

Salafising Barelwiyat: Salafi Doctrine of Al Wala' Wal Bara and TLP Politics in Pakistan

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ABSTRACT: Modern Salafism is perceived to be the proponent of the literalist, puritanical and radical Islam which is based on the concept of Al Wala wal Bara. Contrarily, Barelwiyat is portrayed as the promoter of esoteric, cultural and apolitical Islam. Both aspects of Islam are considered antithetical to each other in daily religious affairs of the Muslims in Pakistan. This paper attempts to explain the Salafi doctrine of Al Wala wal Bara in tandem with the rise of TLP as a prominent Barelwi political party. It also answer the question of how Al Wala wal Bara is shaping the religio-political world view of TLP which is sharpening the religious differences among the Muslims through the binaries of pure and impure Islam.

Keywords

Salafism, Barelwiyat, Al Wala wal Bara, TLP, Politics

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Pakistan is among the first countries who achieved their independence in the name of religion (Zaman 1). Its population is dominated by the Barelwis, which make up the 75-80 percent of the entire population followed by Deobandis and Ahl-e-Hadith who occupy the 20 and 5 percent of the religious composition respectively (Gugler 61). These groups are in continuous state of war with each other for dominating the religious landscape and labelling their interpretation as the 'true Islam' (Phillipon 271). This practice is the continuation of the polemic debates of the early 18th century, which resulted in fatwas (legal rulings) of apostasy (Kufr) against each other. The famous debate of Shah Ismail Shaheed and Maulana Fazl-i-haq Kharabadi followed by fatwas of Ahmed Raza Khan who declared every prominent Deobandi/Ahl-e-Hadith scholars as infidel (Sanyal 210). Deobandi/Barelwi disputes revolve around the personality of Prophet Muhammad and attribution of super human characteristics to his personality by the Barelwis (Tareen 420). Barelwis espouse Sufism as an intrinsic part of their religious life and embrace it completely. Love for Prophet Muhammad (Ishq-i-Rasool) constitutes the core of Barelwi creed (aqeedah). They believe that Prophet would intercede on their behalf in the life hereafter, has been made by the God's light (Noor-i-Khuda), is omnipresent which they refer to as (Aqeedah-e-Hazir-O-azir), has the knowledge of everything happening anywhere in this world (Ilm-e-Ghaib) and is infallible and alive (Hayat-un-Nabi) (Gugler 116). Barelwis manifest their beliefs through public recitations (Mahafil-i-na't), anniversaries (U'rus), celebration of the Prophet's birthday (MiladulNabi) and visits to shrines in their daily religious life (Mujeeb168). Despite crystallization of the core beliefs, Barelwis differ in practices from one community to another. It seems to be the reason why it's precarious to explain Barelwism (Paracha 56-57).

Salafis being the less popular religious group in terms of their followers, commonly known as Ahl-e-Hadith in Pakistan (Zahab 101). Ahl-e-Hadith movement is the product of the Tariqah-i-Muhammadiyah movement, which is based upon the tradition of Shah Wali Allah and the eighteenth-century Muhammad bin Abdul Wahab's teachings (Esposito 9). When it comes to theological views Ahl-e-Hadith reiterate the Salafist emphasis on the oneness of the God (Tawhid), they strictly follow the practices of the pious of the past (Salaf), wage war against the unbelief and scripture (Quran and Hadith) is ultimate legal and religious authority for them (Anjum 451). Unlike their Barelwi counterparts, they

strongly condemn the esoteric and inclusive values of Sufism and label it as an innovation (bida') in 'true Islam' (Ali 4).

This paper is divided into two parts, the first portion is restricted to the concept of Al' WalaWal Bara'¹ or WB, WB's influence over Salafi Tawhid and making of Salafi worldview out that Tawhid. Evolution and increasing influence of Salafi movement in Punjab do not fall under the domain of this paper.² Second portion deals at length with the rise of Tehreek-i-Labbaik as a Barelwisrepresentative, why it is adopting Salafi doctrine of WB and how WB is assisting TLP in gaining more prominence among the Barewli circles in Pakistan.

Understanding WB in the context of Salafism

In Arabic language, the word 'Salf' means an event of the past, which is virtuous in its happening. Similarly, this word is also used for the old generations (Wagemakers 22), which were far more knowledgeable and righteous in character (Abdullah 214). Quran has also used word Salafin the context of past.

“Those who consume interest cannot stand (on the day of Resurrection) except as one stands who is being beaten by Satan into insanity. That is because they say, ‘Trade is (just) like interest.’ But Allah has permitted trade and has forbidden interest. So, whoever has received an admonition from his Lord and desists may have what is past, and his affair rest with Allah. But whoever returns to (dealingabide eternally therein’’.
(The Qur'an, 2; 275)

Readers might get the impression that it refers to any pastgeneration, which has lived before us; however, Salafi Ulemas have defined their rules and regulations in this regard very clearly. For them, Salafis are those pious people who met Prophet Muhammad (SAW) and led their

¹ Al WalaWal Bara will be expressed as WB.

