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DR. M. SHAMSUR RAHMAN

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In view of abject nature of poverty illiteracy, high growth of population and less diversified economy, foreign aid or assistance plays a crucial role in raising domestic resources and investment in Bangladesh. In this paper an attempt has been made to discuss the variant implications of foreign aid and the bureaucratic perception since they are the principal negotiators of aid and its implementors through various projects. To obtain the views of bureaucrats on aid 100 administrative elite holding key positions in the secretariat, corporations, boards and attached departments (Policy Making Units) and in field administration like division, district and upazilas (Policy Implementation Units) were formally interviewed.

Most bureaucrats held that Bangladesh had no other option but to depend upon foreign aid.

Yet at the same time they felt that dependence upon foreign aid must be reduced in the ultimate interest of the country and in order to reduce they suggested certain measures.

However, bureaucrats can play very effective role in the optimum utilisation of foreign aid, taking utmost care of the social utility of aid while negotiating it and keeping a watchful eye on the implementation of the projects within the framework of time and resources.

Bangladesh has been encountering a critical challenge of abysmal poverty, malnutrition, illiteracy, high growth of population, poor and less diversified industrial base owing to poor investment caused by grossly inadequate capital formation.¹ In view of such a grim situation it is common knowledge that foreign aid or assistance plays a crucial role in raising domestic resources and investment where there is acute shortage of these. For a poor country like Bangladesh the resource constraint poses a serious threat to the uplift of socio-economic condition of the masses, as a whole, in general and alleviation of poverty in particular, and in these contexts the foreign aid assumes grave importance.

In this paper an attempt has been made to discuss the variant implications of foreign aid and bureaucratic perception since the bureaucrats are the principal negotiators of aid and its implementors through various programmes. To obtain the views of bureaucrats on aid 100 administrative elite holding key positions in the secretariat, corporations boards and attached departments (Policy Making cum Policy Implementation Units) and in field administration like divisions, districts and upazilas (Policy Implementation Units) were formally interviewed.

Rationale of Foreign Aid in Bangladesh

Late President of Bangladesh, Ziaur Rahman, considered aid as one key variable for development. He argued that Bangladesh

deserved more aid because she had the capacity to absorb it more than other nations.² Socio-economic compulsions and poor resource base had necessitated Bangladesh to seek foreign assistance and it is used as vital input for the implementation of development plans and projects. An official document has underscored the need for foreign aid on the following grounds.³

The country is in a low level equilibrium trap. Heavy pressure on population coupled with limited capacity for investment make it extremely difficult to prevent further worsening of standard of living. The endowment of social and economic overhead capital is extremely scarce. The limited resource base of the country has not been optionally exploited. The most important assets are land and manpower. But man-land (2.3 acres) and man-capital ratio (being US \$140) are very unfavourable. Also the mode of production as well as factor mixes are not conducive to economic growth. In such an economy domestic savings can not be significant. There are not enough capital assets to produce surpluses and there are not too many tax payers either to yield substantial revenue. Close to 8 per cent of the [gross national product (GNP) is required to be invested to produce goods and services and the economy does not yield this much savings. All these call for reliance on external assistance. The country has a history of colonial exploitation for two and a quarter centuries—and it is born barren of resources and growth potential. Its technological base is very archaic and the entrepreneur-ship has been virtually non-existent, various productive processes are traditional and obsolete. To break this vicious circle, it is necessary to promote investment in substantial terms on the one hand for the upgradation of human resources, and infrastructure on the other for adding to production of goods and services. Any progressive measure in this regard has to depend very largely on the flow of external assistance.

The reason for continued flow of external assistance to Bangladesh is the unfavourable balance of payments position in the country. This is essentially because of the economic backwardness and

structural inefficiencies in the production system. At the time of liberation of the country in 1971, trade gap was very nominal. But in the aftermath of global inflation beginning from 1972 the situation has drastically been changed. The terms of trade have deteriorated very adversely and the gap of balance of payments has soured from couple of hundred million US dollars to close to billion dollars, as of 1984. In the pre-liberation days during 1969-70 the export earnings of Bangladesh were US \$ 532 million, while the import payments amounts to US 2338 million dollars. In 1984-85, the export earning increased to \$ 917 millions while the import rose to \$ 2950.⁴ The export base of the country is narrow, having preponderance of primary commodities; imports are of inflexible character, being largely consumption oriented, containing about two thirds in the form of consumer and intermediate goods. The growth in merchandise exports has been lagging behind, imports over the years meeting roughly 30 per cent of the import bill. The export earning is so meagre that 80 per cent of it is spent on fuel imports, 15 per cent goes for debt servicing and 5 per cent remains for essential imports.

Bangladesh economy is also often stumbled by saving and investment gaps. Foreign aid is needed to fill in saving investment gap and to permit a level of investment satisfactory to ensure a desirable level of income growth to reduce all pervasive poverty.

It may also be recalled here that developing countries have been asking for equity in the world economic order since middle of the sixties. During 1974 the international community in the wake of price hike in oil accepted the tenets of the New International Economic Order (NIEO) and the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of the State. The NIEO demands justice, fair play and equity in global economic relations. The supporters of the concept demand massive transfer of resources from the rich to the poor. The weaker and the more disadvantaged the economy, the greater is its needs for resource flow. The country needs resource flow for investment aimed at structural transformation for meeting gap of balance of

payment, for ensuring minimum standards of consumption, and for development and utilisation of human and natural resources so that economic potentialities of the country are fully realised. Bangladesh thus undoubtedly has one of the strongest claims for resource transfer.

Category and Quantum of Aid Flow in Bangladesh

Bangladesh has been receiving three types of foreign aid such as food aid, non-project and project aid. Some aids are also tied, contracted on hard terms such as the case of purchasing wide bodied air crafts. Such borrowing by Bangladesh amounted to SU \$ 523 million upto June 30, 1984. In general the quantum of tied aid is rising since 1981. Bangladesh's reliance on foreign aid in financing her development budget is also substantially high. In the first plan it was 71.9 per cent while in the Two-Year and Second Five-Year Plans they were 76.8 per cent and 63.5 per cent respectively.⁵ Since liberation from December 16, 1971 to June 30, 1984 the total commitment of project aid by different donor countries had been to the tune of US \$ 15,757.8 million, out of which Bangladesh received US \$ 11,438.6 million. The following tables show the flow of foreign aid commitment and disbursement by categories of aid as well as year wise.

TABLE 1
Foreign Aid to Bangladesh (from December 16, 1971 to June 30, 1981)
(In Million US \$)

Category of Aid	Commitment			Disbursement			Pipeline on July 1, 1981
	Grant	Loan	Total	Grant	Loan	Total	
Food Aid	1,630.5	712.2	2,342.7	1,571.7	712.2	2,283.9	58.8
Commodity Aid	1,676.4	1,848.4	3,524.8	1,482.8	1,677.3	3,160.1	364.7
Project Aid	1,541.5	3,469.4	5,010.9	953.8	1,355.5	2,309.3	2,701.6
Total	4,848.4	6,030.0	10,878.4	4,008.3	3,745.0	7,753.3	3,125.1

Source : Government of Bangladesh, Ministry of Planning, External Resources Division, *Flow of External Resources into Bangladesh* (As on June 30, 1981), p. 19.

TABLE 2
Year-wise Flow of External Resources into Bangladesh

	COMMITMENT									(In Million US \$)
	1971-72	1972-73	1973-74	1974-75	1975-76	1976-77	1977-78	1978-79	1979-80	
Food	171	259	155	461	241	142	138	300	275	
Commodity	294	302	172	420	359	304	402	623	290	
Project	147	332	224	206	358	291	634	890	631	
Total	612	893	551	1287	958	737	1174	1813	1196	
DISBURSEMENT										
Food	129	183	229	382	314	121	179	179	375	
Commodity	138	289	103	376	369	251	374	482	388	
Project	6	80	124	144	124	150	268	371	469	
Total	271	551	456	902	807	522	821	1032	1232	

Source: A.M.A. Muhith, *Thoughts on Development Administration*, Dhaka: Sabia Muhith, 1981, p. 117.

These figures are also close to World Bank data with slight variation here and there.

The author of the book was the Secretary, External Resources Division, Ministry of Planning.

The External Resources Division is responsible for procuring and contracting all external aid.

TABLE 3

Year-wise Aid Flow

(In Million US \$)

Year	Aid Commitment	Aid Disbursement
1971-72 (16-12-1971 to 30-6-1972)	610.8	270.8
1972-73	878.4	551.5
1973-74	555.0	461.2
1974-75	1266.7	901.0
1975-76	958.9	800.5
1976-77	726.9	534.7
1977-78	1147.8	833.8
1978-89	1760.2	1030.0
1979-80	1195.8	1223.1
1980-81	1559.3	1145.5
1981-82	1922.9	1239.6
1982-83	1522.5	1177.4
1983-84	1695.1	1268.4
Total	15,757.8	11,438.6

Source : ERD, *Flow of External Resources into Bangladesh*, (As of June 30, 1984), Dhaka, June 1985.

It appears from the Table 1 that there are three types of aid. Commodity aid disbursement was the highest and the loan contents of both commodity and project aid were also very high as compared to its grant. Exception is seen in case of food aid; the loan quantum is low. Bangladesh is a food deficit country although significant improvements have been made over the past years to cover up the food deficiency. The country's dependence on food aid is still continuing as the required amount of food production is often impeded by cumulative variables like natural calamities such as flood and draught, and ever increasing population. Food aid constitutes 19.6 per cent of the total amount of foreign aid to Bangladesh. Commodity aid constitutes another critical element in the total aid package.

Bangladesh is facing serious difficulties in the area of commodity aid. Its trend is on the declining side (see Table 1). Commodity assistance finances import of essential raw material and agricultural inputs. Development imports in the form of small machinery, laboratory equipment and spares are also financed by commodity aid. Raw materials for various industries such as pharmaceuticals, cotton textiles, steel production, fertiliser production or cement production are obtained with commodity aid. Import of intermediate goods like cement, construction materials and transport commodities are also financed by commodity aid. Disbursement from commodity aid generates counterpart funds with which local currency expenditure on development projects is largely financed. Commodity aid, therefore, is one of the most important components of development outlay in Bangladesh. Its flow greatly contributes to domestic resource mobilisation by way of collection of custom duties. This can also help greater utilisation of aided projects because in Bangladesh project aid disbursement is also obstructed by the availability of local currency. In many cases new projects can not be negotiated cause of dearth of local currency to finance implementation of projects.

As it appears from Table 3 that despite the fluctuations in the year-wise pattern of aid in flow and disbursement, the general pattern speaks of increasing trend in respect of both aid commitment and disbursement.

It would not be out of place to list here the countries from which aid loan had been forthcoming. Bangladesh receives large quantum of aid from UN system, Japan, Federal Republic of Germany, U.S.A., Canada and Saudi Arabia.⁶ The rate of interest, grace period and the total repayment of loan varies from country to country which is shown in Table 4.

TABLE 4

All Donor Countries with Rate of Interest

Donor Countries	Rate of Interest (Average percentage)	Grace Period (Years)	Total Repayment Period (Years)
1. Belgium	1.8	10	20
2. Bulgaria	2.5	2	10
3. China	—	2-12	10
4. Czechoslovakia	2.5	2	10-12
5. Denmark	—	7-10	18-40
6. EEC	0.75	10	40
7. France (Treasury Loan)	2.6	10	20
8. France (Bank Loan)	9	.5	20
9. Finland	0.75	10	20
10. GDR	2.5	2	10
11. Hungary	2.5	2	10
12. India	4.4	1-7	5-18
13. Japan	1.6	10	20
14. Iran	2	10	30
15. Iraq	1.6	2-5	8-17
16. Kuwait	1.4	5.5-7	20-25
17. Netherlands	2	3-5	8-18
18. Poland	3	2	12
19. Romania	4	2	12
20. Saudi Arabia	4.2	5	15-20
21. Switzerland	.75	10	40
22. Turkey	2.5	2-3	5-15
23. UAE	3.5	4-10	10-40
24. U. S. A.	2.5	5-10	20-30
25. USSR	2.5	3-5	5-10
26. Yugoslavia	2	1-3	8-12
27. ADB	1.4	2-10	12-30
28. IDA	0.75	2-10	8-40
29. IDB	1.9	5	15-25
30. OPEC	0.75	3-5	7-20

Source : Government of Bangladesh, Ministry of Finance, ERD, *Flow of Sector-wise Disbursement of Project Aid*, pp. 112-132. (From December 16, 1971 to June 30, 1984).

Ecology of International Aid

The profile of external aid to Bangladesh is changing mostly because of (i) gradual decline in the flow of concessional aid and (ii) tougher conditionalities. During 1972-73 Bangladesh had received foreign aid in the form of grants and concessionary loans. But the situation had undergone noticeable changes afterwards as loan assumed the greater portion in the total aid package.

The Official Development Assistance (ODA) receipt of developing countries had fallen sharply since 1982. Aid flows from Development Assistance Committee (DAC) and Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) also declined from the same year. Further-more, the grant content in ODA became less from 1981 and onwards. Aid tying is now wide spread and aid disbursement is either faulty or partially tied and its magnitude is increasing. Also aid composition has changed in favour of slow disbursing project—a detrimental step towards developing countries. Besides, multilateral ODA is disappointing. The resource base of International Development Association has been reduced. The replenishment under IDA, flow of concessional assistance from multilateral channels like UNDP and regional banks has also declined.

Utilisation of Foreign Aid

The successful mobilisation of aid depends upon the effective and prompt utilisation of committee aid. The utilisation, therefore, is an important factor for management of external aid programme. The commitment of aid will not serve the purpose unless it is quickly reflected in the disbursement and its proper use. It may be recalled here that aid mobilisation began with two aims in view. First was the relief and rehabilitation of the country's war-ravaged economy and the second was the financing of successive development plans which began in 1973 ; and currently the country is under the Third Five-Year Plan. A total of US \$ 15, 757.8 millions was committed for the country upto June 30, 1984, out of which Bangladesh could utilise US \$ 11, 438.6 million. The utilisation rate was 72.6 per cent.⁷

Let us now look at the Table 5 which presents the different sectors of economy in which the aid flow has been invested.

TABLE 5

Sector-wise Distribution of Aid in Bangladesh

Sectors	In Million US \$
1. Agriculture	363.2
2. Rural Development and Institutions	95.6
3. Water and Flood Control	330.4
4. Power	595.2
5. Fuels and Natural Resources	276.0
6. Science and Technological Research	23.6
7. Transport	734.1
8. Communications	89.4
9. Industries (Ashuganj Fertiliser Factory)	613.2+236.9
10. Education and Training	99.4
11. Health	97.5
12. Population Control	151.4
13. Social Services	18.1
14. Labour and Training	9.8
15. Public Administration	6.9
16. Physical Planning and Housing	95.1
17. Cyclone Reconstruction	25.0
18. Planning Commission	12.8
19. Private	284.1

Source: Flow of External Resources into Bangladesh, June 1985, p. 144.

A closer observation of the sector-wise disbursement of foreign aid reveals that largest proportion of foreign aid is absorbed by industries. The other sectors in the ranks of absorption are transport, power, agriculture and flood control. Insignificant aid quantum has gone to rural development, health education and social services. It would be pertinent here to add a remark about the utilisation of foreign aid here. One ex-member of Bangladesh Planning Commission held that effective contribution to the local investment for

the rural poor would not be more than 3 per cent of the development budget under the rural works programme and food for works programme which are heavily financed by foreign aid.⁸

Project Implementation Under Aid

During the Second Five-Year Plan (SFYP) the number of projects dropped from 1520 in 1980-81 to 938 in 1984-85. In 1980-81 the number of completed project was 160 while in 1984-85 it was 323. The percentage of completed project in 1984-85 was 35 per cent as against 11 per cent in 1980-81. Along with slow disbursement of aid money, negligence of cost rationalisation and thinning out of resources among too many projects and the procedural aspects were the reasons for slow implementation of projects.⁹ During the concluding year of SFYP reduction in projects was made on grounds of their less importance and the core programmes or projects were sorted out and attached importance to for implementation.

Implication of Foreign Aid

Despite the utter necessity of obtaining foreign aid on account of economic compulsion, the implications of foreign aid are, however, not always good.

It is argued that foreign aid tends to promote capital intensive projects, thereby causing unemployment. However, it cannot be denied that though capital intensive techniques are being financed by foreign aid yet things are changing to a great extent. Now the foreign assistance is also being used to import various commodities and industrial raw material and spares as well as to meet local currency cost of various projects. In Bangladesh IDA credit finances 75 per cent of the total projects with emphasis on rural development and agricultural programmes. Still, sometimes, in the name of efficiency, capital intensive projects are preferred.

It hardly needs any stress that foreign aid is useful to the extent it promotes domestic savings. If foreign aid is absorbed in consumption or constructions of doubtful utility it tends to become a burden on the economy and thereby retards development. The flow of

assistance in Bangladesh in the first few years was for meeting consumption needs. This is substantiated by food aid flow shown in Tables 1 and 2. The economy as a whole had negative net saving upto 1975-76.

Another argument against foreign aid is that it makes a project expensive. The tied assistance tries to promote costly exports of donor countries and provides for luxury imports and creates facilities neither needed nor suitable to the environment of the country.

It can also be argued that foreign assistance results in distortion of priorities and preference for projects the social return of which is not always desirable. According to some analysts, sugar industry in Bangladesh was established with negative social returns. Part of the reason, of course, was modern technology (sugar in preference to *Gur* "molasses") but more important consideration was the availability of aid that financed sugar plants. It is also alleged that, though the recipient countries fix their priorities, yet they are tailored to the donors programmes. It is not true in the case of all donor countries.

Further, foreign assistance creates what is commonly known as debt trap. A recipient country continues to borrow additional export earnings used to meet debt service obligations which, in turn, implies that free foreign exchange is not available to a country which causes restriction of investment choice and capacity to bargain for appropriate technology.

Another argument against foreign aid is that it obliges a country to accept dictates from donors in economic affairs. It cannot be denied that aid does not flow without strings, direct or indirect. Project agreements at times even stipulate consultation on appointment of project personnel, management practices, pricing policy, accounting systems, credit and monetary policies and the like. This, in turn, compromises the sovereignty of a country.

A very strong argument against external assistance is that it promotes dependency relationship. It encourages comfortable life style and thus stops hard decisions required for structural changes in the

economy for ensuring greatest good of the greatest number. For example, since food production can be obtained by application of fertiliser and installation of deep tubewells, the basic decisions on land utilisation and management are continually deferred. Thus, food production may increase but mass poverty continues and landlessness increases. It is held that imposition of socially undesirable or less desirable projects in the wake of foreign assistance is a common phenomena in the developing countries owing to their limited planning capacity. Moreover, the structure of the ruling elite determines the use of external assistance, whether it is to cater to public welfare or only perpetuate the comfortable life style of the elite.

It is argued that enhanced inflow of aid and use of external resources have not improved the living conditions of the people. Despite the inflow of aid, the poverty has been vertically accentuated. There are reasonable indications that both absolute and relative poverty have increased in Bangladesh. More than 50 per cent of rural households are functionally landless and that extent of landlessness seems to be mounting. The number of landless households has increased from 21 lakhs in 1960 to 46.1 lakhs in 1977 at the rate of 4.74 per cent per annum.¹⁰ The rural nutrition survey conducted by Dhaka University revealed that trends deterioration in the nutritional standard of the people continued even after 1975-76 and the proportion of households having less than prescribed minimum calories intake increased from 53 per cent in 1962-64 to 59 per cent in 1975-76 and further to 76 per cent in 1981-82.¹¹ The role of foreign aid in reducing poverty is, however, dependent upon key variables like quantum of foreign aid, its nature and its proper utilisation. In case of Bangladesh it is held that 'foreign bias' of foreign aid, such as donor's preference for new investments, overrunning of time and costs, tying of aid, and donor's preoccupation with certain kinds of accountability¹² and the implementation snags are some of the reasons that have hurdled the optimum use of foreign aid in relation to the reduction of poverty and dependence of foreign aid.

Finally, it is argued that aid influences the import of luxuries and non-essential items and appointment of consultants from donor countries without any positive reason and results. There is also the character and capacity of the ruling elite which determine the extent of non-essential items to enter into the domestic market under the influence of aid. There is also constant pressure on the appointment of consultants from the donors since they have little faith in the indigenous capacity for designing, execution and expansion/operation of projects. One spokesman of the External Resources Division of the Government of Bangladesh reported that Bangladesh had no good reputation as a designer of project.¹³ Muhith has observed that at the present stage luxury imports and payment for consultancy services account for about 10 to 15 per cent of total project costs in individual cases.¹⁴ As a proportion of resources inflow on the whole these elements should not claim more than 5 per cent.¹⁵

The implications of external assistance, as these have been discussed above, are counter-productive to developing countries on two counts. First, if the abilities of the recipient country in priority determination, investment planning, resource allocation, project preparation and execution are found poor, the development programmes launched on the basis of aid will get frustrated. Secondly, the character and orientation of the ruling elite of recipient countries largely determine the usefulness of external assistance. For a country like Bangladesh aid is essential, not only for its development, but also for its mere survival. To get the best out of the foreign aid, planning process must be strengthened. Priorities and strategies must be clearly defined and reflected in the detailed investment plans in different sectors and sub-sectors. An adequately prepared portfolio of project should be kept ready and aid negotiation should continue strictly on the basis of project portfolio and pre-determined priorities and strategies. If roads, as a matter of strategy, are planned to be built with the help of labour intensive methods, then no influence from the donor country be allowed to change it into capital intensive ventures. Much of the criticisms of aid can be overcome by recipient countries if her ruling elite are firm and clear-headed

about priorities and strategies of development with an urge to improve the lot of the common man. The ruling elite in Bangladesh form the middle class. It is said that the ruling elite consists of 250 families. They are interlinked with each other by spreading themselves over the professions of civil service, army, business and politics. The opportunity to enter into the circle of the ruling class is becoming limited. The present elite lack in rural orientation and have a tendency to protect the vested interest of middle class, who are tending to become anti-rural development. In this context the observation of an ex-member of the Planning Commission is pertinent :

Now a days more projects mean more foreign aid which gives opportunity to consume foreign grants or loans. If a project is not completed in time, prolonged and revised, an agency can continue to expand its activities. A ministry finds the planning exercise and the Annual Development Programme as an opportunity to expand its size, assets, power to spend money and appoint people. Ability to offer public sector job is a great power of political value.¹⁶

In the context of on-going debate on foreign aid our respondents were asked to react to the statement that Bangladesh has no other option but to depend on foreign aid at present as also in the future. It is noteworthy that 69 per cent of the elite reported in the affirmative, 28 per cent in the negative and 3 per cent refused to make any statement. Those who favoured aid one of them argued that aid flow is neither adequate nor comparatively high. Infact, it is commensurate with the means of the country. Further, it has also been argued that even in terms of aid as a proportion of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is not sufficiently high. It is only US \$ 11.1 per capita aid in Bangladesh. A number of countries are receiving much higher levels of per capita aid.¹⁷ Hence, Bangladesh needs significantly increased aid flow.

