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JULY 1988

## SOUTH ASIAN STUDIES

RAFIQ AHMAD

*Editor*

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# South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation : Why this Experiment cannot succeed ?

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INDIRA VIDYALANKAR

**Nations can either build trust or weapons, not both.**  
*(An old proverb)*

The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) is the newest entrant on the stage of regional alliances that have appeared on the international scene since the Second World War. These alliances are of many kinds, varying from the purely military ones to those that focus on trade arrangements exclusively, and some that are largely 'talking shops'. There are others which wear different hats on different occasions. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), European Economic Committee (EEC), the Warsaw Pact, the Organisation of American States (OAS), the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Regional Council for Development (RCD) are some of the many such regional arrangements. Some of them have been quite successful in achieving the ends that they set for themselves. This paper seeks to examine the pre-requisites of the success of some of these regional groupings and apply them to SAARC with the purpose of evaluating the chances of its success. It will use India's relations with Sri Lanka<sup>1</sup> in order to highlight the problems inherent in SAARC that inhibit it from achieving genuine regional cooperation.<sup>2</sup>



This paper proposes to take EEC, GCC and ASEAN as models of successful cooperative behaviour in their respective regions, viz., Western Europe, the Persian Gulf Area and South-East Asia respectively. Much research has already been done to evaluate the reasons for the success of the EEC and certain key variables have also been identified which have helped Kechichian analyse the GCC.<sup>3</sup> These variables are a summary of the writings of Joseph Nye, Deutsch, Ernest B. Haas and Philippe Schmitter put forward by them as hypotheses to be verified against similar arrangements. The very basic ingredients for successful regional cooperation in the case of the EEC have been industrialization, pluralism and democracy in addition to cultural, geographic, political and economic compatibility. Above and beyond these minimal conditions, commonly perceived external threat and an external military guarantee are additional factors that contribute towards successful regional cooperation. Once these conditions are met, differences of language, historical experience and style of government, etc., do not greatly affect compatibility.

Since the Second World War, Western Europe remains the most durable example of successful cooperation despite a long history of mutual antagonisms and rivalries culminating in two world wars. In other places, this fact alone should have inhibited any attempt to come together. Yet, the force of circumstance a commonly perceived external threat in the shape of menacing spread of communism and fear of the revival of fascism dictated the necessity of collective action. From Benelux to European coal and steel community and Euratom to a fulfilled European Economic Community, the countries of Western Europe took successive steps which widened and strengthened the network of regional cooperation and they have now reached a stage where they are almost at par with the United States in terms of economic prosperity. This perception of common good on the part of the members of EEC overcame the long engrained history of bilateral and multilateral rivalries. Britain, France, Netherlands, Germany, Italy, Spain, etc., which had gone to war



against each other as recently as five years ago overcame their mutual animosities in order to further their common good.

In addition to the force of circumstance, i.e., common perception of external threat, their physical security was underwritten by the United States in the form of a massive military commitment to NATO. EEC could therefore concentrate on the task of building regional cooperation. By extending its nuclear umbrella in addition to the physical presence of its conventional arms and personnel and pouring huge amounts of money in the form of economic aid under the Marshall Plan, the United States became the most vital external ingredient in fostering cooperation among the Western European countries. Therefore, even a brief examination of the success of the EEC suggests three categories of variables responsible for its success. The first category includes industrialism, pluralism and democracy as basic to regional cooperation. The second category includes a common perception of external threat. And the third category is the external guarantor of security.

The second important experiment in regional cooperation is the Association of South East Asian nations.<sup>4</sup> Unlike the EEC, ASEAN was formed with a politico-security objective, viz., serving as a bulwark against the expansion of Chinese communism. Of the three categories of variables, the common perception of external threat was the major binding force. In this article, P.K. Shee emphasizes the importance of this variable when he says that ASEAN was "a product of a combination of common fears and weaknesses, not of common strength." The fact that the member nations, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines and Singapore also agreed to strengthen economic cooperation served as an additional incentive toward regional cooperation. In their case, the first category of variables, viz., industrialism, pluralism and democracy, hardly applied. In addition, their cultural and political differences, which are many, could have proved an obstacle, yet, "despite differing aims and expectations and stresses and strains in their mutual relationship, ASEAN has survived because they realized how important it was to



keep it alive during a period of great uncertainty for the region" (emphasis added). They have had several notable achievements in the direction of closer regional cooperation. These include the creation of greater understanding and goodwill, a high degree of economic cooperation and political adjustments in the light of the changing environment.

Like the EEC, the success of ASEAN is under-written by the large scale military presence of the United States in the area. In other words, the security of the ASEAN is guaranteed by an external power. It is clear that although the first category of variables does not apply in this case in toto, what is similar is the regime type and the level of economic development. This similarity serves the same purpose as industrialism, pluralism and democracy serve in the case of Western Europe. In other words, the categories of variables identified in the case of EEC are also applicable in the case of ASEAN.

The third successful experiment in the field of regional cooperation is the Gulf Cooperation Council. Its members, Kuwait, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Oman and Saudi Arabia came together in the face of an exceedingly destabilizing external environment, which was a result of the Iranian revolution, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war. The Gulf Cooperation Council states share a common religion, similar political systems (monarchy and Emirdom), economies based on petroleum and many other similar characteristics. In addition, the third category, viz., external guarantor of security also applies insofar as the United States has committed itself through the Carter Doctrine to protect the security of the Gulf area militarily, if the need arises. The strengthening of its military presence, first in the form of the Rapid Development Force and later the creation of the Central Command, envisages a long term commitment to the stability of the area. In any case, the GCC, is expected "to serve the twin purposes of cooperation and coordination in all fields, including security."

Once again, here is a successful example of regional cooperation



which satisfies the three categories of successful cooperation. The GCC, states share similar regime types and economic systems, they share a common perception of external threat and their security is underwritten by a firm military commitment by the United States. It reinforces the earlier conclusion that for regional cooperation to be successful, economic harmony has to be supported by similarity of perception viz-a-viz the external environment and an external guarantor of security. In other words, successful economic cooperation is a defensive mechanism which reinforces common security perceptions. It must be born in mind, however, that common security perceptions alone are an insufficient criterion for regional cooperation because, Central Economic National Treaty Organization (CENTO) and South-East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO)—both defence arrangements against a commonly perceived threat—became defunct once the nature of the external threat underwent a change. Thus multifaceted regional cooperation seems to be a more profitable and successful response (in terms of economic prosperity and regional security) to a commonly perceived external threat.

This rather long discussion of the pre-requisites of successful regional cooperation lead to the inevitable question—what about SAARC? The question is pertinent in the face of the fact that there are contradictions in its organization itself, not to mention its goals. In the first place, India is larger than all the other constituents put together. They all have dissimilar regime types : three democracies, two monarchies and two military regimes. Although they are generally referred to as developing countries, the level of economic development is grossly dissimilar. Among the members of SAARC, the Indian economy is the most developed and diversified, while Bhutan, Nepal and Maldives are really underdeveloped. The common perception of external threat category does not apply at all so far as Pakistan, Sri Lanka (the Indo-Sri Lanka accord notwithstanding) and Nepal regard India (a fellow constituent) as a most important threat to their security. The condition of a common external guarantor of security does not arise also as there is no external



guarantor of security. In fact, Pakistan and Sri Lanka have perpetually looked for outside support—from wherever it has been available—to ensure their security against India's hegemonistic intentions. Nepal turns to China frequently to counter India's 'highhandedness'. The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation therefore presents an anomalous case in the aforementioned pattern of regional cooperation.

The SAARC nations share contiguous geographical features and have had a similar historical experience. All the countries of SAARC, except Maldives, are part of the Indian subcontinent and until recently (till India's partition and independence) were part of the same political system, viz., the British Empire. Although nominally independent, Bhutan and Nepal were also under the effective tutelage of the British government. These similarities could potentially form an initial basis for cooperation, but the bitterness following the partition has long inhibited any kind of normal political diplomatic interaction between the successor states.<sup>5</sup> And Sri Lanka, right from independence, chose to retain a strong link with Britain as a hedge against India's possible hostility. In fact, at the time of independence, the government of Sri Lanka (then Ceylon) signed two crucial agreements with the British government in the fields of external affairs and defence which gave Britain the right to use Sri Lanka's bases, train its armed forces and provide military assistance in the event of an external threat. To the then Ceylonese Prime Minister, D.S. Senanayake, the British connection meant 'a counterforce against India'. Visualizing a distant future when India, under a different [leadership, might turn aggressive, the Ceylonese government felt that Ceylon would be safer under British tutelage.<sup>6</sup>

Even though this close connection with the British ceased to be important with the change of government in Sri Lanka, in 1965-66 under the leadership of SWRD Bandaranaike, and Sri Lanka moved toward a position of neutrality, the suspicion of India's potential hostility did not fade out. So, the Sri Lankan government, during the tension between India and Pakistan in 1971, allowed Pakistan to



refuel its aircraft that flew around India when she stopped Pakistani overflights. Also, Sri Lanka permitted the Voice of America to use its territory for propaganda broadcasts. Trincomalee was open as a refueling base for American ships, thereby bringing superpower presence to the Indian Ocean. And recently, she has sought external help to train its armed forces. Seen together, all this does suggest that for Sri Lanka, the external threat seems to come from its nearest neighbour and therefore it is within its rights to take steps to secure itself against the threat of aggression.<sup>7</sup>

To the outside, particularly Western, observers of India's diplomatic maneuvers, especially since 1971, it appears that either India has been given the role of policing its backyard by the Soviet Union and it is going about that task like a local bully, or, that after successfully intervening in Pakistan's troubles in East Pakistan, it is bent upon imposing its regional leadership on its smaller neighbours. The really small ones, Bhutan and Maldives, do not have much of an option but to agree to India's advice,<sup>8</sup> but Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka do not expect to take India's highhanded behaviour without protest. Pakistan successfully exploits America's paranoia with regard to Soviet Union's expansionist intentions and gets all kind of military assistance. Whether this continuous and increasing military aid can successfully counter Soviet aggression is open to debate, but it definitely enables Pakistan to feel secure and the equal of India in military preparedness. Similarly, Nepal does not take kindly to India's offers of assistance since that would make it totally dependent on India and subject to constant interference. It has, therefore, developed good relations with China as a counter to India's influence. At the moment, Bangladesh is too involved in its domestic problems to make overt gestures against India, which is not to say that there are no problems between the two—the alleged atrocities against the Chakma tribesmen, who have been fleeing to India, equitable distribution of river waters, and India's alleged support to opposition groups, to name only a few but their magnitude has not sufficiently increased for Bangladesh to seek outside assistance.



Where do these suspicions and animosities leave the prospect of regional cooperation? As things stand, the prospect is rather dim because that vital ingredient for successful cooperation trust is missing. At the Dhaka summit of SAARC leaders, President Jayawardene threw the ball firmly in India's court when he said, "India can, by words and deeds, create the confidence necessary to make a beginning." One might be tempted to believe that Sri Lanka agreed to 'trust' India and therefore signed the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord last July, but it is now becoming clearer that Jayawardene agreed to the Accord only when it became obvious that no substantive outside assistance would be available to deal with the Tamil separatists. Also, under the Accord, he could get the Indian armed forces (under the nomenclature of the peacekeeping force) to do the dirty job of finishing off the Tamil militants (that his own forces could not do in four years and were being branded as butchers) for him. The letters exchanged between Prime Minister Gandhi and President Jayawardene are being touted by India's foreign policy makers, as a major triumph in gaining not only Sri Lanka's acceptance of India's dominant role in the region but also of the superpowers, and of the EEC members, as they were most likely to criticize India's intervention in Sri Lanka's domestic affairs.<sup>9</sup> It is also for the first time since 1971, that the Indian armed forces have been used overtly to pursue diplomatic ends.

A cursory survey of SAARC's achievements so far suggests that it has definitely emerged as a forum where the leaders of the region can meet to sort out bilateral and multilateral tensions and actively search for channels of effective cooperation. There is also a recognition among analysts that, "it has the potential of accelerating the developmental process through mutual socio-economic and cultural cooperation directed toward self-reliance."<sup>10</sup> But in substantive terms, the result so far has been disappointing. Although the leaders have met thrice, they have agreed to foster cultural exchanges, create a zone of food security, exchange information on meteorology, cooperate on the suppression of terrorism—all of which could as well



have been accomplished without the formality of SAARC. In the right setting, these achievements could promote greater understanding, but in the context of great mutual suspicion, they cannot accomplish much in the direction of successful cooperation. Media coverage of the third summit meeting in Kathmandu indicated that considerable differences of opinion prevailed on several issues—notably, the admission of Afghanistan and the communique on terrorism, etc.—signifying a wide divergence of perceptions. The Pakistani delegation implied that India was trying to turn SAARC into a bunch of yesmen, which was clearly unacceptable to Pakistan.

It is obvious from the foregoing discussion that the degree of success that SAARC can achieve will be dependent on India's commitment to the idea of regional cooperation. It cannot pursue a policy of regional dominance and regional cooperation at the same time. In the pursuit of its goal of regional dominance, it is compelled toward courses of action that are non-conducive to fostering trust. The presence of India's armed forces—even at the invitation of the Sri Lankan government itself is an ample signal to India's neighbours that should its interest dictate the necessity, India would not hesitate to use the same again.<sup>11</sup> Also, if Indian agents could train the Mukti Bahini and the Lankan Tigers for Tamil Ealam, what's to prevent others from doing the same for Khalistani terrorists, while officially being signatory to the suppression of terrorism communique ?

The onus and initiative for greater and more meaningful cooperation must lie with India which has to 'by words and deeds' show its neighbours that it does not harbour hostile intentions against them. It cannot take refuge behind the specious plea that the modernization of its own armed forces is a response to threats emanating from the neighbourhood, but the acquisition of sophisticated weapons by the neighbours signifies hostile or aggressive intentions. It must take the neighbours into confidence on all matters affecting their interests. The building of trust is a long and tedious process and the initiative and effort in that direction must

come from the largest constituent of SAARC. Once that basic condition is met, all other dimensions of cooperation can become meaningful. But until that can happen, SAARC is doomed to remain a weak experiment which goes through the formality of cooperation without becoming the vital and vibrant forum of multifaceted cooperation that it can be.

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4. P.K. Shee, "A Decade of ASEAN, 1967", *Asian Survey*, August, 1977.
5. The complexity of the Pakistan-Bangladesh issue is being dealt within a separate paper.
6. Lucy M. Jacob, *Sri Lanka*, New Delhi, NPH, 1973, Chapter I.
7. When at the height of the Sri Lankan armed forces action against the Tamils, and the blockade of Jaffna, President Jayawardene sought the Assistance of the US, Britain and Pakistan against India's imminent aggression, recalling India's action in East Pakistan in favour of the Mukti Bahini in 1971.
8. The fate of Sikkim, which India annexed in 1975, is not at all lost on any of its neighbours.
9. There has been widespread comment on India's design for regional dominance in the Indian media. See in particular articles on the subject appearing in *India Today*, December 15, 1987 and *The Statesman*.
10. S. Viswam, *World Focus*, November-December, 1986.
11. After all, even though the provocation was grave, India did interfere in Pakistan's internal affairs and annexed Sikkim like any other 'imperial' power of the past.