²For detailed study see, Roel Meijer, ed., *Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement* (London: Hurst Publishers, 2009), Henri Lauziere's *The Making of Salafism: Islamic Reform in the Twentieth Century* (Columbia University Press, 2015), QuintanWiktorowicz, "Anatomy of the Salafi Movement," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 29 (2006): 207-239 and Juma Khan's *Seerat-e-Nabavia Kay Tanazur ma Masala AlwalaWabarakallmiJaiza* Department of Seerat University of Peshawar, 2018, Phd Dissertation.

lives according to the true and original teachings of the Quran and Hadith. Once Shaykh Muhammad Bin Saalih al-Uthaymeen was asked to define Salafis and he replied;

“As-Salafiyyah” is an attachment or affiliation to the ‘Salaf’. And “The Salaf” are the Companions of the Messenger of Allah (Salallaahu ‘AlaihiWassallam) and the Imaams of guidance (may Allah be pleased with them) from the first three generations, those whose goodness Allah’s Messenger (Salallaahu ‘AlaihiWasallam) bore witness to in his statement: “The best of mankind is my generation, then those who follow them, then those who follow them. Then there will come people where bearing witness of one of them will precede his taking an oath and his taking an oath will be his bearing witness.” (“Fatwaislam.Com: What Is Salafiyyah?”)

Salafis always eulogize the early generations of Islam, as they believe that Islam of that time was real and least contaminated from bid‘a (religious innovation). “Salafis advocate a return to Islamic sources by emulating and following the footsteps of the early generations of Islam” (Ali 9). They discredit all traditions/movements, which developed after the third generation and labeled them innovation in Islam. Consequently, they are in a constant quest to “cleanse the Islamic creed (*‘aqida*) as well as its strict method of application to the sacred texts, worship and everyday life (*manhaj*) of all forms of historical, cultural and non-Islamic influence, which they consider religious innovations (*bida’*)” (Wagemaker 3). In the passion of purification of Islam, Salafis try to imitate supposedly pure version of Islam practiced by the pious predecessors. Salafi ideology is mainly comprises of its *‘aqeeda* and *manjah*. The intrinsic part of Salafi creed is Tawhid which is divided into three parts (i) Tawhid al-Rububiyah (ii) Tawhid al-Uluhiyya (iii) Tawhid al-Asma’ Wa-l-Sifat (Their explanation will be discussed in the context of WB) (Ali 63). Salafis comprehension of Tawhid goes beyond the mere testimony of existence of one God, but also as divine sovereignty in worship, which involves firm negation of popular practices such as visiting the graves of Sufi saints. “The strictness of Salafi *‘aqida* can probably be seen at it clearest in the concept of al-wala’ wa-l-bara’ (love/loyalty and hate/disavowal) (Wagemaker 3). As WB is a test of true faith to show all form of Wala’ (loyalties in term of worship,

social, cultural and political) to Allah, Islam and Muslim alone, likewise, Bara' (disavowal) to all deities other than Allah, Islam and Non-Muslims, similarly, WB provides practical tools to Salafi to fulfill their quest for cleansing impurities and polytheism (*Shirk*) through Tawhid (Ali 30).

"Wala' is an Arabic word which means 'Wali (friend and helper), with the addition of 'Al' it becomes an Islamic terminology of Al-Wala. This term is the guiding source for Salafis in befriending others. It is a very complex word, which does not have a synonym in English/Urdu language, and the word 'friend' is a close description of this concept (Kilani 6). Bara' too is an Arabic word which means hate and denouncement, with the addition of 'Al', it becomes an Islamic terminology of Al-Bara. This term is a guiding source for the Salafis to hate somebody that do not have a synonym in English/Urdu language and the word 'Hate' is a close description of this concept (Kilani 8). Hating or loving someone is embedded in Salafi religious beliefs and it can be traced in Abdullah Nasir Rehmani's words³:

“The most important bond of Iman is to love someone for the sake of Allah and his Deen, and to hate someone for the sake of Allah and his Deen. One who spends money for Allah's sake and restricts his money for Allah's sake, his Iman is completed”. (“AlwilaWalbara- Abdullah Nasir Rehmani Sb,” 02:15–03:21)

WB is an integral part of Salafi Tawhid

As Tawhid is considered the central pillar of Islam; likewise, Al-Wala' Wal Bara' is an important part of Salafi Iman and it's high time to know Al-Wala' Wal Bara's relation with Salafi Tawhid. Sayyid Maududi argues that tawhid is “the most fundamental and the most important teaching of Prophet Muhammad” (Mawdudi 58). Tawhid in its core is a little complex phenomenon; Abd al-Wahhab had divided it into three parts, Tawhid al-Rububiyah, Tawhid al-Uluhiyya, Tawhid al-Asma' Wa-l-Sifat. We are going to write down these three categories in Abd al-Aziz bin Baz words, which will be explored in relation to Salafi Tawhid.

³ Abdullah Nasir Rehmani is the provincial Ameer of Markazi Jamiat Ahl-e-Hadith, Sindh, Pakistan.

Tawhid Al – Rububiyah: Oneness of Lordship This means the exclusive belief in – and recognition of Allah as the unique and omnipotent Lord of mankind who enjoys absolute command and control over all creation.

Tawhid Al – Uluhiyya: Sometimes also known as Tawhid Al- Ibada; (Oneness of divinity, or worship) the belief in Allah as a unique deity, who is alone- and without partners, deserves to be worshiped by people.

Tawhid Al – Asma’ Wa-l-Sifat (Oneness of names, qualities and attributes): The exclusive belief in all of Allah’s attributes and its association with Allah only. Muslims believe that Allah possesses 99 names, each of which describes a different attribute such as Al- Khaliq (The Creator), Al- Qayyum (The Sustainer) and Al- Rehman (The Merciful),(IbnBāz 157).

