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Some Aspects of Muslim Public Administrative Theories

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The purpose of this paper is to bring into focus an area of Muslim politico administrative thought and institutions to which certainly not enough attention has been paid by modern scholars, although Professor Ishtiaq Qureshi, Professor Tripath, and Prof. Haroon Khan Sherwani some over a decade ago have broached the subject in their respective works the "Administration of Delhi Sultanate", "Some Aspects of Muslim Administration", and "Muslim Political Thought and Administration".

The importance of the subject lies in the fact that Muslim states newly emerging from colonial rule are busily engaged in shaping their politico administrative institutions partly by drawing upon Anglo-American or Continental system and partly by incorporating Islamic injunctions. A very befitting evidence of this development is to be found in the adoption of the two successive constitutions in Pakistan in 1956 and 1962. A scientific study of world history relates that attempts at *ipso facto* imitating the traditions and institutions of countries, which are ideologically miles apart from us will result in setbacks and convulsions. Islamic ideology and culture being basically one the different Muslim states share common values and a common culture heritage. Muslim peoples as heirs to one uniform culture and civilisation should not disentangle their thinking from the ideology of Islam and their politico cum administrative institutions should automatically be in line with the traditions of their ancestors and past heritage.

Luckily, detailed speculation and analysis of public administrative theories and organization of administrative institutions from the content of the treatises produced by Muslim scholars as early as ninth century A.D. In this galaxy of contributors some representative names are Ibn-i-Athir Rabi (contemporary of Caliph Mustasim) Abu Nasr Farabi (870—950), Abul Hasan Mawardi (974—1058), Nizam-

ul-Mulk Tusi (1017—1358) and the famous Abul Fazl, the celebrated writer on Mughul Administration. All these erudite scholars and their other counterparts in the Muslim world breathed in an atmosphere of great challenging activity. The simple democratic republic of Medina characterised by the principle of equality before law of a private citizen as well as a public official was fast giving way to a Caliphate influenced by the traditions of the Persian Sassanid emperors. From the ninth century onwards the Muslim history witnessed the meteoric rise of powerful Amirs, who in due course of time proved the political rivals of the chief pontifical authority, the Caliph. By eleventh century Sultanate with an elaborate administrative machinery consisting of a strong and well organized bureaucracy appeared on the scene². These versatile scholars coached in the traditions of Islam and Hellenic thought currents viewed the situation in its proper perspective and advanced their speculations which neither exhibit a divorce from the Holy Path nor do they turn their backs to the exigencies of the tide³.

Due to limitation of time and space I am, however, venturing an examination and critical analysis of the public administrative theories of some few representative minds, *e.g.*, Abul Hasan Mohammad Al Mawardi, Nizam-ul-Mulk Tusi and Zia-ud-Din Barni. The reasons determining the selection of these three writers are thought to be very genuine. In the first instance these works are more specifically devoted to problems and elements of administration than the works of their other counterparts like Farabi, Ghazzali, Ibn-i-Khaldun and some others. Besides, they exemplify the particular regional and situational variations in their reasonings and conclusions as a result of their distinctive surroundings and range of time. If the theories of these three are elaborated they will supply a corporate and comprehensive scheme.

In this connection a word of caution regarding the use of the term Public Administration and its justifiable application to the theories of our Muslim writers need to be uttered. The distinguished authors of the works, who have contributed to the presentation of the theories of administration of these Muslim writers either consciously or unconsciously evaded the usage of the term 'Public'⁴. I have strong reasons to include these works in the literature on Medieval

Public Administration. Some scholars have already accepted them to be a source material of principal importance on the subject under discussion. Professor Ralph Bribanti writing on 'Reflections on Bureaucratic Corruption' duly commends the importance of the *Fatawa-i-Jahandari*: "In Islam, the permeative effect of the virtuous ruler is proclaimed especially in Barni's *Fatawa-i-Jahandari* where it is written that whenever a ruler of pious intent uses his power to glorify Islam, then 'virtue and merit grow and good works and obedience to God arise, and arise with the best of drums . . . But, in Islam, the sole reliance was not on virtue alone, but on system, form, organisation and choice of subordinates as well"⁵. Further, appraising the due importance of Muslim work in the field of Public Administration, the learned authority opines: "Thus, the realistic, pragmatic, qualities of Islam were combined with a regard for piety in a manner much more effective than the doctrines advocated by earlier religions."⁶ In the same way other writers on Public Administration do cite the names of these works as valuable literature on Medieval administration⁷. Hence, these works do find their place in the list of writings on Public Administration. The effort to bring forward their lines of argument in a systematic form, however, is gravely missing and wanting. The reasonings and conclusions of these writers are intimately connected with the first hand experiences of their life, which was actually spent in handling administrative duties, which provided their thought a fundamentally empirical character. They also represent the successive changes in administrative trends due to their changing environments. For example, Al Mawardi, according to Professor Hamilton Gibb "wrote in an attempt to assert the authority of the Abbasid Caliphs against the Buwahid emirs who were in effective control of their state"⁸. The second writer Nizam-ul-Mulk Tusi flourished in a period "of great conflict between accepted ideas of Islamic polity and the Perso Turkish notions, which were slowly creeping into the body politic of the Caliphate"⁹. The third representative Zia-ud-Din Barni's mind depicts different developments in his conclusions and expositions. He was the creature of that environment and atmosphere when the Faithful had founded an empire in the far flung non-Muslim part of the world, where the need of the hour demanded a strong centralised government assisted by a well organised bureaucracy for winning as well as crushing native opposi-

tion by sometimes following a policy of re-approachment and conciliation and sometimes strict suppression. An administrative system to firmly establish the foundations of Muslims rule in the land and to extend the territorial dimensions of empire was the principal requirement of the moment.

As already stated no previous attempt at the examination of these works from the viewpoint of reflections on Public Administration has been directed. A question naturally arises whether these works lack such information. Public Administration in itself is a modern development as a separate branch of academic discipline having independent status of its own. My readings incline me to accept the second line of reasoning. The art of administration had been practised since the very early stages of civilisation, but its systematic study as an independent academic discipline emerged up only fairly recently, for example the term Public Administration came into use only in the 17th century ; Hamilton, the celebrated American political figure for the first time defined it in his Federalist No. 72 only towards the closing of 18th century. In 1812 the famous French publicist, Charles Jean Bonin published his comprehensive treatise on *Principes d'Administration Publique*. By the commencement of 20th century, however, a systematic and comprehensive study of the subject began and this was initiated by some external forces and trends. Physical technology created complex problems in social co-operation ; Industrial Revolution caused tremendous problems of employee relationship, market, labour organization and the Scientific Management Movement of the latter part of 19th century greatly assisted in the cause of the development of this subject. In addition to these the concept of welfare state and now trends in political and other social sciences like Biology, Social Psychology and Anthropology have considerably assisted in making the study of Public Administration a central theme of the study of Social Sciences. With these forces missing in the medieval Muslim world we certainly cannot expect the scholars reflecting on this academic discipline independently.

In order to discover Medieval Muslim speculation on the area of Public Administration it is also imperative to define the subject and conclude whether the views of the Medieval Muslim scholars appertain to it or not. Woodrow Wilson in his brilliant essay "The Study of Public

Administration" observes that it is concerned with the arrangement, organisation and inter-relation of executive departments and agencies; but it includes much more than these structural considerations. The real core of administration is the basic service which is performed for the public such as police and fire protection, public works, education, recreation, sanitation, social security, agricultural research, national defence and others.¹⁰ To make things more clear it will be interesting to demarcate the line of difference between Administration and Public Administration. In this connection it is interesting to note while administration as the organisation and direction of human and material resources to achieve desired ends is found in all enterprises e.g., a family, club, church or university, Public Administration refers broadly to the co-ordination of collective efforts to implement public policy.¹¹ It thus includes the totality of governmental activity, encompassing expertise of endless variety and the techniques of organisation and management whereby order and social purpose are given to the efforts of vast numbers.¹² Dilating a little further on the constituent elements of Public Administration is a collective rational activity because it is characterised by the efforts of some or the many as opposed to single hands and proceeds in the direction of achieving some purpose. It further presupposes a particular type of co-operation involving an authoritative and habitual personal relationship known as organisation in administrative technique and terminology. But, when this administrative activity is undertaken under governmental control and auspices, it is styled as Public Administration. So all administrative activity either at national, state or local level carried on under the superintendence of state and government becomes Public Administration.

