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# POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN PAKISTAN: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE DURING ZARDARI PERIOD

#### Abstract

Political history of Pakistan reflects the least concern to institutionalize the political system for democratic stability. Centralized state structure with authoritarian tendencies, contesting political parties for power and imbalance civil-military relations have always threatened to thwart the cause of political stability. In this context, democratic dispensation to the elected representatives in 2008 which completed its five years tenure after the Government of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, establishes a need to revisiting the political process in Pakistan to understand and evaluate the political development in terms of continues crises and its resilience. For the paper ,analyzes Zardari era 2008- 2013, as he is supposed to be a main functionary of that era.

#### Introduction

Democratic regimes are considered fragile in developing countries, whether they were established as a result of decolonization with imperial legacy or come out of authoritarianism under military rule. Social scientists have recognized the problems of democracy in developing countries and have emphasized the political institutionalization for the stable political system. The politics of Pakistan reflects a history of conflicts, hampering the development of political system<sup>1</sup>. Keith Callard's study marks the initial period of Pakistan's history as a period of change and uncertainty that paved the way for civil and military conflict of power<sup>2</sup>. Ziring<sup>3</sup> and Rizvi<sup>4</sup> consider the weak political leadership and less organized and less integrated political parties as a main cause of political instability. These political trends indicate the weak democratic spirit and least commitment of politicians to institutionalize the system in Pakistan<sup>5</sup>. Even after passing seventy years, Jaffrelot views the politics of Pakistan atypical in many respects. That does not fully comply with the criteria of democratic transition.<sup>6</sup> Similarly Iftikhar H. Malik also defines this phenomena as continues disequilibrium between state and society and failure of Pakistani Government to establish good governance.<sup>7</sup> However, in the debate of weak institutionalization of political system, Saeed Shafqat <sup>8</sup>considers army as a major challenge to sustainable democracy in Pakistan that has become a parallel state in the view of Mazhar Aziz<sup>9</sup>. Similarly Agil Shah focuses that successful democratization requires a military committed to democratic norms<sup>10</sup>. In view of these observations, this paper discusses the

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structure and functioning of the Government of Pakistan People's Party to assess the political development in Pakistan during 2008-2013.

#### **Theoretical construct**

Political development refers to the process of politicization: increasing participation or involvement of the citizens in state activities, in power calculations, and its consequences.<sup>11</sup> There is a great importance of organizational strength for political development. However, the strength of political organizations and procedures vary with their scope of support and their level of institutionalization. W.W. Rostow observes political development as a typical phenomenon of industrial society. These societies are the pattern setters of political development for other societies.<sup>12</sup>S. N. Eisenstadt relates the increased differentiation, specialization of political structure and increased secularization of political culture to political development. <sup>13</sup> Effectiveness, efficiency and capacity are seen as benchmarks of political development. L.W. Pye, identified three levels viz; population, Government performance and organization of polity; where the political development could be observed<sup>14</sup>.

Political development emphasizes the process of modernization and is a closely related phenomena of social mobilization with increasing political participation. The rates of mobilization and participation are high; the rates of organization and institutionalization are low. <sup>15</sup> In developing countries the conflict between mobilization and institutionalization is the crux of politics. In this perspective, a balanced view of the politics in developing countries requires more attention to the art of interest articulation and aggregation, for the growth of political institutions. We have used the insights provided by these approaches in an explanation of political development and institutionalization of democratic process within a state during 2008-2013.

#### **Historical Development**

The formative phase (1947-58) of newly emerged Pakistan was very important to set the patterns of governance and function of state institutions to transform a colonial legacy into democratic political system. Pakistan had security threats posed by India immediately after the liquidation of the British Empire and at the same time, it was confronting with serious economic, political and administrative challenges. In this context, the task of Nation-building and state-building through the definition of Pakistani identity in a multicultural and multi-ethnic perspective became more complex. Pakistan Muslim League did not re-organize and reconstruct its political vision of social and economic advancement of the masses. The imposition of a policy of one nation, one language and one party on the name of national interest for national cohesion, badly affected the process of democratization. Factionalism, regionalism and opportunism characterized the politics of this phase<sup>16</sup>. In 1954, United Front defeated Muslim League in the election of East Pakistan Assembly but it could not maintain its unity due to power politics of the leaders of the parties included in this Front. Resultantly, United Front could not emerge as an alternate political party to consolidate the democratic institutions. Political Governments (1947-58) failed to adapt themselves to address the more acute issues of resource allocation, administrative representation, social development and provincialism and evolve participatory politics. Political parties did not show any commitment to democratic norms and values to direct the future course of political system. The dismissal of Khawaja Nazimuddin as Prime Minister in April 1953 and the dissolution of the first Constituent Assembly in 1954 were the examples of such behavior.<sup>17</sup>