# The Junagadh Affair and the Hyderabad Case : The Rule of Power

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SULTANA AFROZ

The question of the accession of the three princely states of Junagadh, Hyderabad and Kashmir was the cause for much friction between Pakistan and India at the time of the Partition. By August 15, 1947, only these three out of about 565 princely states of the British Indian Empire had not acceded to either India or Pakistan.<sup>1</sup> Prior to British withdrawal, the internal administration of each of these princely states was in the hands of a local prince. The British government, however, was the paramount power, controlling the diplomatic and military affairs of these Indian states. The Indian Independence Act of June 1947 provided that on the withdrawal of British power "the Indian states would resume their independence."<sup>2</sup> In the British position during the debates leading upto the passage of the Indian Independence Act, there were strong exhortations, however, that the states accede to either India or Pakistan and not attempt separate existence as a long range proposition.<sup>3</sup> Lord Mountbatten, the last Viceroy of British India and India's first Governor-General, addressing the Chamber of Princes on July 25, 1947, advised the Princes to accede to India or Pakistan, bearing in mind the geographical contiguity of the State to the Successor Dominion, the communal composition of the State, and the holding of a plebiscite if necessary to ascertain the will of the people.<sup>4</sup>

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**The Junagadh Affair**

A most delicate situation, and one which adversely affected relations between the Dominions of India and Pakistan had arisen from the announcement on September 15, 1947 of the cession to Pakistan of Junagadh by its Muslim ruler. The case of Junagadh has been regarded by Allen Campbell-Johnson, Press Attache to Lord Mountbatten, as significant for the precedent it set.<sup>5</sup> Eighty per cent of Junagadh's population of 800,000 were Hindus and situated in the Kathiawar Peninsula of Western India, the state is separated from Pakistan by several hundred miles of sea. Under the terms of the Instrument of Accession, the Nawab of Junagadh retained his sovereignty unimpaired but such fields of activity as foreign affairs, defence and communications were entrusted to the government of Pakistan. By his action the principles of geographical contiguity and communal majority as suggested by Lord Mountbatten were both violated. The adherence of Junagadh to Pakistan caused much recentment in India. Indian troops entered and took over the State in early November. Later, a plebiscite confirmed popular acceptance of this action in favour of India.

Junagadh received the intermittent attention of the Security Council during the spring of 1948. Security Council action was limited by the general feeling that the accession of Junagadh to India was not of sufficient importance to justify distracting the Council from the more pressing issues including Kashmir.<sup>6</sup>

Through its diplomatic personnel stationed in India and Pakistan, the US government was fully aware of the Junagadh controversy, of the pressure brought on Junagadh by the Indian government and of possibilities for serious friction between the governments of India and Pakistan. Diplomatic sources, however, do not suggest any US interest in the issue. According to Charles W. Lewis, American Charge d' Affairs in Pakistan, "the problem was definitely and permanently terminated by India's action."<sup>7</sup> Likewise, the British government, as Malik Firoz Khan Noon, Prime Minister of Pakistan, regretfully said, "did not turn a hair on this occasion".<sup>8</sup> Pakistan



alone condemned the action and regarded the Indian occupation as an unwarranted violation of Pakistan territory."<sup>9</sup>

### **The Hyderabad Case**

The case of Hyderabad was similar and caused much bitter contention and strain. Hyderabad, with an area of over 82,000 square miles and situated in the heart of India, had a Hindu majority population but a Muslim ruler, known as the Nizam who desired to preserve a limited measure of independence for Hyderabad. He did not wish to accede either to India or Pakistan but wanted a special treaty relationship with the government of India. With Lord Mountbatten's diplomatic support, the Indian government was able to influence the Nizam to enter into a Standstill Agreement with India on November 29, 1947. Thereafter, the Indian government complained that Hyderabad violated the Standstill Agreement morally and physically, sponsoring serious acts displaying her status as an independent nation.<sup>10</sup> Hyderabad was accused of flouting the spirit of the agreement in three areas : in foreign affairs by intrigues with Pakistan, with whom the State arranged a loan of Rs. 20 million (£ 15,000,000) ; in defence, by building up a semi-private army ; and in communication by interfering with traffic at the borders and even with traffic by rail. On the other hand, Western observers noted that Hyderabad was exposed to violent intimidation, such as threats of invasion and to a crippling economic blockade by India.<sup>11</sup> In August 1948, the government of Hyderabad in reliance on Article 35 (2) of the Charter of the United Nations appealed to the Security Council. It informed the Council of the existence of a grave dispute between Hyderabad and India which, unless settled in accordance with International law and justice, was likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.<sup>12</sup>

In reply to enquiries from the United States, the Netherlands, Canada and a few other nations on the Security Council regarding the status of Hyderabad, the British government said that it was technically one of independence after the British withdrawal no



August 15, 1947. However, the situation had been altered on November 29, 1947 with the conclusion of a Standstill Agreement between Hyderabad and India.<sup>13</sup> Under the agreement, for a period of one year, Hyderabad assigned to the government of India the conduct of its foreign relations and matters of common concern (including defence and communications) which were formerly exercised by the British Crown. The United Kingdom government, therefore, maintained that while the Standstill Agreement remained in force, the 'limitations' thereunder on Hyderabad's independence disabled it from being regarded as a 'State' for consideration under the terms of Article 35 (2) and accordingly that the Security Council could not deal with appeal made by the Hyderabad representation.<sup>14</sup>

Furthermore, the British government considered the dispute between Hyderabad and India as a 'domestic' issue because of the existence of the Standstill Agreement whereby India was to exercise control over the external relations of Hyderabad.<sup>15</sup> The same view of the status of Hyderabad during the currency of the Standstill Agreement had been taken by the US government. In July 1948, the Nizam in a letter despatched to President Truman sought American mediation to solve the problem between Hyderabad and the government of India. In August, the US government sent a negative reply to the Nizam through the government of India. By sending the reply to the Nizam through the Indian government, the United States government showed that they were taking the same view as the British with regard to the implications of the Standstill Agreement on the conduct of Hyderabad's external relations. Messages sent from the United Kingdom delegation at the UN to the British Foreign Office confirm that the United States, the Netherlands, and Canada "on the whole . . . incline towards view with which [UK] agree [s]."<sup>16</sup>

Some Muslim countries of the Middle East expressed a desire to mediate in the dispute. Syria offered mediation through the Arab League but was discouraged by the UK government as the latter believed that because of the existence of the Standstill Agreement



the dispute was a domestic one, and that "no necessary basis for mediation existed."<sup>17</sup> Persia (present Iran) and Saudi Arabia were anxious to associate themselves with the cause of Hyderabad, but declined to take the initiative. Iraq did not want to antagonize India since it was eager to get Indian support for the Palestinian issue. There was the possibility of Pakistan actively supporting the Nizam by extending military help. Fear of communal fighting in Pakistan by Sikhs and interference by tribes in the North West Frontier Province and Baluchistan, however, prevented Pakistan from intervening directly.<sup>18</sup>

While Hyderabad's complaint was still pending before the Security Council, on September 11, 1948, Indian troops marched into the state. US Secretary of State George Marshall expressed the view that on historical, economic and ethnological grounds, and for security and stability of the subcontinent, the United States government preferred Hyderabad's accession to the government of India on 'equitable terms' to either complete independence or accession to Pakistan. The Secretary, however, regretted the use of force by India for an ultimate solution particularly in view of the provision of the Standstill Agreement governing the conduct of relations between India and Hyderabad. Marshall failed to focus attention on the obligations of India under the Standstill Agreement concerning Hyderabad. Nevertheless, he stressed that the agreement does not "confer any right on the Indian Dominion to send troops to assist the Nizam in maintenance of internal order nor to station troops in Hyderabad except in wartime." Marshall advised that Hyderabad's future status should be referred to direct [plebiscite] vote of people under international supervision or observation.<sup>19</sup> The complaint of Hyderabad to the Security Council was withdrawn by the government of India on September 28, 1948. According to British Foreign Office documents, Hyderabad never had any right to make a complaint. There was never any dispute or situation endangering international peace nor any act of aggression by India.<sup>20</sup> However, the Hyderabad case failed to serve as a useful precedent for Kashmir which was not considered by the UN members as a



domestic dispute. Kashmir was geographically contiguous to Pakistan and 77 per cent of its population were Muslim. Above all, it had entered into a Standstill Agreement with Pakistan on August 15, 1947. It was obvious then that any dispute between Pakistan and Kashmir while the Standstill Agreement was in operation would be considered as a 'domestic dispute'. However, when trouble broke out in Kashmir between the government of Hindu Maharaja Hari Singh and the Muslim Kashmiris assisted by Pakistani Pathan tribes, the situation gained international recognition with India's sponsorship in the Security Council rather than being dismissed as a 'domestic dispute.'<sup>21</sup>

### Conclusion

The rule of power was affirmed both in Junagadh and in Hyderabad. His Majesty's government and the Truman administration aimed to "retain the friendship of both Dominions and to prevent tension between them."<sup>22</sup> However, geopolitics of the time dictated the choice of political expediency rather than fair play and justice by these two Western powers. Faced with the urgent problems of postwar rehabilitation and reconstruction of Western Europe, with Greece, Turkey and Iran encountering a Soviet threat, and with the Arab-Israel conflict, neither the UK nor the US could afford to incur Indian enmity by supporting the weaker Dominion against the stronger.<sup>23</sup>

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# Culture, Age at Marriage and Fertility in a Village of Bangladesh

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## **Abstract**

*This paper is an attempt to discuss the age at marriage and fertility associated with the existing culture in terms of customs, beliefs and value systems prevailing among the people in rural Bangladesh irrespective of religiosity. Age structure of marriage of the 'eligible spouses' and their age specific fertility have also been examined. The main focus of this paper is on how far the culture is associated with the early age of girls at marriage and its implication for human fertility. This paper also suggests a model for reduction of age at marriage of the girls for their low fertility in rural Bangladesh.*

## **Introduction**

Marriage is one of the social institutions in human society. It is regulated for maintenance of legal sexual relationship and

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reproduction of legitimate children. But to understand the age at marriage and fertility of any spouse, we must know something about their culture. The concept of culture is used widely in the discipline of anthropology and sociology with variety of meanings. It may refer to a people's way of life, their way of looking at the world, their role in it, their values, i.e., what they consider as 'good' and 'evil' in their collective beliefs ; what they consider as 'true' and 'false' in their artistic expression, and what they consider as 'beautiful' and 'ugly' in their daily functioning. But the concept of culture is confined here to the existing arrangements of customs, beliefs and value systems associated with the age at marriage and fertility practised by the people as members of their respective society. On the other hand, the concept of age at marriage specifies here at what ages people get married. But the concept of fertility is meant actual live-birth of a woman or group of women, or a couple or group of couples in the village under study.

Age at marriage is one of the important factors as it is directly related to fertility, especially in the societies where contraceptives are not regularly practised (Coale and Tye, 1961 : 631). In many societies people are marrying later to allow time for education or to be sure of an income before marriage. The age at marriage determines the actual and effective reproductive life span. In researched village as well as in rural Bangladesh, there is a strong pressure on marriage at the pubertal age of girls who have little control over the decision (Jahan, 1976 : 18-19). As a result, their child-bearing potentiality continues unabated almost whole of the fertile period. The main focus of this paper is on finding out the age structure of marriage of the 'eligible spouses' and their age specific fertility in relation to their existing customs, beliefs and value systems prevailing in the village under study.

### **Physical Setting**

Matiara is an interior multi-religious village of Comilla district situated 12 kilometers away in the north-eastern corner of the Comilla district town ; 11 kilometers away by metalled motorable



road on the way to Chittagong Divisional town and the rest 1 kilometer is mud road. The northern side of the village is Roypur, a village near Matiara. On the southern side there is a metalled motorable road on the way to Chittagong-Dhaka city. On the western side is Nolchar, a village near Matiara and on the eastern side is Chittagong road. The village is not built according to any definite plan. It is divided into three *paras* (hamlets) : Paschimpara is situated on the western side of the village; next is Purbapara which is situated on the eastern side and the Daskhinpara is situated on the southern side of the village. There is a primary school, a *madrasa* (Muslim religious educational institution) and a Intermediate College at Choura Bazar near the village.

### Population

The total population of Matiara is about 795, of which 415 are males and 380 females. Out of the total population of 795 persons ; 79.62 per cent are Muslims and 20.28 per cent are Hindus. Among the Muslims 52.29 per cent are males and 47.71 per cent females. Among the Hindus 51.16 per cent are males 48.14 per cent females. It appears that the males are more in number than the females among both the Muslim and the Hindu population. Agriculture is the main occupation of the people of Matiara. About 71.3 per cent people depend on cultivation of land either directly or indirectly as farmers and wage labourers. Excepting two, all females are involved in household work. About 44.74 per cent have studied upto primary school. Only 9.02 per cent have Secondary School Certificate, Higher Secondary School Certificate, Graduate and Post Graduate level of education. The percentage of female literacy is very poor.

### Methods

Both survey and observation methods have been used to collect information. The questionnaires have been drawn up into two phases : one is to collect basic information from every household of the village, which is usually interviewed by the head of the



household. The second phase of the questionnaire was administered separately to collect information on fertility of every married man and woman, i.e., 84 spouses. It should be noted that 84 spouses have been selected on the basis of purposive random sampling to get information from both the religious groups. At the time of data collection emphasis has been given on observation method about the reliability of the survey data. Information from the questionnaire was supplemented by the indepth interview with the key informants.

### Age at Marriage

Age at marriage is an important factor for determining fertility, where births are confined to marriage. In Bangladesh the minimum legal age of marriage was 18 years for males and 16 years for females but now it has been raised to 18 years for females and 21 years for males by government circular. But it should be noted that no one in the study area knew this prescribed age of marriage given by the government. As there is no national system of vital events registration and problem checking the age at the time of registration, this law in itself has little effect. A table is given below to give a clear picture about the age at marriage of 84 spouses of the village under study.

TABLE 1

Age Structure of Marriage of both the Husbands and Wives of Matiara

| Sex<br>Age at Marriage | Husband<br>(N=42) | Wife<br>(N=42) | Total<br>(N=84) |
|------------------------|-------------------|----------------|-----------------|
| 9—11                   | —                 | 3              | 3               |
| 12—14                  | 1                 | 15             | 16              |
| 15—17                  | 1                 | 16             | 17              |
| 18—20                  | 7                 | 8              | 15              |
| 21—23                  | 11                | —              | 11              |
| 24—26                  | 9                 | —              | 9               |
| 27—29                  | 6                 | —              | 6               |
| 30—32                  | 7                 | —              | 7               |
| Mean age               | 24.2              | 15.1           | —               |



The mean age at marriage is 24.2 for males and 15.1 for females. The difference of age at marriage between the husbands and the wives is about 9 years. It indicates that wives have wide scope to continue their child bearing almost whole of their fertile period. The mean age at marriage of the females is strikingly lower in comparison with legal minimum age of marriage. On the other hand, the average age of male marriage is comparatively higher than the minimum legal age at marriage. This probably indicates that in order to get married a man is sometimes required to improve his financial position. Besides, if an unmarried man has a marriageable sister in his family he has to wait upto her marriage. It is one of the moral obligations of males in the study area as well as in Bangladesh, i.e., until and unless the completion of marriage of marriageable females in the family a marriageable male usually does not get married, because marriage of a female is very difficult than that of a male in Bangladesh. As a result early marriage of girls in the village as well as in rural Bangladesh is universal.

### Early Marriage

Early marriage is a common phenomena especially for the girls in the village under study. Girls who attain puberty are objects of great anxiety and care of the parents. The practice of traditional early marriage in Matiara as well as in rural Bangladesh have certain functional features, apart from preventing illicit sex and illegitimate birth. The female chastity is highly praised in our society irrespective of religiosity. To protect the chastity of their daughters the guardians arrange early marriage. To quote a Muslim farmer :

Girls should be married at the age of 13 or 14 when they attain their puberty. By this time they know about husband, family and their role in the husband's family. If the girls remain unmarried beyond then there is possibility of going to *kupath* (evil path).