Keeping in mind the two fundamental requirements of Public Administration—a rational activity and governmental control, the treatises of Al Mawardi, "Ahkam us-Sultaniya,"¹³ Nizam-ul-Mulk Tusi's "Siyasat Nama"¹⁴ and Zia-ud-Din Barni, "Fatawa-i-Jahandari"¹⁵ are comprehensive works on the organisation, management, personnel, functions, public finance and administrative accountability of officials and administrators. The works throw sufficient light on the recruitment, merit standards and qualities of head and heart of public officials and their respective duties. Organisation which is the cornerstone of

Public Administration and which means the structuring of individuals into productive relationship and is primarily concerned with the arrangement of personnel for facilitating the accomplishment of some agreed purpose through the allocation of functions and responsibilities, has been receiving the attention of these writers in full.¹⁶ Zia-ud-Din Barni has devoted some lengthy chapters to the discussion of the measures the political authority should adopt to preserve harmony and concord in the grades and ranks of the officers and chaos-ovcome body politic when attention is not devoted to the proper assignment of each officer according to his merit and status with his individual job.¹⁷ The collection agreement of these three writers is to the effect that the chief executive or the supreme director or the general manager as he is known in the terminology of Public Administration is the vital instrument through whom the basic objectives of Divine creation and human life are realised. He secures harmony in society and guarantees peaceful conditions of life, which extend protection to religion and also lead to the prevalence of plenty and contentment in the social order. Zia-ud-Din Barni is very explicit on this point in his Chapter on "The Establishment of Truth At the Centre".¹⁸

Executive Leadership is the central element in effective management and demands certain qualities of skill, intuition and personal magnetism with a view to co-ordinating the administrative machinery and social activity. The Medieval Muslim writers are fully cognisant of this basic need of a society. They have attached full weight to the possession of high and distinctive qualities by the high head *i.e.*, the Caliph and the Sultan and following him the whole personnel.¹⁹ They in fact justifiably link the origin of political institutions with the dire requirement of a leader. Nizam-ul-Mulk urges on the fundamental necessity of political organisation thus: "God the Almighty selects someone from among men and gives over to him the charge of the well being of the world and the comfort and tranquility of the human race after duly furnishing him with the art of government."²⁰ The head is vested with the supreme responsibility for maintaining peace and security in the land. The head is obeyed, respected and paid full reverence in lieu of his service that he rendered towards the safeguard of people's life, property and interests.²¹

Al Mawardi also links the person of the leader with the achieve-

ment of the social objectives. For example the Imamatus is not only deemed as an institution, which tradition and history sanctify, but reason and intellect fully justify. Wisdom of men consists in entrusting their affairs to an able leader, who saves them from molestation and adjudicates in their hour of need. Imamatus is organised on some fundamental principles of truth, and justice, and establishes the principles of truth, goodness and right. The control and supervision over people is assigned to leaders in the interest of looking after the administrative affairs smoothly and harmoniously.²¹

Zia-ud-Din Barni's observations on the high qualities of the supreme executive leader are, indeed, suggestive of his being a very competent and duty conscious person. Among these qualities justice of course is placed high and supreme. A just ruler is placed next to prophet. So great is his emphasis on justice that he differentiates between inborn or natural and self-created justice. The high test of *true justice* can be fulfilled by rulers and individuals only when they are born with this gift. He further analyses the ingredients of inborn justice as sympathy and fellow-feeling for the oppressed, the protection of the infirm, hatred for tyranny, abhorrence for personal considerations, absence of wrath and fury and the treatment of the two litigants on a par²². These few representative passages do show the great concern of these writers with a sound and well established administration with a competent and duly qualified leader at the helm of affairs. The modern theories of Public Administration treat executive leadership as a vital force in human life. The role of the leader in achieving social objectives is tremendous. However, it must be admitted that the degree of emphasis does vary according to the element of change in social techniques. Because of scientific and technical advancements as we observe the apparatus and procedural aids of administration in modern times tend to be more specialised and comprehensive. But, it can hardly be denied that the medieval Muslim society subject to its own socio-economic conditions did not place stress on the sound and efficient organisation of the administrative machine. Hence, irrespective of the time factor the social relationship of human beings is inevitably bound up with certain accepted patterns of conduct that ensure consistency in social action²³.

The second part of this paper is devoted to the study of Nature

and Role of Bureaucracy in the Medieval Muslim set up. It has been very rightly remarked that however lofty the ideals of a state may be their success depends on their proper execution and in this implementation of programmes the permanent official or the bureaucrat plays a very dynamic role. The lessons of history fully testify to the rise and fall of empires and human achievements and failures caused by the efficiency or the degeneration of their officials and administrative mechanism. The welding of Germany into a great nation is not ascribed to the chivalry of the armies of Bismark but to the Prussian civil service. The history of ancient and medieval empire further illustrates their decline on account of the unsoundness of their administrative institutions. The scope of state activity in Muslim states is not limited to the performance of only regulatory and protective functions, but extends to socio economic welfare fields. Hence, greater the increase in state activity, the official is bound to play the role of the mainspring of society. The bureaucrat in all times has been serving as the major instrument of translating social values into action programmes, because bureaucracy is by no means a contemporary development. In fact it is a 'universal and time honoured phenomenon'. This indeed explains why systems of officialdom prevailed in empires of antiquity. Egypt under Ramses III about twelve centuries ago established an assembly of officials to administer imperial possessions. The pyramids, a technical and organisational accomplishment of enduring significance, symbolise the administrative genius of Pharaohs. Ancient China exhibited the the signs of a viable bureaucracy and the Analects of Confubius contain surprisingly very modern rules of Public Administration. Besides, the role of bureaucracy was not restricted to *gild giysejeepubg* activity, but was an expanded one extending to the governmental attainment of socio economic welfare of the people. For centuries the ancient Chinese have portrayed an impressive mastery of the problems and skills of public administration²⁴.

The Ancient Greeks, however, finding the subject too prosaic for their speculative minds bequeathed to humanity very few records of administrative significance. The Romans on the other hand offer a tremendous contribution on administrative specialisation. The famous Cicero fully emphasises upon the decisive role and the obligation . . . , of direction of public affairs²⁵. Surveying the popularity

of the subject and importance of the bureaucratic machine in the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent the Science of Artha Shastra enjoyed full patronage. Kautilya, the notable Mauryan Chancellor in his praiseworthy 'Artha Shastra' very clearly refers to a good many works compiled on this field Book II of his work is itself exclusively devoted to the analysis of the bureaucratic machine. He is a staunch advocate of a highly centralised administrative machine with Prohita as the key administrator²⁶.

The Medieval Muslim politico administrative literature is replete with speculation on a well planned and well manned bureaucratic system. A centralised bureaucracy with several levels of management known in modern terminology as top, middle and field establishments and performing duties both of functional and auxiliary nature flourished in medieval Muslim administrative system. At the sametime public administration today is conducted at some territorial levels, *i.e.*, central, provincial and local. A minute study of these works of medieval Muslim writers contains a good deal of information on organisation of administration at these levels. Hierarchical pattern of structure is a commonly accepted system of present day organisations. The medieval set up does reveal a connected chain of officials and ministries entrusted with administrative discharge of duties. The valuable work of Professor Ishtiaq Qureshi is an analysis of the administrative mechanism and structural details on early medieval Muslim India²⁷. A very positive value of modern administrative dynamics is decentralisation, but the medieval society with its limitations of lesser developed technology and communication system was based on a high system of centralisation. The power of decision making in practice was shared by the various level authorities but the subordinate bureau and official were always answerable to the top level. Hence, in practice if power was diffused this was more out of the factors of expediency and convenience than faith in the positive value of Decentralisation. As regards these structural differences in modern and medieval system, it is worthwhile to quote a modern authority on Public Administration. "In its details it (administrative dynamics) varies from nation to nation reflecting the peculiar values, customs, political and ideals and institutions of the society of which it is a part"²⁸. He further remarks that

“ambivalent in character in as much as it reflects an urge to concentrate power and a negative resistance to change. In this respect a change of degree will be observed in modern and medieval bureaucracies”.²⁸

Bureaucracy in its plain and simple sense refers to (1) a government of officials and very frequently it is used to denote the peculiar activities of officials in a general way as typifying a regulated administrative system which is organised in the form of a series of offices or in the narrower sense it refers to the cumbersome and round-about methods known as red tapism, which characterise official practices²⁹. In spite of the visible defects in this system, Bureaucracy is standing more and more erect and indispensable in modern states with enhanced powers. If legislature and political executive secure the interests of popularity and public will in a political order, the permanent official or the bureaucrat guarantees efficiency, expertise, technical skill and professional experience, which form the major ingredients of the successful operation of administrative machines. Indeed, a permanent executive drawing its life and blood from the merit system imparts to an administrative system the element of stability and functional specialisation. The loopholes in the system, however, may be looked upon in the light as a modern scholar, Ralph Bribanti remarks : “Government corruption or improbity is found in all forms of bureaucracy and in all periods of political development. To imagine that in earlier periods of history all was pure and idyllic in this realm or that is to make an incomplete and imperfect reading of history. It is equally inaccurate to assume that in earlier periods religion had a greater rectifying role”³⁰.

Hence it is suggested that the yardstick of measuring the elements of efficiency in systems must vary according to their age and material handicaps. All the three major writers on medieval Muslim Public Administrative have treated the official class or in modern parlance the bureaucracy as an indispensable instrument of state machine. They, in support of their argument, quote the Holy Quran, which enjoins obedience to those in authority. Consultation and mutual deliberation in conducting administrative affairs have been made obligatory on heads of states. To quote Barani : “All the past and present scholars of the

world have known, do know and will know, that the curing of evil, the suppression of mischief, the undertaking of important tasks, the framing of stable regulations and the discernment of the ultimate good are (all) dependent upon taking counsel from the experienced and wise well-wishers of the government and selected few of the kingdom."³¹

After fully stressing the necessity of consultation and device the Medieval Muslim thinkers place wazirs in the rank of foremost advisers of the realm. The futility of ill-planned and ill-conceived designs, which may achieve shortlived success, has been truly urged by them. Planning forms to be the basic ingredient of modern social and administrative activity. It is looked upon as a rational process characteristic of all human behaviour. In the theories of these writers careful thinking of the ifs and butts of schemes and operations has been given major place. In the absence of rightly directed and conceived schemes the ship of government will toss to and fro.³²

Dealing with the organisation of administrative machinery these scholars describe the various categories of officials, e.g., Wazirs, Hajibs, Qazis, Arizes, Mustis, Ummals, Muqtis, Barids, Muhtasibs, etc., etc. Indeed, an attempt at the examination of the structural details of these offices and their respective responsibilities shall considerably assist in the development of the theories of Public Administration in Medieval Islam. The absence of these theories mean an unbridgeable gap in the historical development of Public Administration.

