

Either You Are with Us or Against Us

Musarrat Jabeen

University of Sargodha, Sargodha

ABSTRACT

To counter the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, President Bush left no option for Pakistan except to side with him and fight war against terrorism as an ally. The US-led coalition defeated the terrorist forces of Al-Qaeda and Taliban in Afghanistan. These remnant forces are making new safe heaven in tribal areas of Pakistan through porous border after dismantling their network by NATO troops in Afghanistan. The US has begun covert operation and direct military attacks on the territory of Pakistan, a sovereign state, with out prior consultation. Pakistan has repeatedly said that these attacks are violation of its sovereignty while it had already countering terrorism and capturing fugitives that are being handed over to US. But President Bush did not heed and continued his policy. Bush's diplomacy has been paralyzed by the rhetoric of the war on terror, a strategy against evil powers in which non-cooperative actors are with terrorists. Such rhetoric prevents sound strategic thinking. Only political and diplomatic initiatives can distinguish political opponents as well as violent ones such as Al-Qaeda. There is a need to counter violent-ones to reduce the threats faced by US as well as securing the rest of the world. The paper will explore Bush's strategy of countering terrorism by viewing its policy towards Pakistan during his presidency with Pakistan's responses. At the end of Bush regime, the US plan to spend \$750 million in the tribal area on the development projects is raising many questions. Why do they think of building schools and roads in 2008, seven years after 9/11? Why have they ignored this coroner of world where continued fight has been imprinting the minds of impoverished teenagers against west forcing them to raise guns and living the life of militant? The paper will attempt to review these phenomena.

KEY WORDS: Terrorism, strategy, war, alliance, extremism, consultation, radicalism, *jihad*, regional security

Introduction

America is a continental island surrounded by two oceans and protected by different forms of military might and intelligence resources which have the power to influence different spheres of international environment. In fact, power is the ability to mess with other side's mind and action and to interfere with other side's

decision making process. After the events of 9/11, it has been perceived that a non-state actor, Al-Qaeda possesses such power that is reflected in changing American strategic agenda. This shift occurred when the terrorists took the day of September 11, 2001 and destroyed the World Trade Center and damaged a portion of Pentagon. These terrorist attacks were a major event with numerous consequences. It rejected Fukuyama's assertion after the collapse of Soviet Union that "We are witnessing not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of history as such that is the end point of mankind, ideological evolution and universalization of western liberal democracy as the final form of human government" (Fukuyama, 1992).

Changed Agenda after Terrorist Attacks

These terrorist attacks not only killed 3,000 American citizens but also challenged American military and economic powers as well as authority. After these attacks, Al-Qaeda, the self-proclaimed voice of oppressed and victim of American and Arab imperialism became the oppressor while the sole superpower became victim in western eyes. America made a formidable coalition with the support of other nations to pursue its strategic interests and to preserve its security and prestige (Kapur, 2002:635).The purpose of the coalition was also to recover from the psychological blows that had inflicted on US sense of power and well being. Like the attack of Pearl Harbour, this incident also changed the psyche of American people. President Bush declared war against Taliban as they were harbouring Al-Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden, an exiled Saudi dissident, who was allegedly involved in these attacks. The US sources claimed that Bin Laden was a person who declared all Americans to be legitimate target of *Jihad* in February, 1998 (Dada, 2001: 104). All these elements became the direct target of US retaliation. These attacks have also tattered the thinking of peace and destroyed the appeal of pacifist belief that war is immoral and clashes between the civilizations are continued in the name of war against terrorism.

This changed situation entailed massive budget with human resources for new international cause and deployment of US-led coalition forces to counter the terrorism at its doors. This war was also different as compared to Cold War when communism was a threat to US but now power center was changed and instead of a rival superpower, a non-state actor threatened US. Al-Qaeda is assumed to have sponsors in Afghanistan and in several other states including Pakistan, Egypt Sudan and Germany. About this actor, it is believed that it possesses belief, military power and economic resources to damage the superpower against which it had grievances (Rashid, 1997).

Countering the Terrorist Attacks

Following September 11, America conceded the necessity to build links with non-traditional partners as well as help of traditional partners. Some traditional partners like Egypt or Saudi Arabia showed lukewarm commitment to anti-terrorist campaign. These states strangled between two situations, one was their government's support to anti-terrorist campaign and other was populace opinion that saw Washington as a part of problem, particularly in its West Asian politics. Other group consisting of traditional European partners was bound under Article 5th of NATO charter, that an attack on one is deemed to be an attack on all (Palmer & Perkins, 1969: 413). President Bush had to remind the European powers that war against terrorism required active participation by military means rather than verbal support. Despite that French President tried to pacify the situation and paid a visit to Washington on November 2001 to talk for a political solution in Afghanistan. On the other side, Britain was the only country from European members that appeared to be firm on American side. Support from Russia, a non-traditional partner, came in the form of weapons supply to Northern Alliance, intelligence sharing of area and facilitating the coalition troops for bases in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, the countries under Russian influence (Kapur, 2002: 540-41).

