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RAFIQ AHMAD

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Role of Local Government Institutions in the Developmental Process of Bangladesh : An Analysis

MUSLEHUDDIN AHMED TAREK

INTRODUCTION

Throughout the world, local government has been identified as an institution for development. The recent trend of decentralization adds more importance to the existing local government system. It is perhaps the most recent political realization and administrative development in all countries concerned. Strengthening of local government is not only necessary for execution of governmental policy but also for involving people of all spheres of life in the formulation of the development policies as well as in their execution.

Local government means government within an area inside and smaller than the whole state. They are infra-sovereign geographic unit contained within a sovereign nation. They include provinces and other intermediate units. They have defined area population and a continuity of organization as well as the authority and power to undertake and carry out certain public activities. But above all, they are infra-sovereign, i.e., they do not have any aspect of sovereignty. Broadly speaking, local governments are infra-sovereign

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units within a sovereign nation employed for specified functions in their jurisdiction.

Local government means an infra-sovereign governmental unit within the sovereign state dealing mainly with local affairs, administered by local authorities and subordinate to the state government. Normally, the state government has no jurisdiction within the local area in respect of matters administered by the local authorities. But the local government is the creature of the state legislature. Therefore, they can not do many things without the explicit sanction of the state government.

In Bangladesh, day by day development functions and welfare activities of the local government institutions are increasing gradually in respect of their diversity and volume of functions for the well-being of the local people. In this regard, three types of local government units have emerged in our country. These are Union Parishad at the Union (lower local level unity), Upa-Zilla Parishad at the Upa-Zilla (middle level) and Zilla Parishad at the district (top level local government unit). But in urban areas, Municipalities for the Towns and smaller cities and Municipal Corporations for the major four metropolitan cities have been established, i.e., Dhaka, Chittagong, Rajshahi and Khulna. In this context, these local government units have occupied a very important and crucial position in respect of their diversity and multidimensional nature of functions. For the proper implementation and successful execution of these programmes, the role of these local government units and their relations with the central administration are undoubtedly very significant.

Growth of Local Government in Bangladesh

Bangladesh inherited its present structure of local government administration from the British colonial administration. But before the British regime, the Mughal emperor first initiated the introduction of village *Panchayat* in this sub-continent which existed in ancient times for playing effective role in managing the village community affairs as well as law and order. The responsibility of

Village *Panchayat* was to assess and collect tax from the villagers to pay salaries to the Village *Choukidars*. The act empowered the District Magistrate to appoint village *Panchayat* comprising of five members taken from amongst the Villagers. Later, under the Local Self-Government Act of 1885 under the initiative of Viceroy of India Lord Rippon, three tiers of local government came into being, the District Board in the district, the Local Board at the Sub-Division, and the Union Committee in the Union (comprising of several villages). The Chairman of the District Board was either appointed by the Lieutenant Governor or elected by the members of the Board with the responsibilities of such public utility and interest as communication, health and sanitation, etc. The Local Boards were established at the Sub-Divisional level having supervisory control over the Union Committees within their jurisdiction. The Union Committee consisted of nine members elected by villagers, but the Act of 1885 did not provide any Chairman of the Union Committee. They were responsible for management of local ponds, primary schools and law and order. The Union Committees and the Village *Panchayats* worked side by side within their jurisdiction.

But Local Boards and Union Committee depended on their superior bodies for finance. Extensive bureaucratic control coupled with limited financial powers hampered the growth and operation of local self-government bodies and thus the general principles laid down by Rippon in the famous resolution on Local Self-Government in 1882 did not largely materialize. Under this system, the Union Committees and the Local Boards with very restricted powers became mere agents of the District Boards which for all practical purposes became a unit of governmental administration. In urban local administration, to undertake the responsibility of managing their own affairs, the Bengal Local Self-Government Act of 1884 was passed under the Vice-Royalty of Lord Rippon consolidating the various preceeding laws on the subject with election of two thirds of the members and Chairman and Vice-Chairman by the rate payer. However, several Acts were passed between 1884 and 1924, extending

and streamlining the functions of urban local bodies. In 1907, Royal Commission upon decentralisation recommended further democratic measures for local self-government. The Montagu-Chemsford report of 1921 clearly pointed out the need for providing more opportunities for greater popular participation in the local bodies which could serve as a platform for political training of the people. The Bengal Self-Government Act of 1919 also brought important change in the structure of local bodies. The three tier system was replaced by a two tier system, i.e., Union Boards and District Boards. It also recommended some steps towards the advancement of local self-government. In 1923, the Bengal Municipal Act passed some progressive measures. The political reform of 1935 introduced autonomy in the provinces which had impact on local bodies.

Pakistan Regime

After the British colonial rule, there was no significant change in local government administration till the introduction of Basic Democracy System in 1959 and the Municipal Administration Ordinance of 1960 in Pakistan. Under the Basic Democracy System, four tier of local government were established in Pakistan, i.e., Union Council at the Union, Thana Council at the Thana, District Council at the District and Divisional Council at the Divisional level. The Union Council was a fully representative body whereas all the other bodies were more or less comprised indirectly elected and nominated official members. The functions of the several local bodies were more or less same as those were before. Under the ordinance of 1960 several previous laws regarding Municipal Local Government were repealed and a uniform system of Municipal Government was created in the entire Pakistan. Under this law, two types of urban local bodies were established in urban areas. These are Town Committees for small towns and the Municipal Committees for bigger towns with a population of more than 15,000. The members of the Town Committees were directly elected by the people, whereas the Chairman was elected by the members from amongst themselves. But in the Municipalities, there was a lower body

named Union Committee where all the members elected a Vice-Chairman from among themselves. The Chairman of a Municipality was, however, appointed by the government, generally a civil servant of the District.

Local Government in Bangladesh

Since the independence of Bangladesh, there have been significant reforms and changes in local administration before the promulgation of the Local Government Ordinance of 1976 and the Paurashava Ordinance of 1977. These two ordinances repealed all other laws relating to local and municipal administration in Bangladesh. Under the local government Ordinance, the government constituted three types of local government in Bangladesh, i.e., Union Parishad at the Union, Thana Parishad at the Thana and Zilla Parishad at the District level.

The Union Parishad is fully representative body as it was before with the same responsibility. The Thana Parishad comprised official and representative members with official Chairman with the responsibilities of supervising the activities of Union Parishads. But later under the Local Administration (Upa-Zilla Parishad and Upa-Zilla Administration) Ordinance 1982, the government upgraded the Thanas as Upa-Zillas with the provision of directly elected Chairman of the Upa-Zilla. The Zilla Parishad was ineffective till the promulgation of the Zilla Parishad Ordinance, 1988. Earlier the Zilla Parishad was just a unit of District Administration headed by the Deputy Commissioner of the District. But under the recently promulgated Zilla Parishad Ordinance, the Zilla Parishad is now comprises appointed, government nominated and official members headed by a member of the parliament nominated by the government with the responsibilities of coordination of developmental activities in the district.

The Paurashava Ordinance introduced a provision for directly elected Chairman of the Municipalities. But till 1978 there was no Municipal Corporation in the country. In 1978, the Government of

Bangladesh constituted the first municipal corporation of the country in the capital city of Dhaka under the basis of Paurshava Ordinance, 1977. Later, this ordinance was superseded and replaced by the Dhaka Municipal Ordinance, 1983. (Ordinance No. XL of 1983). The government also set up three other municipal corporations in the three major cities of the country, i.e., Chittagong, Khulna and Rajshahi under the Chittagong Municipal Corporation Ordinance, 1982. (Ordinance No. XXXV of 1982), the Khulna Municipal Corporation Ordinance, 1984 (Ordinance No. LXXII of 1984) and the Rajshahi Municipal Corporation Ordinance, 1988 respectively.

Role of Local Government Institutions in Development

Now-a-days nearly all the under-developed countries of the world are expanding the function of the government with the purpose of development, and for this purpose, development administration has got momentum. Development administration has gained wider expression in modern times. It is the principal force in shaping the administrative system. The functions of the state are no more marked within the boundry wall of maintaining law and order, collecting some revenue or protecting the state from foreign aggression. The idea of welfare state has generated ideas of economic development and social justice and forces the civil administration for the achievement of these goals. The manner of its performance is termed development administration.

In Bangladesh, independance has brought about a drastic change in the administrative philosophy and policy of the nation. It has also brought the ideas of economic development and development administration. The idea of a welfare state and the rising expectations of the masses have made it imperative for Bangladesh to undertake development programmes, and government depends upon the local government units.

During the colonial period, the governmental functions centered round :

- (i) Maintenance of law and order,

- (ii) Collection of revenue ; and
- (iii) Justice.

These were done only to exploit the colonial resources. But development of a country is closely related to its economic growth. In the colonial period, this growth is negative in nature. But after the liberation of Bangladesh, government has nationalized all the industrial and commercial enterprises due to several reasons, such as:

- (i) The dominance of intermediate regime ;
- (ii) War damaged economy ; and
- (iii) Better welfare of the masses, etc.

On the other hand, the government has to take up several agricultural and utility types of enterprises to gear up agro-based economy and to improve people's wellbeing due to socio-politico economic condition of the country. As a result, presently there are several nation-building agencies and local government units which have been working at the grass root level of administration, such as Union Parishad, Upa-Zilla Parishad and Zilla Parishad, with the single aim of development. In the under-developed countries, government is only the capable agent of bringing about a change because without change no development is ensured. But for the purpose of development what is required first is the developmental institution. Without an institution, development administration can not be ensured. It is the vehicle of developmental action.

For the purpose of development, institution building should be inconsistent with the developmental objectives. Excepting the divisional level, other levels of administration have had their respective local government units such as Union Parishad at the Union, Upa-Zilla Parishad at the Upa-Zilla, and Zilla Parishad at the District. With the exception of Union Parishad, all the local institutions consist of elected and official members. Obviously, these local units have a vital role in the development activities of nation building.

However, Union Parishad is a fully representative body which is

implementing developmental programmes at the grass root levels. But, there is no scope for people's involvement and to decide their own mode of development because all the activities are from time to time directed by the government through notifications. But whoever formulates these plans they are the representatives of the privileged class because the planning system is based on centralized approach where there is very little scope for people's involvement to initiate the process of development. Therefore, supplying of inputs from its higher authority, Union Parishad is fully depended upon government bureaucracy. In theory, it occupies such character which indicates the nature of local government but in practice, it is nothing but the tutelage of bureaucracy. Although, Union Parishad performs for food programme, rural works programme, construction of rural roads, culverts, etc., and other nation building activities but in the true sense, it performs such functions under direct supervision and control of the officials of the bureaucracy.

Secondly, Upa-Zilla Parishad has now occupied a very crucial position as a local government unit. In the Upa-Zilla administration there are about twenty/thirty nation building departments which are also engaged in shaping and re-shaping various developmental plans and programmes for the welfare of the people. But, without proportionate, directly elected representatives of the people, over-dominance of bureaucracy and the absence of clear-cut relationship between Upa-Zilla Nirbahi Officer and the directly elected Upa-Zilla Chairman are hampering the developmental activities and coordination, which are ultimately hindering smooth and quick implementation of development work.

Thirdly, Zilla Parishad is the most important local government unit in the District. The most prominent side of the District administration of any country like U.K., USA and France is its simultaneous working of local government organs constituted by the local representatives to which the bureaucratic administration is accountable. But, in our country, with the absence of the directly elected representative body in the Zilla Parishad—the Deputy Commissioner

performs all of its functions and development activities in practice. So, joint collaboration with District administration to implement all nation building and welfare activities, such as construction of roads, drainage, irrigation, etc., is needed to achieve the goals and objectives of development.

Appraisal and Conclusion

Day to day development function of the state is increasing. For the implementation and successful execution of these programmes, the role of these local government units is undoubtedly very significant. Because development administration always needs people's participation and their involvement in development and political process, these local government units are directly involved in the implementation of the goals of development. But, in our country, only top level and bottom level are filled up by the people's representatives, and all other levels are dominated by the government due to some administrative drawback which itself is a colonial legacy, static in nature and aloof from the people. Therefore, a new orientation to carry out the fruit of development to the doors of the general masses and thereby to build the nation, is required.

In conclusion, it can be said that for the purpose of development, people's consciousness should be developed first, to which people of all sectors are committed, which is the output of socio-cultural and political development. But in our country, no such institution has yet been developed except bureaucracy. It is true that without sincere involvement of the people, the goal of the overall development of the country cannot be fulfilled.

Evolution of Local Government at its present stage in Bangladesh is the product of several reforms and changes since the promulgation of the *Choukidari Panchayat Act* of 1870 under British colonial administration. Through a number of reforms and re-organisations, the existing tiers of Local Government Institution has emerged. The functions of local governments are virtually multi-dimensional and manifold in nature as it is concerned with all local

activities related to welfare and development of the areas. Even then it could not play its proper role because political institutions at the national level had not properly developed. Local government cannot perform most of the prescribed functions, and their powers are inhibited in many ways by the absence of clearly defined relations between the ministry and the local government. Absence of a truly popular government at the national level has reduced the local governments in the country to surrogate bodies flourishing at the whims and caprices of the bureaucracy or the Minister in charge. The system of legal relationship hampers the process. All these unexpected realities are closely linked to the overall socio-politico-economic condition of the country. Actually the urban-centred politics in Bangladesh and improper growth of national political institutions have retarded the development of local level representative institutions. Therefore, political institutions from the local level should first emanate for achieving development targets in this one of the world's poorest South Asian country.

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Communal Competition for Power in the Punjab and the Unionist-Muslim League Co-operation, 1924-26

Dr. S. QALB-I-ABID

The introduction of the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms in the Punjab had been followed by a severe kind of communal rivalry for power. Each community wanted to have the upper hand in the provincial administration. The Muslims claimed their majority rights due to their numerical strength; the Hindus desired to continue their domination due to their progress in education, and the Sikhs, being the former rulers of the Punjab, claimed as much as 30 per cent of the seats in the legislature though they represented only 11 per cent of the population. The Hindus and the Sikhs also strongly opposed the Muslim right of representation through separate electorates, and demanded that Muslim representation in the legislative council should stay under 40 per cent in spite of being 56 per cent of population. Several attempts were made by the Indian leaders themselves to resolve the communal tension, but they failed to evolve an acceptable formula.

During the first three years of the working of reforms there emerged a situation of no-compromise between the Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs. Each community, disregarding the other, pushed forth its claims regarding its representation in the Legislative Council, local bodies and services. With the passage of time relations between

the communities went from bad to worse, and the gulf between them widened day by day. With future constitutional advance in mind, each community was adding to its strength. The Punjab Hindu Sabha was revived and under the leadership of Raja Narendra Nath gathered a "large following due to its propaganda against the Muslim interests.¹ The Sabha leaders were against the historic Congress-League Pact, (The Lucknow Pact) which, among other things, had recognized the Muslim representation through separate electorates.² Some of its leading members, such as Dr. Gokal and Bhai Parmanand, were also committed to the extremist anti-Muslim religious and cultural movements.³

In addition to the revival of anti-Muslim Hindu Mahasabha, the strength of Hindus in the Punjab had increased by 1924 with the formation of two more political parties, i.e., the Punjab Swaraj Party and the Punjab Hindu Swaraksha Sabha. Although the Swaraj Party was not founded as a purely Hindu party yet it soon assumed a Hindu character. The Nationalist Muslims registered their protest against this attitude.⁴ The party was strongly opposed to the Muslim interests, which, it claimed, were represented by the Unionist Party;⁵ its leading members, such as Lala Duni Chand, Lala Hans Raj, Prof. Ruchi Ram, Lala Lajpat Rai and Dr. Gokal Chand Narang had emerged as sworn critics of the Unionist Party. One of the main demands of this party was the revision of the Government of India Act, 1919. The Swarajists had entered the councils with the sole object of wrecking them by adopting a policy of non-cooperation from within.⁶ They declared themselves opponents of the people and parties which co-operated with the British for the working of reforms. In some provinces such as Bengal and the Central Provinces the Swarajists had achieved a great degree of success. They were in command of a considerable majority of votes and they availed themselves of every opportunity to bring dyarchy to an end by reducing ministerial salaries to a nominal figure, defeating the government over many important heads of budget, obstructing official measures and holding up supplies as long as possible.⁷ In

short, they did everything possible to hinder the working of the transferred subject. In the Punjab, Lajpat Rai, a veteran Hindu leader and a relentless opponent of Fazl-i-Hussain's 'rule' in the Punjab and Shahabuddin's 'rule' in Lahore,⁸ had supported the Swarajist election campaign. The party obtained a notable victory in the elections held in 1923, and organized itself into a solid bloc of twelve members in the Punjab council. Although the party had no power to obstruct the working of the 1919 Act in the Punjab, its leadership (Lajpat Rai, Duni Chand and Prof. Ruchi Ram) was extremely critical of what they called "Muslims represented by the Unionist Party." Prof. Ruchi Ram was elected in 1923 to represent the Punjab University, defeating a Muslim candidate Khalifa Dr. Shujauddin.⁹

Similarly the other Hindu political party, the Punjab Hindu Swaraksha Sabha, formed a few months before the elections, with a view to protecting and safeguarding Hindu interests in the Punjab.¹⁰ Its founding members, Narinder Nath and Prof. Gulshan Rai were also great critics of the Unionist Party. Both of them had been in the fore-front against the measures adopted by Fazl-i-Hussain to improve the position of his community; while Narendra Nath was active in the council, Gulshan Rai was writing articles in the press. The party had difference of opinion with the other two Hindu parties on various issues; but as far as opposition to the Muslims was concerned, they stood together.¹¹ In addition to their combined strength the fast-increasing strength of the All-India Swaraj Party in the Central Legislature, and its vigorous demands to revise the Montagu-Chelmsford Constitution for further constitutional advance in India, further strengthened the Hindu position in the Punjab.