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MUHAMMAD TUGHLAQ

Prof. Muhammad Habib

It is unfortunate that no medieval or modern historian has either given interpretation of Muhammad Tughlaq's measures or succeeded in reconciling the obvious contradictions of his character and policy. The great Sultan was not unaware of the misunderstandings and suspicions by which he had been pursued throughout his career and, like many educated Muslim kings, he wrote an account of his reign with his own hand. The invaluable volume, which would have explained the whole mystery to us, has perished, or, as is more likely, it has been intentionally destroyed. But four or five pages have escaped the hand of the despoiler and may be seen appended to a beautiful volume of the "Tabaqat-i-Ferozshahi" of Maulana Ziauddin Barni for the most detailed account of his reign. And Barni, though conscientious and scrupulously honest in his statement of facts, repeatedly confesses his inability to understand the Sultan, whose character and outlook were radically different from his own. Barni was a religious fanatic while Muhammad Tughlaq believed in toleration. Barni had an unshakable faith in caste and birth, in Sayyids and highly placed Turkish officials and Hindu rajas who could trace their pedigree to the sun and the moon. He held the vile canaille in contempt and considered its suppression the end-all and be-all of every government. Muhammad Tughlaq was a man of the people. He had risen from the ranks of the highest offices in the State after a chequered civil and military career, during which he had devoted his leisure hours to self-improvement through philosophic studies. A friend of heretics, revolutionists and dreamers, Muhammad Tughlaq was, nonetheless, acquainted with every detail of the administrative machine and it was impossible for his subordinates to ignore his commands. He was every inch a soldier as well, and the rebels of his day found him a terrible opponent on the field of battle. His most inexcusable sin, from Barni's point of view was that he insisted on placing his trust in men who, like himself, had made their mark through sheer merit and hard work. Of the ministers and officers who could claim the Sultan's confidence, not one had a gentleman for his father.

“He raised Najba, the low-born son of a singer”, declares Barni in disgust, “to a rank superior to that of Maliks and appointed him to the Governorship of Gujarat, Multan and Badaun. Similarly Aziz Himar and his brother, Firoz the Barber, Manka the cook, Masud the vintner, Ladha the gardener, and many other germs of worthlessness were ennobled and given high offices and territories. Shaikh Baboo, the bastard son of a weaver, was honourably admitted to the circle of the Sultan’s friends and his status was raised in the eyes of men. Feera, the gardener, the lowest and meanest of all men in Hind and Sind, was entrusted with the ministry of Revenue and placed above the heads of Maliks, Amirs and Governor of Oudh. Muqbil, a slave of Ahmad Ayaz and in character and appearance a disgrace to the race of slaves, was entrusted the province of Gujarat, which had hitherto been placed in the charge of great Khans and Wazirs”.

Except when it meant a defiance of his administrative orders, Muhammad Tughlaq could tolerate every variety of opinion and as he explains in the surviving pages of his autobiography, he had himself gone over from traditional orthodoxy to philosophic doubt and from philosophic doubt to rational faith. He not only tolerated Barni, but actually employed him as a courtier for seventeen years. On two occasions, as he tells, Barni ventured to give Muhammad Tughlaq some learned advice based on old Persian tales. The Sultan was to abdicate and give himself to hunting and pleasure. Muhammad refused to budge an inch. He would either put the country right or perish in attempt. Barni, as he became a courtier, never ventured on the delicate topic again. But when Sultan Muhammad died, Firuz Shah dismissed Barni. Malik Maqbul Khan-i-Jehan, a converted Hindu captive who was all powerful in the new reign, felt he had no need of a man of Barni’s ideas. So the poor historian, after drawing a comfortable salary for seventeen years, had to join the ranks of the unemployed, and was forced to seek out his livelihood by copying manuscripts and doing other odd jobs. Even if he found enough work, it could not have brought him more than four to six copper coins a day. But work was not always to be had : and while his style became more expressive and his tongue more bitter, his physical powers began to fail him. His pathetic appeals to Firuz Shah for employment or pension, went unheard, and having despaired of all hope from the king, Barni turned

fiercely against the dead. Why did God condemn him to dishonour in his old age? Muhammad Tughlaq was to blame. Barni, his servant, was a partaker of his sins for he had never summoned up sufficient courage to wean the Sultan from his sinful ways. And the more he pondered over the past the more sinful did the ways of Muhammad Tughlaq and his officers appear. "Some of us (courtiers), who had dabbled in books and possessed some ennobling knowledge, started quarrelling, with each other and traitors that we were—in our desire to retain his favour, we never ventured to explain to him how irreligious his punishments were—from greed of tankas and jitals and from love of honour and promotion, we refrained from speaking the truth and became partners in his sinful deeds. I cannot speak of the feelings of others but for myself, I have suffered no end of hardships. As a punishment for what I said and did, I have been condemned in my old age to poverty and distress and have lost the confidence of everyone in this world. I do not know what will be my fate in the next world and what punishments are awaiting me. Whatever honour or material gain have been my lot in life, I received from Sultan Muhammad Tughlaq. He gave me rewards and presents such as I had never obtained before and am not likely to obtain again even in my dreams".

Muhammad Tughlaq was a born fighter. His conscience did not prick him. He was convinced to the last of the righteousness of his faith and of the soundness of his administrative measures. And the hour of death did not find him wanting in relinquishing the Crown worn for so many years and with a smile and a verse on his lips, he spurred his horse to the realm beyond. For Barni, however, a different end was in store. He had made compromises with his conscience, and his conscience began to retailiate. Its debilitating effects were aggravated by loneliness, poverty and want. Visions of the terrible Satans, anti-Christes with whom he had rubbed shoulders before Sultan Muhammad's throne kept haunting his imagination. "When Sultan Muhammad found that his orders were not executed as efficiently as he desired, he was incited to greater wrath. He punished the people and cut them down like weeds and herbs. There were many wretches—the like of them have not been created from the time of Adam till today—ready to slaughter the Mussalmans at his orders. Even Hajjaj

bin Yusuf did not deserve to be enrolled among their servants and slaves. Such were—Zain Banda, Mukhtas-ul-Mulk, Yusuf Bughra; Khalil son of the Chief Ink-stand bearer; Muhammad Najib, the wretched Nehavandi prince; Quranful, the swordsman; the accursed Aibeh; Mujir Abu Rija, thousands of curses upon him; the son of the Qazi Gujrat Ansali; and the three rascally sons of Thaneswari. The killing of Mussalmans was their only occupation in life. By God, I am sure if a score of Prophets had been handed over to Zain Bandaha, Yusuf Bughra or the accursed Khalil to be put to death, they would not have allowed a night to elapse before accomplishing their full purpose”.

Nevertheless Barni was too honest to resort to mis-statements of facts. His conscience, whatever its other shortcomings, always incited him to speak the truth and the whole truth; but he was an old man, harassed by the anxiety of earning his daily bread. He composed his history, probably from the notes of current events he had been jotting down for years. There are, consequently, many omissions in the *Tarikh-i-Feroz Shahi*. Barni also assumes the existence of other works now extinct and consequently omits or summarises facts which other authors had described in detail. But Barni's interpretation of facts is correct in nine cases out of ten. Personal disappointment and religious prepossessions prevented him from seeing most things in their proper perspective. The reactionary historian of a revolutionary age, he reconciled his moral evaluation of men and movements by preaching it as a gospel of truth that men of virtue and honour—which for him was synonymous with good birth—perish in ignominy while it is the nature of the ‘revolving sky’ and of ‘ungrateful Time’ to lead the wicked to prosperity and power. A historian with such moral convictions inevitably saw everything upside down.

The historian who solves the mystery of Muhammad bin Tughlaq will, in the first place, have to re-interpret Barani's facts in a rational manner. He will also have to tap the other sources of information available. Ibn-i-Batuta has to be used with care, but ‘table talks’ of the mystics, if diligently searched, will yield plenty of suggestive and useful facts.

No satisfactory explanation of Muhammad Tughlaq's copper currency has yet been offered, except the cheap one, that it was a

foolish enterprise. The Mongol empire had a system of paper currency which made the transportation of gold and silver from the far-flung provinces of the empire unnecessary. A special quality of paper seems to have been used and also a special quality of ink and a number of the highest officers were required to seal every note issued. Imitation was prevented by a series of ruthless laws which only the Mongols could inflict or suffer. Under the Il. Khans, Persian financiers anxious to win a cheap popularity by providing money from nowhere, often thought of the easy method of glutting the market with paper currency without providing for redemption; in one instance at least we are definitely told that a cart load of printed notes was ready for distribution. But the Khans were afraid of the effect of such an experience on the stability of the empire and it was never tried.

The Mussalmans of Central Asia had learnt the manufacture of paper from their Chinese captives in the ninth century; it is conceivable that many secret methods for making peculiar kinds of paper and inks still remained a monopoly in the hands of the manufactures of a paper token currency. His intention, moreover, was to issue token coins of small designations and in an age when the mass of the people were not accustomed to the handling of paper currency notes of one tanka each would have received short shrift at the horny hands of the Indian peasantry. Unlike the paper currency of the Mongol empire, the token coins of Muhammad Tughlaq were meant for popular use.