Pakistan and War on Terrorism

Pakistan, being pro-Western in its international orientation was frontline state during the Afghan War of 1980s and again was placed on the same position by US after September 11 but this time, situation was different. After attack, America declared its war against terrorism and demanded to know "If Pakistan was friend or foe" and threatened the South Asian states with all meanings. Pakistan provided logistic and military support to US without noticing of anti-American demonstrations through out the country. Top Pakistani officials visited Taliban for delivering message of massive assault in case of their refusal to hand over Osama Bin Laden (Hussain, 2004: 32). Bush said, "either you are with us or you are with the terrorists". He further said, "This is not however, just American fight and what is at stake, is not just America's freedom, this is the world fight, this is the civilization fight." Pakistan was the only country in South Asia, having diplomatic relations with Taliban. So Pakistan had no alternative but to condemn the terrorist attack as "most brutal and horrible" and offered unstinted cooperation in war against terrorism (Woodward, 2002: 58-59).

In the wake of September 11, US tried to achieve its goals and objectives in South Asia by the prevention of an all out war between India and Pakistan for making its anti-terror campaign successful and got cooperation in this context.

Pakistan transformed itself from supporter of Taliban to a partner of America's ongoing war on terrorism and US was able to use Pakistan's leverage with Taliban to convey its own demands. Even in the post Taliban scenario, Bush continued to rely on Pakistan's government to root out Al-Qaeda, as he claimed it to be operating from Pakistani territory.

Pakistan was under four sets of sanctions at the time of terrorist attacks. As a result of Pakistan's support in war on terrorism, Bush administration removed all nuclear related economic sanctions on September 22, 2001 and provided military and economic assistance. Taking a step ahead, on October 27, President signed a law waiving all sanctions against democracy and debt arrearage through 2003. More concessions were given for rescheduling of Pakistan's debt at low interest rates by saving one billion over three years (2001-04). US provided \$ 624.5 million development assistance in 2002 (Guihong, 2004). Bush Administration made a joint working group on counter terrorism and Law Enforcement with reestablishment of a Defense Consultation Group to improve military relations. American State Secretary, Colin Powell appreciated Pakistan's role and called for peaceful Kashmir issue (Dawn, 2002, October 22).

Operation Enduring Freedom against Al-Qaeda and Taliban

Operation Enduring Freedom was designed to destroy the terrorist training camps and infrastructure of Al-Qaeda and Taliban to eliminate the terrorist activities in Afghanistan. After loosing power in Kabul, "remnant forces" of Taliban ran to the rugged mountain region near the Pak-Afghan border and reassembled to conduct "hit-and-run" attacks against US-led coalition units (Griswold, 2004). It was also doubted that Bin Laden, his associate, Egyptian Islamic radical leader Ayman al-Zawahiri and Taliban Chief, Mulla Omar were hidden in remote areas of Pak-Afghan border. The United States was obsessed with the idea that Al-Qaeda and Pakistani intelligence agencies had links with each other. So it demanded Pakistan to support American multilateral efforts to eradicate Al-Qaeda and other Islamic extremist groups in the region. It was also alleged that Pakistan permitted Taliban militants to get training for fighting in Afghanistan and the neighboring areas. This allegation was in the light of the role of Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) during Taliban regime, when it was believed that ISI officials had sympathies with Taliban and members of Al-Qaeda (Gall, 2004). During Taliban regime, it actively supported them and it was believed to have direct contacts with Al-Qaeda (Risen & Miller, 2001).

The situation of Pakistan's internal security was supportive for increasing sectarian violence in Pakistan that strengthens the idea that Al-Qaeda could operate more freely from here ("Pakistan: A New," 2003). There were some past indications of collision between some elements of Al-Qaeda, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and influential Pakistanis. These doubts were further strengthened by capture of three

major Al Qaeda figures including Abu Zubaydah and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed from a house of Lashkar-e-Taiba in Faisalabad and Jamait-e-Islami's member house in Rawalpindi respectively. (*Dawn*, 2003, November 15). Presence of these elements were dangerous for the regional development as US Special Envoy and Ambassador to Afghanistan Zalmay Khalilzad warned that resurgent Taliban and Al-Qaeda presented a serious threat to Afghan reconstruction efforts. Afghan President Hamid Karzai alleged that militants trained on Pakistani territory continued to infiltrate into Afghanistan to mount anti-government attacks there (Gall, 2003). Such allegations never solve the issues.