Contrary to the Sufi-Barelwidevotional Islam, Salafis believe in action (Amal) oriented Islam. Salafi Ulemas educate their followers repeatedly that the verbal acceptance of Allah as an omnipotent deity satisfies two categories of Tawhid, (Tawhid al – Rububiyah and Tawhid Al –Asma’ Wa-l-Sifat), however, the most essential part of Tawhid (Tawhid al– Uluhiyya) remains unanswered, as this part demands practical actions. Abdullah Azzam, divided the faith (Iman) into two branches: the theoretical and practical. He argued that Tawhid Al-Rububiyah and Tawhid Al – Asma’ Wa-l-Sifat are theoretical parts of Tawhid and they require intellectual and oral confirmation. However, the practical action is required in order to materialize the final category of tawhid, which is Tawhid Al–Uluhiyya. Azzam further explained that “the Tawhid of action is: Tawhid Al–Uluhiyya, firm reliance upon Allah alone, fearing Allah alone and worshipping Allah alone” (Maher 147). He further states that it was only because of this category that Allah decided to send Prophets to mankind. “The only reason [prophets] were sent was to establish Tawhid Al- Uluhiyya” (Ibid 148)

Similarly, Osama Bin Laden explains the relationship between Tawhid, Iman and the Aqeedah in a very straightforward way. "Disbelief in the (tyrannical Muslim rulers) one of the pillars of tawhid, and if he [the ordinary Muslim] does not fulfil this pillar, he is not a Mowahid (a Muslim monotheist), and Tawhid is the basis of Iman and is mandatory for the suitability of action, and without it they are invalid" (Ibid 150). For Salafis, the Uluhiyya (Tawhid) which makes Islam a living ideal and

the parameters for the formulation of actions of Muslim will be drawn under WB.

Five attributes of WB

According to the lectures and writings of scholars of Salafism, concept of Al-Wala' Wal Bara' contains five elements ("AL WALA' WAL BARA - Abu Waleed," 0:15–02:21). A Mowahid is not supposed to profess Wala' until and unless he practice and manifest five (Al-Hubb, Al-Nusrah, Al-Ikram, Al-Himayah and respect the Muslims brothers) elements in his daily actions.

1. **Al-Hubb:(Love)**—to love Allah, Muhammad (SAW) and Muslims.
2. **Al-Nusrah:(Defend)** - to assist Muslim community against the Non-Muslims/enemies.
3. **Al-Ikram:(Honor)** - to elevate and honor the Muslims.
4. **Al-Himayah:(Guardianship)** -to protect and provide shelter to all the known and unknown Muslims.
5. Never backbite the fellow Muslims and respect him in all the affairs of life (Ali 77).

Simultaneously, Bara' too carries five (Al-Bughud, Al-Khuzlan, Al-Izlah, Al-Tazlim, Humiliate the Non-Muslim) attributes which a Salafi Muslim has to express in his routine life.

1. **Al-Bughud:(Hatred)** - Bara' demands a consistent attitude of hate towards the Non-Muslims.
2. **Al-Khuzlan:(Enmity)**—It requires a firm attitude of animosity towards the Kuffar.
3. **Al-Izlah:(Dishonor)** - Never elevate and honor the Non-Muslims.
4. **Al-Tazlim:(Grievance)** Never support Kuffar and their ideology.
5. To humiliate the non-Muslims.

The Four Dimensions of WB

Al-Wala' Wal Bara' is not fixed term and can be observed in different dimensions and roles. The multi-dimensional attitude of Al-Wala' Wal Bara' is important to understand the realities of this concept.

1. **Creedal (Aqeedah)**

This the most important dimension for all Salafi groups like Al-SalafiyyahAl-Ilmiyyah, Al-SalafiyyahAl-Harakiyyah,Al-SalafiyyahAl- Islahiyyah and Al-SalafiyyahAl- Jihadiyyah.⁴ Theyunanimously agree that the main purpose of Al-Wala' Wal Bara' is to clean Islam from all sort of impurities. Salafis have a firm belief that all sort of allegiance to Islam and complete disavowal to all un-Islamic elements will ensure Tawhid.

2. **Social**

Al-Wala' Wal Bara' at societal level is characterized by picturing non-Muslims as potential threat to the purity of Islamic culture. Friendship with these enemies of God is described as harmful to Islam and Muslims, that is why, Muslims should avoid attending their cultural events, wearing their dresses, communicating in their languages and aboding in their countries.

3. **Political**

Most of the Salafis propagate that Muslims should give their Wala (love/allegiance)only to the Muslim rulers who are running the state according to Quran and Sunnah. Simultaneously, Muslims rulers who are not performing according to the Sharia must be disowned. Muslims must discourage the western political conceptssuch as nationalism, capitalism, communism, and democracy. Al-Wala' Wal Bara' in its political sense is connected with TawhidAl-Hakimiyyah.

4. **Jihadi**

This dimension of Al-Wala' Wal Bara' is highlypolitical dimension. This is pertinent to note that only one Salafi faction (Al-SalafiyyahAl- Jihadiyyah) only supports this dimension. In his context Jihadi Salafis advocate and use violence against all those Muslim rulers:

1. Those who are not ruling the country according to Shariah and failed to implement Shariah as theconstitution of their countries.
2. Those who are allies of non-Muslims.
3. Those who are supporting the non-Muslims in war against the Muslims.

