

Indo-U.S Strategic Relations: A Historical Analysis

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ABSTRACT

The history of Indo-U.S strategic relations is not very much old. The journey of Indo-U.S relations was started in a difficult way. Almost for fifty years both U.S and India remained estranged from each other. The end of Cold War brought enormous opportunities for both the countries and opened new vistas which finally shaped into what we call as Strategic Partnership. In contemporary era the strategic relations of both the nations got new momentum and U.S gave a unique status to India which is unprecedented in the American diplomatic history. In this article we would discuss the ups and downs in Indo-U.S strategic relations. We would critically analyze the growing Indo-U.S cooperation. We would also take a look of the history of the relations of both nations. We would address the question that how different global and regional developments had effected Indo-U.S relations and forced both states to change their ordinary relations into an advanced Strategic Partnership.

Key Words: **Indo-U.S, Strategic, Relations, South Asia, Historical, Cold War, Nuclear, Kargil, Post-Cold War, Pakistan, Clinton, 9/11, Bush**

Introduction

India and United States of America are two important states of our globe. Both states are comprised of almost 20 percent of the total world population. Both states have enormous role in world politics. Consequently, the relations among two have long term repercussions both at global and regional levels.

Right from its inception the relations among U.S and India were unable to flourish. Almost for fifty years (1940's-90's) both states had remained disenchanted from each other. The global and regional factors and mutual interests motivated both states to bridge the gaps and to move forward in international relations. The famous estrangement turned into engagement.

Today, the world has witnessed an advanced "Strategic Partnership" between India and United States of America. The foundation stone of this strategic partnership was laid during the era of President Clinton (1993-2001) and it was President Bush (2001-2009) who further provided new heights to Indo-U.S strategic cooperation. A deep study of Indo-U.S relations reveals that this strategic partnership will move forward in future.

The period from 1940 to 1991 proved as an unsuccessful era of India-U.S relations. During 1940's, the Indians desired a staunch support from Americans for their independence from Britishers. However, apart from Indian's concern, the U.S

administration was very much busy in global affairs and W.W 2. The Americans deliberately neglected the Indian independence movement. They were more loyal to British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, as compare to Indian's right of Independence. (Kux, 1993) As Gary Hess said, "the Indian independence movement placed U.S officials in a dilemma that challenged American idealism, political activism and diplomatic skill." (Hess, 1971) However, realpolitik has won. Rationality triumphed and American administration's attitude remained as pro-British rather than pro-independence. It is also historically proved that both U.S and India were different by genetics. Both Possessed diverge cultural and historical experiences. Both had different national behaviors. Consequently, Both Americans and Indians were formulated their defense and economic strategies according to their national behaviors. These dissimilarities overwhelmingly effected the grand strategies of the both states and the mindset of the policy makers. (Ashoke Kapur, 2002)

Indo-U.S Relations in Cold War Era

During the cold war era (1945-91), India was neglected by Americans due to their major foreign policy concerns about Soviet Russia and China. The division of world community on, ideological, political and military grounds was also proved as obstacle in promoting India-U.S relations in cold war era.

The Non Aligned Movement (NAM) was evidenced as a breakthrough in India-U.S relations. India, for the very first time, was able to get some importance in the eyes of American policy makers. Scholars termed it as a "missed partnership." (Mansingh, 1984) Norman D. Palmer has further explained this phenomenon as; it (Indo-U.S relations) went through many ups and downs. (Palmer, 1979)

The Indo-U.S relations were bloomed for a short period of time during crisis in Korean peninsula, in which India was able to get an opportunity to serve as a member of the United Nations Armistice Commission, but after a short period the relations of two states were negatively affected by Suez Canal crisis. India condemned the tripartite (Israel-French-British) offensive of occupying Suez Canal in 1956. In the same year, Soviet forces had crushed the revolution in Hungary. The Indian establishment took no interest to condemn this Soviet act. In result, the U.S administration retreat its opinion of Indian tilt towards Soviet Union. (Chait, 2006)

The first ever visit of India by any U.S president was happened in 1959. Finally, after almost a decade of Indian Independence, the U.S president, Dwight Eisenhower made the break through and paid a visit to India. After the flagship Indian visit of President Eisenhower, the Indo-U.S relations were started developing in a slow pace. Consequently, the American administration under President John F. Kennedy replied sympathetically to Indian appeals for military assistance in the Sino-Indian war of 1962. (Talbot, 2004)

During the 1965 and 1971 Indo-Pak wars, the U.S administration indicated her tilt towards India. In 1971 Indo-Pak war, the Nixon administration had announced to send its air craft carrier, the U.S.S Enterprise, in Indian ocean to pressurize India in favor of Pakistan. (Chait, 2006) But the battle was finished with the emergence of Bangladesh before the arrival of U.S aircraft carrier. It clearly depicted the American intention to support hegemonic designs of India in South Asian region.