Ban on the Activities of Madrassas by Musharraf

It was accessed about Taliban movement that it had begun among students attending Pakistani religious schools (*madrassas*). The Secretary of State Powell opined about them as “programs that do nothing but prepare youngsters to be fundamentalists and to be terrorists” (“House Appropriations,” 2004). These *madrassas* generated their funds locally as well as by foreign entities, donation from Muslim countries particularly Saudi Arabia which was a major donor during Afghan War. These *madrassas* were established at Pak-Afghan border to train and educate the refugees during Afghan War and became the training camps for *Jihadis*. It was alleged that ISI organized them for armed action in Afghanistan. When the war was over, they spread to other places like Kashmir, Chechnya, Philippines etc. (Kapur, 2002:537). The links and politics of non-state actors got benefits from their presence and facilitated funds for them generally generated through drug trade a major source of non-state activity (Economist, 2001, October 20: 19-20).

In January 2002, President Musharraf vowed to end Pakistan's use as a base for terrorism and criticized religious extremism and intolerance in the country. He made efforts to eradicate the extremism and banned five terrorist organizations in January 2002, including Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) and Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP). Among these, Washington labeled LeT and JeM as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) while SSP appeared on the State Department's list of “other terrorist groups ” (“Foreign Terrorist,” 2004). About 3,300 extremists were arrested and detained, but majority was released as no evidences were against them. Many of the suspected militants were trained in Taliban camp (including one man who later tried to assassinate Musharraf (Watson, 2004). In American perception, it was a huge show as Musharraf was the master of double game. While militants viewed Musharraf as “an American lackey who had sold Pakistan's soil, its sovereignty and perhaps control of its nuclear weapons to the Americans” (Sanger, 2009: 234). Most of these released elements regrouped and continued to operate by adopting new names: LeT became Jamaat al-Dawat and JeM became Khudam-ul Islam (Watson, 2002). It was also alleged

that the elements of Al-Qaeda had joined these indigenous forces. The United Nations also listed JeM and LeT as “entities belonging to or associated with Taliban and Al Qaeda organization” (www.un.org, 2003).

Musharraf remained busy in balancing the competing interests to stay in power and ignored the storm gathering around him. US wanted to make Musharraf realize that he could not survive unless he took war to the militants. They had evidences, largely interceptions of conversation among insurgents in the North-West territories (Sanger, 2009: 235). About cracked down of extremist *madrasses*, two observers commented that “most *madrassas* remain unregistered, their finances unregulated and the government has yet to remove the *jihadis* and sectarian content of their curricula” (Ahmed & Norton, 2004). It was also speculated by Washington that Musharraf was reluctant to introduce reforms due to his desire of friendly relations with Pakistan’s Islamist political parties, which have strong political base (Lancaster and Khan, 2004). American Ambassador warned about the continued activities of these groups, so Musharraf banned them from resurfacing and moved to seize their financial assets (Ali, 2003). According to reliable sources, there were roughly 25,000 private Islamic schools in Pakistan and only a small number bred young terrorists and sent them out to attack Americans. Musharraf cleaned out a major *madrassa* of hard-line ideology whose academic curriculum had intolerance and it was well known to American intelligent officers. But it was comical for Americans as they attributed it “something like informing them that we are going to hit place so leave some weapons.” US officials called the efforts cosmetic, ineffective and the result of international pressure (Haqqani, 2003).

During all these years, Afghan President Karzai alleged Pakistani clerics for supporting Taliban whom he considered responsible for destabilization in Afghanistan. In March 2004, skirmishes continued between Pakistan Army and Islamic militants in traditionally autonomous Western Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Pakistan’s interior minister accused Islamist politicians of giving a “free hand” to terrorists. Musharraf asked Pakistan’s religious groups to assist in countering extremism and improving Pakistan’s image as a moderate and progressive state (Qaisar, 2004).

Attacks on President Musharraf and Other Officers

Musharraf faced dire consequences due to change in his policy of cutting ties with Taliban regime and facilitating US-led anti-terrorism operations in the region (Bender and Stockman, 2004). To revenge this policy reversals and efforts to crack down on Islamic extremists groups, Musharraf faced Islamic militant’s outrage and was targeted twice in 2003 (Masood, 2004). In June 2004, Al-Qaeda linked elements made attempts to kill other top Pakistani officials including a top army general in Karachi. The clues taken from the scene were linked with Al-Qaeda, which brought arrest of Masrab Arochi, nephew of Khalid Sheik

Mohammed, a key alleged for plotting 9/11 and a cousin of Ramzi Yousef, who got life sentence for bombing the World Trade Center in 1993 and was imprisoned in US (*Dawn*, 2004, December 23).

