enterprises to tap the strengths of Balochistan. It should include agro-based industries, ground water development projects, livestock development, along with access for export to the Gulf where they can easily win a big share of the market presently dominated by the imports from Australia and New Zealand, cold storage, fruit and vegetable processing plants and development of mineral resources. These and similar other projects and business in the hands of the people of the province would address their problems much better than capital-intensive projects largely concentrated in one or two regions.

***Three areas for industrial investment potential:*** Foremost place is Lasbela district where all facilities are available. The second area is Naseerabad where agriculture is fairly developed making the raw material, basic infrastructure,

railroad, electricity, water and other facilities available. Proximity of Sindh is an additional factor finding markets for finished products for local consumption. The third area is Mekran, with the highest literacy rate and manpower, got good exposure from the Gulf region. The construction of Gwadar Port with a free trade area and the proposed Export Processing Zone will add to the investment opportunities. Two major valleys of Mekran, Kech and Panjgur, are known to be the cultural capital of Balochistan where highly literate population is available to man the future industries of Balochistan. Fisheries and seafood industry too have vast scope for development on Balochistan coast right from Bunewari near Hub to Jiwani on the borders with Iran. The seafood industry alone can earn two billion dollars foreign exchange if the available sea wealth area is exploited properly, meant only for the benefit of the local people. The government in the case will have to stop illegal fishing and indiscriminate use of deadly fishing gears that is being patronized by corrupt political bosses for the past many decades (Shahid, 2005). Chromite was found in Balochistan in 1903; Balochistan should have refinement plant, and iron up-gradation plant in Dilband. Onex marble is available in Chaghi, which should be refined. Balochistan has the best quality of cotton; it produced six billions bales in 2004-2005 (Haider, 2005).

The short-term interests of land mafia or vested interest groups should not damage the interests of local population. Most of the infrastructural development is linking Gawadar with Karachi. The government should pay equal attention to developing road and rail links from Gawadar to the hinterland of Balochistan so that all Baloch equally share the development.

A national law should be enacted fixing a minimum of between 1-2 per cent of Profit Based Tax to be contributed by resource extraction companies towards a 'Community Development Fund', which should be managed under a Trust to plan for long - term welfare of the community/union council/ *tehsil* where these facilities are located.

The created militancy in youth may be managed by promoting martial arts in the province. An institute of conflict management may be established in Balochistan to manage different trends on conflict in Balochistan.

## **Management of Center Province Disharmony**

The idea of this strategy is to harmonize the relations between center and the province as what center commits with International community e.g. China; must be respected and implemented by the province.

**Cooperation beyond economics:** If the politics do not catch up with the economics, many things can go wrong. We need leadership, we need institutions, and we need cooperation in many dimensions.

State has to assume the responsibility to build infrastructure-public economy. A shift is required in conventional development thinking by stressing that

development is about people, their knowledge and institutions. The relations between center and the province can be improved by genuine federal system, fiscal devolution, and by building confidence in people. Here a few of the suggestions of tribal chiefs are added as well. The view is to consider wider options for sustainable settlement of the dispute.

***Genuine federal system:*** Balochistan demands the provincial autonomy provided in the Resolution of Pakistan 1940 (Amanulla, 2005). The question of provincial autonomy remains the key to addressing the issues of federalism. If any changes are needed in our constitution, they should be made. Our constitution has been amended many times for reasons of political power or expediency. It can be amended now to remove the underlying causes of injustice and socio - economic deprivation of the people of smaller provinces. A new federal structure has to be devised in the interest of stability in Pakistan. This will require a recasting of the constitution and the establishment of a more viable structure that gives meaningful autonomy to the provinces. This involves a slashing of the Concurrent List and managing the control of all key resources like oil and gas where these resources are located. The people of Balochistan also need to be freed of the outdated and exploitative *Darbari* and *Sardari* tribal system, which keeps them backward to sustain its own privilege and power. The *Sardars* in Balochistan must understand the new realities of the world. Instead of obstructing genuine development and security related projects, they should welcome any public or private investments in their province which would ultimately bring direct or indirect socio-economic dividends to their people. With greater share in political power and better economic opportunities, the people of Balochistan could chart for them a new and better place in the federation of Pakistan. A system is needed to check the abuse of economic and political power.

Lack of legislative and financial powers is causing the conflict between center and the province. The Senate should be directly elected and it should have the financial powers. The answer to the injustices felt by the Baloch lies in solutions in a genuine federal system and not in conjuring at political system around some misconceived notion of, “supreme national interest” nor by simply increasing the size of the federal government’s development programs in Balochistan and enhancing the job quotas for the Baloch in federally managed public services and projects.

To have the amicable solution the concept of “WENESS” can be launched between the military and local population. It was the shield of Pakistan military which made USSR not to invade Balochistan in pursuit of hot waters in 1980’s. Pakistan military provides defense against external threat. At the same time the territory of Balochistan provides strategic depth to Pakistan military to benefit them at national and regional-international levels.

Army should be recruited from all over Pakistan and NFC (National Finance Commission) should be revised (Ziaratwal, 2005). This plea has already been taken by the recruitment policy of Pakistan army, as around 100 officers from

Balochistan are now taken yearly. Disciplinary clauses of relegation and withdrawal are also relaxed in Pakistan Military Academy.

The only solution lies in dialogue and mutual adherence to the agreed constitutional framework. Wherever a change or adjustment is warranted, it should be made through political and constitutional means. The government should establish firm authority that the rule of law prevails in every corner of the country. The government and the local forces should effect reconciliation with local residents and then work together with them in places where military operations against insurgents have taken place.

Legislative powers regarding Gwadar and other mega - projects must vest in the Balochistan Assembly and the entire income, in the shape of taxes at present going to the federal government, should belong to the Balochistan government. The head of the port authority must be a Baloch and 60 per cent of the membership of its board of directors should be from Balochistan. All the foreign investments in Gwadar should be made on the pattern of the UAE that is on the basis of 51 per cent local and 49 per cent foreign partnership without meeting this condition, no license should be issued. The four federating units should be given equal representation in the senate ('Bugti has doubts', 2005).

20 per cent of royalties should go to the district governments to carry out regular development works, 30 per cent should go to a provincial 'Human Resource Development Fund' to fully finance the education of meritorious boys and girls of the province to study science and technology in quality institutions in Pakistan and abroad. The 50 per cent should go to the provincial exchequer to improve the financial resources (Shah, 2005). Along with this, a mutually agreed formula for the division of royalties ---not just for the gas from Sui but also for the copper from Saindak and the gas pipeline from Iran to India across Pakistan--- and its actual implementation would offer a pragmatic solution. The idea should be to restore confidence and good faith between the center and the province. The federating units must be empowered to make all laws on their own units (Mangel, 2005). The idea behind this proposal is to cost analyze that what we are loosing by not doing this and what we will gain by doing this as a nation? The comparative advantage must be availed.

***Winning the confidence of the local people;*** A civil society should be developed by taking all the political forces into confidence. Unpopular policies should be modified, as the policies of building cantonments. Government has already devised some of steps to promote confidence building measures.

Then Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz granted Rs. one billion grant for speeding up development activities and rehabilitation of drought hit areas in Balochistan and Rs. 10 billion Balochistan uplift Plan, 23 June 2005: These include the implementation of the 5.4 per cent quota for Balochistan in federal jobs, priority for local people in new jobs expected to be thrown up by the Gwadar seaport, compensation to fishermen affected by the port's construction, representation of Balochistan leaders on boards of directors of the Oil and Gas Development

Corporation and the Sui Southern Gas Company. The package also includes a one time waiver on gas charges for local residents, payment of oil and gas royalties directly to areas from where these are extracted, removal of the Constabulary and Coast Guard check posts from cities and towns and the provision of night-landing facilities at Quetta airport. Of the Rs. 10-billion for the province, one billion would be spent on improving health-care system, two billion on uplifting schemes in the Sui area, three billion in Gwadar and four billion in Quetta. But the period within which the pledged amount would be made available to Balochistan and spent on development project not clear.

The philosopher-economist Adam Smith boldly included all useful abilities of the inhabitants of a country whether inherited or acquired, as part of capital. Human capital refers to people and their capacities, education, skills cultures, and technologies; World Bank is sensitive to human capital (see Table. 2)

**Table 2**  
**World Bank's Economic Development Components**

<i>Human capital</i> <i>64per cent</i>	Natural capital 20per cent	Physical capital 16per cent
---	-------------------------------	--------------------------------

(Source: Adopted from World Bank hand book for economic development available on [www.http://wb.org](http://wb.org) accessed on 10 Jan 2007).

The dual paradigm for economic development distinguishes between explanations of natural resources cast at the Balochistan level, commonly known as geo-economic value of Balochistan, the other explanation cast at the national level (Pakistan) and regional level (China) may be labeled as geo-human value. Such sort of values seeks to manage the two way resources (human + natural) for the best interest of China-Pakistan-Balochistan. Now here the value of natural capital is 20per cent and of human capital is 64per cent, so certain mechanism should be developed for local, national and regional economic development in practical terms to manage the issues of dependency and mistrust referred to politics of economic development.

In this view the status of Balochistan as valued referred to its geo-strategic status in national economy the human factor must be evaluated with reference to China and Pakistan, from where it can come for the economic development of Balochistan.

### **Management of Regional-International Relations vis-à-vis Economic Development in Balochistan**

The real challenge is to manage external factor, because political institutions take the cognizance of contemporary realities as much as they serve their interests. In Balochistan the private sector lacks the economic strength much needed for development. Therefore the national and international private sectors would




encroach upon the province. In this predicament, integration of diverse identities for economic development is needed.

**Integrating diverse identities:** The remedy lies in granting political and economic rights to all regions and groups for enabling them to make economic and political advancement. This is pressing for the preservation of our identity as a state. This step needs to be supported by measures aimed at neutralizing the negative effects of globalization on our economy so that the size of the cake is not reduced and its distribution is not skewed further, giving rise to an upward swing in poverty levels and an assertion of cultural identities with renewed force.

**Figure 4**

**Strategy for Economic Development Vision**



To comprehend the economic development; economic strategic vision should be built (see figure. 4) at community, provincial, national, regional and international levels. A Regional Forum for the Economic Development of Balochistan should be created calling in all stake holders, China, United States of America, Afghanistan, Iran, India and of course the Multinational Corporations which are interested to have security concerns managed by utilizing their economic strategy.