Meanwhile at all-India level the Nationalists had been demanding more reforms. The government had introduced the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms with a view to satisfying the 'legitimate aspirations' of the Indians for reforms. As far as the moderate and the 'reasonable' opinion was concerned, the reforms were welcomed. But the extremist section of the Indian opinion had rejected these

reforms as inadequate.¹² Ever since, there had been constant demands raised by the advanced section of Indian politicians for further constitutional advance in India. As early as September 1921, Mozumdar Bahadur moved a resolution in the Central Legislature asking for the establishment of autonomy in the provinces and the introduction of responsible government at the Centre. The resolution was later amended by the Assembly, asking the government to appoint a committee for the purpose stated in the original resolution. The Secretary of State, however, did not agree to the demand, on the plea that further progress was possible under the existing Act. His despatch (of November 1922) did not satisfy Indian opinion and in the following year demands were again made for the grant of constitutional advance.¹³ By 1924, the situation had become worse from the government's point of view; the Swarajist element had won a great victory in the recent elections, and their entry into the councils had stiffened the demand for further reforms in India. On February 5, 1924, Diwan Rangachariar moved a resolution recommending an early revision of the 1919 Act, with the object of granting full self-governing dominion status to India, together with Provincial autonomy in the provinces. Moti Lal Nehru tabled an amendment suggesting the summoning of a Round Table Conference to recommend a draft constitution for India. The debates took place on the 8th, 13th, and 18th February, 1924, and the amended resolution was passed by an overwhelming majority of the Assembly.¹⁴

This notable success of the Swarajist Party was due to the fact that Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, leader of the Muslim League and the Independent Party, (consisting of 17 members) had fully supported the move. He stood for a full enquiry into the Act of 1919, and was opposed to the government's desire to avoid the issue by conducting some sort of departmental enquiry. The Quaid was in agreement with Nehru, the leader of the Swaraj Party, as the demand developed in the Assembly.¹⁵ It was only due to the combined pressure of Hindus and Muslims that the government agreed to institute an enquiry into the working of the Montagu-

Chelmsford constitution, introduced only three years earlier. The Home Member, Sir Malcolm Hailey,¹⁶ expressed government's readiness "to make a serious attempt to investigate justifiable complaints against the working of the scheme in practice ; to assess the causes and to examine the remedies, if necessary."¹⁷ The government also expressed its willingness to make recommendations to the British Parliament, should the enquiry suggest any advance within the boundaries of the existing Act.¹⁸

This commitment first led to the appointment of an official committee with the object of examining the Act of 1919 and the possibilities of amendments, leading to the better working of the administration. It was followed by the appointment of the Reforms Enquiry Committee presided over by Sir Alexander Mudiman ; the other members were ; Sir Mohammad Shafi (then Law Member of the Viceroy's Council), the Raja of Burdwan, Sir Tej Bahadur, Sir Sivaswami Aiyer, Sir Arthur Froom, Sir Henry Smith, Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah and Dr. Parajpye.

The appointment of the Reforms Enquiry Committee must have alarmed the Unionist Party in the Punjab. Although the Unionist Party was predominantly Muslim it had no links with the Muslim League, ever since the latter decided in favour of non-cooperation. The Unionist Party was isolated whereas its opposition was getting stronger. Since the elections of 1923, new developments had favoured the Hindu Community of the Punjab. By 1924, they had three political parties (as mentioned earlier) to advance their claims in future reforms.

Moreover, the Hindus could count on their strong links with the All-India Swaraj Party, whose influence was growing fast at the Centre, as well as in the various provinces. The Hindu opposition at the time was more coherent and better organized, and demands for the cancellation of controversial measures such as the allocation of seats for Muslim student's in various colleges and certain other rules to improve the position of Muslim Community in local self-government institutions, became louder. Likewise, the boycott of

the municipalities since Fazl-i-Hussain's rules came into force also gathered more support. Above all an agitation had also been started against communal electorates by labelling it as 'vicious principle'. The Lucknow Pact (1916) by which certain Muslim rights such as share in administration and communal electorates were recognized, was also frequently attacked.¹⁹

These developments were definitely a signal of alarm for Muslim interests in the Punjab in general and for the ruling Unionist Party in particular. The opposition at this moment was so strong that if unchecked, it could have influenced the forthcoming Reforms Committee against Muslim interest. The same might also seriously affect the ascendancy of the Unionist Party in the Punjab ; the party was formed in 1923 by Sir Fazl-i-Hussain with the support of rural group in the Punjab Legislature. That party by itself had no capacity to counter the opposition's strength. Unlike some Hindu political parties, it had no contacts or influence over the masses.²⁰ In fact the party's influence was largely confined to the walls of the Provincial Council, where, with the help of official bloc and some of its Hindu-Sikh rural supporters, it had been able to pass certain legislative measures, during the first three years of the (1919) Reforms. After the second elections (1923) it had lost some of its Hindu-Sikh supporters ; and the Punjab Government often found itself under pressures from the opposition for its support of the Muslim Minister (Fazl-i-Hussain) and the Unionist Party.²¹ In these circumstances the Unionist leadership was left with no alternative but to seek help from the Quaid-i-Azam and the Muslim League.²² For the Unionist hierarchy this was not difficult. The Unionist leader himself had been a leading member of the League before the reforms. Fazl-i-Hussain had severed his connections with the League when it adopted non-cooperation as its creed and since then he had mainly concentrated on his ministerial responsibilities. Now that the non-cooperation movement had almost failed he could renew his links with the League.

Incidentally, the Muslim League leader (Jinnah) was also in

need of support. Like Fazl-i-Hussain, he had opposed the non-cooperation movement, sticking to constitutional means.²³ He was feeling uncomfortable because the League was still dominated by Nationalist Muslims (led by Maulana Mohammad Ali and Dr. Ansari) who believed in continuing the policy of non-cooperation with the government. Although Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah was against this, so long as these Nationalist Muslims dominated the League he could not influence the League to decide in favour of entering into the Councils. In the 15th session of the League (March-April, 1923) he had failed to secure a decision in this sense.²⁴ Thereafter, the League leader looked to the Punjab, where the non-cooperation movement could not establish a foothold and the policy of cooperation with the government was exemplary. Besides this, it was essential and logical for a leader of the Muslims of India and for a political party which claimed to represent Indian Muslims, to enlist the support of the Punjab Muslims.²⁵ Thus with the object of giving support to Fazl-i-Hussain's party, and at the same time enhancing the League's prestige, Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah arranged to resume the League's discontinued session of the previous year in the Punjab capital, Lahore.²⁶

The most notable feature of this session at Lahore (in May 1924) was the presence of an unusual fervour and enthusiasm.²⁷ On this occasion, the League was able to attract a large number of delegates and visitors; the Khilafatist Muslims also attended in large numbers.²⁸ The Chairman of the reception committee, Agha Safdar, soon came to business by referring to the presence of tension between the three communities of the Punjab. He reported the demands of the Punjab Muslims regarding their share in the Provincial Legislature, local bodies, services and administration of the province. Agha Safdar also referred to the resentment and concern expressed by the other two communities over these demands. The League leader during his address first of all referred to the non-cooperation movement, by calling it a mistake and a failure. He then referred to the communal friction arising from the communal claims of each community. The Quaid-i-Azam underlined the need

of a Hindu-Muslim agreement to settle amicably the claims of each community ; here he also warned the Hindu community by linking the freedom of India with Hindu-Muslim unity : "India will get dominion responsible government the day the Hindus and the Muslims are united. . . . Swaraj (self-rule) is an inter-changeable term with Hindu-Muslim Unity."²⁹

Of course, the Unionists exploited the opportunity to give strength to their claims by using the League's platform. The Deputy President of the Council, Sheikh Abdul Qadir, moved a lengthy resolution to be incorporated as the League's policy in the event of future constitutional changes. As the reforms had been highly beneficial for the Muslims and the Unionist Party, the introduction of provincial autonomy with a weak central government was their first demand. The demand was also made that in the future the division of seats in the Legislature should be on the basis of numerical strength of each community; that would mean raising the Muslim share from 40 per cent to 56 per cent. The resolution warned the government that any attempts to reduce the Muslim share to please the other two communities would be highly undesirable. The Hindu-Sikh campaign for the introduction of joint electorate was denounced, and the continuation of separate electorates demanded. Mir Maqbul, another leading Unionist, referred to the most controversial issue, i.e., the Muslim share in the services and administration of the country. He moved a resolution, asking the League's council to appoint a committee in order to consider the genuine grievances of the Muslims in this respect.³⁰ These resolutions were accepted, to the Unionists' satisfaction, as a part of the League's policy. This acceptance of their point of view was considered by the Unionist leadership as a great victory.³¹ As a result the hitherto isolated Unionist Party was able to secure an effective voice in the League's important committees, such as 'the committee to frame a future Indian Constitution'. Moreover, the League's support helped the Unionists to counter the effect of Hindu campaign against their party. Lala Lajpat Rai now started to criticize the Quaid for his

support of the Unionist Party and advocacy of majority rule in the Punjab.³²

Meanwhile, the Government of India, under pressure from the Nationalist leaders, directed the provincial governments to elicit opinion on the subject of reforms. In April 1923,³³ and April 1924,³⁴ all provincial governments were directed to send detailed papers on the working of reforms alongwith suggestions for further constitutional advance. The Punjab Government sent lengthy memoranda. Each time the Punjab Government expressed its satisfaction with the working of the reforms ; the introduction of various reforms in local self-government, especially the democratization of the local bodies was particularly approved. Similarly, the emergence of a strong rural party in the Legislature was considered to be a good sign. The government was grateful to the Unionist Party, for its majority in the Council had made the selection of ministers much easier than before, when there were no political parties. In the field of legislation, the working of the system was also described as satisfactory. The government pointed out that out of a total of 17 Bills introduced in the Legislature since the inauguration of reforms, 14 had been passed into law. However, one regrettable feature of the reforms, the government's note ran, was the emergence of communal competition for power. In this connection various reforms introduced by Fazl-i-Hussain and the allegations by the Hindu leaders were also discussed. Nonetheless the government felt that Fazl-i-Hussain's actions were justified : "The Minister's attempt to secure definite opportunities for the community which constitutes his chief support in the Council, is not in itself unreasonable ; it may indeed be admitted as one of the inevitable results of the Reforms scheme. His actions, again, could be justified on their merits, for the community (Muslims) was backward in education, and had not so far gained in the administration a representation at all commensurate with its numbers. . . . Many of the measures introduced by the Minister would not have met with acute criticism, had they issued from an Executive Government not susceptible to the charge of communal feeling. . . .For the moment, there is every justification

for the attempt of a majority community, backward in educational and political status, to raise itself to the level of its rivals. Real harm will only be done if that community passes from the constructive process of denying equal opportunities to other members, or deliberately excluding them from the administration.”³⁵

Undoubtedly, there was a degree of justification for Fazl-i-Hussain's efforts to improve the position of his backward community. It was not only the view held by Maclagan's administration, his successor Sir Malcolm Hailey also considered it justifiable.³⁶ In Bengal, it was observed, places were reserved for Muslim students in government colleges, in aided colleges and in 35 Zilla and government high schools. These changes had been introduced during 1921-26.³⁷ Before the reforms the veteran Hindu leaders such as Lala Lajpat Rai had been accusing the government of deliberately keeping the backward areas out of its education schemes;³⁸ Lajpat Rai was against Hindu opposition to Fazl-i-Hussain's opening of intermediate colleges in the predominantly Muslim areas of Gujrat and Lyallpur.³⁹ But Hindu opinion at large was against the extension of reforms, for they feared that it would further improve the Muslim position and undermine theirs.⁴⁰ The Hindu press which had earlier been the greatest supporter of reforms, made no demands for the further transfer of subject to popular control, and gave an impression to the government that “there would be some gratification if certain subjects now transferred were to pass over to the reserved side.”⁴¹ They also persuaded Sir Edward Maclagan (the Governor) to adopt an undemocratic attitude and override certain decisions of the Ministry of Education and Local Self-government which were supported by the majority in the Legislative Council.⁴² The Hindu attitude seriously affected the Punjab's constitutional advance. The Government under these circumstances was compelled to advise against the transfer of any major subjects to ministerial control until the competitive rivalry of the communities had abated.⁴³ The Punjab government also advised against any addition to the agricultural votes, demanded by the rural interests of the Punjab, for it feared that Hindu politicians would vehemently oppose such move.⁴⁴

However, the ministers and the ruling Unionist Party, who were enjoying the fruits of the reforms, strongly advocated further constitutional advance. The Sikh member for revenue implied that one of the objects of the Act of 1919 was that the reforms would be extended: "As time goes on, more reserved subjects should be transferred and (that) eventually all departments under the reserved head should be placed under the charge of the ministers, thereby replacing members by ministers, i.e., that the number of the ministers would increase and the number of members would decrease so as ultimately to place the ministers in charge of all the portfolios making them responsible to the Legislature.⁴⁵ Sunder Singh Mijithia opined that the transfer of subjects to popular control could be effected even without making an alteration in the existing Act.⁴⁶ The Unionist Party also favoured the extension of reforms leading to provincial autonomy. The Party strongly criticized the dyarchy. This dual system, they thought, prevented: (a) the creation of a united government; (b) the development of a party form of government; and (c) the development of a sense of responsibility in the Legislature. Like their Sikh colleagues the Unionists also advocated the transfer of all reserved subjects, and on that issue they referred to the Section 25(a) of the 1919 Act, which allowed such a process. Being the representatives of rural interests, the Unionist ministers demanded a substantial increase in the number of rural voters. They suggested a lowering of the franchise qualifications from existing Rs. 25 to Rs. 5 land revenue, and the enfranchisement of agricultural tenants. The ministers demanded the modification of electoral rules to ensure their (rural) monopoly in the future councils. In view of the wholesale propaganda against the ministers, the government was asked to provide its ministers and members with the services of the publicity department to explain their policies to the illiterate population of the province. Such a measure, the ministers thought, would help counter the spreading of false stories by the 'agitators' and 'mischief-mongers.'⁴⁷

With official information collected by the Government of India

in hand, the Mudiman Committee assembled in Simla on the 4th August, 1924 and started its business. The committee received memoranda and evidence from various important sources, including the Punjab; the Punjab's case was presented by the following: Harkishen Lal (former Minister), Nanak Chand (Secretary, Hindu Nationalist Party in the Council), Prof. Gulshan Rai (Secretary Punjab Hindu Sabha) and Malik Barkat Ali (Vice-President to the Punjab Muslim League). As expected the Hindu representatives complained bitterly against the system of communal electorates as a method of representation, and the administration of various subjects under the control of the Unionist Party. Harkishen Lal, a former friend and a ministerial colleague of Fazl-i-Hussain, expressed his opinion against any advance towards Self-Government until the system of communal representation was abolished. Nanak Chand also argued against communal electorates.⁴⁸ He thought that this system was responsible for the communal tension and bitterness in the Punjab. The Hindu leader argued that the communal electorates for the Muslims were "opposed to the spirit of democracy and cannot help in the formation of a Nation . . . the organization of the communities on the basis of religion would produce the most difficult problem in the administration of the province."⁴⁹ Although Nanak Chand admitted that even in the absence of communal electorates, the Punjab Muslims would still preponderate, he would still prefer to be ruled by a Muslim majority "in whose election they (the Hindus) have a hand."⁵⁰ However, in the event of the continuation of separate electorates, Nanak Chand suggested that this system should not be continued for more than a 10 years period. He strongly advised against any further extension of these electorates in the local bodies, unless the minority community in a particular municipal area, or district board, demanded such an extension. The Hindu leader also expressed his community's concern over the Unionist Party's domination of the Punjab cabinet. He opined that the Hindu representative in the cabinet should be acceptable to the bulk of his own community. As far as the ministerial power of recruitment were concerned, Nanak Chand pointed out that the

ministers had abused such powers in the past. He suggested that recruitment should in future be undertaken regardless of the communal claims; the ministers should have nothing to do with it; and the Governor should be responsible for such matters.⁵¹ Prof. Gulshan Rai also agreed with his Hindu colleague, in the matter of reduction of ministerial control over recruitment: "It would be necessary to exclude the recruitment of services entirely from the jurisdiction of Legislatures and the ministers . . . the ministers and Legislatures should have nothing to do with the grant of *jagirs* (the grant of lands), pensions, titles or the Crown Lands . . . all these subjects should be under the control of the Governor."⁵²