As Pakistan's coercive counterterrorism policies became more vigorous, numerous observers warned that increased government pressure on tribal people and military operations in FATA were creating a backlash, sparking unrest and strengthening pro-Al-Qaeda sentiments in Southern and Eastern cities of Pakistan (Abbas, 2004). President Musharraf said in an interview that he was concerned about "fall out" from the recent military operations and a Pakistan Army spokesman drew direct links between a six-week-long spate with sectarian bombings and killings in Karachi as a result of government's efforts to root out militants in South Waziristan (about 72 persons were killed between May 3 and June 10, 2004). Even failed attempts were made to assassinate the Prime Minister of Pakistan and the Chief Minister of Balochistan. As sectarianism and bloodshed increased in Pakistan, analysts again expressed acute concerns about country's fundamental political stability ("Several Arrests," 2004). Moreover, several international aid agencies suspended their operations in Balochistan province after receiving threats of suicide attacks (Yusufzai, 2004).

Aid Package for Countering Terrorism in Early Years

After terrorist attacks, Stephen P. Cohen has analyzed that American strategy is rapidly moving away from the typical post Cold War "billiard ball" model to state to state interaction. It is now looking more inside nation with efforts to locate those militant groups which are being nurtured and trying to fathom the domestic dynamics of that country. In this scenario, Pakistan is assumed as part of problem and aid to Pakistan is to engage it for countering terrorism (Nuri, 2004: 3-4). In July 2003, President Musharraf paid a visit to US and held a meeting with President Bush at Camp David. It was an honour for Pakistan as handful world leaders had visited this place. During this visit, economic and defense assistance of \$ 3 billion over a period of five years was approved. However, this package was conditioned with annual certification by US Congress. The basic purpose of this package, was to stop cross border terrorism. In Fiscal year 2001, \$500 million and in 2002 about one billion was sanctioned (Nuri, 2004:1). According to the reports of the Department of Defense and Foreign Military Sales, it made agreements with Pakistan of billions dollars during all these years ("Defense Security," 2003). The direct US Foreign Military Financing for Pakistan was estimated about average of \$400 million per year as data of previous financial years showed. Apart from this, Congress allocated billions of dollars in additional defense spending to reimburse Pakistan and other cooperating nations for their support in war on terrorism.

US Concerns about Pakistan's Support of Militants

Pakistan changed its pro-Taliban policy after 9/11 but US remained doubtful and alleged that Taliban still receiving logistical and other support inside Pakistan. Some senior senators voiced such worries that elements of Pakistan's intelligence agencies might be helping members of Taliban and perhaps even Al Qaeda (Dao, 2003). In August 2003, the arrest of three Pakistani army officers on the suspicion of having ties with Islamic extremists, Deputy Secretary of State Armitage has been quoted as saying, he does "not think that affection for working with us extends up and down the rank and file of the Pakistani security community" (Abbas, 2003).

In October 2003, in a testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Assistant Secretary of Defense Peter Rodman said, "There are elements in Pakistani government whom we suspect are sympathetic to the old policy of before 9/11," adding that there still exists in North-Western Pakistan, a radical Islamic infrastructure that "spews out fighters that go into Kashmir as well as into Afghanistan." In 2004, a senior Pakistani expert has repeated the same thing before the same Senate panel that, "in the absence of greater US guarantees, regarding Pakistan's long-run security interests, it is dangerous [for the Pakistani military] to completely remove the threat of extremism to Kabul and Delhi." He appreciated sincere decision of Islamabad for eradicating extremism as "tantamount to dismantling a weapons system" ("Senate Foreign," 2003). Washington is still repeating this allegation.

Pak-US military to military relations remained sour as CIA had never set free itself from the notion that ISI was in coordination with Taliban. No doubt, CIA had no option but to rely on its information for local militancy and operations. In June 2008, the National Security Agency intercepted the messages indicating the support of ISI for Taliban to disrupt Afghanistan. During this time, list of about twenty individuals of Taliban and Al-Qaeda was approved by Washington who could be targeted either by CIA or American military commandos. Taliban leader Haqqani was at the top of classified list (he had been favourite of Washington during Afghan War) because he was identified as an Al-Qaeda associate. Same was the case of Baitullah Mehsud, the accused killer of Bhutto and many other included in this list (Schiewek, 2006:167) Baitllah Mahsud was killed by a US missile fired by a pilotless drone aircraft on August 5, 2009. It was a huge and severe decision ever made by US administration because the threat of blackish was so high. CIA also decided to send officials to Pakistani leadership to present evidence and demand termination of these connections with Taliban but it became late due to bombing of Indian embassy in Kabul on July 7, 2008, killing 54 people including India 's Defense Attaché to Afghanistan. In coming months, Pakistan took tough stance and voiced serious concerns over the allegation on ISI. Pakistan also rejected US proposal for joint operation in tribal area and protested drone attacks inside Pakistani territory and asked for shifting drone technology and authority to Pakistan army. The

Army Chief General Ashfaq Kayani told US officers that it would be difficult to bridge the trust deficit, if statements maligning ISI kept coming from US and said that linking ISI with the Taliban was inappropriate (*Dawn* (Islamabad), 2009, April 8).