## Learning Statement

In the era of globalization political capital is being expedited as per frequency of global agendas visiting its potential to get realized at macro or micro level and the political capital in Balochistan is no exception to this reality. In Balochistan political set up is affecting the development. It is apprehensive that the states like India, USA, Iran or the Arab Emirates do not see in their regional and international vision Balochistan as developed part of Pakistan so they try to nullify the process of development in Balochistan, e-g section in India suggests a tit-for-tat policy be pursued in Balochistan in response to Pakistan's interference in Jammu and Kashmir ([www.saag.org/BB/view.asp?msgid=26773](http://www.saag.org/BB/view.asp?msgid=26773)).

It is found that bilaterally US has opted a policy of engagement with China but disengagement at regional and international level. A full constellation of circumstances constituting Balochistan conflict is operative. In fact no strength exists in the education system of Pakistan and particularly of Balochistan to refine political capital. The resource illiteracy exists at different levels: as the power structure of Pakistan lapses the Balochistan factor as denominator of economic development in Pakistan as the sense of urgency and eagerness is not being paid

and the tribal and native system does not recognize that foreign investment is a source for development.

Subjects of 57 years of neglect or managed under ad-hoc strategies; are now partners in development. It is a clear lack of domestic component for economic development; which undermines the utilization of foreign investment. In Balochistan genuine democracy does not exist; as either the elections are engineered by the bureaucracy or hampered by the tribal system. Sardars fear loosing of power once the economic development takes place. The government has been patronizing majority of sardars for its own objectives. Provision of incentives to native population becomes difficult in tribal system. In Balochistan matter to the fact is that the investors out of Balochistan and out of Pakistan are equally considered foreigner by virtue of practice. Their fears are that outsiders, whether foreign or domestic, will undertake development work and threaten the identity and livelihood of the local inhabitants. The local population can not question their tribal leaders for their welfare rather they are directed to account and audit the government in this respect to secure more benefits which will be ultimately used by the Sardars of tribal system. In fact they are being played by their political leaders. In socio-political management of foreign investment in Balochistan the Sardars can not be over looked.

It is clear that foreign investors do influence economic choices. Moreover, their policy design is often defective, ignores ground realities. More importantly mega projects yield more benefits to international investors or the rest of the country, as compared to the local population.

Building Gawadar port is linked to the stability in Afghanistan and Central Asia. From a defensive perspective, Pakistan navy would find it easier to operate closer to the Gulf. During times of crisis it could move its naval assets farther from Indian naval and air threat.

While locating Balochistan in global foreign investment trends the study establishes; that the natural resources have become integrated into the political economy of local, regional, and global conflicts. With the present distribution of factor endowments and technology between developed and developing nations, the theory of comparative advantage thus prescribes that developing nations should continue to specialize primarily in the production and export of raw material, *fuels*, *minerals*, and food to developed nations in exchange for manufactured products (Salvatore, 2000). The development of mineral resources in Balochistan reflects the global politics as well.

The paper has found that locals are suffering from crises of identity and the national elites at the helm of affairs are facing the rights of federation legitimacy while the regional states are overvaluing their interests whether they are Chinese commercial interests or US war on terrorism-energy interests. It is clear that long term security of the state is not possible without providing its citizens with at least basic subsistence, education and health care. Politicians are not included in the

factors of production, but they affect the process of production. The 3-D strategy mentioned in this paper may be applied vigorously.

*“Let me assure you that I have not for one moment allowed the affairs of Balochistan to slip out of my mind. I pondered, over the ways and matters of improving the lot of our people in this province and of enabling them to secure for themselves the same position and the same political status within the polity of Pakistan, which are open to their brethren in other provinces....”*

(Quaid-I-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Address to Sibi Darbar on Feb 14, 1948).

Balochistan may remain dependent as the seriousness of dependence relies on the element of competency. Ownership is not the most critical factor. Balochistan may insist on majority ownership by its own locals. But if locals are incapable of successfully making the important entrepreneur and managerial decisions; there is still reliance on others. Entrepreneurship is more important than management. It seems that international interests would work with power structure of Pakistan so it is desirous on part of local socio-politics to resolve the conflict amicably with power structure of Pakistan for greater development of Balochistan. In this way the cooperation for economic development between China and Pakistan-Balochistan may take the shape of reality.

## References

- Amanulla [Senator Pakistan]. (2005). *Round Table Dialogue on Provincial Autonomy* organized by Balochistan NGO's Forum on May 24.
- Asia Times. (2007). [http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South\\_Asia/HK28Df01.html](http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/HK28Df01.html) accessed on January 15.
- Bugti has doubts about performance of parliament panel. (2005, September 30). *Daily The Nation*.
- Dunken, Emma. (1989). *Breaking the Curfew: A Political Journey through Pakistan*. London: Michael Joseph.
- Garver, John W. (2005). *China & Iran: Ancient Partners in Post-Imperial World*. Washington: University of Washington.
- Ghausi, Sabihuddin. (2005, July 10). Distribution of Resources: Sindh Balochistan Develop Differences. *Daily Dawn*.
- Haqani, I. A. (2004, September 20). Personal interview with Sardar Attaullah Mangel. *Daily Jang*, Quetta.
- Haque, Ihtasham ul. (2004, September 13). Government to move against land mafia in Gwadar. *Daily Dawn*, Karachi.
- Hussain, Dilawar. (2005, March 1). Energy sector fuels fire of economic growth. *Daily Dawn*, Karachi.
- India and Balochiastan. (2007). [www.saag.org/BB/view.asp?msgid=26773](http://www.saag.org/BB/view.asp?msgid=26773) accessed on January,18.
- Kardar, S. (2005, January 27). The bitterness of the Baloch. *Daily Daw*, Karachi.
- Khan, Z. (2005, December 9). China: an Emerging Giant. *The Frontier Post*, Peshawar.
- Kundi, M. A. (2005). Dean of State Science, University of Balochistan, Quetta, Personal Interview.

## *Musarrat Jabeen* **China and Economic Development**

- Leonard, B. (1963). *Religion and Politics in Pakistan*. Berkley: University of California Press.
- Mangel, S. A. (2005, September 19). Gawadar: Project and Difference in Baloch Nationalists and Government. *Daily Jang*, Quetta.
- Salvatore, D. (2000). *International Economics; Seventh Edition*. USA: Fordham University.
- Shah, M. (2005, March 19). Balochistan: a Jewel in the crown of Paksitan. *Daily Dawn*, Islamabad.
- Shahid, S. (2005). *Investment Opportunities*. [www.http://eldis.org](http://eldis.org) accessed on May 5.
- Ziaratwal, A. R. (2005). *Round Table Dialogue on Provincial Autonomy* organized by Balochistan NGO's Forum on May 24.

### **Biographical Note**

**Dr. Musarrat Jabeen** is the Chairperson of Department of International Relations at the University of Balochitstan, Quetta.

## Towards the Tashkent Declaration

Lubna Abid Ali

*Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad*

### ABSTRACT

In the aftermath of September 1965 Indo – Pakistan the tragic happenings in the Indian occupied Kashmir were having repercussions on the Pakistan side of the Kashmir border. A news report was published in *Dawn*, quoting a radio programme *Sada-i-Kashmir* that the Indian Government was thinking of dividing the valley of Jammu and Kashmir into three parts on linguistic basis. In addition to this, the police had started taking punitive action against the students who refused to sign a prescribed form conforming their loyalty to India with the promise to take active part in Congress activities. To show solidarity to the Kashmiri brethren, Mr. Bhutto called a press conference in Rawalpindi on 11 November 1965 and criticized the Security Council for its slow progress in solving the Kashmir issue. An analysis of Pakistan's domestic atmosphere in the post-war period reveals that people felt betrayed psychologically and emotionally by the United States and were disillusioned with Pakistan's adherence to the Western sponsored pacts. In the meanwhile the Soviet Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin invited President Ayub and Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri to meet each other on Soviet territory to reach an agreement on the restoration of peace between India and Pakistan. The Sino – Pakistan axis was the underlying cause, which compelled the USSR to play the role of a peace-maker and Shastri immediately accepted the offer. The central argument of this study is that the US and the Soviet policies towards the regional arrangements in South Asia broadly coincided and resulted in Tashkent Declaration. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the then foreign minister in Ayub's Cabinet differed with the contents of the declaration and sought to include a commitment to finalize a solution of the Kashmir problem. But it was clear that Bhutto's role and effectiveness was limited. Setting aside his exchanges with Swaran Singh, his talks with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko were also far from friendly. Ironically Ayub had to seek the help of the Soviet premier to overcome the obstacles to agreement imposed by his own Foreign Minister.

The report of *Newsweek* correspondent on Kashmir refugee camps in Pakistan in October 1965 revealed Indian atrocities against Muslims in Indian held Jammu and Kashmir. The whole Indian delegation at that boycotted the UN Security Council session.<sup>1</sup> Also, *Washington Star*, in its issue of 1 September 1965 commented on Indian atrocities in the following words:

“Indian officials claim Pakistani infiltrators started fire, both extremists and moderate Kashmiris and the victims themselves interviewed while digging in the smoldering wreckage claim the Indian army was responsible (Dawn, 1965, December 23).”

Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the then foreign minister in a press conference expressed that Pakistan's relations with the United States had run into certain difficulties. He stated Pakistan's desire to restore good relations with Washington, but not at the expense of the fundamental interests of Pakistan (Pakistan Times, 1965, November 12).

However, the Ayub government was not fully sensitized to the public sentiment, when President Ayub Khan left for the United States on 10 December 1965 for his talks with President Johnson. On his way to the United States, he stopped at London to meet the British Prime Minister Harold Wilson. The then Information Secretary, Altaf Gauhar has described Ayub's itinerary after his arrival in the United States:

After the informalities, the delegation was conducted into the White House and Johnson took Ayub by his arm and led him to a room towards the far end of the corridor... After a while George Ball, the United States' Secretary of State said, "Gentlemen! I am used to waiting for the President. It is most likely they will join us much before 12 O'clock..." That was around 10.30 in the morning. The two Presidents walked into the room a little after 1 O'clock. We are very good friends and there is no one whom I admire more than Ayub and I deeply cherish his friendship.... Ayub promised that Pakistan would use its influence for moderation and invited Johnson to visit Pakistan. As Ayub finished Bhutto nudged the Information Secretary and whispered he has given in (Gauhar, 1993:376).