Though no historian seems to have observed the fact, the token copper coins issued by Muhammad Tughlaq are often found. The metal used seems to be bronze and the superscription is radically different from that of all other coins of the middle ages. The language used is Persian and not Arabic, as was the traditional custom. While most medieval coins of the baser metals are difficult to decipher, in this case special care was taken to make the legend legible. The simple custom of superscribing the Sultan's name on one side and the Caliph's on the other was discarded in favour of historic description, which leaves no doubt that we have here the Sultan's famous token coins. "Minted tanka," runs the legend, "current during the days of Muhammad bin Tughlaq, who hopes (for divine favour). He who obeys the Sultan obeys the Lord". A silver coin, in those days was known as tanka; a copper or bronze coin was known as jital. Here

is a jital calling itself a tanka ; it must therefore have been a token coin. The word, 'current' is significant. Other coins circulated owing to the value of their metal; this tanka owed its value to the power and credit of Muhammad Tughlaq. No other coin of this style or with such a legend was struck in the middle ages.

Barni, indulging in his habitual exaggeration of a Persian writer, does not hesitate to declare, that the token coins were struck by every Hindu goldsmith in his house and had no more value than clods on earth. This poetic fancy in itself impossible at a time when four or five mans of wheat could be obtained for a jital, is modified by the same writer's more accurate statement that the value of the old (silver) coin owing to the great honour it had attained, rose from one to four and one to five". In other words, within the empire where Muhammad Tughlaq's firmans ran, the token coin depreciated to 20% or 25% of its face value. "Outside the Empire", he says, "the bronze (token) coin was accepted for its value in metal, one silver tanka being exchanged for a hundred tankas of bronze". The proportion of 1 to 100, it may be safely assumed, represents the relative value of bronze and silver; no depreciation beyond that was possible. Barni leaves us in no doubt that, when the experiment failed, Muhammad Tughlaq nobly redeemed his promise. With unlimited wrath in his heart, Muhammad Tughlaq issued a firman ordering every one who had a bronze tanka to bring it to the treasury, where a silver tanka would be given to him in return. Why did a ruler who was so scrupulous in redeeming his pledge, fail to guard against so obvious a trick as the imitation of his token currency? No punishments for the manufacturing and uttering of false coins had been laid down and Muhammad Tughlaq, generally so ready to use his sword against those responsible for the failure of his policy, seems in this case to have allowed every one to go scot free. Was there some peculiarity in the composition of the metal upon which he relied to prevent the imitation of his token but which his subjects, nevertheless, succeeded in discovering? Even if the false coin was sufficiently like the true coin to deceive a bona fide holder it would be impossible to separate the two after they had got into circulation and many perfectly innocent persons would have suffered by any attempt to separate them. A chemical examination of the token tanka may bring some curious features to light.

No measure of Muhammad bin Tughlaq excited greater hostility and opposition among his contemporaries than the change of capital from Delhi to Deogiri. Of course, he had to be obeyed. Barni condemns it; Ferishta praises Deogir but is not prepared to defend the change of capital. The 'table talks' of the mystics represent the Sultan as a ruthless tyrant and give in detail the hardships entailed by the measure. And yet as future history showed, there was no step in which Muhammad Tughlaq, from his own point of view, was indubitably right. It has been some time sought to defend Muhammad on the ground that Deogir was a central place and that it was not possible to govern the Deccan from Delhi. Such an argument, however, cuts both ways. If the Deccan could not be governed from Delhi, neither could Hindustan be governed from Deogir. It is not likely that Muhammad Tughlaq overlooked such an elementary fact. The condition of Delhi was highly artificial; three-fourth of its enormous population depends, directly or indirectly, on the government for its livelihood. If Muhammad Tughlaq had removed the seat of government to Deogir the population of Delhi would have starved; and face to face with starvation it would have insisted on electing another king. So the government and the citizens of Delhi had to be transported together. But why remove the capital at all? The 'Table talks' and histories of the mystics give us some clue to the Sultan's real motive.

Muhammad Tughlaq knew the Deccan better than any of his contemporaries. Malik Kafur, in the course of four successful campaigns had plundered the richest temples of the South and compelled most of the rajas to accept the overlordship of Delhi, but Alauddin, acting on the sane and sensible advice of Alaul Mulk, the fat and wise Kotwal of Delhi, had refused to annex a bigha of land. The southern rajas were deprived of all the jewels they had collected, 'star by star', from the time of Vikramaditya but their territories were retained to them with the diplomatic suggestion that they were welcome to make up for the loss by plundering their neighbours. It was not the habit of the Khalji autocrat to undertake more than he could very safely perform. Mubarak Shah after his accession entirely changed the Deccan policy. He not only overthrew the Yadavas of Deogir but established his administration over their territory which was distributed among a large number of petty officers, known as the Amir-i-Sadah or Comman-

ders of one hundred, who were expected to collect the revenue and keep the population quiet. It was a brittle and rickety administration. There was only a thin sprinkling of Muslim populations in Gujrat, Rajputana and Malwa. In Deogir there were no Muslim population whatever, except the officers and their men. To the south, east and west of Deogir there were powerful Hindu chiefs, who had lost their prestige but not their power; a union of their forces could have any day driven the weak forces of the empire pellmell beyond the Vindhya, and the hold of Delhi over Gujrat and Malwa, conquered so lately by Sultan Alauddin, would have also been endangered. But the fateful dice had been cast. Muhammad Tughlaq was driven to the conclusion that position of Deogir would never be secure so long as the kingdom of Warangal was allowed to exist. He led an expedition against Warangal, during his father's reign and tasted the bitterness of failure. His second attempt, however, was successful and Warangal, like Deogir, was entrusted to the Sadah Amirs.

Still the situation was anything but satisfactory. Foreign government—a government of the South by the North—was as intolerable to the Sadah amirs of the Empire as to the Hindu population whom they were expected to control. Every one saw that it could not last beyond a decade; the forces of opposition were too strong. The success of Islam in India, moreover, depended on its becoming thoroughly indigenous. Shahbuddin and the Slave kings had succeeded in Hindustan owing to two great movements. The Mongol invasions of Central Asia and Persia had driven a large number of Muslim refugees to India who settled in the country for good. At the same time the Chisti and Suhrawardy mystic orders (silsilahs) with their super-military discipline had carried on an extensive religious propaganda in every village and town of Hindustan, and their efforts had brought a considerable minority of pure Indians within the fold of Islam. This minority of gardeners, cooks, barbers, and other 'germs of worthlessness', which Barni detested, naturally stood for that social democracy which is the finest contribution of Islam to India and gave to the Empire of Delhi the strength it needed. Unless something like this happened in the Deccan also—unless by deportation or conversion, an indigenous Muslim population was created there—the breeze of the first Hindu reaction would sweep everything aside. Muhammad Tughlaq, who combined the bull dog tenacity of Shahbuddin Ghori

with the far-sighted-tolerance of Shaikh Fariduddin, to whose school he belonged, grimly made up his mind to accomplish the task. The population of Delhi was there, being comfortably beneath his nose ; it was a fine social and economic unit for a southern capital and he would take it there. But this was not enough. Unless an extensive propaganda was undertaken and centres of Muslim social and religious culture were established in the Deccan, his scheme would fail. The mystic also had to be transported for the purpose of preaching and propaganda. But would they obey ?

But men of religion among the Mussalmans were then divided into two different and somewhat hostile groups – the ahl-i-Shariat or ‘Priests’ who believed in salvation through the performance of religious practices and the ahl-i-tariqat or mystics (sufis) who believed in spiritual culture. With the former Mohammad Tughlaq’s relations were always hostile. He hated them for their erroneous interpretations of the Shariat ; he despised them for their worldliness and he persecuted them for trying to dominate the policy of the state. With the ‘mystics’ however, his relations were more intimate. He was a disciple of Shaikh Alauddin, grandson of Shaikh Farid of Ajodhan, and had been brought up in the atmosphere of the Chisti Silsilah Tradition, not well-authenticated, asserts that he used to frequent the Khanqah of Shaikh Nizamuddin Aulia ; and the credit of having constructed a mausoleum over that saint’s tomb certainly belongs to him. The Deogir scheme, nevertheless, created plenty of friction. Muhammad Tughlaq claimed that the head the state had a right to the allegiance of the ‘mystics’ as ‘mystics’, and that he could issue to them orders superior even to those of their *pir* or master. One of the most important of these orders used the allocation of spiritual dominion or wilayat, *i.e.*, the sphere of a mystic’s propaganda. The disciple had to go wherever his master ordered and work according to his directions. It was thus that Shaikh Moinuddin of Ajmer and his successors had succeeded in spreading the tentacles of their organisation over Hindustan. Mohammad Tughlaq thought that there was a congestion of mystics in the Punjab and the Doab, while they were badly needed in the distant provinces, and particularly in the Deccan. The Chisti mystics, on the other hand, considered the government an embodiment of sin, and of the worldliness which they detested. “Can a Qazi,—a servant of the state—really say his prayers ?” Shaikh Jalaluddin of Tabriz had asked ; and even Shaikh

Nizamuddin the most tolerant of them, had summarily broken with a friend, who owing to the appeals of his starving family, had hesitated before refusing Sultan Alauddin's offer of the governorship of Oudh. Mohammad Tughlaq's new claim led to a protracted struggle. He began by requesting the chief mystics or Shaikhs to enter his service. Maulana Ibnuddin and some descendants of Shaikh Fariduddin refused the employment offered. The Sultan retaliated by asking them to come to his durbars or to his dinner and made it clear that the slightest assumption of superiority on their part would be met with condign punishments. They came but only after they had made it clear that they were reluctantly obeying superior brute force. Shaikh Qutubuddin Munawwar, grandson of Shaikh Jamal Hansawi, who lived quietly by the side of his ancestor's grave, was one day surprised by a visit from Hasan, an Imperial officer, accompanied by a body of soldiers. "You are wanted by the Sultan," Hasan informed Him. "Have I any choice in the matter?" "No," replied Hasan, I have been ordered to take you (to Delhi). God be praised, the Shaikh replied, "I do not go of my own free-will." Mohammad Tughlaq was shooting arrows when Qutubuddin Munawwar arrived. He received the Shaikh warmly but was annoyed to find that the latter's arm did not tremble when they shook hands. "I went to Hansi but you did not consider it worthwhile to pay me a visit," the Sultan complained "I am a poor man," the Shaikh replied, "I pray for the Sultan and for all Mussalmans from my secluded corner but do not consider myself important enough for the company of kings. Please permit me to depart". Two lacs of tankas sent to the Shaikh through Feroz Shah and Ziauddin Barni were flatly refused. "All I need is two seers of Kichri and a little ghi," he said, "please take this back." The two messengers insisted nevertheless, on his accepting two thousand tankas at least. Shaikh Qutubuddin Munawwar distributed them among the poor men of Delhi and returned to Hansi.