US Reliance on Musharraf

President Musharraf's support made Bush to invest too much confidence in him as he could talk at general to general level with Powell and made efforts to convince the democratic vision of Pakistan that appealed Bush, who had entirely ignored Musharraf as yesterday's dictator as Clinton behaved him during his visit of South Asia in March 2000. After 9/11, for Americans, Musharraf became the most attractive leader with pragmatic approach and a survivor who understood the actual position and Bush viewed him as a fierce fighter against terrorism of all types, a perception Musharraf strengthened by capturing some Al-Qaeda members (Sanger, 2009:238).

Since 2002, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has been focusing on Pakistan and counterterrorism, as its reports pointed out. One area in which they showed problem, was the over-reliance of US, on single individual by ignoring any positive development of Pakistan's democratic institutions and civil society. It was analyzed that such development was a key to long-term success of US policy in the region. According to one witness, the United States' attempt to deal with Pakistan through "policy triage and by focusing on the personal leadership of President Musharraf," both of which are "flawed concepts." Another witness has provided a similar analysis, asserting that Musharraf is the best seen as a "marginal satisfier" who will do only the minimum expected of him. For instance, in the wake of more serious counterterrorism efforts during Bush era, Musharraf "is likely to return to his satisfier mode." This expert recommended that, "The United States must alter the impression that its support for Pakistan is essentially support for Musharraf," a sentiment expressed by Pakistani analysts (Sanger, 2009).

Pakistani Military Operations

In an attempt to block infiltration along Pak-Afghan border, Islamabad deployed some 70,000 troops to the region in 2002. In April 2003, US, Pakistan and Afghanistan formed a Tripartite Commission to coordinate their efforts to stabilize the border areas. In June 2003, due to increased US pressure, Islamabad for the first time sent its armed forces into FATA in search of Al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters who had eluded US-led campaign in Afghanistan (Schiewek, 2006:166). By September 2003, Islamabad sent 25,000 troops in the tribal areas and a major operation took place in coordination with US-led forces on Afghan side of the border as majority of retreating Taliban and Al-Qaeda fugitives entered into North

and South Waziristan, the Southern most of FATA's seven districts which share a very long and inhospitable borders with Afghanistan's Paktia and Paktika provinces. During all these years, Pakistani security forces were engaged to capture suspected Al Qaeda fugitives in Waziristan, as a number of stalwarts like Abu Zubaida, Adil Aljazeera, Al-Libi and other made their journey to Karachi and Gulf through Arabian sea (Gul, 2006: 29-30). The operations encouraged US officials, who saw in them a positive trend in Islamabad's commitment in tracking and capturing the wanted extremists on Pakistani territory. These officials admitted that Pakistani government finds it more difficult politically to pursue Taliban members who enjoyed ethnic and familial ties with Pakistani Pashtuns. This was also admitted by the Vice Chairman of US Joint Chiefs of Staff, who told a Congressional panel that Islamabad government had "taken some initiatives to increase their military presence on the border, such as manned outposts, regular patrols and security barriers ("Pakistan says," 2004). Islamabad's overt operations in the western tribal regions brought vocal criticism for Musharraf among Islamist groups, many of whom accused him of taking orders from the United States ("Fazal Accuses," 2004). Whatever Pakistan did in war on terrorism, it was not appreciated by US, despite the fact that a large number of Pakistanis were killed in these operations. Pakistani officials called the operation a victory, but the apparent escape of militant leaders, coupled with the vehement and lethal resistance, put up by their well-armed cadre (believed to be remnants of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan), led many observers to call the operation a failure, marked by poor intelligence and hasty planning (Tohid, 2004).

Keeping in view these developments, Islamabad tried to persuade Pashtun tribal leaders to undertake their own efforts by organizing tribal "lashkars" (fighting group) for detaining or at least expelling wanted fugitives. Tribal leaders in South Waziristan formed two *lashkars* and succeeded in capturing and handing over fifty percent of fugitives of given list. Despite that political administrators in the district were not satisfied with the slow pace of progress and issued an "ultimatum that included threats of steep monetary fines for the entire tribe, as well as for any individuals who provided shelter to unwanted foreigners" (Rhode and Khan, 2004).