The renewed contact of the Muslim members of the Unionist Party with the Muslim League, which had resulted in the revival of the Punjab Muslim League, soon paid its dividend. In order to counter the Hindu onslaughts, the Punjab League sent its memorandum based on the resolutions passed at its Lahore session in May, 1924.⁵³ Similarly, Malik Barkat Ali presented his memorandum and gave evidence to the Mudiman Committee, in support of the claims of the Unionist Party. He fully supported the introduction of provincial autonomy in the Punjab: "The distinction between the reserved and the transferred subjects should be abolished . . . all provincial subjects should be placed in the hands of minister responsible to the Legislature . . . the appointment of non-official members in the Legislatures should be discontinued; the nominated official bloc should also disappear."⁵⁴ In complete contrast to the Hindu demands, Malik Barkat Ali argued in favour of giving full powers to the Ministers in making parliamentary as well as other appointments in the subjects under their control. He also opined that the cabinet as a whole should be responsible to the Legislature and also advocated strongly the retention of separate electorates for the Muslims and that they (Muslims) should be given a majority of seats in the Punjab Council.⁵⁵

The Reforms Committee (the Mudiman Committee) published its report in December, 1924. The Committee divided itself into two

groups. The majority consisted of Mudiman (the Chairman), Sir Shafi, A. Froom, H. Smith and the Maharaja of Burdwan; the minority were: Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, Sir Siva Swamy Aiyer, Muhammad Ali Jinnah and Paranjpye. The majority held the view that the 1919 Act was working in most provinces, and "is giving training in parliamentary government to the electorate and also to the members of the Legislatures and to the Indian ministers." The report argued that "the period during which the present constitution has been in force has been too short to enable a well-founded opinion as to its success to be formed. The evidence before us is far from convincing us that it (the Act) has failed."⁵⁶ The report, however, deplored the existing communal friction. It said the tendency to prefer communal interests to the interests of India was not conducive to the success of responsible government; and this state of affairs, the committee felt, would retard the constitutional advance of India. Nonetheless, the committee asked Indians to take steps to remove this difficulty: "We, however, are not without hope that the leaders of all communities will continue, in the interests of constitutional development in India, to strive to develop unity in place of discord, and thus prove that the acuteness of the existing communal tension is but a temporary phase."⁵⁷

Now we shall examine the Reforms Committee's Report affecting the Punjab in the light of minutes and memoranda presented to it by the various representatives of the province. As regards the proposal to broaden the franchise, the committee maintained that "there had not been sufficient practice in the exercise of responsibility to justify any general lowering of the franchise qualifications."⁵⁸ As for the reduction of the qualifications for the rural franchise and the enfranchisement of the agricultural tenants, as advocated by the Unionist Ministers, the committee rejected the proposal on two grounds: firstly using the plea that the ministers had failed to indicate the method and possible results of such an enfranchisement and secondly due to the fact that the Punjab government itself was reluctant to see a large addition of rural votes, which would create difficulties for the administration.⁵⁹ The committee also maintained

the status quo in such matters as the introduction of provincial autonomy and the form of electorates. As regards the further transfer of subjects to the popular control, the committee examined a list of reserved subjects, and agreed to transfer only the subjects of lesser importance such as Land Acquisition and Provincial Law Reports. So far as the role of the official bloc in the Council was concerned, the committee did not agree that the official members of the Council should not cast their votes on the subjects relating to the transferred departments. The committee not only gave full right of vote to the official members but also accepted the provincial government's privilege to direct its officials as to the manner in which they should cast votes in their respective Legislatures.⁶⁰

On the question of communal electorates, the committee was placed in an awkward position. The minority community in the Punjab was against it but the majority community (Muslims) passionately demanded its retention. Taking a view of the all-India situation, the committee admitted that the separate electorates were an obstacle to the political advance of British India; but due to the absence of an agreeable solution of the matter, it could not recommend any change in this direction.⁶¹ In the matters of recruitment, the committee neither favoured ministerial control nor local government's influenced, as propose by the Unionist and endorsed by the Lee Commission.⁶² It gave all powers of recruitment to the proposed Public Service Commission. On the most controversial aspect of recruitment, the communal quota in services, the committee neither accepted the Muslim claims nor the Hindu point of view. In order to adjust the claims of various communities it adopted a mid-way position by recommending the following formula: "In the rules for recruitment, the government should see that with due regard to efficiency, all communities should receive due representation in the public services."⁶³

The recommendations of the Reforms Committee were in no way injurious from the Unionist's point of view. With the exception of some reduction in ministerial control over recruitment, the

committee made no recommendation which could affect the Unionist control over the affairs of the Punjab. Their association with the League paid its dividends, when the Mudiman Committee used the League's resolution of May, 1924 to counter the Hindu-Sikh propaganda against the ruling party.⁶⁴ In the following year the Hindu propaganda was so acute that Lala Lajpat went to the extent of suggesting the partition of the Punjab; the Western part to be Muslim and the Eastern to be non-Muslim. In order to prevent the Muslims from getting a majority in the Council, Hindus and Sikhs united against them. Mangal Singh (a Sikh leader) said the concept of a Muslim majority was fanatical. Lajpat Rai pleaded the Sikh case with the same intentions; criticizing the Lucknow Pact as a great blunder, he said that the communal electorates were negation of Nationalism and had divided the communities into water-tight compartments. He reportedly pleaded for the abolition of separate electorates for Muslims.⁶⁵ Meanwhile the bond between the Muslim League and the Unionist Party further strengthened. The 17th session of the League (1925) once again endorsed 2 favourite Unionist demands—the creation of the Muslim majority in the Punjab Council and the retention of communal electorates. The League also urged the British government to appoint a Royal Commission, with the object of establishing self-government in India. Its committee to frame a scheme for constitutional advance included among others, Sir Mohammad Shafi, Sheikh Abdul Qadir, Sikandar Hayat and Malik Barkat Ali from the Punjab.⁶⁶

In the year 1926 when the Unionists' position in the Punjab once again seemed to be in jeopardy the Muslim League came to their rescue. The Governor had excluded the Muslims from the cabinet, following a policy of reconciliation with the non-Muslim opinion in the Punjab. Only a year before, the League leader had pleaded the Muslim case of having a majority of seats in the Punjab Council before the All-Parties Conference and warned that the attempts to deny these rights would not be tolerated.⁶⁷ The League's session in 1926, therefore, provided a golden chance for the Unionist

Muslims to make propaganda against the Hailey administration. The session was presided over by a leading member of the Unionist Party, Sheikh Abdul Qadir. The latter himself was a victim of the Government-Hindu understanding. Abdul Qadir had resigned his presidency of the Punjab Council to become a minister in the Punjab cabinet in 1925 ; but due to the government's policy of reconciliation with the Hindus, his appointment was not renewed in 1926. Thus, angrily, referring to the exclusion of Muslims from the cabinet he said : "A strange commentary on the so-called strength of the Muslims of the Punjab is furnished by the fact that during the year that is just ending, the Punjab has remained without a Muslim minister, simply because a tried administrator of the capacity of Fazl-i-Hussain was chosen by the government as an executive councillor. . . .Exception was taken to this by many Muslim Associations and Newspapers, but their voice remained unheeded. . . . It is further regrettable that in the newly formed council also the transferred subjects are probably going to be administered without Muslims having a share in that administration."⁶⁸ Another leading member of the party also asked the government to safeguard the interests of the Punjabi Muslims; he strongly argued that, out of two ministers in the Punjab cabinet, one should be a Muslim.⁶⁹

The delegates from other provinces supported the Punjab Muslims' case. Sir Abdur Rahim (a Bengal delegate) also registered his criticism : "As many as 36 men of one community made a unanimous demand that a representative of their community should be in-charge of one of the portfolios in the transferred departments. It seemed to him that the local government would find its hands forced to recognise the demand. The law was sufficiently elastic, and the Governor could appoint a Muslim minister in addition to the two already existing. This would be better, as the three communities of the province, namely Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims would be represented in the ministry."⁷⁰ Likewise, Dr. Shafaat Ahmad (a U.P. delegate) favoured the demand but in a different style. He said : "The argument in favour of the appointment of a Muslim minister was not one of the loaves and fishes ; it was that of restoring the

confidence of a community in government.”⁷¹

As a result, the League passed a strongly worded resolution on the question of the Muslim share in the Punjab Cabinet: “The League deplores the absence of a Muslim minister from the Punjab ministry and urges the necessity of having at least one Muslim minister in the administration of transferred subjects.”⁷² The League’s session was also exploited by the Punjab delegates to repeat their other demands. Keeping in view the forthcoming enquiry into the Government of India Act 1919, Sheikh Abdul Qadir emphasised the need of giving majority rights to the pre-dominantly Muslim provinces: “If non-Muslim majorities in most provinces have the chance of an effective control of their affairs, there is no reason why the same privilege should not be extended to provinces where the Muslims dwell in large numbers.”⁷³ On this point, Abdul Qadir criticized the joint efforts of the Punjab Hindus and the Sikhs to reduce the Muslim claims. He emphasised the need to demand from the forthcoming Royal Commission on Reforms majority rights for the Muslims of the Punjab and Bengal.⁷⁴ He also demanded the retention of separate electorates for the Muslims until a mutual agreement was concluded. Abdul Qadir raised the demand for a proper share for the Muslims in the administration of the country.⁷⁵

The Punjab had clearly dominated the proceedings of the League’s session. Although there is no evidence to suggest that the government took serious notice of the League’s demands, shortly afterwards F. K. Noon was appointed⁷⁶ a minister in the Punjab cabinet to represent the Punjabi Muslims.

In short, throughout the period under discussion (1924-1926) the Unionist Party benefitted due to its revived links with the Muslim League. It was only due to the support given by the Quaid-i-Azam that the Punjab’s ruling party was able to offset the combined Hindu-Sikh pressures against the Unionist rule in the Punjab.

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Rajendra Cola's Raid on Sri Vijaya in 1025 A. D.: A Political and Economic Study of Eleventh Century Tamil Nadu

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Past historical scholarship has viewed Rajendra Cola's raid on Sri Vijaya in A.D. 1025 as either an attempt at the political domination of the Malayan Peninsula, or as a punitive expedition to protect the interests of the Tamil merchants trading with China. Such views, grossly simplistic as they are, have become part of conventional historiography, and have not been seriously questioned until recently. A fresh examination of the source material analyzed in the light of Eisenstad's formulations suggests that the raid was merely symptomatic of the resource management system that evolved in the Tamil country.¹ Raids and military expeditions of a predatory nature served a dual purpose. Firstly, in a polity which was highly decentralized and where sovereignty was shared by several segments of the state, each having a fair degree of autonomy within its own sphere, the ruler was compelled by the logic of existing politico-economic institutions to formulate and execute goals that would serve to strengthen the position of the dominant political authority. This meant, in effect, that the ruler could pursue autonomous political objectives by manipulating existing institutions and by displaying initiative. Secondly, as Cola state system was based on

a very slender agrarian base, which was constantly being eroded by the grant of *ellemysenary* land tenure to Brahmans and Temples, both of which enjoyed a number of fiscal privileges which included exemption from taxation, long distance raiding served to expand 'free floating resources' available to the court.²

The Cola presence in Sri Vijaya has largely been seen in the context of Tamil trade with China through the Straits of Malacca. Underlying the writing of scholars like Nilakanta Sastri, Paul Wheatley, Wolters, and Majumdar is the assumption that the Cola political and economic system was structurally capable of acting in the interest of the Tamil merchant guilds who controlled the trade between the Coromandel Coast and China.³ Another facet to this hypothesis is the belief that the Sri Vijayan Empire was a powerful maritime state, with a well developed urban/hinterland continuum and commanding vast areas of agricultural land from which the surplus to sustain a merchant dominated society could be generated. Wolters, who views Sri Vijaya as a classic example of a maritime state, describes it as a " . . . federation of trading ports on the fringe of large areas of forests . . . Sri Vijaya was not a state with territorial boundaries, but a series of interlocked human relationships among harbor principalities and pirate lairs based on patronage, loyalty and power."⁴ Whereas this analysis is fairly consistent with the source material, Wolters' hypothesis that the Sri Vijayan economy was sustained by a vigorous participation in the trade nexus of Southeast Asia and hence commercial rivalry between them and the Colas of the Tamil Coast existed appears unjustified. The archaeological excavations in Sumatra have shown no evidence of material prosperity in Sri Vijayan sites.⁵ The absence of urban sites along the coast of western Sumatra and Malaysia together with the poverty of epigraphs testifying to widespread commercial links and the almost negligible traces of monumental architecture lends credence to the view that the importance of Sri Vijaya as a socio-economic entity has been overrated. It is significant that Sri Vijayan archaeology has not produced a single monument comparable to Angkor Wat, and the site of the ancient capital near Palembang has not revealed

any trace of widespread commerce. Although it may be argued that the Sri Vijayan system was run in a way that could dispense with the statues, temples, and other ceremonial constructions which are a feature of premedieval Southeast Asian statecraft, it may be pointed out that the Sri Vijayan epigraphs, of which the Telagu Batu inscription is the most elaborate, contain definite influence of the Sanskrit model of kingship and hence the other concomitant elements were probably present.⁶ The absence of such elements may indicate that the hitherto accepted notions of Sri Vijayan history need drastic revision.

The origins of Sri Vijaya are lost in the mists of time. By the end of the tenth century Sri Vijaya had consolidated its position in the heartland of central Sumatra around Palembang and had succeeded in gaining control over both sides of the Sunda Straits. In the north it established a tenuous control over the Straits of Malacca. The Chinese records suggest that China granted the status of an important tributary state to Sri Vijaya in recognition of the fact that, with the acquisition of control over the Straits of Malacca and Sunda, the Sri Vijayan state controlled the major entrepôts to the South China Sea.⁷ It has been postulated that from this point onwards Sri Vijaya started undermining the interests of Tamil merchants, leading to Rajendra Cola's raid of A.D. 1025.⁸

The Cola economy was predominantly agrarian. Trade, both internal and foreign, was peripheral to the economic system. Trade was not controlled by the Cola state but was in the hands of merchant guilds, of which the Manigramam of Kodambalur and Valanjiyar of Tiruppurambiyam were the most noteworthy. The epigraphs of the period reveal that the trade which these corporations carried out was within the framework of the *Periyanadu* assemblies. Powerful as these assemblies appear to be, they are to be viewed as a part of the process of agrarian integration that was set in motion during the early part of the fifth century. The disappearance of such organizations during the fourteenth century, followed by the drying up of commercial contact with Malaysia which was not

resumed until the early nineteenth century, can be traced to the change in the agrarian system brought about by the destruction of the 'nuclear areas' with the advent of the Vijayanagar Empire. With trade and the agrarian system linked to each other, it follows that the earlier belief that the trade of early medieval Tamil country was independent of the agrarian economy needs to be reconsidered. Burton Stein has rightly observed, "Vigorous and powerful as they appear to be, the medieval trade organizations must be seen as essentially integrated within the principal forms of social and economic organization of medieval South India in general and Coromandel in particular."⁹

There are certain other pointers to indicate that the maritime bias attributed to Sri Vijaya needs reconsideration. The vast eastern coastal plains of Sumatra, which have been described as 'unique' and have been considered by both Coedes and Wolters as the base of major maritime activities, have been described in vivid colors by Chinese and Arabic sources of the second millenia A.D., and lately have been explored by archaeologists. Finds from east Sumatran sites include antiquities such as statutory and inscriptions, but the absence of ceramic deposits suggests sparse habitations, and hence these sites cannot be taken as mature urban sites. Malayan archaeology has not succeeded in identifying any site which can be considered a true urban site along the western coast of the peninsula. Kedah and the sites around the mouth of the Takupa River have yielded evidence to suggest strong acculturation influence by settlers from the Tamil coast. Much of this influence is seen in the iconography of Siva and Ganesa and in inscriptions recording the visits of Buddhist pilgrims. There is little evidence to suggest that there was sustained commercial contact.¹⁰ Tamil influence in Southeast Asia was mainly cultural and cannot be interpreted as evidence of economic interaction.