If the grandson of Shaikh Jalaluddin, the senior successor of Shaikh Fariduddin, could be so indifferent to the Sultan's advances, the attitude of others can be well imagined. Of course, there were many mystics ready to accept the Sultan's money and to do his bidding. But Muhammad Tughlaq wanted men of independent character and true godliness, who would spread Islam in the Deccan through 'the perfume of their virtues;' he had no need for mystics who exploit the sincerity of their disciples and misrepresent their faith. Muhammad Tughlaq's

last attempt at peaceful solution was the imposition of compulsory but purely nominal duties on a number of selected mystics. The duty of tying the Sultan's dastar when he sat on the throne was assigned to Shaikh Nasiruddin Mahmud, generally known as the Chiragh-i-Delhi the senior successor of Shaikh Nizamuddin Aulia and the most influential mystic of his day. The duty of handling the Sultan his pan, of putting scent on his clothes and so forth were given to men of some what lesser status. From a secular point of view these were offices of great honour. But Shaikh Nasiruddin refused to perform what he considered to be the nominal duties of the valet and was thrown into prison; later on, reflecting that his master had not condemned service to the Sultan, if exacted through force, he consented to undertake his honorary office. It was obvious that the measure had not succeeded in winning the goodwill of the saints, and Muhammad Tughlaq fell back on his last resort—the gentle courteous pressure of brute force. The spiritual dominion of Hindustan was divided among the mystics by the Sultan's order and they were ordered to betake themselves to the sphere allotted for their preaching and propaganda. It was made perfectly clear that if courteous and neatly worded requests were not obeyed, obedience would be enforced at the point of the sword. The scheme was, on the whole fairly successful. The mystics would not serve the Sultan, but neither would they rebel. If they were transported to a distant province and ordered to remain there, they would go on preaching and inculcating their doctrines and never care to return. Maulana Shamsuddin Yahayah, an early disciple of Shaikh Nizamuddin Aulia, was summoned to the Sultan's court and was granted an audience, after he had been kept under mild surveillance for some days. "Of what use is a man of your learning in Delhi," the Sultan "told him" go to Kashmir. Sit in the idol temples of that region and invite the people to Islam." A number of soldiers were entrusted with the duty of conveying the Shaikh to his destination. Shamsuddin returned to his house on the pretext of preparing for the journey. "I dreamt of Shaikh Nizamuddin last night," he told his relations. "He was calling me to himself. It is idle for them to talk of my going to Kashmir. I intend joining my master". Next day he developed an ulcer on the chest and it had to be operated upon. Muhammad Tughlaq suspecting a trick, ordered the Shaikh to be brought before him. He

was taken there on a cot, being too ill to move. The Sultan allowed him to return, and Shaikh Shamsuddin Yahyah breathed his last a few days later.

The fate of other mystics, however, was not so tragic, Amir Khurd, an author of the time of Feroz Shah has left in his *Suyarul Aulia* an account of the successors and disciples of Shaikh Nizamuddin who had survived upon the time of Muhammad Tughlaq. Every one of them was compelled to go to Deogir. During the days when Sultan Muhammad Tughlaq was sending people of Delhi to Deogir and planning the conquest of Turkestan and Khorasan and the overthrow of Changiz Khan's descendants, he summoned the law officer (Sudurs) and all the leading men of Delhi and the surrounding territory. He also ordered the construction of a magnificent pavilion under which a pulpit was constructed; from the pulpit the Sultan was to address the assembled notables and incite them to a holy war against the infidels. About this time Shaikh Fakhruddin Zarradi, Shaikh Shamsuddin Yahya and Shaikh Nasiruddin Mahmud were called by the Sultan. Shaikh Qutubuddin, the Sultan's Dabir, who was a disciple of Shaikh Akbruddin..... wished to take him to the Sultan before the others arrived. Shaikh Fakhruddin was reluctant to meet the Sultan. I have often ground before this man. I will not co-operate with him and he will not spare my life. I wish to overthrow the descendents of Changiz Khan" the Sultan asked him when they met, "Will you help me in the enterprise?" "If God so wills", Shaikh Fakhruddin replied, "This is an ambiguous promise," the Sultan complained, "It is impossible to speak more definitely about the future" was the reply. Muhammad Tughluq was annoyed. "Give me some advice on which I may act," he requested. "Surpress your anger," replied Fakhruddin, "Which anger?" the Sultan inquired. "The anger of an animal" the Shaikh explained. When (the four) sat down for dinner, the Sultan and Shaikh Fakhruddin had to eat out of the same plate. The Sultan observing that Shaikh Fakhruddin abhorred dining with him, began to separate the meat from the bone and placed it before the Shaikh. Fakhruddin tasted bits of it with great reluctance. When dinner was over, a robe of honour and a purse of gold was brought for each of the distinguished guests. The other accepted it, but Shaikh Qutubuddin, feeling sure that Shaikh Fakhruddin would not consent to touch the Sultan's gift and thereby subject himself to Muhammad Tughlaq's

wrath, took the robe and purse on his behalf Muhammad Tughlaq rated them thoroughly for his act. Leave off these idolatorous beliefs he said, or I will put you to death.

Shaikh Fakhruddin Zarradi had, nevertheless, to go to Deogir with the rest. He alighted by side of the royal tank but made up his mind to go on a pilgrimage to Macca without the Sultan's permission. Qazi Kamaluddin, chief Qazi, whom he consulted about the enterprise, tried to dissuade him. 'It is not prudent for you to leave without the Sultan's permission, specially as he is on the look out for an opportunity to punish you. It is, moreover, his intention to make Deogir famous by setting here the scholars, Shaikhs and Qazis of the whole world.' Fakhruddin discarded, the cowardly advice. He left Deogir on the pretext of joining a marriage party and then fled to the sea coast. While returning from Arabia, he was drowned. Shaikh-Fakhruddin's turbulent spirit was not shared by the majority of the mystics. They protested but obeyed. Khwaja Karimuddin Samarqandi, a man whom Shaikh Nizamuddin had delighted to honour, consented to perform the duties of Shaikh-ul-Islam of Satgaon in Bengal and served the Sultan with loyalty and devotion. The mystic poet, Amir Hasan whose Fawaidul Fawaid has been a model for the 'table-talks' (mal-fuzat) of later mystics, dragged himself to Deogir, in his old age to die. Not a word of complaint seemed to have escaped his lips. It was the veteran soldier's last service to the Empire. Maulana Sharfuddin Firozgarhi, another Chisti mystic of eminence also died after reaching Deogir. It is clear from Amir Khusrau's account that he had to go to Deogir with all his relations, though one of his uncles was brought back to Delhi by the Khwaja Jahan Ahmad Ayaz. "The Khawaja-i-Jahan," he says, "was appointed Vazir of the empire in 731 A. H. as he witnessed the regard Shaikh Nizamuddin had for my uncle, Saiyid Qutubuddin, he desired to bring back the latter with him. My uncle did not wish to return, but as he was well aware that the Khawaja-i-Jahan could enforce his wish by procuring an order from the Sultan, he consented to keep the Khwaja's company on two conditions—first, he was to be allowed to wear the dress of a Sayyed and a mystic, secondly, he was not to be saddled with any administrative duties. He had to make these conditions as it was Sultan Muhammad's policy to deprive Sayyed and mystics of their robes and turn them into administrators.

Muhammad Tughlaq's government did what it could to help the people in their journey to Deogir, but they suffered great hardships and the Sultan soon after permitted them to return to Delhi, if they so desired. The majority of the survivors, however remained in their homes to cast off the yoke of the Sultan who had caused them so much trouble. Viewed as an administrative act, the measure was a failure; Deogir did not, and could not become the capital of India. But as a movement of emigration it succeeded beyond expectations. In one terrible sentence, Barni has summed up the result of Muhammad Tughlaq's measure. "All around Deogir the ancient land of infidelity, there spang up the graveyards, of the Mussalmans". What more could Muhammad Tughlaq have wished. These graveyards made Islam indigeneous in the Deccan. In the south as well as in the north, there were then plenty of forests to clear and plenty of food for those who were willing to work. In the neighbourhood of the ancestor's graveyards their descendents built their new homes. Even the mystics after their death were forced to co-operate with the Deccan policy of of the great Sultan: the tomb of saint became a cultural centre of his silsilah and contributed simultaneously to the expansion and the regeneration of Islam. So much at least is clear. Muhammad Tughlaq's ruthless but far-sighted measure started a movement of emigration from the north to the south which continued till the end of Aurangzeb's reign and supplied the Bahmani kingdom and the Sultanates of the Deccan with the life blood they needed.