⁴ For detailed study of various Salafi groups, see QuintanWiktorowicz's Anatomy of the Salafi movement.

4. Those who supportsun-Islamic political systems in their countries.

Doctrine of WB and Binaries of Love and Hate.

Abdullah Saleh Al Fawzan wrote a book on Al-Wala' Wal Bara' in which he narrated a long list of signs for Loving Muslims and hating the non-Muslims.

Signs for loving the Kuffar

1. Praying for the health of Kuffar
2. Mimickingthe outfits of Kuffar
3. Accepting the argument of Kuffar
4. Migrating and living in the communities of Kuffar
5. Starting businesses and investing in the countries of Kuffar
6. Visiting Kuffar's countries just for the sake of recreation
7. AssistingKuffar and becoming their ally against the Muslims
8. Following the Gregorian Calendar over the HijraCalendar
9. Participating and celebrating the western events(Saleh bin Fawzan 15).

Signs for loving Muslims

1. Wearing Muslim dresses and attire
2. Praying for the Muslims and cursing Kuffar
3. Leaving the countries of Kuffar and migrating to the Muslim places
4. Becoming the saviors of Muslims in every stage of life
5. Prefer using Hijra calendar over Gregorian Calendar
6. To wage Jihad against all liberal political parties and Governments who are running the affairs of the Muslims Countries on the behalf of Kuffar and strive for the establishment of a global Caliphate (Ibid23)

WB: Salafi tool to hate Non-Muslims and other than Salafi Muslims

The genealogy of waging Jihad on Non-Muslims and marking of a clear distinction between Muslims and Non-Salafi Muslims (Shiites) goes

back to the teaching of Ibn Taimiyyah and Muhammad bin Abul Wahhab⁵. Offering Slam to Non-Muslims, participate in their social events, celebrating their festivals, opting their dress and prefer Non-Muslims language over Arabic are the signs of showing Wala', will transform him a heretic like Non-Muslim. Joaswage makers, summed up the Salafi worldview of WB in these words, WB establishes a clear dichotomy between Salafi Islam and rest of the world and present Tawheed as a litmus test for Muslim to separate the humanity into two distinct groups, True Muslim and the entire world (Wagemakers 4). Moreover, WB infuse a sense of rivalry and animosity among its followers which is not reserved only for Non-Muslims, but it also expanded to those Muslims who are affiliated or following the sects and schools of thoughts antithetical to the Salafi interpretation of Islam (Al-Zawahiri and Ibrahim 25).

Idea of Sufism and 'Brelwis' in the making

Sufism is interpreted in South Asia as 'moderate' and 'esoteric' strand of Islam, which is a possible middle ground between increasing fundamentalism and secularism in the Pakistani society (Yousaf and Huaibin 25). On contrary to this popular notion, defining Sufism is an arduous task and it cannot be reduced to a single unified entity due to the varied experiences of its Sufi masters. The multi-faceted character of Sufism has accommodated numerous ideas and principles, which includes the opposition to already set norms of the society and resistance to the colonial policies (Ridgeon 6). Jamal Malik adds to this body of literature on Sufism in following words, "Before becoming Sufi, various Sufis were in military according to various personal accounts known as (malfuzat) and Eaton described it as 'Warrior Sufis' (Malik 587). From radical expression of politics to being an apolitical entity, Sufi experiences are so diverse in different parts of the world that it would be an act of sheer injustice to this term to put it under one generalized definition. When this diversity of experience comes to South Asia, it is represented by the Barelwis in an entirely mystic way. Historically, Barelwis has been custodians of plurality and this tradition of plurality date back to the early settlement of the Sufi Khanqahs in the region (Qadri 5). When British came to this region as traders and ultimately

⁵ Muhammad Bin Ali (Al-Wala' Wal Bara' in Wahhabism: From A Tool to Fight Shirk to Takfir of Muslim Leaders) Journal of Islamic Studies and Culture, Vol. 7, No. 1, June 2019, P 30.

became the rulers of the region after 1857's war of independence. This failure made Muslims in general and Ulemain particular defensive and they started introspecting causes of their downfall in sub-continent. Ulemas were of the view that God imposed foreign rulers on them in lieu of their moral degradation and their increasing distance from the true teachings of Islam (Metcalf 264). Religious leaders started to re-interpret the teachings of Quran and Sunnah and laid stress on adherence to the 'Sharia'. These reformist ideas later translated into movements known as Ahl-i-Hadith and Deoband in Indian sub-continent. With the rise of colonialism in India, Sufism came under criticism from various quarters. Modernists who were inspired by the 'Age of reason' and 'Enlightenment' who wanted to impart scientific thinking among the Muslim population called it anti rational and on the other end reformists viewed Sufism as a contaminated element of Islam (Paracha 12-13).