Perceived security threats on external front combined with internal deteriorating political situation enhanced the role of civil and military bureaucracy in the formation of state policy and its execution. Politicians began to cultivate the military for strengthening their position in the body politic. Consequently, martial law was declared in October 1958, abrogated the parliamentary constitution of 1956 and scrapped the political system which was in its transitional phase<sup>18</sup>. General Ayub Khan who assumed the power on the name of national unity and political stability, was against the political parties and considered the democratic system not suitable to the genius of Pakistani people. He introduced Basic Democracies System and highly centralized presidential system to rule the country authoritatively. He was not ready to share power with political elites and relied heavily on the civil bureaucracy in decision making process. The political, administrative and economic policies and actions of military regime enhanced the class and regional inequalities between East and West Pakistan. His introduced political system failed to integrate its policies and function of state institutions to remove the cleavages of the people, particularly of East Pakistan. His centralized and authoritarian rule negatively affected the growth of democratic process and political institutionalization.<sup>19</sup>

Ayub Khan was replaced by another military man, General Yahya Khan, in March 1969, who abrogated presidential constitution of 1962 and imposed martial law in the country. In 1970, this regime held the first general elections on the basis of universal adult franchise but he could not cope with the demands of East Pakistan for political power sharing and socio-economic equality. Resultantly, East Pakistan was separated from Pakistan in December 1971 in a military debacle.

Political Government of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, succeeded to frame a unanimous constitution of 1973. However, practically, it could not alter the continued pattern of centralized power structure for his personal ascendancy. He also did not believe participatory politics and governance. Pakistan People's Party remained undemocratic in its party structure, based on patronage, rather than principles. His treatment towards opposition parties and socio-economic reforms provided military an opportunity to recapture its role in the political system of Pakistan. Consequently, an elected Government of PPP missed the chance to resolve political, economic and social problems to sustain the political system thus could not lay down the infrastructure for political institution<sup>20</sup>.

General Zia ul Haq dissolved Bhutto's civilian Government through martial law in July 1977. Like Ayub Khan he was also against the role of political parties and considered their functioning contrary to the Islam. He attempted to restructure the administrative system for stability by means of Islamization and depoliticization. Political parties started Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD) in 1981 to withdraw martial law, to restore parliamentary constitution of 1973 and to hold general elections. Military Government conducted nonparty based general elections in 1985 and amended the constitution of 1973 in the same year, to give it

an explicit presidential form to minimize the role of parliament. Zia's policies promoted ethnic and sectarian division which restricted the prospects of social and cultural pluralism<sup>21</sup>.

In this way, political system based on the restructured constitution of 1973 reduced the ability of political institution to govern and thus limited the scope of political development in Pakistan. The severe constraints on the authority of elected political leadership affected the civil-military relations as well. Use of Presidential power under article 58-2, for three times during 1990-1997 to unseat the elected Prime Ministers reflected the centrality of the political system. In such context, leaders of political parties did not prefer to democratize their parties and remained depended on personal charisma and patronage networks to mobilize support<sup>22</sup>. Consequently, the elected Governments of PPP and PML(N) (1988-99) could not perform effectively and efficiently to institutionalize the system.

The military returned to power in October 1999 after dislodging the civilian Government of PML(N). General Pervez Musharraf formed National Security Council in October 1999 to determine the constitutional role of military in the politics of Pakistan. His political system was based on devolution of power, completely bypassing the provinces. Practically, this system could not attain the objectives of 'good governance' and 'enlightened democracy.' He militarized the state and its economy and weakened the Government organs<sup>23</sup>.

The inconsistence history of political development in Pakistan reflects the weak organizational strength of political parties, centralized political system and imbalance civil-military relations which restrict the growth of political institutionalization. The present paper deals with the theme in the context of Pakistan's politics. Zardari period is focused in terms of both contemporary political, administrative and socio-economic challenges and long term historical continuities.

## Elections 2008

It was a general perception that no party would be able to win seats in the general elections 2008, necessary to form the Government. Muslim League Nawaz PML(N) was incapable to introduce a coherent political strategy during election campaign. Religious parties were not united as had been in the elections of 2002. Jamat- I- Islami(JI), Pakistan Therik- e- Insaf (PTI) and Pakhtun Khwa Milli Party(PKMP) boycotted the elections as a protest against the policies of Gen. Pervez Musharraf. Benazir Bhutto was murdered on 27 December, 2007, when she had ended her election speech at Liaquat Bagh Stadium, Rawalpindi. This incident changed the electoral position in favour of Pakistan People's Party and Benazir's widower, Asif Ali Zardari became the Co-Chairman of the PPP<sup>24</sup>.