Was Muhammad Tughlaq right in bringing the Deccan within the control of the Empire? It is easy to answer the question from the standpoint of a fanatical Hindu or Mussalman. But for the student who approaches history without any religious prepossessions the answer will depend upon whether the political, cultural and social contributions of Islam to India have been sufficient to make up for the loss of life and property it has entailed. "Surely, kings when they conquer a city", says the Queen of Sheba, "ruin it and degrade its noblest citizens, This is what they always do" (The Quran, Chap. XXVII, 3). Nothing but the gravest reasons can morally justify such a terrible disturbance of the organised society of a country. Muhammad Tughlaq, however, was more anxious for the purification of Islam than for its political expansion. A scholar of the school of Averroes and Alberuni his critical mind revolted against that conglomeration of

polytheistic practices and clerical inventions which was declared to be 'the Islam' but with which Allah and His Apostle had nothing to do. He hated the worship of dead saints and living pirs ; he protested against the vicious interpretations which later commentators had fastened to the sacred texts. The lives of the companions of the Prophet and the sayings of the Greek Philosophers were constantly in his mind. No Indian ruler has so ruthlessly tried to conform to the traditions of the second Caliph. So on the one hand, he warred with what in mystic terminology is known as Shirk-i-Khafi (subconscious idolatry) in every form. On the other hand, he made a clear distinction between the principles of Islam and the prosperity of the Mussalmans of India as a community. For the former he worked ceaselessly and restlessly throughout his life ; for the latter he did not care. The only *raison d'être* for the existence of a Mussalman was that he should sacrifice himself for his faith and the same was true of the community as a whole. It had no business to fatten and prosper by converting the revolutionary principles of the revolutionary Prophet into a job-hunting priest-worshipping creed which had no mission in the world but to supply more bread and butter to its votaries. Islam to Muhammad Tughlaq was a mission and a faith ; he did not, like our laterday politicians, interpret it as the articles of association for community trying to enter the service of the State. He loved his religion for the same reason as Plato loved philosophy—it was the grand principle of social justice. Fierce in his punishments as a judge and as a warrior, Muhammad bin Tughluq's worst enemies have not been able to accuse him of communal oppression or religious persecution. It was the Mussalmans who suffered most in his reign. For he insisted with the tongue and the sword' that they should live up to the creed.

Muhammad bin Tughlaq was the training and temperament a revolutionist out for a new heaven and new earth, the sworn enemy of caste domination and priesthood and every variety of vested interests. Stern in exacting obedience to his orders as the head of the state, he was humble and unassuming in private life. Few men have loved freedom and equality more. It was inevitable that the Sultan's principles should drive him to the greatest dilemma, of his life. Born in an age when the whole world was convinced that it could not live without its kings, he began by doubting and ending by disbelieving in

the moral basis of his own authority. Hereditary kingship was a pagan institution; there was no place for it in Islam. The only authority by which according to the democratic principles of Islam, one man could govern others was their *ijtima*-consensus, agreement or general will. Unable to find such an *ijtima* in India, Muhammad Tughlaq began to search for a Caliph who might be able to transmit to him some part of the undoubted moral authority of the Pious Caliphs. Barni's account makes it perfectly clear that Muhammad Tughlaq's contemporaries had not only forgotten the Caliph but were surprised at such a dignity being discovered by the Sultan's agents. The splendid receptions offered to the Caliph's ambassadors were not intended to win the applauses of the gallery, for the gallery was content to watch with a mocking smile. Muhammad Tughlaq was seeking to pacify the doubts in his own breast.

It is a curious evidence of Muhammad Tughlaq's revolutionary attitude, that instead of looking at the officers of the government as their patron and benefactor, he viewed them from the stand point of a hostile and persecuted member of the opposition. It was, of course the lower rungs of the official hierarchy that sinned most. The great arrogance and pride that little authority creates in little minds, speculation, bribery, oppression, the spirit of insubordination and the equally-base spirit of subservience—all these and many other sins of the bureaucracy were well known to the Sultan, who had himself climbed all the steps of the official ladder. It has been given to few—perhaps to none—to serve an irresponsible government in a subordinate capacity and yet retain the instincts and feelings of a gentleman. Muhammad Tughlaq, however, was not unaware of the strength of their *esprit de corps*. Hence his anxiety to turn mystics, who were the negation of that spirit, into administration. The plan failed and the Sultan saw that he could only crush their spirit by overwhelming force. It was a desperate and dangerous enterprise, but Sultan Muhammad's sense of justice left him no alternative. The worst sinner in his eyes were the *Sadah* amirs who had been established over the princes of Gujrat, Malwa, Deogir and Warangal. They were strangers to the population which they were expected to control by force; the opinion of their coreligionists which may, or may not, have operated as an effective check, was conspicuous by its absence and the

supervision of the provincial governors was mostly nominal. So left to their own devices, the petty officials, who had little starts of and who had little culture and no morals and were apparently drawn from the lowest strata of Indo-Muslim society proceeded to oppress the people whom the military strength of the empire had rendered helpless. Contemporary as well as later historians were too much influenced by class feeling to give us an accurate picture of these amirs. But it must have been a singularly atrocious catalogue of crimes that induced Sultan Muhammad Tughlaq to decide that nothing short of their wholesale slaughter would be a sufficient punishment for their misdeeds. The amirs of Malwa and Gujrat were brutally suppressed, but the Deccan officers proved too strong for him and after a protracted struggle succeeded in asserting their independence and the Daccan which Muhammad Tughlaq had with so much trouble brought within political and cultural influence of Islam, slipped out of his hands.

Muslim Renaissance In India

By Abdul Hamid

A revivalist movement was clearly noticeable in the world of Islam towards the middle of the 19th Century. Purely defensive in nature, its main object was to check the infiltration of Western ideas and influences and to arrest the growing decline of Muslim political power. The problem facing the leaders of the movement differed from country to country. So did the aims and characters of the leaders. Jamal-ud-Din Afghani was perhaps the only leader who viewed the Muslim world in its integrity. He travelled from country to country in pursuit of his mission and his impatient idealism brought him into conflict with those who disagreed with his aims and methods.

The movement for Muslim renaissance in India started with Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan and is generally known as the Aligarh movement. Its founder was the scion of an aristocratic family fallen on bad days. He took service in the judicial department of the East Indian Company at the age of 17 and served at Agra, Rohtak, Delhi and Bijor. He was serving at the last-named station when the War of 1857 broke out. The Muslims suffered heavily during this War and were subjected to ruthless suppression after it had ended. But this could not go on indefinitely. Some far-seeing British administrators realized that unrelenting repression of the Muslims would lead nowhere. It would be ultimately ruinous for the rulers themselves. But the results of this changed thinking accrued to the Muslim community only slowly.

Sir Sayyid was shaken at the plight of the Muslims after 1857. He had nearly resolved to leave the country for good. But he abandoned the idea on maturer reflection and decided to dedicate himself to the regeneration of his people. This decision gave him a purpose and sense of direction in life. He pleaded with his vanquished community to march with the times and to adjust itself with the changed environment created by foreign conquest.

His programme of reconstruction began with educational reform. His first object was to overcome Muslim hostility to Western learning.

The Muslims were passionately attached to their outdated system of education. They looked upon Western learning as injurious to their faith and kept away from it. In his attempt to break his community's isolation from Western thought and culture, he organized a translation society (known as the Scientific Society) which issued Urdu versions of some standard English works on subjects like agriculture, economics, history and science. But his educational outlook was radically changed by his visit to England in 1869. It was there that he conceived the idea of a residential school imparting formal education as well as helping to cultivate clean habits, better living and self-confidence in its pupils. The plan was speedily executed after his return to India. The school started working in 1875 under the name of M. A. O. College. Financed entirely by voluntary subscriptions, the College was the first symbol of Muslim renaissance in India. Religious instruction was a compulsory subject in its curriculum. Its rules required the employment of a small number of English teachers to help shape the institution on the lines of an English Public School. The College developed a rich social life in which games, debates and other extra-curricular activities figured prominently.

Some friends of the College came to resent the very sight of Englishmen working on the College staff. They believed that the English professors were politicians first and teachers afterwards. Sir Sayyid's later critics have repeated the charge and confidently attributed sordid political motives to English professors. Their special mission, it is asserted, was to teach the Muslims to be loyal to the British. The charge that the foreigners alone gave a pro-British turn to Muslim politics cannot be sustained even though it has been supported by a mass of plausible evidence. Some of the English professors proved to be an asset to the College. They included such renowned literary figures, as Mr. (later Sir) Walter Raleigh, Mr. (later Sir) Thomas Arnold and Theodore Morison. They gave their best to the College and its students.

The emphasis on games produced numerous sportsmen of merit and the critics came to look upon Aligarh as a nursery of gamesters. The fondness of Aligarh students for sports and the encouragement of games by College authorities, we are told, prevented the growth of a sound academic tradition. This is only partly true. The vitality of

Aligarh is not to be judged only in terms of its intellectual achievements. The College can be more appropriately described as a socializing force. It drew Muslim students from all parts of the sub-continent. Here they lived together, ate together and played together. Common living broke down the barriers of language and material circumstances. The Aligarh students regarded themselves as Muslims first and Indians afterwards. This common outlook fostered consciousness of a separate Muslim nationality that was to lead directly to Pakistan.