Among those who answered in the negative, one of them asked, aid for whom ? His reply was that only 5 per cent aid would go to

villages and the rest of it would flow to the urban areas and benefit the richer section of the people. Another respondent was a harsh critic of foreign aid and he categorically stated that if foreign aid was completely eliminated the interest of the rural poor would not suffer at all, as he believed that only 3 per cent of the aid money was spent on the rural people.¹⁸ He, further, stated that, despite considerable and increasing aid neither growth had taken place nor poverty had been removed. Citing an example from history he recalled that three decades back there was no foreign aid for people living in the Subcontinent and without aid the people survived. Rather, there was evidence of transfer of resources from Bengal to other parts of the world in the colonial period.¹⁹

Though the administrative elite believed that the country had to depend upon foreign aid yet at the same time they felt that dependence upon foreign aid must be reduced in the ultimate interest of the country. In order to reduce foreign aid they suggested certain measures, which are shown in the following table.

TABLE 6

Suggestions for Reducing Dependence on Foreign Aid

Measures	Response Percentage
Increase of domestic resources	60.0
Proper use of Development Funds	17.0
Emphasis on Basic needs Programme	12.0
Others	11.0
Total	100.0

The 60 per cent elite who advocated increase of domestic resources made a plea for the promotion of export oriented projects, setting

up of import substitute industries, cutting out of import and wage earners, schemes, ban on luxurious items, reduction of grandiose plans emphasis on labour intensive projects and increase in food production and observance of austerity. The second category 'proper use of development funds' also covered the same items. The third category of response pertaining to 'basic needs programme' included proper wages, employment policy for generation of employment and adoption of measures for providing food, clothing, shelter, health, and education. The 11 per cent elite suggested a variety of measures which have been grouped in the category of 'others'. They included withdrawal of subsidies like ration facilities from the urban elite, a complete reorganisation of socio-economic framework, development of appropriate technology, developing effective management techniques, export of manpower, cut in defence expenditure, population control measures and, finally, the presence of strong political will. Table 7 offers an overview of the responses summarised here.

TABLE 7

**Option for Foreign Aid and Suggestions for Reducing
Dependence on Foreign Aid**

Suggestion for Reducing Aid	Increase of Domestic Resources	Proper use of Development Funds	Emphasis on Basic Need Programmes	Others	Total
Yes	43 (71.7) (62.3)	15 (88.2) (21.7)	4 (33.3) (5.8)	7 (63.6) (10.1)	69 (69.0) (100.0)
No	15 (25.0) (53.6)	2 (11.7) (7.1)	8 (66.7) (28.6)	3 (27.3) (10.7)	28 (28.0) (100.0)
Refused Answer	2 (3.3) (66.7)	—	—	1 (9.1) (33.3)	3 (3.0) (100.0)
Total	60 (100.0) (60.0)	17 (100.0) (17.0)	12 (100.0) (12.0)	11 (100.0) (11.0)	100 (100.0)

Note: The two figures in parentheses under the frequency denote percentages with respect to column total and row total respectively.

Conclusion

It is assumed that foreign aid and economic growth should move together. Foreign aid would be meaningful for a country when it helps the growth of the economy of the recipient country. But in the case of Bangladesh the economic growth is stunted and extreme poverty is being accentuated. Therefore, the question arises, whether we should go for foreign aid. Most bureaucratic elite held the idea that the economic compulsion requires the regular flow of aid and they viewed that the per capita aid flow in Bangladesh still is not very high as compared to other developing countries.

It is true that Bangladesh needs aid, but to what extent? Even the socialist countries took aid for their development. For example, China obtained aid from Russia for development and she did effectively utilise the aid. Despite sufficient aid flow Bangladesh economy has not improved much. One of the principal arguments in support of aid is that it should encourage savings and thus ultimately reduce dependence on aid. It is not also true to say that external resources are neither adequate nor high. A study reports that foreign aid in recent years is financing almost the whole of Annual Development Programme.²⁰ The total disbursement of foreign aid to Bangladesh as on June 30, 1984 was 1575.8 million US dollars.²¹ It is also reported that per capita external debt of Bangladesh was about 53 US dollars on the basis of 89.9 million people.²² However the bureaucrats were in favour of optimum utilisation of aid which would enhance the mobilisation of domestic resources and thus curtail dependence upon foreign aid.

It appears from this discussion that utilisation of aid is not only constrained by the recipient country for the slow mechanism involved from the aid reception point to aid implementation. The donor countries also create some problems in giving aid.

The bureaucratic elements can play very effective role in overcoming the situation since they are the principal negotiators and implementors of aid through a number of projects. While negotiating

aid they should take of social utility of the aid in favour of a certain project along with donor's terms and references and, further, they should keep a watchful eye on the implementation of the projects within the framework of time and resource limit.

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Rehabilitation Process of the Lathyrism Victims in Bangladesh

PROFULLA C. SARKAR

Abstract

This paper is an attempt to discuss the concept of rehabilitation in the context of lathyrism victims in Bangladesh. The concept of lathyrism, how far its victims are a burden on the society, their psychological reactions and how they lead their life, have been included in this paper. This paper also discusses the services available for the victims and the rehabilitation process associated with the given services, both statutory and voluntary. The problems of the execution of the rehabilitation process through income-generating programmes are also discussed in this paper.

Introduction

Rehabilitation is a relative term. The term is related to the refugee problem, physically handicapped and mentally retarded persons, destitute women, deserted children, the deaf and dumb and the blind, etc. The term 'rehabilitation' was used by the International Labour Conference in June, 1955 to mean "the restoring

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of handicapped persons to the fullest possible physical, mental, social, vocational, and economic usefulness of which they are capable" (Taylor and Taylor, 1970 : 13). According to the concept of Inamdar and Parajpe (1981) rehabilitation is the act of restoring forfeited rights and privileges. Jarvikoski and Lahelman (1981) used the term 'early rehabilitation'. According to them, it is a branch of rehabilitation which is opposed to restorative rehabilitation rather emphasized on the immediate initiation of the rehabilitation measures among the disabled employees. This idea is also expressed by Nagi (1965) and Weiner, et al., (1964). In the opinion of Waldman (1982) rehabilitation is quite apart from the human and social benefits of restoring to a physically or mentally handicapped person the ability to support himself in the society. In a broader perspective, rehabilitation is the combined and coordinated use of medical, social, educational and vocational measures for training or retraining the individual to the highest possible level of functional ability. In the context of the lathyrism victims, rehabilitation means the restoring of working ability of the victims to utilize their fullest capacity to become productive and contributive members in the society through income generating programmes. In this context, emphasis has been placed on economic rehabilitation which is concerned with the well being of the victims as well as on their self-reliance of which they are capable.

In this project 257 lathyrism victims have been interviewed to understand the concept of lathyrism : its causes, the way of life of the victims, their psychological reactions, etc. The main purpose is to give a clear idea of the rehabilitation model and the problems for the execution of the existing rehabilitation programmes initiated by the statutory and the voluntary organizations in Bangladesh.

Lathyrism

Lathyrism is a crippling disease of the lower limbs. The disease is not contagious. The onset of the disease may happen in different ways. Usually, a few days prior to actual paralysis there is a sudden

agonising pain as the calf muscle contracts into the shape of a ball (Singh, 1975 : 9). The muscle remains in contracted state for about 10-15 minutes until the spasm passes either with massage or by itself. The disease often starts with a sudden fall, as patients are unable to stretch their legs. There is a bending at the knee joints and a heaviness in the limbs. This stiffness of the muscles increases till the patient is unable to walk.

Lathyrism is divided into four stages. The first one is the non-stick stage. At this stage the patient manages to walk without the aid of a stick. He walks on toes with knees slightly bent and ankles extended, resulting in jerky movements. The patient may remain in this condition for the rest of his life or may pass on to the next stage. The signs of the first stage are present to a greater degree in the second stage, the one-stick stage, in which the stick becomes necessary

TABLE 1
Different Stages of the Lathyrism Affected Persons

Victims	Hindu			Muslim			Grand Total
	Male	Fe-male	Total	Male	Fe-male	Total	
Non-stick	12	3	15 (5.9)	103	30	133 (51.7)	148 (57.6)
One stick	4	4	8 (3.1)	46	10	56 (21.7)	64 (24.8)
Two sticks	3	1	4 (1.6)	20	5	25 (9.7)	29 (11.3)
Crawling	—	2	2 (0.9)	9	5	14 (5.5)	16 (6.3)
Total :	19 (7.6)	10 (3.9)	29 (11.5)	178 (69.2)	50 (19.3)	228 (88.5)	257 (100.0)

Note : Figures in the parentheses are in percentages.

for a patient to maintain balance of his body (ibid.). At the third stage, muscular stiffness is marked and patients walk slowly due to considerable bending at knee joints and crossed gait. The muscular rigidity is so great that the victims need two sticks for support and there is marked tilting of the pelvis side-ways to maintain balance. This is called two sticks stage. In the fourth and final stage the patient is unable to walk upright on account of the considerable bending of the knees and extreme stiffness of the lower limbs. The patients must crawl to move from one place to another. This stage is called the crawling stage.

Victims are a Problem of the Society

This section reveals to what extent the lathyrism victims are a problem for the society. Lathyrism is a toxic neurological disorder due to over-consumption of *kheshari* (lathyrus). The problem of excessive consumption arises when *kheshari* is used as the staple food or as a major part of food for several months consecutively. The disease does not kill persons but it is incurable and it makes victims cripples. The number of lathyrism victims in Bangladesh is about eleven thousand (Bhuiyan and Sarker, 1980 : 9). The lathyrism victims in Bangladesh are mostly concentrated in Rajshahi and Kushtia districts (Cato Aall, 1977 : 7). There are many obscure areas in Bangladesh where the lathyrism victims are not investigated.

Lathyrism is one of the national problems in Bangladesh. If this problem is not solved the socio-economic development of this country will be hampered. The lathyrism victims are a liability to their family as well as to the state, because this large number remains inactive and has to depend on the family and the society. In this way our national economy suffers and per capita income is getting reduced. In many cases the lathyrism victims are not only a burden on the society but if a victim is the working member of the family the entire family has to depend on other members of the society. So, the dependancy ratio is increasing in our country and as a result our national economy is under pressure.

Psychological Reactions of the Victims

When a person is attacked by lathyrism he undergoes different types of treatment such as allopathic, homeopathic, ayurvedic and folk. When one method is unsuccessful then the affected persons generally undergo multiple treatment, i.e., at a time they apply more than one method. It has been observed that in most cases, when the condition of the patient does not improve after using different methods of treatment, he becomes frustrated and attributes his disease to fate and expresses the idea that what happened to him is preordained by fate. A few Hindu patients cited the notion of *karma* the cosmic system of reward and punishment according to one's deeds in the past lives (Kirkpatrick, 1979 : 63). Both the Hindu and Muslim patients believed that they became the victims of this disease because of the sins committed by them in the past.

A few victims are interviewed about their working ability as well as willingness to have work. Most of them replied that they were eager to do any work possible to be done by hand, because lathyrism is a crippling disease of lower limbs. The upper part of the victim's body remains normal. The victims show their eagerness to have working facilities by rehabilitation programmes, which might be helpful to reduce their suffering. Some of the victims reported that they wanted to commit suicide when they failed to support hungry mouths of their dependents. Many patients are detached from their relatives after the attack of lathyrism, and many families have been broken by divorce and separation. We asked a few victims whether they faced any problem in connection with coitus after the attack of lathyrism. They reported at the initial stage that they faced such type of problem due to unnecessary fear but later on they were normal. The lathyrism victims want to live like other members of the society because they have some hopes and aspirations like everyone else in the society.

The Way of Life of the Victims

Most of the people in the research area engaged in agricultural work, irrespective of whether they are land owners or landless.

Although lathyrism affected persons can work in their occupation during the first stage of the disease but at the second stage they gradually become inactive. In many cases the patient is the only earning member of the family. In this situation he has to sell his property to maintain his family and meet expences of treatment. When a patient fails to improve from treatment he becomes frustrated. Then he becomes crippled physically, economically and mentally. At this stage he has no alternative but to beg.

The lathyrism victims are not only the landless persons but in many cases they have no homestead. Many of the lathyrism affected families have only one living hut. This poorer section of the population cannot afford to purchase rice, wheat, and other food grains due to high prices and poverty. Then they have to depend on *khesari* as their staple food because it is the cheapest pulse in the market which helps them to support their dependent hungry mouths. The disease is never found among those who have the resources to provide nutritious diet. The victims have no choice of daily food. They could not afford to consume protein and nutritious food. Many Muslim patients reported that they took meat once a year at the annual festival of *'Id ul-Azha*. As a result most of them are suffering from mal-nutrition and cannot resist the attack of lathyrism.

Rehabilitation Process

The rehabilitation process represents how the lathyrism victims are being rehabilitated by the statutory and the voluntary organizations in Bangladesh. The voluntary organizations are Swedish Free Church Aid, World Food Programme, Swa-Unnyan and Rural Advancement Committee. The statutory organizations such as the Ministry of Relief and Rehabilitation, Union Parishad, and Bangladesh Sericulture Board are involved with this rehabilitation programme.


The Swedish Free Church Aid is providing financial assistance to the Swa-Unnyan for the prevention of the disease and the rehabilitation of the victims. Under this scheme two thousand

victims are getting benefit. Sixty-three development workers have been appointed by the Swa-Unnyan to work in the villages of twenty *thanas* of Rajshahi and Kushtia districts. There is a motivational programme to change the people's food habit and also the rehabilitation of the victims.

For the rehabilitation of the victims, two thousand affected persons and some of their family members are involved in endiculture (growing of silkworms on leaves of castor oil, cassava, and sweet potato), spinning, reeling, and weaving. To run this programme necessary inputs have been provided to the participants free of cost or low cost. There is also a revolving fund for providing spinning wheels on credit. Swa-Unnyan has already distributed spinning wheels among the victims and an additional five hundred victims have been trained to operate the spinning wheels.

To run this programme effectively Swa-Unnyan provided training facilities for the victims and their family members. The training programme is executed by the Swa-Unnyan with the cooperation of the Bangladesh Sericulture Board. The experts of the different sections of the Sericulture Board, such as rearing, spinning, reeling and weaving, are involved with the participants for short term training. Besides, the Bangladesh Sericulture Board is providing

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marketing facilities to the victims and their family members to sell their production. Sometimes they purchase cocons from the Sericulture Board to produce thread and sell it to the Sericulture Board. In this way they earn money.

Swa-Unnyan has taken up a programme for giving short term loans to the victims, without interest, for agriculture and poultry. To run this programme Swa-Unnyan has given agricultural land to the landless victims and supplied necessary agricultural inputs such as seeds, fertilizers, irrigation and so on, with the close cooperation of the local agricultural departments. A short-term loan has been given to fifteen victims for production of ice cream stick, nineteen victims have been trained in bee keeping and a few number of victims have been given loan on grocery shops. Besides these, Swa-Unnyan is providing loan facilities for the victims and their family members on paddy husking project and jute works programme.

To execute this income generating programme and to make effective use of the institutional facilities as well as of local resources of the victims, Swa-Unnyan provided functional, educational, training facilities for the victims and their family members. This training has been given by the experts from the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee. The personnel of the Swa-Unnyan are also getting supervisory training from the same experts.

The World Food Programme is providing wheat for the prevention of the disease and for the nutritious diet. The arrangement is made in association with the Ministry of Relief and Rehabilitation of Bangladesh. The Chairman of the Union Parishad receives wheat from the Ministry of Relief and Rehabilitation through the Sub-Divisional Officers (SDO). The Chairman also looks after the selection of the victims and distributes one maund of wheat free of cost monthly per victim. Under this scheme two thousand victims are getting this facility. The entire rehabilitation programme is controlled and followed up by the Swa-Unnyan for evaluation, curtail, modification and expansion.

Problems of Rehabilitation

The voluntary and the statutory organizations are working for the rehabilitation of the lathyrism victims directly and indirectly. Among them, Swa-Unnyan is the key organization which is directly involved with the victims. But the selection of victims is done by the Chairman of the Union Parishad, and, accordingly, he distributes wheat among the selected victims. Some problems are found in relation to selection of victims and distribution of wheat. The Chairman is the local person, rather a political man, as a result he favours his people to get wheat irrespective of requisite criteria. The village level workers of Swa-Unnyan report that many of the scheduled victims do not participate in many programmes which are arranged by Swa-Unnyan, because they are not real victims. So, corruption is related with the mismanagement for the selection of victims as well as for the distribution of wheat and this also creates problems in the execution of the existing rehabilitation programmes.

For the rehabilitation of the lathyrism victims, a short term loan for agriculture and poultry is introduced by the Swa-Unnyan with the help of the Rural Agricultural Bank. Most of the victims are living in poverty. As a result, when they get cash they cannot utilize the entire amount for the programmes. A portion of the total amount is used for the partial fulfilment of their basic needs and the rest is utilized for the scheduled programmes. So, cash payment creates problems in the implementation of the scheme.

The spinning wheels are already supplied by the Swa-Unnyan to the victims. The wheels are not working well and it requires maximum force, which is difficult for the victims who are in the sticks and crawling stages. Besides, the wheels are not well equipped, as a result they are frequently out of order and also create problems for producing so smooth thread.

Swa-Unnyan is suffering from a chronic shortage of funds, and can not employ suitable trained staff having aptitude for this kind of rehabilitation work. For the same reason, Swa-Unnyan is not able

to build houses for endiculture in different areas for the victims. Besides these, the services rendered by the Swa-Unnyan and other voluntary and statutory organizations are not adequate, because the total number of victims is about eleven thousand. Among them, only two thousand victims are being helped by rehabilitation. So, the financial constraint is one of the main problems for the execution of the existing rehabilitation programmes.

Conclusion

In conclusion, it can be mentioned that almost all the lathyrism victims live in absolute poverty which, in economic terms, means that they have no adequate income to get the basic necessities of life. Most of them are denied health, education, housing facilities, etc. Only rehabilitation can make the victims fully or partially productive and contributive members of the society. So, this rehabilitation process has a dual interest. On the one hand, the income-generating programmes are concerned with the wellbeing of the lathyrism victims and their family members and seek to restore them to the maximum vocational functioning and social participation, i.e., self reliance of which they are capable. On the other hand, it serves a national purpose by helping to conserve and improve the human resources needed for national reconstruction and development, i.e., to integrate the victims into the mainstream of society.

In the United Kingdom, by an Act of the Parliament the responsibility for looking after the disabled is statutorily placed on the district local authorities. Such authorities are required to refer the disabled to appropriate institutions and also to bear all the costs involved in their training and rehabilitation.

In a country like Bangladesh, it would be a good idea if the responsibility for medical, educational, vocational and economic rehabilitation and welfare of the lathyrism victims as well as their dependent family members is statutorily placed on the district local authorities. This would ensure that the victims in the remotest corners of the country can get the benefit of rehabilitation services.

The district local authorities may be empowered to impose a small levy from the proceeds of which they can meet the cost of providing rehabilitation programmes.

Besides these, the Government should set up an inter-Ministry Coordination Committee for the rehabilitation of the victims to review whether suitable posts might be identified and reserve for the trained victims both in public and private services.

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Soviet Union and South Asia: Issues and Constraints

MOONIS AHMAR

Introduction

It would be incorrect to postulate that the Soviet approach to South Asian security has always been consistent. If one examines the Soviet security perceptions in South Asia, a greater degree of inconsistency could be found. Till 1955, the Soviet leaders had apprehensions both against India and Pakistan because they considered the leadership of newly emancipated South Asian countries as a protege of Western imperialism. After 1955, such an approach was abandoned and replaced by a more pragmatic and rational outlook, especially vis-a-vis India.