The quotation from Gauhar reflects Bhutto's concern over American response to Kashmir and Pakistan's stance on the issue. Probably Bhutto had in mind that during the talks with President Johnson, Ayub would explore the possibility of using the American pressure to induce India to negotiate Kashmir's future on the terms laid down by Pakistan.

In fact, on 4 September 1965, Kosygin had written identical letters to India and Pakistan stating, "The parties should enter negotiations for the peaceful settlement of the differences that have arisen between them" (Asian Records, 1965, October 7, pp 6696-97). President Johnson wanted the Indo – Pakistani talks to succeed because only then the two countries would contribute to the establishment of peace, which the United States had desired as the only guarantee against the Chinese in the Area. However, it is significant to note that in the Joint Communiqué issued after the US - Pakistan talks, there was no reference to the forthcoming Indo – Pakistan talks, as it was earlier promised by USA (Times of India, 1965, December 7).<sup>2</sup> The Soviet overtures towards Pakistan reflected the growing spirit of détente with the US and expanding conflict with China. Ayub Khan had already visited Moscow in the first week of April 1965. Even before going to the United States, Foreign Minister Bhutto and President Ayub Khan had both visited Moscow on 23 November 1965. Mr. Bhutto went to Moscow not

because he suddenly found a change in the Soviet attitude towards Pakistan, but to stir up a feeling of rivalry in Washington and thus increase the price for his coming back to the latter's fold (Ayub, 1971:235).

By this mission, Ayub also wanted to convey a message to the world that by giving up dependence on the United States Pakistan had not become a satellite of China. Accepting the Soviet offer for mediation in Indo – Pakistan conflict and agreeing to meet Indian leadership in Tashkent was equally used to appease the Pakistan's leftist opposition groups. The then Foreign Minister, Mr. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto advised President Ayub not to accept anything less than an agreement on the holding of plebiscite in Kashmir. However, after turning down Bhutto's advice to the cautious and not to concede too much, President Ayub decided to sign the Tashkent Declaration as drafted by the Soviet Union. Bhutto asked the President to permit him to publicly disassociate himself from the agreement at Tashkent. The President, however, refused to accept his resignation at that time and ordered him to remain at his post (Ziring, 1958:66).

On the other hand, Indians were determined not to discuss Kashmir at the conference. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto at the end of his talks with the Soviet leaders before the Tashkent Conference on 23 November 1965 told a press conference that President Ayub would discuss with the Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri the whole gamut of Indo – Pakistani relations (The Hindustan Times, 1965, November 26). In the backdrop of this while addressing a public meeting at Roorkee, Prime Minister Shastri declared that the question of Kashmir could not be discussed at Tashkent. Kashmir was an integral part of India and its sovereignty and territorial integrity would be safeguarded at all costs (Ibid).

Before the Tashkent conference, the Indian government unleashed a diplomatic offensive against Pakistan. It even drew the Soviet government's attention to what it considered to be misuse of military equipment supplied to Indonesia by the Soviet Union for self-defence purposes, which was also non-transferable without specific Soviet approval. The British newspapers reported that the Chinese MIG 19s had been seen flying in Pakistan and China had given Pakistan a credit worth sixty-seven million dollars to buy armaments. The Indians were highlighting the significance of Chinese assistance to Pakistan and were using it as a counterweight to influence the Soviet thinking in the context of Pakistan's efforts to lead for the settlement of the Kashmir dispute at Tashkent (New York Times, 1965, December 30).<sup>3</sup> As far as the agenda of the conference is concerned, there was no specific agenda for talks with India at Tashkent. It was expected that it might last a week to ten days and was to accomplish little except perhaps to open up some new avenues for exploration.

Prime Minister Shastri and President Ayub Khan reached Tashkent on 3 January 1966 with six members of the delegation. On the flight to Tashkent, Major General Rafi asked President Ayub, "Would the country accept whatever settlement does take place?" President Ayub replied, "Since I am the President, I

have taken this decision. If our people do not like it, they can choose their own leaders” (Raza, 1984:285).<sup>4</sup>

The Pakistani delegation comprised Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Information Minister Khawaja Shahabuddin – Pakistani High Commissioner in India Arshad Hussain, Foreign Secretary Aziz Ahmed, PIA Chief, Air Marshal Asghar Khan and Information Secretary Altaf Gauhar. The Indian delegation comprised the External Affairs Minister Swaran Singh, Defence Minister Y.B. Chavan, Secretary Ministry of External Affairs C.S. Jha and Indian Ambassador to the Soviet Union T.N. Kaul.

According to a commentary on the composition of the Pakistani delegation by the *Patriot*, both the pro - China and pro-US lobbies were being represented by Bhutto. Shahabuddin was president’s own man. Altaf Gauhar was reputedly a stalwart of the US lobby and Aziz Ahmed of the pro-China section. Arshad Hussein and Asghar Khan represented Ayubist component of the administration.

On the first day of the Tashkent conference, there was an opening speech by Ayub Khan and the tone of the speech was so conciliatory that Ayub even did not mention the word “Kashmir” – definitely an act of commission, which was appreciated by the Indian press and criticized by the President’s political opponents in Pakistan. While commenting on this aspect of Ayub Khan’s speech, the *Patriot* commented in its editorial:

So it is a hopeful sign that the President of Pakistan did not think it prudent to talk of Kashmir as such and laid considerable emphasis on peaceful discussions if Pakistan had realized that war will not get its leaders what they want” (The Patriot, 1966 January).<sup>5</sup>

Further highlighting Ayub’s inaugural address, C.S. Jha described Ayub’s speech as constructive. Nevertheless on the same evening, a Pakistani spokesman made it clear that if the problem of Jammu and Kashmir, which is root cause of the trouble, was not settled then the Indo – Pakistan relations would collapse (The Statesman, 1966, January 5). Mr. Bhutto was the leading spokesman of this school of thought. He tried to convince Ayub to have an agenda for the conference. Altaf Gauhar has described the whole incident in these words:

Ayub’s impression was that there was no possibility of Shastri yielding on Kashmir dispute. When Ayub was relating how Shastri kept saying that he was answerable to the people, Bhutto interrupted him and said quite sharply, but you too are answerable to the people. You do not have a heavenly mandate that was the first indication of Bhutto’s unhappiness with the way negotiations were proceeding (Gauhar, 1993:382).

Due to Bhutto’s firm stand and insistence on agenda, Ayub Khan had to convince Kosygin to discuss Kashmir. Z.A. Bhutto later on recalled:



Mr. Chavan the Defence minister said to me ‘You must settle Kashmir here and now, there must be a final settlement. I said, ‘Mr. Chavan, if you expect me to remove the ashtray from here to there, I would not do it. if Kashmir has to be settled it has to be settled on our terms’. Then he went to Mr. Shastri and Mr. Shastri went to Mr. Kosygin, Mr. Kosygin went to Ayub Khan and they all said, ‘you have a very difficult Foreign Minister and unless and until he is removed from the negotiations, there can be no progress’ (Bhutto, 1976:49).

Therefore, Kosygin pressed Shastri to discuss the Kashmir problem because President Ayub also had to mollify public opinion in Kashmir. Thus, it was insisted by Pakistani delegation to have an agenda. India wanted to continue without the agenda, while Pakistan preferred having a specific list of subjects to be discussed. According to observers of the conference, Bhutto, “cut a sorry picture by constantly fidgeting in his chair and looking blankly at the ceiling, while Kosygin made an appeal for amity between the two countries. At one stage Bhutto lighted a cigarette leaned back on his chair – a posture which brought a hard look from President Ayub Khan towards his foreign minister” (Indian Express, 1966, January 6).

During the deliberations of the Tashkent Conference, parleys continued as Pakistani representatives asserted that they would sign a no-war pact, as insisted by India, only if there was some mechanism to discuss the Kashmir issue. This continued till the third day. It was indicated on the fifth day that the talks had reached a very delicate stage. The tense situation was reflected in the sudden hardening of Pakistani attitude to the Indian concern regarding the Chinese note to India, which had given a clear warning to India to be ready for a growing tension and an unrelenting military pressure all along the Indo – China border during the Indo – Pak 1965 war (Asian Recorders, 1966 January 29).

The situation had deteriorated to such an extent that on the sixth day of conference, there were banner headlines in all newspapers that the summit was going to flop. Newspapers gauged the mood of the two sides and speculated that unless a miracle happens, the Tashkent conference should end tomorrow on an unmistakable note of disagreement between Prime Minister Shastri and President Ayub Khan. However, the tables were turned on the following day. After the virtual breakdown of the talks, Prime Minister Shastri and President Ayub Khan dramatically reached on an agreement. They signed a nine-point declaration. In fact, the success of the summit depended on the last minute attempts of the Soviet premier. *The Washington Post* acknowledged the positive role of Kosygin in making the Tashkent conference a success in these words:

“Kosygin was able to do what neither Wilson nor Johnson could have done. Now the Soviet Union can talk with authority about peace in Asia, because it is a power with an Asian Frontier of thousands of miles (Lipman, 1966).

It is not difficult to understand that the success of the conference depended on behind the scene influence, pressures and tacit diplomacy. As mentioned earlier, inside story had been narrated by the then Information Secretary Altaf Gauhar in his book on Ayub. Altaf Gauhar mentioned his visit to Ayub's villa in Tashkent on the morning of 9<sup>th</sup> January and found out that Ayub and Kosygin had gone somewhere outside Tashkent. A meeting was fixed for Ayub with Kosygin on the evening of 9<sup>th</sup> January. The meeting between Ayub and Kosygin sealed the fate of the Tashkent conference.

According to Gauhar, when Ayub came back he invited him for a walk in the beautiful lawns around the villa and Ayub told him that Kosygin had taken him to see an aircraft factory and shown him how many aircrafts were produced there every month. Ayub Khan also told that Kosygin mentioned the total number of factories in the Soviet Union and the total number of aircrafts, tanks and guns that were manufactured by Soviet Union every year. Kosygin had told Ayub, according to Gauhar that for third world countries war was no longer a mean of resolving their disputes. Ayub was deeply impressed by what Kosygin told him (Gauhar, 1993: 386-387).