Sir Sayyid was fully aware of, and sympathized with, the deep-seated Muslim feeling against Western education which was generally accused of turning its recipients to atheism. The provision of Western education in the College was combined with religious instruction to counteract this danger. It was decided to produce a comprehensive syllabus of religious education under the guidance of the renowned theologians of the day. Maulavi Muhammad Qasim of Deoband refused to sit on this committee on the ground that its membership was open to shia divines. The unpopularity of his religious views was often made an arguments against the College and Sir Sayyid thought it fit to disassociate himself from the committee of religious instruction. All that gave a bad start to the subject of religious study at the College. Its content remained highly formal and teaching entirely lifeless. The generality of students did not take it very seriously. But while an Aligarh student was proud of being a Muslim, he remained quite ignorant of his faith. This defeated one of Sir Sayyid's objects. Aligarh could not give a lead to the Muslim world in the study of Islam.

There is a lot to criticise in Aligarh. But its great role is the advancement of education among Muslims of India will not be denied even by its worst critics. Muslim students who could not get admission to institutions of higher learning maintained out of public funds freely availed themselves of the hospitality of Aligarh. This should be clear from the fact that as late as 1925, 69% of the entire College going Muslim students in the sub-continent were studying in Aligarh. An extensive system of scholarships instituted by Sir Sayyid himself guaranteed the education of the indigent without branding them with inferiority.

Sir Sayyid Ahmad professed to have no politics and did not like

to be called a politician. A constitutionalist by temper, he condemned the racialism of the rulers, pleaded for equality before law for all classes of British subjects, emphasized the need for amicable relations between different religious communities, and preached loyalty to the government established by law. Apparently there is not much politics in all this. But the educational character of the Aligarh movement was soon changed by some extraneous influences. The first of these influences was the anti-Urdu campaign of some Hindu leaders of Benares started in 1867. The object of the Hindu attack was to dislodge the Urdu language from its established place as medium of instruction in schools and as the language of law courts in upper India. Sir Sayyid reacted immediately and took a decisive stand. He looked upon Urdu as a Muslim language and interpreted the Hindu attitude as an attack on Muslim culture. It was at this stage that Sir Sayyid was filled with despair about the future of Hindu-Muslim relations at the persistent Hindu belligerency on this front. He even spoke of Hindus and Muslims parting company 'for ever' without, perhaps, being clear about the implication of his own words. The Urdu-Hindi controversy that began in Sir Sayyid's day continued unabated till the partition. Aligarh leaders continued to defend the claims of Urdu as the *lingua franca* of India. Under their influence Urdu came to be regarded as the national language of the Indian Muslims.

The second factor that gave a political complexion to the Aligarh movement was the political creed of the Indian National Congress. The founder of the Indian National Congress was an eminent member of the Civil Service, A. O. Hume. Like many members of his service he was interested in India. Profound was his distress at the growing economic misery of the masses. He was convinced that a popular rebellion against British rule was not far off. The idea of organizing a forum for the discussion of the social and economic grievances of the people was meant to act as a safeguard against that eventuality. The graduates of Calcutta University, who assembled at his invitation in 1885, became the founding members of the Congress. English was the official language of this body and its members were full of the British Liberal Philosophy of the day. They demanded representative government for the country and claimed to speak even for those who did not share their ideas. However, the application of British Liberal ideas to the Indian society of 1885 was premature. A homogeneous society

is the first requisite of successful representative government. Social contrasts, religious differences and cultural disparities do not provide a congenial soil for the democratic experiment. Sir Sayyid understood all this clearly and expressed his views incisively. He argued that the factors making for the success of representative government in England were absent from India. Representative government of the Western pattern would be fatal to Muslim interests as it would inevitably lead to majority rule. Majority rule is dangerous in a country where majorities and minorities are separated by social and cultural barriers. The hostility of the Hindu majority towards the Muslim minority was based on historical reasons. The very memory of Muslim rule was irritating to the politically conscious sections of the Hindus. A majority conscious of its power and embittered against the minority is not likely to use its authority with wisdom or restraint. Majority rule will be indistinguishable from tyranny in the Indian situation.

The Congress demand for a competitive Civil Service examination in addition to the one held in London was also opposed by Sir Sayyid. His basic reason was the certainty of a simultaneous examination preventing the Muslims from obtaining their due share in the administration as educationally backward Muslim could not compete with the Hindus on terms of equality. He continued to advance other and less convincing reasons for this course: right type of administrator could not be discovered through bookish tests and that competitive examinations might well lead to the success of candidates of humble social origin who may prove to be poor administrators and their very presence in seats of authority would be resented by communities proud of their traditions.

Sir Sayyid's political ideas made a great impression on his community. Muslim aloofness from the Congress is largely attributable to his advice, though it was subsequently reinforced by experience. The political utterances of Sir Sayyid would make an interesting reading today. Some of his ideas are doubtless reactionary. But the second half of the 19th Century was far less democratic than the latter half of the 20th. We shall not understand the man if we disregard the circumstances of his times. Nor must we mistake the essence of his argument for the trappings in which it was presented. He emphasized and underlined the impossibility of the orderly working of Western

representative institutions in the midst of a culturally heterogeneous society. The Quad-i-Azam broadly followed Sir Sayyid's line of thought when he stated that Western democratic apparatus could not be imposed on a united India without disastrous consequences.

Sir Sayyid made a prolonged study of religion. By reason of his meagre knowledge of Arabic he was not qualified to theorize about this branch of knowledge. His judgments on questions of religion and theology proceeded more from political considerations than from an unbiased study of the subject itself. The relation between the Muslims and the British rulers had worsened irremediably after the War of 1857. The rulers have nothing but hostility and contempt for their restive Muslim subjects. The Muslims on their part cordially detested everything Western and were unreconciled to British rule. Sir Sayyid's problem was to improve their mutual relations. He tackled this at the religious level because the religious argument carries great weight in Muslim society. Some points that emerged from his religious studies were as follows: The Muslim and Christian faiths are very close to each other. They have a common background and follow a long line of Prophets mentioned in their respective scriptures. Islam does not forbid its followers from entering into social relations with the Christians. The doctrine of Jihad is the most misunderstood doctrine of Islam. The Muslims can only engage in Jihad in exceptional circumstances. The circumstances of British rule in India do not permit the Muslims to take up arms against their rulers. Islam teaches its followers to be faithful to those who bear rule over them.

The cynic, who brands it as political theology, is not wholly wrong. This use of religion to find support for politics of expediency is disastrous to both religion and politics. But there is another and a weightier side of Sir Sayyid's religious researches. He studied religion with an eye on the tremendous scientific advances of the 19th Century. Science was generally regarded as an ally of irreligion. He had initiated the movement for Western education among the Muslims, he said, and it was his responsibility to see that this education did not weaken the spiritual foundations of the Muslim society. His religious writings were meant to show that the findings of science did not contradict the tenets of religion. The task was delicate as well as bold. The idea may not have occurred to anybody before. Sir Sayyid committed

numerous errors of judgment. But the broad purposes of Quranic interpretation that he had set before himself (*i.e.*, to reconcile religion with science and to preserve the solidarity of the faithful) have been closely followed by subsequent commentators of the Holy Book. Much of Sir Sayyid's theology proved ephemeral. It made no impression even on his closest associates.

Sir Sayyid's efforts at a fresh understanding of religion were also meant to help the reform of Muslim society. Quite a few of the social practices current among the Muslims are said to be derived from religion. Many of these are outdated and even harmful. Sir Sayyid wrote numerous articles in his journal *Tahzib-ul-Akhlaq* to show that they had nothing to do with religion. Those articles can be read with profit today and they would show the weak spots of the society as located by Sir Sayyid. The vigour and freshness of Sir Sayyid's thought will not escape the reader and he may be astonished to discover that the problems of social reform among the Muslims are practically the same as when Sir Sayyid wrote his essays.

Sir Sayyid had a dynamic personality and a massive intellect. Few subjects lay beyond the range of his interests. He wrote on such diverse themes as history, archaeology, education, religion, politics and social reform. He even advocated the extended use of Homeopathic system of medicine.

Sir Sayyid had his admirers as well as detractors. Both were largely unjust to him as they tended to go to extremes in judging his work and achievements. By his critics he was misrepresented rather than misunderstood. But his admirers committed the error of claiming permanence for plans and ideas that Sir Sayyid had avowedly intended to be temporary.

With a genius all his own Sir Sayyid defined the essential problems of community and advanced practicable plans for solving them. He firmly grasped the relation between means and ends. He gave a new angle of vision to his community and in doing so he laid the foundations of the Muslim future in the sub-continent.

Nationalism and History*

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“Nationalism is a generic and comprehensive concept which refers to and describes that variable ensemble of physical and psychic element which generates the cultural homogeneity, group consciousness and solidarity forming the foundation of a nation”. The core of nationalism, therefore, is group consciousness ; the love of the community, great or small, to which we belong. This association is an instructive emotion, and it is the object of this paper to study its development through ages and to determine how best and effectively it can withhold the centrifugal tendencies in a developing country today. It is confessed at the very outset that the study is by no means exhaustive.