Another step was taken in 2004 that set a dead line for those foreigners who were living in the tribal areas and were allowed to live in Pakistan, if they surrendered their weapons and registered with government with a commitment that they would not be part of terrorism. Even a single person was not registered after passing the fixed dead line, the government repeatedly extended the dead lines and final one was passed on May 10, 2004. Islamabad stated that this "Shakai agreement" was not attenuation of its counterterrorism efforts but the top US military officer in Afghanistan, Lt. Gen. David Barno objected that Pakistan's strategy of seeking reconciliation with foreign militants in western tribal areas "could go in the wrong direction" (*Dawn*, 2004, August 18).

Almost immediately after making the deal, 27 years old Nek Mohammed, who fought with Taliban in Afghanistan issued threats against Islamabad and pledged his loyalty to Mulla Omar. Deals between the government and foreign militants were a failure. In response to an unsuccessful conciliatory approach, Islamabad ordered authorities in South Waziristan to close more than 6,000 merchant shops in an effort to use economic pressure on rebel tribes, and a massive mobilization of federal troops also came into effect. Next day, Pakistani warplanes bombed three places of militants in South Waziristan, including one supposed to be used as a terrorist training camp. It was calculated that more than 20,000 troops were involved in this sweep operation that left about 72 people dead, including 17 soldiers, after three days of fighting (Khan, 2004). On June 18, Nek Mohammed was located, apparently through signals intelligence and was killed along with seven others in a missile attack. Pakistani security officials claimed and took full credit for Nek's killing and rejected any foreign support but numerous local witnesses reported the presence of an aerial drone and doubts about Pakistan's material capability to effect such an operation led some to conclude that US had been involved in attack (Khan and Wazir, 2004). This brought further violence in South Waziristan while sporadic and lethal skirmishes continued in Western Pakistan.

US Military Presence in Border Area of Pakistan

American military presence on Pakistani territory is a sensitive issue and reports of even brief incursions from tribal area caused tensions between Islamabad and Washington since 2004" (Pakistan Protests," 2004). In December 2003-04, about 2,000 Afghanistan-based American troops were reportedly involved in 'Operation Avalanche' and 'Operation Mountain Storm' against Taliban. In these operations, new tactics were applied and Pakistani troops also supported across the international border (Sanger and Schmitt, 2004). During these years, it was reported that US military in Afghanistan had plans to "go into Pakistan with Musharraf's help" to neutralize Al-Qaeda but Musharraf rejected this proposal and Americans were not in the position to put US troops in Pakistan against Islamabad's wishes. A senior US diplomat with another military officer told a House Armed Services Committee panel that it was "absolutely" the policy of Washington to keep its troops on Afghan side of border. In April 2004, US Ambassador to Afghanistan caused some further annoyance in Islamabad when he said that the Pakistani leadership must solve the on going problem of militant infiltration into Afghanistan or "we will have to do it for ourselves." In this way US indirectly threatened Pakistan to obtain its objective in its war against terrorism and forced Pakistan to allow "hot pursuit" up to ten kilometers into Pakistani territory but this was officially denied by Islamabad government (*Dawn*, 2005, October 14).

Mussarat Jabeen **Either You Are**

Since the spring of 2002, US military and law enforcement personnel have been engaged in tracking and locating fugitive elements on Pakistani territory, especially with signals and other intelligence including spy satellites, electronic surveillance planes, armed aerial drones and sophisticated ground sensors and computer stations (Meyer and Miller, 2004). The provision of night-vision equipment, communications gear, transport helicopters and used C-130 transport aircraft aid was to be aimed at bolstering Islamabad's counterterrorism which also included funds for road-building projects in Frontier Province and FATA. The US also trained and equipped Pakistani Army to find and target terrorist elements (Bukhari, 2004). Since 2004, heavy search operation against terrorists in Pashtun-majority areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan has been continued. Bush lured Pakistan and repeatedly said that Pakistani leadership was a strong ally against terror and continued aid, despite Musharraf's announcement of pulling back from the tribal area because of a truce he had agreed with tribal leaders. But Congress warned to link reimbursement to Pakistani military performance. Intelligence reports written during Bush administration documented the support of ISI for Taliban. They disclosed that Bush knew even Musharraf had little interest in sending army into frontier territory as Bush put to one of his aides, "they get their asses kicked every week." Every military professional who returned from Islamabad returned with the same report. Seven years after 9/11, 80 percent of Pakistani military was arrayed against India as US sources claimed (Sanger, 2009:246).

Change in Bush Strategy

With increasing militancy in Pakistani territory, Bush changed his strategy and secretly began to lift restrictions on limited role of CIA in Pakistan. As Sanger disclosed in his book that the first series of decisions were never announced publicly due to fear of public reaction and blackish in Pakistan. Bush did not issue the new finding, the legal document which the White House would have to report to Congress that permitted CIA to conduct new overt operation. Instead that he loosened restrictions on one existing finding, issued just days after 9/11 using that method and did not notify Congress for a new approach (Sanger, 2009:235-36). Bush's decision was enveloped in great secrecy because Musharraf expressed fear of huge cries on American idea of dealing militancy in sovereign Pakistani territory. In many speeches, he publicly insisted that he would never permit unilateral step and would be taken it as an attack on Pakistan's sovereignty (*Dawn*, (Islamabad) January 26, 2008).