Early marriage also reduces the economic burden involved in supporting daughters particularly in disadvantaged families. Besides,



a very young girl could be married off with less dowry and ornaments. Unmarried girls are social and economic liabilities, because of dowry and other requirements, and this may enhance with the increase of age of the girls. Early marriage increases the period over which a female can produce male heirs for group into which they are married. Moreover, it assures maximization of procreation and helps to remove stigma of barrenness (Nag, 1975 : 296). It has been observed during the field work that the aged parents try to arrange marriage for their daughters at an early age because in case of their death they do not like to create burden for their sons and on others, on whom the girls have to depend after their death. Early marriages are arranged to please elderly grand parents who insist on seeing the marriage of grand-children before their death.

It has been observed that the guardians among the Hindus arrange their daughters' marriage earlier to protect them from conversion to Islam. Because the Muslims are not only numerically but also economically and politically dominant in Bangladesh. It has been reported by a respondent that two Hindu girls got married to the neighbouring Muslim boys a few months ago because their fathers failed to procure bridegrooms in time due to their financial insolvency. It was observed in the village under study that not only the parents of mature unmarried girls but also the girls themselves, feel guilty if they remained unmarried for sometime (Aziz and Maloney, 1985 : 55).

Some of the Hindu respondents in this study believed that if a girl is given in marriage before her puberty, the parents will acquire virtue in this and the after life. It is also believed that the first menstruation of the girl at her natal residence is disgraceful for the parents. Thus there is a competition among parents for securing bridegrooms in a hurry to get their daughters' married, otherwise they are considered defaulters. As a result most of the Hindu girls in Matiara got married around the age of puberty. It was reported by the respondents that sometimes the guardians of the boys arrange



their sons' marriage earlier to overcome the problem of delinquency. Many of the respondents reported that early marriage of boys helps to get enough time for rearing of children, especially a son who will provide economic security in old age. It has been observed that the grooms prefer younger brides for active and enjoyable sexual partnership for a long time (Maloney, Aziz and Sarker, 1981 : 86). Moreover, the wives are viewed as useful domestic workers for a long time. So, it is clear that traditional customs, beliefs and value system affect the age at marriage in rural Bangladesh.

### Age Specific Fertility

Age specific fertility indicates the age at which the women first became mothers and the subsequent births of their children. Motherhood is emphasized as the primary avenue of personal and social accomplishment for women in agricultural societies (Tiffany, 1982 : 94). It was reported during the field work that the newly married women got worried if they did not conceive within a year or two of their marriage. In such case the Hindu women worship god and goddesses to bring about conception (Sarker, 1983 : 108). Among the Muslims, in the village understudy, the desire for first pregnancy and child birth (especially when a woman has not yet had a child) is strong on the part of both husband's and bride's parents because they believe that it reduces the chances of divorce or separation of the newly married couple. For this reason early pregnancy and child birth are welcomed as a blessing of God for the women as well as her parents (Sarker, 1982 : 67). Sometimes the women go to the folk physicians for *tabij* (amulet) or *kabiraj* (ayurvedic physician) for medicine which is prepared from native herbs and plants for conception. So, early age at marriage and early motherhood are deeply rooted in our traditional customs, beliefs and value systems. The age specific fertility of 42 mothers is stated below to give a clear idea about the age of motherhood and the subsequent births of children.



TABLE 2

## Age Specific Fertility of 42 Mothers of Matiara

| ASF<br>Age of women | Hindu | ASF | Muslim | ASF | Total<br>Women | Total<br>ASF |
|---------------------|-------|-----|--------|-----|----------------|--------------|
| 12—14               | —     | —   | 3      | 1   | 3              | 1            |
| 15—17               | 3     | 5   | 7      | 14  | 10             | 19           |
| 18—20               | 1     | 2   | 3      | 7   | 4              | 9            |
| 21—23               | 2     | 6   | 2      | 6   | 4              | 12           |
| 24—26               | 1     | 4   | 4      | 13  | 5              | 17           |
| 27—29               | —     | —   | 1      | 5   | 1              | 5            |
| 30—32               | 1     | 3   | 3      | 16  | 4              | 19           |
| 33—35               | 2     | 9   | 2      | 12  | 4              | 21           |
| 36—38               | —     | —   | 1      | 5   | 1              | 5            |
| 39—41               | 1     | 3   | 2      | 10  | 3              | 13           |
| Total :             | 12    | 37  | 30     | 102 | 42             | 139          |

Table 2 indicates that 20 children out of 139 were born before the age of their mothers was 18 years. The government of Bangladesh has declared that the legal age at marriage of the females should be 18 years and for males 21 years. But this order has not been implemented, for the females at Matiara in particular and Bangladesh in general. Had this law been executed the birth rate would have declined and the intrinsic growth rate would have reduced significantly. Moreover, higher fertility rate is found among the Muslims as compared to the Hindus in the village under study. Similar result is also found in different studies both in and outside the countries conducted by Stoeckel and Choudhury (1973), Maloney, Aziz and Sarker (1981), Hill (1979), Kirk (1966) and Mendelbaum (1974).




**Policy Implication**

In closing, it can be mentioned that the rural people are very much sensitive to their traditional customs, beliefs and value systems which promote early age at marriage of their daughters. Early age at marriage is one of the causes of high growth rate of fertility (Nag 1983 and Lorimer 1959). It has been proved by empirical studies that late marriage of women causes fewer births. In the research area as well as in rural Bangladesh the practice of contraceptives does not play a major part in reducing fertility in the early reproductive years. Under the existing socio-economic condition, a girl is a social and economic burden and when she does not go out for work or for education, she remains at home requiring a constant vigil to keep her virgin. If a girl is not married at an early age and if she gets older it may lower her value in the marriage market. Under these circumstances, the guardian tries to look for a suitable groom to get his daughter married.

Late marriage and high celibacy are important factors of the decline in birth rates to a large extent in western countries during the period of demographic transition (Dixon, 1971 : 215). The raising of legal age of marriage of women in Bangladesh would not create any significant impact unless it is socially accepted by the people at different levels. In a least developed country like Bangladesh, education of women and their employment are perhaps the most important factors causing delay in their age at marriage. A model has been suggested for reduction of early age at marriage and low fertility of the females through the compulsory general and vocational education and income generating programmes.

The model suggests that the government of Bangladesh should introduce compulsory free junior secondary education (upto 8th class) and vocational training programme for the school going children. Through the compulsory education and vocational training programme the young generation will acquire knowledge and skill which will be effective to involve them in income generating programmes. Side by side the taught will be motivated for the sake

MODEL SUGGESTED FOR REDUCTION OF AGE AT MARRIAGE AND FERTILITY



of traditional values associated with the practice of early age at marriage. Those who will be dropped out at this stage of completing 8th class will be included in the income generating programmes.

Through the income generating programmes the young generation especially girls will be employed and will be able to contribute to their families which will help them to become self-reliant. On the other hand, through the motivation the young employed generation will be conscious of their future economic assurance and they will automatically prefer later age at marriage instead of early age. Through this dyadic contact between the self-reliance and self-consciousness the young generation will change their traditional norm about the early age at marriage and its consequence will be low fertility.

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# The Establishment of SAARC : An Introduction

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AHMAD EJAZ

The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) is a unique experiment. Before the birth of SAARC, the seven states of South Asia—Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan and Maldives—had focused mainly on international issues through the international forums such as United Nations Organization, Non-Aligned Movement, Commonwealth, etc. But cooperation at the regional level for common South Asian issues was non-existent, largely because of tensions, conflicts and even open warfares. Thus, for the first time, with the aim of promoting cooperation among themselves in the economic, social, cultural and scientific fields, the seven states of South Asia established a regional forum, South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation in 1985.

The concept of regional cooperation was initiated by the late President General Zia-ur-Rehman of Bangladesh. During his visits to Pakistan, India, Nepal and Sri Lanka in 1978-79, President Zia-ur-Rehman put forward the idea of South Asian Regional Cooperation. Later, he sent letters in May 1980 to the heads of governments of Pakistan, India, Maldives, Bhutan, Nepal and Sri Lanka suggesting a summit conference with the aim of exploring the possibilities of an institutional framework for cooperation.

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The fields in which regional cooperation was possible, to Zia's mind, were economic, technological, scientific, educational, social and cultural. Sri Lanka, Nepal and Maldives were first to accept the proposal. The two major states of Pakistan and India flatly rejected the proposal. Pakistan was reluctant to participate in a forum where India might find an opportunity to exercise a policy of domination over its smaller neighbours. India, on the other hand, was apprehensive about the establishment of such a group which could provide her neighbour states an opportunity to 'gang-up' against her.

Fortunately, at last, the efforts of the late President Zia-ur-Rehman bore fruit and these two states agreed to his proposal on the condition that prior to the summit conference a meeting be held at the senior-official level in order to explore the possibilities of holding a summit conference.

The Government of Bangladesh prepared a working paper on Regional Cooperation and sent it to the countries concerned on November 25, 1980. The working paper explained the necessity of South Asian Regional Cooperation in the following words :

Countries of the region have cooperated with one another both bilaterally and regionally under the umbrella of such forums as the ESCAP, the Non-Aligned Movement and Commonwealth. The efforts have not fully exploited the vast potential of regional cooperation that exists and the consequential benefit that this will bring, collectively and individually, to the countries of the region.<sup>1</sup>

The working paper hoped that the common history, language, culture and ethnicity of the seven states of the region would help them to adopt a regional approach to the advancement of their economic interests and enable them to have an effective collective voice in international forums.<sup>2</sup>

The working paper proposed the following eleven areas of cooperation.

1. Telecommunications
2. Meteorology
3. Transport
4. Shipping
5. Tourism
6. Agricultural Research
7. Joint ventures
8. Market promotion
9. Scientific and Technology Cooperation
10. Educational and Technical Cooperation
11. Cultural Cooperation.

The first meeting of South Asian nations was held, at the level of Foreign Secretaries, in Colombo in April 1981. Meeting accepted the Bangladesh working paper as the basis of discussions. Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Nepal desired the establishment of an institutional framework for the organisation. And, expressing the reservations about the establishment of an institutional framework, Pakistan and India advocated a gradual and step-by-step approach to the idea of South Asian Regional Cooperation. Expressing his Government's stand, the Pakistani delegate, Riaz Piracha, stated :

We in Pakistan feel that we should move forward in a measured manner, one step at a time, without forcing the pace of progress. We must first of all identify the areas in which cooperation is feasible and practicable at present and consider the most suitable way in which this cooperation can be furthered. As the field of cooperation expands, we shall be moving to higher ground and a framework will naturally grow out of functional requirement.<sup>3</sup>

The delegates agreed to set up the following five study groups of experts for which coordinators were appointed :

- |                                   |     |            |
|-----------------------------------|-----|------------|
| 1. Agriculture                    | ... | Bangladesh |
| 2. Rural Development              | ... | Sri Lanka  |
| 3. Telecommunications             | ... | Pakistan   |
| 4. Meteorology                    | ... | India      |
| 5. Health and Population Activity | ... | Nepal      |



The Foreign Secretaries also agreed to set up a committee of the whole comprising of senior officials of seven countries, with Sri Lanka as coordinator, to explore other potential areas of cooperation.

The second meeting of Foreign Secretaries was held at Kathmandu on 2 to 4 November, 1981. The meeting considered and endorsed the recommendations of the five study groups. To facilitate the implementation of these proposals, the study groups were converted into working groups whose Chairmanship was to be shared in rotation.

The meeting also identified three new areas of cooperation : transport, postal services and science and technology.

The new study groups were to be coordinated by Maldives, Bhutan and Pakistan respectively. The issues of formal institutionalization of the concept and convening of a meeting at foreign ministers' level were not finalized due to the polarization between the views of smaller and larger South Asian countries. It was finally decided to keep the proposals under consideration. All the countries concerned agreed to SAARC as an 'evolutionary' and 'flexible' process to be seen in the 'long-term perspective.'<sup>4</sup>

The Foreign Secretaries held their third meeting in Islamabad on 7—9 August, 1982.

In his inaugural address, Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Sahabzada Yaqub Khan, reaffirming his country's strong commitment to the concept of regional cooperation considered it "as an important vehicle for the establishment of mutual confidence and promotion of good-neighbourly relations in the region."<sup>5</sup>

The meeting approved the recommendations of the five working groups on Agriculture, Rural Development, Telecommunication, Meteorology, Health and Population Activities. It also gave approval to the reports of the three study groups on transport, postal services and scientific and technological cooperation agreeing to convert them into working groups.

The meeting decided to set up an additional study group in the fields of sports, art and culture. The Foreign Secretaries also decided to hold "regular consultations by the countries of the region, as deemed appropriate, on matters of common interests relating to international economic issues."<sup>6</sup>

It was further decided to establish a Committee of the Whole under the chairmanship of Sri Lanka to prepare, on the basis of the reports of the working groups, an "integrated programme of action in the agreed areas of cooperation and to recommend modalities and mechanism for implementation, coordination and monitoring of the agreed programme of action and recommend funding modalities and arrangements for long-term component."<sup>7</sup> The Foreign Secretaries decided to meet again in February or March 1983, in Dhaka to decide upon the schedule and venue of holding conference of regional foreign ministers in the middle of the same year.

The Committee of the Whole met at Colombo in January 1983, and drew up a comprehensive programme for regional cooperation, based on the reports submitted by the working groups on the eight agreed areas of cooperation in the following fields:

1. Agriculture
2. Rural Development
3. Health and Population Activities
4. Telecommunications
5. Meteorology
6. Postal Services
7. Transport Services
8. Science and Technology

In each one of the fields, the committee recommended two action programmes for implementation, 'short-term' and 'long-term' programmes. The short-term programme would include, the exchange of data, expert services, training and research and holding of seminars and workshops in South Asian countries on the agreed areas of cooperation.



The 'long-term' programme would consist of the establishment of Regional Institutions for Training and Research, Coordination and Cooperation among the already established national institutions of the member countries and augmentation of support to the national facilities pertaining to the agreed fields of cooperation : such projects would need substantial additional investment by the concerned countries.<sup>8</sup>

The fourth meeting of the Foreign Secretaries of South Asian countries was held in Dhaka on March 28, 1983. The Foreign Minister of Bangladesh, Mr. A.R. Shams-ud-Doha I inaugurating the meeting, expressed the belief that the current endeavour towards South Asian Regional Cooperation is a good sign. It suggests that the Association, leaving behind the stage 'preparatory build up', has finally entered the phase of implementation. And it is the result of a climate of trust and goodwill.<sup>9</sup>

After reviewing the work done by the Committee of the Whole the meeting adopted the Integrated Programme of Action (IPA) for implementation. The delegates also decided to establish a standing committee at the foreign secretaries level to coordinate and monitor the implementation of the 'Integrated Programmes of Action.'

Welcoming the offers of assistance from the European Economic Community (EEC) and International Telecommunication Union (ITU) for promotion of South Asian Regional Cooperation, the meeting decided that the Regional Forum with its 'Integrated Programme of Action' would be formally launched at a meeting of South Asian Foreign Ministers in New Delhi on August 1—3, 1983.<sup>10</sup>

It was also decided that the Foreign Ministers meeting would be preceded by a preparatory meeting of the regional Foreign Secretaries in New Delhi on July 28—29, 1983.