Friendship with India was strengthened so as to counter Pakistan's joining the Western alliance systems, viz, Cento (previously called Baghdad Pact) and Seato. Nehru was no longer considered as the 'lackey' of imperialism and the Russian ties with the Indian Communists were relegated. Nevertheless, during the Tashkent conference of January 1966, there occurred a qualitative change in the Soviet attitude towards Pakistan. Abandoning an inexorable support to India, Moscow reverted back to its policy of neutrality with regard to the Kashmir dispute. During the 1968-69 period, Pak-Soviet relations ameliorated in the sense that successful endeavours

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were made by both sides to condone the bitterness of the past and pave the way for goodwill and harmony. Peaceful coexistence and sovereign equality were accepted as the guiding principles in the normalisation of ties between Moscow and Islamabad. However, the outbreak of 1971 East-Pakistan crisis, leading to the Indo-Pakistan war of December 1971 and the subsequent dismemberment of Pakistan, vitiated the progress achieved in the development of Pakistan-Soviet ties. The Soviet criticism of Pakistan's handling of the East Pakistan crisis and its subsequent alignment with India on that issue eroded prospects for a positive Soviet role in Pakistan. As a sequel to these developments, both countries were back to square one. Events taking place in the post-December 1971 period, however, generated hopes for a reconciliation between Moscow and Islamabad. The Bhutto regime (1971-1977) made concerted efforts to patch up differences with the Soviet Union. Mr. Bhutto's visits to Moscow in 1972 and 1974 undoubtedly contributed a lot to bridging the areas of divergence and replacing them with mutual trust and harmony.

Ironically, the achievements accomplished during Bhutto's period in normalising relations with the Soviet Union were overshadowed by the outbreak of Afghan crisis. The Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan was attributed to its long term objective of expansion beyond Central Asia. The 'expansion factor' was considered vital behind the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan. Moscow's military interference in a non-Warsaw Pact and a non-Aligned Muslim country became a source of obsessive criticism not only in Pakistan, but throughout the non-Communist world. It completely changed the geo-political and strategic scenario of South Asia. The United States, which after its military debacle in Indo-China in 1975 had minimised its involvement in Asia, thought it prudent to take leverage of the negative ramifications of the Soviet military engagement in Afghanistan by re-involving itself in the affairs of South Asia. Nonetheless, the scenario emerging after the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan gave impetus to a growing super-power rivalry in South Asia, the Gulf and the Indian Ocean

regions. The Americans tried to overcome their sense of insecurity emanating after the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan by establishing the Rapid Deployment Force (later on replaced by the Central Defence Command) and augmenting their naval-military deployment in the Indian Ocean. The defence of Pakistan against any Soviet onslaught was considered imperative by the American policy-makers for salvaging their interests in South Asia and the Gulf.

From the above analyses, two important points could be derived : firstly, the Soviet security approach to South Asia has remained incompatible with that of the United States. Secondly, the Soviet Union consider Pakistan, rather than India, significant for the fulfilment of its objectives in South Asia. Unlike the United States, the Soviet security or political objectives are concealed. This is so mainly because of the covert nature of the Soviet Foreign Policy-making process. Ostensibly, the Soviet Foreign Policy is shaped by bodies like the Foreign Ministry, Central Committee of CPSU and the Politburo. But in the real sense, it is the Politburo which makes key decisions on foreign policy issues. Contrary to this, in the case of the United States, foreign policy is not centralised ; there are a number of public bodies which influence the American decision-making process. Given the covert or inward nature of the Soviet policy-making process, it is not easy to arrive at some specific conclusion. For that matter, a historical background of the Soviet interests and involvement in South Asia in the pre and post-1945 period has to be given. Moreover, the Soviet security approach in South Asia could well be defined in the dichotomy of Indian and Pakistani factors. Excluding India and Pakistan, there cannot be a proper study of the Soviet policy in South Asia. Coupled with this, the role of the United States, China and the recent initiatives taken by Mikhail Gorbachev in the context of South Asia in particular and Asia in general will also be discussed in some detail.

The Soviet Involvement

Recently, South Asia has attained a unique geo-strategic importance

for the Soviet policy-makers. The region composed of seven countries viz, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan and Maldives, which is situated in the backyard of Soviet borders. South Asia obtained high priority as a sequel to a number of developments like the emergence of India as a dominating power after the dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971, the British withdrawal from the East of Suez in 1971, the American retreat from Indo-China in 1975, the fall of pro-American regime in Iran in February 1979, the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979 and the outbreak of Iran-Iraq war in September 1980. South Asia is the only region from where the Soviets can expand their influence in rest of Asia and Africa. With their military contingents in Afghanistan, a foothold in Irani or Pakistani Baluchistan could enable the Soviets to emerge as a dominating factor in the Gulf, East Africa, Southern Africa, South Asia and the Indian Ocean region. Against this background, the Soviet policy-makers feel that without controlling South Asia in general and Pakistan in particular, their entire strategy to gain pre-eminence in Asia and Africa could be a total failure.

According to a Pakistani writer, "South Asia became second only to the Middle East as the site of the largest sustained investment of Soviet attention and resources amongst the developing regions of the world. It is the only region of the developing world which, besides Eastern Europe, has seen Moscow get militarily involved in its politics, precisely, military intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979. From the standpoint of Soviet Foreign Policy, the primary significance of the states of South Asia stems from their role in the larger Asian balance of power. In the context of its competition with China and the United States for regional and global influence, Moscow regards its relations with India as the linchpin of its efforts to curtail the influence of their powers in the South Asian region."¹ Soviet-Indian rapport is the only possibility of a wider Soviet role in South Asia, given the fact that India has a dominating power status in the region. It has 72 per cent of area, 77 per cent of population and 78 per cent of the region's G.N.P.

According to a Western author, "South Asia occupies an intermediate position in the hierarchy of the Soviet foreign policy priorities, below Europe, East Asia and the Middle East, but well above Latin America. No South Asian state possess the indigenous power to threaten the Soviet Union. However, the ability of certain countries (for example Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka) to ally themselves with a major power hostile to Moscow periodically creates apprehensions among the Soviet leaders."² Undoubtedly, the traditional and present Soviet approach towards South Asia stems from its clash with Western powers. Before the Russian revolution of 1917, the Russian Czar and the British authorities were at logger-heads over the control of Afghanistan. Britain wanted to contain the Soviet influence beyond its Central Asian borders. Moreover, after the Second World War, the American policy of containment (masterminded by the famous American diplomat George F. Kennan and executed by the former U.S. Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles) leading to the formation of Baghdad Pact (later on changed into Cento) and Seato was also meant to encircle the Asian borders of the Soviet Union. Lately, the American Central Defence Command, established as a sequel to the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan and the security stakes in the Gulf is also conceived by the Soviet policy-makers to pressurise Moscow politically and militarily. On these grounds, following questions arise : How did the Soviets respond to the Western threats in South Asia ? What was the response of South Asian countries vis-a-vis the Soviet offers to develop friendship ? What initiatives the Soviet leadership has taken to neutralise the Western security system in South Asia ?

Since the inception of a Communist Government in Russia in 1917, the Soviet leaders maintained a consistent support to various National Liberation Movements in Asia and Africa. Such a support gave impetus to liberation movements not only in the sub-Continent but throughout Asia and Africa. Before the outbreak of October revolution, Lenin wrote in 1916 :

"We shall exert every effort to foster association and merger

with the Mongolians, Indians, Egyptians. We believe it is our duty and in our interest to do this...we shall endeavour to render to these nations, more backward and oppressed than we are, 'disinterested cultural assistance.' ... In other words, we will help them pass to the use of machinery, to the lightening labor, to democracy, to socialism."³

Over the years, the Soviet influence gained legitimacy in India. In 1918, the wireless station of the Soviet Government broadcast a report of a memorandum handed to the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets by some fictitious Indian delegation. The delegation had requested the Soviets for assistance and called upon Russia to stretch a fraternal hand to oppressed India.⁴ Similarly, in an article published by an Indian Communist in Europe, it was stated: "the very existence of a pro-Bolshevik Afghanistan will be the greatest signpost, of Bolshevism to the tribes of the North-West Frontier Province who will pass the message onward to India."⁵ In September 1920, a Congress of the Peoples of the East was held. The Congress was reportedly attended by delegates from 37 countries including India. In 1920, at the Third Congress of the Comintern International, Lenin pointed out:

"British India is at the head of these countries, and there revolution is maturing in proportion to the growth of the industrial and railway proletariat on the one hand and to the increase in the brutal terrorism of the British—who are more frequently resorting to massacre (Amritsar) public flogging, etc.—on the other."⁶

The Communist Party of India received full backing from the Soviet controlled Comintern International. However, it failed to seize power in 1948 when it organised an abortive popular uprising in Telengana, Hyderabad. Such an uprising was crushed by the Indian Government and the CPI which attempted to destabilise the newly formed Congress Government suffered a crushing defeat. With the debacle of CPI to capture power by force, the Soviet leaders

began to give second thoughts to their policy towards South Asia. After the death of Stalin in 1953, second thoughts were given by the Soviet policy-makers towards their ties with India and Pakistan. Such a change in the Soviet approach was a sequel of two main developments, viz :

1. The Soviet Union wanted to contain the Western challenge in Asia.
2. With the death of Stalin, the new Soviet leadership began to delink itself with his policies. Parochial approach was replaced with real politik and coexistence with the bourgeois states was considered imperative to widen the Soviet influence in the newly emancipated Third World countries.

On these grounds, the year 1955 was significant in view of the opening of Indo-Soviet cordiality. During that year, the two top Soviet leaders Khrushchev and Bulganin visited India and Afghanistan. Their visit was a reaction to the growing Western encroachment against Moscow in Asia and the joining of Pakistan the U.S. sponsored defence alliance systems. The two Russian leaders issued statements in India in which they vehemently criticised Pakistan for being an ally of the West. Speaking at Srinagar, Marshal Bulganin called "Kashmir as the northern part of India" and referred to Kashmir as "part of the Indian people." In reply to address of welcome at Srinagar, Khrushchev said : "in the Republic of India, we see our ally in the fight for peace." He criticised Pakistan as being "one of the first participants of the Baghdad Pact" and concluded, "we are saying frankly that the building of American bases on the territory of Pakistan cannot but worry us."⁷ As time showed the Soviet Union adopted a clear-cut stand in favour of India and helped New Delhi with massive economic and military assistance.

There cannot be two opinions about the generous economic and technical assistance rendered by the Soviet Union to India. Such a relationship continued unabated. For instance, the Soviet Union helped New Delhi in more than 80 major development projects,

including the giant steel plant at Bhilai and Bakaro that still amounts for more than half of all the steel produced in India. Most of these projects, including dozens of power plants, coal mines and heavy equipment factories, were financed over long-term at very low interest rates, usually at 2.5 per cent. Interest is charged only on credit usually used. The Soviet Union does not charge any interest for the period starting from the conclusion of the agreement to its total implementation. There is no charge for commissions, expenditures in keeping accounts, payment of administrative expense, etc. In case of India, the value of Soviet credit is calculated in terms of Indian rupees.⁸ Apart from this, the Soviet Union is India's biggest market for consumer goods. The Soviet Union buys one-fifth of India's total export and 83 per cent of its cosmetic and detergent exports. In 1986, the Soviet trade deficit with India was expected to be 700 million dollars. Moreover since 1955, more than 80,000 Indian workers and technicians have been trained on Indian-Soviet projects, especially during construction and subsequent installation of equipments. Indian colleges, institutions and universities established with the Soviet assistance have trained an additional 35,000 specialists.⁹ An APN report quoting the statement of the Chairman of USSR State Committee for Foreign Economic Affairs, K. Katushev said that about 60 projects, which emerged in the course of Soviet-Indian economic cooperation contribute tangibly to strengthening of India's independent economic potential. They account for 36 per cent of national output of steel, 32 per cent of aluminium, 77 per cent of metal making facilities, 47 per cent of generalising equipment, 47 per cent of refined oil and 10 per cent of electricity.¹⁰ In 1978, the Soviet Union was engaged in technical and economic cooperation with 55 developing countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America. The Soviet Union was assisting them in the construction of 950 industrial projects as stipulated by agreements. 507 projects including 208 industrial plants were commissioned as on January 1, 1976. These enterprises had the target of producing some 27 million tonnes of steel, attracting more than 11 million tonnes of iron ore and 10 million tonnes of coal and processing 11.5 million tonnes of oil every

year.¹¹ Against this background, one can very well understand the depth of Indo-Soviet economic and technical cooperation. Such a cooperation is based on reciprocity and convergence in the areas of security and political perceptions between the two countries.

When the areas of convergence outnumber the areas of divergence, the prospects of cooperation on security and military fields are well imagined. Both India and the Soviet Union have a common perception over South Asia. New Delhi and Moscow have a common threat perception against the US policies in the region. The re-involvement of Washington in the affairs of South Asia and its elevated naval-military deployment in the Indian Ocean are considered by India and the Soviet Union as a destabilising factor in the region. Even in case of Afghanistan, India has refrained from openly criticising the Soviet military intervention in that country and has maintained a neutral posture.

Security Initiatives

From the Soviet side, a number of initiatives have been taken regarding the security system of Asia in general and South Asia in particular. The Soviets perceive the security predicament of South Asia in the dichotomy of American strategic involvement and intra-regional disputes. In this perspective, the Soviets feel that South Asian security problems can only be settled through a collective approach followed by the regional countries based on the principles of peaceful coexistence and sovereign equality. Such an approach should favour Indo-Pakistan detente on the one hand and Sino-Indian reconciliation on the other. Recent normalisation talks between Moscow and Beijing are also considered by analysts seeking goodwill and harmony between the two countries. Without the Chinese support for the Soviet initiatives of Asian security the very scheme for Asia-Pacific security system could be redundant. But since the beginning of Sino-Soviet split, the Soviet leaders had followed the policy of encouraging India against China. At that time, Moscow considered Beijing and Washington as anti-Soviet powers aiming to gang up Asian countries against the Soviet Union.

As early as in March 1969, a member of the Presidium of the Soviet Peace Committee, P. Reshetov, while on a tour of India, had suggested the constitution of a common front of the Soviet Union, India and Burma "against the adventurous policies of the Chinese Government." In May 1969, while at the funeral ceremony of President Zakir Hussain of India, Premier Kosygin observed that Soviet-Indian cooperation was designed to defend India's territorial integrity and sovereignty against "adventurist encroachments by external forces seeking hegemony in Asia."¹²

The first explicit reference to a Collective Security System from the Soviet side came in an *Izvestia* article written by Vikenti Matveyev on May 29, 1969, which sought to refute the theory that British withdrawal would leave a power vacuum in Asia. Matveyev noted that the Chinese believed in the 'vacuum' theories and that judging from articles in the Peking press, Moa-Tse Tung and his associates have quite definite designs on several countries in the area.¹³ On June 8, 1969, the then Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev formally launched his ACSS by saying that "course of events had placed on the agenda the task of creating Collective Security Scheme in Asia."¹⁴ In his speech at the 15th Congress of the Trade Unions in 1922, Leonid Brezhnev said that a Collective Security System in Asia "must be based on such principles as renunciation of the use of force in relations between states, respect for sovereignty and inviolability of frontiers, non-interference in each other's internal affairs and wide development of economic and other forms of cooperation on the basis of complete equality and mutual benefit."¹⁵ Emphasising on his proposal of Asian security, Leonid Brezhnev during his tour of India in November 1973 stressed the need for confidence building among the Asian countries. He noted that there is a growing confidence in the countries of Asia in lasting peace and a stable situation conducive to the concentration of the efforts of these countries on the urgent tasks of internal development. The search is being stepped up for practical ways and specific steps both of a partial and general nature, leading to the establishment and consolidation of the security of Asian states. It is precisely these

problems that the Asian public is considering now, and we regard this as a major achievement.¹⁶ Notwithstanding the Soviet initiatives, nearly all Asian countries, including India, expressed their inability to join the ACSS scheme, as they considered such a scheme to achieve two main objectives : firstly, to mobilise India against China and secondly to contain the American influence in Asia. Events taking place in South Asia in the post-1971 period, especially the secret visit of Henry Kissinger to Beijing the connivance of Islamabad and the dismemberment of Pakistan as a result of close Indo-Soviet collusion shaped new Soviet policies in South Asia. In this context, the August 1971 Indo-Soviet treaty was considered as a milestone in the further broadening of Soviet influence in South Asia.

The former Soviet Foreign Minister A.A. Gromyko in a speech delivered at the signing ceremony of Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation with India on August 6, 1971 highlighted the importance of the newly established Indo-Soviet alliance. Elaborating his views about the treaty he said :

“The significance of this treaty cannot be overestimated. It crowns the consistent policy of two countries aimed at cooperation and friendship. In India, the basis of that policy was laid down by the outstanding national leadership and statesman Jawaharlal Nehru. He found his true successor in the esteemed Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. The Soviet Union on its part, following the Leninist foreign policy, has always, for the very first days of independence won by the great Indian people, set the firm and invariable course at achieving ever stronger and wider friendship with India. Alongside this, the Treaty is a document of great international importance contributing to the consolidation of peace in Asia and elsewhere, peace which is needed by all nations, including those of the Continent of Asia.”¹⁷

In a statement given in *Lok Sabha* on August 9, 1971, the former Indian Foreign Minister Swarn Singh justified the Treaty of

Friendship with the Soviet Union in the following words: "it is a Treaty of peace, friendship and cooperation. It is also a Treaty of Non-Aggression. It further provides a credible assurance that in the event of an attack or a threat thereof, the High Contracting Parties shall immediately enter into mutual consultation in order to remove such a threat and to take appropriate effective measures to ensure peace and security of these countries. It is therefore, in essence, a Treaty of Peace against war."¹⁸ After the dismemberment of Pakistan, the Soviet Union hoped to sustain its leverage over South Asia. The emergence of Bangladesh as a sovereign state on the international scene was considered as a political thrive of Moscow and New Delhi.

Still the Soviet Union didn't abandon its option to normalise relations with Pakistan. A number of statements were made by the Soviet leaders to support dialogue between India and Pakistan. Against this background, the signing of Simla Agreement was considered by Moscow as a first major step towards normalisation of relations between the two adversaries. For instance, *New Times* (Moscow) published a commentary which appreciated the normalisation process in South Asia in the post Indo-Pakistan war period. It stated: "a major step towards normalisation in South Asia was made in Delhi on August 28 when India and Pakistan concluded their two rounds of talks and signing an agreement providing for the settlement of humanitarian problem engendered by the armed conflict on the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent in December 1971. It is significant that although the talks were officially between Indian and Pakistani diplomats, Bangladesh in fact also took part. Without her participation, the success of the talks would have been meaningless, for the problems involved clearly affect all three. Moreover, the basis of the talks and agreements were the proposals advanced in the Indo-Bangladesh declaration of April 17 this year. The Delhi agreement had everywhere been seen as a major practical step towards complete normalisation on the Indian sub-continent and the establishment there of the durable peace which the people of the region required to direct all their resources and efforts combating poverty and raising

their standard of living."¹⁹ When the former Premier of Pakistan Mr. Z.A. Bhutto revisited Moscow in 1974, the Soviet leaders offered to establish close friendly relations with Pakistan. In a speech at dinner hosted in honour of Mr. Z.A. Bhutto on October 24, 1974, in Moscow, Alexei Kosygin outlined main Soviet determinents in its relations with Pakistan. He said: "In its relations with Pakistan, as with other developing countries, the Soviet Union invariably pursues the Leninist policy of peace, good neighbours and cooperation on the basis of equality, mutual advantages, respect for sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs. Conflicts on incompatibility of interest do not divide us. Objective conditions exist for the realisation of our mutual desire to raise to a higher level our bilateral relations to strengthen cooperation between the Soviet Union and Pakistan in international affairs."²⁰

From 1973 to 1977, there was some improvement in Pak-Soviet relations, but after the Afghanistan crisis both countries were back to square one. Undoubtedly, the Afghan factor has significantly eroded prospects for a tension-free Pak-Soviet relations. It was only after the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan that Pakistan reverted back to its close friendship with the United States and the South Asian security problems complicated owing to the involvement of extra-regional powers in regional affairs.

Afghan Scenairo

There are two approaches regarding the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan. The protagonists of the first approach reject any linkage between the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan and the Islamic revivalist movements in the Soviet Central Asia. Decades of Communist rule in Central Asian Muslim areas has vitiated any prospect of an Islamic resurgence. Afghanistan is important because of its strategic position and the Soviets intervened in that country in order to salvage their interests and influence and not precluding the so-called Islamic threat in Central Asia.

According to the second approach, the Soviets intervened so as

to deepen their influence in South West Asia and the oil-rich Persian Gulf. The waters of Gulf are hardly 500 miles from the Soviet controlled Afghanistan and given the oil factor, Moscow feels it plausible to establish its influence in that region. Such an influence will naturally be at the expense of the US economic, political and military interests. Afghanistan is considered merely as a stepping stone or a spring-board for the fulfilment of the long-term Soviet interests in South Asia and the Gulf. Given these facts, the Soviets systematically developed contacts with the Afghan intelligentsia and various influential groups. For decades the Soviets invested millions of dollars in modernising various sectors of Afghan economy. By 1967, the Soviets had invested 468 million dollars in developing Afghanistan's economy, 50 per cent more than the US total 288 million dollars aid. In the following two years, Soviet aid further increased to new proportions. During 1968-69, 30.5 million dollars aid was provided to Afghanistan. Contrary to this, the American aid dropped to 4.8 million dollars in 1968-69 to meagre 1.46 million dollars in 1969-70.²¹ The Soviet influence in Afghanistan deepened with the outbreak of Saur revolution in April 1978. The newly formed regime under Noor Mohammad Taraki brought revolutionary changes in the country's economic, social and political systems. Close ties with the Soviet Union and the East European countries were established. The Western powers, especially the US became apprehensive of the pro-Soviet policies of the Kabul regime. The local privileged and orthodox groups felt insecure and as a reaction to Taraki's so-called 'revolutionary' reforms began 'counter-revolutionary' activities. Given the situation, the Afghan leaders were forced to forge close political and military links with Moscow. On December 5, 1978, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union signed a 20-Year Treaty of Friendship and good neighbourliness and cooperation. The main points of the 15-article treaty signed between the two countries are as follows :

After reaffirming their commitment to the aims and principles of the Soviet-Afghan treaties of 1921 and 1931, the two countries agreed to develop and strengthen bilateral co-operation on a wide

range of matters on the basis of equality, national sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in each other's internal affairs and to aid one another in the "training of national personnel and in planning the development of the national economy."

