

Violence as a Way to Freedom: The 1947 Making of Punjab's Boundary.

*The state is "truly fortunate which has justice for its boundary line, not the one whose boundaries are fixed by spear and sword."*¹

Hugo Grotius

The human dimension of the 1947 catastrophe has been the subject of numerous works on the Partition of India. Both states do not let the ghosts of partition, as some consider a 'holocaust', rest in peace or let their countrymen lose sight of the trauma even after more than six decades of independence. The haunting memories loom large and lurk behind any attempt to salvage efforts at securing the peace of the region. But then the half a million casualties and the migration of 12 million across borders in an otherwise peacetime milieu is a hard to overlook phenomena and remains even to the present times, one of the greatest migrations ever recorded.²

June 3, 1947 saw the first practical plan to have been delineated for the transfer of power between the anticipated states of India and Pakistan, two separate and sovereign entities to be carved out of the subcontinent on the tentative date of August 15, 1947.³ As enunciated in the Plan, the Punjab and Bengal were to be partitioned, they being the main centres of Muslim population in undivided India.⁴ The modus operandi had been decided in an earlier plan, the historic statement of February 20, 1947. The Plan entailed that;

The provincial legislative assemblies of Punjab and Bengal would meet in two parts, one representing the Muslim majority districts and the other the rest of the province. The members of the two parts of each legislative assembly sitting separately would vote whether or not the province should be partitioned. If a simple majority of either part decided in favour of partition, division would take place. Each part of the assembly would also decide whether to join the existing constituent assembly or a new constituent assembly. As soon as it was decided, the Governor-General would appoint a Boundary Commission to demarcate the boundaries of the two parts of each province on the basis of contiguous majority areas of Muslims and non-Muslims and also other factors.⁵

Following the announcement the West and East Punjab assemblies met on 23 June 1947, the former voting against partition by 99 to 27 and the latter deciding in favour of partition by 50 to 22.⁶ The verdict had been given and partition of the province was inevitable. The next stage commenced and that was of setting up a Boundary Commission by the Governor-General, "the membership and terms of reference of which will be settled in consultation with those concerned...to demarcate the boundaries of the two parts of the Punjab on the basis of

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ascertaining the contiguous majority areas of Muslims and non-Muslims. It will also be instructed to take account of other factors.”⁷

The Boundary Commission and the Radcliffe Award have been studied at length from the varying standpoints of the parties involved in its constitution, making and implementation. Yet none have been able to point out the cause of the turmoil and disorder that quaked and bled Punjab for months and prophesied a destiny of trouble and fear for the region. The present study is not on the causal analysis of Partition itself, a division which in the opinion of many was necessary, if not good, but is an attempt to establish that there was no alternative to it,⁸ and that violence became the path to its final achievement. This is not to say that it was an impulsive act, an accident or an incidence for which causes did not exist. That debate has been going on for as long as the decision to divide India was taken, though unfortunately it is one of those verdicts of history for which no group was or is still ready to take the responsibility, not even the British who blamed it conveniently on the arrogance of the Muslim League and the Congress.⁹ That perhaps became the main reason for the chaos and anarchy, turmoil and brutal massacre of summer 1947 in the Punjab.

Violence has many dimensions and is understood by varying terms; riots, massacres, carnage, genocide even holocaust. What happened in the Punjab of 1946-47 was indeed a mixture of all. It was however, not spontaneous, though it did include many local acts of violence not sponsored by the state or any other agency such as loot, arson, abduction and rape yet there was an organization and a planning to it all involving not one but all communities at play.¹⁰ Then as the violence moved on in time there were crimes of “revenge and retaliation”,¹¹ that engulfed the province in no time. This is when there emerged the phenomenon of, now being interpreted as ‘retributive genocide’ which was not the consequence of partition but became “the mechanism for creating the conditions for partition.”¹² For all this the political circumstances and ground realities coupled with the leaders’ inadequacy, failing and expediency and the state’s negligence and hastiness were equally and tragically responsible. Despite that, the very need and use of violence to achieve partition seems to be the greatest of all misfortunes.