The first meeting of Foreign Ministers of seven South Asian countries was held in New Delhi on August 1—2, 1983.

The Foreign Ministers of Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan and Maldives met for the first time to hammer out a

cooperation programme that could be a prelude to an association like European Economic Community (EEC) or the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). Mrs. Indira Gandhi, the then Prime Minister of India, in her inaugural address said that collective approach would be useful to solve the economic problems facing the countries of the region individually.

Addressing the preliminary session of Foreign Ministers Conference, Pakistan Foreign Minister, Sahabzada Yuqub Khan, contended that the cooperation venture of SAARC was rooted firmly in the collective wisdom of the developing countries.<sup>11</sup>

The participants formally launched the SAARC through their signatures on the organisation's declaration on August 2, 1983. It outlined the objectives of SAARC as to promote the welfare of the peoples of South Asia and to improve their quality of life. The meeting identified nine areas for cooperation under the 'Integrated Programme of Action.' The areas were :

1. Agriculture
2. Rural Development
3. Telecommunications
4. Meteorology
5. Health and Population
6. Postal Services
7. Transport Services
8. Science and Technology
9. Sports, Art and Culture.

The finalization of the data of summit conference was postponed until the next meeting of the Foreign Ministers.

The first meeting of the standing committee of SAARC, at the level of Foreign Secretaries, was held in New Delhi on February 27—28, 1984 to review the progress made in the implementation of the



'Integrated Programme of Action'. The meeting finalized the short-term aspects of the 'Integrated Programme of Action'. Pakistan and India agreed to run one training course each for the transport planners of the region, while a workshop on local planning for the rural poor was to be organized by Sri Lanka. Nepal was to sponsor seminars on Malaria and Leprosy during the year 1984. Pakistan accepted the responsibility of organizing a session on water-management. And Maldives and Bhutan were to run training programmes for sea-crafts and table tennis.<sup>12</sup>

The second meeting of the standing committee which held in Male on July 7—8, 1984, not only reviewed the work of nine technical committees, but also adopted a report about recommendation for strengthening and streamlining the institution of SAARC.

The Standing Committee also approved the assistance and cooperation offered by the European Economic Community and International Telecommunications Union in the fields of transport, telecommunications, science and technology.<sup>13</sup> Pakistan also announced its annual contribution of five million rupees for the SAARC activities.

Foreign Ministers of South Asian countries met for the second time in Male on 10—11 July, 1984. President of Maldives, Mamoun Abdul Gayoom inaugurated the conference. Speaking in the plenary session of the conference, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan "called for the evolution of a joint South Asian approach and strategy to meet the threat posed to the regional economy as a result of the general apathy of the developed world to the developing countries."<sup>14</sup>

The need for improvement of telecommunications and air transport links in the region, especially between the capitals of all South Asian countries was stressed upon. The most important decision taken at this meeting was about the holding of the first summit at Dhaka in the last quarter of 1985.

The Third meeting of the standing committee of the regional



Foreign Secretaries was held again at Male in Maldives on February 5—7, 1985. The committee decided to set up seven research institutions to forge greater cooperation in Meteorology, Health, Civil Aviation, Shipping, Agriculture and Communications.<sup>15</sup>

The Foreign Secretaries endorsed the reports of the Technical Committees, set up in all the nine areas identified so far for SAARC.<sup>16</sup> They also confirmed the decision to recommend to the third Foreign Ministers conference, scheduled to meet at Thimpu, in Bhutan in May 1985, that the summit should be held in Dhaka during the same year.

King Jigme Singye Wangchuk of Bhutan inaugurated the third meeting of Foreign Ministers of South Asian countries held on May 13—14, 1985. In his inaugural address, King of Bhutan called to shed the inhibitions of the past and look ahead with courage and confidence in "our ability to shape our future, individually and collectively, in the best interests of our people and the region."<sup>17</sup>

The meeting agreed to the holding of the first summit at Dhaka on December 7—8, 1985. It also agreed that the summit would be preceded by meetings of both the standing committee and of the Foreign Ministers who would give finishing touches to the summit agenda. A comprehensive charter and a permanent institutional framework with a council of Foreign Ministers at the top were recommended for consideration and adoption by the summit.<sup>18</sup>

Addressing the plenary session of the meeting, Pakistan Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Zain Noorani, said that it was the earnest hope of the Government of Pakistan that the conciliatory approach and statesmanship, which had been shown by all concerned, would enable the SAARC to build further the foundation of friendship and cooperation in South Asia.<sup>19</sup>

The first summit of the heads of states and governments of South Asia was held on December 7—8, 1985, in Dhaka. The purpose was to formally launch the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation.



The meeting was chaired by President Hussain Mohammad Ershad of Bangladesh. And attended by the Indian Premier Rajiv Gandhi, Pakistani President Zia-ul-Haq, Sri Lankan President J.R. Jayewardene, Nepalese Monarch King Birendra Bin Bikram Shah Dev, Bhutanese ruler King Jigme Singhye Wangchuck and Maldives President M.A. Gayoom. A charter for the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation was approved and a declaration was issued by the regional leaders proclaiming their commitment to the promotion of the objectives of regional cooperation.

The Summit emphasised, in both the charter and declaration, that regional cooperation was to be based on respect for the principles of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, political independence, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, pacific settlement of disputes and mutual benefit.

During the summit, the leaders also got an opportunity to hold informal discussions pertaining to relations among themselves. During their speeches the leaders hoped for optimistic future of SAARC and said that it would play an important role in accelerating the harmony among seven nations of South Asia.

At the end of the meeting it was agreed that the second and third summit meetings would be held in 1986, at Bangalore, India and in 1987 at Kathmandu, Nepal.

The formation of SAARC was welcomed with varying notes in the South Asian press. Describing it as "A new era in South Asia" one leading daily of Pakistan declared that "the Dhaka summit was certainly a high point in the new mood and spirit as reflected in the process of South Asian Cooperation set in motion in 1981." It, however, pointed out that a lot will "depend on whether the member nations will show the wisdom and prudence to take advantage of the goodwill and understanding generated by the new enterprise" for resolving 'bilateral disputes and differences' and thereby creating a climate of regional peace and stability."<sup>20</sup>

One provincial daily thought it "an experiment with trying out."<sup>21</sup>



*The Pakistan Times*, a national newspaper of Pakistan, described the Association as 'A successful start' in the way to getting together to "develop themselves and give better life to their peoples."<sup>22</sup>

An Indian daily in its editorial comments contended that the South Asian nations have decided to promote all round mutual cooperation in agriculture, health and population control, meteorology, postal services, rural developments, science and technology, sports, arts and culture, telecommunications and transport through the SAARC.<sup>23</sup>

*The Hindustan Times*, an english daily, welcomed the formation of SAARC in general terms. However, in a note of caution it observed: "SAARC, like all other new born, perhaps would have to go through a period of teething trouble. But the agony could be greatly reduced if the seven members were to subject themselves to a period of a self-imposed moratorium on raising bilateral issues involving SAARC members."<sup>24</sup>

One Chandigarh daily commented that by the creation of SAARC, "mistrust can not be removed overnight but certain inhibitions can be overcome, and Dhaka summit seems to have achieved this limited aim."<sup>25</sup>

The Dhaka daily, *Holiday*, commending the role played by Bangladesh as host of the summit, stated that it was "quite a diplomatic feat that Bangladesh could finally persuade leaders of six South Asian nations to assemble in Dhaka 'to moot regional cooperation' amid so many 'diversities plaguing South Asia.'"<sup>26</sup>

*The Bangladesh Times*, lauded the new role played by President Ershad and the initiatives that he had taken in convening the SAARC summit in Dhaka.<sup>27</sup>

*The Rising Nepal*, an english daily of Nepal, under-scored the realistic approach of the SAARC Leaders whose efforts opened a 'new chapter' in South Asia. The daily anticipated a better



future for the region.<sup>28</sup>

The Island - state daily "*The Sun*" noted that "regional cooperation in the economic spheres is inevitably tied up with improved political relations among (South Asian) states". "The two processes" it stated "are complimentary" and "need to be reinforced if regional independence is to be made a reality."<sup>29</sup>

### **World Leaders on SAARC**

From amongst the major powers, United States and Peoples Republic of China welcomed the formation of SAARC.

The U.S. President, Ronald Reagan, in his message to the first summit Chairman, expressed his country's willingness to stand ready "to provide appropriate assistance at your request in launching programmes of regional cooperation."<sup>30</sup>

Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang hailed the Dhaka summit as "an event of great significance in the South Asian region". In a telegramme to Bangladesh President, Ershad, he said, "China is delighted to see that, thanks to the joint efforts of the seven countries, gratifying progress has been made in the South Asian Regional Cooperation initiated by Bangladesh." "SAARC" according to the Chinese Premier, "was in the interest of the people of all the South Asian countries for it was deemed to bring peace in the region; Zhao wished the summit a great success."<sup>31</sup>

Prime Minister R. J. L. Hawke of Australia stated how his country valued the regional cooperation. The United Nations Secretary General, Javier Perez de Cueller, wished "every success" to the first regional summit of SAARC in Dhaka. In his message to the summit Chairman, he expressed in optimistic manner that the summit will open "a new era of progress" in South Asia and help to reduce regional tensions.

He further stated that he had followed with satisfaction "the positive developments of this new regional organisation in the past

few years". Indeed, it was no coincidence that the venue of the conference was Dhaka in Bangladesh which had first proposed the idea of South Asian Regional Cooperation."<sup>32</sup>

### Conclusion

Taking an overview of the whole discussion including South Asian Press reviews and the optimism expressed by the international leaders it appears that the formation of SAARC is a novel experience in our region, because it is for the first time in the history of South Asia that the leaders of the region have opportunity to discuss mutual affairs by formally entering into an regional association.

There is no denying the fact that there are many obstacles in the form of economic and political stresses and strains in the way of mutual harmony and goodwill, but despite all such hurdles SAARC has been moving gradually and cautiously to fulfil its mission.

Although it is a non-political Association yet the increasing cooperation in non-political fields is expected to generate a climate of goodwill and understanding which would lead in turn to cooperation in the political spheres as well. In the light of the progress of SAARC in the past three years, the future of SAARC's goal is, however, directly dependent on the contributions made by the major members of the region—Pakistan and India.

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# Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan

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ALTAF A. SHEIKH

In 1973, when ex-King Zahir Shah was in Rome for medical treatment, Sardar Daud with the support and connivance of Soviet Officers, who were working as instructors, etc., with the Afghan Forces, staged a coup d'etat. Thus, Sardar Daud returned after a long exile from the corridors of power. Initially, in the mid-fifties, it was Sardar Daud who in his capacity as Prime Minister had brought in the Soviets in an effort to counter-balance US and western influence. This opened the door to Soviet influence in Kabul and a virtual army of Soviet experts and instructors descended on Kabul. Alarmed at the increasing influence of the Soviet Union and the anti-west and anti-Pakistan overtones of Daud's policy, Zahir Shah dismissed Sardar Daud and brought in a number of Prime Ministers who were not members of the Royal family. Initially, this gesture was hailed by the public as the beginning of democracy, however, when the change on the surface did not bring any amelioration to the lot of the common man, dissatisfaction against the regime became noticeable. This provided fertile ground for the left wing elements to agitate and for Sardar Daud to capitalize on it. In 1973, when due to a severe draught, the country was facing famine and the government had undertaken no relief measures, Daud seized the opportunity to overthrow his cousin, Zahir Shah and to grab the reins of government. While there was no direct involvement of



Soviet experts or left wing elements in the coup, it was widely believed that in view of his past pro-Soviet policies, Sardar Daud's accession to power had come about with Soviet connivance, as Soviet military experts who were working at battalion and company level in the Afghan forces must have known of the move to topple Zahir Shah. This coup came as a complete surprise to Pakistan. While Sardar Daud can not be called a Soviet puppet, at that time, there was a short term congruence of interests of the two parties concerned. Moreover, Sardar Daud, believed that he would be able to maintain his non-aligned and independent stature and at the same time secure Soviet economic and military assistance to bolster his regime. On the other hand, the Soviets were looking at it merely as a preparatory stage for an eventual take over has a leftist, pro-Soviet regime and abolition of the Royal dynasty.

During his rule of approximately five years Sardar Daud initiated a dialogue with Pakistan and made serious efforts to find a solution to the 'Pakhtoonistan' issue and the eventual acceptance of the Durand Line. He also took various initiatives to attract Western economic assistance. Sardar Daud also settled the Hilmand River and boundary dispute with Iran and the Shah promised substantial economic and financial assistance. In fact, he was working for the emergence of Afghanistan as a truly non-aligned state, at peace with its neighbours. For obvious reasons, this did not fit in with the regional and global policies of the Soviet Union. They, therefore, used this period to strengthen the left wing Khalq and Percham Parties in Afghanistan and set up Soviet cells within the country and the Armed Forces. In April 1978, when Sardar Daud realized the vast network of these clandestine cells and their objectives, he struck with a heavy hand and Khyber Khan, the head of the Khalp, and his numerous associates, including those from the Perchan Party were arrested. Khyber Khan was tortured in captivity, he died in jail. When his funeral procession was taken out, a wave of grief and anger was whipped up by his supporters and his number two in the Khalq Party, Hafiz Ullah Amin (who had escaped arrest) quickly master-minded a coup. Amin had been incharge of contacts with left wing



elements in the Armed Forces and his close associates, Abdul Kadir (a Squadron Leader in the Air Force), Aslam Watanyar (Commander of a Tank Regiment) and Gulabzoi, etc., planned an assault on the presidential palace. Initially, Sardar Daud did not correctly assess the seriousness and the extent of the challenge to his power. The Tank Regiment commanded by Watanyar blocked the Palace and Abdul Kadir with only four planes started strafing the Palace. An infantry relief column mounted by the Loyal Army Commander was mowed down by machine gun fire and suffered heavy casualties. After that no serious attempt to rescue Sardar Daud and his family was made by the Afghan Armed Forces. This inactivity on their part is inexplicable. Sardar Daud and all members of his family were killed in cold blood.

In the new regime, power was shared by Tarakai (President), Hafiz Ullah Amin (Prime Minister) and Babrak Karmal (Leader of the smaller Parcham Party). It did not long for friction to develop between the trio—and Babrak Karmal and his class associate Mrs. Anahita Ratebzad were expelled. They sought refuge in Czechoslovakia, where Karmal had been appointed as Ambassador and then sacked. His brother who was Ambassador to Pakistan was also recalled; he joined the rest of the group in Prague. With the expulsion of the Parcham group, the Khalq Party now assumed full power and Hafiz Ullah Amin became the key executive of the regime.

The take over in Kabul by a left wing regime, triggered a wave of resentment throughout Afghanistan. Tribe after tribe and province after province raised the banner of revolt. Kabul with moral and material support of Moscow tried to suppress it with a heavy hand. This only fanned the insurrection, thousands were killed and thousands, especially from the tribal belt along Pakistan, sought refuge on the Pakistani side of the Durand Line with their kith and kin. Due to humanitarian considerations, Pakistan had no alternative but to let the refugees enter Pakistan and with the assistance of the UN and other friendly countries to offer succor and assistance.

With the passage of time, differences emerged between Tarakai



and Hafiz Ullah Amin over the manner in which the insurgency should be quelled and the extent of control the Soviet Union should exercise over the government. While Hafiz Ullah Amin wanted greater freedom of action in internal and external affairs, the Soviets wished to exercise a veto over all major policy decisions and Tarakai was willing to accommodate them. These differences assumed an acute form. In August 1979, when he visited Moscow, on his back from the Non-Aligned Summit in Havana through the good offices of the Soviets, a reconciliation was effected between Karmal and Tarakai. It was furthermore decided that on return to Kabul, Hafiz Ullah Amin would be removed and liquidated and Karmal would be appointed as Prime Minister.