They pledged that they would respect each other's foreign policies (including 'the policy of non-alignment which is pursued by . . . Afghanistan') would not engage in any military aggression against each other and would consult one another about all issues which might affect the security, independence and territorial integrity of either country. Furthermore, in accordance with Article 4, they agreed that "in the interest of strengthening their defence capacity" they would continue to develop military cooperation "on the basis of appropriate agreements concluded between them."

Both sides declared that they would continue their efforts to promote peace and co-operation in all parts of the world and would "actively contribute towards general and complete disarmament, including nuclear disarmament, under effective international control." With regard to Asia, they stated in Article 8 that they would "facilitate the development of co-operation among the Asian states and the establishment of relations of peace, good neighbourliness and mutual confidence among them" and the establishment in the area of an "effective security system . . . on the basis of joint efforts by all countries of the continent."²² It is beyond any shadow of doubt that the Soviet Union used the Soviet-Afghan friendship treaty as a pretext for its military intervention in that country. According to that treaty both Kabul and Moscow established special relationship in which there was a provision for seeking help and assistance from each other.

India Factor

According to an Indian political analyst, "Afghanistan brought the United States back to South Asia after some 15 years but in a role which could work only on the short and medium-run and was bound to fail in the long-run. The role was to help the Afghan resistance overthrow the Soviet backed Marxist regime, to compel the

Soviets to pull out their troops from Afghanistan, and restore Afghanistan's role as an independent, non-aligned, if pro-Soviet regime, and to integrate Pakistan into a new US strategic alliance covering West Asia, the Middle East and the Indian Ocean.²³ When the United States made frequent efforts to re-establish its influence in South Asia under the cover of Afghan imbroglio, the Soviet Union was bound to react. As a result, when Pak-US strategic ties were being negotiated in 1981, Moscow tried to counter such a situation by strengthening its ties with India. In December 1980, the then Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev visited New Delhi. During that visit he was able to neutralise any possible Indian criticism against his country's military involvement in Afghanistan. While addressing a meeting of both chambers of the Indian Parliament in December 1980, Brezhnev pointed out: friendship between the Soviet Union and India is the common possession of both peoples. Our relations have stood the test of time. They have become an important factor for the strengthening of peace in Asia and beyond. Developing on the firm foundation of the Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation, they serve to embody the principles of peaceful coexistence and equal and fruitful cooperation between states with differing social and economic systems."²⁴ After an interlude of six years, another Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of CPSU, made an official visit to India from November 25-28, 1986. It was Mr. Gorbachev's first visit to an Asian country and the first visit to India by a Soviet leader since Brezhnev's visit to New Delhi in December 1980. On November 27, 1986, Mr. Gorbachev and Mr. Gandhi signed a 'Delhi Declaration' devoted to the principles of a nuclear-free and non-violent world. Included in the declaration was a call for:

- (a) The complete destruction of nuclear arsenal before the year 2000.
- (b) The prohibition of the development of a new type of weapons of mass destruction.
- (c) The banning of all nuclear weapons from outer space.

- (d) The banning of all nuclear weapons' tests.
- (e) The banning of chemical weapons and the destruction of existing stock-piles.
- (f) The reduction of the level of conventional armed forces.²⁵

It was during his state visit to India that Mikhail Gorbachev re-emphasised and elaborated his Asian Collective Security Scheme. Giving equal status to China and India in such a scheme, Gorbachev called a model system for Asia based on the pattern of Helsinki Conference in Europe. He argued that when European countries can resolve to settle their disputes through peaceful means, why can't the Asian countries do the same? Precisely, Gorbachev's revival of ACSS raised new hopes for a greater Soviet role in Asia.

Prior to Gorbachev's proposal, another Asian country, Mongolia, put forward a proposal in May 1981 for a "convention on mutual non-aggression and non-use of force in relations among the countries of Asia and the Pacific." Such a proposal was to be supported by "corresponding guarantees by the permanent members of the Security Council. According to Mongolia, it was a "Pan-Asian system of Collective Security which is the essence of the Mongolian proposal."²⁶ It was in July 1986, when Gorbachev formally mooted his proposal for a Collective Security System for Asia. While delivering an historic speech on July 28, 1986, in the Soviet Far Eastern city of Vladivostok, Gorbachev called for convening a Helsinki type security conference for Asia.²⁷ In Gorbachev's proposal, three separate areas of conflict were included: These were Soviet-Japanese strategic alliance with the United States and the possibility of its rearmament, the Korean dispute and the Sino-Soviet split of 1960s.²⁸ To be more specific, in Vladivostok speech, Gorbachev had declared: "We require a radical break with the traditions of political thinking in the views on problems of war and peace in international security."²⁹ On September 27, 1986, in an article published in *Pravda*, Ovchinnikov, a Soviet political analyst, spelled out details of 'the All Asia Security Formula.' They included "the signing of the Treaty of Non-Proliferation of nuclear weapons by

those Asian states which have not yet done so" and "freeze of the level of military activity in Asia and the Pacific."³⁰

In his visit to India, Gorbachev made it clear that the Soviet Union and India were two major Asian states. In a press conference addressed before leaving New Delhi, Gorbachev said : India and Pakistan are neighbours, Neighbours must always live in friendship, helping each other and build their relations in spirit of mutual understanding. We should find always to achieve such relations. Any other way would lead to unpredictable consequences. We should all remember this. I am sure this should also be true to the Government of Pakistan."³¹ According to an Indian analyst, certain features of Gorbachev's plan need attention like the reference to the "Asian-Pacific region." throughout the text ; the tacit acceptance of some rules of conduct for the states of the world. That the Soviet Union is concerned with two factors : namely, the nuclear programme of the Asian states and possibilities of deeper American involvement in the region."³² V. Ovchinniko, the political analyst of *Pravda* in an article entitled "Asia : security not confrontation" discussed Gorbachev's proposal of ACSS scheme. He suggested that "the all Asia security formula would also comprise the following measures : the refusal of all nuclear states to be the first to use nuclear weapons in Asia and the whole world ; non-use of nuclear weapons in Asia and the whole world ; non-use of nuclear weapons against countries and regions in that part of the world which observe the non-nuclear status, the acceptance of the three non-nuclear principles not to have, not to produce, and not to import nuclear weapons by states having no such weapons ; the joining of the Treaty on non-participation of nuclear weapons by those Asian states which have not yet done so, complete ending of nuclear tests ; including in Asia, the Pacific and the Indian Ocean. Freezing the level of military activity in Asia and the Pacific states to take part in schemes of space militarisation ; prevention of the setting up of new military blocs and enlargement of existing ones in the region ; elimination of foreign military bases in Asian countries and the Pacific and the Indian Ocean ; refusal to support subversive anti-government and armed

terrorist groups from outside.”³³ Gorbachev's proposal of ACSS scheme could thus be called a complete set of principles. His approach is based on regional cooperation and excluding non-Asian powers from the affairs of Asia. He feels that the only way Asia could delink itself from Western imperialism is through mitigating its intra-regional disputes on the pattern of Helsinki conference and exacerbating the process of cooperation notwithstanding conflicts. In this scenario, he favours Indo-Pakistan normalisation on the one hand and Indo-China reconciliation on the other.

Here one would agree that much of the Soviet influence in South Asia is limited to India. Such an achievement is incredible in giving India a dominant status in South Asia. In the last three decades, the level and magnitude of Indo-Soviet interaction has touched new heights. The period of Mikhail Gorbachev will surely give impetus to the Indo-Soviet economic, political, military and security ties. Both countries have committed each other to assist by signing a number of treaties, pacts and agreements. On July 3, 1987 Mikhail Gorbachev and Rajiv Gandhi signed a comprehensive long-term programme of scientific and technological cooperation at Kremlin. Prior to the signing of that agreement the two leaders in these talks examined in detail a number of international problems, especially those which directly affect the security of both sides.³⁴ Highlighting the growing Indo-Soviet ties, Aleksandr Ignatov, *APN* news analyst in his report said : “It goes without saying that the contacts and relations between the two big states, which have been actively developing for more than 30 years now, are beneficial for the Indian and Soviet peoples, to begin with. Over the next 12 months, 2,500 Indian prominent figures in the cultural field will visit 44 Soviet cities.”³⁵ In an interview to Soviet correspondents, the Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi said : during the last few years the relations between the Soviet Union and India have improved tremendously. And it is all the more significant because they were already very good. During these last months since Secretary General Gorbachev's visit, a number of things have happened and I do not think there is enough time to go into every thing. But perhaps the most significant

thing that happened during the visit was the signing of the Delhi Declaration, which is a major step forward in thinking for big countries in the world. We have also had a material change in our relationship in the technological exchanges that are to take place.³⁶

One would recall that in the field of military cooperation India had been receiving military aircraft of the MiG series from the Soviet Union since the summer of 1962. The MiG 29 was considered a superior aircraft to the comparable US designed F-16, a fighter interceptor, used by Pakistan Air Force, and India was the first country to acquire the MiG 29. According to an AFP report on January 5, 1987, the Soviet Union had offered with an airborne warning and control system (AWACS). The offer had reportedly been made to counter the proposed supply of a US AWACS system to Pakistan. However, UNI reported on January 5 that the Indian Air Force was reluctant to accept the Soviet offer because of the limited range of the 11-76 and also because the importation of an AWACS system might jeopardize the development of an indigenous airborne surveillance system.³⁷ On the whole, India became the only non-Communist country to receive sophisticated weapons from the Soviet Union. Most of those weapons are manufactured in Indian ordinance factories under the licence system.

In an interview with UNI, the Soviet First Deputy Minister Yuri Vorontsev categorically stated that the Soviet Union "has no intention of sacrificing even slightly the interests of our time-tested friend India." He praised India's support for the reconciliation process launched by Najib's regime in Afghanistan. He also described India's approach to the Kampuchean issue as 'constructive.' The Soviet Union highly appreciated India's efforts to strengthen mutual trust and understanding among the countries of South Asia.³⁸ On the other hand, the Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi denied reports of Indian tilting toward the Soviet bloc. At an airport Press Conference in New Delhi on his return from a two-day visit to Moscow, the Indian Premier Rajiv Gandhi dismissed a suggestion that India was slipping into the Soviet power bloc. He said that relations between two countries were governed by certain common

principles like disarmament and non-violence. Asked specifically by a correspondent whether India was getting pushed into the Communist bloc, Rajiv replied, "Not at all." Asked whether chances of a rightwing coup in India had diminished following his talks with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, Mr. Gandhi said, India's internal matters did not figure in the discussion.³⁹ Regarding China, when the Indian Prime Minister expressed his country's differences before the Soviet leaders, Gorbachev replied that China also lay claims to large chunk of Russian territories. He told the Indian Prime Minister that Sino-Soviet relations have improved notwithstanding a border dispute between the two countries. He probably tried to communicate to Rajiv Gandhi that in India's case too the Chinese might adopt a flexible stand on the basis of reciprocity.⁴⁰ The crux of Gorbachev's security approach towards South Asia is to preclude the Sino-Indian and Indo-Pakistan hostilities. Given the progress made in Sino-Indian border negotiations, it is better if the Tibet issue, which has recently attained a high profile is managed amicably without involving any extra-regional power.

Ties with Pakistan

One should not overlook the fact that the entire Soviet initiative for erecting a South Asian security system would become meaningless until and unless there is a breakthrough in Pak-Soviet relations. Historically, the cleavages between Moscow and Islamabad emanated from the latter joining the Western alliance system and the role played by some powerful interest groups against any sort of interaction between Pakistan and the Soviet Union. From 1947-1953, the Soviet Union sent feelers of friendship to Pakistan. The lack of encouraging response from the Pakistani leaders forced Moscow to give second thoughts to its policy vis-a-vis the new Muslim state. During the period 1954 to 1965 the Soviet Union maintained a hostile posture towards Pakistan. The U-2 incident of 1960 and Pakistan's collaboration with the anti-Soviet military pacts of SEATO and CENTO galvanised the level of suspicions and mistrust between Pakistan and the Soviet Union. However, the Soviet initiative to bring India and Pakistan together at Tashkent after the 1965 war

re-established the Soviet neutrality in South Asia. From 1966 to 1970, there was a marked improvement in Pak-Soviet ties. The policy of Bilateralism mooted during Ayub's era centered on cordial relations with all big powers.

Pakistan's disillusionment with the US inability to salvage itself during the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war contributed a lot in delinking it from its all-out dependence on the United States. Things however took a different turn in 1971 when the Soviet Union decided to support the Bangladesh movement by signing Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with India in August 1971. There was a temporary rupture in Pak-Soviet ties but Bhutto's visits to Moscow in 1972 and 1974 helped patch up suspicions and discord between the two countries. When Moscow and Islamabad succeeded in reconciling their differences, the Afghan crisis torpedoed prospects for the evolution of cordial and friendly relations. Hence, since 1979, Pakistan and the Soviet Union are unable to make any tangible breakthrough in improving their relationship. On these grounds, Afghan factor is considered as the Achilles Heel in removing tension and bitterness between Pakistan and the Soviet Union. Still the Soviet leaders feel that without the inclusion of Pakistan in their proposed ACSS they cannot make any headway for its successful implementation.

According to the Soviet Press Bulletin, "in the past four decades the level of Soviet-Pakistan relations has consistently varied for numerous reasons. But they have been invariably marked by at least two characteristic features : first, these relations have been founded on peaceful coexistence which implies, among other things, respect for all countries' territorial integrity and national sovereignty of all states and non-intervention in each other's domestic affairs. Second, Pakistan-Soviet ties have always been significant for both countries, met their national interests, and promoted peace and security in the region. Therefore, slumps in Pak-Soviet relations were usually not durable. Despite the remaining difficulties, the two countries enliven their economic, political and cultural ties and held identical or similar stands on a number of key international issues. On September

30, 1947, the Soviet delegation voted for admitting Pakistan to the UN at the second UN General Assembly session. At a meeting of the allied powers' foreign ministers in London in late November of the same year, the USSR said, contrary to some Western delegation's manoeuvres, that Pakistan should be among the countries taking part in the consultations on a peace treaty with Germany. The Soviet side thus showed its respect for the contribution made by the peoples of the South Asia sub-continent to the rout of Nazism. The USSR wanted to help Pakistan assert its status of sovereign and equal member of the international community and also to maintain good neighbourly relations with the newly emerged country. On May 1, 1948, the USSR and Pakistan established diplomatic relations. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, there existed vast objective possibilities for establishing many-sided cooperation between the USSR and Pakistan. At that time the Soviet Union agreed to supply to Pakistan 120,000 tonnes of bread and grain and thus helped it solve its serious food problems. The Soviet Union supplied to Pakistan industrial equipment and purchased from it cotton, jute, leather, and other primary goods which were not in great demand with other trade partners. Moreover, Pakistan invariably had trade surplus with the USSR, which helped the newly-emerged country save its scanty currency resources. The USSR was one of the first to respond to the request and supplied to Pakistan 150,000 tonnes of wheat in exchange for jute and cotton.⁴¹ The official Soviet viewpoint regarding its differences with Pakistan was stated by the former Soviet ambassador to Pakistan Vitaley Smirov in his speeches during 1985. During these speeches he outlined three Soviet grievances against Pakistan. These grievances were :

- (a) Increase in Pakistan's involvement in the Afghan war.
- (b) Discrimination against the Soviet embassy and other Soviet missions in Pakistan.
- (c) Anti-Soviet propaganda.⁴²

A noted Indian scholar however, pointed out four diverging factors in the Pak-Soviet relations. Firstly, the Afghan factor,

secondly the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, thirdly, the strategic linkage between Pakistan and the US and fourthly Pakistan's nuclear programme.⁴³

While addressing a press conference in New Delhi, a leading Soviet academician, A.I. Chicherov, warned that militarisation of Pakistan by the United States was a direct threat not only to India but also to the Soviet Union and its other allies. He told newsmen that the arms buildup by the US in the zone was aimed at re-establishing its hold which Washington lost after the debacle of Shah. This was sought to be achieved through the help of President Zia. Answering a question Chicherov said that "militarisation of Pakistan is a direct threat to Indian security, especially from nuclear weapons."⁴⁴ Related to such a criticism is the Soviet disapproval of Pakistan obtaining AWACS. E. Ryabtsev, *APN* political analyst, commented on the proposed supply of AWACS in the following words: "the intention of the US to supply AWACS equipped aircraft to Pakistan testifies to the plans of the Washington Administration to exchange the scale of the armed interference in the affairs of non-aligned Afghanistan. According to the American press, these airplanes will enable the Afghan armed opposition, assisted by the Pakistan military, to deliver effective missile strikes at Kabul and other cities. It is clear that the American Administration is mobilising every possible means to thwart the process of national reconciliation in Afghanistan. It is also obvious that the deliveries of the AWACS aircraft to Pakistan pursue the aim of torpedoing the Afghan-Pakistan talks in Geneva on settling the situation around Afghanistan, the talks at which certain progress is becoming visible."⁴⁵

Another irritant in Pakistan-Soviet relations, i.e., Islamabad's close rapport with Washington, was critically evaluated by a renowned Soviet writer Victor Georgiyev in his article published in *International Affairs*, Moscow. According to him: "it is not for nothing that US Secretary of State, George Shultz, described Pakistan as at frontline state situated in a militarily important place. The territory of Pakistan is the base for waging the undeclared war against the Afghan people. Afghan counter revolutionary bands are being

trained by Pakistani and American instructors at bases in Pakistan. Pakistani troops are helping to bring the bandits in DRA (Democratic Republic of Afghanistan) and have ever since become involved in operations inside Afghan territory. Washington tries to use its Pakistan ally to strengthen its influence in adjacent regions notably in the Gulf and the Middle East. To this end, Pakistan has been included in the US Central Defence Command (Centrom) covering 19 states in Asia, Africa and the Middle East. The United States is also helping Pakistan expand the network of radio active electronics surveillance stations on its territory.⁴⁶ It should be clear that the Pakistan Government has termed the Soviet/Afghan allegations as baseless and just an attempt to justify the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan. Notwithstanding its intermittent criticism on Pakistan's militarisation programme, covert support to the Afghan resistance groups and strategic alignment with the US, the Soviet leaders are still hopeful of patching up their differences with Pakistan. Without Pakistan, they feel, their entire endeavour for an anti-US security system in Asia could be abortive. On these grounds, the present Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev has followed a policy of tactical conciliation vis-a-vis Pakistan.

During his last visit to India in November 1986, Gorbachev expressed his country's desire to improve relations with Pakistan. He stated : "We stand for good, friendly relations with the Pakistani people, and approaches to achieving such relations should be worked out. Other ways lead to unpredictable consequences and we should all remember this. I think this fully applies to the Pakistan Government."⁴⁷ Moreover, Dr. M.S. Kapitsa, Director of Institute of Oriental Studies, Moscow in his press conference at New Delhi in April 1987 disclosed that Pakistan had shown interest in the concept of Asia-Pacific security system and had termed the Soviet proposal 'positive' while China, though welcomed the Vladivostok speech of Mikhail Gorbachev, had not yet come out with an open statement on *the security system issue. As regards India, discussions had been held* and those would continue.⁴⁸ It is still to be seen how the South Asian countries including Pakistan and China, respond to Gorbachev's revival of ACSS scheme.

The present Soviet Ambassador to Pakistan, Abdur Rehman Vazirov, like his predecessor Vitaley Smirov, has been trying to reach over to different segments of the Pakistani elite like University teachers and students, the strategic community, political leaders and journalists, and chambers of commerce and industry. However, Moscow has been unable to erode the strong linkage between the United States and the military-civilian regime in Pakistan. Nor has it been able to enlist the support of Miss Benazir Bhutto, the main opposition leader, for a settlement of Afghan issue through direct negotiations between Islamabad and Moscow or Islamabad and Kabul.⁴⁹

The Soviet leadership also realises the impediment in normalising ties with Pakistan and China. Mikhail Gorbachev, in his historic speech at Vladivostok on July 28, 1986 announced measures aimed at removing irritants in his country's relations with the two neighbouring countries. He announced the withdrawal of 8,000 troops from Afghanistan, supported national reconciliation in Afghanistan and expressed his country's desire to settle border disputes with China. Apart from the reduction of the Soviet troops along the Sino-Soviet borders, Gorbachev during that speech gave extra importance to China in any future Asian security system. However, it seems that without the settlement of Afghan crisis on the basis of resolutions passed by the U.N. General Assembly there cannot be any positive breakthrough in deriving South Asian support for the Soviet security approach. Merely by the withdrawal of a meagre portion of its troops from Afghanistan the Soviet leadership cannot remove the level of regional and international criticism. Similarly, in case of China, Moscow without giving some tangible concessions in the settlement of boundary dispute cannot assure the inclusion of China in its proposed Asia-Pacific security system. Much of the success of the Soviet approach to South Asian security depends on the peaceful settlement of Afghan crisis, breakthrough in its relations with Pakistan, Indo-Pakistan detente, Sino-Indian reconciliation and Sino-Soviet rapprochement. Until and unless these are resolved, the Soviet role in South Asia in particular and Asia in general would remain limited and vulnerable to American military and political pressures.