Nineteenth century witnessed a birth of a new sub sect of Sunnis the Barelwis that was the result of a tension between the revivalists and Sufis. This religious group regarded Ahmed Raza Khan Barelwi as their religious leader. They embraced the local practices of the region in their religious doctrine and emerged as the custodians of 'Indigenous Islam' in various historical accounts (Qasmi 19). Barelwis emergence is a reactionary response to the competing groups of religious thought (Khan 4). Ahmed Raza Khan immediately responded to the criticism of Sufism, called it an intrinsic part of Islam through his writings, and questioned the faith of critics in return. His text-centered approach came as a shelter for Sufism and it synthesized the two Barelwis and the Sufis. Subsequently, two prominent Sufi orders Chistiyya and the Qadriyyah fell in line to the proclamations of Ahmed Raza Khan in no time (Kamran 58). After his death in 1921, Barelwis founded a platform with the name of All India Sunni Conference to increase their influence in the sub-continent and started supporting the cause of Pakistan in the last decade (Sanyal 105). Creation of Pakistan witnessed a foundation of JUP first political party of the Barelwis in 1948 (Ahmed 4).

Sense of Alienation among the Barelwis, Militant Sunni Tehreek and emergence of TLP

Ayub's martial rule in an attempt to establish the writ of the state brought all the shrines and adjacent mosques under the control of the state through the newly created department of Auqaf. This act of state forced Pirs to accept the 'modernized' version of Sufism as defined by the Ayub

administration, which was clearly in contradiction to the definition of the Barelwi Ulema (Ewing 253). Ayub's decline followed the rise of Zulifqar Ali Bhutto who redefined state's official narrative on socialist lines and claimed that it is already inherent in Islam to gain popularity among the society. He borrowed concepts from GM Syed's idea of Sufism and this definition was again against the ideas of Barelwi scholars (Ewing 261). Zia-ul-Haque equated Ulemas with the Sufis as he was of the view that both are serving the cause of Islam and there is no difference between the two. It further challenged the miraculous claims of the saints by authoring biographies of the saints under the Auqaf department (Paracha 74). Musharraf's 'Enlightened Moderation' brought the Barelwi scholars into mainstream for the first time in the history of Pakistan (Musharraf).

Formation of the department of Auqaf brought major shrines under state's patronage and challenged the Pirs/Sajjada Nasheen's authority within Khanqah and among their followers. State's ever changing definition of Sufism, and continuous patronization of Deobandi Ulemas in state offices created a sense of alienation among the Barelwi-Sufi Ulemas in Pakistan. They not only rejected State sponsored Sufism but also shared their anxieties with Bhutto and Zia ulHaq (Paracha 6). Similarly, in an interview Mahfooz Ahmed Mashadi, a prominent Barelwi politician and scholar declined to support US funded Sufism in Pakistan (Mashadi).

Until 1970's JUP was not an effective political force while Deobandis on the other hand had a considerable influence between the state and society (Ahmed 25). Zia's Islamization and patronization of the Deobandis by the state cracked the JUP, which alienated Barelwis, and they lost political relevance. Deobandi's increasing influence in the state apparatus, forceful occupation of Barelwi mosques in all over the country and despite of having majority of followers least political representation in politics, left no other option for Barelwis to take arms in hand and start violent struggle for the protection of their rights. This led to the rise of a militant group Sunni Tehreek under the leadership of Saleem Qadri in 1990, which worked under the slogan 'Jawaanian lootaa in gay masjidain bachan gay' (We will sacrifice our youths to safeguard our mosques) (Nabeel et al. 2). Initially ST was not into politics and had four point agenda to work upon:

1. To protect the interests of the Ahl-e-Sunnat.

2. To safeguard the mosques of Ahl-e-Sunnat from forceful occupation (Qabza) by Deobandis.
3. To remain intact with common Barelwis and protect them from false beliefs of other sects.
4. Work for regaining the control of Barelwi mosques and shrines from administration (Nabeel et al. 6).

Interestingly, Saleem Qadri was neither a madrasah graduate nor he had penned down books related to Islam, previously, he was the devotee of Dawat e Islami (Missionary Barelwi Jamat) and used to drive rickshaw to earn his livelihood. He inspired the Barelwi youth of his time and made one thing clear that you do not need to be a religious scholar to work for Islam. ST repeatedly staged his power shows all over Pakistan to fetch their legitimate rights and this gave a sense of empowerment to the Barelwi followers. ST was of the opinion that Barelwis cannot achieve their legitimate religio-political rights until they opt for the same militant means as other religious groups did to achieve their ends. According to a report, ST took back more than twenty Barelwi occupied mosques from Deobandis until 1997 (Ahmed 169). Saleem was receiving death threats and eventually assassinated in 2001 (Ahmed 170). Similarly, ST's second leader Abbas Qadri, along with seventy other leaders and number of followers were killed in Nishtar Park Karachi 2006. These killings testified the ST's fears, made Barelwi followers more radical in their demands and approach in coming years. After the incident of Nishtar Park (2006), Asia Maseeh case (2009) and assassination of Salman Taseer (2011) Barelwis who were alienated, engaged in military activities in the name of self-protection in early 1990's changed the style of their politics and accelerated the process of activism around the issues of Namooos-e-risalat (Prophet's Honour) and Ishq-e-Rasool (Love for the Prophet Muhammad). This increased their street power and they hijacked and challenged the writ of the state, whenever they wanted.