To understand violence in a region with multi cultural, multi ethnic roots, layers of varying shades of faith, a vastly sprawling land mass, a heavy baggage of historical experiences and an assortment of social traditions is not a difficult venture. Such societies are prone to rioting at the smallest pretext of conflicting interests. India also was not a stranger to such moments of friction and violent encounters between the residing communities yet a major fall out with as ghastly consequences as witnessed at the time of partition had somehow always been averted. A cursory glance at the history of India is sufficient to appreciate its adaptability to invaders and warriors. Political, religious and economic interests brought many an ambitious wanderers to the shores of India from Europe, Central Asia and the Arab world whose motives were not always friendly and peaceful. India did put up resistance, sometimes of a severe nature in the shape of battles and wars, but its resilience and ability to accommodate always assuaged the sharp edges of destructive enmity and corrosive hatred.

In all this the mutual relationship of communities residing in India though at times put to test, never erupted in any serious outpouring of intense animosity or violence, at least of not the Partition magnitude. Even during the long Muslim rule that spanned over centuries, the subject populace continued to maintain a level of internal harmony and congruence. The arrival of the British again saw a commonality of interests in defending the soil against foreign occupation in the 1857 war of independence. How this spectacle of mutual coexistence exploded into a belligerent clash in a matter of a few decades is an interesting development and something to be probed into. The long standing coexistence seems to be a façade papered over by expediency but the question is was it such a thin, slender cover that split apart as soon as there was no authority left to monitor or direct their actions? And that to an extent that they who had spent centuries in a 'next door' situation jumped at each others' throats unable either to restrain their fury or to honour the memories of their shared past?

What actually happened in the Punjab, is a gruesome tale of uprooted identities and broken ties. It was nothing short of a complete cleansing; Eastern Punjab had been virtually cleared of the Muslims whereas the number of Hindus fell remarkably low in West Punjab.¹³ The thrill and splendour of independence was replaced by a sadness that came from half a million dead and another 12 million displaced. Not ironic that even today the overwhelming memory of 1947 for people across "North India remains that of Partition, rather than of independence."¹⁴ To this frenzy all communities contributed equally. G.D. Khosla, one of the first to record this event, wrote in his work that was first published in 1949:

History has not known a fratricidal war of such dimensions in which dimensions in which human hatred and bestial passions were degraded to the levels witnessed during this dark epoch were religious frenzy, taking the shape of a hideous monster, stalked through cities, towns and countryside, taking a toll of half a million innocent lives. Decrepit old men, defenceless women, helpless young children, infants in arms, by the thousands were brutally done to death by Muslims, Hindus and Sikh fanatics. Destruction and looting of property, kidnapping and ravishing of women, unspeakable atrocities and indescribable inhumanities were perpetuated in the name of religion and patriotism....Madness swept over the entire land, in an increasing crescendo, till reason and sanity left the minds of rational men and women, and sorrow, misery, hatred, despair took possession of their souls.¹⁵

Such malice and venom definitely came from a deep-rooted acrimony that had been advantageously veiled for so long. It evidently did not grow out of nowhere and though history points to a centuries-old seemingly stable social order, partition marked its total collapse in a matter of a few months.¹⁶ Punjab was the focus of this apocalyptic incident that brought in its wake mass tragedy, so drenched in blood.¹⁷ Was violence the only way to freedom and why?

The composition of the two Boundary Commissions, one for the Punjab and the other for Bengal, formed to mark the borderlines of India and Pakistan, was fraught with controversial tendencies; it was to comprise of four judges each, two from the Congress and two from the Muslim League, all legal specialists with

no geographical expertise. In the overwrought environment of communal mistrust Jinnah's proposal of setting up a commission comprising three impartial non-Indians to be appointed by the United Nations Organizations,¹⁸ seemed a reasonable suggestion. But it was turned down, both by the British, more specifically by the Secretary of State, Lord Listowel, on the pretext of not involving international powers in the Empire's internal matters,¹⁹ and the Congress in particular Nehru, which feared unnecessary and unacceptable delay.²⁰ As convention was to have it, Mountbatten hardly disagreed with the Pandit. The Boundary Commission completed its work on August 13 1947, though it was not made public till the 17th, remaining virtually a secret document between the Viceroy Lord Louis Mountbatten and the man "who had been charged with the gargantuan task of delineating the frontiers of India and Pakistan,"²¹ Sir Cyril Radcliffe. The choice of a man who had not visited India ever, had virtually no knowledge of its geography, people, culture and historical trends was in itself a matter of strange wisdom.