The Tashkent Declaration was signed by India and Pakistan on 10 January 1966. In lieu of the "no war declaration" sought by India, there was a "no force" commitment proposed by Ayub. About the issue of Kashmir the declaration merely stated that "Jammu and Kashmir were discussed and each side set forth its respective positions" (*The Times*, 1966, January 11). The Tashkent Declaration, which read as following.

"The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan, having met at Tashkent and having discussed the existing relations between India and Pakistan, hereby declare their firm resolve to restore normal and peaceful relations between their countries and to promote understanding and friendly relations between their people. They consider the attainment of these objectives of vital importance for the welfare of 600,000,000." (Ziring, op. cit.).

The details of the agreement were as follows:

1. The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan agree that both sides will exert all efforts to create good neighbouring relations between India and Pakistan in accordance with the UN charter. They reaffirm their obligation under the Charter not to have recourse to force and to settle their disputes through peaceful means. They considered that the interest of peace in their region and particularly in the Indo – Pakistan sub-continent and indeed the interests of the people of India and Pakistan were not served by the continuance of tension between the two countries. It was against this background that Jammu and Kashmir was discussed and each of the sides set forth its respective position. While speaking in the National Assembly on 16 March 1966, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto gave

critical appreciation of all the articles of Tashkent Declaration. First of all, he distinguished between a declaration of intent and a contractual agreement. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto regarded it as a declaration of intent. He stated:

Article-I says that in the background of tension the dispute over Jammu and Kashmir was discussed... and it was in accordance with the United Nations Charter. Therefore, we do not enter into a new commitment. We are already a member of the United Nations – both India and Pakistan... This is a commitment, which is against India because in its confirmation it has committed itself to settle the Jammu and Kashmir dispute according to International Law and Treaties (Bhuttos' speech in the National Assembly on 16 March 1966).

2. The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that all armed personnel of the two countries shall be withdrawn, not later than 25<sup>th</sup> February 1966 to the position, they held prior to 5<sup>th</sup> August and both sides shall observe the ceasefire terms on the ceasefire line.
3. The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that relations between India and Pakistan shall be based on the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of each other.
4. The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agree that both sides will discourage any propaganda directed against the other country and will encourage propaganda, which promote the development of friendly relations between the two countries.
5. The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agree that the High Commission of India to Pakistan and High of Pakistan to India will return to their posts and the normal functioning of the diplomatic missions of both countries will be restored. Both the Governments shall observe the Vienna Convention of 1961 on diplomatic relationship.
6. The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed to consider measures towards the restoration of economic and trade relations, communication, as well as cultural exchange between India and Pakistan and to take measures to implement the existing agreements between India and Pakistan.
7. The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that they will give instructions to their respective authorities to carry out the repatriation of prisoners of war (POW).
8. The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that both sides will continue discussion on questions relating to the problems of refugees and eviction of illegal immigrants. They also agreed that both sides will create conditions which will prevent the exodus of people.

9. The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that both the sides will continue meetings at the highest and at other levels on matters of direct concern to both countries. Both sides have recognized the need to set up joint (Indo-Pakistan bodies, which will report to their Governments in order to decide what further steps should be taken.

“On 9 January, when we were discussing the machinery I put a direct question to Premier Kosygin”. Thus narrated Z.A. Bhutto, “in this question of machinery you must know that as far as we are concerned we can only accept it, if Jammu and Kashmir is made the main dispute for determination by this machinery”, and according to Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, Kosygin stated: “Jammu and Kashmir is disputed and naturally you have a right to bring this up under Article 9.”

The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan recorded their feelings of deep appreciation and gratitude to the leaders of the Soviet Union, the Soviet Government and personally to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of USSR for their constructive, friendly and noble part in bringing about the present meeting, which has resulted in mutually satisfactory results.

They also expressed to the Government and the friendly people of Uzbekistan on their sincere gratitude for their overwhelming reception and generous hospitality. They invited the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of USSR to witness this declaration (Ibid).<sup>6</sup> The Indian press welcomed the Tashkent Declaration. *The Times of India* felt that there was no reference to negotiation on the Kashmir issue although a discussion on all matters of direct concern to both the Governments was provided through the proposed joint India – Pakistan bodies (Times of India, January, 1966).

Asghar Khan narrated his impression of the Declaration in the following words:

“The Indians were jubilant and smiling. Tashkent Declaration was for Pakistan a statement of surrender. The Indians were all over the room shaking any hand that they could grasp. It was as if India had defeated Pakistan in hockey at the Olympic” (Khan, 1978:120-121).

The people of Pakistan and political parties strongly reacted against the Tashkent agreement, as it was predicted. It is interesting to look at the statements of various political leaders on Tashkent agreement. Shaukat Hayat Khan, General Secretary of the Muslim League said, “The feelings and sentiments of the people of Pakistan and Kashmir have not been taken into account in the Tashkent Declaration (The Statesman, 1966, January 18).

Moreover, Ayub’s reluctance to explain the reasons for accepting the Tashkent Declaration was more than the aroused Pakistan could tolerate. Henceforth, they precipitated the agitation movement against Ayub. People from every walk of life participated in the agitation. Women raised the slogans: “Give us back our husbands, fathers and brothers”. In Lahore the students marched to Governor House from the Regal Chowk and the Cheering Cross. The police

arrested and tried to crush the unrest. However, the public mood was quite hostile. For them, the President had sold Kashmir to the Hindu babus and warlords, not in the battlefield, but on the negotiating table. The unrest in Karachi was equally strong and Larence Ziring aptly evaluates the politics of agitation in Ayub era in the following manner.

... Human torrents swept through Karachi's principal thorough fare. On arriving at the US Information Services Library, they proceeded to smash the windows before setting the buildings ablaze. Neither this outburst of popular disfavour nor the lesser ones in Lahore and Rawalpindi caused the President to reconsider his decision (Ziring. op. cit.).

However, Ayub broke his self-imposed silence with a mid-day radio address to the nation on 14 January 1966. Taking note of the popular outbursts against his policies, the President remarked in his speech. "There may be some amongst us, who will take advantage of your feelings and will try to mislead you". Clearly, the President held the view that the demonstrations were the work of his political antagonists and especially his Foreign Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto.

## Notes

1. Text of the speech made by Mr. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in the Security Council meeting held on 25 October 1965, as quoted in Deora, M.S. & Grover, R. (Eds.). (1993). *Documents on Pakistan and International Conflict*, (16) 263 – 279. New Delhi: Annual Publications,
2. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, "On Indo – Pakistan Speech in the National Assembly" 16 March 1966. *Politics of the People*, ed. Hamid Jalal and Khalid Hassan, vol. 1 "Reshaping Foreign Policy 1948 – 1966" op. cit., p.300. Subsequent quotations are from the same speech, pp. 301 – 303.
3. Also see *Washington Post*. (1966, January 3)
4. Also see *The Statesman*. ( 1966, January 4)
5. Also see Chaudhry, G.W. (1975). *India Pakistan Bangladesh and the Major Powers*. New York: The Free Press.
6. In the Indian document of the Tashkent Declaration the relevant paragraphs began, "The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan", as above, in the Pakistan documents these paragraphs begin, "The President of Pakistan and the Prime Minister of India", otherwise the texts were identical.

## References

- Ayub, M. (1971). *Pakistan's Soviet Policy 1950 – 68: A Balance Sheet*. Delhi: National and International.
- Bhutto, Z. A. (1976). *Speech in the National Assembly on 14 July 1972*. Islamabad: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting.
- Gauhar, Altaf. (1993). *Ayub Khan: Pakistan's First Military Ruler*. Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications.
- Khan, M. A. (1978). *The First Round*. Lahore: Taabeer Publishing House.
- Lipman, Walter. (1996, January 11). *Washington Post*.

## *Lubna Abid Ali Towards the Tashkent Declaration*

Raza, S. (1984). *The Pakistan Army War 1965*. Lahore: Services Book Club.

Ziring, L. (n.d) *The Ayub Khan Era: Politics in Pakistan 1958 – 1969*. New York: Syracuse University Press.

### **Biographical Note**

**Dr. Lubna Abid Ali** is an Associate Professor in the Department of International Relations at Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad.

## Political Activities of Indian Women during Sultanate

**Rukhsana Iftikhar**

*University of the Punjab, Lahore*

### ABSTRACT

Men always play a dominant role in the Indian politics. History of subcontinent rarely mentions the women who played active role in politics of the court. Feudal structure, social values, customs and traditions are the main hindrances in the women-development especially as politicians. Raziya Sultan, a female sovereign during Sultanate period is a unique example. Besides her, many other women showed their involvement in the court affairs. This article is an attempt to explore the political activities of women during Sultanate period.

### Introduction

Women have emerged as an integral part of a social structure. Their role in various fields of the life has contributed equally as male members of the society. As far as the matter of politics is concerned, history has presented various examples of women's sagacity, their administrative skills and political maturity to manage the political crisis.

When Turks came to India, they brought their own heritage. Women had been given a respectable status in the society. They also took an active part in politics (Misra, 1967:5). The sultans of Delhi had large *Herams* and a considerable impact of sultan's mother, sister and wife showed through the politics. Some of the ladies enjoyed a high position in the court of sultan (Altekar, 1938:219). But for the first time in the history of Hindustan the claim of a lady to the throne of Hindustan as a sovereign ruler was honoured (Mahavananda & Mujumdar, 1953:286). It indicates the freshness and clarity of the Turkish mind in the 13<sup>th</sup> century which gave full consideration to the merits of an individual irrespective of sex (Tripathi, 1936:29) [as male was the main criteria for the selection of a sovereign].

The earliest reference of a lady who participated in political activities during Turkish rule is Khudavanda-i-Jahan, Shah Turkan (wife of Sultan Iltutmish). She was Turkish slave by origin and rose to the status of Chief Queen of Sultan Iltutmish (1210-1236A.D). Although Sultan Iltutmish expressed his desire to nominate Raziya as his successor but Shah Turkan was interested in nomination of her own son Ruknudin Firoz Shah (Siraj, 1970:632).