The antiquity of the commerce between the Tamil coast and Southeast Asia can be discerned from a number of sources. The

Chinese writer Pan Kuo of the fifth century refers to the trade of the city of Haun-tche which can be identified with Kanchipuram. From the same period, a reference to foreign trade occurs in the earliest Tamil texts ; and Cilapatikaram of Ilango contains a vivid description of the prosperity of the town of Kaveripumpatinam, which was a trading port of some significance. This is attested to by the discovery of a large number of Roman coins with dates ranging from Nero (A.D. 54—68) to Hadrian (A.D. 117—138). The discovery of the Roman trading station at Arikamedu identified with Poduche of Ptolemy and Periplus of the Erythrean Sea confirms the impression gained from contemporary indigenous records.¹¹ However, from the first millenium of the Christian Era begins a period of accelerated commerce between the Coromandel coast and South-east Asia. In Kedah on the Malaysian coast evidence has been found of merchant settlers dating to the Pallava period. The port of Takuapa on the western side of the Isthmus of Siam was a major terminus for trade between India and China. From this site comes a ninth century inscription which records the building of a tank by a merchant guild called Manigramam.¹² With the advent of the Cola power in Southern India, the contact between the two regions become more widespread. This is exemplified by the fact that in A.D. 1025 the Sri Vijayan ruler of Malaysia built a Buddhist shrine at Nagapattam which was supported by grants from the Cola ruler Raja Raja I.¹³ Subsequent to this date, Javanese inscriptions attributed to Airlanga (A. D. 1006—1049) refer to Dravida and Cola merchants. Coedes is perhaps justified in believing that the Tamil merchants played an important role in the development of Indian cultural influence in Southeast Asia.¹⁴

A significant but suspiciously underemphasized body of epigraphs exist to suggest that friendly relations existed between the Cola kings of the Tamil coast and the Sri Vijayan state. In the third year of the reign of Rajendra I, a jewel set encrusted with precious stones was presented by an agent (*kanmi*) of the Sri Vijayan king (Srivijayat-taraiyar).¹⁵ Another inscription of about the same time records

that a gift of lamps fashioned by local craftsmen was presented to the Nagapattinam temple by a merchant claiming to be the agent of the reigning Sri Vijayan king.¹⁶ A last inscription, dated in the seventh year of the reign of Rajendra Cola I, records the gift of 87.75 *kalunju* (unit of quantity) of *cinakkanakam* (gold of China) and 60.75 *kalunju* of *undaigaippon* (donated gold) to purchase jewels for the presiding deity of the temple, to finance worship and food offerings, and to feed two priests who worked as the caretakers of the temple.¹⁷ All these gifts were endowed by a person styling himself as the agent of the king of Sri Vijaya, whose identity is as yet unknown. These epigraphs offer one clue as they describe him as *Kidarrattaraiyar*, which can be translated as King of Kedah. One conclusion which these inscriptions suggest is that there was little tension between the rulers of the Tamil coast and Malaysian coast and as the date of the last inscription is A.D. 1019, barely six years before the raid, it is definite evidence of the absence of any hostile feelings between the two states.

The agrarian foundation of early Tamil trade is clearly discerned from a number of epigraphs which record the activities of assemblies (*Chitrameli*; *meli* means 'plow' in Tamil), which are also styled as *periyanaadu*. Although the role played by this corporate body in the economic life of the period has not been adequately studied, a few salient features regarding the role played by this association can be gleaned from contemporary records. A few inscriptions from the Tamil heartland exemplify the relationship between the agrarian bodies and merchant groups of the nuclear areas. An inscription dated A.D. 1168, found in Tittagudi in South Arcot district, records the endowment by the *Chitrameli* assembly to a temple whose deity, a soil goddess (*Bhumi Devi*), is adorned by the symbol of the plow of the *Chitrameli*.¹⁸ This endowment was made by a group of merchants, which included both local and itinerant merchants. It is significant that the latter group is mentioned in inscriptions from Malaysia. The agrarian character of Cola commerce is again attested to by an inscription of A. D. 1235 from Anbil, in Tiruchirapali,

which mentions that the merchants were subordinate to the *Chitrameli*.¹⁹ These and other inscriptions reveal that trading organizations were firmly based in the agrarian system. Stein, who first drew attention to this feature of medieval trade, has argued, "It is in fact not possible to conceive of trade of any sort or by any kind of organization which were not part of the fabric of the predominantly agrarian society of the time ; the *Chitrameli* inscriptions make it clear that the various organizations of Coromandel merchants were integrated with and subordinate to assemblies representing the major interest groups in the more developed portions of the Coromandel."²⁰

From this analysis of the relationship between the agrarian order and the commerce of the Cola period, two significant conclusions can be drawn. First, the Coromandel trade with Malaysia was not so sustained and vigorous as Nilakanta Sastri believed. On the contrary, it appears to have been very desultory and intermitent ; and this precludes the possibility of trade rivalries leading to the raid of A.D. 1025. Secondly, the fragmented nature of the agrarian system with the almost total absence of an infrastructure to sustain and promote trade, together with the fact that Cola state policy was not motivated toward achieving monopoly over the Coromandel trade, warrants the assumption that the raid of A.D. 1025 had its genesis in causes which were not commercial. The raid of A.D. 1025, if seen in the perspective of Cola state formation and its resource base, suggests that the main motive for this venture was the acquisition of plunder and at the same time a daring act of initiative that would serve to strengthen the position of Rajendra I.

Historians working on the history of ancient Tamil Nadu have been tardy in recognizing the true nature of the Cola state. The raid of Rajendra Cola I on Sri Vijaya has been interpreted as a symptom of a dynamic political entity with a centralized leadership and administrative system, military and naval forces maintained from the central exchequer, and a strong economic foundation which could sustain such a gigantic infrastructure. Taken as a whole,

Nilakanta Sastri argued in his now monumental classic, *The Colas*, that the 'Byzantine monarchy' of this dynasty made possible their aggressive imperialism of which the raid marks the high watermark. A characteristic passage from this book would serve to illustrate the stance of this school :

The administration had been carefully organized and a fairly powerful bureaucracy brought into existence. . . . The army was a strong and tried body of men, well able to defend the wide land frontier and to keep down any threatened breaks in areas newly subjected to the empire, and ready for aggressive warfare abroad. The hold on Ceylon and some other islands like the Maldives was securely maintained by a powerful naval force which also served to protect the considerable overseas trade of the empire with the islands of the East Indies and with China. During the thirty-three years of his reign, Rajendra turned these initial advantages to the best possible use and succeeded in raising the Cola empire to the position of the most respected state of his time, and one which possessed though perhaps for a short time considerable domain over the Malay Peninsula and the Eastern Archipelago.²¹

Largely responsible for such generalizations is the nature of source material available to the historian. Cola inscriptions inscribed either on lithic surfaces or on copper plates are by far the most reliable source for the study of the political and economic structure of early medieval Tamil country. Until quite recently historians have shown little sophistication in the use of Cola epigraphs. The flamboyant rhetoric of these epigraphs, particularly the *Meykritti* (preamble), has led historians to infer that the spatial distribution of the epigraphs indicate the spread and consolidation of Cola rule. Rather than taking these inscriptions, essentially those found on the periphery of the Tamil country, as evidence of symbolic sovereignty, historians believed that they indicate actual political domination by the Cola monarch. Starting from this basic assumption relating to

the extent of royal control, two generations of Tamil scholars have erected an elaborate edifice which contains the entire panoply of a modern bureaucratic state. This kind of an administrative system presupposes a very stable resource base with centralized controls. Earlier historians tended to ignore the fact that in early medieval Tamil Nadu the expansion of royal initiative was inhibited by two factors. First, the strong social constraints like caste, corporate groups, value systems, and the emergence of the *bhakti* protest movement acted as barriers to the extension of royal influence. Secondly, the agrarian order was so structured that the most fertile areas were in the hands of non-producing classes which were exempted from any kind of fiscal obligation. This resulted in a situation where taxation became marginal to the overall economy, and resources for the execution of public policy were derived from various types of free floating fluid resources which were not tied to any particular ascriptive group, and thus could be freely accumulated, transformed, and finally redistributed.

The Cola political structure was very complex, and did not conform to any archetype described in traditional Smrithi literature. Whereas the Pallava rulers made a conscious effort to institutionalize kingship along Smrithi lines and sought to legitimize their dynasty by creating large settlements of the priestly order, the Cola theory of kingship made a marked departure. Retaining the essential elements of the Pallava system, the early Colas, particularly Raja Raja I (A.D. 985—1001) and Rajendra Cola (A.D. 1014—1044) devised a system of control based not on bureaucratic managerial lines but on a division of political power into various units each ostensibly independent but linked to the person of the Cola monarch by ritualistic ties. The non-formal nature of the Cola state can be discerned from the preambles of the inscriptions issued by the early monarchs. The *meykirttis* of Raja Raja I, and Rajendra Cola I contain the essential elements of the political and cultural ideology of the period. The fact that a laudatory preface invariably preceded the operative part of Cola land charters reveals that such documents were used for the transmission of the doctrine of kingship and

betrays the characteristic elements of ritual monarchy on which it was based. Stein, writing about the nature of Cola state formation observes, " . . . there is persuasive evidence that the political order established by Raja Raja I and Rajendra I self-consciously sought to convey a new and different quality of kingship and state."²²

Cola kingship was not custodial in nature and this makes the political theory of early medieval Tamil country different from that of the Maurya or Gupta dynasties. It is significant to note that, in cases where the Cola king alienated resources in favour of Brahmana settlers and established new colonies dominated by the priestly class, the king's edict (*dana-sasana*) took effect only with the concurrence of the local peasantry. This is best exemplified in the Larger Leyden Plates of Raja Raja I.²³ This inscription, which records the grant of land for the upkeep of the Buddhist *vihara* (Buddhist monastic structure) at Nagapattam, enjoins upon the *nattar* (the dominant peasantry) to uphold the charity. In fact, it was only after the *nattar*, who are shown in this document as the executors of the deed, performed the ritual of circumambulating the land accompanied by elephants that the royal order took effect. Other Cola inscriptions of the eleventh century record the involvement of the *nattar* in the execution of royal orders. In other words, the Cola king did not possess the absolute right to alienate the resources of his kingdom but was, in fact, dependent upon the peasantry for legitimizing his claim to do so.

The reasons for the non-formal and ambiguous nature of Cola kingship are found in the polity which evolved in the Tamil country. A study of the earliest bardic tradition embodied in the Corpus of Cankam literature reveals that the most crucial factor contributing towards the legitimization of a king or chieftain was his participation in war. The poems of the *pukam* (Tamil poems extolling valor) genre contain a number of references to the art of war, and the consequent glorification of war became an important element in Tamil political tradition. War was considered noble, not only because it represented a 'profession of arms', but death on the battle field was taken as an ideal well worth striving for. The puram

165. 2 states that, "they died having set up their fame on a firm basis." ("*tampukal niriit tammayntanar*"). The literature of the day constantly emphasizes the idea that honor and fame could be achieved only by bravery in war, deeds of slaughter against the enemy, and the acquisition of plunder by the victors. In the context of Tamil polity this pronounced glorification of war led to the emergence of a very unstable and non-organized form of rulership. The chieftain's or king's claim to rule, unlike the case of the Sanskrit tradition, did not emanate from his position as a king but from his active participation in predatory warfare. What further glorified him was the distribution of plunder, and it was expected that he share his booty by redistributing the fruits of battle. Thus the legitimization of a king in this society came from the bardic compositions that extoll his bravery, generosity, and initiative. It was only from the sixth century onwards that the cooperation of the *brahmanas* was invoked to fabricate geneologies and to authorize the powers of the king. The Cankam *Arasan* did not control a large area of land and it was this goal that inspired the later Pallava and Cola rulers to look for broader and more concrete forms of legitimacy. In spite of the fact that the Cola state was amorphous and lacked the elements of an organized polity, the epigraphs clearly show that warfare was the prerogative of the king and that the waging of war against neighbouring states or an extended frontier attack on distant states like Sri Vijaya were occasions when the royal presence could be asserted in a dramatic and highly apparent manner. The *raison d'être* for such a situation is obvious from a study of Cola state organization.

Historical scholarship for the past fifty years has held that the Cola state was a centralized polity ruled by a dynasty consisting of over twenty warriors from A. D. 846—1279. However, this view appears erroneous, as shown by Stein.²⁴ An alternative suggestion advanced by him, which emphasizes the distinction between ritual sovereignty and political sovereignty, helps in elucidating more clearly the nature of the Cola state. He views the Cola state as consisting of a multiplicity of political units, each unit having

effective control over its own sphere of influence. Each of these segments can be taken as representing structurally the entire system. The Cola state can be divided into three segments :

1. Nadu or Kurrum
2. Feudatories
3. Brahmadeya or Devadana Settlements

It is significant that although they all accepted the political suzerainty of the Cola ruler they were more or less independent within their own spheres. As yet there is little evidence to show that the imperial writ extended to these areas. In the absence of an established political order, which in this case was markedly decentralized, the only alternative course by which the demands of centralized control could be reconciled with that of jealously guarded local autonomy, was by manipulating existing institutions and making them serve royal interests. George W. Spencer has ably demonstrated that the proliferation of temples in the Tamil country during the reign of the most self-congratulatory of Cola rulers, Rajendra I, can be traced to his policy of making the Cola kingship a visible entity.²⁵

In a polity so characterized, aggressive warfare was an integrative activity and hence the various wars of Rajendra Cola I, rather than representing an attempt at political domination and extension of Cola domain, may be viewed as a device to maintain political equilibrium in the Tamil country. The raid on Sri Vijaya in A.D. 1025 may be taken as yet another manifestation of an uncertain and non-formal power asserting its authority over subordinate units of the state by taking the initiative to wage war. In addition to the economic advantages of war gained by systematic plunder, it served to diffuse the tension between the various 'lesser kings' vis-a-vis the Cola state. A suggestion tentatively put forward is that such acts of wanton aggression and leadership could synchronize with periods of increasing challenges to the domination of the Tanjavur rulers.

The Cola economy was essentially agrarian in character, with trade and industrial crafts, operating within the limits of an agrarian

economy. As the major resource of the region was agricultural land, it seems reasonable to assume that land revenue alone could sustain the imperial treasury, pay the salaries of the government staff, and uphold the various charitable endowments made by the Cola king. It has been argued that the gigantic Hindu temples, the *ellemysenary* settlements granted to members of the priestly class and the Cola court at Tanjavur were all maintained from the central treasury, which was in turn dependent upon a well-established revenue department which collected, assessed and transferred the fiscal resources to the treasury. The role of the 'plunder dynamic' in Tamil history has not been stressed primarily due to the enthusiasm on the part of historians to discover the elements of a full-fledged state in Cola times. An alternative hypothesis which helps in understanding Cola history is to view the wars, campaigns, and inter-dynastic skirmishes as a conscious policy pursued by a ruler with a slender resource base in order to increase the flow of resources, both monetary and material, to the state.

A study of the agrarian system of the Cola macro region shows that, contrary to earlier beliefs, the agrarian economy was outside the pale of royal control. The main reason for this is to be sought in the character of the system itself. Stein has pointed out that basic to the agrarian order were the "nuclear areas of corporate institutions."²⁶ He views these nuclear areas as ecological systems based on factors like irrigation and soil conditions. Such a situation would obviously imply a scattered settlement pattern. With the advent of Cola rule in the ninth century, particularly during the reign of Rajendra Cola I, effort was made to integrate the various scattered settlements into a system which would make each unit a structural complement of the whole. The creation of rent free settlements of Brahmanas and the granting of immense quantities of land to Hindu temples were both aimed toward the integration of the agrarian system. While integration was aimed at and attempted, no effort was made to obtain control over the resources of the region.

The inscriptional evidence dating to the eleventh century suggests

that resource management came within the purview of institutions like Ur, Sabha, and Nadu. These agrarian bodies were autonomous and functioned independently and there was little attempt to regulate their activities which resource management would entail.

In a situation where the position of the ruler was threatened by a number of contending elements, he was compelled to use warfare and predatory expeditions as a strategy to assert his supremacy. Rajendra Cola's raid on Sri Vijaya can be seen as an attempt at mobilization and rationalization of power for the fulfilment of royal goals in order to enhance authority and prestige. In another way such predatory raids were economically advantageous as the Cola king had command over a slender resource base. The proliferation of quasi-autonomous and segmentary units in the periphery of the Tamil country made this dynasty depend on such expeditions to augment royal assets.

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Civil Servants as the political elites at that time were fiercely engaged in domestic power struggle. Iskander Mirza, Chaudhury Muhammad Ali, Muhammad Ikramullah, Aziz Ahmed and a few other civil servants became the key figures in the foreign office. Some high-ranking military officers, like Ayub Khan entered into this group of foreign policy elites and began to influence the foreign policy processes, particularly after the death of the Quaid. Pakistan sought to cultivate the friendship of its Muslim neighbours in order to strengthen itself against India and gain diplomatic support over various issues on international level and forums like the United Nations. Although Iran was not hostile to India yet it was more friendly towards Pakistan.

Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan, an old associate of the Quaid, and having a long ministerial experience, (he held ministerial posts and in Alwar State from 1928 to 1932, Interim Cabinet of India from 1946-47 and Federal Government of Pakistan from 1947-1948) was appointed as the Ambassador of Pakistan to Iran and Iraq on May 16, 1948.¹

But during the Anglo-Iranian oil dispute Raja favoured the nationalist leadership of Iran. Consequently, he was transferred to Turkey, a less volatile place on October 17, 1952.² He spent about eight months in Turkey and then, it is said, he decided to give up the diplomatic job.