Elections were held on 18 February 2008 and are considered the fairest one since those of 1970. According to election results 2008, PPP won 91 seats out of 258 of National Assembly seats. PML( Q) was the second largest party in terms of votes however, captured only 41 seats. PML(N) was second in terms of seats by securing 67. MQM, ANP and MMA secured 19, 10 and 06 seats respectively. PML(F) could secure only 4 seats. PPP(S), NPP and BNP (A) were the parties which secured just one seat each on their credit. Eighteen seats were won by the independent candidates<sup>25</sup>.

#### **Government Formation**

Pakistan People's Party emerged as the largest party in general elections 2008 but was not in a position to form the Government singularly at the centre. Considering the exigency of the situation, Asif Ali Zardari formed coalition Government with PML(N), MQM, ANP and MMA(JUI-F), at the centre as well as in provinces contrary to the calculations of President Musharraf.

In first phase of Government formation, PPP proposed 11 names for the federal cabinet after consultation with PML(N). Among 11 names, 05 belonged to the Punjab o4 from Sindh, 01 from NWFP now KPK and 01 from Balochistan.<sup>26</sup> Pakistan Muslim League(N) agreed to share power with every coalition party in the Punjab with the same ratio as followed in the federal cabinet.<sup>27</sup>

Coalition Governments were formed in the provinces. Dost Muhammad Khosa elected un opposed Chief Minister of Punjab with the support of the coalition partners-PML(N), PPP, MMA. PML(N) has 109 seats in the house of 297 excluding reserved seats. Later Shahbaz Sharif assumed the office of Chief Minister on 8 June 2008 and enlarged the Punjab cabinet by including 16 new members in which 08 members belonged to PML (N) and 08 belonged to PPP. Qaim Ali Shah was elected as Chief Minister of Sindh. MQM boycotted the oath taking ceremony of Chief Minister as party had reservation over the appointment of Shoib Suddle as Inspector General Police, Sindh .<sup>28</sup> Later on a power sharing formula reached on consensus between PPP and MQM . As a result MQM succeeded to get 13 ministries besides having 01 advisor and 01 special assistant.<sup>29</sup> Sindh cabinet was also expanded from 21 to 41 members with the induction of 20 more ministers in which 13 were included from MQM and 7 from PPP<sup>30</sup>. In this way PPP formed the coalition Government in Sindh with the support of MQM and ANP.

A coalition Government of ANP, PPP and PML(N) was formed in NWFP. Amir Haider Khan was appointed as Chief Minister of the province by the support of 113 members.<sup>31</sup> In Balochistan, Aslam Raisani elected unopposed Chief Minister with the support of PPP, MMA JUI-F and independents.<sup>32</sup>

Dr Fahmida Mirza secured 249 votes and became the first woman Speaker of National Assembly of Pakistan on 20 March.<sup>33</sup> Syed Yousaf Raza Gilani was elected Prime Minister of Pakistan with huge majority, getting 264 votes in National Assembly. Five members belonging to the PML(Functional) remained abstained from voting to PM.<sup>34</sup> This was first time in the history of Pakistan that cabinet members were sworn in with black bands on arms which they wore as a mark of protest against the President Musharraf who administered oath to them.<sup>35</sup>

Nineteenth century British Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli had observed that 'Coalitions, though successful but their triumph has been brief,'. The major coalition partner of PPP and PML(N) were ideologically on different wavelength and had long list of past political rivalries. The law and order situation in Karachi, separatism in Balochistan, collapsed economy and security problems were considered the major factors to form this coalition Government. It was expected

that there would be sustained cooperation between the PPP and PML(N) to share the 'burden of history' for the democratic process. On external front, America was expecting Pakistan's coalition Government to lead the fight against terrorism. In this context, it was generally believed to be a very difficult political exercise in the prevailing circumstances.

The leader of the two major parties PPP and PML(N) signed a formal declaration to form a coalition Government.<sup>36</sup> The PML( N)'s terms of coalition with PPP were: 1- the judges will be restored within 30 days, which of course would be expired on April 30 of the same year; 2- it will be done through a resolution.<sup>37</sup> In the following section we will discuss the politics and governance of the coalition Government of PPP to deal with the question of how far the regime change in terms of democratic spirit and commitment of political parties towards democratic process and political institutionalization.