During the life time of Sultan Iltutmish, Shah Turkan had gained political strength (Siraj, 1970:634). She enjoyed influence in Sultan's court (Ahmad, 1972:189). Immediately after the death of Sultan Iltutmish (1236 A.D), she manipulated

political affairs to enthrone her indolent and pleasure loving son. Shah Turkan concentrated all powers in her own hands even she issued royal orders (*Farmans*) by her name (Siraj, 1970: 635). A younger son of Sultan Iltutmish Muizz-ud-Din was first blinded and then put to death by the orders of this ambitious lady (Ahmad, n.d:190).

Raziya was the next hurdle in the way of her authoritarianism. So, Shah Turkan conspired against Raziya. Raziya tackled this abnoxious problem in a tricky way and imprisoned Shah Turkan (Siraj, 1970: 635). Turkish Empire witnessed a glorious example of a Queen's government. The accession of Raziya to the throne of Delhi in the year of 1236 A.D heralded a new era in the history of Sultanate. It asserts the claim of a woman to the office which was earlier considered to be the monopoly of males. Raziya was elevated to the throne solely because of her merits and talents (p.637).

It was in the midst of chaos and confusion that Raziya asserted her claim to the throne. She cleverly exploited the general discontent against her mother's rule. Clad in red garment, customary for revolution, she showed herself to the assembly of Friday prayer and in the name of Sultan Iltutmish appealed for help against the cruel rule of her brother and mother (Ullah, 1945:116).

Poet historian Isami reveals that Raziya entered into an agreement with the people. She was given a chance to prove her abilities and if she did not prove herself better than man, her head was to be struck off (Isami, 1974:127). Turkish nobility 'core of forties' gave tough resistance to Raziya but she faced all situations courageously. Even before her accession Sultan Iltutmish judged her talent, especially after her expedition of Gwalior. She handled the administration of Delhi in the absence of her father and acquitted herself very credibly (Siraj, 1970:637). During her regime she successfully handled the problem of Lakhnavati, Lahore and Multan Provinces (Isami, 1974:128).

After becoming a Sovereign ruler of Hindustan, Raziya turned to bring some revolutionary changes in her mode of living. She started wearing Kaba and Kulla instead of usual feminine dress. Isami criticized her in these words: "I have heard that she came out of *pardah*. She adopted vulgarity by rejecting pious virtues. She wore kaba and kulla and came out of the shelter [*Purdah*]" (Ahmad, 1972:195).

She consolidated her empire by taking bold administrative steps. The nobles who favoured Raziya were awarded by her. She appointed them as governors of the important provinces of Delhi sultanate. It was in her mind while appointing the governors, to avoid the concentration of the powers in the hands of particular section of nobility. Raziya embarked upon the policy of enlisting and patronizing non-Turkish nobles, she could bank upon in the time of political crisis. Thus inclusion of non-Turkish noble was used as one of the means to create a new force to serve her political ends. Jamil-ud-Din Yaqut, the Abyssinian slave, received a special consideration for being a non Turkish. He occupied the prestigious office of *Amir-i-Akhur* (the master of horse) which according to tradition was enjoyed by the Turk nobles. This act of Raziya received a great opposition at the hands of



Turkish nobles who were being deprived off all privileges. So during the third year of her regime these nobles hatched a conspiracy against her (Ullah, 1945:119).

Yaqut advised, assisted and accompanied Raziya on the various occasions. Being a blind support of her mistress, he was quite close to her. Minhaj-us-Siraj a contemporary historian, speaks nothing about the intimacy between the two while Isami castes a slur upon their relationship (Isami, 1974:128-30).

Either it was a scandal with Yaqut or the revolt of Altuniya (governor of Tabarhindah) Raziya faced all difficulties very courageously. She used all tactics to revive her as a Queen of Hindustan. Even the proposal of the marriage to Altuniya on the part of Raziya seems to be completely a political move. But all her efforts to regain her lost powers proved futile (Siraj, 1970: 646-48) because she was out of Delhi. In the month of September, 1240 A.D. Sultan Muizz-ud-Din Bahram Shah (son of Sultan Iltutmish) led an army against Raziya and Altuniya. The forces of Raziya were defeated by royal army and both Raziya and Altuniya fell into the hands of Hindus in Kaithal (a town in Karnal, district of the Punjab) who put them to death on Oct. 13, 1240 A.D. (Ahmad, 1972:203). Indeed Raziya was a talented lady as well as a sharp politician. Minhaj says:

“Raziya was a great monarch, she was wise, generous, benefactor to her Kingdom, a dispenser of justice, she was the leader of her army. She was endowed with all the admirable attributes and qualifications necessary for kings; but she was not born of the right sex (Siraj, 1970: 64-5).”

1. Being a woman of intellectual aptitude she encouraged education. During her rule (1236-1240 A.D), she patronized men of letters. Minhaj-us-Siraj (1970: 646) was entrusted the task of supervision of Madarsia-i-Nasiriya which became a centre of learning during Sultanate (Also see Ali, Y.H. (1962). *Glimpses of Medieval Indian Culture*. New Delhi, p. 73).

Raziya being a female ruler has a great political significance in the history of Sultanate period. It is surprising that she did not find a place in the list of sultans which was prepared by the orders of Sultan Firoz Shah Tughluq (Afif, 1938: 81). This omission by Sultan Firoz Shah no way undermined her contribution in stabilizing Turkish Empire in Hindustan. Raziya stands as the only example of a woman who wielded sovereignty during Muslim rule in India (Tripathi, 1936: 109).

Malika-i-Jahan, the wife of Sultan Jala-ud-Din Khalji and mother in law of Sultan Ala-ud-Din Khalji had interest in the political affairs during Sultanate period. As a wife, she enjoyed a complete influence over her husband; Jalal-ud-Din Khalji (*Tarikh-i-Firoz Shahi*, 1963: 156). Malika-i-Jahan was responsible for creating problems and misunderstandings between her daughter and son in law, Ala-ud-Din. Ala-ud-Din had secret relations with a mistress named Mahak. It could not be kept secret from his wife and mother in law. Malika-i-Jahan played a role to widen the gulf between husband and wife. At last Ala-ud-Din was settled down in Deccan (Ashraf, 1956:56). After the death of Sultan Jalal-ud-Din Khalji;

she played a most treacherous role by laying aside the claim of Arkali Khan (her eldest son) who was in Multan at that time. She supported Qadir Khan against her own son and enthroned him by giving him the title Rukuniddin Ibrahim (Tarikh-i-Firoz Shahi, 1983: 359-60). She concentrated all powers in her hands and particularly ruled in the name of her younger son. She heard petitions and issued decrees. But she did not possess the requisite intelligence to handle the political affairs. Ala-ud-Din Khalji took the benefit of the foolishness of Malika-i-Jahan and snatched the throne of Delhi (p.360).

Two ladies of Tughluq dynasty interfered in the political matters. They were Makhduma-i-Jahan, mother of Sultan Muhammad bin Tughluq and Khudavand Zada, the sister of Sultan Muhammad bin Tughluq. The Sultan sought the advice of his mother not only in the management of royal household but also in important political issues (The Rehla of Ibn Battuta, 1953: 118). It was according to the advice of Sultan Muhammad bin Tughluq's mother that he solemnized the marriage of his daughter with Shaikh Fatullah bin Shaikh Auhadudin Nagori (the grand son of Sufi Baba Farid, in 1327 A.D) at Daultabad [capital] (Rizvi, 2004: 130-131). Makhduma-i-Jahan enjoyed considerable influence in political sphere. She received envoys and royal guests in the court. One of them was Ibn-Battutah who had been received and entertained by her when he reached Delhi in 1334 A.D (Hassan, 1963: 172) being a woman of charitable disposition; she maintained a number of hospices (inns) for the comfort of travellers.

Sultan Muhammad bin Tughluq's death (20<sup>th</sup> March 1351 A.D) plunged Delhi Sultanate into great confusion and chaos. It was further aggravated when the deceased Sultan's eldest sister Khudavand Zada intervened in this matter of succession. Being a woman of Royal lineage, she put forward the claim of her own son Devar Malik against Firoz Shah Tughluq (Afif, 1938: 38-40). Though Firoz Shah succeeded with the efforts of the nobles but according to Afif, she had never abandoned the idea of placing her son upon the throne of Delhi. She hatched a conspiracy of Firoz Shah's murder but he escaped and guilty confessed his crime before the King (p.77). Firoz Shah pardoned Khudavand Zada and fixed her annual allowance but Firoz Shah gave punishment to Devar Malik to visit the Sultan every Month attired in robe and slippers (p.79-80).

The ladies of Lodhi dynasty were quite active in politics. Shams Khatoon, the chief Queen of Bahlol Lodhi was the main cause to reopen the war against Sharqi ruler of Jaunpur. She instigated Sultan Bahlol Lodhi not to opt a ceasefire until and unless her brother was released by the enemy (Farishta, 1974: 555).

Bibi Amba, the Hindu wife of Sultan Bahlol Lodhi managed all circumstance in favour of her own son Sikandar Lodhi. Isa Khan, the nephew of Bahlol Lodhi challenged the accession of Sikandar (Nizam Khan) Lodhi because he was born of a Hindu lady, Bibi Amba. Amba gathered the sympathies of the nobles of Sultan's court and finally her son was enthroned (p.563).

Ladies of the *Heram* seems very active in political life of the 15<sup>th</sup> century. Bibi Matto, the widow of Sultan Shah Lodhi (Uncle of Bahlul Lodhi) once

defended the Delhi fort against the army of Sultan Mahmud Sharqi by a strange strategy. Bibi got Afgan women dressed in men clothes and posted them on the parapet, thus deceiving the besiegers by a false shadow of numbers.

The role of *Heram* in Delhi-Jaunpur relation can not be ignored in any assessment of political life of that period. In 1437 A.D. when Ibrahim Sharqi marched against Muhammad Shah of Delhi, the latter gave his daughter Bibi Raji in marriage to Ibrahim's Son Mahmud. When Mahmud ascended the throne Raji played a role in political development. The battle of Nerila in 1462 A.D. was instigated by her. She told her husband that if he did not lead the army against the enemy, she would herself tie quires to her waist and marched as the head of army. In that battle Qutab Khan Lodhi, brother in law of Bahlul Lodhi was taken as a prisoner. Bhalul's wife, Shams Khatoon sent a message to her husband that as long as Qutab Khan, her brother was not taken out of prison, rest and sleep was unlawful for Sultan (Nizami, 1997: 87-88).