The present study focuses on the province of Punjab for the simple reason that the level and degree of violence here was unparalleled and unprecedented as compared to the others under dissection. In the opinion of many it was not a riot but a war of extermination mainly of minorities; in Eastern Punjab of Muslims and in Western Punjab of Hindus and Sikhs.²² The root of it all lay in hastening the decision with the twofold impact of cutting the boundary line ineptly and letting the Punjab burn incongruously. Partition had become a reality and in the circumstances there was bound to be trouble in the Punjab and if the last Viceroy is to be given any merit, his vigour and speed had at least the worth of confining it to the Punjab.²³ Strange as this logic might sound, it had some iota of truth. The rest of the country was saved from the jolt; even Bengal avoided a resurgence of violence after the initial Calcutta killings. Had there been more time the contagion could have been unpreventable from spreading far and wide. This may not, also justify the mayhem in both parts of the Punjab, or exonerate Mountbatten from his 'mass of inaccuracies' and 'plethora of blunders' that he bequeathed as a parting legacy upon the people of the Indian subcontinent.

Radcliffe Award was the pathway to a violent division of the Punjab. Not only were the chairman and the components of the Boundary Commission unqualified for the gigantic task, the time span too, was criminally short. After his arrival in India Sir Cyril Radcliffe was given approximately five weeks to finish his job which he himself believed to be one of a butcher, supposed to cut pieces off without much finesse or subtlety, not a surgeon's operation, a work that would please no one.²⁴ The question is why did he accept it? With a sound reputation for judicial brilliance, "high integrity, legal reputation and wide experience"²⁵ in England, why did he accept a position that entailed nothing less than a thorough knowledge of the specifications of the country he was being called upon to divide with so little time in hand? On his maiden trip to an unknown land he agrees to divide a land of 88 million people, spread over 175,000 square miles with distinct cultures, different faiths, divergent beliefs and very dissimilar political leanings. This was a near impossible task for even the most proficient, trained, skilled and instructed of men. All lawyers on the Commission, the team was in no way qualified to bear the onus of the assigned task. It was also clear that with their separate interests the major political shades in the Punjab would not approve any

one formula. To agree to the job, either for privilege or prestige, was the first and probably most risky of all mistakes. In retrospect it proved to be a toxic one. Radcliffe was not all neglectful of it. He himself admitted;

The many factors that bore upon each problem were not ponderable in their effect upon each other. The effective weight given to each other was a matter of judgment, which under the circumstances threw it upon me to form; each decision at each point was debatable and formed of necessity under great pressure of time, conditions, and with knowledge that, in any ideal sense, was deficient.²⁶

Radcliffe began his work immediately after his arrival on July 8, 1947. With scanty knowledge of the land and virtually no experience of working in the hard Indian climate, he was lodged in a section of the Viceroy's house.²⁷ This too raised a question on the much trumpeted impartiality stance of both the 'exclusive' architects of Indian fate. It was understood and even communicated by the Governor of the Punjab that in view of the highly inflamed communal situation, the residence of the Chairman of the Commission in the Government House would be misinterpreted.²⁸ It was all the more essential that the Commission should work in an environment that was "free from official influence" and bear no impression that any pressure was being brought to bear upon it to secure "an award of a particular kind."²⁹ But unlike the Governor the Viceroy wanted the Chairman in close proximity to his abode. This action of Mountbatten appears to be in contrast to the bureaucratic counsel, which seems consistently advising the authorities to make suitable arrangements for the Chairman and his secretary at Faletti's Hotel, Lahore mainly to avoid uncalled for criticism on the Commissions' work and decisions.³⁰

The partition proceedings could not go too far with the settlement of boundaries. And for that the paraphernalia had to be acquired and improvised to the conditions on ground. With maps as aides, and on maps alone was this fate to be instituted. The Punjab Boundary Commission held four preliminary meetings in the building of the Punjab Legislative Assembly, Lahore mainly to sort out procedural matters; regular hearings took place from 21 July to 31 July 1947, the Chairman attending only two on 14 and 15 July respectively.³¹

The alteration of the Boundary line allegedly at the behest of Mountbatten made matters worse. Radcliffe was apparently made to allot Ferozepur, Zira and also a large portion of Gurdaspur district to India, thereby giving a link to it with the state of Jammu and Kashmir.³² Amritsar was thus protected and also linked with India. It also "represented Radcliffe's arbitrary and inconsistent use of 'other factors' _____irrigation, communication, strategic_____to determine where the boundary would fall."³³ Whether pressure was from Mountbatten, the Governor-General or Nehru, the Kashmiri Congress leader, the fact remains that Radcliffe acquiesced to the whole plan and was thus "an accessory to give the Award a semblance of impartiality and a seal of authority".³⁴ From this single act sprouted a million sins. Again history fails to understand Radcliffe's tranquil submission to Mountbatten's schemes and intrigues. A foul play or breach of trust by the departing authorities thus added incorrigible harm, mischief and injury to the relations of the two subsequently born countries of India and Pakistan.