## Politics and Governance of the Coalition Government

The first task of the coalition Government was to reinstate the judges along with Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, Chief Justice of Pakistan. There were differences between PML(N) and PPP over the procedure to restore the judges sacked by President Pervez Musharraf by declaring a state of emergency in November 2007. The judiciary issue was complex one in prevailing situation. Sharif demanded the complete restoration of the judges through a resolution within 30 days after the formation of federal Government. Zardari backed out of his commitment after forming the Government. He was delaying the matter for political purposes. He did not want to have problems with military that could possible in case reinstated judges challenge the legitimacy of Musharraf's orders. He was of the opinion that immediate reinstatement of judges would enhance the political popularity of PML(N).

Subsequently, PML(N) withdrew from the coalition Government in May 2008 although, continued its support to the Government in Parliament. The collapse of the coalition Government came when it was widely expected that both leaders would built consensus for the continuity of democratic process. This political crisis pushed Pakistan to what the *Daily Times* called 'the brink of disaster.'<sup>38</sup>

This disagreement between PPP and PML(N) over the judiciary issue impacted the Punjab politics where PML(N) has strong hold. After the resignation of Khalid Maqbool as a Governor, on 15 May 2008, appointment of PPP stalwart Salman Taseer, as Punjab Government after failing to deal with PML(Q) leadership.<sup>39</sup> Same tactics PPP had adopted as a ruling party in 1988, when General (retd.) Tikka Khan was appointed as Governor of the Punjab to put a check on Nawaz Sharif Government. This development has sparked row between PPP and PML(N) with the latter branding the appointment of Salman Taseer as a conspiracy against the Punjab Government. Nawaz Sharif and other party leaders of PML(N) boycotted the oath taking ceremony of Governor Punjab, due to their reservation on his appointment. Political situation became more aggravated when Governor vowed to galvanize the PPP in Punjab, " it would be made new Larkana....party president Bilawal Bhutto would be invited to contest election from Punjab".<sup>40</sup> In this way both parties employed the same tactics against each other as they had

adopted in the last decades of  $20^{\text{th}}$  century for personal ascendency despite that both have signed charter of democracy in 2006. Appointment of Taseer as Governor of Punjab was one of the factors that created difficulty in having terms between PML(N) and PPP.

The alliance of political parties was need of the hour to bring the country out of crises. Government appointed a committee to resolve the judges issue through a resolution to intact the support of PML (N). The committee members were Sherry Rehman, Raza Rabbani and Farooq H. Naek. The response of other coalition partner on the judiciary issue was mixed one. ANP supported the view of PML(N) about deposed judges and showed their willingness to support the resolution while Fazlur Rehman of JUI considered the stance of Sharif on judges issue unreasonable as the reinstatement of judges was not as important as the other issues of Pakistan.<sup>41</sup> Practically the committee remained ineffective and even did not present the resolution in the Assembly for the debate. There was also a proposal by the Government to resolve the issue through the next constitutional amendment.

Despite the differences among the coalition partners, the Government succeeded to force President Musharraf to resign under the threat of impeachment. In the emerged situation PML(N) float the idea of having next President from smaller provinces but could not succeed to attain the support of the parties of smaller provinces. PPP nominated Zardari as Presidential candidate. Asfandyar Wali considered the demand of PPP justified to have its President as it was a major party in the coalition Government.<sup>42</sup>Subsequently, Asif Ali Zardari managed to get himself elected President of Pakistan on 26 August,2008 with the support of PPP, MQM, JUI, ANP and other coalition parties.<sup>43</sup>

The politics of Pakistan was initially dominated by the perception that Zardari being Co- Chairman of PPP and President of Pakistan had influential position but at the same time he had repeatedly clashed with key power centres, including the judiciary, military and opposition political parties.

Months of rising tension between PPP and PML(N) over the issue of the reinstatement of higher judiciary reached on a point when President Zardari imposed Governor's rule in the Punjab on 25 February 2009, following the Supreme Court's disqualification of Sharif brothers from holding office. It seems a pre-emptive attempt by Zardari to suppress political challenges from PML(N). PPP was in effort to come in power in Punjab by avoiding PML(N). Meanwhile, a lawyer movement for the restoration of judges had been started in the country with the collaborations of lawyers, civil society and political parties including PTI and JI. Nawaz Sharif led a successful long marc on 15 March 2009 to show his solidarity with the cause. It was the pressure of lawyer movement, long march of Nawaz Sharif and army that compelled the Government to restore the judges on 16 March 2009. Participation of middle class in the long march indicates the changed course of democratic process to reasonable extant.<sup>44</sup>