As the dictatorial rule of Musharraf started, they used the Barelwis against the rising militancy of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the US authorities to hold rallies against the TTP funded ST (Imtiaz). Later on, PPP's civilian rule also continued the patronization of Barelwis, tried to assimilate them in the state structure, and used them against extremist elements in the society (Salman 3). These policies backfired when a liberal Governor of Punjab Salman Taseer who supported the amendment of blasphemy laws in support of Christian women Asia Bibi who was accused of false blasphemy charges. This

started a new wave of accusations; Barelwis stamped him as Blasphemer, and issued numerous fatwas, which presented Governor as Kaffir. Some labeled him impure Muslim just because of one reason that he did not align with the Barelwi interpretation of Blasphemy law. Ulemas started igniting the policemen to kill Taseer, and ultimately his own bodyguard who was a regular visitor of a Dawat-e-Islami center in Rawalpindi assassinated him. When executed by the state, MumtazQadri admitted that he was inspired by the speeches of two Barelwi clerics Mufti Hanif Qureshi and Imtiaz Shah (Salamn 9). His execution erupts a large-scale mobilization of religiously charged Barelwis. This was one of those rare historical moments when political experts and commentators feared to mourn over the death of the executive head of the country's biggest province (Gugler 9). Right after the killing of Salman Taseer 500 Barelwi Ulemas issued a declaration under the banner of Sunni Ittehad Council to boycottTaseer's funeral ceremony and paid high tribute to MumtazQadri (Gugler 16). Pakistan had not witnessed such sickening example of Bara' in terms of hate, anger and disassociation over a dead body before. Dozens of Ulemas refused to lead Taseer's funeral just because of religious indifferences over the issue of Blasphemy law (Khan).Bara' contained even after Taseer'sburial ceremony, as three Ulemas who agreed to lead his funeral prayer received death threats (Zulqarnain). On the other hand, MumtazQadri'swas receiving exceptional Wala' (respect), his honored receptions left a mark on the minds of Barelwi youth of Pakistan to become the defenders of the honor of the Prophet, moreover, Qadriwas awarded by various titles by the Barelwi clerics such as 'Ghazi-e-Millat', 'Muhafiz-e- Millat-e-Islamia' and 'Hero of Islam' (Ghyas).This marks the rise of new era of religious intolerance in Pakistan where Barelwis started glorifying and cherishing those who killed in the name of the Prophet (Qadri 10).

The Ulema who were taking active part in the process of hailing the murderer as the protector of Prophet's honor Khadim Hussain Rizvi unabashedly stands at top. He was one of the Barelwi religious clerics who made to headlines when a movement was launchedto revert the court orders to execute Mumtaz Qadri. Khadim Hussain Rizvi was an ex-government employ (Imam Masjid) in the department of Auqaf (Lahore) and resigned from the job after this incident. He actively participated in the 'Ghazi Bachao Tehreek' ⁶and make it to the top tier of leadership of

⁶ This movement was launched by the barelwis to stop the execution of the MumtazQadri.

this movement due to his fiery oratory skills in the indigenous language (Basit 11). During the course of Ghazi Bachao Tehreek Barelwi Ulemas consciously monopolized the notion of Ishq-e-Rasool and kept it alive under the guise of Namoos-e-Risalat and it became the most important reason of the Barelwi mobilization over the years. Almost all sections of Barelwis including apolitical and moderate group of Dawat-e-Islami also favored the new assertive outlook of Barelwis (Gugler 12). Furthermore, Mashaikh who were the torchbearers of the barelwi movement retreated and firebrand clerics like Khadim Hussain Rizvi came to prominence and brelwis in turn appropriated this use of violence as an effective tool to counter deobandi influence (Kamran 65). In addition to this, the same assertive role, which Barelwis had been posing since Taseer's assassination, with the adroit usage of internet and mass protests, resulted in the emergence of TLP (Sevea 2). With this violent and radical support base, Khadim Hussain Rizvi founded a political party with the name of Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan. Barelwis admired assertive and fearless role of Khadim Hussain Rizvi, which he played during Ghazi Bachao Tehreekh, they overwhelmingly supported him with the aspirations of becoming an effective political force in coming years. It is interesting to know that unlike Jamat-i-Islami and Jamat-ud-Dawa's new political face Milli Muslim League (2017). TLP does not have any background of community service and charities. They market only their firebrand style of retributive justice for those who killed in the name of Prophet. Being a clever Barelwi cleric Khadim Rizvi know the boiling point of moderate Barelwis that when Prophet's honor becomes matter of debate, Barelwi start mass protests with impressive numbers. Over the issue of sanctity and honor of Prophet Muhammad, Barelwi start behaving violently like Islamists (Gugler 5). Poster boys for their movement are the who took state's law in their hands and killed someone on the suspicion of blasphemous activities which includes Mumtaz Qadri, Tanveer Ahmed (the one who killed an Ahmadi in Glasgow) and murderers of Mashaal Khan (Nambiar). JUP as the representative political party of the Barelwis, which failed to leave any mark in political arena. On the other hand, ST managed to mobilize its followers and winning back dozens of Barelwi mosques and madrassas though militant means, but even this could not helped the ST to emerge as successful electoral outfit of Barelwi in Pakistan (Paracha 51). Unlike the JUP, ST and other Barelwi political parties TLP publicly refused the politics of alliances and co-operation with religious and political parties other than Barelwis (Sevea 5). This policy of no alliance helped TLP in emerging as leading force within Barelwi circles (Sevea 1)