It was the legacy of Sultanate which also followed by the competitors (Mughals). Mughals ladies like Nur Jahan, Mumtaz Mahall and Jahanara Begum were quite influential in the political matters of Mughal Empire.

## References

- Afif, S. (1938). *Tarikh-i-Firoz Shah*, translated by Malvi Fida Husain Talib. Hyderabad.
- Ahmad, M.A. (1972). *Political History and Institutions of early Turkish Empire*.
- Altekar, A. S. (1938). *The Position of Women in Hindu Civilization*. Benaras.
- Ashraf, K. M. (1956). *Life and Conditions of the People of Hindustan*. Delhi.
- Farishta, A. Q. (1974). *Tarikh-i-Farishta*, translated by Abdul Hai Khawaja, 1(555). Lahore.
- Hasan, A. M. (1963). *Tughluq Dynasty*. Calcutta.
- Isami. (1974). *Fatuh Us Salateen*, edited by Mahdi Hasan. Baroda.
- Mahavananda, S. & Mujumdar, R.C. (Ed.). (1953). *Great Women of India*. Calcutta.
- Misra, R. (1967). *Women in Mughal India*. Allahabad.
- Nizami, K. A. (1997). *Royalty in Medieval India*. Delhi.
- Rizvi, A. A. (2004). *Sufism in India*, (I) 130-131. Lahore.
- Siraj, M. (1970). *Tabqat-i-Nasiri*, translated by Major Raverty, Vol.I (632). Delhi.
- Tarikh-i-Firoz Shahi*. (1963). Translated by Elliot and Dowson, Vol III, 156. Allahabad.
- Tarikh-i-Firoz Shahi*. (1983). Translated by Syed Moin-ul-Haq. Lahore.
- The Rehla of Ibn Battuta*. (1953). Translated by Aga Mehdi Hussan. Baroda.
- Tripathi, R.P. (1936). *Some Aspects of Muslim Administration*. Allahabad.
- Ullah, Habib. (1945). *The foundation of Muslim Rule in India*.

## Biographical Note

**Rukhsana Iftikhar** is Lecturer in the Department of History at the University of the Punjab, Lahore.

## **Kafi: A Genre of Punjabi Poetry**

**Saeed Bhutta**

*University of the Punjab, Lahore.*

### ABSTRACT

Kafi is a prominent genre of Punjabi literature and is very rich in form and content. This article deals with the etymology, connotation and definition of Kafi with its literary and cultural background and the atmosphere in which it flourished, so as to have a better concept of it. It also includes a commentary on the Punjabi writers of Kafi, classical as well as the poets coming after the creation of Pakistan. It is a tribute to the talent which has gone into creative efforts of the five hundred years of the tradition of Kafi, which is the pride of this region. The article also points to the avenues which Kafi has opened to the new poets.

What is the etymology of Kafi? What is its historical background? The researchers have divergent views on it. Let us first take the opinion of the scholars and intellectuals. Dr. Nazir Ahmed (1979) observes,

“Kafi is a Thath and a raga of music. Now since the Qawwals sing Kafis, therefore it is believed that it is called Kafi because it is in some way related to the Kafi raga. This may not be wrong but some objections have been raised against it. First, you may sing a Kafi in any raga (may be Bherwein). On the contrary, the same Kafi can be sung in every raga. In other words, there is no definite relationship between raga and Kafi. Thus, if no such relationship exists, then why are, these five lines poems called Kafi, not Asavrian and Holian?

“One argument that is forwarded in relating the poem Kafi with the raga Kafi is that Kafi Thath is the vastest of all ragas and any raga within it and its tunes have always being popular. Among the holy saints, which include Moen-ud-Din, Nizam-ud-Din, Amir Khusro and Bulhe Shah, these have been very popular. Common people are their audience and it is not strange that for the transmission of their poetry they used the most popular raga, Kafi. But there is one thing that goes against it. Many Kafis of Shah Hussain do not fall in the category of Kafi. Jai Jai Vanti, Vodhuns, Kahnra, Dhanasri, are very different from Kafi Thath” (Ahmed, 1979).

Syed Ali Abbass Jalalpuri (1993: 207) writes,

“Kafi is a well known genre of Punjabi poetry, which Shah Hussain has composed in ragas and which Bulhe Shah and Ghulam Farid carried to sublimity. There is a tradition that earlier its name was Kami (related to Kam or sensuality

## South Asian Studies 23 (2)

and love). Which later changed into Kafi. Majority believe that Kafi meant Kamil or perfect. In Indian music Kafi is a raga as well as a Thath” (Puri, 1993: 207).

Muhammad Asif Khan (1989: 24) says,

“One thing is definite, that the F sound in Kafi is not from Sindhi or Punjabi speech. This has been introduced from Persian” (Khan, 1989: 24).

Makhdam Muhammad Zaman Talib-ul-Maula comments,

“The word is actually Qafi (rhyme scheme) related to Kafi, That is rhymed speech. It means the words or sentences which use rhyme” (In Khan, 1989: 24).

Abdul Ghafoor Qureshi (1989: 79) tells us,

“Kafi is in fact a distortion of the word Qavafi in Arabic dictionaries. It has been mentioned as concise poetic composition. But there is no reference to this genre in Arabic literature” (Qureshi, 1989: 79).

Syed Atta Hussain Musvi wrote,

“In Arabic language Kafh means duff (cymbals) to which small bells are attached” (In Khan, 1989: 24).

Sharif Kunjahi (1996: 17-18) notes,

“To read Kafi as rhyme scheme (Qafia) is not correct. In our opinion the real word was Kav. It is called Kafi because in Sindhi and classical Punjabi, the last letter is not a consonant and usually it would have been pronounced with a declining accent” (Kunjahi, 1996: 17-18).

The research scholars have much speculated about the word Kafi. The aforesaid arguments of Muhammad Asif Khan suggest that, this is an Arabic or Persian word. As opposed to this Sharif Kunjahi traces its origin to Kav which is a Sanskrit word. Even before the arrival of Muslims in the Sub-Continent this word was used for poetry. The passage from Kav to Kafi is not improbable. All these scholars are respectable but it is difficult to arrive at a definite conclusion from their writings.

What is the form of Kafi? Is it related to content or form? In this context Dr. Nazir Ahmed opines.

“Kafi is usually a rhymed composition of five or seven and sometimes more verses. At times it has a climatic line. But the content is usually mystical. The term Kafi is generally used with reference to the work of Muslim mystics. For Non-Muslims the word is the Shabd or Ashloka” (Ahmed, 1979).

Muhammad Safdar Mir (1990:175) writes,

“Like Bhajan, in Kafi also, the Rahao or the climatic lines is an essential constituent but while composing a book, for convenience, it is not necessarily repeated after every line or stanza. Even the reader does not care to repeat it and feels that the verses are independent and have no thematic connection” (Mir, 1990:175).

Muhammad Asif Khan (1989) writes,

“All the lines coming after every climatic line in a Kafi, all the lines that follow it have their own autonomous value. But each line gives its full meanings when read with the climatic lines” (p.37).

Both Safdar Mir and Muhammad Asif Khan consider the climatic lines as the distinctive quality of the genre of Kafi. According to Dr Nazir Ahmed, some Kafis have climatic lines and some not, or some Kafis are not well knit and continuous. According to Safdar Mir, when Dr. Nazir raises such objections actually he exposes his ignorance of the technique of Kafi and Bhajan. Kafis have been extensively written in Punjabi. This has made it difficult to assign a subject to it. Neither is it distinguished by its subject. Kafi is a formal genre and its distinctive quality is the climatic lines. Neither the number of lines is fixed nor the subject. Some Kafis have only half a line for the climax. But then it is repeated to make it a complete line. In Shah Hussain’s Kafis the climatic line has been repeated after every line. This is so with most of the Kafis of classical poets. In some of Bulhe Shah Kafis, the climatic line comes after three lines. Actually the meanings of the lines can be understood only with reference to the climatic line. In the light of these definitions of Kafi, many Shabd of Hindu Bhagats are found to be very close to the form of Kafi. Take this example of Bhagat Kabir:

My heart is in turmoil for the absence of my beloved.

Neither is there rest in the day nor sleep in the night.

I remain in torture till dawn.

My heart is in doldrums as if I have been born on a deserted bed.

The eyes are tired and no way is visible,

My cruel lord did not inquire after me.

O Sadho! Kabir says, my pain has greatly tortured me (Oudh, 1990: 293).

Beside Bhagat Kabir other Bhagats have also written Bhajans which come up to the form of Kafi. But the editors of Bhagat Bani have never used the word Kafi for these compositions. Dr. Jit Singh Sital, the editor of the *Kalam-e-Nanak*, has described the poetry of Nanak under the title of the genres or forms, but Kafi has no where been mentioned. However, there is the description of Maru Kafi in the ragas. Dr. Sital has edited this poetry very much according to Guru Granth.

“Here Guru Nanak’s poetry (Bani) is discussed in some details so that the readers may be acquainted with the various aspects of this great creative work. In this elaboration, particular care has been taken that it must be arranged according to the tradition established by Sri Guru Arjan Dev Saheb. Other efforts beside this sometimes may create confusions. Therefore in the following details the order of Bani has followed the ragas, ragnis and the poetic genres as titled by Sri Guru Granth Saheb” (Sital, 1971: 21).

Guru Granth was compiled by Guru Arjan in 1604 (Sital, 1971:4). Guru Arjan (1563-1606) and Shah Hussain (1539-1599) were contemporaries. Even they did not name any poetic creation of Guru Nanak as Kafi. In fact the form of Kafi existed even before the Muslim poets. But the Naths and Bhagati poets called it

Bhajan and Shabd, while the Ismaili pirs use the term Ginan for it. Shah Hussain is the first Punjabi poet who used the term Kafi for this Genre.