## **Executive and Judiciary**

Having strengthened the independence of judiciary, Supreme Court focused its attention on National Reconciliation Order, 2007 (NRO). Supreme Court had first

directed the Government to submit the NRO to the Parliament for approval to make it law. The Government could not manage the require majority due to MQM's prevarication. As a result, on 16 December 2009 the court declared the NRO null and void. The court opined that the NRO seems to be against National interests thus it violates the provisions of the constitution. Therefore, Supreme Court ordered the Government to reopen the corruption cases against the existing President of Pakistan in the Swiss Courts. In this process, the response of law ministry was non- cooperative who prevented the Attorney General of Pakistan to carry out the order of Supreme Court.<sup>45</sup>

Meanwhile 18th amendment was passed by the Assembly. Some of its provisions had directly affected the autonomy and independence of judiciary regarding the appointment of Chief Justice of Pakistan (see for details article 175). Judiciary demonstrated its increased confidence by challenging those provisions that affected the powers of judiciary and referred them back to the Parliament to review. National Assembly passed 19<sup>th</sup> amendment on 22 December 2010 and increased the powers of judiciary in the judicial appointment procedure to avoid any further conflict with judiciary.

Relations between executive and judiciary became more serious when Supreme Court ordered PM Gilani to write a letter to Swiss authorities to re-open the investigation against Zadari- Bhutto family banks accounts. Gilani refused to follow multiple directives of Supreme Court on a plea that Zardari had Presidential immunity. However, PPP directed the case to Speaker of National Assembly on 24 May 2012 to review the case of Gilani in the light of the apex Court's verdict. The Speaker ruled out that despite being convicted, Gilani cannot be disqualified under article 63 of the constitution and did not forward the reference to Election Commission of Pakistan. At this juncture, PML(N), PTI and JI demanded the resignation of PM. PML(N) and PTI filed separate petition in the Supreme Court challenging the Speaker's ruling to save the Prime Minister from disqualification.<sup>46</sup> PPP Government considered it justified as after 18<sup>th</sup> amendment Speaker had judicial powers to decide over the disqualification of a member of the National Assembly. The Supreme Court refused to accept this stance of Government and finally Gilani was declared guilty of contempt of court on 26 April 2012, for not obeying the orders of the Court. Gilani resigned on 19 June 2012 under the pressure of Supreme Court<sup>47</sup>. Subsequently, Raja Pervaiz Ashraf who had served as Minister of Water and Power during 2008-2011, was replaced as PM of Pakistan on 21 June 2012.

These developments undermined the process of democratization and opened the debate of sovereign Parliament viz -a- viz independent judiciary. Muhammad Waseem interprets the dismissal of Gilani as the result of clash of institutions,<sup>48</sup> while some were considering it as constitutional liberalism . In a real democracy, it is the only constitution that is supreme. The executive, judiciary and legislature are all subservient to it. Burki views it as one more step forward to Pakistan's political transition.<sup>49</sup> In the political history of Pakistan, only the executive has had any real power in this question of Government variables. Now Judiciary played an independent role as it was always meant to play. Executive, legislature and judiciary are the state pillars, coordinate with each other for democratic governance and for the institutional stability. Efforts to establish the supremacy of

one institution over the other institutions is inherently conflict producing and weaken the federation.

## **Civil-Military Relations**

The military is a dominant force in Pakistan since independence thus enjoys more autonomy than any other state institution. To enhance the civilian control on the state system, Zardari Government tried to put ISI under the control of the Ministry of Interior. The military was not ready to comply with political institution and the decision met greater resistance from the military. Ultimately this decision was reversed within hours of its issuance due to perceived threat from military to democratic system of Pakistan.<sup>50</sup> General Ashfaq Parvez Kavani became COAS in November 2007 and made some efforts to build the image of military supportive to democracy. He called some of 300 army officials back into armed ranks from civilian posts. The differences have started between military high command and civilian Government, on the Kerry-Lugar-Berman Bill 2009. Bill offered Pakistan \$ 1.5 billion annually in non military development US Aid for five years. The Bill adopted a new strategy for the material assistance that enhanced the civilian check over the military. Zardari considered this Bill a success of democratic forces whereas military perceived it as US efforts to weaken the country's security institutions. In this context, Kayani's meeting with federal secretaries of various ministries at General Head Quarter in March 2010 just before his official visit to US for strategic dialogue clearly reflected the military's preference of bureaucrats rather political executive.<sup>51</sup> Through bureaucratic nexus military influenced the political Government to enhance its institutional hegemony. This nature of civilmilitary relations spread many speculations. Time Magazine declared Kayani as the 'most influential General in the World' in 2009. He had the patronage of Obama Government to ensure the continuity in the war against terror. Under these circumstances to settle the relations with military, Gilani extended his tenure as COAS for next three year.<sup>52</sup> Political parties issued considerable statements and welcomed the decision of the Government in muted ways.