It was officially announced by the Foreign Office on July 14, 1953 that "Mr. Ghazanfar Ali Khan till lately Ambassador of Pakistan to the Republic of Turkey, has been appointed as High Commissioner for Pakistan to India."³ He was appointed an envoy to India when both the countries were on the way to cooperation. Pandit Nehru had toured Pakistan on July 25, 1953 and Muhammad Ali Bogra was supposed to tour India alongwith Zafarullah Khan from August 16, 1953. In between the exchange of visits of both Premiers, Raja took the charge of his office. The unhappy incident of Sheikh Abdullah's arrest took place on August 9, 1953. But Raja Ghazanfar managed not to let the incident influence the healthy

atmosphere.⁴ The Nehru visit was welcomed warmly by Pakistanis and there was extreme goodwill for India as was exemplified by the spontaneous warm receptions given to Pandit Nehru in Karachi.⁵

Raja Ghazanfer Ali Khan had left for home earlier than the decision of his appointment as High Commissioner to India was announced on July 14, 1953. While enroute to Pakistan he was welcomed by King Faisal of Iraq at Baghdad. He met the King at his Palace and then he visited the Iraqi Foreign Office and met the Iraqi Foreign Minister on July 10, 1953.⁶ Although it is not proved that he left Ankara with a heavy heart with a determination to enter the national politics. The rumour was in the air since April 1953. But Ghazanfar Ali Khan had dismissed all speculations about his return to the Punjab politics, occasioned by his visit to the province. He, however, asserted that he had never shirked off any responsibility when called upon by the people or when he himself felt the necessity to serve the people, while facing the press reporters at Lahore Railway Station.⁷ Whenever he came on a casual visit to his home country he boldly commented on the situation prevailing at home. Had he returned to the active politics he would have become an unavoidable danger to the stalwart policy makers of the country. It is clear that an un-important post in Ankara could not make Raja keep out of politics. (The high office of High Commissioner to India may have been given as a bait to him.) It can be assumed safely that Zafarullah Khan and Muhammad Ali Bogra decided to install him in the post. Justification to this office for Raja, however, existed because the circumstances prevailing at that time demanded a person like him to create a conducive climate to approach some agreement with India. The services of Raja Ghazanfar were also needed for an early and favourable solution of Kashmir and other problems. He had accepted the office at Ankara with a heavy heart and it was feared that the strong-willed person like Raja may have revolted. (The strong-worded correspondence between the Foreign Office and Raja could not be approached due to the official embargo and one cannot approve the conclusion with a documentary proof.)

Raja Ghazanfar Ali in a statement before leaving for Lahore

said at Karachi that "I am carrying with me tremendous good will and shall make the sincerest possible efforts to remove the existing misunderstanding between India and Pakistan." He further asserted, "I am very lucky to go at a time when undoubtedly there is such goodwill among the people of the two countries."⁸ Raja addressed the Rotary Club, Lahore. He hoped for a settlement of Indo-Pakistan disputes. He asserted that "unless a solution to the existing differences between the two countries was brought about in the shortest possible time, none of the two countries could make any progress on the international front or at home." He also appreciated the Nehru-Ali talks at Karachi.⁹ He also said that he was very optimistic about Ali-Nehru talks. "The settlement of disputes is vital", he said, "the period of madness is over." He called for forgetting the past.¹⁰

Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan unpreservedly and boldly commented on the political issues faced by Pakistan during his diplomatic career. In an interview with the *Pakistan Times*, while advocating freedom of expression for the masses, he said that selfish politicians had forsaken ideals of Pakistan on vital constitutional and political problems. He also suggested that steps should be taken to set up a joint committee of Pakistan and Middle East experts to consider what articles could economically be manufactured in Pakistan to meet the needs of a particular Middle East Zone. He proposed: "this is the proper time to do it because all the Middle Eastern countries are planning to set up various kinds of factories."¹¹ He had visualised the future need of capital of the Gulf countries necessary to employ the Pakistani manpower. But nothing solid was done in this respect by the policy-makers of Pakistan.

Raja was a constitutionalist, though he was not given a chance to contribute to constitution-making of his country. He, however, called for quick framing of a constitution. He condemned provincialism and called for an early countrywide elections. He regretted that "in spite of six year's long waiting suspense and deliberations, Pakistan was still without a constitution. He suggested that "the

first General Elections should be conducted by the Judiciary without any interference from the Executive.”¹² He had high democratic ideals. He further suggested that the new constitution should be treated as an ‘interim constitution’ and should be left open to any amendment which the duly elected representatives of the people might deem necessary later on. He also visualised his conception of an Islamic state based on “honesty, free from virus of nepotism, corruption, jobbery, favouritism, in which justice would reign supreme. There should be equal opportunities for all the poor and the rich.”¹³

Commenting on political instability in the Punjab, Ghazanfar Ali Khan asserted that the Punjab would not brook centre’s interference. He asserted that the unhappy state of affairs in the Punjab was due to the centres’ attempt at imposing ministeries of its own choice on the province. “Leave the people alone to choose their own leadership, and do what they like, in their province.”¹⁴ Although he refuted the report emanating from Lahore and appearing in a section of the Indian press that he would shortly visit Lahore in connection with a non-confidence motion against the Noon Ministry, had no foundations. The assertion of the Raja about the Punjab politics was resented by Chaudhury Muhammad Ahsan, the MNA from Gujrat.¹⁵

On his first visit to India since Partition, Raja Ghazanfar was pleased to find great good will there for his country. “Imagine”, he said, “on the second day after my arrival in New Delhi, about forty refugees from my home district of Jhelum came to see me. We felt real brothers.”¹⁶ He had strong faith in an agreed solution between the two Premiers. He also hoped that the Kashmir question was not beyond a solution. During an interview to G.I. Jain of the *Times of India*, speaking for himself, he said, “were it not for his desire to serve a good cause, dear to my heart—friendly relations between the two countries—he would have retired.”¹⁷ He was in favour of direct peaceful negotiations with India.

Premier Muhammad Ali visited India alongwith Zafarullah

Khan on August 16, 1953. A joint communique was issued in favour of peaceful settlement of the Kashmir problem. But by December, 1953 Pandit Nehru started saying that the circumstances were changed and that no more talks with Pakistan were useful.¹⁸

Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan in a press interview at Bombay on February 5, 1954 laid stress on early settlement of all outstanding disputes between Pakistan and India which he thought affected millions in both the countries. He was on his first official visit to Bombay and was accorded a rousing welcome by the leading Indian citizens and the Pakistanis,¹⁹ during an interview with the *Bharat Jyoti*.

On April 11, 1954, Raja wanted the end of visa system between India and Pakistan. He remarked, "the resumption of Railway passenger traffic between Amritsar and Lahore will go a long way in removing the travel and trade barriers between India and Pakistan."²⁰ It was due to his efforts that the rail link between Lahore and Amritsar was resumed.

Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan visited Lahore in October 1954. During his stay at home he was interviewed by *The Dawn*. He denounced the ill-advised leaders of the Punjab. He also did not agree with those who were demanding the dissolution of the Pakistan Constituent Assembly or asking for fresh elections at that stage. He hoped that the constitution would be passed by the promised date given by the Premier. He was also deadly against the provincialism and discouraged such feelings. He believed that every province must stand on its merits. "We are all Pakistanis and everyone, irrespective of provinces and other things, should have equal rights and opportunities."²¹

In India, Raja always helped the government of India to solve its regional problems. He offered his good offices to the West Bengal Government for helping a settlement of the ten days's old worst strike of mariners paralysing its river transport in Bengal, Assam, Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. Nearly ninety per cent of the

striking mariners were Pakistani nationals. The offer was accepted by the West Bengal Government because she had been unable to counter the problem. The strike had immobilised almost every vessel of the biggest river service of India. He viewed that it was his duty to take cognisance of any action committed by Pakistani nationals in India, which may cause trouble or embarrassment to the Government of India. "We desire to promote good relations between the two countries."²²

With the efforts of Raja Ghazanfar, bright chances of a meeting between the Premiers of India and Pakistan, looked bright and the atmosphere of cordiality and friendliness was created. For the first time in the history of Pakistan, India had invited its Head of State to pay a goodwill visit on the Republic Day.²³ Its sole credit went to Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan and he hoped that the forth-coming visit of the Governor-General, Ghulam Muhammad held great significance. He also urged on liberalizing the issue of visa between the two countries.²⁴ The Kashmir issue was however dropped from the agenda on the insistence of Pandit Nehru. This was disclosed in a brief meeting of Raja with Pandit Nehru at Madras. Only trade was to be discussed.²⁵ The Governor-Generals's visit was taken as the happiest news since 1947 by the people of both countries. The visit made a historic contribution towards a solution of the outstanding problems faced by both the countries. Ghazanfar Ali Khan had been working to pave the way for the Premiers' meeting. He held meetings with the Indian Education Minister, Maulana Azad, Nehru and the Secretary General N.R. Pilla on the subject.²⁶ Raja expressed his satisfaction on Governor General's visit to India which had created a healthy atmosphere.²⁷

The visit of a number of Indian Nationals to Lahore on the occasion of the Cricket Test Match between Pakistan and India was a very significant event during Raja Ghazanfar Ali's tenure. It was a unique decision to allow the Indians and specially the Sikhs to visit Lahore when still the emotions of the uprooted families had not cooled down. It was feared by the high officials of both the

countries that some unfavourable events might take place. But Raja made this impossible and unthinkable task a reality and about fifty thousand Indians came to see the Match. Presiding over the annual day celebrations of the Indian Educational Institute in Delhi, Raja referred to the Cricket Match. He said that about 20,000 more would be issued in the next few days to the residents of Amritsar and Jullundhur. "The test", he said, "was a secondary attraction with a majority of visitors who were merely going to meet their old friends."²⁸ He came home for necessary arrangements of the Match. During a Press Conference he hoped a warm welcome from Lahorites to the Indian visitors.²⁹ After the Match was over peacefully, he thanked the masses for the warm welcome. The C.I.D. and the Custom's Staff was also greeted by Raja.³⁰ The Match was a very great success. The Sikhs specially had been won over by Raja.³¹

Speaking at a gathering of Delhi University students, Raja held that the press in the two countries was responsible among other factors for causing misunderstanding as it did not reflect the public opinion and feelings but advised people to think as it thought. Similarly, according to Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan, some politicians and political parties also misled the masses who wanted friendship.³² He was also against seeking foreign help for the solution of Indo-Pak disputes. He was addressing the first public meeting in Karachi after 1948, under the auspices of the Indo-Pakistan Friendship Association chaired by Dr. Khan Sahib. Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan said: "They should try to solve their problems among themselves."³³ He thought that the problems between the countries were soluble by peaceful negotiations and ruled out any possibility of war. He declared that the SEATO was not intended against India, and Pakistan had to think of her relations in international affairs and eventualities in case of a World War.³⁴

He had a very kind heart towards the non-Muslims in general and the Sikhs in particular. He had contributed a lot during his tenure as the Minister of Refugee Rehabilitation to the peaceful

evacuation of the non-Muslims from Pakistan. He was very popular with the Sikhs. They regarded him as a symbol of Indo-Pakistan friendly relations. He was accorded a rousing reception at Amritsar Khalsa College on February 20, 1955. As he entered the Common Hall of the College, which was packed to capacity, the students raised slogans, *Sikh Muslim Unity Zindabad, Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan Zindabad.*" The students also gave him *Khalsa* three cheers—"Jo Bolay So Ho Nihal."³⁵ The Principal had declared half-day holiday to celebrate the occasion. Praises in superlatives were lavished on Raja both in Punjabi prose and poetry. C.P.N. Singh, the Governor of East Punjab, had said publically that Pakistan's move in the alleged better treatment of Sikh visitors to Lahore was to create a rift between Hindus and Sikhs. But Raja refuted it and his whole speech was punctuated with shouts of "*Raja Sahib Zindabad.*"³⁶ He refuted the allegation and asserted that there was "no politics behind special treatment to Sikhs. Pakistan wanted to reciprocate hospitality."³⁷

Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan, in his speech at Jullundhur on February 21, 1955 urged upon Mr. Nehru to solve the disputes with the neighbour first and declared boldly that, 'No-War Declaration' between India and Pakistan was meaningless unless the Kashmir problem was solved. "Kashmir is a matter of life and death for Pakistan." He further said that both the Premiers had agreed to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir and they would meet to work out details. He said that the United States military aid to Pakistan had not changed the context of the issue. He ruled out that Pakistan was yielding to any power on the issue. "He did not see why the Kashmir issue should be withdrawn from the United Nations."³⁸ He was on his way to Karachi to participate in the meeting of Indo-Pakistan Steering Committee.

On another occasion he was invited to the birthday celebrations of Guru Nanak on November 19, 1955, at Delhi. The representative meeting of the Sikh Community was addressed by Raja, being the only person to speak in Punjabi, at the insistence of the Sikh

audience. He said in his address, "We the Muslims and Sikhs have many things alike. We believe in one God, we are martial and the most of all the resemblance is that both the nations think after it happens."³⁹ He concluded: "By far the best remedy of all that ails humanity would be, therefore, to inculcate the true spirit of religion and allow Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims to freely live according to the highest ideals of their own religions."⁴⁰

He was very popular with the other Indian non-Muslim communities. He was warmly welcomed in Ambala. He went there to inaugurate a number of functions to celebrate the birth anniversary of Lord Mahavira, founder of Jainism. The citizens garlanded him profoundly, showered flowers and embraced him warmly. He proposed that India and Pakistan should not imitate the nuclear madness of the West.⁴¹

About Kashmir, Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan regretted that during the seven years after partition, attempt after attempt failed to change the situation in regard to Kashmir and other problems, because each party was trying to dupe the other with clever political moves.⁴² He also declared that the Kashmir issue would be on the top of agenda during the coming Premiers' talks to be held on March 28, 1955. But a week before the proposed meeting of the Premiers, Raja was surprised to hear the official Indian announcement that the scheduled meeting had been postponed.⁴³ After a lapse of 22 months the Premiers resumed their talks. In a press interview Raja said that the solution of the intolerable and all-important Kashmir dispute was necessary, upon which depended the future of relationships between the two countries. Concluding his remarks, he said "a settlement arrived at through direct negotiation will be a guarantee of our future close relationship."⁴⁴

Choudhury Muhammad Ali gave a statement that the Kashmir issue would be referred to the United Nations if the coming talks between the Indian and Pakistani Prime Ministers failed. Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan clarified that the statement was meant to reassure the people of Pakistan who had been disappointed with the

result of the Delhi talks of May 1955.⁴⁵ He indicated in Bombay that the holding of the next Premiers' Conference would entirely depend on the Indian Governments' reply to the demand for clarification on the Kashmir issue. The clarifications were sought by Karachi Government on the views expressed in Srinagar by the Union Home Minister, Pandit G.B. Pant on the possibilities of a plebiscite in the disputed State, reported in the Indian press. Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan also hinted at two eventualities : "either the Nehru-Ali meeting would be delayed or its holding itself might become uncertain."⁴⁶

More than once Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan urged upon an early and fair solution of the Kashmir issue. He asserted, "No lasting amity unless Kashmir solution is found."⁴⁷ He again asserted at Madras that "he would blame India cent per cent for delaying a plebiscite in Kashmir which was the only and the best solution of the dispute."⁴⁸ He further declared that Pakistan would not lose interest in Kashmir even "for one hundred years" and delay would not serve any useful purpose. He added, "Recent protest in Pakistan against Pant's statement reflected the interest of the people of that country in Kashmir."⁴⁹ He had a hope that direct negotiations by the two countries would help to resolve the Kashmir problem. He disclosed that the Premiers would be meeting within the next two or three months with a firm determination to come to a final decision on the Kashmir issue.⁵⁰ He ruled out the partition of Kashmir in any case and declared that time was favourable for a plebiscite.⁵¹

On the pattern of Kashmir liberation movement, the Goa *Satyagraha* was launched. The Bharati press charged that the Pakistani nationals were serving in the Portuguese Police, Armed Forces and Civil Services in Goa, Raja described the reports as "completely incorrect and baseless."⁵³ He further declared that Pakistan Government was not backing any move by its citizens for launching a movement in Kashmir or anywhere else. He asserted that the idea of *Satyagraha* for liberating Kashmir seemed to be born of desperation and frustration due to delay in solving the problem.