TLP practicing WB

TLP is continuously vying for intra Barelwi prominence, uses violence as a means to safeguard their interests and till now it is successful in its motive as already had done by the ST. It also keeps itself intact to the Barelwi theological foundations to remain the only representative political party of the Barelwis. In the display of violence, they are exactly expressing like extremist Salafis. It continuously refers to their (Barelwi) ancestor as the custodians of 'real Islam'. Instead of preaching devotional Islam and peace for the humanity, they condemn religious minorities, denounce and curse other Sufis who do not agree with their version of Islam (Qadri 10). In this hate spilling, they still consider themselves as proponents of 'real Islam'. Following the footsteps of Salafi doctrine of WB, which divide the world into 'pure', and 'impure', TLP leadership is visualizing the Muslim society in the binaries of pure and impure, and Islamic and un-Islamic. Their lectures/speeches are not only worsening the religious landscape but also influencing the Youth to become religious fanatics over the issue of *Namoos e Risalat*. A boy from Charsadha district participated in TLP organized protest held over the issue of *Namoos e Risalat* and remained absent from school. On his return to school, he killed the Principal with the statement; he marked me absent when I was defending the sanctity of Prophet. Moreover, it has become a hallmark of TLP Leadership to examine others' actions with the lens of *Ishq e Rasool*. Here are few examples of this behaviour:

Although, Khadim Hussain Rizvi is not into writing but he equally acknowledges the vitality of using internet for swift transmission of his ideas in a wide spectrum of Muslim society in Pakistan. TLP under the leadership of Khadim Rizvi is sabotaging the previous comprehension and providing a new conscience of Sufism through YouTube official channel, different Twitter accounts, Facebook pages, religio-political congregations and live Friday sermons (Basit 13). It is the hallmark of Salafi puritanical Islam to divide the world into two distant parts, true and fake. Likewise, it's an intrinsic part of their methodology to interpret others' actions through WB and label them as contaminated acts committed by impious people. Following Salafis' footsteps Khadim Hussain divided the Sufis into two diametrically opposite camps of 'real' and 'fake' Sufis.

"Today people are spreading nonsense in the name of Sufism, they believe Sufi is a person who always

propagates love, avoid conflicts and ignores wrong practices. No, (in negation) 'real' Sufi cannot tolerate enemy of the Prophet (SAW) on this earth. Real Sufi neither preach peace all the time nor render services to America". ("Sufi KonHotaHai? By Allama Khadim Hussain Rizvi," 01:15–02:21)

Above-mentioned statement opened a new debate of real and fake Sufis. It shackled the century's old reverence attached to the concept of Sufism, which is mostly (Barelwis) not viewed with this skepticism that Sufis can be fake. Khadim Hussain Rizwi has repeatedly denounced many fellow Barelvi religious clerics and spiritual leaders who interpret Sufism as a peaceful strand of Islam. As Salafis denounce different interpretations of Islam, Khadim Hussain also belittled them as coward, agents of West and fake Ulemas, who are in constant quest of appeasing foreign authorities. Moreover, he out rightly rejected the notion of apologetic Islam and threatened the Government with severe consequences if it try to alter the Blasphemy law.

In another speech, his message was more loud and clear:

'In the disguise of terrorism and extremism they are waging war against Islam. They want us to bring a moderate version of Islam, which does not carry the teachings of Jihad. Muslims of the whole world are under attack and some people are preaching peace in the name of Sufism' ("Allama Khadim Hussain Rizvi 2019 | Hazrat Siddique Akbar R.A | Asal Sufi KonHai | Emotional Bayan," 00:10–01:21)

Along with Sufis, TLP's vilification campaign did not even spare intellectual of Barelwi-Sufi circles. Dr Tahir ul Qadri⁷ belongs to same Hanafimadhab and a practitioner of Sufi Islam, moreover, he is a staunch believer of peaceful existence with other religions. Dr Qadri did not only condemn Mumtaz Qadri's act of killing but also advised his followers not to take law in hands. Dr Qadri's statement invited Khadim Hussain's anger, instead of dealing with sagacity and refuting Dr Qadri's

⁷Dr Tahir-ul-Qadri founded Minhaj-ul-Quran an international non-governmental organization in 1980.

argument over Blasphemy law though dialogue, Khadim Hussain started character assassination and portrait Dr Qadri as the agent of Christian priests.

‘Do you know the meanings of Kanz, I have taught Arabic grammar (an-nahw al-'arabi), it means treasure. He (Dr Ashraf Asif Jalali) has done massive research about this Canadian pimp (dallay) and pig (khanzir). Oh you son of a veterinary doctor (dangar doctor deyaputra), oh you priest (padri), oh you pig (khanzir), oh you dishonored⁸ person (begherat), oh you Chief of Satin (ShaikhnulShaitaan); for whole life you earned money and reputation over the name of Prophet (PBUH), however; in critical times you deserted him and joined the camps of Priests’. (“Khadim Rizvi Abusing on Dr Tahir Ul Qadri in Mosque YouTube,” 01:00–03:10)

Throughout the proceedings of Asia Maseeh case, TLP leadership, pressurized the Government through street protests, presented the image of Judges of Supreme Court as 'biased' and 'impure' (people who are trying to bring changes in Blasphemy law) and kept their followers charged to kill someone or get killed to protest the honor of Prophet.