In early months of 2008, Pakistani media raised voice against CIA Predator aircrafts that hovered off Pak-Afghan border. It was assured by Washington that they would strike target inside only under the most restricted conditions. The drones could not strike with out knowing exactly whom they had in their sight. Now process was changed, Bush simply lowered the standard of proof that was

needed before the Predators could strike. For the first time, CIA no longer identify its target by name, the signature of a typical Al-Qaeda safe house or a group entering a known Al-Qaeda safe house was enough to authorize a strike. Moreover, the agency and the Special Forces were given permission to go after a group of Al-Qaeda members. The list was extended to twenty persons with the permission to make use of a special modified version of Predator designed for precision strikes. A pilot-less hunter killer drone that had bulked up to the size of a small fighter aircraft could drop a ton of guided bombs and missiles of all types (Sanger, 2008: 236).

Pakistani nation kept on protesting to stop drone attacks on Pak-Afghan border despite Islamabad and Washington's denial of US military presence. US had two small CIA forward operation bases" in Pakistan located in military facilities. But the bases were tiny and American faces could be easily recognized as military advisers. Bush administration was convinced that Pakistani government was unwilling to deal with Pushtun militants in tribal belt and incapable of doing so as one of the Bush top aides said, "It was born of sheer frustration and it was clear that the chaos settling over the country would continue and may be worsened. Problem was to attack an ally" (Sanger, 2009: 238).

In summer 2008, President Bush took secret unilateral action and authorized American military to invade an ally. While, US official denied unilateral action, General Rodriguez, US commander for Eastern Afghanistan, told Pentagon about shifting of Taliban and Al-Qaeda fighters from Afghanistan to Pakistan and sharing of information but rejected conduct of any unilateral operation inside Pakistan (Iqbal, 2008). Defense Secretary, Robert M. Gates said, "If Pakistan agrees, US is ready, willing and able" to send troops in tribal area. Rodriguez told about the beginning of construction of eight "coordinator centers" by US military to be staffed by offer from three countries for intelligence sharing and conduct of combat operation. The statements of high ranking officers like Gates and Admiral Michael Mullen, chairman of the joint chief of staff, left little doubt as they believed US troops bolstered the efforts of Pakistani military in FATA, Mullen said in Pentagon news briefing "if asked to assist, I think we could do a lot." Rodriguez pointed about willingness to cooperate in operation on either side of border as for him there was "a growing realization amongst all of them, every body needs to do more together" (Hasan, 2008). Rodriguez admitted working on counter insurgency operation but he denied any plan or involvement or even having any information about American invasion and said that "I m not going to comment on it." Such statements are nothing more but concealing the reality. In 2007, the US military established a shared computer link and a high frequency radio communication set up with Pakistani military to advance its mission (Anwar, 2008). Pakistani official admitted of only getting support in intelligence sharing, technical cooperation, training and provision of equipment but US drone attacks are no more a secret.

Bush allowed Joint Special Operation Command, a branch of military to make covert attack into Pakistan territory. There was no justification of such action as Pakistan was already fighting on American side. This was a different type of attack, as no Taliban

regime was to be dismantled or search operation for any weapon of mass destruction was required. Bush was not in a position of making horrible speeches to encourage his troops, a mistake that will help in creating a new generation of pro-Taliban sympathies. This task was against Bush's claim in public that American ground operation on Pakistani territory would happen with advance consultation of Pakistani military and when required, American and Pakistani troops would operate together. It sounded like a partnership with a major non-NATO ally, a status given to Pakistan in 2004. In reality, those joint operations were rare and never satisfactory for either side and Pakistani nation resented American military presence in a sovereign state. Other was technology, and Pakistan had no match with advance equipments of American forces (Sanger, 2009: 250). Bush had further loosened the reins on CIA and the Black Special Forces, newly liberated from the restriction that had bound them before and began to look for targets for a cross-border raid. These attacks were not different from those of Iraq and Afghanistan (Sanger, 2009: 256). The purpose of new strategy is to unnerve the terror groups and whatever the equipment that could crack the network of Al-Qaeda is being used without consultation and permission of an ally and sovereign state. American forces are fighting for six years into Iraq and eight years into Afghanistan (Sanger, 2009: 259).

In counter productive efforts, Taliban has increased suicide bombing in Pakistan and in September 2008, a terrorist attack was made on Marriott Hotel, near the official residence of Prime Minister of Pakistan. It exploded 1300 pounds of TNT and RDX mixed with aluminum oxide and killed more than 60 people, injuring about 250. The American embassy in Islamabad became high alert after this event and Pakistan became central front in the war against extremists (*Dawn*, 2008, September 25).