He concluded that Pakistan was opposed to colonialism and Portuguese colonialism was not different from colonialism elsewhere.⁵³ Ghazanfar Ali Khan made it clear that Pakistan had no claims on Goa and had no territorial interests in the area. "It is a matter entirely between India and Portugal."⁵⁴ Accepting the total claim of India on Goa, Raja asserted that "Goa will have to join India ultimately." The people of the colony would have to be given the right to decide their future. He further said that Pakistan would not oppose the Goan's struggle to be free.⁵⁵ His assertions were in a way contrary to the official policy of the Pakistan Government of taking keen interest to safeguard the bonafide rights of the Goans whereas Raja lent a moral support to India towards the merger of Goa with India and the aggressive policy of India in the area. C.R. Rodrigues, the President of 'Associacao Descendentes Portugueses' in a statement resented Raja's views on Goa.⁵⁶

The Indian Government claimed that minorities were not protected in Pakistan and specially in East Pakistan and that was the reason that they were going to India where, according to Indian leaders, there were better living conditions for all the minorities living there. Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan denied the claims of Indian Refugee Rehabilitation Minister, Mehr Chand, regarding the restoration of confidence in minorities in East Pakistan. He asserted that "there was no communal tension or any incident like that during the last three years." In Shillong during a press conference, he said that there was no reason or justification for migration of minorities from East Pakistan.⁵⁷ He declared that forces in West Bengal were responsible for Hindu exodus from East Pakistan, and said that the East Pakistan Government included the representatives of minorities and the life in the province was stable and normal.⁵⁸ The migration from both sides of the border pained Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan. He urged the East Pakistani Hindus to call back their families from West Bengal.⁵⁹ He refuted the statement of his Indian counter-part as mere imagination that "if the borders were thrown open, fifty per cent of the refugees in Pakistan would return to India." Raja said that "it was a flight of imagination."⁶⁰

He argued that the Hindu exodus from East Pakistan could be stopped if migration certificates were not freely issued and if entry points were sealed for a year or two. Among the reasons he gave was publicity about India's rapid progress. People naturally had come in the hope of finding employment there. The last and the important of all the reasons, according to him, was the will of people to join their families.⁶¹

Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan made considerable efforts to promote friendship between India and Pakistan. He mentioned four factors affecting the Indo-Pakistan friendship, i.e., the attitude of the masses, the attitude of the Governments, the attitude of the Press and finally the attitude of the officials.⁶² He criticised the Afghan propaganda against the One-Unit Scheme of Pakistan. He hoped that no aid to anti-Pakistan moves would be accorded by India.⁶³ He also condemned the Russian assertions about Kashmir. Raja talked at Lahore to the press reporters that "such statements did not provide any cause for pessimism about the solution of Kashmir tangle."⁶⁴ During a press conference at Delhi, he made the point that he would shortly seek an interview with Pandit Nehru to explore the possibilities of meeting between the Premiers of Pakistan and India. He said, "amicable settlement of Kashmir issue was essential."⁶⁵

Speaking about the home politics during a press conference at Lahore, Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan hoped that Pakistan's new constitution should be Islamic in character and the courts be provided with power to examine "whether a certain constitutional provision was repugnant to Islam or not."⁶⁶ He was in favour of Joint Electorates and asserted that Quaid-i-Azam also favoured the same kind of electorates. In support of his contention, he quoted the speeches and statements of the Quaid after 1947, "wherein Father of the Nation had made it clear that minorities would be generously treated and all those living in Pakistan would be one nation."⁶⁷ About the draft constitution of the country he said that it was liberal and democratic document which fully guaranteed rights of the minorities.

Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan was exploring grounds for the Prime

Minister's meeting. In this connection he visited Karachi and had two hours discussion with the Premier. Later he met with Iskandar Mirza at a Luncheon. He also had a meeting with the Foreign Minister, Hamid-ul-Haq Choudhury and the Federal Foreign Secretary.⁶⁸ He participated in the Congress session held at Amritsar and declared that the Nehru-Ali talks on Kashmir were not being held in near future, after assessing the whole situation at Karachi and Delhi.⁶⁹ While speaking at Bombay, he said that Kashmiris must decide their own future themselves. At the same time, he declared that Pakistan would not in any circumstances repudiate her international commitment to secure for the Kashmiris' right of self-determination.⁷⁰ Pandit Nehru and other top leaders of India started ruling out the plebiscite in Kashmir. Raja Ghazanfar Ali could not reconcile himself to the views expressed by the Indian Premier on the Kashmir issue. The views were 'unfortunate', according to him. He asserted that India was a party to the dispute and that how could she take up the role of a judge. He asserted in Bombay that, to rule out plebiscite was closing the door on negotiations. He further, declared that "no meeting is possible if it is determined beforehand that there will be no plebiscite."⁷¹

Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan also declared that Pakistan's participation in SEATO was irrelevant to Kashmir. He was touring Dacca and was interviewed by APP. He viewed that Nehru's argument was "irrelevant and uncalled for."⁷² In this connection he sought a forty-minute short notice interview with Pandit Nehru. Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan was supposed to submit the report of his findings during the meeting to his Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister in Pakistan.⁷³ He submitted the report to the Premier at Dacca in due course.⁷⁴

Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan had become more critical of the Indian leadership, specially after Pandit Nehru ruled out the plebiscite in Kashmir. The Bandung Conference was being held and the representatives of India, Indonesia, Burma and Ceylone were participating. Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan retorted that "deeds speak

louder than words." He further asserted: "It is becoming the fashion for the Bandung Conference nations to give advice to others, but this advice will only be heeded if we make an honest and sincere attempt to live by Bandung standards by ourselves."⁷⁵

In April 1956, it was reported by the *Indian Express*, that Pakistan Government was considering making some important changes in the personnel of its foreign envoys in India, Washington, Indonesia and Iraq, some changes in the Central Cabinet were also reported and that Pakistan Government was considering to send an Ambassador to Moscow.⁷⁶ A few of the Pakistani papers had also started a campaign against Raja due to his leniency towards the non-Muslims, specially when he was working hard to stop the Hindu exodus from East Pakistan. He was strongly criticised when he was touring East Pakistan in that connection. *The Nai Roshni*, charged that Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan had openly rebelled against the Pakistani Premier and his assertions were quite contrary on some issues.⁷⁷ *The Morning News*, came out with a similar demand in editorial on the subject. The Foreign Office offered no comments about the editorial. When asked by a press reporter that the Raja was likely to be affected by the reshuffle in Pakistani diplomatic set up, an official source of the Foreign Office replied, "possibly."⁷⁸ Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan commented about the hostile propaganda that he was likely to be replaced, he described it as "kite-flying." He further said, "neither the Pakistani Foreign Office nor I know of any proposal for my transfer from Delhi."⁷⁹

But in the last week of May 1956 it was confirmed that Raja would relinquish his charge at Delhi.⁸⁰ *The Statesman*, reported that Mian Ziauddin was likely to succeed him.⁸¹ The official press note by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs came on June 14, 1956. Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan was appointed as the Ambassador of Pakistan to Italy.⁸² He was offended on his transfer and at that time he indicated the possibility of his returning to active politics. He was speaking in a farewell function arranged in his honour by the United Nation's Association.⁸³ During another farewell function

organised by the refugees in his honour, he said that he was looking forward to the day when there would be no visa restriction between the two countries.⁸⁴ The Delhi Congress Association also arranged a farewell function in his honour. In the course of his last public speech in India, he laid stress on Kashmir issue. He asserted: "no matter where he was or what post he held, he would strive for solving the out-standing Bharat-Pakistan disputes."⁸⁵ Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan reached Lahore on June 19, 1956 by road via Amritsar and handed over charge of his post to Mian Ziauddin on June 20, 1956.⁸⁶

Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan's main effort, during his stay in India, was to change the atmosphere of mutual suspicion between the peoples on either sides of the Indo-Pakistan borders. This aim he pursued vigorously and his personal drive in this connection produced measurable results. All his efforts were concentrated on creating a climate of confidence, both in India by his conduct and in Pakistan by using his powerful influence at home. It was during his tenure that the two countries reached an agreement on holding a plebiscite in Kashmir. The diplomatic triumph was however, spoiled by the timing of our acceptance of US Military Aid which Nehru used as a pretext to wriggle out of his commitment. According to the *United States News World Report*, January 4, 1954, Vice-President Nixon, "tended to favour military aid to Pakistan as a counterforce to the confirmed neutralism of Jawaharlal Nehru's India."⁸⁷ Ghulam Muhammad and Muhammad Ali Bogra also visited Delhi during Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan's tenure. He had a personal equation with Nehru with whom he had personal contacts.⁸⁸ It was during his tenure that the rail link between Amritsar and Lahore was restored. It was also during his tenure that the Pakistani and Indian players played Cricket for the first time at Lahore. The holding of the Match was entirely Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan's idea.

He was unhappy whenever the Pakistani or Indian Government took a rigid view and some accused him of being too soft on India. His relations with the Press were close and cordial. He covered the

entire spectrum of Indian political life for he personally knew leaders of all political parties and kept up his old equation with them attending weddings, sending presents, condoling deaths, walking in funerals, visiting important cities. "Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, who was not invited by his own colleagues, came to a quiet lunch. Rafi Ahmad Kidwai, the powerful and popular Food Minister of India, was a frequent guest."⁸⁹

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Book Reviews

**Fanley Wolpert, *Jinnah of Pakistan*,
Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1989,
Pages 541.**

Wolpert's well-researched biography of Pakistan's founding father is a thorough and objective study of the coming of political independence and partition of the Indian sub-continent. The author pays rich tributes to the Quaid and maintains that no single Mussalman figure in the past two hundred years did so much in such a short span of time. The Quaid brought to realization the seemingly chimerical dream of founding a Muslim majority state in the sub-continent. Surely, Pakistan is the gift of Quaid's political acumen par excellence.

Wolpert pays rich tributes to Jinnah's professional insight. He was one of the shrewdest barristers in the British Empire. Surely, he was the most tenacious. By winning his case he changed the map of South Asia and altered the course of world history. Looking back, we see that he had entered politics as a Liberal Nationalist, joining with Congress soon after he returned to India. He started off as an apostle of secularism and Hindu-Muslim unity, but ended it forty years later as an architect of partition that split Pakistan away from India.

The theme of national unity was echoed by Jinnah at every political meeting he attended, in which he emerged as India's true "Ambassador of Hindu-Muslim Unity."

After his disillusionment with Congress, for Jinnah, 1916 was a year of national fame and good future. India advanced, under his inspiring leadership towards a political horizon that seemed ablaze with the golden dream of imminent freedom.

Jinnah was fully conscious of the Hindu's cunning contrivances. Referring to the Nehru Report, he observed that democratic though the report might have been in principle, it fundamentally repudiated the Lucknow Pact and offered no compensatory advantages to the Muslim community. He believed that the report was replete with platitudinous exhortations only.

Thoroughly disillusioned by Hindus, the Quaid appealed to the Muslims to organise themselves, stand united and then press every reasonable point for the protection of their community. He was brought to a point when he had to tell Gandhi : "If we cannot agree, let us at any rate agree to differ, but let us part as friends." This was a major point of departure in Jinnah's life. In fact, he had delivered his swan song to Indian nationalism.

Wolpert tells us that at the *Round Table Conference* in November 1930, Jinnah made two points which offered an important insight into his strategic thinking. He declared that while the British had commercial interests and the political interest in India, to Muslims the demand for Pakistan was all in all. Jinnah had long recognised wide range of Muslim special interest, needs and demands, but this was a new departure in his thinking. It became a major theme of his Pakistan strategy : that the Muslims were a party, a distinct bloc, separate from the Hindus, the princes and the British.

Secondly, he warned that unless the Round Table negotiated a "settlement" to "satisfy the aspirations of India," when the seventy million Muslims and all others who had "kept aloof" might be tempted to "join the non-cooperation movement." His cardinal principle was to ensure that it should become the mistress in her own house, and he could not conceive of any constitution that the British might frame, which would not transfer responsibility in the Central Government to a Cabinet responsible to the Legislative.

Quaid-i-Azam's Lahore address lowered the final curtain on any prospects for a single united independent India. Those who understood the Quaid enough to know that once his mind was made up, he never reverted to any earlier position, realized how momentous a pronouncement that Quaid had just made. He literally meant every word he had uttered that important afternoon in March 1940. There was no turning back. The ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity had totally transferred himself into Pakistan's great leader. The Quaid had to undergo major tribulations for achieving his goal. For instance : as regards *Cripps Mission* he said that Muslims were prepared to face all consequences if any scheme or solution which was detrimental to the interests of Muslims was forced upon them. They should not accept it but resist it to the utmost of their capacity. If they had to die in an attempt, they would do fighting.

Jinnah's unpurchaseable character is well known. After taking a position once, he would never deviate. During the Pakistan Resolution of March 1940, at Lahore, Jinnah meant every word uttered. Then both the Hindus and the British never gauged the true calibre of this formidable man. He made the Muslims, after decades of decay, believe in themselves.

Hindu hated him, Muslim quislings stabbed him in the back, the British never forgave him for being their better, Mountbatten even called him psychopathic. Mrs. Sarojini Naidu who worshipped him earlier as an Ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity thought that he was a fallen angel, i.e., a Lucifer. However, for Muslims he was their great benefactor.

And now a few observations about his character traits. Without freedom of speech, Jinnah wisely understood any nation would remain 'stunted' or 'wither' like a rose bush that is planted in a place where there is neither sunshine nor air. Jinnah remained a great civil libertarian, always outspoken in defence of individual rights and equal justice. He insisted on behalf of redeeming the deported editor of the *Bombay Chronicle*, B.G. Horniman.

"I do maintain, and I have drunk deep at the fountain of constitutional law, that the liberty of man is the dearest thing in the law of any constitution, and it should not be taken away in this fashion."

Jinnah never lost his temper except for calculated political advantage. He used anger as a barrister or an actor would, to sway his jury audience, never from an uncontrollable flaring of passion. For personal passion had all but died in him and was never rekindled.

Masterful leader that he was Jinnah marshalled his forces, tightening his grip on the sword arm of his embryonic nation throughout the negotiations with the Cabinet Mission. He exhorted his followers saying "Do not be afraid of death." Our religion teaches us to be always prepared for death. We should face it bravely to save the honour of Pakistan and Islam. There is no salvation for a Muslim than the death of a martyr for a righteous cause.

Wolpert calls Quaid-i-Azam as supreme strategist of pendulum negotiations. He probed first at the weak points of his opponent, then rushed to the opposite sides exposed flank, always seeking as he shifted his ground to rally his former 'evening' to his side. He was the most ingenious advocate, extracting for each client the greatest constitutional concession which the British, and Congress were willing to grant at every turn. Just when one side thought it had him securely in its corner, Jinnah twirled with agility totally out of reach.

To refresh our memories, Quaid's certain quotes are also worth consideration. On August 11, 1947 he declared :

"The first duty of a Government is to maintain law and order, so that the life, property and religious beliefs of its subjects are fully protected by the state."

Secondly, "one of the biggest curses from which India is suffering is bribery and corruption. That really is a poison. We must put that down with an iron hand. Blackmarketing is another curse. I think blackmarketeers ought to be severely punished because they

undermine the entire system of control."

"Next evil is the evil of nepotism and Jobbery. This evil must be crushed relentlessly. And I want to make it quite clear that I shall not tolerate any kind of Jobbery nepotism or any influence directly or indirectly brought to bear upon me."

To conclude Quaid-i-Azam's shrewd and skillful leadership combined brilliant advocacy and singular tenacity to win his suit for the creation of Pakistan on behalf of the Muslim nation, his only client during the last, lonely, pain-filled decade of his life. To quote Stanley Wolpert, few individuals significantly alter the course of history. Fewer still modify the map of the world. Hardly anyone can be credited with creating a nation-state. Muhammad Ali Jinnah did all three. Quaid-i-Azam virtually conjured that country into statehood by the force of his indomitable will. His place of privacy in Pakistan's history looms like a lofty minaret over the achievements of all his contemporaries in the Muslim League.

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Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph,

In Pursuit of Lakshmi: The Political Economy of the Indian State, Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1987.

This new book by the Rudolphs, both of them Professors of Political Science at the University of Chicago, is a welcome addition to the increasing literature on the political economy of the Third World States. In this work, the Rudolphs have made serious efforts in defining and explaining the different variables that are responsible in creating and sustaining the political economy of India. The authors have aptly chosen the title *Lakshmi*, the goddess of wealth and fortune, not as a figure of 'popular pantheon', but rather to describe the 'homogenized, decultured language of political language' of India.

The Rudolphs' believe strongly in the predominance of centrist politics, one in which class politics has played a minor and marginal role. The marginality of class politics is also explained in terms of sectoral characteristics of the Indian economy, the timing of industrialization and in the variety of social formations. In India, class politics also involves two actors : private capital and organised labor. However, there has emerged a third actor in the form of state, which regulates the politics and economy in the centrist direction. As the Rudolphs' have stated the state in India not only benefited from historically high stateness, legal sovereignty, and cultural orientations (the state as father and mother and as chief patron) but also benefited from its sectoral resources, what in Indian terms is referred to as the economy's 'commanding heights', (pp. 397-398). The state's role has also been enhanced through its bargaining advantages over organized interests, such as trade unions and private sector industries.