There can be no final word about how long the form of Bhajan or Kafi has been in use. But it is most probable that if the Bhajans had been based on Mantras in Vedas, then they would not have been so deeply rooted in the people. Actually it was nourished in the climate of Punjabi, Sindhi and Hindi cultures. Some critics arrive at this conclusion from the similarities of the techniques of Kafi with woman's expression of love. They take it as a derivative of Hindi literature. While Hindi literature was limited to Rasso, even then great classical poets like Baba Farid were creating universal literature in Punjabi. If one has to fall back on conjecture, it may also be claimed that this genres spread to other areas through Naths and Ismaili Pirs of the Punjab. We believe that Kafi and Bhajan are based on the folksongs which have been popular in the Punjab for centuries. Classical poets also based their poetry on folksongs. There is a reflection of folksongs in many Kafis of Shah Hussain. 'oh mamma, of Khaeras don't speak to me' (Ghaffar, 2005: 551).

If such climatic lines are read separately from Kafis, these sound like bridal songs, as if a bride is departing from her father's home. Such examples abound in other classical poets too. It may be that these poetic lines carry in them the melody and the rhythm of folksongs.

In the Punjabi poetry of Guru Nanak (1449-1539) as it exists now, some Shabds are found which are according to the form of Kafi. After Guru Nanak, a significant name is that of Shah Hussain, who wrote in the form of Kafi and extended its dimensions technically as well as intellectually.

After him many poets took it seriously. Among the classical poets Shah Sharaf, Ghulam Hasan Gaman, Khair Shah, Aqil Jogi and Muhammad Bakhsh Nauroz are the most renowned. But there were Shah Hussain, Bulhe Shah, Sachal Sarmast and Khawaja Ghulam Farid who took Kafis to sublimity.

Shah Hussain (1539-1599) is the first recognized writer of Kafi. Folksongs are reflected in his Kafis. On the surface, it looks quite common-place poetry but he has studied the philosophy of life in depth. His other great contribution to Punjabi literature is the use of symbols. His symbols grow from Punjabi culture and these are multidimensional in meanings. This is an intellectual and technical innovation which has exerted great influence on the classical and modern Punjabi poetry. The

following Kafi is an illustration of his style.

O Mamma! Who can I tell, this state of separation pain  
Fires of faqeers smoulder, wherever I rummage ruby-red gain  
O Mamma! Who can I tell, this state of separation pain  
Thorns pierce; make me mad, separation my mind's refrain  
O Mamma! Who can I tell, this state of separation pain  
Bread of pain, curry of thorns, from burning bones for obtain  
O Mamma! Who can I tell, this state of separation pain  
Jungles, moors she roams in search, yet not found the swain

O Mamma! Who can I tell, this state of separation pain  
Says Husayn the destitute devote, if he's found, joy I'd attain  
O Mamma! Who can I tell this state of separation pain (Ghaffar, 2005: 783).

Bulhe Shah (1692-1758) comes next. Bulhe Shah has dealt with many subjects but the most prominent in his universal approach is his love for men. He very courageously condemns hypocrisy, mischievousness, greed, jealousy, prejudice and class divisions among men. He carries a message of love for the whole humanity.

Sachal Sarmast (1740-1826) talks of the unity of God, of union and separation and of true love for the real lord and negating one self for God. Khawaja Farid comes last in this tradition of poetry. His poetry has many dimensions and approaches. But in it the philosophy of Wahdat-ul-Wajod, love, separation from divine beloved and descriptions of Rohi frequently appear. In the poetry of Khawaja Farid divine and profane loves go side by side. In his descriptions of nature, he blends the objective and the subjective. When the clouds thunder on the burning Rohi, its noise is very welcome. He related it to the aspiration of the heart. The Pello pickers are ultimately dyed in the colours of Farid. He has used the symbol of Sassi for separation in love. Very few poets have touched the heights of art as he has.

In the British period Punjabi language had been thrown out of curriculum. As a result the new educated generation has been alienated from its heritage. After the creation of Pakistan some middle class intellectuals started thinking afresh about their language and literature. They arrived at the conclusion that true creative activity is possible only in the mother tongue. They were also fully aware of the fact that in order to put an end to the alienation created by the colonial period, they shall have to come back to their literary heritage. Many poets wrote Kafis in the classical tradition. But they could not rise above it. Kafis have also been written after independence. But the Kafis of Mushtaq Soofi, Ghulam Hussain Sajid, Shahzad Qaiser, Khaqan Haider Ghazi, Rifaat Abbass and professor Sharib have carried this genre forward thematically.

Mushtaq Soofi, in his Kafis in "Haith Vagay Daria" has followed Shah Hussain by repeating every line. He did not bring any change in the form of Kafi but he has based most of his Kafis on the songs of Sandal Bar. Even some of the climatic lines are actually the songs of the Bar. For his metaphor, landscape and romance, he chose the diction of the Bar. He regrets that there is no dearth of resources, but there is barrenness in them use of which there seems to be no end. He dreams of an ideal society in his poetry. The beauty of the Bar, the landscape and the romance have been so blended that his work has attained sublimity.

The first poetic collection of Ghulam Hussain Sajid "Dunia Phiray Ghamazi" includes some Kafis beside other poems. But his "Pani Ramz Bharay" is a book of Kafis which he has named Waee. Waee is the name of a collective prayer which is offered to break the stifling force of cruelty and exploitation, when it reaches its



extreme. Sajid is the Child of the river Ravi. The beauty of the Ravi and the rich culture of the Bar are ingrained in his unconscious. He wishes that the oppression around him ultimately come to an end and a new world blossom. His approach is subjective in this era of ideological poetry. There is a bitter sweet melancholy that runs deep through his poetry and casts a spell over the reader. He draws the landscape of the Ravi in his chaste language. His passion does not burst out in a conflagration rather he keeps this heat under his mature response. It is not a deliberate effort but a spontaneous out-burst which comes out with ease.

Shahzad Qaiser has published four collections of his Kafis. The form and mood of these Kafis is classical. His diction is also very close to that of the Kafi. His Kafi deals with the problems of human existence, the inner barrenness, the relationship between the body and the soul, mortality of man and the blessing of the Murshid. His Kafis fall in the category of subjective poetry.

The two poetic collections of Khaqan Haider Ghazi “Band Gali Vich Sham” and “Dam Dam Nal Dhamal” also include some Kafis. He has described the agony of his own time through an address to Baba Farid, Sultan Bahoo, Lal Qalandur and Bulhe Shah. The great exponent of this style in Punjabi poetry is Shah Hussain who has described the torture of separation through an address to his mother. In modern poetry Amrita Pritam is a big voice that has narrated the massacre of the Partition and the great moral degradation through an address to Waris Shah. This kind of style basically flourishes in a period of intellectual barrenness only when people become callous to the cries of pain. In such a situation the poet address one who has been through such a torture. In the other Kafis of Khaqan which have been addressed to Bulhe Shah, the pain of this age has been concentrated in twenty eight stanzas. He has made his utmost effort to break through this web of torture but to no avail. The agony of time, oppression and cruelty has been so blended in the classical tradition that this Kafi has become the representative genre of this generation.

Rifaat Abbass has published two collections of Kafis “Sangat Veda” and “Ishk Allah Saien Jagia”. Their form is classical. Sangat Veda deals with man from the age of Vedas to the present age. The poet has made the people of this culture aware of the oppression of history. He has also suggested the creation of a new structure on these ideas. In “Ishq Allah Saien Jagia” there are two basic metaphors, Ishq and Allah. Apparently these two are the subjects of classical Kafi. But the poet has so beautifully adjusted these topics to the folk dialect that puts a stamp on his poetic talent. To mould every day attitudes into beautiful verses is his distinction.

A collection of the Kafis of Professor Sharib “Koi Androu Dur Kharkavay” has already been published. The great distinction of his Kafi is that he describes the internal problem of human existence in folk tradition. Separation from the beloved, the pain of deprivation despite labour and the wailings of separation from the beloved are so beautifully blended with the memory of the landscape of the old Punjab that his Kafi becomes a beautiful epitome of form and content. The poet is

looking for a person through whom he may explore the internal possibilities of existence. Despite its ugliness, he does not allow the beauty of life to be absent from his mind. His poetry expresses the feeling of unequal distribution of wealth, deprivation and despair. But the spell of the desire for the beloved turns this ugliness into an aesthetic experience.

The highly conscious poets of the Punjab are trying hard to identify themselves with their literary heritage in order to erase the alienation created by the colonial period. This poetry is much richer than other poetic genre in that it has behind it a classical tradition which is five hundred years old. Its acceptance is a part of Punjab's collective unconscious. The best writers of the present age have chosen it for their creative venture. The contemporary Kafi poets, keeping with the contemporary needs are trying to give a new form to the Punjabi genre in order to secure for it a status in the age of computer. It is a very welcome effort for Punjabi literature.

## References

- Ahmed, N. (Ed.). (1979). *Kalam Shah Hussain*. Lahore: Packages.  
Ghaffar, M. A. (Tr.). (2005). *Shah Husayn, Vol 2,551*. Lahore: Feroz Sons.  
Khan, M. A. (Ed.). (1989). *Kafian Shah Hussain*. Lahore: Pakistan Punjabi Adabi Board.  
Kunjahi, S. (1996). *Malir Tay Kafi*. Lahore: Punjabi Adab  
Mir, M. S. (1990). *Shah Hussain Aur Ous Ki Shairy* (Edited by Shoail Ahmed, Maqalat Halqa Arbab-e-Zaoq). Lahore: Polymer.  
Oudh, H. (Ed.). (1990). *Kabir Vachnovly (Tr. by Sarsvati Kaif)*. Delhi: Sahitya Akadmi.  
Jalalpuri, A. A. (1993). *Khird Nama*. Jehlum: Khird Afroz.  
Qureshi, A. G. (1989). *Punjabi Adab Di Kahani*. Lahore: Pakistan Punjabi Adabi Board.  
Sital, J.S. (Ed.). (1971). *Kalam-e-Nanak (Baba Nanak)*. Patiala: Bhasha Vabag.