When Tarakai returned to Kabul, some key members of his entourage including some members of the cabinet, informed Hafiz Ullah Amin of the plan. In a meeting of the cabinet which was presided over by Tarakai, Hafiz Ullah Amin confronted Tarakai, a heated debate followed, which led to an exchange of fire. It is said that in this incident some members of the cabinet were wounded or killed. The Soviet Ambassador, who had played a key role in bringing the Junta to power, intervened to patch up differences. A meeting in the presidential palace was arranged, at which it was agreed that neither party would carry arms. Fearing a trap, in contravention of the agreement, Amin and his friends were carrying arms. The guards from the top of the building fired at them and an exchange of fire took place, in which the military secretary to the President (a friend of Amin) who was covering Amin, was killed. Amin and his friends ran away, rallied their forces (Amin had always wielded great influence amongst the Armed Forces) and captured power. According to one version, Tarakai was wounded/killed in the exchange of fire at the palace; according to others, he was subsequently strangled. Watanyar Gulabzoi and others who were present with Tarakai at the palace, disappeared to reappear again on December 29, 1979 with Soviet troops. They had sought refuge in Moscow with connivance of the Soviet Ambassador.



It would be seen from the foregoing that the Soviet plan to overthrow/assassinate Hafiz Ullah Amin had misfired and the wrong man had won. They, therefore, were compelled to change their strategy. Outwardly, they accepted Hafiz Ullah Amin, but had, at the same time, various plans for his overthrow, which included two unsuccessful coups by local commanders. With his influence in the Armed Forces, Amin was able to crush these coups. There were also rumours of an attempt at assassination through poisoning. In view of the large number of assassinations/killings, etc., in the ruling Junta, I submitted a report to the government, in which I remarked that the "Kabul regime is going under ground, six feet and in wooden boxes."

To stabilize his regime and to secure wider support, Hafiz Ullah Amin made an attempt to initiate negotiations with the mujahideen, the USA and Pakistan. He also sought financial support from the World Bank, Western countries etc. While initially, Pakistan had some doubts about the intentions of Amin, all the same, at my insistence, we finally agreed to initiate negotiations and, it was agreed that the then Foreign Minister, Mr. Agha Shahi would visit Kabul in the middle of December 1979. While pressing for negotiations, I had clearly informed the government that the only alternative to Amin was "Babrak Karmal arriving in Kabul riding on a Soviet tank", and that there was no possibility of a conservative right wing regime taking over power in Kabul as the Soviets would abort by force any such possibility.

Unfortunately, due to heavy snow-fall, the Agha Shahi visit did not materialize and time was now running out. In retrospect, I feel that as the Soviet plan for the overthrow of Amin though military intervention was now in an advanced stage, time for any meaningful discussions with us had already slipped away.

On the night of 25th December 1979, I was invited to a Christmas party by a colleague. That night there was unusually heavy air traffic and at about nine, the Air Attache rang me up to inform me of the unusual nature of air activity. When we reached the Kabul



airport, we saw an awe-inspiring scene. An air Armada was landing troops and equipment. Within the next forty-eight hours an air borne division had landed and occupied the air field and the surrounding area. It included a Tank Regiment, light artillery and armoured personnel carriers etc. The sudden arrival of these troops led to numerous conjectures and speculations in the diplomatic courps. According to a majority they had come to assist Hafiz Ullah Amin against the *mujahideen*, but my feeling was that they had come to overthrow Amin. To seek a clarification from the Afghan Government on the reasons for the arrival of the Soviet troops, we (a group of colleagues) decided to request the French Ambassador to call on Deputy Foreign Minister Shah Mohammad Dost (who later on was elevated to the post of Foreign Minister). Dost informed the French Ambassador that "there are no Soviet troops in Kabul." When the Ambassador replied that "even the blind can see" Dost reiterated, "I do not see any Soviet troops on Afghan soil." Hafiz Ullah Amin who had moved out of his residence in Kabul to Aman Palace (the Defence Ministry which is in the outskirts of Kabul) sent me a message through a reliable source stating that "I (Amin) have not invited any Soviet troops."

After they re-grouped their forces, within twenty-four hours, the Soviet troops went into action. One brigade moved towards the garrison at Pul-e-Charki to neutralize the Afghan Force there, another brigade moved towards Paghman to contain an Afghan Division stationed there and the rest of the troops moved into Kabul. The attack began at about 7 p.m. One group headed for the T. V. and Radio stations and the Ministry of Interior, etc., another went straight to the Ministry of Defence, where Hafiz Ullah Hmin was living. Near the T. V. station, which is about 200 yards from the residence of the Ambassador an Afghan tank standing guard received a direct hit killing the crew and shattering windows in the neighbourhood. Soviet troops met with some resistance and approximately 300 Afghans died in the fighting. Soviet losses were negligible. The column which went to the Defence Ministry knocked out Hafiz Ullah



Amin's guards and blew up his residence with canon fire. The entire family was killed and burnt in the resultant fire.

Before mid-night, the show was over and death like calm descended on the city, Babrak Karmal, Gulabzoi, Aslam Watanyar, Anabita Ratebzad etc., came from Moscow in an official plane after the show was over. Watanyar visited the Radio and T.V. stations in the hope of receiving a hero's welcome. The Soviet troops had surrounded and insulted the staff at the station. The news reader, a young attractive lady, called Watanyar a traitor who had brought foreign troops in Kabul and spat at him. Next morning, she was shot. A demonstration by school girls was mowed down by Soviet troops. With their blood, these girls wrote '*Azadi*' on the walls. The Afghan revolution has been nurtured through such sacrifices.

Soviet excuse for intervention has been that they were invited by the 'Afghan leadership'. The question is, which leadership? Amin could not have invited his own executioners, and he had clearly denied it in a last minute message to me. Karmal was in exile in Moscow. Even if we accept the Soviet contention that he had secretly arrived in Kabul a few days before Soviet intervention, at that time he was not a member of the government or leadership. In fact, he was a rebel in exile. In this context, I wish to recall an interesting incident. While the fighting was going on in Kabul, I was playing with the radio to ascertain the time of the capture of the Kabul radio station by the Soviets. Suddenly, I heard a strange voice from a station in Central Asia broadcasting a speech in Persian stating that "traitor Hafiz Ullah Amin has been overthrown and killed and democracy has been restored. This was at a time when fierce fighting was still going on in Kabul and cannon and gun fire could be heard all over the city. Next morning, Second Secretary, Sher Afghan brought me a tape recording of a speech broadcast by Babrak Karmal on Kabul radio at about 4 a.m. It was the same speech, I had heard earlier from a station in Central Asia.

The capture of Kabul was followed by the movement of approximately 5—6 divisions by land transport, tanks, etc. The traffic was



as thick as on a weekend in Western city. The troops fanned out towards Herat, Jalalabad, Kandhar, etc., and soon occupied key positions in the country. They came over the Salang Pass and the road built with Soviet assistance linking Afghanistan with the Soviet Union.

The operation was conceived by the Soviet Union as a quick surgical operation to get rid of a 'renegade', (Hafiz Ullah Amin) and to install a favourite, Babrak Karmal. The Soviets had no idea that they would get bogged down in Afghanistan for over nine years and would they see humiliation of their arms and troops. Thanks to the magnificent resistance put by the people of Afghanistan and the *mujahideen*, the Soviets admit to at least 15,000 dead and 25,000 wounded. As a result of Soviet intervention, out of the actual population of 15 million, approximately over one million have been killed or have died due to various reasons and over 5 million are now refugees either in Pakistan or Iran. The Afghan nation had therefore paid a very high price for its struggle for freedom and deserve the admiration of all freedom loving people. Through their valiant efforts they have forced a superpower to look for a face-saving device—The Geneva Accords—to pull out. While Geneva Accords have received a mixed reaction, they have provided the ground for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. A historic event indeed! However, peace has not yet returned to Afghanistan and a fratricidal war is still going on. In evaluating the scenario and for evolving a policy for the future, the policy makers in Pakistan must keep in mind the following objectives :

- (a) In Afghanistan, Pakistan must now look towards the future, work for a government which is broad-based in the real sense of the word and enjoys the support of the majority of the people in Afghanistan. Only then would it be able to create conditions conducive to the return of the refugees and be in a position to initiate the process of reconstruction of the country. In this context, it is pertinent to point out that the UN has already launched a \$ 1.6 billion fund, of which over \$1 billion have already been committed.



- (b) In our relations with the Soviet Union, we should also look beyond Afghanistan. During his recent visit to Pakistan, Foreign Minister Shevendnadze made various offers of economic collaboration ; we should give these offers a serious thought. We have now an ideal opportunity to mend fences with the Soviet Union. We cannot afford to miss the opportunity.
- (c) With Iran, for the first time since the revolution, we have an opportunity to develop relations on a sound basis. We should give the Iran based *mujahideen* due share in the interim government set up in Afghanistan. We should plan economic political and defence collaboration with Iran.
- (d) We have close and friendly relations with the USA. It has been a major supplier of economic and military assistance to us and the *mujahideen* during the last decade. In the fast changing global situation we have to retain their support for stability in the region. Statements made by President Bush and key members of his government have assured continued support to Pakistan. Furthermore, the restoration of democratic set up in the country should facilitate closer links with the USA. Many countries, i.e., Turkey, etc., have evolved a policy of close links with the USA and economic and industrial collaboration with the USSR. It should not be difficult for our policy makers to achieve the same delicate but appropriate balance.



# Politico-Psychological Umbrella for Cooperation

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KHAWAJA AMJAD SAEED

The paper consists of three parts. The first part identifies scope of paper in the overall framework. It looks at PPEST formula and then suggests for treatment of two P's namely, political and psychological. The second part gives a fine treatment to several aspects including one world dream, ideological and political position of Asian and Pacific Countries and their political scene, possible solutions at five levels namely, country, sub-regional, regional, continental and global. It ends up with a plea of implementation of the suggested conceptual framework. The last part deals with psychological treatment with professional approach. It makes a case for psychological umbrella for cooperation, identifies major psychological barriers, explains responses that world trends require, explains psychological and institutional barriers to global understanding, and presents a candid four-point analysis of obstacles within the individual namely, cognitive, attitudinal, personal and communication. It concludes with a brief narration of agencies promoting a world centred view.

It pleads that it is in the minds that the seed of global understanding is to be sown.

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## CONSTITUENTS OF THE PAPER

The paper consists of the following three parts :

Part I : Scope of paper in the overall framework

Part II : Political Umbrella

Part III : Psychological Umbrella

Each of the above part is now explained below :

### I

#### SCOPE OF PAPER IN THE OVERALL FRAMEWORK

Cooperation between countries in terms of working relationship is affected by various factors. It is important to understand the total framework and then see the place of the paper within its orbit. In our view "PPEST" formula best describes the position.

| <i>Alphabet</i> | <i>Meaning</i> |
|-----------------|----------------|
| P               | Political      |
| P               | Psychological  |
| E               | Economic       |
| S               | Sociological   |
| T               | Technological  |

For comprehension, one can appreciate that technological transfer, its sharing and adaptation is a must to further the cause of cooperation. Interaction of people through tourism is a joy to be shared by people of various regions. Economic cooperation integrates nations and enables countries to see the advantage of Law of Comparative Cost translated in reality. Psychology is an intangible factor which is delicate to handle. The above exercise is infructuous, futile and fruitless if political cooperation is conspicuous by absence. Thus this paper can be seen in total perspective. We shall specifically deal with the two aspects namely political and psychological umbrella for cooperation.



## II

### POLITICAL UMBRELLA

#### One World Dream

What would happen if the world is to be united under one political umbrella? Is it possible? Does bionic and supersonic world leadership exists to achieve the above objective? These questions worry many minds. Ideally this stays as a high sounding uncrytallised dream. Today, to be realistic, this is not possible. The world is split in various ways. From the view point of level of economic development, the world stands divided in the following five parts :

#### Classification of the World : Level of Economic Development

| Stage of Development | Ideological Split  | Political Position   |
|----------------------|--|--|
| 1. The First World   | Capitalistic, Free Enterprises, Openness of Economies, Competition, Private Initiative encouragement: Well developed economies.      | Strong democratic governments with smooth handing over after election results, Respect [for election results, Dignity to opposition. |
| 2. The Second World  | Communication, Socialism, Closed economies, State Domination in work, business and economic activities : Concern for social justice. | Authoritarian Rule with regimented approach.   |
| 3. The Thlrld World  | Hybrid system with a mix of 2 and 3 above : struggle for development.  | Mix of good democratic set ups, military rules and shaky governments.  |
| 4. The Fourth World  | Capitalism and Socialism Mix : oil rich but developing.  | Kingships, dynastic rulers, military dictators.  |
| 5. The Fifth World   | Capitalistic and Socialistic Patterns: People mostly below poverty line.   | Shaky political set up with a hybrid approach.   |



**Political Scene of Asian and Pacific Countries**

It will be interesting to review the political situation in Asian and Pacific context as under :

1. Asian and Pacific countries are heterogeneous in political framework.
2. All types of political set ups exist namely, presence of emperors and kings, military rulers, democratic frameworks.
3. Some countries have excellent intra political relations ; other are antagonistic to each other ; yet others keep changing their political stance with passage of time.
4. Several countries have destabilised internal political positions as consensus continues to stay as a hope of tomorrow and in many cases of distant tomorrow. These countries political set ups can further be categorised into two parts :
  - (a) Internal destabilisation due to conflicts in the thinking of political parties. The ruling ones do not appear to have a wider measure of tolerance for honouring the view points of others.
  - (b) Interference from external forces are having damaging effects on the internal strength and health of the political set ups. This is due to a strong belief held by external forces for spreading their ideologies or increasing their horizons of influences.
5. Past events and history influence some political governments to change the geography of some countries and make a new map on the world.

**In Search of a Solution on Political Frontier**

What type of logistics we need to strength political umbrella for cooperation ? A framework in this respect is suggested below :

**1. Country Level**

- (a) Internal stability is the crying need of the hour. Attention be given to it as priority number one.



- (b) Consensus development must be aimed at with the assistance of effective communication, use of broader outlook, involvement of major political parties in national thinking process, mutual respects and dignity. The task is challenging but needs to be met.
- (c) Broad framework of political parties, preferably not more than three be evolved. Periodical elections can pave the way in this respect. Three to five years flexible position be worked out to achieve the above goals.
- (d) A belief in acceptability of ballot results be developed and institutionalised.

## **2. Sub-Regional Level**

- (a) Sovereignty of countries, irrespective of size, be accepted from the core of the heart by all countries of the sub-region. United Nations Charter does advocate this prescription which needs to be implemented in toto.
- (b) Tolerance to absorb minor differences be followed as a guiding inflexible rule. This is expected to help develop mutual respect and also inspire confidence in the political institutional framework of the smaller sized countries.
- (c) Continuous and on-going dialogue must be pursued as a publically well announced and religiously well practised strategy for tackling major controversial issues. The communication may start with points having consensus.
- (d) In the first round causes of conflicts must be diagnosed rather than guiding oneself with symptoms. Learning from diagnostic approach of medical science, a scientific analysis be undertaken and then the second round of developing solutions be started.
- (e) The spectrum of solution be used in a broad and wider perspective to avoid one-solution rigid policy and may follow the practice of series of alternatives which will have



more probabilities of striking an understanding and tackling the problem.