In legal terms, some inside the administration, pointed that "it would be as if the presidents sent American commandos not just stealthy CIA operative, but platoons of night fighters with big guns, into Berlin to Paris to root out group plot to bomb an airplane." For justifying this military action, the house officials developed a new term of "anticipatory self defense." A few official of the State Department, who were not in favour of Bush decision equated it to Nixon's decision during Vietnam to conduct a secret war in Cambodia where the Vietcong found sanctuary. It also presented the legal problem as CIA could operate inside Pakistan with a proper finding and question remained why military was authorized to do so (Sanger, 2009:251-52). These choices of Bush are harsh as it can be resulted in escalation to violence against coalition forces in Afghanistan, and an increase in the risk posed by Al-Qaeda and Taliban from their safe heaven for Pakistan. Both are already carrying attacks on NATO forces in Afghanistan and suicide bombing in Pakistan. Opinions were written and put in file. Many elements of the decision and logic behind it have remained secret even to this day. Perhaps it will be reviewed and written by Obama administration. Whatever is going on in Pakistan, is Bush's unfinished business and a question for forth coming President.

Durand line is an official symbol of division as it is meaningless for tribes, living on both sides of border but for NATO it is a hurdle which they could not pass. In spring of 2008, American casualties in the region exceeded than those of Iraq, even though the American forces in Afghanistan were one fifth of Iraq. NATO forces became regular

target of suicide bombers and militants' attacks. Europe ignored its commitment to stay in the fight and Bush's call to provide troops to NATO (Sanger 2009:248). Bush applied one strategy review after another, a useless exercise in the last months of his eight-years-long presidency. The next administration will start with its own review. Pakistan is facing more casualties than any other ally. Islamist elements are not in favour of Pakistani military operations and US attacks in western tribal areas and continued.

Conclusion

It is observed that Pak-US partnership has worked for Washington interests either in the Cold War era against the evil empire or war against terrorism in Afghanistan. Washington and Islamabad have different and sometime conflicting goals despite that Pakistan made efforts to avoid ups and downs in relationship with loosing more lives in war on terrorism than any other partner but the fact remains that its process is never expected. US policy always revolves around its interests and Bush administration lowered sanctions after 9/11 for countering terrorism. It also tried to prop up Pakistan politically as well as economically, as a failed Pakistan was never suitable to core US geopolitical agenda and not even a remotely thinkable option for America.

On Bush's departure from office, America and Pakistan are no closer to a common strategy, than they were on September 12, 2001. Bush tried to convince Pakistan that they were fighting a war for their own survival but Pakistani government never conceded it. In the words of Musharraf, still "tight rope walking." In American perception, Pakistan is supporting the US just to keep the aid flowing, without making Pakistanis think that they are fighting America's war. In reality, it is not correct as Pakistan has concerns about terrorism and is not supporting both sides and never tried to be an opportunist or positioned itself to ally with the winner whether that is Washington or Taliban. US should not leave Afghanistan at this stage, just to focus on the sanctuary in Pakistan. Like so many crisis that Bush pushed off, it has become a full scale crisis, by the time he decided to deal with it. Bush invested in single person in Pakistan that was unwise. After Musharraf, Bush's response to democratic government was not warm. Bush accepted Musharraf as a person committed to democracy and stalwart fighter in his coalition against terrorism. Bush's intoxication of leader to leader talk with argument that it enabled him to make deals that "only president can make" was also a reason of his failure. Pakistani military was well-aware of the fact that Afghanistan would become client state of India and this thinking is not wrong reviewing the past relations of both countries.

In present situation, Islamic militants, nuclear weapons and weak government all are warnings to on going bloody and chaotic war. Pakistan is wrongly blamed of ignoring the evidences and uninterested or incapable of dealing the problem. Pakistan is not deceiving Washington and buying its security since 9/11, by becoming its ally while US is fooling itself by pressurizing Pakistan to win its own war. Washington is required to invest and

design Marshall Plan style projects to give region an American style success. This strategy needs to be implemented delicately as these projects themselves will end the militancy. It is expected that new president in Washington would keep in view these, consideration's and would not reject negotiations and declare, 'either with us or against us'. White House required to pour sources in Pakistan like Iraq, where progress is still slow. In absence of peace, security and strong economy, Pakistan can become a real heaven for Al-Qaeda and other terrorists. US have more at stake if Pakistan collapses than in stabilizing Afghanistan and Iraq.

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Biographical Note

Musarrat Jabeen is working as Assistant Professor in the Department of International Relations & Political Science, University of Sargodha, Sargodha.