"Judges paid derogatory remarks about Blasphemy Law, they are working on Western-Christian agenda; it is high time to stand against them. If Judges set Aasiya Maseeh free, we will launch a massive campaign against courts and Government, neither Imran khan will remain Prime Minister, nor will Mian Saqib Nisar continue as Chief Justice. I request you all to get ready for martyrdom, Muhammad Afzal Qadri will get the first bullet but we will not retune homes until we purify our Courts from these Judges." (“Speech of Pir Afzal Qadri on Which He Apologized,” 01:15–02:05)

⁸ In Indian Subcontinent, notion of a man's honor (ghairat) is attached with the honor of his women. Addition of 'Be'(pronounced: Bay) before ghairat means, 'no ghairat', which constitutes a picture of a person who cannot protect his women.

Later on when Judges could not find Aasiya Bibi guilty of accusations and set her free, TLP leadership including Khadim Hussain Rizwi and Pir Afzal Qadri addressed and ignited the people to kill Judges. In the latter part of their speeches, they advised the security persons to repeat the story of Mumtaz Qadri and make our Courts clean from such vicious personalities. Pir Afzal Qadri divided the Pakistan Army in to two parts, 'pious generals' and 'impious generals' and asked the pious general to depose the Army Chief General Qamar Javeed Bajwa.

"As per The Sharia law (Islamic religious law) these three judges should be killed (wajib-ul-qatl), if they are out of access from our religious political workers, either their driver or security guards should kill them. General Bajwa has lost its credibility and we ask Muslim generals in Pakistan Army to start rebellion against him. Last but not the least, Imran Khan (Prime Minister) is a proven Jewish Child." ("Pir Afzal Qadri, Khadim Rizvi Talking about Army, Judiciary and Imran Khan, #asiabiverdict," 02:15–02:50)

Societal interpretation of WB restricts its follower to be friends of Non-Muslims. It restricts Muslims to interact with them Non-Muslims, accept their gifts, celebrate their historical and cultural events. Following the same interpretation, Khadim Hussain Rizwi, warns Muslims not to participate in social events of the Non-Muslims, adaptation of western norms, participating in their events will make you an impure Muslim.

'Anyone who observes western events or celebrates Valentine day is a cursed (lanati) person. Likewise, anyone who sells, buys and exchange flowers/gifts on Valentine day, he is a reprobate. They all are transgressing the limits of Islam and are illegitimate babes. If you have enough money and time, help poor people, read Quran, sent salutation to Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) and serve your parents on Valentine day.' ("Valentine's Day by Maolana Khadim Hussain Rizvi," 00:15–01:21)

Under the patronage of Pir Afzal Qadri and Khadim Hussain Rizvi, TLP is propagating literalist and puritan version of Islam. TLP has emerged as a coercive mechanism of moral policing which is rapidly altering the

esoteric nature of Sufism and turning it into a puritan movement in Pakistan. Neither Sufis cursed on the base of religion nor did they reserve blessing for their coreligionists. During the course of COVID-19, Khadim Hussain interpreted the disease with the political lenses of WB. WB reserves blessing only for Muslims and on the other hand, it presents cursing the Non-Muslim as a virtuous act. He offered his Wala (sympathy) the Muslim in Xingjian and cursed the Chinese over the implementing of draconian laws on innocent Muslims. He did not restricted his Bara (curse) only for Chinese and even cursed those Muslim who are the allies of China. Moreover, it's interesting to note that while discussing COVID-19, Khadim Hussain consciously involved the personality of Prophet and realized his Barelwi followers that it's the Prophet's personality which saved Pakistan from different diseases like COVID-19.

‘We are saved because of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH), otherwise; Allah had turned us into Monkey and Pigs. Chinese had made two million Muslims captive, now look at China; it is suffering from God’s wrath. They do not accept the existence of God and forced Millions of Muslims to eat Pig and drink alcohol. Oh Allah, bestrew them, destroy them, and perish them. O Allah, excruciate them and excruciate their friends as well(Daaani Creations, 03:15–05:21).

Khadim Hussain Rizwi never miss any chance of marketing TLP's love for Prophet Muhammad and presenting him as the only savior of the Muslims. They monopolizes the personality of Prophet Muhammad and successfully uses the notions like Ishaq e Rasool, Namooos e Rasalat, and Blasphemy law to remain intact with Barelwi audience. Most of Khadim Hussain's sermons end at this couplet authored by Imam Ahmed Raza

AajLayunkipanaah, aajmadadmangunsey
phirnamaaneingay, qayamatmein agar maangya
Seek his protection today, today ask help from him
He would not agree, if on Judgment Day to ask you then
went⁹

⁹<http://sunniport.com/index.php?threads/nimatein-bant-ta-jis-simt-translation-of-ala-hazrats-naat.4477/> (accessed on 2-oct-2020) 7:12 pm

Constantly evolving definition of Sufism by the state of Pakistan resulted in the alienation of the Barelwis. Their silencing in the state apparatus and the failure of archetypal JUP, heightened their insecurity and they resorted to violence with the rise of ST. Although ST, could not fetch Barelwi vote but it succeeded in injecting a new vigour in the toned down Barelwis. What altered the dynamics of Barelwi politics is TLP's rise. It filled the electoral vacuum within the Barelwis created by the ST and ultimately replaced its counterpart as a pressure group too. Usage of abusive language and violence as an essential means by the TLP clerics has further minimized the gap between WB and Barelwis, furthermore, it has proved itself as the tributary of salafi inspired literalist Islam in Pakistan.

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