Reports to the presence of a Congress spy in the Chairman's close associates also exist in the person of Rao Sahib V.D. Iyer an Assistant Commissioner,³⁵ leaking classified information regarding the boundary line to Nehru and Mountbatten. His presence in a Commission vowed to neutral decision-making does raise serious questions, as his was an important office used as a link to communicate rulings and recommendations to the relevant members of the august body.³⁶ "Leaks were definitely drifting across the Viceregal Garden to Mountbatten and Iyer was the leading suspect."³⁷ At the same time the delayed announcement of the Award, Mountbatten stretching it to August 17, caused half a million casualties and more than a million migrations;³⁸ the ill-fated populace unaware of where and on which side of the border they stood as independence dawned. There were mainly rumours regarding the decisions of the Boundary Commission and no confirmed reports that contributed to widespread disturbances and violence,³⁹ as several thousands of people found themselves on the wrong side of the border after 17 August 1947.⁴⁰ It amounted to little less than a "territorial murder".⁴¹ The delay was deliberate to avoid being held liable for the massive administrative failure. The British had it on their agenda to defer the announcement for "without question, the earlier it was published the more the British would have to bear the responsibility for the disturbances which would undoubtedly result."⁴²

Population transfer became both the immediate and ultimate cause of violence in the Punjab and none in any position of authority with the sole exception of the Governor of the province, Sir Evan Jenkins were taking any serious note of it. Nehru categorically stated that he was opposed to the principle of population transfers.⁴³ The Muslim League leadership also was not anticipating a mass migration. Jinnah's stance was unclear; "It is possible that there will be exchange of population if it can be done on a voluntary basis."⁴⁴ This ambiguity was to become the main cause of millions of his community losing all that was precious to them. Even the administration did not foresee any mass transfer of population. Mountbatten addressing a Press Conference said, "Personally I don't see it... Some measure of transfer will come about in a natural way. This is to say I have a feeling that people who have just crossed the boundary will transfer themselves. Perhaps Government will take steps to transfer populations."⁴⁵ To consider that the displacement of population would be "on a relatively minor level and spread over a long period"⁴⁶ was a gross miscalculation on his part. Actual transfers far exceeded the original estimates. In the Punjab approximately 4.5 million Sikhs and Hindus were uprooted from their homes and forced to migrate to East Punjab under appalling conditions; similarly 5.5 million Muslims migrated to West Punjab under no different conditions.⁴⁷ The outcome of such an unforeseen mass migration became the root cause of the turmoil Punjab faced. The bloodbath had to be confronted with "an immediacy and on a scale that shocked all the governments involved."⁴⁸ A state of denial and a resultant lack of preparedness was thus to unleash the worst horror for the inhabitants of India.

Nehru also seemed to share Mountbatten's views on a 'fairly rapidly' done work by the Boundary Commissions.⁴⁹ It was indeed a strange logic to leave the matters of "modifications and variations" of the borders to after the two states had been created, in the fear that "if we complicate the issues at this stage, their work will be prolonged and final decisions will be delayed."⁵⁰ Thus it was

considered pertinent to leave the “lengthy process involving the ascertaining of the wishes of the people concerned in any particular area affected,” because “if all this work is left to the Boundary Commissions, their work will be heavy and prolonged.”⁵¹ What else were they constituted for? If this was not the imminent requirement and responsibility of the Boundary Commissions, what was? To leave such crucial matters to the governments of the nascent states was not only felonious but an abuse of the assurance given for a peaceful transfer of power to Indian hands. To this callous haste all parties contributed equally, some by promoting and the others by supporting and acquiescing, though a generous estimate suggested not less than a five-year date for departure of the British.⁵² Records suggest that it was the Viceroy’s brainchild towed by others.⁵³ The apologists of Mountbatten’s scheme and planning have however tried to convert the haste into a merit, as that prevented the contagion from spreading and the short time given to Partition ultimately contained its intensity.⁵⁴ This strange logic does not rectify the damage by any means since the existing control and command system was the only way to prevent and forestall the tragedy that had been brewing for sometime and to which Jenkins, the Governor had been referring to frequently in his fortnightly reports and communiqués.