The authors also in this book have raised some fundamental issues related to Demand Politics and Command Politics, as associated with liberal and authoritarian regimes. The pace of economic development in India is unchanged whether liberal or authoritarian governments are in power in New Delhi. In this context, the Rudolphs' have analysed the era of 1952-86 under four distinct periods. (1) 1952-53 to 1963-64 [Nehru]; (2) 1964-65 to 1974-75 [Indira Gandhi]; (3) 1975-76 to 1976-77 [Emergency]; (4) 1977-78 to 1985-86 [Janata/Congress]. The Nehru era was characterised by a charismatic leadership and ambitious five-year economic plans with a heavy emphasis on agriculture and industry. However, during the period, 1964-75, Demand Politics emerged (p. 228). Rudolphs' have contributed this to the exogenous factors : Military failure in War with China (1962), War with Pakistan (1965), Death of two successive Prime Ministers (Nehru in May 1964 and Shastri in January 1966) and the acute famine conditions in various parts of India. This was accompanied by factors such as increases in electoral participation, communal riots, strikes and lock outs, student indiscipline and agrarian unrest. All these had its cumulative effects on the rise of Demand Politics during this period. The period between 1975-77 was characterised

by authoritarian rule of Mrs. Indira Gandhi. This was the period when she imposed internal emergency in the country by banning strikes and demonstrations, arresting opposition leaders, censoring the press, and depriving the citizens of their civil and political rights (p. 240). However, in terms of economic indicators, there was marked improvement in the food production sector. With the victory of Janata (a conglomeraton of non-Congress parties) in 1977, there was an end to the authoritarian regime. With the restoration of the pre-emergency liberal regime, there was again a resurgence of Demand Politics. The authors have concluded that there is an indeterminate relationship between type of regime and politics on the one hand and economic performance on the other. According to Rudolphs', the success of authoritarian rule under the emergency in achieving state objectives lent some credence to the view that command features of an authoritarian regime provide short-term gains by repressing mobilization and participation. Yet during the Nehru era and under Janata, Indira Gandhi, and Rajiv Gandhi governments, democratic regimes were associated with good economic performance (p. 243).

One of the interesting features of this book is also the discussion of the Demand Groups in a pluralistic set up such as India. The authors have analysed the three Demand Groups in detail : Labor, Students, and Agriculturalists. The political marginality of organised labor is attributed to several factors : workers in the organized economy, the pool for organized labor, constitute only 10 per cent of the total work force ; the state which employs two-thirds of the workers in the organized economy, constitutes an ambiguous adversary and the multiplication and rivalry of national federations and of industry and enterprise unions (pp. 259-60). However, Rudolphs' statement that India's broad labor front was isolated from cultivation and middle class professionals is subject to question. For, in the state of West Bengal, the Centre for Indian Trade Union (CITU), did make significant gain of its grass root support by making strategic coalitions with the cultivators and Bengali middle class '*Bhadralok*'. Similarly, other major trade unions, Indian National Trade Union Congress (INTUC), All India Trade Union Congress (AITUC) to

varying degrees have also achieved margin of success in mobilising the support of the middle class, particularly in urban semi-urban places. Rudolphs' description of students as a Demand Group deserves much credit, particularly the way it has been portrayed as a political 'class'. Throughout their post-independence career as a demand group, students have rarely challenged the centrist consensus (broad issues of national interest), even though they have challenged particular centrist regimes from time to time over various social, economic and political issues. In the agricultural sector, Rudolphs' have mentioned about the rise of what they call as 'Bullock Capitalists'. This group is different from other agrarian classes such as agricultural laborers, small holders and large land owners. Bullock Capitalists are, generally, those independent, self-employed agricultural producers with 2.5 to 14.9 acres of land. They take advantage of new technology and credit institutions and make the best use of it through human, physical and financial capitals. Rudolphs' have discussed at length the impact of this new class of agricultural producers in their book, primarily from a North Indian/ Indo-Gangelic perspectives. It is worthwhile to see, if the same characteristics are valid for other regions of India.

In short, Rudolphs' book is a landmark in the field of contemporary South Asian Studies. In the past, there was in fact very little work (mostly by Francine Frankel, Myron Weiner, Atul Kohli, Pranab Bardhan, Jagdish Bhagwati, Mary Katzenstein, etc.) that tried to address the central issues of India's political economy. *In Pursuit of Lakshmi*, is a must for all readers who have interest in comparative politics and particularly in the fields of political economy of the developing nations.

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Statements

SOUTH ASIAN REGIONAL COOPERATION

THE ISLAMABAD DECLARATION OF THE HEADS OF STATE OR GOVERNMENT OF THE MEMBER COUNTRIES OF THE SOUTH ASIAN ASSOCIATION FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION ISSUED ON 31st DECEMBER, 1988.

The President of Bangladesh, the King of Bhutan, the Prime Minister of India, the President of Maldives, the King of Nepal, the Prime Minister of Pakistan and the President of Sri Lanka met at the Fourth Summit of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation at Islamabad from 29-31 December, 1988.

The Heads of State or Government expressed their deep satisfaction at the progress achieved by the Association since the last Summit. They reiterated their commitment to the SAARC Charter and renewed their determination to cooperate in promoting the welfare of the peoples of South Asia and to improving their quality of life by eradicating poverty, hunger, disease, illiteracy, unemployment and environmental degradation.

They recalled that their countries were linked by cultural, social and historical ties and they had at their disposal substantial human and natural resources. They recognised that these provided a sound basis as well as immense opportunities for regional cooperation. They therefore expressed their determination to make optimal use of their resources for the benefit of their people by working jointly to pursue their shared objectives. They were aware that by acting in concert they could realise the full potential for regional progress, taking into account complementarities and growing inter-dependence.

The leaders endorsed the decision of the Council of Ministers that any country in the region subscribing to the objectives and principles of the SAARC Charter may be admitted as a member of the Association by a unanimous decision of the Heads of State or Government.

The Heads of State or Government expressed satisfaction at the progress so far made in the implementation of the SAARC Integrated Programme of Action. They underlined the need for closer cooperation in the activities undertaken under this programme. They took note of the measures to streamline and re-orient various SAARC activities to make them more action-oriented so as to improve the quality of life of their peoples. They directed that the Secretary General may submit recommendations to the Standing Committee which should in turn decide how to streamline SAARC activities and make them more effective. They welcomed the establishment of the SAARC Agricultural Information Centre (SAIC), as well as the steps being taken for the establishment of other regional institutions.

The Heads of State or Government lauded the smooth functioning of the SAARC Audio Visual Exchange (SAVE) Programme which had proved to be a useful medium for promoting a South Asian consciousness amongst the peoples of the region. They decided that SAVE Programmes should also emphasise social, economic and technical themes. They also noted with satisfaction the successful launching of the Youth Volunteers Programme and the SAARC Chairs, Fellowships and Scholarships Scheme. They decided that education may be included as an agreed area of cooperation.

The Heads of State or Government expressed satisfaction that the South Asian Food Security Reserve had become operational on 12 August 1988. The Reserve would serve as a cushion against food shortage and was a tangible manifestation of the spirit of cooperation in the region.

The Heads of State or Government noted with satisfaction that the SAARC Convention on Suppression of Terrorism had been ratified and had come into effect on August 22, 1988, thus reflecting the

sincere desire on the part of the member-States to enter into meaningful cooperation to eliminate the scourge of terrorism from the South Asian region. They called for the adoption of enabling measures by member-States to implement the Convention at the earliest.

The Heads of State or Government expressed grave concern over the growing magnitude and the serious effects of drug abuse, particularly among people, and drug trafficking. They recognised the need for urgent and effective measures to eradicate this evil and decided to declare the year 1989 as the "SAARC Year for Combating Drug Abuse and Drug Trafficking." They agreed to launch a concerted campaign, as suited to the situation in their respective countries, to significantly augment SAARC efforts to eliminate drug abuse and drug trafficking. These included closer cooperation in creating a greater awareness of the hazards of drug abuse, exchange of expertise, sharing of intelligence information, stringent measures to stop trafficking in drugs and introduction of more effective laws. They directed that the Technical Committee concerned should examine the possibility of a Regional Convention on Drug Control.

The Heads of State or Government expressed their deep sense of sorrow and profound sympathy at the loss of valuable lives and extensive damage to property suffered during the year by Bangladesh, India, Nepal and Pakistan as a result of unprecedented floods, cyclones and earthquakes. In this connection, they recalled their earlier decision at Kathmandu in November, 1987 to intensify regional cooperation with a view to strengthening their disaster management capabilities and took note of the recommendations of the meeting of the SAARC Group of Experts on the Study on the Causes and Consequences of Natural Disasters and the Protection and Preservation of the Environment, that met in Kathmandu in July 1988. They expressed the conviction that identification of measures and programmes as envisaged by the Group of Experts would supplement national, bilateral, regional and global efforts to deal with the increasingly serious problems being faced by the region as a result of the recurrence of natural disasters and the continuing

degradation of the environment. They urged that the study should be completed in the shortest period of time so that it could provide a basis for the member countries to draw up an action plan meaningful cooperation amongst the member states. They decided that a joint study be undertaken on the 'Greenhouse Effect' and its impact on the region.

The Heads of State or Government noted with satisfaction that modalities for studies to be carried out for cooperation in the areas of trade, manufactures and services had been worked out by a Group of Experts, which met in Islamabad recently. They emphasised the need for the completion of the studies within the agreed time schedule. They directed that the Fourth Meeting of Planners should examine the possibility of cooperation in agreed areas of trade, manufactures and services, which would promote the objectives of meeting the basic needs of the peoples of the region. The report of the Planners should be considered at the next Council of Ministers meeting, with a view to making specific recommendations to the next Summit.

The Heads of State or Government reviewed the progress on the Situation of Children in SAARC countries. They reiterated their commitment made in the Bangalore Declaration to accord the highest priority to the needs of children in national development planning and stressed that the concept of Human Resource Development should lay particular emphasis on the welfare and well-being of children, especially in the literacy and health spheres. They called for the conclusion and adoption of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1989. They decided to declare 1990 as the "SAARC Year of the Girl Child."

The Heads of State or Government noted with satisfaction the effective functioning of the SAARC Secretariat and its role in coordinating SAARC activities. They also noted that a Headquarters Agreement had been signed between the Secretariat and the host Government. They thanked His Majesty's Government of Nepal for the assistance and cooperation extended to the Secretariat.

The Heads of State or Government noted that the decision to

involve regional NGOs or professional bodies in SAARC activities, taken at the 5th Session of the Council of Ministers, pursuant to the direction given by the Kathmandu Declaration, was an important step towards the promotion of people-to-people contact which has always been emphasised by the Association.

The Heads of State or Government stressed the need for closer and more frequent contacts among the peoples of SAARC. As a beginning, they decided that Supreme Court Judges and Members of the National Parliaments of each member State would be entitled to a special SAARC travel document which would exempt them from visas. They further directed the Council of Ministers to examine what other categories of persons should be given this facility and to submit their recommendations.

They further noted with satisfaction the mandate given to the Secretary General by the Council of Ministers at its 5th Session on the question of contacting organisations with similar aims and purposes.

The Heads of State or Government expressed their determination to give concrete shape to the objectives of SAARC. In this context they emphasised the need to progressively carry out SAARC activities within a broad framework of a long-term perspective and to harmonize their efforts to ensure tangible benefits to the peoples of South Asia as a whole. They were conscious of the fact that all South Asian countries faced problems in varying degrees in areas such as food, clothing, shelter, education, primary health care, population planning and environmental protection. Towards this end they were of the view that all member states should identify areas of core interest in their national perspective plans or prepare such plans and consolidate them into a regional plan to be called "SAARC-2000—A Basic Needs Perspective", with specific targets to be met by the end of the century.

They recognised that Human Resource Development is one of the means of realizing these objectives. In this context they welcomed the offer of the Government of Pakistan to host a Centre for

Human Resource Development and directed the Secretary-General to set up a Group of Experts from member states to examine the proposal on the basis of a paper to be prepared by the Government of Pakistan and to submit its recommendations to the Standing Committee.

The Heads of State or Government reaffirmed their abiding commitment to the purposes and principles enshrined in the UN Charter, particularly those enjoining respect for the sovereign equality, territorial integrity and national independence, non-use or threat of use of force, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states and peaceful settlement of all disputes. They reiterated their faith in the United Nations as the most important forum for the maintenance of international peace and security and for the promotion of international cooperation aimed at the progress and prosperity of mankind.

The Heads of State or Government noted with satisfaction the relaxation of global tensions through intensified Super-power dialogue on a broad range of international issues and welcomed the progress towards the resolution of protracted regional disputes and conflicts. They agreed that these developments had enhanced the prospects for disarmament, security, peace and progress for all peoples of the world. They appreciated the important role played by the United Nations in bringing about these positive changes in the international political environment. They also called upon all States to strengthen the capacity of the UN system in all respects to achieve the purposes of the UN Charter.

The Heads of State or Government reiterated their deep commitment to the principles and objectives of the Non-aligned Movement as an important force for strengthening world peace and harmony as well as for promoting development with justice and equity. In this context they expressed satisfaction over the results of the Ministerial Conference of the Non-aligned Movement held in Cyprus in September 1988 and expressed the hope that the decisions of the Conference would contribute to the reduction of tensions and to the

promotion of development. They hoped that the current discussions on the improvement in the methodology of the Non-Aligned Movement would result in strengthening the movement and enable it to play its role with greater effectiveness.

The Heads of State or Government believed that the escalation in military expenditure was a major constraint on world development. In this regard they noted that the UN Conference on Disarmament and Development had clearly established a link between disarmament and development and had provided a valuable framework for future action in this vital area. They urged that resources saved through disarmament measures should be diverted in particular to developing countries for development.

They welcomed the agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union on Intermediate Nuclear Force. They hoped this would be a precursor to further accords to reduce strategic nuclear arsenals drastically and to prevent an arms race in Outer Space. They called for the early conclusion in the Geneva Conference on Disarmament of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and a Convention to ban Chemical Weapons. They declared their intention to continue their efforts to contribute to the realization of the objective of halting the nuclear arms race and eliminating nuclear weapons. They declared their resolve to support every effort to conclude a treaty prohibiting vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The Heads of State or Government noted with deep concern the continued structural disequilibrium from which the world economy had long suffered. This had resulted in slower growth in the developing countries, downward trends in commodity prices, decline in the net export earnings of the developing countries and deterioration in their terms of trade. These developments combined with the overwhelming debt burdens, the reverse financial flows from the developing to the developed countries and the sharp rise of protectionism in the developed world had further aggravated the economic difficulties of the developing countries.

The Heads of State or Government emphasised the interdependent character of the economies of the developed and the developing countries. They called for the resumption of the North-South dialogue with a view to restructuring the international economic system and to establishing the New International Economic Order based on justice and equity. They called for coordinated actions by the developed and the developing countries to increase the net flow of developmental assistance, overcome debt difficulties, expand the access of the developing countries to the markets in developed countries, arrest the deterioration in terms of trade of the developing countries and stabilize commodity prices.

The Heads of State or Government reiterated the need for preserving and liberalizing the multilateral trading system with renewed efforts both within and outside the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. They also underscored the importance of the developed countries fully respecting and implementing the commitments made in Punta del Este on 'standstill and rollback' arrangements. They expressed concern that on account of differences between major trading entities on the question of agricultural subsidies, the Montreal Meeting on the mid-term review of the Uruguay round was inconclusive. They particularly regretted that there was no progress in the negotiations on issues of major interest to developing countries such as trade in textiles and a Safeguard System. They were disappointed that on some of the issues of interest to developing countries on which there was agreement, particularly tropical products, it would not be possible even to implement the decisions taken, from the beginning of 1989 as envisaged. They emphasised that the development dimension must be taken into account in the negotiations on new issues, particularly services and intellectual property rights. They agreed to take concerted action to this end in the forthcoming negotiations.

The Heads of State or Government fully supported the call for the initiation of a comprehensive process for the preparation of an International Development Strategy for the Fourth United Nations

Development Decade as well as the proposal of the Group of 77 for convening a Special Session of the General Assembly in 1990 to revive growth and development in the developing countries.

The Heads of State or Government reemphasized the need for increased resource flows and special measures in favour of the least developed countries within the framework of the Substantial New Programme of Action (SNPA) for these countries. They supported the convening of a high level United Nations Conference on the least developed countries in 1990 to review progress and formulate national and international policies and measures for accelerating the development process in the least developed countries during the 1990s, especially in order to help them achieve their long term socio-economic objectives.

The Heads of State or Government of Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal and Sri Lanka expressed their deep appreciation for the exemplary manner in which Prime Minister of Pakistan chaired the meeting. They expressed their profound gratitude for the excellent arrangements made for the meeting and for the warm and generous hospitality extended to them by the Government and the people of Pakistan.

**JOINT PRESS RELEASE ISSUED ON DECEMBER 31, 1988
AT THE END OF FOURTH SAARC SUMMIT
ISLAMABAD**

The President of Bangladesh, the King of Bhutan, the Prime Minister of India, the President of Maldives, the King of Nepal, the Prime Minister of Pakistan and the President of Sri Lanka met at the Fourth Summit of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation at Islamabad from 29—31 December, 1988. The meeting was marked by an atmosphere of mutual understanding and spirit of accommodation.