Memo gate controversy erupted in October 2011 which again strained the civilmilitary relationship. It was an un addressed memorandum, sent to the former US military Chief Admiral Mike Mullen. It reflected the concerns that Pakistani military outfits might attempt to topple the civilian Government in the wake of ordering the military to stand down during the Osama bin Laden raid. In this perspective, memo sought Obama administration to help to ask Pakistan army to deist from launching a military coup in the country. Mansoor Ejaz, a businessman based in America who was involved in memo controversy claimed that, Hussain Haqqani, Pakistani ambassador to Washington, had directed him to deliver a confidential memo, asking for US help for President Zardari. The memo was asserted to be written by Hussain Haqqani at the behest of Zardari. Pakistani Government rejected the claim as malicious and a 'total fabrication'.<sup>53</sup>

To investigate the issue, Government formed a parliamentary panel. Meanwhile Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, Shameem Whyn's request to the Supreme Court for an independent probe into the matter, was accepted by the Supreme Court. Nawaz Sharif filed a petition in the Supreme Court in November 2011 to clear ambiguity and confusion about the memo, was also accepted by the

Supreme Court.<sup>54</sup> His action pitted Judiciary and army against the Government. The court rejected the Government's proposal to investigate the issue by a Parliamentary panel which reflected the distrust of judiciary on political institution. Tension between Government and the military reached at the peak after Gilani's statement that the armed forces and the intelligence chiefs had acted in an " unconstitutional and Illegal" manner by filing the affidavits on the memo issue in the supreme court without getting the approval of the Government. The military reacted within days, as the remarks of Prime Minister could have " grievous consequences."<sup>55</sup> In this situation. Yousuf Raza Gilani made a strong assertion of Parliamentary supremacy in the National Assembly, declaring that " all state organs, including the military are answerable to the Parliament...state within the state would not be tolerated and that all institutions including the military of defence should be answerable to the Parliament and the executive, who is the Prime Minister". He further announced to set up a commission to inquire about those responsible for allowing the Al Qaida leader Osama bin Laden to live in Abbottabad for six years.<sup>56</sup>

The confrontation between military and Government over this issue affected the democratic process immensely. Military and Haqqani had been at this crossroads before, at the Kerry Lugar episode in 2009. Military had demanded Haqqani's removal in 2009 having an instrumental role in the Kerry Logar aid, but he managed the situation at that time. Military was not ready to trust him any more on the memo case issue and pressurized the Government to investigate the matter and hold the ambassador to account. Whereas, Haqqani had denied having any role in memo controversy.' He said: "the target is not me, the target is President Asif Ali Zardari and Pakistani democracy."<sup>57</sup> Soon after attending the meeting with President, PM, COAS, DG of ISI on 22 November 2011, Haqqani tendered his resignation. Military remained more assertive on this issue as it has expanded its powers over civilian Government in national security narrative.

## **Political Parties**

Political party is a fundamental institution of any democracy and supposed to function democratically for political development. However, political parties remained involved to give tough time to each other whenever they found the opportunity throughout the period 2008-2013. The JUI and MQM left the coalition in 2010, thus PPP lost the strength in the National Assembly. MQM remained part of PPP Government in Sindh to achieve maximum political advantages through bargaining tactics and polarization. PML(N) was a major coalition partner of PPP but their mutual distrust and following of old practices of power politics did not let them continue together for a longer period. PML(N) quit the PPP Government in 2010.<sup>58</sup> Resultantly, the situation emerged with these developments was tricky one to manage for the Government. PPP had negotiations with PML(Q) in April 2011, a rival party of PML(N) in the Punjab and succeeded to form a coalition at the centre with PML(Q) in exchange of 05 federal ministerial positions and 08 junior ministerial appointments. One year later, Chaudhry Pervez Elahi, leader of the party, became deputy Prime Minister of Pakistan however, without any constitutional powers.<sup>59</sup>