Nationalism, apparently is a derivation from Nation originally a Latin : Natio or Natus, meaning thereby birth, origin, or race. In its use the word Nation has been ambiguous for a long time. Its use by the political scientists in an extremely political sense has been very recent, such as the German Nation, the American Nation or the British Nation. But its cultural usage has not been altogether unknown or uncommon, which on the contrary, has been as wide spread as its political usage, e.g., the Arab Nation, the Jewish Nation, the Armenian Nation, etc. In the former case the meanings of nation had been political, in the sense of a state, in the latter, the term gives only a cultural sense because the Jewish and the Armenians did not possess a state for centuries.

Nation and Nationality, therefore, may be old terms, with different meaning but “nationalism is essentially a modern movement and in its shortest span of existence, as a dominant element of societal life and organisation, it has shown such a dynamic vitality and such an all pervading character that the mistake has frequently been made of regarding nationalism as permanent, or at least, very ancient factor in History”.

Nationalism, today, is a state of mind in which the supreme

*An extension lecture delivered in the Department.

loyalty of the individual is felt due to the Nation State. Although attachment to the native soil, to parental traditions and to established territorial authorities have been known throughout history, it was only at the end of the 18th century that nationalism became a generally recognised sentiment moulding public and private life and one of the great, if not the greatest, single determining factor in history.

In fact it rose as a dominant force in the 18th century in Western Europe and in North America. The American and the French Revolutions may be regarded as its first manifestation. It spread in early 19th century to Central Europe; towards the middle of the century to Eastern and South-Eastern Europe and towards the end of the nineteenth century or with the beginning of the 20th century it placed its stamp over Asia and Africa. Nationalism, thus, spread so rapidly in the last century throughout the world that it was branded as the "Age of Nationalism."

The popularity of the movement against the old political order is obvious, but the change-over in the Continent was not so simple as to qualify a claim crediting the victorious armies of Napolian, inspired by the Revolution in France, of having rooted in other European countries the germs of nationalism.

A man, ever since he organised himself socially, looked in common interest as an object of unity. Racial and religious discriminations gave birth to nationalism which later stressed the particular and parocial, the differences and the national individualities. Racial and religious distinctions gradually replaced territorial discriminations and emotions and sentiments were rationalized under the developing tendencies of human self-consciousness.

England faced the brunt of the changed political vision with the dawn of the seventeenth century. The scientific discoveries and commercial enterprises poisoned the allegiance to the feudal aristocracy, creating to build up a strong middle class with a consciousness that they were moulders of destiny at a great turning point from which new concepts of liberty would be born. The concepts of nationalism in England therefore, shared with itself the concepts of the English trading classes whose enthusiasm for liberty were based upon the individual,

his rights, and upon communities beyond all divisions. Locke, precisely, advocated the thought and the American and the French Revolutions merited him, in the subsequent years, a due recognition. Thomas Jaffarson and Paine in America came out as champions of American liberty and human rights. Rousseau prepared the soil for the growth of nationalism in France not only by his stress on popular sovereignty but also in his appreciation of considering a man—a common man—as a true depository of civilization and civil rights.

Thus the American War of Independence and the French Revolution became a typical product of the 18th century political thought. In France, however, the contribution of Herder was unparalleled because he defused Rousseau's thoughts in the masses by popularizing folklores, folksongs, and the primitive popular traditions as revealing the true creative forces of a nation. Nay, Herder, went a step still further. He challenged Rousseau's Universalism and advocated the peculiarities of each national tradition, regarding them as a valuable source of creative inspiration.

Europe—the whole of Europe—was indifferent to revolutionary changes in France, but she feared most the popular French slogan: Liberty, Equality and Fraternity. The Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen were not thought valid for the French alone but for all people indiscriminately. The slogan therefore, attracted people of all walks of life, inspiring them to self-consciousness and thus nationalism became a corner-stone of all liberal and democratic thoughts, causing disaffection in the ranks and files of other European countries. Nationalism in France boosted up the morale of the French troops under Napoleon not as much as it demoralised the troops of other countries which suffered at the hand of the French adventures.

Germany was considerably influenced by Herder, but the wave of nationalism reacted strongly against the French aggression and once again emotions and the instincts haunted the minds suspending all attempts at progress. The onus to reverse the process was on Bismark. He unified Germany on authoritarian bases, and challenged the influence of French liberalism. Even the achievements of Mazzini in the unification of Italy did not influence the Germans, although Spain and Russia 'caught cold.'

Russia was considered by German Romantic Thinkers as the last strong-hold and a future saviour of a West undermined by the heritage of the American and the French Revolutions. But she soon belied all hopes of anti-liberalism. "The momentum of nationalism increased in the first half of the 19th century and reduced to their sizes the supra-national states of Habsburg and the Ottoman Sultans." The first great War spread the movement in Asia and Africa, and created national heroes like Kamal Atta Turk, Saad Zaghlul, Ibn-i-Saud, Sun Yat Sen, Ghandhi and Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah.

Thus, nationalism, in its static or analytical sense, is conventionally used to create the modern political system based upon the units of national state. It is a collective sentiment of a people and their joint efforts to organise themselves politically on the basis of individual rights. Nationalism as such appears outdated immediately after the people emerges into a Nation. It is agreed that the struggle for the preservation and extension of group solidarity has been the basic factor and process in the evolution of man-kind and it remains inevitable that the psychic traits thus developed, may become grounded deep in the minds of a new Nation. Nevertheless the concepts of nationalism will be entirely changed.

What, then, is Nationalism of a free Nation? Is it the common interest, common origin, common language, common traditions, common aspirations, common economic interest, common territory, common religion and ideals, common humiliations, defeats and victories and common history, a nationalism, as suggested by Gilchrist (*Principles of Political Science*)? But, then, nations may have a common origin but speaking different languages. Other may have common economic interest but different religion and ideals. Apparently, nationalism varies from Nation to Nation and from people to people. To Turkey and Soviet Russia it may mean economic self-sufficiency; to pre-war (1939—45) Germany and Italy the growth of Nazi and Fascist Parties; to British, the English honour and prestige; to American, the fear of communism; and to India, the fancy of secularism under militant hostile communalism and neutralism with heavy sense of capitalism.

Nationalism of a free nation thus develops into an ideal individually and collectively. Ideals and emotions mark and indeed

constitutes the self-conscious stages of the growing nationalism. The quality of tenacity is grounded deep in the strong personal instincts of attachment out of which appreciation of affinity between the persons grows. The consciousness of unity emerges as a part of growing self-consciousness in the individual. It is on them that dawns the concepts of national-self whose interest more or less are identified with those of the individual self. This National-self thus appears as a double object of affection : it fosters self-love, as we love ourselves, and love for the community. Thus national sentiments grips human nature from two sides : on the one hand it develops personal pride, prestige, honour, and self-interest, on the other, it swings to higher level of individual Will, with disinterested affection, to self-devotion, and cheerful acceptance of social duties as the chief aim of individual life.

It is here that Nationalism appears to have entered the periphery of Patriotism, although there exist a very thin difference between the two. A person may be inspired by nationalism but he may or may not be a patriot. A man may love his motherland, his environment, his society but they do not have the consciousness of nationalism. Those who have the consciousness but do not find a will to develop it, may be called anti-patriots. Patriotism then, may precisely be defined, as consciousness of nationalism together with a will to realize its development still further. It is essentially an active force in human mind, whether it spends itself to the development of thought, action and deeds. Each man's individuality in this respect colours his character as patriot. All patriots are idealist, imaginative, sentimental and practical.

Let us think for a while, of Nationalism in Pakistan. Providence has divided our land into two zones separated from each other at a distance of more than a thousand miles. The division of land is significant because it has divided the society. Different languages, cultures, and traditions were ineffective in the growth of better understanding between the two wings, as they in fact are in various regions of the Western Wing, but for a long distance between the two. Regional interests, economic disparity, and Western domination over Eastern Wing were therefore questions posed by misunderstandings as well as a lack of any cohesive element which may have developed

as the symbol of unity between the people and become a greater source of integration between the two Wings. Islamic ideologies, besides common political and economic interests, had been the only factor demanding the consciousness for nationalism in this country with very little success, during the past. Islam is an ideal and by no means it enforces its ethics and morals upon its followers. Its acceptance is voluntary but subjecting the behaviour of the Muslims towards their own selves as well as towards the society under a strict control. Hence the dynamic evolution of Islam, for its early followers were sincere and devoted to the cause of the religion. Today it is just a shadow of its name, its past glory and achievements. If Islam could not and still cannot prevent its followers from accepting bribes, indulging in black-marketing, and smuggling, how can it become an ideological basis in the larger interests of the country? On the other hand, even the prostitution of Islam, which was a common feature during the past, may appeal if at all, the Muslims in Pakistan. But there is a substantial portion of the non-Muslim in the country, whose loyalties and consciousness for nationalism could not be doubted. Islam can become their ideal in practice, but in what manner can we attract them in the name of our religion, and our ideologies, is not understood.

Let us, therefore, give up exploitation of Islam, for political ends and make the best use of its teachings in reforming our own selves and the society at large. Let us attract people to Islam not by mere slogans but by moulding ourselves individually and collectively in accordance with the fundamentals in the Quran. Let us give up our artificial approach to life and adopt what has been branded as the simplicity of Islam. Let us develop self-reliance which develops self-resistance. Let us not call the people to unite in the name of Islam, but ask them to stand by us in the name of Pakistan—nay, in the name of the Quaid-i-Azam—a symbol of Unity, Faith, Discipline and Progress.