## Biographical Note

**Dr. Saeed Bhutta** is an Associate Professor in the Department of Punjabi at the University of the Punjab, Lahore.

## Book Review

### **The Kite Runner**

*Khaled Hosseini*

Bloomsbury Publishing Plc, 36 Soho Square, London, 2003. 240pp. ISBN 9780 7475 9489 5

### **Reviewed by Naheed S. Goraya**

*Centre for South Asian Studies, Lahore*

The novel, “*Kite Runner*” under review is written by a Tajik novelist and a physician originally an Afghani, residing in North California. It is the first novel, written in English by an Afghan. It has been narrated in 25 chapters. It was first published in 2003. It has also been adapted into a film by the same name, released in December 2007. Hosseini’s personal memories of peaceful pre-Soviet era, Afghanistan as well as his personal experiences with the people of Hazara, led to the writing of this novel. The novel loosely fills in most of the relevant facts about Afghanistan’s chaotic recent history---the civil war of 1978, Soviet invasion, rise of Taliban opposition, the tensions between the Pashtuns and the Shiite Hazara minority. It covers the period from Soviet invasion of 1979 until its reconstruction, following the fall of Taliban. The novel is set in the backdrop of the troubled land of Afghanistan, starting in the 1960’s when the situation was more or less unruffled, before the soviets entered the scene in 1979. It revolves around a rich boy and his servant - companion.

It is a story of a young boy Amir, a boy from Wazir Akbar Khan District of Kabul whose mother died at the time of his birth. He is an out sider and ill-at-ease with himself. He is awfully hungry for the love of his father. He is haunted by the guilt of betraying his childhood friend Hassan, the son of his father’s servant from Hazara. Hassan is a child of preternatural goodness and self-confidence, though he is illiterate and often picked up by roving Pashtun boys. His description of Amir’s relationship with Hassan is beautifully nuanced and the moment of Amir’s ultimate betrayal is genuinely shocking

In the beginning of the novel, Amir, the narrator of the novel recalls a day in the winter of 1975 that changed everything in his life. He recalls certain things of which the important one is that he receives a phone call from his friend Rahim

Khan from Pakistan who requests him to visit Pakistan. Then he remembers Francisco and recalls Rahim Khan's words, **"There is a way to be good again."**

He mentions about Hassan who is another childhood friend. Ali, Hassan's father works for Amir's father, despite having a contrasting difference of Pashtuns and Hazara, Shia and Sunni. The most shameful thing here, he tells about Hassan's mother who ran off with a clan of travelling dancers and singers and that is considered *infra dig* for Afghans. Here the narrator tells about his findings of an old history book, titled *Khorami*. This book is about the fact that the Pashtuns have oppressed and persecuted Hazaras for the reason that the Pashtuns were Sunni Muslims while Hazaras were Shia.

The narrator tells about Amir's father, Baba who always kept himself apart from himself because his wife died when she gave birth to Amir. Baba is of the view that stealing is the greatest sin of all sins while all other sins are at variance with. Baba does not like Amir's habits but still he is happy that Rahim Khan understands him. Here starts a kind of jealousy between Amir and Hassan and he snaps at Hassan out of jealousy.

The author tells that Baba never considered Ali as his friend and same was true of Amir's relation with Hassan. He tells about his routine of school life when Hassan used to do all his work, including making breakfasts, ironing clothes and polishing shoes. A time came when Amir started making fun of Hassan for which he used to repent and felt guilty after that. Here Amir tells about his first short story which he wrote but his Baba did not show any interest. It was Rahim Khan who writes a note to Amir after reading the story and encourages him to write more for his God gifted talent. Amir wishes that Rahim Khan would his father. When Amir shares his story with Hassan, he points out a problem with the plot of the story Amir gets jealous of him but suddenly Afghanistan changes forever.

Here starts, 'beginning of an end'. The night of 17<sup>th</sup> July, 1973, the destruction of Afghanistan started with the Russian invasion. It dawned the next day that Daoud Khan, the cousin of King Zahir Shah had ended the 40 years of King's reign with a bloodless coup. Here Amir and Hassan meet a boy, Assef who dislikes Hassan because he is from Hazara. For Hassan's 12<sup>th</sup> birthday, Baba arranges his cleft lip repaired by a plastic surgeon. Life of both Hassan and Amir changes drastically when Assef makes him realize that Hassan is merely a servant and not a friend, rapes him. Although Amir knows all yet he pretends that as if nothing has happened. Hassan starts avoiding Amir but still he wants to be friend again but does not get any positive response from Amir. The relationship between them starts getting deteriorated. As Amir's 13<sup>th</sup> Birthday approaches, he blames Hassan for stealing his birthday watch and money. Hassan very surprisingly admits but Amir's Father forgives him. Still Ali insists on leaving. In March, 1981 Amir and Baba leave for Pakistan very secretly as spies of Soviet soldiers were omnipresent. After facing a little problem, they are allowed to cross the borders. Along with other refugees, they are transported in a fuel truck to Pakistan. Amir along with his father settles in Fremont, California. In 1983, Amir did his

graduation from high school. Then a girl, named Soraya enters his life. She is the daughter of his father's friend. Her father does not like Amir. Baba gets inoperable Lung cancer but he refuses the treatment. He engages Amir with Soraya. Amir and Soraya get married and after One month, Baba dies. In 1988, Amir completes his first novel and in the following year, the book is also released. At this moment, he remembers his old friend Hassan who had great belief in his writing abilities.

Here the story comes to a new turn again, one day when Amir tells Soraya about his plan to go to Pakistan where he wants to meet Rahim Khan. Amir believes that there is an unspoken truth between him and Rahim Khan. It all foreshadows the fact that Rahim Khan knows each and every thing about Hassan and all what has happened between them. When Amir returns to Pakistan, he finds Rahim Khan sick. Rahim Khan tells him about the unbearable life of Afghans under Taliban rule. No doubt, he, like all others was in the beginning very happy when Taliban defeated the Russian soldiers because he thought that life in Kabul would improve. Rahim tells him that he has met Hassan in the year of 1986. By then, Ali, Hassan's father had been killed by a land mine. His wife gave birth to a son named, Sohrab. Hassan wanted his son to be a Kite runner, as Talibans had banned Kite fighting shortly after taking over.

Amir becomes anxious to meet Hassan but Rahim Khan gives him a letter. The letter shows the clear wishes of Hassan to see his Friend Amir. No sooner did Rahim Khan come to Pakistan than Taliban Officers came to take his house but Hassan refused to leave. Resultantly, he and his wife were shot dead. Rahim Khan requests Amir to bring Hassan's 10 year old son from Kabul. The most awful thing for Amir, is the bitter fact that Hassan was Amir's real brother. Amir gets very much annoyed and betrayed for what his father had done to him. He thinks that Hassan could have spent a better life in America. Then Amir at once decides to go to Kabul. He enters Afghanistan with the help of a person, named Farid. Who has childhood contempt with him because he was born with a privilege. But the moment, Farid learns why he is going to Kabul; he starts thinking better of Amir. The entry into Kabul was shocking for Amir because he saw a huge destruction and begging children. Both Farid and Amir try hard to find Sohrab. Then in an orphanage, they are told that a Taliban official has bought Sohrab. It makes Farid very much furious. But the Director of the orphanage tells them that he had no choice except selling children, otherwise Taliban would take as many children as they wanted. The director tells them to go to Ghazi Stadium and look for the official who bought Sohrab. Next day, they find the man and make an appointment with him. Amir goes to meet him alone. The Taliban official, wearing Glasses brings a great shock to Amir when he removes his glasses because he is Assef. He tells him that he can have Sohrab but first, he has to win an unsettled business with him. He tells his guards that only one of them will come out of the room and if it is Amir, then they must let go Amir and Sohrab. The fight ends when Sohrab takes out Assef's eye with a slingshot. It is the moment which fulfills the taunt of Hassan, calling him, "One Eyed Assef". Then they drive away.

Amir gets into conscious after two days. Rahim Khan has already left the town, leaving some money and a letter for Amir, requesting him to forgive himself and his Baba. Amir goes to Islamabad along with Sohrab. He calls his wife and tells her all what has happened in Kabul and about Sohrab. But the American Embassy tells him that before adopting Sohrab, he would have to provide the death certificate of his parents (Hassan and Farzana). It was the time when most of the people in Afghanistan had hardly the birth certificates. More over, he had to prove Sohrab to be his real nephew. Soraya arranges for a humanitarian visa to get Sohrab into the US. Until that time Sohrab was supposed to stay in an orphanage. Sohrab becomes very much perturbed and tries to commit suicide. Fortunately, he survives and both of them go to America but Sohrab remains silent for one year. The novel ends with a party thrown by an American-Afghan Community; Amir buys a kite for Sohrab. They both fly kite and win, just as he and Hassan did years earlier. Amir is Sohrab's kite runner and for the first time, Sohrab smiles for Amir. The novel ends with a hopeful note of optimism that the whole world would prefer to see it unspoiled. It combines the tones of memory and nostalgia with a desire to recreate a lost world. It touches upon all the aspects of childhood emotions like jealousy, love, possessiveness, etc.

The novel reminds us that we all human are alike, fighting similar daily and lifelong battles, just in different circumstances. Its many themes include ethnic tensions between Hazara and Pakhtoons in Afghanistan and the immigration experiences of Amir and his father in the US. It is told with simplicity. It is a novel of great hidden intricacy and wisdom like a timeless Eastern tale. There are many beautiful sayings in the novel like, "Afghans cherish customs but abhor rules". "Better to get hurt by the truth than comforted with a lie." The major themes explored in the novel are war, loyalty, forgiveness, friendship, redemption, sacrifice, race, class, fear and the relationships between father and son. It is a novel to be read, discussed and enjoyed by any one who wants a chance to make things right again. It also provides a sense of traditional Afghan life styles and culture. However, the four main themes shown by the author are Strength of Character, Sin and Redemption, Relationship between Parent and Child, as well as Loyalty and Friendship between two people. It speaks the most distressing truth about the power of evil, both personal and political. It intoxicates like a high-flying kite with the power of hope. It is shimmer of life. It is a Shakespearean beginning to an epic tale that spans lives lived across two continents amid political upheavals, where dreams will die before they bud and where a search for a child finally makes a coward into a man, rich and soul searching. His world is patchwork of the beautiful and the horrific. The novel is a sharp and unforgettable taste of the trauma and tumult experienced by Afghans as their country buckled.

Khaled Hosseini gives us a vivid and engaging story that reminds us how long his people have been struggling to triumph over the forces of violence, the forces that continue to threaten them even today. The novel has also been translated in

**South Asian Studies 23 (2)**

Urdu language with the title of *Patang Baaz Sajna* and has been published in Sunday magazines of Daily *Jang*.