Finally, the community, which was out rightly neglected in the outcome of the entire spectacle, were the Sikhs of the Punjab. Mountbatten confessed that it were the Sikhs who had asked for partition yet all that could be done for them was that the British through the Congress had complied with their demand.⁵⁵ His approach, “...I am not a magician. I am an ordinary human being.... You cannot expect the British to solve all your problems.... it is not I who is responsible for asking for partition”⁵⁶ clearly put the communities of the Punjab at each other’s throats and also stipulated the Colonial policy in one single statement. Mass transfer of population was virtually pushed out of the reigning options. Sikhs constituted 13% of the population of the Punjab and taking their holy places and canal regions into consideration, an area they had built largely on their own, it was impossible even to carve out one district into a Sikh majority area.⁵⁷ There was a major threat of a Muslim/Sikh collision and though much of it could be seen written on the wall, hardly any effort was made to prevent it from happening. In the days before the publication of the Boundary Award, Sikh *jathas* launched heavy attacks on the border areas of the Punjab.⁵⁸ The situation worsened after the publication of the Award and so did the desire for revenge, as the community came to realize that they were to lose Lyallpur⁵⁹ and the shrine of Nankana Sahib to Pakistan. In one of the most violent instances almost one thousand Muslims were massacred in an attack on a train in Amritsar.⁶⁰ East Punjab government had virtually lost all control and was on the verge of collapse.⁶¹ Apart from raising alarm, the policy of the British seemed to be one of reticence to all their pleas and requests. The Maharajas of Patiala, Nabha and Faridkot, apart from the political leadership, are on record to have entreated in the last crucial days of planning to consider their demands.⁶² To this the advice given to the Viceroy by his close aide Sir George Abell was ‘it would be best not to send a reply’.⁶³ The sheer negligence to the interests of one of the most influential communities of the Punjab was to lead to the most blood stained partitions in the annals of the world, more so when the dangerous mood of the community had been evident ever since the announcement of the 3 June Partition Plan. Master Tara Singh had clearly stated that territories full of Sikh religious places and properties should not be included in

Pakistan at any cost.⁶⁴ Their shrines, birth-places of their *gurus* and their holy places going away were sensitive points to which a mere colonial apology was not enough. Mountbatten's stance was that he had no influence over the Award and if there was any such impression it was based on false notions.⁶⁵ The last Viceroy was sending a message to all the Sikhs in the security forces, especially his own Sikh bodyguards that his hands were clean. Securing himself he landed the Punjab and its people in a very troubled spot. East Punjab witnessed greater turmoil in the wake of British departure and the Sikh attacks only intensified in ferocity.⁶⁶

Thus, 'harassed and hurried' by his college alumnus Mountbatten, with the latter's bizarre fixation with 'speed',⁶⁷ he delivered the goods in the small time and left India never to return. It is believed he burnt all his records before leaving India never again to visit either the documents or the land. On that history might turn its face away but the ignorance of the man portrayed as his qualification by the Viceroy that he was bound to be impartial because he knew so little about the country and parties involved,⁶⁸ was a neglect and oversight the region and its people could have hardly come to terms with. The size of the country, the nature of the job and the time allocated for it were all a matter of shock and surprise to him on his arrival as he was briefed at the inaugural reception.⁶⁹

Was the Punjab capable of being divided without the prospect of having to go through the turmoil it eventually did? A fertile region of agricultural lands and canal colonies, it was indeed the granary of India. In the 1940's it was by far the most volatile of other regions as "events were getting precipitated by the day at a pace faster than anywhere else in India."⁷⁰ The demographical face of the Punjab was such that no line could neatly divide the three communities residing in the province, Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs. No matter where the frontier was demarcated, Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs were bound to be on the wrong side of the line drawn.⁷¹ Similarly in the context of partitioning the land, none of their demands could be met, with Congress and the Muslim League on opposite bearings on the division of the land and the Sikhs harbouring their own dreams. It was a stupendous task that required professional expertise and amply sufficient time, both of which were pathetically lacking when the decision was finally reached. The result was an unending chain of violent events that engulfed the Punjab and left its scars even on the face of the future of the region dissected and distributed on the whims and conniving of a few individuals and their latent interests.