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Pakistan's Pentad—India's Obstinancy Nuclear Debate in the Region

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INTRODUCTION

Ever since the world witnessed the nuclear holocaust of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, a parallel nuclear and counter-nuclear race has begun; the former heading towards the sky-high pile ups of the nuclear arsenals containing the most deadly weapons mankind ever experienced and the latter blocking this deadly nuclear race through various impediments as PTB, Sea Bed Treaty, Outer Atmosphere Treaty, NPT, SALT, STAR, NWFZ's, etc. It has become fashionable in the nuclear age that 'haves' employ all means to dissuade the 'have-nots' from acquiring what they possess, thereby maintaining a monopolistic stand as a leverage for achieving their own aims. Nations go nuclear because of multi-dimensional reasons. However, for analytical convenience one can divide them into four broad categories: military security, political prestige and influence, economic gains, domestic pressures and compulsions.¹

A great majority of Third World countries (have-nots) lacking the indigenous sources of energy are in a bad shape, and, consequently, some of them have turned to production of nuclear energy, a choice which has been thrust upon them because of the incumbent inequities of the operative world economic order.² Pakistan is also one of them. Two factors mainly contribute to Pakistan's quest for nuclear

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technology. Firstly, the acute, precarious and complex security dilemma. Pakistan is sandwiched between two hostile neighbours, both wedded to a super power through a "Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation." Secondly, the achievement of political and economic benefits accrued by going nuclear. On the one hand, Pakistan would enhance her prestige and influence in the Muslim Bloc as well as Third World countries and on the other it would greatly lessen Pakistan's dependence on the imported POL (Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants) for her domestic needs. Pakistan has persistently emphasised that her nuclear programme is for peaceful purposes. But nobody, especially the western media, seems to believe this despite the fact that the evidence quoted in various stories is basically circumstantial, even guess-work, and not a concrete proof.³ Pakistan has sincerely worked for easing the tension and creating a peaceful atmosphere in the region. She has offered India one concrete and practical proposal after the other which have now transformed into a pentad as under :

Jointly sign the non-proliferation treaty.

OR

Sign a bilateral nuclear non-proliferation treaty.

OR

Acceptance of international inspection by IAEA of each other's nuclear facilities.

OR

Joint efforts for the creation of a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in South Asia.

OR

Joint renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons altogether.

India has not only rejected every proposal but has also embarked upon a malicious propaganda against Pakistan. Instead of evaluating her own ambitions she is obstreperous about Pakistan's peaceful nuclear programme. What are the real motives behind India's

obstinacy and rejection? And what is India upto? This paper aims at exploring these questions.

JOINTLY SIGN THE PROLIFERATION TREATY

India refused to sign the NPT on a plea of discrimination, but what actually persuaded her to remain out were her ambitions to go nuclear. At the time India was already working for an explosion. Indira Gandhi informed Rajia Sabha on August 27, 1970, that research was continuing for conducting a nuclear explosion.⁴ India started working on the explosion as far back as 1964-66, just after the Chinese explosion. Between 1965 and 1971 three opinion surveys were conducted in India based on random sample which indicated that a majority of public favoured a nuclear weapons programme.⁵

Ever since her 1974 Pokharan explosion India has persistently insisted and advocated her explosion as peaceful but no subsequent test explosions were conducted to harness the benefits for country's economic development. A prominent Indian strategist Subramanyam strongly pleads the development of nuclear weapons on the following grounds⁶:

1. India's strategic competition with China.
2. Acquiring respect in international community.
3. Reducing India's dependence on super powers for her security needs.

He adds, "India (without going nuclear) will not be able to normalise relations with China just as China could not exercise her options without going nuclear first. A non-nuclear India will continue to depend upon major nuclear powers for the security and those who oppose Indian nuclear option are in fact compelling this country to rely permanently on the Soviet connection for her security."⁷

Indian public as well as government officials place heavy reliance on nuclear weapons. An Indian government official is reported to have said, "If we had nuclear weapons in 1971, we could have blown

the Enterprise out of the Bay of Bengal.”⁸

A question also arises about New Delhi's nuclear capability to military uses as well. The answer is quite simple. Mere explosion or even possession of a warhead is of no significance until the delivery means are also available. The Indians are well on their way. It is well known to the world that India is going ahead with her future programme in the field of rocketing and latest electronics control system.⁹ Since 1967, India has launched more than a thousand solid-fuelled rockets and six indigenously designed and built satellites into the orbit.¹⁰ On July 18, 1980 India became the sixth nation to have successfully launched an earth satellite besides four nuclear weapon states (excluding UK) and Japan.¹¹ India has achieved an international ballistic missile capability by successfully launching a 1300 pound satellite into geo-stationary orbit. Another direction in which R & D efforts are being generated is space-based remote sensing for resource management.¹² Another significant event in India's nuclear history is 'going critical' of Dhruva Atomic Reactor which when operated at full capacity can give as much PL-239 as is sufficient to produce eight bombs a year, when decided so. Experts say India did not have access to adequate quantity of un-safeguarded PL-239 before this.

The above demonstrate the amazing speed with which India is developing her nuclear capabilities while persistently refusing to sign NPT. It is evident that her achievements are meant for purposes other than peaceful. Moreover, under the garb of peaceful research, India is perfecting every minutest detail to be able to remain only at tongue-to-lip distance in starting her debut for the nuclear arsenal. The Indians cannot be dissuaded from Nehru's advice on nuclear policy, who declared¹³:

1. Peaceful uses of nuclear energy have a military fall out. This nuclear option should be kept open.
2. Nuclear research should be conducted in all its facets and should be kept secret.

In the light of Nehru's advice the Indians are well on their way. India has been able to create the third largest pool of scientists and engineers in the world after the super powers and out of this pool has arisen a cream of elite nuclear and space scientists and engineers. The technological gap between India and Pakistan is so wide that it is not practically and logically possible for India to retard her R & D just because of Pakistan. Moreover, in fulfilment of her long cherished desire of achieving the status of a Super Power, there is no option left to India but to militarily develop the technology. On the other hand, not only Pakistanis but even Indians are not sure of Pakistan's nuclear capabilities. In their book, 'Pakistan's Nuclear Bomb's Brigadier Mohan Kaushak and O. N. Mehrotra of IDSA (Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis, New Delhi) have outlined the following difficulties in the way of Pakistan going nuclear.¹⁴

1. It is not an easy task to set up a uranium enrichment plant. Given the technical and industrial know-how and infrastructure of West Germany, Britain and the Netherlands, URENCO was erected in more than fifteen years. Japan took more than ten years to set up a pilot scale centrifuge plant. It would indeed be a miracle if the genius of just one scientist in Pakistan can do this job in a couple of years.
2. Will there be uninterrupted supply of power for centrifuge ?
3. In spite of Pakistan having indigenous uranium resources, we doubt whether the Sihala facility will get the feed.
4. Whether Dr. A. Q. Khan has sufficient uranium in stock to run his enrichment plant.
5. Work at Kahuta project has stopped because of an irregular supply of parts and the trouble with equipment and design.

They move on further to say, "We are not optimistic of Pakistan being able to produce enough quantity of weapons grade enriched uranium in the near future."¹⁵ It would be appropriate to quote Major General D. K. S. Namboodiri as having said : "the fact remains that from available evidence Pakistan has neither the

potential nor the resources to sustain an active nuclear power programme."¹⁶ It is not an easy affair for Pakistan to go nuclear. What can be said with a great deal of certainty is that by going nuclear Pakistan will invite all kinds of punishment from the Western World and may even be destabilized by the western powers and Israel.¹⁷

SIGN A BILATERAL NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

If India feels it would succumb to international blackmailing by signing the NPT-1968-70, Pakistan has also offered her to subscribe to a limited non-proliferation treaty, i.e, signing a bilateral NPT. It would contribute to relieve this region from the hazards of nuclear weapons. The bilateral NPT essentially means that both the signatories would neither manufacture nor acquire themselves nor would help any other country of the region to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons. Moreover, both the signatories would open their nuclear facilities for inspection to the other. Both the countries would be at will to move ahead in their nuclear research for peaceful purposes. They may even cooperate in the field and benefit from each other's experience. It would enhance efforts of the two governments towards the welfare of the people. But in spite of all this India has not welcomed the proposal, simply because it would be a constraint on her long cherished aspirations of leading the region. India is the sole proprietor of nuclear power in the region and would exert her unchecked weight in the affairs of the region through possession of nuclear weapons. The acquisition of nuclear weapons will help India in influencing and blackmailing Pakistan and establishing her hegemony in South Asia.

INTERNATIONAL INSPECTION BY IAEA OF EACH OTHER'S NUCLEAR FACILITIES

Yet another practical proposal of allowing inspection by IAEA of each other's nuclear facilities has also been floated by Pakistan. IAEA is an international organisation regulating various aspects of

the nuclear business. It is the agency which has the sole authority of appointing its inspectors on nuclear installations of non-nuclear states to check any illegal diversion of fissile material. Since both India and Pakistan are members of the IAEA it looks quite pertinent to submit all nuclear installations under its safeguards. India has openly criticized the proposal on grounds of discrimination. Moreover, Indians proclaim that accepting the proposal would mean succumbing to international blackmail. But some experts widely differ. They opine that India refuses to accept the proposal because she has already reached a stage far ahead to that of Pakistan. After years of toil she has now indigenously built reactors from where she is at will to divert the fissile material for weapons production, when decided so. There have also been reports on India embarking on the fusion technology for generating thermo-nuclear power which would provide the country the capability to make hydrogen bombs. How can she agree to a proposal by a country which yet to develop infrastructure even for initial nuclear programme, what to talk of a sustained long term? It would not like to give a time lag to Pakistan to be able to catch up with her. An international safeguard on India's nuclear facilities would mean a check on her hegemonial and regional leadership designs, now being acquired through weight of nuclear power.

CREATING A NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE ZONE IN SOUTH ASIA

More than a decade earlier in 1974, at the 29th Session of UN General Assembly, Pakistan proposed declaring of South Asia as a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ). It invited South Asian states to initiate without delay necessary consultations with a view to establishing a NWFZ and requested the UN Secretary to convene a meeting of regional states for the purpose.¹⁸ The proposal is being continuously taken up at successive General Assembly Sessions. A NWFZ is a specific area prohibiting the testing, production, passage and storage of nuclear weapons. Pakistan has time and again with

solemn sincerity called on the Indian leaders to come forward and join hands in at least securing own region from the hazards of nuclear weapons. But the same old story comes up from the other side. The importance of NWFZ in reducing the risks of nuclear wars is evident from the number of such proposals through out the globe to include Romanian for a Balkan NWFZ, Soviet proposal for a Mediterranean Zone, Finish proposal for a Nordic Zone, Chinese proposal for an Asian Pacific Zone, Polish proposal for a Central European Zone, African proposal for a Zone in Africa, Iranian proposal for a Middle East Zone and the Latin American proposal.¹⁹ A year or so back, twelve countries including Australia, New Zeland, Fuji, Papa New Guinea, Tonga, Kiribati, Cook Islands, Solomon Islands, Mauru, Niue, Tuvalu and Western Somao forming the South Pacific Forum have concluded a treaty for keeping their zone free of all nuclear weapons. The treaty puts a complete ban on the use, ownership and stationing of nuclear weapons. India rejects the Pakistani proposal on the following grounds :

1. A Nuclear Weapons Free Zone proposal should include all the nations of the area and geographical limits be larger.
2. It should not upset the existing military balance. Since China is blocked on the north and west by the Soviet Union it is in a position to exercise its big power role in south and south east. A NWFZ restricted to South Asia would tilt the military balance over-whelmingly in favour of China.
3. South Asian Zone would deprive India of the option to develop nuclear weapons if China became a threat to India.²⁰
4. UN General Assembly could not declare a particular area of the world as a NWFZ.

The story behind the scene is different. Since India also proposes nuclear weapons capability and has in fact brought a number of

its devices at the final stage, it would not agree in making the region nuclear free through a mutually evolved agreement between states of the region.²¹ By formally committing to a treaty, India would not be able to project her weights as the biggest power of the region. She wants a hard grip on the smaller states of the region. She also has apprehensions about China. The Indians have their eye on the future. They are preparing themselves for the time of rapprochement between Soviet Union and China. The Indians also put forward bankrupt point of uselessness of making this small particular area a NWFZ when all others are possessing the weapons. Indian Minister of State for Foreign Affairs told the Lok Sabha that India would not subscribe to the idea of NWFZ in South Asia because some states in the region have already become nuclear. What a plea for refusal. He also asserted that India would not go for a nuclear umbrella. He added that India is quite capable of self-defence and the capability of Indian scientists is not to be under estimated.

JOINTLY RENOUNCE THE USE OF NUCLEAR WAPONS

The renunciation or the use of nuclear weapons jointly by both the countries is a viable solution of relieving the nuclear tension in the region. But like all the other four proposals, India displays an indifferent and negative attitude to it. India pleads that she has already renounced the use of nuclear weapons in the region and suggested Pakistan to do on her own. But what is the harm in a joint renunciation? Simply because India wants to keep her option open for the manufacture and use of nuclear weapons. Why to fear Pakistan when due to the growing Indian military superiority over her and the political schism between the military and its people in Pakistan, she is unlikely to start a war. This is even truer now that Soviets are firmly placed in Afghanistan.²²

CONCLUSION

Pakistan's quest for nuclear technology stems from a multitude

of factors. The most notable being the economic, political benefits accredited to a nuclear explosion and the prevailing geopolitical and strategic environment in the region. Pakistan has yet to tread a long way in achieving the requisite breakthrough in nuclear technology which could be of a significant value. But the western world as well as the neighbouring India have baselessly suspected her peaceful nuclear programme being loaded with military application. Pakistani leaders have vehemently asserted that their nuclear programme is for a peaceful purpose. To erase even the last traces of suspicion and doubt Pakistan has offered India a pentad consisting of jointly signing the NPT 1968-70 or a bilateral NPT, international or bilateral inspection of each other's nuclear facilities and joint renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons. The Indian leaders on one pretext or other have rejected every proposal, doubting the sincerity behind the pentad and labelling it just as a PR. Since unprejudicial assessments by international and even Indian experts lead to the conclusion that Pakistan has yet to go a long way to make a bomb and also because in that eventuality, it would face all the punishment by the western world, is it fair on the part of India to repeat alligations against Pakistan. Moreover, the nuclear history is still blank to prove if some country has made a bomb through clandestine means. Keeping all this in mind it does not require much intelligence to locate the reasons behind India's obstinancy to Pakistan's pentad. India has reached that threshold of nuclear know-how and technology where she feels to receive far less dividends favourably acceding to Pakistan's pentad than to move ahead with her programme. If India really desires peace in the region, she must give a supporting hand to Pakistan's proposals.

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Indian Foreign Relations in South Asia

(January—June 1987)

MOHAMMAD SARWAR

India though has all the three tools, that Hans Morgenthau mentioned, essential in international affairs; logic, bribes and threats, but its actions are generally governed by superiority rhetoric for weaker nations, inferiority complex with super powers and a total lack of imagination with immediate neighbours like Pakistan and China.

The Indian diplomacy, during the period under review, remained bogged down in its more immediate neighbourhood with no signs of any improvement in her relations with Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and China.

In respect of China, India seemed to be adopting a rational that since Sri Lanka and Pakistan have been posing a (so-called) serious threat, a deliberate policy to neutralise China should be adopted. The realistic approach to solve the border dispute with China is to follow the principle of give-and-take and a retreat from the 1962 resolution passed by the Indian Parliament which declared that "every inch of disputed land was India's." But Rajiv Gandhi's Government in 1987 does not feel itself morally and politically strong enough to move back from that position and give something to China.

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INDO-PAKISTAN

Indo-Pakistan relations during the period under review remained clouded under border tension, accusations by India on Pakistan's Nuclear Programme and Pakistan's involvement in East Punjab. Operation Brasstacks served to escalate the already tense situation.

Operation Brasstacks

It was in November last when Pakistan came to know about the Indian winter exercise Operation Brasstacks on its Rajasthan border. The size and duration of the exercise was unusual in which "India was to test its mechanised infantry"¹ and its "ability to launch an invasion on Pakistan in the event of War."² All-in-all "it cost India about \$250 million."³

At this massive deployment of Indian forces near the border, Pakistan naturally felt alarmed and the border tension between the two countries touched a dangerous limit. By the third week of January the armed forces on both sides moved in forward positions along the Punjab border and were put on 'red alert'.

Through diplomatic channels and military hotline, Pakistan proposed India some specific steps to defuse tension created by the "unprecedented concentration of some 200 thousand Indian armed forces along Pakistan's eastern border without any provocation from this side."⁴ Despite this Pakistan also decided to take certain moves such as the "extension of its winter exercises for another one month and moved two armoured divisions closer to the frontier with India in the strategically important Ravi-Beas corridor."⁵ Meanwhile the Indian Prime Minister told Pakistan Envoy in Delhi that "temperature should be brought down."⁶ Pakistan on the other hand, after Junejo-Rajiv telephonic talk, asked its Foreign Secretary Mr. Abdul Sattar to visit New Delhi for talks on de-escalation of present tension.

Delhi Talks

Pakistan Foreign Secretary Mr. Abdul Sattar's five day-talks (January 30 to February 3) with the Indian authorities concluded in an agreement to "adopt a sector by sector approach for the pull-out

of troops deployed on the border, not to attack on each other, exercise the maximum restraint, to avoid all provocative action along the border"⁷ and to resume talks in Islamabad soon.

The second round of talks was held in Islamabad, from 27 February to 2 March, where both sides agreed to withdraw their troops from the Rajasthan Sector in two phases without affecting the Indian triennial exercises Brasstacks. (For details see text of the agreement in Statements Section).

Although Pakistan secured a significant propaganda advantage from these talks but India gained a tactical advantage by getting the withdrawal of Pakistani troops where "India is militarily vulnerable while leaving the status quo intact"⁸ in respect of Brasstacks. The negotiated settlement made it possible for India to go ahead with its operation Brasstacks exercise without causing anxiety in Pakistan, and for Pakistan to retain its precautionary troops dispositions without causing provocation to India.

Cricket for Peace

On the invitation of the Board of Cricket Control of India (BCCI) President Zia-ul-Haq paid a three-day visit to that country to watch a Cricket Match at Jaipur. During his visit, which was called by the Indian Foreign Secretary, as being an "unofficial, private and cricketing one". He also met Rajiv Gandhi. President Zail Singh, visited Ajmeer Sharif and practised public relation with great swings.

President Zia's mission of 'Cricket for Peace' with a sixty member delegation surprised the critics both at India and Pakistan. Despite instructions to the Indian media to downplay the visit, the Indian press could do nothing but to publish his resolve that "he had come to defuse tension and restore communications and confidence between the two countries."¹⁰ His diplomatic initiative or offensive indicated a total reversal of India's propaganda vis-a-vis Pakistan.

Indian External Affairs Ministry's Report

The External Affairs Ministry in its annual report, released in the

first week of April, termed "Pakistan's search for sophisticated weapons including AWACS type capability, attempts to raise Kashmir question at International fora and reluctance to develop trade with India on a non-discriminatory bases, as negative developments" and have "adversely affected India's efforts to improve relations."¹¹

The report reiterated India's desire to live in peace and good neighbourly relations with Pakistan demonstrated by India's initiative for official talks to diffuse aggravated situation on the Punjab border in January. The Pakistan's Foreign Minister on the other hand informed the Parliament that "establishment of tension free, good neighbourly relations with India on the basis of equality, justice, sovereignty and mutual respect is the fundamental element of Pakistan's foreign policy."¹² Despite these gestures from Delhi and Islamabad in April, both sides remained sweaty by counter accusations along the incremental speed of mercury till June.

INDO-BANGLADESH

The formate of Indo-Bangladesh relations in the first half of 1987 had been the same as in the last year. Despite the official level talks no significant development witnessed on the outstanding issues like Tin Bigha, and Ganga water sharing, newly emerged islands in the Bay of Bengal and the Chakma tribal insurgency and repatriation of Chakma refugees from Tripura to Bangladesh. All the Indian moves towards its relations with Bangladesh seems to be governed by its superiority rhetoric.

Indian External Affairs Ministry's visit to Dhaka

Mr. N.D. Tiwari, during his a week long tour to Bangladesh, Burma and Vietnam, reached Dhaka on January 7th to review Indo-Bangladesh relations. Besides his talks to his counterpart, Mr. Humayun Rashid Choudhry, he also met with President Hussain Mohammad Ershad and some other members of the Cabinet. The two foreign ministers reviewed the whole gamut of bilateral issues including river water dispute and repatriation of Chakmas. It was

also decided to "introduce direct dialing between the capitals of the two countries from January 26."¹³

The basic motive behind Mr. Tiwari's visit was to "heal the rupture in Indo-Bangladesh relations resulting from the non-fulfilment of promises made by New Delhi with regards to resolving various bilateral problems."¹⁴ He also came with a fresh proposal for allowing India a "railway corridor through Bangladesh to link Assam with West Bengal."¹⁵ India want to correlate the handing over of Tin Bigha corridor with a passage to Assam through Bangladesh. The Indian proposal was first made as early as in 1973.