- (f) After the understanding is reached, a mutually acceptable institutional framework be developed as a strong logistic for follow up, monitoring, and implementation.
- (g) Practical implementation of the memoranda of understanding be periodically reviewed for cementing the bonds of relationships.

### **3. Regional Level**

- (a) ASEAN was set up as a regional body in Far East and Pacific area. The cooperation amongst ASEAN countries has mainly been due to good political relations. This example is worth following for other regional bodies.
- (b) SAARC was set up a few years ago. A few meetings have been held but expectations of people from SAARC have yet to materialise. More meetings with specific agenda be convened with a large hearted approach to let all countries politically operate freely in their own countries to make a steady start for cooperation. After the SAARC meetings, the press conferences by the heads of respective countries may focus on areas of cooperation rather than using it as magnifiers of conflicts and launching pad of further hatred. Love and affection are keys to the solution of problems. Without these pre-requisites, the process of political harmonisation can at best exist as the hope of distant future with very low possibilities of materialisation. To the above destination, all SAARC countries must move forward.

### **4. Continent Level**

In Asia, Japan has emerged as a great economic power. Based on the World Development Report for 1987, Japan is Number Two in respect of exports in global set up (\$ 176 billion). The New Japans (generally known as NICs), namely, South Korea, Singapore,



Taiwan and Hong Kong have also come up and have been rightly named as Newly Industrialised countries. India is an industrial gaint. China is struggling to have a new economic order. Their political leadership is opening up their country to joint ventures and Special Economic Zones have been set up in their Southern part. Middle Eastern Countries, despite suffering from oil price shock, still constitute a large market. Other countries including Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Burma, Malaysia, Indonesia and other countries are pushing ahead in development. Accordingly there is a need for a unified thinking approach of an institutionalised framework for the following jobs :

- (a) It can serve as clearing house for helping Asian and Pacific countries to sort out their political differences.
- (b) It can also initiate thinking for cooperation with other continents.

## **5. Global Level**

Restricting oneself to cooperation within the continent may present an introvert look. It is necessary to look beyond the Asian and Pacific areas and look for good political relations within the global dimension.

## **Implementation**

We have presented a conceptual framework for political umbrella. Who will implement the same? Our job is to sell ideas and motivate all concerned to comprehend these and reduce constraints and taper off the barriers to pave the way for implementation. How quickly this could be done? We believe that gestation period does exist in generating new, creative and innovative ideas and their acceptability. Our wish is that this gestation period be as little as possible. However, we cannot prescribe a time limit for implementation. We hope that all concerned will give due attention to the above suggestions.

increased conflict. This fact demands new concepts and practices of world wide sharing of responsibilities and a readiness to see the world as an interdependent community. Moreover, the situation does suggest that we need to find ways and means to benefits from diversity, to communicate with others who do not share the same values and behaviour pattern to manage conflict reasonably and constructively and to tolerate differences.

It also necessitates that opportunity for participation in the social and economic processes must enhance and must be made more visible.\* People should acquire understanding and skills needed for such participation.

### **Responses that World Trends Require**

1. Through wider education in our schools, people can perceive what is happening.
2. Research can provide new insights and help discover ways and means.
3. Travels, mass media, trade missions and exchange programmes can provide experiences for facilitating international understanding.

Let us start with education and see how it, at the school level, can help people understand the nature of the emerging global society and develop the identities, attitudes and skills required for responsible participation.

### **Becker (the World and the School)**

A case for world centered education is schooling for a global age (edit James Beits, Mc-Graw Hills Book Company, 1979) writes that questions which help provide a focus are as per following details :

1. What kind of experiences are likely to help youth develop the competencies and insights needed to gain some understanding of and control over the global events and processes in which they are involved ?



2. What resources, talents and instructional materials are available and appropriate for such efforts ?
3. What agencies, school programmes and special projects offer promising programmes in the area of world studies ?
4. How can schools and communities design and manage programmes which are likely to help youth the skills and identities needed for responsible participation in interdependents world ?

The UNESCO recommendations concerning Education International understanding offer set of guiding principles for educational policy. They include :

1. An international dimension and a global perspective in education at all levels in all its forms.
2. Understanding and respect for all people, their cultures, civilization, values and ways of life, including domestic, ethic, cultures and cultures of other nations.
3. Awareness of the increasing global interdependence between people and nations.
4. Ability to communicate with others.
5. Awareness not only of the rights but also of the duties incumbent upon individual, social groups and nations towards each other.
6. Understanding of the necessity for international solidarity and cooperation.
7. Readiness on the part of the individual to participate in solving the problems of his or her community, country and the world at large.

### **Psychological and Institutional Barriers to Global Understanding**

Before we embark upon the project of providing psychological umbrella, we must recognise the barriers which stand in the way of world wide orientation. Psychologists, generally, recognize two

categories of barriers. One has its source within the individual and the other originates outside the individual and exists in the society and socialising agents.

### **Obstacles within the Individual**

A knowledge of many barriers within the individual will allow more effective design of programmes. Tornery has recognized four types of within - individual obstacles :

1. Cognitive
2. Attitudinal
3. Personal
4. Communication

These are briefly reviewed as under :

#### **1. Cognitive Obstacles :**

A variety of research conducted in 1960s revealed that the process of political learning begins early in life as children participate in authority relationships, make decisions and deal with interpersonal conflicts as well as intergroup conflicts and cooperation.

Torney J.V. "International Learning and International Education in a Global Age" *Bulletin 47*, National Council for the Social Studies, 1975, pp. 39-40, concluded a discussion of the way in which international learning takes place in elementary students by saying that by the time elementary school students reach the intermediate grades they have developed a sense of national identity, a set of attitudes, beliefs and values about their own and other nations as international actors and about such international processes as war and peace. Children's international learning is cumulative. What children learn about the world at one age builds upon and is influenced by what they have previously learned.

Research has also revealed that those of high intelligence were accelerated in their political attitude development. It is also noted (Council) that children do not simply reproduce the communications that reach them from the adult world, they work them over, detach



them from their original contexts and assimilate them to a general conception. The children selectively appropriate the material provided by schools, by mass media, by parents and incorporate these individual structures. From a developmental point of view, children's perceptions show a movement from personalism, parochialism, and concreteness toward greater impersonalism and universalism. As the child grows he/she moves from a concern with one's own needs to a greater responsiveness to community needs ; and form an authoritarian response pattern to a less authoritarian orientation.

Piaget's work points out the need for experience with the physical and personal environment rather than direct teaching for the development of the ability to see other peoples perspective. Further research by Chandler, "Ego-Centrism and Antisocial Behaviour" : The assessment and training of social perspective taking skills, *Developmental Psychology*, Vol. IX, 1973, pp. 326-332, shows that practice in performing different roles and viewing one's performance apparently is helpful in increasing the ability to understand others.

It is important to note that the period of middle childhood identified by many studies as a time of relatively low rejection of groups and relatively high attitudinal flexibility once the end of this period is reached, behaviour organised in a given pattern is difficult to reorganise. Accordingly psychologists are of the view that middle childhood (before the onset of puberty) is even the appropriate critical period for development of world-centered attitudes and global perspective. Moreover, this period is critical because many barriers which are erected later on, do not exist during middle childhood. Even if they come into existence they can be easily dismantled.

## 2. Attitudinal Obstacle

Some attitudes are not changed by development but are more fixed from early childhood. These prove to be real impediments to international socialisation. One of these is a very strong sense of



national community as an in-group. Connel maintains that young children's ideas about potential external enemies that pose a threat to their country originate from primitive fears that their safety will be endangered. As a result of these fears the feelings of nationalism and distrust of others become strong quite early in life. This situation calls for a review of massmedia which contribute to the development of fear and stereo-types of groups other than one's own. Moreover, children's sense of belonging to a national community is established and reinforced by many symbols, e.g., flag. The global political community does not have any symbols. As long as national identities are inculcated by the fear of others, the concept of international perspective will remain a mere dream.

### **3. Personal and Motivational Obstacles**

When individuals are convinced of the superiority of their own culture and of the inferiority of others, they are least likely to develop a global perspective. A chauvinistically high level of national pride may be used to downgrade other nations and their cultures. Another motivational barrier is the preference for similarity. The old adage "birds of same features flock together" seems to have much support from research. People are more attracted to someone described as holding attitudes similar to their own than to a stranger described as different from them. Successful programmes for global perspective should incorporate techniques designed to modify these basic tendencies.

### **4. Communication Obstacles**

A fourth kind of intra-individual barrier is perceptual or communication barrier. The spoken language is the most outstanding example. Children, and also many adults, feel that their group way of speaking is the only normal one children need to have exposure to a language other than their mother tongue in order to be globally or inter-nationally socialised.

Registra and Johnson found that the study of another language appears to increase positive attitudes towards speakers of that



language and the culture it serves.

So far we have seen how it would be possible to maximise the effectiveness of programmes by taking into account the levels of cognitive development and particular individual differences. However, obstacles may also exist in the persons and institutions responsible for socialisation, e.g., parents, school text books, T.V., Newspapers. An important obstacle to the international awareness may be the experience and perception of parents, teacher or television producer. Mass media has been criticised by many psychologically for not helping to form a more realistic picture of other nations and countries. The perception of one's own nation and people as in groups and other nations as outsiders is a common theme in both mass media and many school curricula.

Hanney points out that television is potentially a very patent source for presenting cultural similarities and differences so as to increase two important abilities. Perspective consciousness—understanding that our own view is not universal and that others view things differently and cross-cultural awareness—results in awareness of diversity in ideas and practices.

### **Agencies Promoting a World Centered View**

*1. Exchange Programme (Student Exchange):* One of the means to achieving a world-centered view has been international student exchange by being an exchange student or by hosting students from another culture. People learn to interact with others. In such exchange programmes, the emphasis should not be on the benefits to the individuals involved, because such experiences are to be provided to develop a deeper understanding of other cultures.

*2. Other Types of Exchange Programmes:* There should be visitors bureaus in each country which can be contacted when individuals or delegations from outside visit the country members of the bureaus may organise visits to places of interest, give luncheons or dinners or invite the visitors to their homes. Opportunities for teachers to travel abroad for a summer may be provided and more

or more commerce and trade delegations may exchange visits.

3. *Media Based Programmes*: Area study centres may be organised to study present information in a neutral statistical form.

World centred schools be established and special curricula be developed for them.

### **Concluding Comments**

The foregoing discussion of the programmes for providing a psychological umbrellas appear to be unrealistic in the light of the present realities. The organisations which had started with the sole purpose of serving the world as a whole are running into difficulties and overwrought with political and ethnic strifes. However, psychologists are of the view that it is in the minds of men that the barriers to a global perspective exist and it is in the minds that the seed of global understanding is to be sown.



# Book Review

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**Akhtar Ali**, *South Asia : Nuclear Stalemate or Canflagration*, Karachi : Armament and Poverty, 1987, Pages 225, Price Rs. 250.

The book under review, written by Mr. Akhtar Ali, is a continuation of his earlier work, *Pakistan's Nuclear Dilema*. This 225 page work has been covered under nine topics : Nuclear Energy in Pakistan—Status and Prospects; India's Nuclear Policy—Influences and Constraints ; Pakistan's Nuclear Perspective—Posture and Pressures ; Cerebral Defence ; Ballistic Missile Defence—Borrowed Deterrence—A Nuclear Umbrella ; Nuclear Deterrence ; Diffusing a Nuclear Arms Race ; and, a comprehensive Introduction. It is beafed up with the addition of very useful and informative four Appendices.

The book has been written with two main objectives, first to explore ways and means of diffusing a nuclear arms race in South Asia and, secondly, to search for possible options and a course of action for the policy makers. The countries on the map of South Asia have typical identification in the 'World Affairs' because of the prevailing geo-political situation in the region. According to the author's analysis, there is a kind of nuclear stalemate prevailing in South Asia. India made an atomic explosion in 1974 while exactly ten years later Pakistan announced its achievements in the enrichment of the available uranium. Since then there seem to be many reasons responsible for not pushing beyond the prevailing nuclear status.

The author has observed and felt the challenges faced by Pakistan posed by the overriding threat of Indian nuclear capability. He has



suggested that without raising undue alarm Pakistan can go for any of the following four options :

- (a) Cerebral Defence
- (b) Ballistic Missile Defence
- (c) Nuclear Defence
- (d) Nuclear Guarantee (the last one is of course the weakest option).

Mr. Akhtar Ali has also gone into the details of the Indian capabilities in the nuclear field and has come out with a view that she is trying to compete with 'China' from whom they have already tasted a military defeat and who is considered a real threat for them. India, besides having an atomic capability has also procured and installed heavy water plant and uranium enrichment instruments. They are much more capable of producing many deadly nuclear weapons which are beyond doubt a serious threat to the neighbouring countries, there is a sizeable number of Indians who seem to be in favour of pushing not only India but also the entire sub-continent into a race of nuclear weapons.

It is in fact a very alarming situation for the countries around India that some of her educated and well-placed citizens have lobbied that India must go nuclear if only to subjugate Pakistan and other smaller nations of the region. As far as Pakistan's case goes, it is just vicious propaganda against Pakistan, facilitated by Mr. Z. A. Bhutto's statement about eating grass to make a bomb and Mr. A. Q. Khan's statement about obtaining the technology of achieving the enrichment capability. Whatever it is, this remains a sad story and an unhealthy sign of a bleak future for the inhabitants of this region.

The author is of the opinion that this trend should be controlled for the betterment of mankind. He further suggests that a correct and a beneficial alternative of the nuclear capability is the nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. It has been proved that nuclear



energy is a cheaper, economical and rapid means of acquiring energy. Then, why should we not go for it? In the end, it is worth mentioning that Mr. Akhtar Ali has handled a difficult and sensitive topic in a proper way and has tried to do justice to the subject by highlighting nuclear designs of South Asian states in a scholarly and objective manner. The book, hopefully, will prove to be a significant addition to the existing material on the subject.

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Research Assistant

Centre for South Asian Studies.

**V.V. Swaminathan**, *Problems of Peace and Security in Asia*,  
Sterling Publishers Private Limited,  
New Delhi, 1986, pages 87, Price Rs. 60.

Asia, the biggest continent in the world has been a focus of attention of every political scientist. It not only possesses the enormous quantities of natural resources including strategic materials, but also owns the Indian ocean, which according to Mahan, is the key to the world. It is a too diversified continent relating population, religion and ethnology. Peace, especially after the Second World War, has always remained in Asia in a very fragile state, and peace loving people have always bothered about. Hundreds of books highlighting various aspects of peace in Asia have been written and the inventory is increasing daily.

The book under review discusses concisely the situation in Asia after World War II and the various developments that have taken place since then. The subject has been dealt under five headings, i.e., Politics of Military Blocs; US strategy in Asia; First Effort

for Asian Unity; Peace and Security ; A System of Collective Security for Asia.

The book opens with the elaboration of the evils of military blocs. The author blames US for attracting a number of Asian countries to its bloc. The opening chapter, elaborating the evils of military blocs, blames the US devices of attracting a number of Asian countries to its bloc. He contends that "America set itself the task of constructing a net work of military bases all over the World and started an unprecedented arms race by improving new kinds of weapons, especially nuclear. Asia had a special place in the new military strategy of Washington where US policy makers hoped to get easily into the shoes of the outgoing colonial powers." The author elaborating on the pros and cons of SEATO and CENTO for Asia writes that "SEATO and CENTO opened the door for interference by the US and Britain in the internal affairs of Asian countries . . . (and that) subversive activities were carried on in Burma with the active support of SEATO." He extends his analyses in regard to the situation in West Asia as well.