The new coalition Government remained busy to harness the political strength of PML( N) in the Punjab. After renaming NWFP as Pakhtunkhawa, a move was started to create new administrative units in Pakistan. The move had mustered the support of right wing parties including JI, PML (Functional) and PML(LM). Gilani was a staunch supporter to constitute Southern Punjab as a separate province. PML(Q) also joined the move to weaken the weight of its arch rival , PML (N) in the National politics.<sup>60</sup> Zardari fully supported Gilani to initiate consultation process with all the political parties with a view to make a separate province in Southern Punjab to give them political and administrative identity.<sup>61</sup> However, PML(N) was against the division of the Punjab but tactfully dealt the issue and endorsed the creation of province with a view of essentially reviving the territorial limits of the old Bhawalpur state as well.<sup>62</sup>

Throughout the period, both parties could not evolve consensus on long awaited issue of Indus water distribution between Punjab and Sindh and construction of Kalabagh Dam. Not any referendum was conducted to decide the solution of the issue as promised by the PM of Pakistan, Syed Yousaf Raza Gilani. After the resignation of Gilani as Prime Minister in 2012, the move for Siraki province got slow down. Although, Siraki province has become a slogan of political parties to get the votes from Southern Punjab, practically, no National political party seems serious to divide Punjab yet. Similarly, the Lahore High Court ordered the federal Government to construct the Kalabagh Dam on 29 November 2012 but Government could not pursue all stake holders including political parties for the solution of the issue.

The democracy in this period has been undermined by the weak organization of political parties as well as by the zero- sum- game approach to politics. Political parties continued to work as undemocratic institution with non political power sharing pattern and clientelistic model. Both leaders of PML(N) and PPP did not pay any attention to improve internal democratic structure of the party. Political parties have identifications through their leaders who remained key decision makers and embodiment of the party itself. Similarly mass political mobilization had not been institutionalized by articulating and aggregating their interests to consolidate the political system.

Despite the continuity of these old patterns of party politics some positive developments are also observed during the period. For the first time, an elected Government completed its five years after the Government of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. Seventh NFC Award, Aghaz-i-Haqooq-e-Balochistan, political reforms in Gilgat-Baltistan and FATA, passing of 18th Amendment, reconstitution of the Council of Common Interest, allocation of 120 billion rupees to Khyber Pakhtunkhawa as net hydel profit and increasing gas development surcharge for Balochistan were such developments which show the positive contribution of political parties to popular demands of the provinces to strengthen the federation. However, the dynamics of Balochistan in security perspective, remained beyond the capacity of the Government and continued subject to security establishment for governance.

## Social Development: A Missed Opportunity

Social development is one of the most important pre condition for sustained economic growth that is overlooked by the successive military and civil

Burki describes this phenomena as ' missed Governments of Pakistan. opportunities'.<sup>63</sup>Pakistan is at bottom of the list of those countries allocating the lowest amount of budget for education and health sectors. However, education is continuously developing some a couple of decades which is eventually helping the development of all other sectors. One of the drawbacks which Pakistan's education system is facing is low investment of the Government in this sector. It was only 2 to 2.2 percent of the total GDP. PPP Government could not change the patterns and standard of investment in the education sector. Actual development expenditure in the education sector had fallen woefully short of budget amount whereas an obvious increase on non- development budget and defence budget was observed during this period that leads to conclude that social development which promised during election campaign was not the priority of the PPP has Government. In the financial year 2008-2009, education budget was 2.10 percent of GDP which decreased by 0.5 percent in 2009-2010. Ironically during the financial years 2010-2011, 2011-2012, only 0.9 percent of the GDP was allocated for the education development.<sup>64</sup> According to Human Development Report 2013, Pakistan globally was ranked 177th in terms of public expenditure spending on education. Huge subsidies were provided to PIA. Pakistan Steel Mill and Railways which were higher than funds allocated for health and education sector in the different budgets presented during this period.

Similarly no improvement and progress can be observed in budget allocation patterns for health sector. Rupees 23.15 billion were allocated for health sector during the federal budget 2009-2010.<sup>65</sup> Long awaited issues such as poor system of regulations, lack of efficiency and resources, could not get addressed by the Government. Any structural and operational changes were not introduced by the PPP Government in health care system to facilitate the people. Government failed to provide immediate and satisfactory relief to victims of the devastating floods in 2010.<sup>66</sup> However, it introduced various legislative measures for special protection and empowerment of women. It included The Prevention of Domestic Violence Act, 2008, The Protection Against Harassment of Women at Workplace 2009, The Removal from Services( special powers) Ordinance2000( repeal) Act 2010, the Services Tribunal( amendment) Act. However, these measures did not meet the expectations of the people.