So far none of the parties have accepted the charge of violence that became the fate of the Punjab. Yet the millions lost on the way to freedom have to be accounted for. The charges are both of connivance and negligence. Communal tension was at its peak and in the heightened situation Congress and especially the Hindus were loud in criticizing the authorities.⁷² The British officers were in charge in all the places that riots broke out and obviously were in the thick of things when animosities erupted. Even if there is some sinister element in these allegations of conniving with one side against the other, the concerns of negligence are far nearer to truth.⁷³ The leaders of the parties were hardly in the earshot of the suffering, screaming masses. The information that certain organized militant cadres close to "and fully answerable to the Congress and League politicians were at the forefront of the events was known but glanced over."⁷⁴

It was recourse to violence that would ultimately blur the realities and provide a face saving for both the British and the national leadership. In days following August 15 violence was to take up other dimensions; of driving out the 'other' and staking a claim to the land.⁷⁵ In the chaos that followed the announcement of the Boundary Award, the Colonial masters departed, the Congress dictated its terms in Bengal and Kashmir, got an edge over the division of material assets, army and water sources and the Muslim League fought out a free country, no matter how truncated or moth eaten. But in this entire chronicle the masses on whose behalf and for whose sake the battle was fought, were not taken into account, perhaps their most precious asset on whose fortunes the entire political drama was enacted. The summer of 1947 was just the beginning of a long, sordid tale of migration, dislocation and suffering for a great majority of destitute Punjabis on both sides of the newly demarcated boundaries, whose first identity and status at the dawn of independence was that of 'refugees'.

End Notes

¹ Note on the "Radcliffe Award" by Sharifuddin Pirzada in *The Partition of the Punjab 1947: A Compilation of Official Documents*, vol. 1, Lahore; National Documentation Centre, 1983, XL.

² Ian Talbot, *Freedom's Cry: The Popular Dimension in the Pakistan Movement and Partition Experience in North-West India*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1996, 154.

³ Khawaja A. Khaliq, "Genesis of Pakistan", in *Pangs of Partition: The Parting of Ways*, eds., S. Settar and Indira Baptista Gupta, New Delhi: Manohar, 2002, 132.

⁴ Ibid. 133.

⁵ "Statement by His Majesty's Government", IOR R/3/1/156, *The Partition of the Punjab 1947: A Compilation of Official Documents*, vol. 1, Lahore: National Documentation Centre, 1983, 4-7.

⁶ Note on the "Radcliffe Award" by Sharifuddin Pirzada in *The Partition of the Punjab 1947: A Compilation of Official Documents*, vol. 1, vii.

⁷ Viscount Mountbatten's Broadcast on the All-India Radio, IOR R/1/3/50, 3rd June, 1947, *The Partition of the Punjab 1947: A Compilation of Official Documents*, vol. 1, 6.

⁸ S.K. Chaube, "The Last Straw that Broke the Nation's Back", in S. Settar and Indira Baptista Gupta, 96.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Paul R. Brass, "The Partition of India and Retributive Genocide in the Punjab 1946-47: Means, Methods and Purposes", *Journal of Genocide Research*, (5) 1, (2003), 72.

¹¹ Ibid, 76.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Jim Masselos, *Indian Nationalism: An History*, New Delhi: Sterling Publishers Private Limited, 1993, 222.