In the chapter on "US Strategy in Asia" the author discusses the acquisition of bases by USA in Asia for her strategic interests which according to him are detrimental to the peace in Asia. Surprisingly enough he does not mention even the USSR's interests nor her involvement in Asian affairs is touched upon. It seems that the author perhaps is intrigued only by the US interests and her involvement in Asian affairs.

Swaminathan commends Jawaharlal Nehru's efforts as the first ever efforts for Asian unity. And considers him to be the flag bearer of peace in Asia. His belief in the effectiveness of Nehru's thought is so firm that he suggests that the world peace in general and Asian peace in particular can only be achieved through the guiding five principles outlined in Nehru's Panch Sheel. Mr. Swaminathan has also touched upon "Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace" proposal and put forward the Indian viewpoint. In the last chapter entitled "A System of collective Security for Asia" the



author is full of praises for the Soviet's Asian Collective Security Scheme. He terms it as "the first concrete proposal for a collective security system in Asia" It must be remembered that it is the same proposal which late Mrs. Indira Gandhi diplomatically rejected considering it as a hegemonic derive of USSR.

Mr. Swaminathan has so absurdly dealt the subject that the book appears almost to be an official handout of the Government of India. The author has portrayed himself as a person with a narrow vision. It appears that the book is an attempt to project Nehru. Long paragraphs of his speeches have been quoted. The author has presented only one side of the picture. He has tried to establish that USA alone is responsible for creating tension in the region. Soviet Union, according to him has always sincerely worked for easing tension.

Although the book highlights in brief almost all the inter-state conflicts in this region. But India's conflicts and disputes with her neighbours have been deceitfully avoided, e.g., there is no mention of Kashmir or Sri Lanka. It would have been ideal if all the current issues of the region were impartially mentioned. Moreover the author has been quite biased and prejudicial, e.g., while mentioning Afghanistan he says, "An undeclared war has been unleashed against Afghanistan with active support of USA". Elevating the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation he writes, "It has served as a bastion of peace in the sub-continent and has been a major factor to be reckoned with in Asia and the World". A biased and a prejudiced book propagating Indian view-point about peace in Asia.

ANSAR ALI KHAS

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# Statements

## *SOUTH ASIAN REGIONAL COOPERATION*

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**ADDRESS BY MOHAMMAD KHAN JUNEJO, PRIME  
MINISTER ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN  
AT THIRD SAARC SUMMIT, KATHMANDU  
NOVEMBER 2, 1987.**

Today, the SAARC summit has come to the lap of towering Himalayas. The edifice being built by the will of the peoples of South Asia matches in the magnificence of its conception the grandeur of a marvel created by Nature.

Yoday, the Summit comes also to its spiritual home. The seat of its Secretariat, beautiful Kathmandu is the capital of a peaceful Kingdom whose sagacious monarch long ago envisioned the idea of a comity of South Asian nations working together in peace and harmony for the well-being of their teeming millions.

Today, the presence here of Monarchs, Presidents and Prime Ministers of South Asian countries symbolises a salutation to the successful realisation of His Majesty King Birendra's visionary idea.

On behalf of the people of Pakistan and the Government I have the honour to lead, it gives me great pleasure to convey to Your Majesty, and to the Government and people of Nepal, our sincere compliments and warmest greetings.

I bring also the profound regards of the people of Pakistan for His Majesty the King of Bhutan, their Excellencies the Presidents

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The Centre for South Asian Studies is grateful to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (Director SAARC) for providing material on South Asian Regional Cooperation.



of Bangladesh, Maldives and Sri Lanka and His Excellency the Prime Minister of India.

May I express our appreciation for the memorable welcome and generous hospitality the Government and people of Nepal have extended to me and members of my delegation.

I wish to express also our felicitations on your assumption of the chairmanship of our Association. Your Majesty's eloquent and inspiring address is a good augury for the progress our Association will surely achieve under your sagacious leadership.

We believe that the last year witnessed a steady march towards the broadening and deepening of cooperation among South Asian countries. His Excellency Mr. Rajiv Gandhi provided a vigorous impulse to the development of new proposals and initiatives.

The concept of the SAARC vision has been realised. Its broadcast simultaneously from all SAARC capitals at the inauguration of this Summit bears testimony to our resolve to promote greater mutual goodwill and understanding among our peoples. These programmes will disseminate information, bridge the communication gap and dispel the fog of ignorance.

During the last year, the SAARC countries have completed preparatory action to conclude an agreement on the creation of South Asian Food Security Reserve. Although modest in size, the Reserve will supplement notional stocks and help member states tide over emergencies which often afflict our region due to vagaries of nature.

For the future, I suggest that the member states consider additional voluntary contributions to the Regional Food Reserve. Spectacular rises in agricultural production have enhanced the capacity of the South Asian countries to help one another in time of need. Such help will represent a convincing demonstration of the benefits of our cooperation.

In reiteration of our commitment to this common objective, I pledge Pakistan's readiness to double our contribution to the Regional Food Reserve.



Another positive result realised during the last year is the progress towards evolving a SAARC Convention on suppression of terrorism. Terrorism is a heinous phenomenon. It is indiscriminate and savage. Bomb blasts in bazars, blowing up of busses and other such despicable acts perpetrate death and injury on innocent men, women and children. No cause can camouflage crimes against humanity.

The conclusion of this Convention will proclaim the firm commitment of the governments of the SAARC countries to give no quarter to any one charged of the crime of terrorism in any South Asian country. He who threatens to tear apart the fabric of civilised society will be pursued and prosecuted.

The determination of the Government of Pakistan to extirpate terrorism is illustrated by the laws we have enacted and the special courts we have set up for deterrent punishment of those found guilty of terrorist acts.

I have referred only to the more outstanding achievements. These do not, of course, exhaust the catalogue of accomplishments of the last year. All the technical committees continued to develop and implement programmes and projects. Our officials and experts, professionals and intellectuals have contributed to enlargement of regional interaction. On behalf of my Government, I extend to all of them our appreciation and commendation.

The decision of the South Asian leaders to foster regional co-operation has captured and captivated the imagination of our peoples. Special regard for neighbours is a shared value and tradition in South Asia. Moreover, the prospect of harmony and collaboration among the seven South Asian countries with over a billion population has attracted international attention and interest. The world community is aware that working together, the South Asian countries would play a role of great influence for a peaceful and just international order. We have only to demonstrate our political will and ability to reinforce and supplement one another's strengths and capabilities.

I have no doubt that the noble aspirations shared by the nations



of South Asia can be realised. The potential is visible to all of us. Only it has to be converted into the actual. The promise has to be translated into reality. And this can and will be done. What we need is perseverance of endeavour and consistency of commitment to the principles we have proclaimed in the Charter of our Association.

Friendly cooperation has to be predicated on respect for political independence and territorial integrity, sovereign equality, non-interference and non-use of force. The hallmark of goodwill is mutual sensitivity to one another's problems and feelings. We should behave towards neighbours as we would like them to behave towards us ; refrain from actions that we want them to eschew.

Regional cooperation depends for its success on our ability to foster confidence and trust. This will require conscious effort. Geography alone cannot compel cooperation. History, unfortunately, provides ample proof of that truism. Moreover, disparities of size and resources and apprehensions rooted in the past cannot be considered as positive factors. Obstacles and inhibitions will have to be overcome. This can and will happen, *Insha Allah*, so long as we hold firmly to the faith that inspired our Association and so long as our actions conform to the ideals we have proclaimed. We must not hesitate to take constructive initiatives to strengthen peace and co-operation in our region. The harvest that awaits our collaborative efforts would be so rich and abundant as to eclipse the narrow national gains and benefits that might look attractive today.

Many problems afflicting human societies have rightly acquired a universal concern. Concerted action to tackle them at the regional level could represent an important landmark towards their global solutions.

The highest priority must be attached to the eradication of drug abuse and drug trafficking. This is a deadly scourge. It afflicts often the youth and thus threatens those who are the hope of our future. We cannot afford to let this cancer spread. Pakistan is participating in a global campaign to tackle this problem. We want to eliminate illegal production of opium, to wipe out trafficking, to deter



the criminal, to treat the victim. Regional cooperation is indispensable if we are to succeed.

The nuclear issue, too, should engage urgent regional attention. Manifestly we share a common interest in keeping our densely populated region free from nuclear weapons. Agreement on the subject is inherently achievable. None of the countries has said it intends to produce such weapons. A joint renunciation of the nuclear option as a binding instrument would reassure our peoples. In fact, we should go further and consider a regional agreement placing a comprehensive ban on nuclear explosion tests.

I mention some of these ideas not in any spirit of debate but because I believe we need to give our Association a new impetus based on mutual confidence and trust. We should not hesitate to discuss matters which may obstruct or block the fountains of creativity and growth. Thus, the Heads of State and Government of South Asian countries can give a strong impetus to our Association.

It is fortunate that close to our region, the countries of South East Asia are joined together in another Association. They have not only blazed a good trail; their record of achievement over the years provides proof of the efficacy of regional cooperation.

I suggest that we authorise the SAARC Secretariat to establish contact with the ASEAN Secretariat and discuss modalities by which the two Associations can benefit from each other's experience. In course of time we could even consider an institutional connection that might be mutually acceptable.

Here in Kathmandu, this august gathering can contemplate the majesty of the Himalayan peaks which, figuratively speaking, lie within our grasp. Perhaps we can reflect also on the glory of the aim that has brought us together. What can be more sublime than the amelioration of the lives of our people? We, the leaders of South Asia, would serve history well if we lead our peoples to the glorious vision of fellow-feeling and solidarity, progress and prosperity.

In the end, I would like to say once again how privileged we are



to have the benefit of Your Majesty's guidance at this important juncture in the evolution of our Association. The Pakistan delegation has come to this Third Summit in the conviction that this day marks the beginning of a most fruitful year in the development of SAARC.

In the realisation of that result, it will be a privilege for me and my Government to extend our wholehearted cooperation to Your Majesty.

**ADDRESS BY MOHAMMAD KHAN JUNEJO, PRIME  
MINISTER ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN  
AT THE SAARC SUMMIT, KATHMANDU  
NOVEMBER 4, 1987.**

We have spent two glorious days in this magnificent capital. But surely time alone is not a correct measure of our Meeting.

Days are part of a continuum. Moments merge, one into another, lost like drops of water fallen into the ocean of eternity. Yet some are distinct, with an eternal place in history, memorable because they are meaningful, momentous.

Such were the past two days : joyous, productive, purposeful promising.

The unique pleasure of our South Asian get-together testifies to affinities of languages and commonalities of cultures, bonds of geography and ties of traditions.

The purpose and promise of the conference is manifest in the deepening regional consciousness and the dawning realisation that in harmony and cooperation all and each of our peoples can look forward to more rapid progress.

The beauty of the prospect opening before us, as we rise from one summit to another, inspires and invigorates our march towards a better future, transcending the difficulties of the moment.



Looking back, we celebrate the pioneering role of Bangladesh in the establishment of our Association, deeply grateful to Excellency President Hussain Muhammad Ershad for giving SAARC an inspired start. The historic city of Dhaka will be remembered as cradle to yet another epoch-making movement.

Bangalore was an important milestone on the road to consolidation and further expansion of constructive cooperation. Excellency Rajiv Gandhi made a valuable contribution in the realm of new and practical ideas for deepening of mutual knowledge and understanding.

Here at Kathmandu we have launched new ventures in regional collaboration. The Agreement to establish Regional Food Security Reserve would provide a cushion of collective self-reliance to relieve emergencies caused by floods and droughts. At the start the size is modest but we can and should enhance it in course of time.

The Convention on Suppression of Terrorism will be another concrete and meaningful achievement. Terrorism is a menace and scourge. We need both national and international action to combat it effectively. We must not permit the abuse of the territory of our respective states as sanctuary or launching platform by criminals to perpetrate heinous acts in other states. The terrorists must be prosecuted and punished.

Here at Kathmandu we have laid new building blocs on the structure of South Asian cooperation. Slowly but steadily a splended edifice is rising in view. Not only our own peoples but the world at large is taking notice of the potential being converted into the actual.

The Kathmandu Declaration proclaims a confirmation of our faith and a renewal of our resolve. We are determined to further supplement national endeavour by regional collaboration in pursuit of the common objective of amelioration of the economic and social problems in South Asia.

It has been a privilege and honour that our deliberations at this Third Summit have been guided by a sagacious monarch. Noble heir to ancient wisdom. His Majesty King Birendra is a leader of lofty



vision. He has long cherished the inspiring concept of a zone of peace for his own land. We may confidently hope that during the year of His Majesty's Chairmanship, the billion people of South Asia will witness unprecedented endeavour for the promotion of harmony and cooperation.

The two days we have spent together have produced results so substantial as to ensure a prominent and praiseworthy name for Kathmandu in the annals of our Association. We shall always derive encouragement and inspiration when we shall think of this conference.

We are profoundly impressed by the serene tranquility of this splendid capital, stretching in the lap of the majestic Himalayas.

Our sojourn here will be memorable for the warmth of the welcome accorded to us by Your Majesty, the Government and people of Nepal. The graciousness of the hospitality extended to us manifests a tradition rooted deep in the generosity of the people of Nepal.

In closing, therefore, I express once again profound appreciations and gratitude of the members of my delegation, and also on my own behalf, for the many courtesies and kindnesses, cordiality and warmth extended to us.

May the Kingdom of Nepal progress and prosper

May SAARC continue to develop and grow.



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January to June 1988

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January to June 1988

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# Chronology of Important Events of South Asian Region

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January to June 1988

## BANGLADESH

- March 20* Bangladesh will import 100,000 tonnes of rice from Pakistan under a contract signed in Dhaka.
- 24* Bangladesh had asked Pakistan reportedly to take back its about 250,000 citizens stranded in Dhaka since 1971.
- 25* President General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq and Prime Minister Mohammad Khan Junejo extended greeting to President Hussain Mohammad Ershad and Prime Minister Mizanur Rehman Chowdhury of Bangladesh on Bangladesh's independence day March 26.
- „* Justice (Retd.) A.F.M. Ahsanuddin Chowdhury called on Prime Minister Junejo in Rawalpindi.
- 31* A six member delegation of Parliamentary Opposition Group headed by its leader, Syed Fakhr Imam went to New York to attend a conference under the International Repatriation Council which will deliberate upon the ways and means of repatriating three lakh people stranded in Bangladesh.
- April 3* International Council for Repatriation of Pakistanis held a conference in New York and asked the Government of Pakistan to immediately announce the date for the repatriation of the Pakistanis stranded in Bangladesh since 1971.

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The Chronology has been prepared by Mrs. Mussarat Javed Cheema, Research Assistant of the Pakistan Study Centre, University of the Punjab, Lahore.



- April 5* President Hussain Mohammad Ershad gave highest awards of the Supreme Command to the members of the Pakistan National Defence College who visited Dhaka.
- .. Bangladesh Ambassador of Pakistan, Mr. C. M. Shafi Sami, said that it is the legal responsibility of Pakistani Government to repatriate about four lakh Pakistanis stranded in Bangladesh as early as possible.
- 18* Bangladesh's Education Minister Mr. Anisul Islam Mahmood, visited Pakistan and discussed with Prime Minister Junejo the ways of enhancing cooperation between the two countries in the field of education.
- June 2* A nine-member Bangladesh military delegation headed by Sadiqur Rehman Choudhury visited the General Head Quarters in Rawalpindi.
- 5* The visiting nine-member Bangladesh military delegation visited the heavy rebuild factory at Taxila.