Public Reaction of the Visit

While Mr. Tiwari was holding formal talks with Mr. Choudhry at the Foreign Office building in Dhaka, hundreds of people led by "Farakha Action Committee staged a demonstration in front of the Foreign Office." The demonstrators registered their "protest against Indian construction of Teesta barrage and raised anti-India slogans."¹⁶

Chakma Repatriation

The Indian and Bangladeshi officials, in December 1986, chalked out a programme for the repatriation of Chakmas to Bangladesh from January 15. It was decided that "about 300 families would be sent back from Tripura to Chittagong Hill Tracts and Bangladesh government would provide Rs. 500 and free ration for six months to each family after their return."¹⁷

The Bangladesh Foreign Minister when on January 17, met his Indian counterpart in Nepal expressed Dhaka's shock that the tribesmen who were scheduled to return on January 15, had not come back. The Dhaka press in the mean-time reported that "the repatriation plans were scuttled by India by resorting to firing at the border into Bangladesh areas. The Indian High Commission at Dhaka on the other hand released a press note, on January 15, pretending that "as preparations for repatriation were in their final stages the sounds of rifles and LMG firing at the repatriation points from the Indian side," and so the repatriation was cancelled.

The Indian High Commissioner, on January 27, was summoned to the Foreign Office in Dhaka to clarify the position stated in the press note. He first failed to turn up at the scheduled time. On the next day when he visited the Foreign Office "he was told in diplomatic terms that the press release which his mission had issued on the cancellation of the tribal refugees had many inaccuracies."¹⁸

During the last week of March, Bangladesh Foreign Minister while replying to a motion in the Parliament mentioned that refugees is amongst the most outstanding issues with India.¹⁹ The three days talks between the border security forces Commanders of India and Bangladesh, on Chakma issue failed in Dhaka (on April 6) and resolved to refer the issue at higher diplomatic level. But when Foreign Secretaries of both the countries met in Dhaka (on 25–27 April) there was no break through on the issue.

Controversy over South Talpatty Islands

The issue of the ownership of South Talpatty island was raised in the Parliament of Bangladesh in March and Indian Parliament in April respectively. The All-India Radio on April 10, broadcasted a statement by the Indian Minister of State for External Affairs regarding the Indian Ownership of the island, which followed by the instructions to Bangladesh High Commissioner in New Delhi to take up the issue with the Indian Government.

Talpatty is a new issue in Indo-Bangladesh relation. Seven years before there emerged an island in the Bay of Bengal and still uninhabited, to which India called New Moors and Bangladesh named South Talpatty. The ownership of this island has been under discussion in the past and both sides agreed to resolve the issue through negotiation. Although the issue is being included in all diplomatic level meetings but never treated as a special case.

Joint Rivers Commission's Meeting

A two-day meeting of the Indo-Bangladesh Joint Rivers Commission (JRC) held in New Delhi (May 12–14) after two years. The Commission was set up in 1972, in quest for a solution of the

Ganga and 53 other rivers flowing between the two countries. The Commission was scheduled to meet four times a year. The latest 29th meeting was significant in the sense, that Nepal was also included in the Commission which changed the nature of the issue from bilateral to a trilateral one.

At the conclusion of the meeting two sides "agreed to extend the terms of JRC for another six months, extended the adhoc sharing arrangements of the Teesta river flow during the dry season till the end of the current year and proposed a meeting of irrigation ministers in July to discuss permanent arrangements of Teesta flow and other river issues."²⁰

Foreign Secretaries met in Dhaka

The Foreign Secretaries of both the countries met in Dhaka (25—27 April) for three days. The major issues on agenda again has been the problems such as delimitation of maritime boundary, South Talpatty island, the return of Chakma refugees from India and Tin Bigha enclaves. Besides a "constructive discussion"²¹ on these controversial and burning political issues the meeting decided "to take steps to allot land in the diplomatic enclaves in their respective capitals for each other's High Commission,"²¹ because in both countries their respective Embassies are functioning in rented buildings.

INDO-SRI LANKA

India's involvement in Sri Lanka's ethnic problem started soon after 1983 riots, when she immediately dispatched her Foreign Minister to Colombo to offer mediation between Tamil guerrillas and the Sri Lankan Government. The Sri Lankan Government though unwillingly accepted the abortive mediation but at one time, in early 1985, outrightly rejected Indian help to solve its internal problem. The small island state could not resist to keep Indian interests out and again in July 1986 agreed to put her internal problem under Indian umpirage in Thimpu (Bhutan).

The process of actual negotiations between Tamil militants and Sri Lankan Government lasted until December 1986. During this

period the Indian Government "the honest broker, herself acted as a God-father of Sri Lankan Terrorism to the extent that the proposals amounted to removing the Sinhala electorates from the eastern province were also rejected by the Tamil group. It is evident that the only recipient of the efforts of the trouble-shooter have been the terrorists. The terrorists, with the assistance of both Indian and Tamil Nadu Governments, became so powerful in January 1987 to stage an open rebellion against the legitimate and elected government of Sri Lanka and seeking to create a separate state in the Island. The Sri Lankan Government after guerrilla take over of Jaffna, was compelled to launch an economic blockade and stop the supplies of oil, food and other essentials to force militants to surrender to the Sri Lankan authorities.

Indian Reaction

The Political Affairs Committee of the Indian Cabinet on January 7, expressed its concern over the economic blockade of Jaffna. In the first week of February India activated her envoy in Colombo and his counterpart in New Delhi to convey a message to Sri Lankan Government to "immediately lift the economic blockade of northern Jaffna district and also to suspend the brutal military operations."²³ Delhi also reminded Colombo that it can not always remain idle by-stander because of: "(a) its past involvement in seeking the solution to the four-year old crisis in that country (b) the presence of three lakh refugees in India, and (c) the likely fall out within Tamil Nadu."²⁴ The Indian Government further asked Sri Lanka to take immediate steps as :

1. Stop unconditionally the military offensive against the Tamils and withdraw or reverse its unjust results (specially those which came out after December 19).
2. Lift the economic and communication blockade and other discriminatory measures against the Tamil population.
3. Affirm its official commitment to the December 19 proposals."²⁵

The Sri Lankan President, Mr. J.R. Jayewardene, responding this ultimatum, on February 12, sent a six point proposal which infact, was a "refusal to first two points of the Indian ultimatum but continued commitment to the December 19 proposals,"²⁶ and an offer to create a Tamil majority eastern province after detaching the predominantly Sinhala areas from it.

Controversy over Zail Singh's Remarks

The Indian President Giani Zail Singh in an address to the Parliament on February 23, "condemned the military operations and economic blockade against Tamil and accused the Sri Lankan Government of backing out December 19 proposals and called for a political solution of the ethnic problem."²⁷ The Sri Lanka on the other hand summoned the Indian High Commissioner Mr. J.N. Dixit to the Foreign Office in Colombo and told him that "Sri Lanka has always maintained that the good offices of the Indian Government in seeking a resolution of the ethnic problem is vital importance. But when references at the highest level [of this nature are made, serious doubts can be raised in the minds of international community about Sri Lanka's intentions."²⁸

The Foreign Minister of Sri Lanka said that his government was "deeply disappointed at the reference made to Sri Lanka and it does not have any constructive effect."²⁹ The Indian High Commissioner while commenting on this development said that "whatever was said by President Zail Singh is the considered assessment of the Government of India."³⁰

Sri Lanka in the meantime, for providing relief to its civilians reviewed fuel embargo in such a way as not to assist the terrorists, and conveyed to India that: "In view of the fact that militants are based in India", even then India could "play a positive role in devising a ceasefire and bring the militants to negotiating table."³¹

Charges and counter charges have been remarked Indo-Sri Lanka relations during the past several weeks. Further complications arose when Rajiv Gandhi virtually threatened Sri Lanka to suspend economic blockade in Jaffna and reaffirm its commitment to December 19

'Amparai Formula' in order to continue India's mediatory efforts.

Abortive Initiatives

After Sri Lanka lifted fuel and communication blockade, India again came forward with some half hearted initiatives to resume dialogue or even to access the situation on both sides. Mr. Dinesh Singh, as a special envoy to Rajiv Gandhi visited Colombo on March 14, followed by Mr. J. N. Dixit, both met President Jayewardene. At home the Tamil Nadu Chief Minister met Tamil leader Dr. A. Balasingam in Madras. The two Union Ministers ; Mr. Natwar Singh and Mr. Chidambaram also discussed the issue with militant and moderate Tamil leaders on March 18. Mr. Natwar Singh then informed the Parliament that "Colombo is totally committed to the December 19 proposals," but his statement to the house seemed to suggest that "India was not sure whether the LTTE would agree to resume negotiations with Colombo on the basis of the December 19 proposals."³² Rajiv Gandhi also at the same time spoken of "unilateral decision to pressurise militants to accept the December 19 proposals."³³

Again in the first week of April Mr. B. Tilakaratne, the Colombo's envoy to Delhi, played a shuttle, but all these efforts proved futile with no hopes of the resumption of talks.

War of Words

Right in the middle of these developments when the militants perpetrated the violence in Jaffna the Sri Lankan Prime Minister Mr. R. Premadas, under a tremendous pressure in Parliament to take strong measure had to say that "friend who want political solution is an enemy."³⁴ In India the Political Committee of the Cabinet called it an 'extraordinary' statement and the Indian High Commissioner in Colombo was understood to have told Sri Lanka that "if the statement as reported in the press is correct then India will have to consider its implications."³⁵

The Sri Lankan President, at the same time also accused New Delhi of following a "Hitlarian Policy vis-a-vis Sri Lanka,"³⁶ and

Tamil Nadu Government played a disruptive role and an act of deliberate provocation across the Palk Strait, provoking President Jayewardene to accuse New Delhi of following 'Hitlerian Policy' and disturbing implication for India.

Tamil Nadu action turned the Table

Along these surface developments ; the Tamil Nadu support for terrorists and cross accusations from Delhi and Colombo, there was another move for "a unilateral decision to pressurise militants "on the part of the Indian Government."⁴³ *The Sunday Observer* quoted authoritative sources as saying that "plans were drawn to crush Jaffna and the LTTE, and New Delhi's signal to go for LTTE and its ally EROS have been clear since the Tamil Nadu State Government announced its aid package to the Island Tamils."⁴⁴ The paper further quoted Indian diplomats and official privately conveying Colombo that "LTTE leader Parbhakaran must be got out of the way and his group crushed if normalacy is to be restored in the north and Tamils be allowed to live peacefully through a political settlement."⁴⁵ When Sri Lankan forces in the last days of May started an organised offensive against LTTE and EROS terrorists in Jaffna, the Indian Government, despite, a pressure from both opposition and ruling party, appeared to be not to precipitate the situation by direct intervention.

India's Gunboat Diplomacy

On June 3, about 19 Indian boats carrying relief aid to Jaffna Tamil were turned back by Sri Lankan Navel boats. New Delhi called it as deliberately negative and obstructive⁴⁶ action by Sri Lanka. Next day, in a swift operation, the Indian Air Force escorted by Mirage-2000 fighter-bombers dropped relief supplies in Jaffna Peninsula. A total of nine aircrafts were used in this operation with five AN-32 aircrafts loaded with 25 tonnes of rice, pulses and medicines and 4 Mirage-2000 fighters as escorts. The Indian Government justified this drastic step by saying that "India had no intention of risking a conflict with Sri Lanka and the whole exercise should be

seen in the context of Indo-Sri Lankan friendship."⁴⁷ The airdrop was a naked violation of Sri Lanka's independence. President Jayewardene called this action as an unwarranted assault on our (Sri Lanka's) sovereignty and territorial integrity."⁴⁸

Indo-Sri Lanka Pact on Relief Supplies

India and Sri Lanka on June 15, agreed to follow some modalities for dispatch of relief supplies from the Government and people of India to the Sri Lankan citizens on Jaffna peninsula. (For text of the Pact see 'statements' of the present issue).

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Book Review

Rajput, R.S. Dr. (ed.), *Dynamics of Democratic Politics in India*. A study of 1984 and 1985 elections of Lok Sabha. Deep Publications, New Delhi, 1986, pp. 465. Price Rs. 375.00.

Dr. Rajput is a research officer in the Institute of Constitutional and Parliamentary Studies, New Delhi. His *Democracy at Grass-roots* co-authored with Professor Dr. Meghe has been widely acclaimed in the field of democratic decentralisation. As a researcher, Dr. Rajput has to his credit about 35 research papers published in various journals, a testimony to his experience.

The book under review has been divided into three parts : Democratic Perspectives, Elections in the States and Union Territories, and the Epilogue. The author critically analysed the 1984 election scene with relevant facts and figures. The book contains also the analysis of election outcome in various States and Union Territories. Chapter One attempts to study in detail the programmes, i.e., political, social and economic aspects of the manifestos of different parties. On the political front the comparative study of the election manifestos indicate that national unity and integrity of the country is the major concern of all the national parties. The slogans of '*Garibi Hatao*' and the '*Government that works*' given by Congress in the 1971 and 1980 general elections respectively do not find place in its election manifesto of 1984 and no explanation appears for their omission. All parties are concerned with the rising threat of corruption at all levels and they all, including the ruling party, have promised to clean the society from this menace. The Punjab and Assam problems are the major concern of all the national parties.

The manifestos of the Congress and other leading parties do not refer to the issue of Khalistan, though all the parties have exploited it to win the Hindu sentiments. The Bhartiya Janta Party (BJP) declared in its manifesto: "nation shall not allow another assault in the country's integrity and that there can be no compromise with those who talk of Khalistan. At the same time Bhartiya Janta Party will not suffer from any harm being done to innocent people, Hindu or Sikh." During 1980-84 there was a very hot debate about the switching to the Presidential form of Government. It enjoyed the blessings of late Mrs. Indira Gandhi. The Congress manifesto does not refer to this controversy at all. All the national parties advocate a non-aligned foreign policy whereas the leftist parties advocate strengthening of relations with the time tested friend—the Soviet Union. The Congress has advocated a strong centre so far as the Centre-State relations are concerned, whereas all the opposition parties join hands to advocate more political and financial powers for the states. One may, therefore, conclude that the opposition parties share almost similar ideas on several issues and if they diffuse their personal ego, then there is no problem to talk, negotiate, unite and fight the ruling Congress, whose political programme is comparatively less ideological and less radical.

Regarding different social issues, the election programmes of all the parties include the protection of women, scheduled castes, scheduled tribes, backward classes, minorities the press and other media of public opinion. On the number of social issues the election manifestos have observed silence. It is really strange that the Bhartiya Janta Party's manifesto keeps silent on the problem of minorities and does not make any reference to the Mandal Commission Report. All the national bourgeois parties do not have any labour policy.

The manifestos of all the national parties mention the seconomic problems and issues in detail. The Congress(I) claims to have made definite achievements in some of the economic sectors whereas all the opposition parties expose its failure and extravagant claimes.

The problem of unemployment is the most important issue in the manifestos of all the national parties. The Congress promises more employment avenues whereas the Janta Party calls for a guaranteed employment and the leftist parties advocate that the right to work should be treated as a fundamental right. The Congress which was once a champion of nationalization keeps silent on this issue. Both the Congress as well as the Bhartiya Janta Party do not want to restrain the multinationals in India. The leftists favour nationalisation. The Bhartiya Janta Party manifesto has favoured the Gandhian Principle of trusteeship of property. The issue of land reforms was not included by the Congress and Bhartiya Janta Party whereas other parties favour radical reforms. All the national parties except the Janta have elaborated their industrial policies as well.

The Second Chapter discusses the mandate for national unity and integrity. The eighth Lok Sabha Election December (1984) were held under the tragic circumstances and had, therefore, important dynamics of their own. The elections were held in a relatively uncommon, unstable, tense and sentimental situation on the 21st day of the assassination of Mrs. Indira Gandhi. To hold the elections in such a situation was really a great task. Mr. Rajiv Gandhi picked up that challenge. He preferred consent to sympathy. He wanted power, prestige and glory to be based on legitimacy and credibility through elections. The substantial mandate to Congress in the polls has changed the composition of the political parties and experienced leadership. The author expressed that the BJP attributed the party's debacle to the sympathy factor, specially among women, attraction of the youth towards Rajiv Gandhi and the opposition's failures to project a united picture. In the polls people blamed the opposition because the voter was not ready to tolerate disintegration.

The author includes the report of poll survey conducted by various organisations. He also presents the comparison of polls expenditure since 1952 to 1984 which indicated that expenditure increased from 10.45 crore to Rs. 300 crore in 1984. The data

analysis of the election is shown in a tabulated form. The Author concludes with the remarks that the mandate of the people is for five years and it is the duty of the ruling party to project the rights of the voters to fulfil the promises made to them during the election campaign.

In Third Chapter, the author has quoted the views of the national newspapers and of the people of different shades of opinion. The opinions of the political parties and leaders have also been recorded in this chapter. The international reactions on the results of the polls and the congratulation messages received from prominent world leaders have also been recorded. However, the popular mandate to Congress (I) under the leadership of Mr. Rajiv Gandhi has been appreciated by the nation. The foreign dignitaries and the international mass media have highlighted his victory in the banner headlines. The results of the polls enhanced the prestige of India and it is placed on top of the democratic countries of the world.

In a psycho-literary perspective the author expresses the spirit of the Indian voter. At one time it was strongly believed that the Indian voter is a hero/dynasty worshipper. It is not true for today. The Author says that the Indian voters' records stand not as virtually flawless. He has gone about his work with a fine sense of discrimination and a spirit of experiment. The Indian voter is in favour of the evolutionary approach. He will do what may appear to be a revolution through the ballot-box. He is committed to two things, the country and the principle of performance. He is not against individual/regional parties if they show promise of performance. He is not ideology-orientend but puts more appreciation on performance than the practice of politics.

Part second of the book consists of twenty case studies of Lok Sabha elections (1984) of different states of India. The author presents in these exercises the study of election statistics. It is not a mere tabulation of statistics ; or it is an analysis of statistics. In this task the author has produced every detail about these

elections, e.g., historic background, area, population, literacy rate of the area, election campaign and strategy, number of electorates, voter turnout, details of votes polled, details of constituencies, electorate's share of the political parties and the statistical analysis of the election results.

The author has made a good effort to draw certain conclusions on the basis of behavioural and statistical analysis of 8th Lok Sabha elections in India.

The book is helpful in understanding the results of the elections and the background against which these were held. More importantly, the All India Political Parties were reduced to an insignificant position in the House and were over-shadowed by regional parties. Notes and References, selected bibliography and a set of appendices having statistical data on political parties and the list of elected representatives adds to the overall utility of the book.

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Till early 1980's the world as well as the South Asian people knew little about the dots on the map of the Indian Ocean and almost nothing of the language and culture of a chain of about 1200 islands in a whole archipelago called the Republic of Maldives. For an average Pakistani it was still a mystery when they came to know that the seventh sister in SAARC family is a Muslim country of the Indian Ocean. The younger generation of the Republic of Maldives itself is still unaware of its past history,

which they presume to have begun in the year 583 A.H. or A.D. 1153, when the Islands embraced Islam.

They know that their forefathers embraced Islam and they still recall the name of the first person who converted their ancestors from Buddhism to Islam. His name was Al-Faqir Hifiz Hassan Fali Takur. The Singhalese images were forbidden and any pre-Muslim relic found were destroyed after conversion. So Buddhism and Singhalese images completely vanished from the Maldives History.

It was in 1879, when the British Commissioner of the Ceylon Civil Services, Mr. H.C.P. Bell first came to the Maldives to investigate the pre-existence of Buddhism. The Muslim Orthodoxy in the Islands at that time was so strong that to fulfil his objective he was obliged to move with utmost care not to offend the Muslim sentiments.

The commitment of the Maldivian people at large to Islamic faith and rituals is still so strong that they do not tolerate anything that is forbidden by the Quran. They even deny their own history before the day Islam was introduced. It was on the invitation of the Worldwide International Foundation (WIF) and the personal assurance of the President Manmoon Abdul Gayoom of Maldives that Mr. Thor Heyerdahl reached the islands to investigate some recent archaeological finds there. The President at a reception for Thor said "we are a young republic, yes. But now we have proof that we too have an history, just like our neighbours on the continent."

He was shown the recent discoveries, particularly long-eared images, hitherto despised and hidden away. On another island named Fua Mulaku he found the remains of walls made of beautifully cut and fitted stones, which reminded him of the fingerprint masonry he had seen previously in the pre-historic Middle East. He also heard for the first time of the mysterious Redin and the legendary tales such as jinni from the sea who demanded the sacrifice of virgins.

In the jungle of an uninhabited Island, Gaaf-Gan, he was shown a huge temple mound, covered with symbols of the sun and containing

sculptures of lions and a bull. Later, during excavation of the 'Phallus Temple' on Nilandu led to an extraordinary discovery.

The quest for the origin of Maldives history led Thor further afield—to Sri Lanka, to the west coast of India, to Hindu and Buddhist remains, to buildings, constructions, carvings, beads and cowrie shells left by the vanished civilisations of Sumeria, Mesopotamia, Bahrain and the Indus Valley.

The picture of Maldives which after the discovery of mystery of these islands by Thor now begins to emerge is of islands which far from being remote and insignificant form a crucial central point of early eastern, pre-European civilisations as they trade, emigrate, rise and decline. And they flourished within reed-ship sailing distances of each other, and perhaps even more distant places as well.

Thor Heyerdahl has unfolded a fascinating historical and archaeological detective story as he penetrated into the mystery of the Maldivian Past. *The Maldivian Mystery* is an exciting, eye-opening book absorbing in its details and in its broader scheme of ideas. It offers in itself a voyage of discovery and a discovery of voyages. It reveals the author's curiosity, determination, ingenuity and courage.

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Statements

SOUTH ASIAN REGIONAL COOPERATION

INDO-LANKA PACT ON RELIEF SUPPLIES

(15th June, 1987)

The following is the text of the joint communique on the agreement between Sri Lanka and India on relief supplies : Taking into account discussions between India and Sri Lanka from June 1, 1987 onwards : Motivated by the desire to provide relief supplies to Sri Lankan citizens on the Jaffna Peninsula.