The Heads of State or Government reaffirmed their commitment to the principles and objectives of the Association enshrined in the SAARC Charter and renewed their determination to work collectively towards the attainment of these objectives. They issued the Islamabad Declaration.

The Heads of State or Government were deeply shocked at the armed attack on the Republic of Maldives on 3rd November, 1988 aimed at destabilising the Government and taking over the country. They strongly condemned these acts of violence which disrupted the peace and security of a member state. They expressed full solidarity with the Government of Maldives.

The Heads of State or Government expressed concern at the high incidence of drug production, trafficking and abuse. They decided to declare 1989 as the "SAARC Year Against Drug Abuse" in order to focus attention on drug-related problems facing the region. They called upon member states to prepare and implement national programmes in this regard.

They welcomed the launching of SAARC Chairs, Fellowships schemes and the Youth Volunteers programme. They recognised that Education was one of the principal areas requiring urgent attention in the region and decided to include Education among the agreed areas of cooperation. For this purpose they decided to set up a Technical Committee and accepted the offer of Bangladesh to chair the Committee.

The Heads of State or Government agreed to launch "SAARC-2000 A Basic Needs Perspective" which calls for a perspective regional plan with specific targets to be met by the end of the century in areas of core interest such as food, clothing, shelter, education, primary health care, population planning and environmental protection. In this context they welcomed the offer of the Government of Pakistan to host a Centre for Human Resource Development and directed the Secretary-General to convene an Expert Group Meeting of member countries to work out modalities for the realization of "SAARC-2000 —A Basic Needs Perspective."

The Heads of State or Government welcomed the idea of holding South Asian Festivals from time to time and accepted the offer of India to host the first such festival.

The Heads of State or Government directed the Standing Committee to examine the desirability of establishing a regional body to promote cultural links among member states.

They welcomed the coming into force of the SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism. They stressed the importance of the adoption of enabling measures at the national level that would be necessary in order to fully implement the provisions of the Convention.

They welcomed the Agreement regarding the establishment of a South Asian Food Security Reserve in August this year, which marked a major breakthrough in the common endeavours of the Governments of member countries of SAARC to assist each other in food emergency situations.

The Heads of State or Government expressed their satisfaction at the progress achieved in the implementation of the Integrated Programme of Action (IPA). They recognised the need for focusing attention on more concrete and result-oriented activities within the SAARC framework.

They welcomed the establishment of the SAARC Agriculture Information Centre (SAIC) at Dhaka and were of the view that proposals for the setting up of regional institutions, focusing on problems of common concern in the region, should be given priority.

They reiterated their earlier commitment to accord priority to the needs of children in national development plans. They decided to declare 1990 as the "SAARC Year of the Girl Child" and directed that specific programmes and activities be undertaken to increase public awareness of the problems of the girl child.

They expressed satisfaction at the progress in the studies underway regarding the feasibility of cooperation in areas of trade, manufactures and services. In the meanwhile they directed the Secretary

General to convene a special meeting of the Group of Coordinators to identify any specific areas where cooperation may be feasible immediately. They directed that the report of the Group should be presented to the next session of the Standing Committee and the Council of Ministers.

The Heads of State or Government expressed profound sorrow at the natural disasters suffered by Bangladesh, Nepal, India and Pakistan in 1988 and urged that the study on the Causes and Consequences of Natural Disasters and the Protection and Preservation of the Environment be completed in the shortest period of time so as to provide a rational basis for identifying areas keeping in view the potentials and possibilities of evolving a regional plan of action, particularly to strengthen disaster management capabilities and to protect and preserve the environment.

They expressed satisfaction at the concrete steps being taken for the implementation of the SAARC Audio Visual Exchange (SAVE) Programme. They directed that social, economic and technical themes should be given emphasis by the SAVE Programme.

Recalling the usefulness of the earlier Ministerial meeting on Women in Development held in India in 1986, the Heads of State or Government called for the holding of a second Ministerial level meeting and welcomed the offer of the Government of Pakistan to host the meeting.

They expressed satisfaction that pursuant to the direction given by the Kathmandu Declaration for enhancing people-to-people contact, concrete steps had been taken by including regional NGOs and professional bodies in SAARC activities.

They decided that any country in the region subscribing to the objectives and principles of the Charter may be admitted as a member of the Association by a unanimous decision of the Heads of State or Government.

The Heads of State or Government noted with satisfaction the effective functioning of the SAARC Secretariat and its role in coordinating SAARC activities. They appreciated the work of the SAARC

Secretary-General in the discharge of his responsibilities and thanked His Majesty's Government of Nepal for the assistance and cooperation extended to the Secretariat.

The Heads of State or Government gratefully accepted the offer of the government of Sri Lanka to host the Fifth SAARC Summit in Colombo in 1989.

The Heads of State or Government expressed their deep appreciation for the outstanding manner in which the Prime Minister of Pakistan had conducted the meetings as the Chairperson of the Fourth SAARC Summit. They also expressed profound gratitude for the gracious hospitality extended to them by the Government and people of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and for the excellent arrangements made for the Conference.

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"چوتھی سربراہ کانفرنس" (اداریہ)

روزنامہ جنگ ، ۲۹ دسمبر ۱۹۸۸ -

سارک چوتھی سربراہ کانفرنس - (فیچر)

روزنامہ نوائے وقت ، ۲۹ دسمبر ۱۹۸۸ -

- سارک سربراہی کانفرنس - بامقصد بنانے کی ضرورت - (اداریہ)
 روزنامہ نوائے وقت ، ۲۹ دسمبر ۱۹۸۸ -
- سارک کانفرنس ، اندیشے ، توقعات - (اداریہ)
 روزنامہ نوائے وقت ، ۲۳ دسمبر ۱۹۸۸ -
- سارک کانفرنس - مسئلہ کشمیر بھی اہم ہے - (اداریہ)
 روزنامہ نوائے وقت ، ۳۰ دسمبر ۱۹۸۸ -
- سارک کانفرنس - مشترکہ اعلامیہ - اعلان ڈھاکہ - اعلان بنگلور - اعلان کھٹمنڈو -
 روزنامہ جنگ ، ۲۹ دسمبر ۱۹۸۸ -
- سارک کے قیام کا مقصد - بہتر نتائج کی طرف ایک اور قدم - (فیچر)
 روزنامہ جنگ ، ۲۹ دسمبر ۱۹۸۸ -
- سارک ۰۰۰ معاشی ، ثقافتی اور سیاسی پہلو ۰۰۰ کامیابیاں اور ناکامیاں -
 (خصوصی سروے رپورٹ)
 روزنامہ جنگ ، ۲۹ دسمبر ۱۹۸۸
- سارک ممالک مشترکہ صنعت کاری شروع کریں - ڈاکٹر مبشر حسن کا تجزیہ -
 روزنامہ جنگ ، ۲۹ دسمبر ۱۹۸۸
- سارک میں بھارت کا کردار - ڈاکٹر رفیق احمد سے گفتگو -
 روزنامہ جنگ ، ۲۹ دسمبر ۱۹۸۸ -
- سلہری ، زیڈ - اے - اب معاہدہ کیوں ؟
 روزنامہ جنگ ، ۳۰ دسمبر ۱۹۸۸ -
- طفیل ، محمد - سارک سربراہ کانفرنس -
 روزنامہ جنگ ، ۲۳ دسمبر ۱۹۸۸ -
- منصوری ، مجاہد - سارک کی کامیابی ۰۰۰ بھارتی روپے سے مشروط ہے -
 روزنامہ جنگ ، ۲۹ دسمبر ۱۹۸۸ -

Chronology of Important Events

SOUTH ASIAN REGION

July to December, 1988

BANGLADESH

- July 11* Bangladesh welcomed the agreement signed between Pakistan and Rabita Al-Alam-al-Islami on July 9th under which the organization will bear the expenses of repatriation of stranded Biharis in Bangladesh.
- 22 Pakistan offered to Bangladesh a state credit of US \$50 million on easy terms for repairing of machinery and other equipment of transportation.
- 23 Pakistan's Minister for Planning and Commerce Dr. Mahbub-Haq stated in a Press Conference that repatriation of nearly a quarter million Pakistanis stranded in Bangladesh since December 1971 will start soon.
- 28 Dr. Mahbub-ul-Haq called on President H.M. Ershad of Bangladesh and handed him a special message from President Zia-ul-Haq of Pakistan.
- August 18* The Bangladesh Cabinet decided for three-day state mourning on the sad demise of the death of President Zia-ul-Haq.
- 19 Bangladesh's political parties and many other organizations expressed their deep sorrow at the tragic death of President Zia-ul-Haq.
- September 18* A three member delegation from Pakistan left for Bangladesh to assess the needs of flood-affected people.
-

The Chronology has been prepared by Mrs. Mussarat Javed Cheema, Research Assistant of the Pakistan Study Centre, University of the Punjab, Lahore.

- October 14** The Planning Minister of Bangladesh, Air Vice-Marshal (Retd.) A.K. Khundkar, made a four day visit to Pakistan said here that both Pakistan and Bangladesh have agreed to start joint industrial venture in various fields.

BHUTAN

- December 14** Pakistan and Bhutan agreed for the establishment of diplomatic relations and exchange of ambassadors.

INDIA

- July 1** Pakistan Government has taken a major decision to allow import of all kinds of raw material from India if it is cheaper in competition.

- 11** Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi while flying over Pakistan, conveyed his good wishes for the progress and prosperity of the people of the Pakistan and expressed India's desire to establish friendly relations with Pakistan according to Simla agreement.

- August 3** According to All India Radio Report, a senior Indian Official alleged in the Parliament that Pakistan was involved in a plot to get Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Home Minister Buta Singh assassinated by some Sikhs.

A Pakistan Foreign Office spokesman regretted that Indian leaders made false statements in the Indian Parliament. He described it completely baseless the report of the *Times of India* that falsely implicated Pakistan in an alleged plot hatched in the Golden Temple to assassinate Rajiv Gandhi and Buta Singh.

Pakistan's Ambassador to New Delhi Dr. Humayun Khan, in an interview to VOA, said that he would take personal interest in the implementation of strategy for bilateral relations with India.

- 6** Indian Defence Minister claimed in a Press Conference in Sri Nagar that Pakistan made another attack on the Siachen Glacier while the entire Siachen was a part of India.

August 9 Pakistan's Interior Minister, Naseem Ahmad Aheer speaking in the Senate refuted Indian Official Charges of Pakistan's involvement in the Sikh Separatist Movement.

12 Major General Raja Muhammad Iqbal, Acting Secretary of Defence said that the situation at the Siachen Glacier was normal. However during the last week some clashes between the two forces did take place.

13 Pakistan's Ambassador to US, Jamshed Marker, challenged India's Defence Expenditure in a letter to the US Senate, that was doubled in four years. He also added that regional approach was the best way to ease nuclear tensions on the sub-continent.

14 Pakistan's highest civil award 'Nishan-i-Pakistan', was awarded to former Indian Prime Minister and leader of Bharataya Janata Party Morarji Desai.

15 Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, in the independence day speech warned Pakistan that his government would be forced unless to take retaliatory action unless Pakistan stop suport for Sikh extremists in Punjab state.

16 India has completed the work erecting 11 feet high barbed wire along the control line in Indian occupied Jammu and Kashmir.

18 Indian Parliament expressed its sorrow at the sad demise of President Zia-ul-Haq.

19 Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi visited the Pakistan Embassy in New Delhi to pay his condolences at the tragic death of President Zia-ul-Haq.

20 Demonstrations were staged in the occupied Kashmir to mourn the death of President Zia-ul-Haq.

21 The Foreign Minister of India, P.V. Narasimah Rao, in an interview to the Soviet weekly, Naw Times, said that despite India's commitment to friendship and good neighbourly relations with its South Asian neighbours, relations with Pakistan were at "a low ebb".

22 A para-military trooper died and 40 people were injured during pro-Pakistani demonstrations clashed with security forces in Indian-held Kashmir.

- August 22* The Acting President of Pakistan, Ghulam Ishaq Khan, in a message to Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi expressed his deep sorrow over the loss of life and property resulting from the havoc caused by the earthquake in India.
- 27 Dr. Farooq Abdullah, Chief Minister of Indian-held Kashmir, said that pro-Pakistan element in Kashmir would not be tolerated at any cost and those creating tension would be 'thrown' across the border into Pakistan.
- September 21* The Pakistan Defence Secretary Syed Ijlal Haider Zaidi left for India to attend the fourth round of talks on Siachin.
- 24 India and Pakistan agreed to hold the next round in Islamabad in January/February 1989.
- October 4* The Indian Commerce Minister, Mr. Dinesh Singh visited Pakistan and met the representatives of private sector of Pakistan in Islamabad and exchanged with them views for expanding bilateral trade between two countries.
- „ Pakistani businessmen at a meeting with Indian Commerce Minister, Mr. Dinesh Singh said that there were some restrictions in the trade policies of India and Pakistan.
- 21 Additional Foreign Secretary of Pakistan, Mr. Ahmed Kamal told the United Nations General Assembly's main committee that Pakistan stands for a regional approach in overcoming nuclear Proliferation for the Indo-Pakistan stands for the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent as well as for the achievement in reduction of conventional arms. He reaffirmed Pakistan's commitment to the objective of nuclear non-proliferation.
- November 1* The State Bank of Pakistan announced the decision to allow banks and authorised dealers to accept export letters of credit received from India directly in favour of private sector parties in Pakistan.
- December 1* The Government of Pakistan declared the Consulate General of India in Karachi, Mr. B.D. Sharma, and an Official of the Indian Embassy in Islamabad Mr. Ramesh, as persona non grata and asked them to leave Pakistan within 24 hours. Ambassador Niaz A. Naik, described that the Indian Government's action of declaring Pakistan Defence Attache, Mr. Z.I. Abbasi, as persona non grata was very unfortunate.

Later he also called on the Indian Foreign Secretary, Mr. Menon, and lodged a strong protest on the Indian action.

- 31 Pakistan and India signed three bilateral agreements. They are concerned with no attack on each other's nuclear facilities, avoidance of double taxation, and cultural cooperation.

NEPAL

- September 28 King Brendera Bir Bikram Shah Dev of the Kingdom of Nepal arrived in Islamabad on short visit.

SRI LANKA

- August 8 Sri Lanka's Foreign Minister, A.C.S. Hameed arrived in Pakistan to deliver a message of President Jayewardene held a meeting with Pakistani Foreign Minister.
- 21 Sri Lanka's Foreign Minister said that with the death of late President Zia-ul-Haq the world has lost a great statesman, when he arrived at Islamabad to attend the funeral of President Zia-ul-Haq.

SAARC

- July 30 A two day SAARC workshop on Women's Role in Agriculture was held in Bangladesh's capital—Dhaka.
- August 1 Foreign Minister of the SAARC countries signed in a convention at the third summit held in November 1987. Pakistan ratified the SAARC regional convention on the suppression of Terrorism. The convention defined terrorism, and requests "each state to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in another state. India and Sri Lanka have not so far ratified the convention.
- 9 Pakistan's Foreign Minister Sahabzada Yaqub Khan left for Kathmandu to attend the fifth session SAARC Minister's Council.

- August 11* Sahabzada Yaqub Khan addressing the session of the fifth ministerial conference of SAARC stressed that environment of peace and stability was central to the success of regional cooperation for which member-countries of SAARC should strive.
- 12* Pakistan officially announced its acceptance to host the next summit of Heads of States and Governments of SAARC countries in December.
- September 5* The three day SAARC seminar concluded with a set of recommendations for the betterment of the women folk in the SAARC region.
- October 13* The three day SAARC workshop on science policy held in Islamabad.
- December 28* The fourth summit meeting of Heads of States and Governments of seven member South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation began in Islamabad.
- 29* Prime Minister Mrs. Benazir Bhutto addressing at the 4th SAARC summit stressed the need for considering ways and means of reducing arms expenditure.
- 31* The three-day SAARC summit ended with the adoption of the Islamabad Declaration, reaffirming the commitment to its principles and objectives enshrined in character.

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Notes to Contributors

Manuscripts, articles, book reviews and notes or letters on themes of contemporary or historical interest, with particular reference to South Asia, will be welcomed.

Manuscript should be clearly typed on one side of the paper only, and should be double-spaced. Two copies should be submitted.

Bibliographies and footnotes should be placed at the end of the article. Footnotes should be numbered consecutively, and bibliographies should be arranged alphabetically. Foreign words should be underlined.

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Utmost care should be taken to prepare statistical data for publication. All headings, columns, rows, symbols, units of measurement, periods, political and geographical areas, and sources should be clearly stated in each statistical table, instead of giving such explanations in the text.

Tables, maps, and diagrams should be numbered and given at the end of the article, each on a separate sheet of paper. They should be clearly drawn so that they are suitable for photocopying as submitted.

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