### INDIA

- January 1* India has started its winter exercises and military movements has intensified along the line of control in the Indian held Jammu and Kashmir reportedly.
- 7* India has alleged that Pakistan coast-guards had seized India fishing boats who were fishing in Indian waters near Kuch.
- 13* The Indian GOC-in-Chief Northern Command, Lt. General Nanda, at a Press Conference in occupied Jammu, alleged that Pakistani troops made artillery fire at Siachin glacier on 10, 11, January. He also alleged that during 1987 there had been 1,400 incidents of 'unprovoked' firing by Pakistani troops along the control line.
- 14* Pakistan Foreign Office spokesman regreted about Soviet offer of supply of three nuclear-powered submarines, which would help Indian Navy for the first time to acquire nuclear-fire capability and heighten the Indian threat to other South Asian countries.

- January 14* Pakistan Foreign office spokesman said that statement of Indian GOC about Pakistan's Artillery firing in the Siachin glacier on 10, 11 January was very wrong and described it as 'gross exaggeration'.
- 17 It is reported that India has alleged that Pakistani naval coast guards had seized six Indian freighters carrying dates loaded in Gulf states.
- 19 Pakistani Minister of state for Foreign Affairs said that every country has a sovereign right to determine its economic development projects and security requirements. So Pakistan had not objected to Indo-U.S. accord on Super Computer signed on 9 October 1987.
- 20 Premier Rajiv Gandhi expressed his gratitude to President Zia-ul-Haq, Premier Junejo and Chief Minister Arbab Jehangir Khan for making "excellent arrangements" for his visit, while he was visiting Peshawar.
- 21 By admitting two identical adjournment motions, Senate decided to discuss the acquisition of nuclear sub-marines and stockpiling of sophisticated arms by India, posing threat to Pakistan's security and upsetting equilibrium of power in the region.
- 25 On India's republic day President Zia-ul-Haq and Prime Minister Junejo extended greeting to President R. Venkataraman and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi.
- 27 Prime Minister Junejo expressed grave concern over the acquisition of the nuclear powered sub-marine by India.
- February 1* Indian Railway authorities had removed away Railway tracks on Khokrapar route, near Umerkot.
- 9 According to BBC, Indian army has been put on full alert on the Siachin glacier.
- 10 Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, visited Siachen glacier area. He was accompanied by Farooq Abdullah, Chief Minister of occupied Kashmir, was accompanied by him. Indian Prime Minister directed the troops there to teach a 'lesson' to be remembered.
- February 10* Indian Minister of State for External Affairs, Natwar Singh said that on Siachin there was no question of dispute as the territory 'is our'.



- February 12* Pakistan and Indian delegation headed by Anis Ahmed, Joint Secretary (Maritime) Ministry of Defence, and Shrimati Indira Misra, Joint Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs Government of India during their second round of talks in Islamabad, agreed to release all the detained fishermen and vessels as a gesture of goodwill.
- 16 Foreign Office spokesmen regret over bellicose statements of the Indian leaders and hoped that India would "join Pakistan in promoting normalization rather than fear".
- 17 Premier Junejo asked India to response to Pakistan's consistent desire for peace, which is in the interest of the entire region, while he was addressing to the editors of national dailies.
- 20 Indian GOC-in-Chief, Northern Command, Lt. General B. C. Nanda, told that Indian troops have full control of the situation in Siachin, while he was addressing Press Conference in Srinagar.
- 22 The Consulate of India disclosed in Karachi due to an increase of 200-250 per cent in the number of visa applicants.
- 24 The third round of Indo-Pakistan inter-government talks on Tulbal navigation project was held in Islamabad (23-24 February).
- 25 Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi invited President Zia-ul-Haq to hold talks on the Afghan situation and the border differences between India and Pakistan.
- March 20* A 10-member Pakistani boatmen left for Bombay to bring back the fishing vessels which had been seized in India in the last two years.
- 24 Senator Javed Jabbar left for New Delhi to attend the 30th World Development Conference organized by Society for International Development.
- 26 An official meeting was held in New Delhi between India and Pakistan on the Tulbal barrage project.
- 27 BBC said according to Sunday Observer's statement that Israel and India had discussed joint action to destroy Pakistan's nuclear plant.

- 28 Indian cotton traders had given a firm indication to purchase 200 to 300,000 cotton bales from Pakistan.
- April 3* Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi of India had ordered tightening of security on the border between the Indian State of Punjab and Pakistan after an emergency meeting with Governor of Punjab in New Delhi.
- 6 Pakistan denied the Indian delegation that it was helping the Sikh extremists.
- 8 India and Pakistan agreed to introduce the facility of return journey tickets for passengers between certain pairs of cities in India and Pakistan.
- 13 A nine-member delegation led by Mr. S. K. Mahmud, Secretary, Ministry of Interior went to New Delhi to have talks on illegal border crossings, smuggling and other matters.
- 14 Indian Premier Rajiv Gandhi talking to pressmen at the New Delhi Airport, declared the disputed Siachen glacier as an integral part of India.
- „ According to Press Trust of India about 30 people were injured in Indian held Kashmir in a violence. The demonstrators were mourning for those Pakistanis who died in an ammunition depot explosion at Ojheri Camp.
- 15 It was reported that India would send an additional force of Soviet made Mi-26 and Mi-17 helicopters to the Siachen glacier area to reinforce the fleet already stationed there.
- 16 Complete strike was observed in various cities of occupied Kashmir to mourn heavy casualties in the Ojheri Camp blast.
- 18 Giving an interview to Press Trust of India President Zia-ul-Haq of Pakistan said that all allegations of interfering in the internal affairs of India are baseless.
- 19 Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi alleged that Pakistan was not responding positively to Indian proposals for normalising relations between the two countries, while he was addressing a conference of army commanders.
- 20 The Pakistan Embassy in New Delhi, in a press statement told as incorrect and misleading an Indian newspaper report that Pakistan had turned down an Indian proposal for a meeting between defence secretaries of the two countries.



*April 21* Foreign Secretaries of Pakistan and India, Mr. Abdus Sattar and K.P.S. Memon, had agreed to restore with immediate effect hotlines between themselves for personal communication.

22 Dr. Farooq Abdullah said that his government had started creating barbed wire fencing along the international border with Pakistan from Chhamb to Kathua. He said that he had solid proof that Pakistan was allegedly using the border for the flow of arms to the Sikh terrorists. He states in an interview to daily *Telegraph*.

„ Indian Embassy to Islamabad described in a press note that Rajiv Gandhi addressing the Parliament on April 20th said that India on different occasions had commitment to friendship and cordial and cooperative relations with Pakistan.

23 Prime Minister of India Rajiv Gandhi addressing a conference of the Congress Party in Tamil Nadu, stated that relations between India and Pakistan could only be normalised after Pakistan abandoned its nuclear pretensions had stopped.

24 The work of barbed wire fence along the Indo-Pakistan border in Amritsar began under the supervision of the team of engineers of the Central Public Works Department of India.

25 The second two day meeting of India-Pakistan committee to combat drug trafficking and smuggling began its proceedings in Islamabad.

27 Two battalions of special armed constabulary, one from Madhya Pradesh and other from Uttar Pradesh have been sent on guard duties on government installations and offices in Kashmir valley. While Border Security Force have been shifted to border with Pakistan from there reportedly.

*May 2* It was reported that one person killed and one injured with the firing by the Indian army troops on a border village Nakkar Kot in Ponch, Azad Jammu and Kashmir.

8 Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan has said in an interview that "India by flirting with Dr. Najibullah of Afghanistan and by trying to boast him has itself wasted their chance of playing some useful role in Afghan problem.

- May* 10 The reports of any tension on Indo-Pak border pertaining to the checking of smuggling of arms - narcotics into India were denied by Indian Border Security Forces.
- 11 It was reported by BBC quoting Indian authorities that Pakistani troops tried to capture a key point on Siachin on 9th May.
- 16 India and Pakistan agreed to take immediate and solid steps to contain terrorism, drug trafficking, smuggling and illegal border crossing in Home Secretary level meeting held in New Delhi.
- 17 According to a report of *Khaleej Times*, 15,000 Indian border guards have been deployed in Punjab sector on Indo-Pak border besides 4,000 army troops who are at 2 hours notice.
- 20 The third round of talks between Defence Secretaries of Pakistan and India concluded in Islamabad and decided to resolve the Siachin problem by negotiation according to Simla Agreement.
- 23 The Prime Minister of Pakistan Mr. Muhammad Khan Junejo while flying from Beijing to Hong Kong said, as a result of talks between Defence Secretaries of Pakistan and India, the tension on the border has decreased. Alleged 2 Pakistani trespassers were killed by Indian border security force, on the Jammu sector facing Sialkot.
- 29 During ministerial meeting of non-aligned countries at Havana, Mr. Zain Noorani of Pakistan announced that Pakistan is ready for mutual inspection of nuclear installations with India.
- 31 Mr. Abdul Sattar, the Foreign Secretary of Pakistan went to India to continue talks with his India counterpart.
- June* 2 The two days talks of Foreign Secretaries of India and Pakistan ended in New Delhi, both agreed to continue the talks.
- 7 7 Pakistani Fishermen came back to their country after spending the confinement in Indian jails. They were arrested by Indian Navy.



- 8 The Prime Minister of India Mr. Rajiv Gandhi has alleged that Pakistan's nuclear programme has forced India to boast its defence.
- 14 In the special session of U.N. General Assembly, the Pakistani delegate rejected India's allegation that the Pakistan's nuclear programme was intensified to obtain nuclear weapons.
- 15 The Government of Pakistan was praised for looking into the Holy Shrines of Sikhs during a meeting of Sikh Yaterees with President General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq.
- 16 President Zia-ul-Haq reassured Pakistan's commitment to the establishment of a nuclear free zone in the region. He also said that India has not yet gave positive response to this proposal.
- 24 The Government of Pakistan took 'serious notice of the news which had [published in the international press about the possibilities of an Indo-Israel collaboration to attack Pakistan's nuclear facilities.
- 25 A spokesman of the Ministry of External Affairs stated that India and Israel have no intension to attack on Pakistan's nuclear facilities.
- 27 The Indian Ambassador to Pakistan in a statement at a press conference blamed Pakistan for pursuing a nuclear weapon oriented programme. He also said that there is no possibility of a joint Indo-Israel attack on Paklstan's nuclear installations.
- June 28 President Zia-ul-Haq while addressing the closing session of an international seminar on 'National Stability and Regional Security' said that the Indian leaders should seriously discussed with Pakistan the issue of peace and Security.
- 30 Pakistan's Embassy in West Germany had strongly denied the allegation of Pakistan's involvement in Sikh insurgency. Pakistan was blamed for this by the Indian Prime Minister Mr. Rajiv Gandhi during this visit to West Germany.

## NEPAL

- March 27* In World Hindu Conference held at Kathmandu, leader of the Pakistan delegation Mr. Charan Das Perwani said that Hindus are under no pressure in Pakistan.
- 28 Mr. Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Chairman Senate of Pakistan left for Nepal to attend the opening ceremony of King Mahindra Memorial Eye Hospital.
- June 2* Nepalese delegation discussed the possibilities of joint ventures of Pakistan and Nepal with members of the Chamber of Commerce and Industries of Pakistan in Karachi.

## SRI LANKA

- January 14* Mr. Zain Noorani Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan said in the Senate although Indo-Sri Lanka accord was signed between two Sovereign States, but despatch of Indian troops to Sri Lanka is an interference.
- 19 Minister for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan Mr. Zain Noorani said that Sri Lankan leadership has assured Pakistan that there will be no change in their policies towards Pakistan as regards Indo-Sri Lanka agreement of 8 July, 1987.
- 27 Pakistan and Sri Lanka signed an agreement in Colombo under which Sri Lanka will import 40,000 million tonnes of rice from Pakistan.
- „ The Sri Lankan Deputy Minister for High Education, Atta Yayke, arrived on a week-long visit to Pakistan.
- April 27* Sri Lankan trade delegation signed an agreement in Karachi with rice export corporation of Pakistan that Colombo will buy 20,000 tonnes of Irri rice from Pakistan.
- May 24* General S. C. Rana Tunga of Sri Lanka called on the Minister of State for Defence, Rana Naeem Mahmood in Islamabad.

## SAARC

- March 16* A two day regional workshop on ASEAN concluded in Dhaka. Regional Cooperations with reference to SAARC were discussed.



- 29 Chairman Pakistan Agriculture Research Council stated on the eve of inauguration of SAARC member countries' meeting on 'Cooperative Research Strategies' that agricultural scientists of SAARC countries can make use of experience of other countries in the production of crops.

*April 15* Pakistan's Minister for Planning and Development Dr. Mahboob-ul-Haq suggested a development plan for the SAARC members in the United Nations by which the countries can rapidly advance its economics.

*May 4* SAARC countries had agreed to set up a SAARC Parliament which will meet once a year.

- 29 In Dhaka 3-day SAARC seminar was held on adopting new technology for rural electrification.

## LIST OF PUBLICATIONS

1981-87

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|---|---------------------------------------|
| Rafiq Ahmad<br>Sarfaraz Hussain Mirza               | <i>Maldives</i> : No. 5, March, 1984. |
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| Rafiq Ahmad<br>Musarrat Javed                       | <i>Bhutan</i> : No. 7, December 1986. |

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| Rafiq Ahmad<br>Rahim Yar Abbasi                           | <i>South Asian Scanner</i> : No. 1, (1981).                      |
| Rafiq Ahmad<br>Rahim Yar Abbasi                           | <i>South Asian Scanner</i> : No. 2, (1982).                      |
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## Monographs

- Rafiq Ahmad *The Assam Massacre : 1983*  
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Mohammad Sarwar *The Assam Agitation, (Urdu)*  
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Syed Farooq Hasnat ; *Demands to Armed Conflict.*  
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- Theodore P. Wright (Jr.) *Seminar 1984*  
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Prof. Richard B. Barnett *Seminar 1985*  
*The Late Pre-Colonial Background to the*  
*Indian Princely States.*  
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- Rafiq Ahmad (Editor) *South Asian Studies : Vol. I, No. 1,*  
*January 1984 ; Vol. I, No. 2, July 1984 ;*  
*Vol. II, No. 1, January 1985 ; Vol. II,*  
*No. 2, July 1985 ; Vol. III, No. 1,*  
*January 1986 ; Vol. III, No. 2, July 1986,*  
*Vol. IV, No. 1 ; January 1987 ; Vol. IV,*  
*No. 2, July 1987 ; Vol. V, No. 1, January*  
*1988.*

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Manuscripts, articles, book reviews and notes or letters on themes of contemporary or historical interest, with particular reference to South Asia, will be welcomed.

Manuscript should be clearly typed on one side of the paper only, and should be double-spaced. Two copies should be submitted.

Bibliographies and footnotes should be placed at the end of the article. Footnotes should be numbered consecutively, and bibliographies should be arranged alphabetically. Foreign words should be underlined.

Bibliographical references should be complete in respect of the title of the book, the name of the author, the year and the place of publication.

Utmost care should be taken to prepare statistical data for publication. All headings, columns, rows, symbols, units of measurement, periods, political and geographical areas, and sources should be clearly stated in each statistical table, instead of giving such explanations in the text.

Tables, maps, and diagrams should be numbered and given at the end of the article, each on a separate sheet of paper. They should be clearly drawn so that they are suitable for photocopying as submitted.

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