“It was agreed on 15th June, between the Governments of India and Sri Lanka in Colombo that the following will be the modalities for despatch of relief supplies from the government and people of India to the Sri Lankan citizens on Jaffna peninsula.

1. Relief supply will be sent by Indian vessels up to Kankesanthurai. The Indian vessels will be unarmed. Prior to loading, relief supplies will be inspected by representatives of Indian Red-Cross and any representatives of Sri Lanka Government that it may choose to nominate.
2. The Government of India will convey in advance the routes that Indian vessels will take from ports in India to Kankesanthurai. The Sri Lankan Navy will escort these vessels when they enter Sri Lankan terri-

The Centre for South Asian Studies is grateful to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (Director SAARC) for providing material on South Asian Regional Cooperation.

torial waters, the Sri Lankan naval and port authorities concerned will make necessary arrangements to receive Indian vessels bringing in supplies.

3. Logistical arrangements for offloading of supplies at Kankesanthurai port, arrangement for their transport and distribution of goods to areas in Jaffna peninsula including the Vadamarachchi region, Tenamarachchi and Vallikanam west region and Jaffna city will be undertaken by the Government of Sri Lanka through the government agent, Jaffna, and the following agencies will be associated with the distribution of humanitarian aid.
 - (a) Six representatives of the Sri Lankan Red Cross including representatives of the Jaffna chapter.
 - (b) Six representatives of the Indian Red Cross.
 - (c) Representatives of the Jaffna multi-purpose co-operative societies.
 - (d) Two representatives of Government of India/Indian High Commission.

Precise tonnage description of relief supplies to be despatched by India will be decided mutually through normal diplomatic channels."

(Reproduced from *The Telegraph*, (Daily), Calcutta, June 16, 1987)

PAKISTAN-INDIA RELATIONS

Text of an agreement initiated by Indian and Pakistani Foreign Secretaries in Islamabad, March 2, 1987.

"1. The consultations were held in pursuance of para (x) of the Minutes of Consultations initiated in New Delhi on February 4, 1987 for discussion of further concrete measures for de-escalation along the border.

2. It was agreed that :

- (a) All defensive and offensive formations in the sector of Barmer-Chhor will commence return to their peacetime locations, which shall be completed within 15 days of the date of initiating of these minutes.
- (b) In the sector comprising Barmer-Chhor in the south and upto Hindu Malkot-Mandi Sadiqqanj in the north, all defensive and offensive formations will commence return to their peacetime locations from 16th March, 1987.
- (c) The pullout of troops will be undertaken in a graduated manner and will be monitored through regular contact to be maintained by the DsGMO of both sides.

3. For discussion of further de-escalation measures along the international border, a Pakistan delegation has been invited to visit New Delhi at an early mutually convenient date to be settled through diplomatic channels."

(Reproduced from *The Muslim*, (Daily), Islamabad, March 3, 1987)

REPORT OF THE EIGHTH SESSION OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE (JUNE 1987)

Introduction

At the invitation of the Government of the Republic of India, the Standing Committee held its eighth session in New Delhi from

16-17 June 1987 under the Chairmanship of Mr. K. P. S. Menon, Foreign Secretary of India and the leader of the Indian delegation. This session of the Standing Committee was held preceding the third session of the Council of Ministers.

Announcement of Contributions by Member States

In the general statements made by the leaders of the delegations in the Committee, some member countries made announcements of their financial contributions for SAARC programme activities. The latest position regarding the pledges of contribution is as follows :

Bangladesh :	Bangladesh Takas 7.5 million (1987-88).
Bhutan :	Bhutanese Nu 2 million (1987-88).
India :	Indian Rupees 15 million (1987-88).
Maldives :	Maldivian Rufiyaa 250,000 (1987).
Nepal :	Nepalese Rupees 7 million (1987-88).
Pakistan :	Pakistani Rupees 12.5 million plus Rupees 500,000 for scholarships (1987-88).
Sri Lanka :	Sri Lanka Rupees 5 million (1987).

Review of the Progress in the Implementation of the Integrated Programme of Action

The Committee reviewed the progress achieved in the implementation of the Integrated Programme of Action (IPA) since its seventh session held in Bangalore in November 1986. For the consideration of this item, the Committee had before it the report of the Technical Committees on their last meeting as well as the Report of the Programming Committee on its third session. Chairpersons of the Technical Committees presented their reports to the Standing Committee and drew its attention to the issues calling for its decision.

(a) Health and Population Activities :

The Committee noted the offer of short-term training fellowships to two nominees from each of the SAARC member countries from

the International Centre for Diarrhoeal Diseases Research, Bangladesh. It suggested that each member country take an early decision on this offer based on its national requirements and policies.

(b) *Local Costs of Servicing :*

The Committee considered the mode of financing the local costs of the services of experts deputed on short and long-term assignments to member countries which do not have the resources to meet such costs. It suggested that the present practice of the sending country paying for international travel cost and the host country providing local hospitality should continue. However, if a member country faced a problem in providing the local costs of such experts, it may take up the matter bilaterally with the sending country concerned.

(c) *Rural Development :*

The Committee considered the suggestion of the Technical Committee on Rural Development that it should be the coordinating agency for the proposed SAARC Youth Volunteers Programme. The Committee recalled that the scheme for the Programme, as worked out by the Meeting of Experts, envisaged no coordinating agency. It, therefore, did not see any need to designate one.

(d) *Telecommunications :*

The Committee approved the participation, in the Seminar-cum-Conference on Software Maintenance in Telecommunications, of four outside experts from international agencies identified in the Report of the Technical Committee on Telecommunications. It requested the host country to bear the expenditure on their participation. It decided that in case the host country was not able to meet the expenditure, then the international agencies concerned should be approached by the Technical Committee for assistance in the deputation of these experts.

The Committee considered the request of the Technical Committee on Telecommunications that in the case of its training

programmes, the criterion laid down that the projects/programmes included in the SAARC Calendar of Activities should be undertaken only if the host country got confirmation regarding the participation of the nominees of at least four member countries, in addition to the host country, should be waived. The Committee felt that there were wider considerations of an important nature which had led it to lay down this criterion. As these considerations still remained valid, the Committee saw no compelling reason to make a departure from it.

(e) Women in Development :

The Committee considered the suggestion of the Technical Committee on Women in Development for creating a Women's Cell in the SAARC Secretariat. The Committee felt that it was for the SAARC Secretariat to decide, in the light of its staff resources, as to the most effective manner in which it could maintain, coordinate and otherwise assist in the implementation of activities in different sectors coming under SAARC cooperation.

Report of the Programming Committee

The Committee considered and endorsed the report of the Programming Committee on its third session. It adopted the revised account of activities undertaken since November 1986 and the Calendar of Activities scheduled for 1987-88.

The Committee approved the measures recommended in paragraph 6, Section III of its report, for further processing the proposals for the establishment of regional institutions. It decided to consider these proposals in detail at its ninth session with a view to making appropriate recommendations to the Council of Ministers. For this purpose, it requested the Secretary-General to update his note on the question of the order of priority among proposed SAARC regional institutions.

The Committee endorsed all the recommendations contained in

Section II of the report of the Working Group on the Sharing of Institutional Costs of SAARC Regional Institutions. The Committee decided that the privileges and immunities to be accorded to professional staff members of a SAARC member country serving on deputation in another member country in a regional institution, should be the same as those admissible to the officers of UN organisations and specialised agencies located in the host country.

It further decided that the representative of the SAARC Secretariat would, in principle, be entitled to participate in the meetings of the Governing Boards of the SAARC regional institutions. Actual participation would be decided by the Secretary-General in each case, keeping in view the limitations of the staff resources of the Secretariat.

The Committee endorsed the recommendation of the Programming Committee contained in Section V of its report, on the establishment of a multi-sectoral investment institution.

The Committee took note of the revised Rules of Procedure of the report of the Programming Committee and decided that these Rules continue to be applied on a provisional basis.

The Committee considered paragraph 13 (a) of Section VII of the report of the Programming Committee concerning 'Draft Provisions relating to salaries, allowances and other entitlements of the Secretary-General and the members of the staff of the Secretariat, and revised these Provisions. The Committee decided that these Provisions should be applied with effect from 1st July, 1987 and should remain in force until the end of 1987. They would be reviewed by the Committee with a view to being finalised, at its ninth session, in the light of up-to-date figures on salaries, allowances, and other entitlements, to be furnished by the Secretary-General.

The Committee adopted the Staff Rules and Financial Regulations contained in the report of the Programming Committee.

The Committee decided to expand the functions of the Programming Committee. The expanded functions of the Committee will be as follows :

"The Programming Committee will assist the Standing Committee in matters relating to selection of regional projects, their location, cost sharing modalities among the member States, mobilisation of external resources and in such other matters as may be necessary. The Programming Committee will also determine inter-sectoral priority of work programme under IPA, and review the consolidated Calendar of Activities."

Report of the Meeting of Experts for Expanding and Strengthening Regional Cooperation

The Committee considered the report of the Meeting of Experts for Expanding and Strengthening Regional Cooperation held in New Delhi from February 23—26, 1987. It noted with appreciation that the Meeting had been able to concretise the five New Ideas approved, in principle, by the Heads of State or Government at the Bangalore Summit. It recommended that the Council of Ministers :

- (a) endorse the report of the Meeting of Experts ;
- (b) approve the following five schemes elaborated and concretised by the experts :
 - (i) SAARC Audio Visual Exchange ;
 - (ii) Organised tourism among SAARC member countries including facilities for limited convertibility of national currencies ;
 - (iii) SAARC Documentation Centre ;
 - (iv) SAARC Chairs, Fellowships and Scholarships ;
 - (v) SAARC Youth Volunteers Programme ;

(c) Fix the dates of commencement of the implementation of the schemes as follows :

- | | |
|--|--|
| (i) SAARC Audio Visual Exchange | Date of the opening of the Third SAARC Summit. |
| (ii) Organised tourism among SAARC member countries, including facilities for limited convertibility of national currencies, | 1-7-1988 |
| (iii) SAARC Documentation Centre | To be fixed later. |
| (iv) SAARC Chairs, Fellowships and Scholarships. | Academic year commencing in 1988. |
| (v) SAARC Youth Volunteers Programmes. | To be fixed later |

(d) Request the member Governments to initiate the necessary administrative actions, including the designation of focal points, where necessary, in order to enable the commencement of the implementation of the schemes on the dates suggested above and at the earliest possible dates for which no dates have been fixed ; and

(e) Request the member Governments to nominate as early as possible their representatives on the SAVE Committee, Programme Committee to review and monitor the progress of SAVE, and the Documentation Expert Committee as recommended in paragraph 12 of the Group of Experts on the SAARC Documentation Centre.

Report of the Group of Experts on Terrorism

The Committee endorsed and accepted the recommendations contained in the Report of the Second Meeting of the SAARC Group of Experts on Terrorism held in New Delhi from 18—20 March, 1987.

It recommended that the Council of Ministers call upon member States to take early measures to implement these recommendations, particularly by enacting/amending national legislations relating to extradition, taking into account the provisions of paragraph 4 of the Report.

The Committee also recommended that the Council of Ministers decide to convene a group of legal experts of SAARC member countries to prepare a draft regional convention on terrorism for consideration at the ninth session of the Standing Committee.

Establishment of a South Asian Food Security Reserve

The Committee considered the proposal for the establishment of a South Asian Food Security Reserve along with the text of a Draft Agreement establishing the South Asian Food Security Reserve.

The Committee recommended that the Council of Ministers decide to establish the South Asian Food Security Reserve and designate the SAARC Secretariat to function as the Secretariat for the Reserve. It further recommended that the Council of Ministers request the member States to examine the Draft Agreement and complete the necessary formalities with a view to signing the Agreement at the forthcoming Kathmandu Summit.

Letter from the Secretary-General of the SAARC Secretariat to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers regarding various aspects of the role of the SAARC Secretariat

The Committee considered the letter of March 30, 1987 from the Secretary-General of SAARC to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers on some aspects dealing with the role, power and the functions of the Secretary-General and the SAARC Secretariat. It recommended to the Council of Ministers to request the Secretary-General to prepare a comprehensive draft containing specific suggestions covering the various points raised in the letter. It further recommended that the Council of Ministers lay down the following

interim guidelines on the questions of dealing with different institutions under the UN system, regional bodies, voluntary organisations and countries outside SAARC :

“Regarding communications received by the Secretary-General from such bodies and individuals which intend to elicit information regarding SAARC, the Secretary-General has the authority to provide such information, as adopted and approved by member Governments. Each case of request for formal contact, cooperation, linkage or consultative status between outside organisations and countries should be submitted to the Standing Committee and the Council of Ministers. The Secretary-General should inform the requesting organisations that all initiatives for such linkage, contacts or consultative status would come from SAARC itself.”

Vote of Thanks

The visiting delegates thanked the Chairman for the warm welcome accorded to them and for the excellent arrangements made by the Government of India. They also expressed their appreciation to the Chairman for the excellent manner in which he conducted the proceedings.

COUNCIL OF MINISTERS : THIRD SESSION DRAFT REPORT

New Dehli : June 18—19, 1987

At the invitation of the Government of the Republic of India, the SAARC Council of Ministers held its third session in New Delhi from 18—19 June, 1987, under the Chairmanship of Mr. N.D. Tiwari, Minister of External Affairs of India and the leader of the Indian delegation.

The meeting of the Council of Ministers was inaugurated by Shri Rajiv Gandhi, the Prime Minister of India. On behalf of the Foreign Ministers of SAARC countries, Mr. Shailendra Kumar

Upadhyaya, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Nepal thanked the Prime Minister for his inaugural address.

The Council considered the report of the Standing Committee on its eighth session (document SAARC/SC.8/18/Rev. 1), commended the Committee for its work and endorsed the report. The Ministers also expressed their appreciation for the work of the Programming Committee at its third session.

The Council expressed its satisfaction at the tangible progress made in the implementation of the Integrated Programme of Action. They emphasized that SAARC should concentrate on concrete and action-oriented projects and programmes which could bring direct benefits to the people and that greater discretion should be exercised in the selection of activities in different sectors.

Views were expressed that there was an urgent need for cooperation in the field of mass media. Such cooperation could take a number of forms such as establishing a common SAARC news agency, instituting an annual SAARC award to a journalist from the region and greater involvement of media in SAARC.

In pursuance of the directives given by the Heads of State or Government at the Bangalore Summit, the Ministers undertook a review of the proposals for the establishment of regional institutions. They endorsed the recommendations of the Working Group on the Sharing of the Institutional Costs of Regional Institutions and the decisions taken by Standing Committee on the issues referred to it by the Working Group. The Ministers also endorsed the procedures laid down by the Standing Committee for expediting the processing of proposals for the establishment of regional institutions. They stressed that economy and optimum efficiency should be the twin criteria governing the establishment of such institutions. In this connection, they attached particular importance to the recommendation of the Working Group that regional institutions should be established in association with national institutions.

The Ministers expressed the hope that with the establishment of common criteria and procedures relating to the administrative structure and financing of regional institutions, it should be possible to establish some of the proposed regional institutions without much delay. At the same time, they recognised that the process of institution-building was, by its very nature, slow and required a thorough examination of all the implications if the institutions to be established were going to be viable and beneficial to all the member countries.

The Ministers endorsed the procedure approved by the Standing Committee for further considering the proposal for the establishment of a multi-sectoral investment institution.

The Council approved the Standing Committee's decision that the Rules of Procedure as revised by the Programming Committee at its third session, continue to be applied on a provisional basis.

The Ministers regarded the establishment of the SAARC Secretariat in Kathmandu as a land mark in the process of the consolidation of the institutional base of SAARC. They felt that measures should be taken to enable the Secretariat to discharge its functions effectively. They urged the member countries to assist the Secretariat in taking over the functions of monitoring and coordination of the implementation of SAARC activities presently done by member Governments.

The Council endorsed the Staff Rules and Financial Regulations approved by the Standing Committee and the decisions taken by the Committee on the "Draft Provisions relating to salaries, allowances and other entitlements of the Secretary-General and the members of the staff of the Secretariat."

The Ministers noted with satisfaction that the five New Ideas endorsed by the Heads of State or Government at the Bangalore Summit had been elaborated into concrete programmes. They were convinced that these programmes would play a significant role in bringing South Asian peoples closer. The enhanced interaction

amongst them would foster goodwill and trust which, in turn, would open new vistas of regional cooperation.

The Ministers accepted the recommendations contained in the report of the second meeting of SAARC Group of Experts on Terrorism. They called upon member States to take early measures to implement these recommendations, particularly by enacting/amending national legislations relating to extradition, taking into account the provisions of paragraph 4 of the report. They decided to convene a Group of Legal Experts of SAARC member countries to prepare a draft regional convention on terrorism for consideration at the ninth session of the Standing Committee.

The Council decided to establish the South Asian Food Security Reserve and designated the SAARC Secretariat to function as the Secretariat of the Reserve. It requested the member countries to examine the Draft Agreement annexed to document SAARC/SC.8/3/Rev. 1 and to complete the necessary formalities with a view to signing the Agreement at the forthcoming Kathmandu Summit.

The Ministers considered the letter of March 30, 1987 from the Secretary-General of SAARC to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers on some aspects dealing with the role, powers and the functions of the Secretary-General and the SAARC Secretariat. They requested the Secretary-General to prepare a comprehensive draft containing specific suggestions covering the various points raised in the letter. They laid down the following interim guidelines on the question of dealing with different institutions under the UN system, regional bodies, voluntary organisations and the countries outside SAARC :

“Regarding communications received by the Secretary-General from such bodies and individuals which intend to elicit information regarding SAARC. The Secretary-General has the authority to provide such information, as adopted and approved by member Governments. Each case of request

for formal contact, cooperation, linkage or consultative status between outside organisations and countries should be submitted to the Standing Committee and the Council of Ministers. The Secretary-General should inform the requesting organisations that all initiatives for such linkages, contacts or consultative status would come from SAARC itself."

The Ministers recommended to the Heads of State or Government of the Member countries that the third SAARC Summit in Kathmandu be held from 2—4 November, 1987.

The Ministers decided to hold the fourth session of the Council of Members in Kathmandu immediately prior to the third SAARC Summit.

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Chronology of Important Events of South Asian Region

January—June 1987

BANGLADESH

- January 1* Bangladesh and Qatar signed an agreement in Dhaka, aiming at strengthening already existing cooperation between the two countries regarding manpower.
- 4 Mrs. Hasina Wajid was unanimously re-elected as leader of the Awami League.
- „ The Foreign Ministry of Bangladesh was reported to have turned down Iran's request for support, to change the venue of the fifth OIC Summit from Kuwait.
- 6 Indian Foreign Minister Narain Tiwari arrived in Dhaka for talks with Foreign Minister of Bangladesh. (His visit was part of series of his visits to SAARC countries).
- 7 It was disclosed by officials at Dhaka that Bangladesh was "building a 34 meter long barrage on the River Tangan in northern Panachagar, bordering India, to irrigate 10,000 hectares of dry land with the aid of Asian Development Bank."
- 7 During a formal talk at Dhaka, the Indian and Bangladeshi Foreign Ministers, agreed to resolve their outstanding bilateral issues.
- 13 President Hussain Mohammad Ershad left for Jakarta on a first state visit to Indonesia.
- 16 Five people were killed and 11 wounded as a result of ethnic violence in Chittagong Hill Tracts.

The above Chronology has been prepared by Mrs. Musarrat Cheema, Research Assistant of the Centre.

- January 18* The Government of Bangladesh introduced the Death Penalty for smugglers.
- 21 The confronting tribesmen in Chittagong Hill Tracts declared to have direct negotiations with Bangladesh Government for solution of regional issues.
- 24 About 30 opposition leaders including Mrs. Khalida Zia were arrested on account of staging an anti-government street demonstration. (However, Mrs. Zia was released later).
- 25 President General Ershad left for Kuwait to attend OIC Summit meeting.
- 27 Yugoslavia agreed to furnish a \$70 million credit to Bangladesh for the purpose of financing development projects in the power and shipping sections.
- February 1* Regarding Iran's rejection of OIC Summit call for ceasefire in Gulf War, the Foreign Minister of Bangladesh, Humayun Rasheed Chaudhery termed it as 'unfortunate'.
- „ Over 500 Bangladeshi lawyers went on a two-day hunger strike, demanding the resignation of Chief Justice, A.F.M. Munim.
- „ Canadian Foreign Minister, Joe Clark, arrived in Dhaka on a five-day visit to Bangladesh.
- 8 The Bangladesh trade delegation led by Commerce Secretary, A.B.M. Ghulam Mustafa arrived on a week's visit in Islamabad.
- 9 The preliminary meeting of the 6th session of Pak-Bangladesh joint committee on trade was held in Islamabad.
- 12 It was announced by Anwar Hussaini, Power Minister, that Bangladesh would build a nuclear power plant near the Ganges river, north of Dhaka.
- 13 Buddhist rebels in Southern Chittagong Hill Tracts gunned down 12 Muslim Bengali settlers and wounded several others.
- 15 At least 13 people were killed and 100 people made homeless when tribal guerrillas attacked a remote village in the Chittagong Hill Tracts region.