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- ¹⁴ Tai Yong Tan and Gyanesh Kudaisya, *The Aftermath of Partition in South Asia*, London: Routledge, 2000, 7.
- ¹⁵ G.D.Khosla, *The Stern Reckoning: A Survey of Events Leading Up To and Following the Partition of India*, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1990, (reprint of 1949 edition), 3.
- ¹⁶ Tai Yong Tan and Gyanesh Kudaisya, *The Aftermath of Partition in South Asia*, 8.
- ¹⁷ Anthony Spaeth, 'The Price of Freedom', *Time*, 11 August, 1997.
- ¹⁸ Penderel Moon and Nicholas Mansergh, eds., *Transfer of Power: Constitutional Relations between Britain and India*, vol. xi, 31 May- 7 July 1947, Listowel to Mountbatten, 9 June 1947, London: Her Majesty's Office, 226.
- ¹⁹ *Ibid.* 328.
- ²⁰ Nehru was particularly not interested in adhering to this proposal. "We have thought over this matter and we think that this suggestion is not feasible or practicable. This would involve considerable delay. The UNO headquarters would probably have to communicate with each member Government and a long time would elapse before a choice could be made. It is possible that the ultimate choice might not be a very suitable one. There are other considerations also which militate against this proposal. We, therefore, would not welcome it." Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru to Viscount Mountbatten, 10th June 1947, IOR R/3/1/157, *The Partition of the Punjab 1947: A Compilation of Official Documents*, vol. 1, 32-33.
- ²¹ Tai Yong Tan and Gyanesh Kudaisya, *The Aftermath of Partition in South Asia*, 78-79.
- ²² In September 1947 the Communist Party of India published a report "*Bleeding Punjab Warns*". Retrieved from P. C. Joshi Archives, JNU, New Delhi.
- ²³ Penderel Moon and Nicholas Mansergh, ed., *Transfer of Power*, vol. xii, Minutes of Viceroy's Miscellaneous Meeting, 10 July 1947, 328.
- ²⁴ Tai Yong Tan and Gyanesh Kudaisya, *The Aftermath of Partition in South Asia*, 93-94.
- ²⁵ Proceedings of the special Committee of the Cabinet held on 26th June 1947, IOR R/3/1/157, *The Partition of the Punjab 1947: A Compilation of Official Documents*, vol. 1, 64.
- ²⁶ A. A. Michel, *The Indus Rivers: A Study of the Effects of Partition*, New Haven: 1967, 194.
- ²⁷ Mr. I. D. Scott to Governors' Secretaries, Bengal and Punjab, IOR R/3/1/157, 5th July 1947, *The Partition of the Punjab 1947: A Compilation of Official Documents*, vol. 1, 104-105.
- ²⁸ Mr. S. E. Abbott to Mr. I. D. Scott, 5th July 1947, IOR R/3/1/157, *The Partition of the Punjab 1947: A Compilation of Official Documents*, vol. 1, 106.
- ²⁹ *Ibid.*
- ³⁰ At numerous places such counsels and correspondence clearly suggest a clean, unbiased official approach to the problem particularly in the given circumstances of tense and threatening communal outburst. *The Partition of the Punjab 1947: A Compilation of Official Documents*, vol. 1, 106, 113.
- ³¹ Foreword, *The Partition of the Punjab 1947: A Compilation of Official Documents*, vol. 1, Lahore: National Documentation Centre, 1983, i.
- ³² V. N. Datta, "Lord Mountbatten and the Punjab Boundary Commission Award", in S. Settar and Indira Baptista Gupta, 12.

- ³³ Tai Yong Tan and Gyanesh Kudaisya, *The Aftermath of Partition in South Asia*, 96.
- ³⁴ V. N. Datta, "Lord Mountbatten and the Punjab Boundary Commission Award", in S. Settar and Indira Baptista Gupta, 35.
- ³⁵ Gazette of India Extraordinary dated Saturday, the 2nd August 1947, *The Partition of the Punjab 1947: A Compilation of Official Documents*, vol. 1, 112-113.
- ³⁶ Mr. V.D.Iyer to the Secretaries of the Punjab Boundary Commission, BCP B File 72-Polit.Genl./47, 19 July 1947, *The Partition of the Punjab 1947: A Compilation of Official Documents*, vol. 1, 412-413.
- ³⁷ T. McGirk, 'Making the Cut', *Time*, 11 August 1997, 31.
- ³⁸ V. N. Datta, "Lord Mountbatten and the Punjab Boundary Commission Award", in S. Settar and Indira Baptista Gupta, 13.
- ³⁹ Penderel Moon and Nicholas Mansergh, ed., *Transfer of Power*, vol. xii, Viceroy's Personal Report no. 17, 16 August 1947, 762.
- ⁴⁰ Tai Yong Tan and Gyanesh Kudaisya, *The Aftermath of Partition in South Asia*, 98.
- ⁴¹ S. Hashim Raza, ed., *Mountbatten and the Partition of India*, New Delhi: Atlantic Publishers, 1989, 112.
- ⁴² Minutes of Viceroy's 69th Staff Meeting held on 9th August 1947, IOR R/3/1/171, *The Partition of the Punjab 1947: A Compilation of Official Documents*, vol. 1, 248.
- ⁴³ Viscount Mountbatten's notes of an interview with Pandit Nehru, sardar Patel and Mr. Kriplani on 10th June 1947, IOR R/3/1/157, *The Partition of the Punjab 1947: A Compilation of Official Documents*, vol. 1, 32.
- ⁴⁴ Mr. Jinnah's interview to the special correspondent of the Associated Press of India on December 10, 1945, published in *Dawn*, December 12, 1945.
- ⁴⁵ Clipping from the *Daily Statesman*, 5th June 1947, BCP B File 1-Polit. Gen./47, *The Partition of the Punjab 1947: A Compilation of Official Documents*, 137.
- ⁴⁶ Philip Ziegler, *Mountbatten: The Official Biography*. London: Collins, 1985. 403.
- ⁴⁷ For a detailed study of the Impact of Partition see S. Iyar, 'August Anarchy: The Partition Massacres in Punjab, 1947' in *South Asia*, vol. 18, 1995, 13-36.
- ⁴⁸ Alex Von Tunzelmann, *Indian Summer: The Secret History of the End of an Empire*, London: Simon & Schuster, 2007. 249.
- ⁴⁹ Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru to Viscount Mountbatten, 12th June 1947, IOR R/3/1/157, *The Partition of the Punjab 1947: A Compilation of Official Documents*, vol. 1, 34.
- ⁵⁰ *Ibid.*
- ⁵¹ *Ibid.*
- ⁵² Alex Von Tunzelmann, 201.
- ⁵³ *Ibid.* 201-202.
- ⁵⁴ For details of how a ground was made to defend the Viceroy and prove his innocence in matters relation to the violent conditions in the Punjab, see Penderel Moon, *Divide and Quit: An Eyewitness Account of the Partition of India*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989. 277-82.
- ⁵⁵ Viscount Mountbatten to Earl of Listowel, IOR R/3/1/50, *The Partition of the Punjab 1947: A Compilation of Official Documents*, vol. 1, 19.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Viscount Mountbatten's notes of an interview with Pandit Nehru, Sardar Patel and Mr. Kriplani on 10th June 1947, IOR R/3/1/157, *The Partition of the Punjab 1947: A Compilation of Official Documents*, vol. 1, 31-32.