## **Economic Development**

On economic front, fiscal deficit, high inflation, energy shortage, decreased investment, un- employment and high debts were the challenges to meet. In the prevailing security situation, Pakistan had difficulty to raise money to finance its budget deficit which was up to RS. 700 billion as per projection of the 2010-11 budget. <sup>67</sup> Federal Government heavily relied on borrowing to finance the budget deficit. Four Government heavily relied as they had serious reservations about the Government's policies against fiscal discipline. Budget deficit with over 80 percent of the available pool of money was reserved for non- development expenditure. Government did not introduce any stimuli package for economic recovery and cut the development spending which affected the economic growth drastically. The rupee dominated debt amounted to 31 percent of GDP and foreign currency denominated debt equals to 25 percent of GDP. Government had to focus on increasing export and home remittances; the two vital sources to earn foreign

exchange. The Government slashed subsidies to fight a widening budget deficit and remained under pressure to do more to soften the blow of inflation running at over 20 percent.<sup>68</sup> Pakistan's economic growth rate was averagely 3 percent per year during 2008-2013 as compared to 6 percent of the preceding five years 2002-2007.<sup>69</sup> Investment declined to a 50 years low at 12.5 percent of GDP during its tenure. Among the causes of this poor economic situation, the striking one was the energy shortage that had reached to 3000 megawatt.<sup>70</sup> The Government never met the revised target of budget deficit in this period. To meet the expectation of the people, Government introduced various schemes and policies such as Benazir Income Support Scheme, Benazir Behan Basti Scheme, and the rise in pension and salaries, proved cosmetic steps to appease a few. In view of Dr. Mubashar Hasan the budgets were presented by the PPP Government during this period were not different from the budgets presented in the last thirty years. As it fallowed the doctrine of free enterprises, deregulation, privatization and globalization.<sup>71</sup>

## Conclusion

In this paper the structure and functioning of the elected Government is discussed to assess the political institutionalization in terms of political development. Socioeconomic development level increases the prospects for civilian rule, and institutionalization strengthens the political system. Study shows that political institutionalization and socio-economic development was not the priority of the Government. Opposition parties hindered democracy by engaging it in adversarial politics in traditional political style. ANP and MQM accused one another of their involvement in target killing in Karachi. Similarly JUI( F) and ANP were fighting to gain political influence in KPK and FATA . In this political situation, Government remained involved in political machinations to complete its tenure.

Political parties not seem serious to become a credible alternate to the ruling party and continued to hold the Government responsible for every failure. Their mutual antipathy and disrespect of democratic norms and procedures continued throughout the period. Contest between PPP and PML(N) for political power, however, threatened to thwart the cause of political stability in Pakistan. Their tactics at times threatened to derail the fragile democracy of Pakistan and distracted the Government from addressing important issues of governance.

Similarly mass political mobilization not seems to be institutionalized through articulating and aggregating mass interest for the consolidation of political system. However, despite the continuity of old patterns, PPP and PML(N) showed enough maturity to save the political system through cooperation in instituting a number of constitutional reforms, designed to strengthen the federation of Pakistan. The most significant of these is the 18<sup>th</sup> amendment to the constitution of Pakistan 1973. For the first time, an elected Government completed its five years after the Government of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto.

Military remained more assertive in this period than in any civilian Government. PPP tried to clip the powers of military on the line as Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto marked during his regime but could not succeed to establish the supremacy of civil political institution. PPP opted for making a coalition Government to advance the ideas of Benazir Bhutto regarding politics of reconciliation for democratization and to bring the country out of crises. But later on Government accepted the hegemonic role of military and compromised political values to stay in power. The report of Abbottabad Commission is not make public un till now. Defence budget was not debated in the National Assembly as was announced in the Parliament. The institutional design of such democracy correlates with the success of the strong role of non-elected institutions. Instead of accepting subordination to the civilian Government and commitment to democratic norms, military acted in accordance with its self image as the last bastion of National strength and guardianship. The military establishment went one step forward in domestic politics of National security narrative and continued to have the final say in the foreign policy as well.

The Government could not cope with long awaited social and economic challenges effectively and efficiently. The chronic problems which have accumulated over several decades are inadequate investment in health, education, population service, infrastructure and disaster management; inequitable economic structure, and gender grievances. Government could not change the spending patterns and standard in the education sector in the greater interest of common man. Similarly no improvement and progress has been observed in budget allocation patterns for health sector. On economic front, fiscal deficit, high inflation, energy shortage, decrease investment, unemployment and high debt were the challenges to meet. The Government could not fulfill its social and economic contract.

It is hoped that questions raised and some of the findings in this paper will stimulate critical thoughts and further research.

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