- February 16* The opposition parties and alliances organised a nation-wide strike to protest against autocratic policies of the Government and to press for the resignation of President H.M. Ershad.
- 22 The outlawed Shanti Bahini guerrillas attacked a village in southern Bangladesh and, as a result, at least nine Muslim settlers were killed and ten injured.
- 24 It was reported that at least 50 persons were injured in an armed clash between two rival factions of the youth wing of the ruling Jatiya Party, at Chittagong Airport.
- 26 The Parliament adopted a Bill replacing English by Bengali in official work except for communication with other countries.
- March 1* In order to increase links between education, cultural and sports organizations, India and Bangladesh revived a cultural and academic exchange programme at Dhaka.
- 7 President Ershad signed the Bangla Language (Mother Tongue) Introduction Bill 1987, to ensure the use of Bengali in all spheres of life.
- 9 France's State Minister for Foreign Affairs, Diolier Brinai arrived in Dhaka for a three-day visit.
- 10 In an official statement, Bangladesh strongly protested against the presence of an Indian naval vessel in its waters off south western Khulna coast bordering Indian West Bengal.
- 11 The Indian frigate Vasco de Gama left Bangladesh territorial waters after the Bangladesh Government's protest.
- 12 Nasim Khan, leader of nearly a quarter million stranded Pakistanis in Bangladesh, threatened to fast unto death if the issue of repatriation of the Biharis was not taken up immediately.
- „ Romanian President Nicolae Ceausescu arrived in Dhaka for a three day official visit.
- 14 President H.M. Ershad inaugurated an Asian ministerial meeting of group of 77, in Dhaka.
- 24 Britain and Australia offered 129,250 tonnes of wheat to Bangladesh to help control spiralling cereal prices.

- March 26* Direct dialling between Bangladesh and India was introduced.
- April 3* The Bangladesh Government sanctioned development programmes costing \$100 million in the troubled south-eastern Chittagong Hill Tracts.
- 5 The second meeting of Bangladesh-Pakistan Joint Economic Commission began in Dhaka with a call, from the visiting Pakistan Finance Minister, for greater cooperation in the fields of trade and industries between the two countries.
- 6 India Bangladesh border talks ended without reaching a satisfactory solution on the return of 27,000 Chakma tribals to Bangladesh.
- 7 According to an agreement signed in Dhaka, Pakistan decided to sell 100,000 tonnes of rice to Bangladesh.
- 13 President H. M. Ershad, addressing a public rally in Dinajpur, alleged that the Farrakha barrage built by India across the river Ganges had starting turning the north of the country 'into a desert'.
- 17 Chakma guerrillas killed 13 Bengali speaking people in the south eastern Chittagong Hill Tracts.
- 18 Finance Minister M. Syeduzzaman left for Paris to attend the two-day Bangladesh aid group meeting, seeking \$1.9 billion aid for 1987-88.
- 22 The first-ever SAARC workshop on radio news to seek closer cooperation among its member states was opened in Dhaka. (More than 250 newsmen from SAARC countries participated).
- 25 Indian Foreign Secretary, at his arrival on a three-day visit to Dhaka, said that the figure of tribal refugees from Bangladesh into India had reached 50,000.
- 26 India and Bangladesh Foreign Secretaries began talks in Dhaka to settle bilateral differences.
- May 4* Bangladesh and India began their eighth meeting of the Joint Committee of Experts to find a solution to the disputed sharing and augmentation of common river waters.

- May 5* According to Ordinance issued by President H.M. Ershad it was made necessary to include one army officer on each 13-member district council.
- 6 President H.M. Ershad officially changed Bangladesh Industrial Laws to allow government owned industries to sell 40 per cent of their shares to private investors and workers.
- 8 The second meeting of the SAARC technical committee on women and development opened in Dhaka.
- 20 Under an agreement signed with Iran, Bangladesh would export jute goods worth over \$13 million.
- 25 Bangladesh officials during a meeting with the visiting Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister urged for the immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan.
- June 1* Under an agreement signed with Japan, Bangladesh would get a 21 billion Yen loan from Japan.
- 8 A year long strike of Senior Lawyers, against the government decision to decentralize the judiciary was called off.
- 10 Commerce Minister M. A. Munim disclosed that Bangladesh had signed an agreement with Iran to import 200,000 tonnes of crude oil.
- 12 Under a new industrial credit programme, World Bank would provide \$190 million to Bangladesh.
- 15 More than 12,000 lawyers hoisted black flags on court buildings and stopped work across the country, demanding independence of judiciary.
- 19 Large demonstrations were staged in Dhaka by the opposition leaders to protest against new taxes.
- 21 A seven-hour general strike was called on by the 21 major opposition parties against proposals for fresh taxes in the new national budget.
- 27 Bangladesh Foreign Minister told the visiting Foreign Minister of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus that although his country supported Turkish Cypriots at international forum, but it was against permanent division of Cyprus.

- June 29* Prime Minister Mizanur Rehman Choudhury dropped from the proposed budget some tax increase that had provoked opposition parties to call a national strike.
- 30* The fiscal 1987-88 budget was passed by the parliament with 206 opposition members staging a walkout.

BHUTAN

- June 8* Bhutan and Maldives jointly appealed to Sri Lanka to resolve their differences through negotiations.
- 11* NCNA reported that China and Bhutan were satisfied with the result of the fourth round of border talks held in Thimphu.

INDIA

- January 1* Sikh militants killed six people and wounded five others in the Indian State of East Punjab.
- 2* Indefinite curfew was clamped in Batala city in view of tensions following killings of at least six Hindus by the Sikh extremists.
- 3* India received the first batch of the most advanced Soviet MiG-29 interceptors.
- „* More than 2,500 people in Bombay were left homeless as fire in leaking diesel pipeline destroyed a slum area.
- 4* India received a Shipment of MiG-29s from the Soviet Union.
- 5* An indefinite curfew was enforced on part of Ahmadabad following clashes between Hindus and Muslims.
- 6* India signed a contract with the U. S. General Electric Company for 11F. 404 jet engines to power the proto-types of the country's first locally made fighter plane.
- 7* A resolution adopted by the Sikh militants congratulation, warned the government to withdraw the para-military Central Reserve Police from East Punjab, or be prepared for their protest action.

- January 7* Subha D. Singh, leader of Gurkha National Liberation Front (GNLF) in a statement, warned the government that any agreement of cooperation between the central government and the communist marxist government, of West Bengal to crush Gurkha land movement would be tantamount to putting Darjeeling on fire.
- 8 In Washington, A.P. Venkateswaram, Secretary of External Affairs, had a round of talks with Senior U.S. Officials. (It was reported that India had committed itself to U.S. military equipment purchase worth more than \$60 million).
- „ Nine people were shot dead in Punjab by suspected Sikh militants.
- „ Jethedar Darshow Singh, Chief priest of Akal Takht at the Golden Temple, demanded forthwith the withdrawal of Central Reserve Police Force from East Punjab.
- 12 BJP leaders in separate statements blamed the ineffectiveness of Barnala government for the collapse of law and order in Punjab.
- 14 Danish Premier reached New Delhi for a three-day official visit to India.
- 15 The Indian Army Chief, Gen. K K.K. Sundarji, in a press conference, disclosed that the Indian Army was making a comprehensive reappraisal of its state of technology in the context of requirements of modern warfare.
- 18 K. Natwar Singh, Minister of state for External Affairs, reached Moscow for a three-day official visit.
- 18 In a two-hour operation in the Golden Temple complex, 60 people were held including six top Sikh militants wanted for various murders.
- 19 Sikh extremists assassinated a leader of the Ruling Congress Party and seven other people in a new surge of terrorist attacks in East Punjab.
- 20 Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi said that Pakistan had massed troops along the Indian border.
- „ The Central Government sent more security forces to help Punjab and combat militants.

- January 20* Indian Foreign Secretary, A. P. Venkatswaram, tendered his abrupt resignation. (He was reported to have been publicly insulted by Premier Rajiv Gandhi).
- 21 2.5 million public employees in India went on a nation wide strike in protest of the proposal of selling state companies to the private sector.
- 21 Suspected Sikh militants killed another three people in East Punjab.
- 22 Indian government extended invitation to the GNLF Chief for talks on the Gurkha community's future status in India.
- 23 In an unprecedented move, the Indian Foreign Service Association adopted a resolution protesting the manner in which Rajiv Gandhi publically upbraided Foreign Secretary on 20 January.
- 24 India boycotted a Colombo Conference where international cooperation on Indian Ocean marine affairs was discussed.
- 29 Akali Dal Working Committee in East Punjab warned the SGPC to function according to the provisions of the SGPC Act or quit the office.
- 30 As a result of a clash between two communal groups, an indefinite curfew was imposed on certain parts of Ahmedabad in the Indian state of Gujrat.
- .. A local leader of ruling Congress party and two others were gunned down by suspected Sikh militants in East Punjab.
- 31 Indian and Pakistani Officials began high level talks to defuse tension on their borders where more than 250,000 troops faced each other in a state of preparedness.
- .. As a result of Hindu Muslim riots, about five persons were killed and 10 injured in Ahmedabad.
- February 1* Mr. J.N. Dixit, India's Ambassador to Sri Lanka was called to New Delhi for urgent consultation on the Island's ethnic conflict.
- 2 An indefinite curfew was imposed in Ujayan city, Madhya Pradesh, following eruption of communal violence.
- 4 Gurkha separatists temporarily suspended their campaign for a separate homeland, following assurances of full Indian citizenship.

- February 5* Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark, arrived in New Delhi, for a six-day visit to India.
- „ After series of intensive talks, “Islamabad and Delhi initiated an agreement pledging not to attack each other and providing for an initial pull-back along their border.”
- 6 The Indian Government, according to a Radio report, declared the Tribal National Volunteers (TNV) of Tripura state as unlawful.
- „ An Extradition Treaty was signed between India and Canada.
- 7 Mr. Abdul Wakil, Afghan Foreign Minister, arrived in New Delhi for two days visit to have talks with Indian leaders.
- „ Thousands of Gurkhas staged demonstrations for a separate state in north east India during a visit of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi.
- 9 Surjit Singh Barnala, the Chief Minister of East Punjab, refuse to resign rejecting an order of the five high priests of Sikhism.
- „ Six persons were killed of violence in the Indian state of Punjab.
- 11 Sri Lanka indicated that it would study the Indian proposals sent by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in a message on 10 February to control the bloody ethnic conflict.
- „ Punjab Chief Minister, Surjit Singh, was excommunicated by the high priests of the Sikh faith.
- 13 Manjeet Singh Khalsa, Chief of the self styled ‘Khalistan’ armed police, was killed in a police encounter.
- 14 At least four people were killed in a sudden eruption of violence in Ahmedabad.
- „ India and Soviet Union signed a protocol according to which both the countries would assist each other for providing tele-communication transit to the Third World countries.
- 15 Mr. Harbhajan Singh Sandhu, Agriculture Minister of East Punjab, was dismissed for having joined a new rival Sikh party.
- 18 Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's Congress Party suffered defeat at the hands of Mizo National Front (MNF) in the state elections to Mizoram Assembly.

- February 18* The Mizo National Front won 21 out of 34 State Assembly seats.
- 19 "India and Pakistan completed a pull back of troops from offensive positions along the frontier of the disputed Kashmir territory."
- 20 Suspected Sikh militants shot dead two people and injured three others in various incidents in East Punjab.
- " A huge rally of about 100,000 moderate Sikhs was staged in support of Barnala, in the East Punjab village of Longowal.
- " Mizoram was upgraded from an Indian Federal Territory to a State.
- March 1* India and Pakistan signed an accord to pull out 70 per cent of their troops deployed close to the borders.
- " Japan announced grant-in-aid of about 9.2 million US dollars to India for economic development and other projects.
- 2 The Soviet Deputy Minister for Defence and Commander-in-Chief of naval forces called on the Indian Defence Minister Mr. V. P. Singh.
- 4 The acting Jathedar of Akal Takht, Mr. Darshan Singh gave a call to the Sikhs to resort to a social boycott of Punjab Chief Minister Mr. Surjit Singh Barnala.
- " The Assam Chief Minister Mr. Prafulla Mahanta questioned the demand by the Congress for a greater Mizoram, when six of the seven Chief Ministers of the North-east, four of them belonging to the Congress, had rejected it outrightly.
- 7 India rejected Bangladesh contention of equitable sharing of river water common to both the countries.
- 12 The Burmese parliament ratified the Indo-Burmese agreement on a Maritime Boundary in the Andaman Sea, Coco channel and the Bay of Bengal previously signed on December 23 at Rangoon.
- 14 Indo-UK signed two agreements in New Delhi to provide an assistance of Rs. 215 crore as grant and project aid to India.
- " China called on India to stop rallies on its soil by Tibetan exiles protesting against Chinese rule in their homeland.
- " India sent her ex-Foreign Minister Dinesh Singh to Sri Lanka to resume India's mediatory efforts to resolve Sri Lankan ethnic problem.

- March 15* External Affairs Minister for India hoped that the Geneva talks under UN auspices would succeed in resolving Afghan issue.
- .. The All India Sikh Students Federation (Manjit Group) at the Hola Mohalla Festival at Anandpur Sahib warned that any Akali leader who attempted to reach an agreement with the Indian Government would meet the same fate as Mr. Harchand Singh Longowal.
- 18 The Minister of State for Defence Production told Lok Sabha that the Government has approved the setting up of two atomic power plants with a capacity of 235 MW each at Kaiga in Kerala and Rawatbhatta in Rajasthan.
- 19 India ruled out military intervention on behalf of Tamil separatists in Sri Lanka.
- 21 Soviet Union announced their willingness to sell super-computer to India but wanted details like safeguards and commercial aspects to be worked out on a government-to-government basis.
- 23 In West Bengal due to the boycott call of Gorkha National Liberation Front (GNLF) only 3 votes were cast in three Assembly constituencies of Darjeeling, Kalimpong and Kurseong.
- 30 It was announced in Moscow that the two Indian satellites would be launched by the Soviet Union.
- April 3* China virtually ruled out a settlement of its boundary disputes with India on the basis of historic treaties as it did in the case of Hong Kong and Macau.
- 4 Three-day Indo-Bangladesh talks on Chakma issue started in Dhaka.
- .. India and Angola signed an agreement in New Delhi for a credit of Rs. 10 crore to Angola to enable it to buy consumer durables and capital goods from India.
- .. The Government of India reconstituted [its Atomic Energy Commission. Mr. M. R. Srinivasan, Secretary Atomic Energy Department, was appointed Chairman of the eight-member Committee.

- April 7* Indian and West German officials concluded an agreement for \$326 million aid to India for energy, coal, steel, high-tech areas and development of mining and oil exploration.
- 12 The Indian Minister of Defence, Mr. V.P. Singh, resigned from the Government after a controversy over the multi-crore defence deal and the fairfax issue.
- 18-20 The Indian Minister of Defence Mr. K. C. Pant visited China and held talks with two Central Committee members on border issue.
- 22 India and Mexico signed a memorandum of understanding in New Delhi for exchange of information.
- 25 India and Soviet Union signed a protocol on cooperation in shipping.
- .. Chief Ministers of six non-Congress (I) states—Andhra Pradesh, Karnatkaa, Kerala, Punjab, Tripura and West Bengal—met at New Delhi to discuss common issues including the urgent need to re-structure centre—state relations and with an objective of eventually forging a national alternative.
- 27 India called the Sri Lankan Government to stop bombing and lifting of the blockade of Jaffna Peninsula.
- 28 The Tamil Nadu State Government sanctioned Rs. 14 crore for providing food, clothing and medicines to the Sri Lankan Tamils affected by the Island Government.
- 29 The Minister of State for Defence announced in Lok Sabha that India has indigenously developed and successfully tested a guided missile recently.
- May 4* The Indo-Afghanistan joint commission, in New Delhi, decided to establish direct banking arrangements, closer trading cooperation and intensifying their industrial cooperation.
- 6 China blamed Indian military personnel crossing the boundary and concentrating troops along it for military exercises.
- 7 The Indian Government envoy Mr. Acharya Sushil Muni and Akal Takht acting head-priest Mr. Darshan Singh chalked out a four point peace formula for East Punjab crisis in Amritsar.

- May 8* India warned Sri Lanka against involving outside forces in its pursuit of military solution to the ethnic problem.
- 11* President's rule was imposed on East Punjab with immediate effect. The 117 member State Assembly was suspended, the State Government of Mr. Surjit Singh Barnala was dismissed and the Director General of Police, Mr. J.F. Ribeiro, was given a free hand to deal with terrorism in the State.
- 12* The legislative party of the Akali Dal (Longowal) called the Centre's decision of presidential rule in the state as "un-democratic and in violation of the spirit of the Indian Constitution."
- 13* The US Secretary of State, Mr. George Shultz, in Washington urged New Delhi to use its good offices with Moscow to assist in the early withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan.
- .. The II non-Congress (I) like-minded parties appointed a three-member committee to evolve a common approach to choose the candidate for forthcoming presidential elections.
- 14* Goa became the 25th state in the Indian Union.
- 21* The Key Soviet Foreign Affairs advisor to Mr. Mikhail Gorbachov, Mr. Anatoly Dobrynin arrived in New Delhi on a week-long visit.
- .. Premier Rajiv Gandhi, in a letter to British Prime Minister, called for a joint approach from major Commonwealth countries to restore normalcy in Fiji and restore the constitutionally elected government of Dr. Timoci Bavadra.
- 25* The British Prime Minister, Mrs. Margaret Thatcher in her reply to Premier Rajiv Gandhi rejected Indian proposal for joint sanctions against the New Fijian regime.
- 27* The Government of India announced the termination of its agreement with the Fairfax group—the Private American Investigation Agency.
- 30* About 41 people, including women and children, were killed by armed extremists in Aurangabad district of Bihar.
- .. Dr. Gopal Singh was sworn in as the first Governor of Goa.

- June 3* The 19 Indian boats and a ship carrying humanitarian aid and media persons to Jaffna returned back at Rameswaram, as the Sri Lankan naval authorities did not allow them to enter into their territorial waters.
- 4 In a swift operation, transport aircrafts of the Indian Air Force escorted by Mirag-1000 fighter-bombers dropped relief supplies to the beleaguered Tamils in Jaffna peninsula in northern Sri Lanka.
- 5 The Telugu Desma Party, the Communist Party of India (Marxist) and the Janata Party announced a joint programme of action to create public awareness on scandals like the Bofors gun deal; the Fairfax issue and the submarines deal and, on state problems like pending projects.
- 6 At the end of the two-day plenary session of the Indo-Soviet economic, technical and scientific commission in Moscow, the two sides signed several protocols relating to energy, power, metallurgy and other areas.
- 7 In Haryana, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi said that President's rule would continue to operate in East-Punjab until terrorism was wiped out from the state.
- 9 A US Republican Congressman Mr. Jim Courter charged that the Naval base at India's Nicobar Island in the Indian Ocean, partially built with Soviet help was being used by Soviet Navy submarines.
- 13 About 5000 Bodo tribesmen of Assam under the banner of All-Bodo Students Union marched through the streets of Gauhati and held a rally at the Judges Field in support of a 'separate homeland' for the state's plains tribals.
- 11 Congress (I) decided to field the Vice-President Mr. R. Venkataraman as its candidate for the presidential elections on July 13.
- 14 The External Affairs Minister Mr. N. D. Tiwari reached Beijing on a three-day visit to China to discuss Indo-China border dispute.
- 15 Various tribal organisations, including the All-Bodo Students Union, the All-Rabha Students Union (ARSU) and All Mising Students Union jointly formed All-Assam Tribal

Students Union (AATSU) and called for a 24-hour strike in protest against the Assam Gana Parishad (AGP) Government's alleged anti-tribal policies.

- June 18* The Foreign Minister of Bangladesh, Mr. Humayun Rashid Choudhary after the inauguration of SAARC Council of Ministers meeting in New Delhi met with Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Foreign Minister N. D. Tiwari.
- 19 Premier Rajiv Gandhi bluntly refused to accept President Zia-ul-Haq's suggestion that the forum of the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation be used for sorting out bilateral problems between India and Sri Lanka.
- „ World Bank extended three loans to India totalling \$929 million for two projects in power sector and water supply and sewerage.
- 20 India and Nepal concluded an agreement to establish a joint commission to promote and coordinate economic cooperation between them.
- 21 The opposition parties of India adopted Mr. V. R. Krishna Iyer as their Presidential candidate for the forthcoming election.
- 25 The East Punjab Police and para-military forces in a pre-down swoop, on the 'Serai' area of Golden Temple Complex, rounded 130 persons; recovered some weapons and documents relating to extremist activities.
- 28 India and Soviet Union signed a time-bound scientific and technological programme in Moscow, encompassing all major fields of the two disciplines.
- 29 Former Chief Minister of East Punjab, Mr. Surjit Singh Barnala pleaded for a sincere implementation of the Anand Pur Sahib Resolution in the interest of removing the disruptive contradictions in the Indian polity.

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Notes to Contributors

Manuscripts, articles, book reviews and notes or letters on themes of contemporary or historical interest, with particular reference to South Asia, will be welcomed.

Manuscript should be clearly typed on one side of the paper only, and should be double-spaced. Two copies should be submitted.

Bibliographies and footnotes should be placed at the end of the article. Footnotes should be numbered consecutively, and bibliographies should be arranged alphabetically. Foreign words should be underlined.

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Utmost care should be taken to prepare statistical data for publication. All headings, columns, rows, symbols, units of measurement, periods, political and geographical areas, and sources should be clearly stated in each statistical table, instead of giving such explanations in the text.

Tables, maps, and diagrams should be numbered and given at the end of the article, each on a separate sheet of paper. They should be clearly drawn so that they are suitable for photocopying as submitted.

Abstracts

Authors should submit abstract of their articles, not exceeding 100 words. The first page of the paper should include the title of the paper as well as the name and institutional affiliation of the author.

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