⁵⁸ Punjab FR 30 July 1947; 13 August 1947. L/P&J/5/250, IOR.

⁵⁹ *Civil and Military Gazette* (Lahore), 19 September 1947.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Mudie to Jinnah, 23 September 1947, Mudie Papers. Mss.Eur. F 164/15, IOR.

⁶² Maharaja Yadavindra of Patiala to Viscount Mountbatten, 7th August 1947, Maharaja Sir Har Inder Singh to Viscount Mountbatten, 8th August 1947 and Maharaja Pratap Singh of Nabha to Viscount Mountbatten, 9th August 1947, *The Partition of the Punjab 1947: A Compilation of Official Documents*, vol. 1, 241-242, 244-245, 250-51.

⁶³ Minutes of Sir George Abell and Viscount Mountbatten, IOR R/3/1/157, *The Partition of the Punjab 1947: A Compilation of Official Documents*, vol. 1, 243.

⁶⁴ Pakistan Government, *Note on the Sikh Plan* (Lahore, 1948), 26-27.

⁶⁵ Viscount Mountbatten to Raja Har Indar Singh of Faridkot, 10th August 1947, IOR R/3/1/157, *The Partition of the Punjab 1947: A Compilation of Official Documents*, vol. 1, 256.

⁶⁶ Ian Talbot, *Freedom's Cry*. 157

⁶⁷ On June 5, 1947 Mountbatten was answering questions with regard to the composition of the Boundary Commission in a press conference. When enquired to clear up a point of procedure, that, should it not fall on the authority of the Constituent Assemblies of the two states to decide the boundary and assume the responsibility?, his answer was a simple need for 'speed', as it was not certain how long it would take the two states to set up their respective Constituent Assemblies. "Peaceful, quick and speedy settlement" which he so "sincerely" desired eventually got everything for the Raj and nothing concrete for the Indians. Viscount Mountbatten to Earl of Listowel, IOR R/3/1/50, *The Partition of the Punjab 1947: A Compilation of Official Documents*, vol. 1, 18-25.

⁶⁸ Ajit Bhattacharjea, *Countdown to Partition: The Final Days*. New Delhi: Harper Collins, 1997. 59-60.

⁶⁹ Leonard Mosley, *Last Days of the Raj*, New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1965. 195.

⁷⁰ Bir Good Gill, "Road to Nowhere: The Akalis, Cripps and the Azad Punjab Scheme", in S. Settar and Indira Baptista Gupta, 243.

⁷¹ G.D.Khosla, *Stern Reckoning: A Survey of the Events Leading up to and Following the Partition of India*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, 219.

⁷² Penderel Moon, 79.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Yasmin Khan, *The Great Partition: The Making of the India and Pakistan*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007, 146.

⁷⁵ Ibid. 127.