In 1974, India has conducted its first nuclear test in Pokhran. India prescribed the right of self-defense and self-determination as the major reasons to develop its nuclear programme. The U.S leadership considered the test as harmful for the 'Atoms for Peace program' and called for a strict action against India. Consequently, under Glenn amendment of 1994, the U.S announced economic sanctions for India. As Secretary of State Henry Kissinger affirmed, "The Indian nuclear explosion...raises anew the specter of an era of plentiful nuclear weapons in which any local conflict risks exploding into a nuclear holocaust". (Foundation) The US Atomic Energy Commission also communicated his concerns to Indian Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) that the US-India 1963 agreement did not permit India to practice any technology or material provided by the US for a nuclear detonation. (Saha, 2021)

There was no considerable development among two states in the upcoming decades of 1970's and 80's. The major reason was American primary concerns of cold war and Vietnam crisis.

In 1979, the Soviet forces had invaded Afghanistan. This important event during Cold War era deeply impacted the Indo-US relations. The U.S administration gets involved with Pakistan to oust the Soviet forces from Afghanistan. The Pak-U.S security cooperation was going to new avenues. Ultimately, the Indian establishment considered this U.S move as serious threat to Indian security vis a vis national interest. The American hard core stance over Nuclear Non Proliferation also pinched Indian policy makers throughout this era.

During cold war, it is evident that both U.S and India had clear difference of opinion over world issues. The major differences were over strategic thought and economics. In Strategic affairs main differences were U.S world view of cold war and policy of containment, the U.S support to Pakistan and U.S policy of Nuclear Non Proliferation.

In the field of economics both states had divergent views. The U.S market economy is based on free trade. While for Indians the policy of free economy meant inequality and exploitation and they considered this policy as unfit for a developing economy.

The prospects for a productive Indo-U.S liaison were started to develop in the late 1980s and resulted in some major improvements in late 1990s. In the years of 1989 to 1991, there were some considerable developments in global politics and South Asian region. In 1989, the cold war was ended. The end of cold war removed the chief differences in the Indo-U.S relationship. In the same year of

1989, the Soviet forces retreated from Afghanistan. In 1990, hike in oil prices, due to the Gulf Crisis, was observed. The government in India was changed in 1991 and the new government under, P. V. Narasimha Rao, decided to restructure Indian economy by transforming it into more open and market friendly. The year 1991 also brought the disintegration of USSR. (Adhikari, 2005)

These developments provided new basis to Indo-U.S relations. Some of these modifications were the major shifts in global history while others were the regional implications of these events.

Indo-U.S Relations in Post-Cold War Era

The end of cold war provided a vast ground to Indian and U.S strategists where they can play more openly. After the end of cold war phenomena, the menace of USSR communist Ideology would no more worry the U.S policy makers (Maynes, 1990) End of the cold war unrestricted the two states from the limitations of their historical inclinations. An optimistic transformation has been observed in the relationship among both states in this era. Both India and U.S were ready to initiate a strategic dialogue and put effort for an enhanced liaison. Though, the proliferation of nuclear weapons and international arms reduction continued as a question among the two nations. (Mishra B. , 2005)

The demise of Russian empire provides an irrelevancy to the theory of Non-Alignment which remained a salient feature of Indian foreign policy for almost three decades. This global strategic development and emergence of a new world order inclined Indian policy makers to reevaluate their global strategy and to address the question of how to safeguard Indian interests in this new emerging situation.

During the two years of 1989-91 drastic developments were made in Indo-US relations. This radical change among relationship of both states was more qualitative than quantitative. However, this qualitative change still required years to come visible. Meanwhile, the trade and economic relations were gradually nurtured. However, China-U.S trade was still much higher than U.S-India mutual trade. Indo-U.S trade has to go through a long journey to surpass the volume of China-US mutual trade. At that time the foreign direct investment of U.S in China was four times greater than American FDI in India.

Provided the two states past of shared rancor, mistrust, and irritability, the defense assistance was dramatic and a transformation in American policy. The ground of this obliging initiative was placed during President Clinton's era, than U.S secretary of defense had contracted "Agreed minute on defense Relations" with Indian defense minister, Shankarrao Bhavrao Chavan, in January 1995. (Ganguly, 2003) There was a clear shift in U.S policy towards India. However President Clinton's resolve with nuclear nonproliferation regime hamstrung any substantial growth in military to military collaboration and transfer of dual use technology to India. (Gaan, 2007)

The year 1995-96 was proved as a setback to Indo-US foreign relations. The unlimited extension of Non-Proliferation Treaty (N.P.T) in Geneva Talks in 1995 and hard core American stance in Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) debate echoed the past disagreement among two states. The crisis among two countries was worsened when both states were not ready to change their stances on Nuclear-Non Proliferation. The U.S argued for a pacific as well as safe future of humanity through a perfectly adopted policy of non-proliferation. India considered both NPT and CTBT as India centric, that is, an effort to restrained India from the acquisition of nuclear-power status, which is enjoyed by five global powers. (Paul, 1998)

The U.S administration had failed to realize Indian establishment about the consequences of Nuclear Proliferation for the global peace and peace of South Asian region. Ultimately this idealistic approach of U.S was not matched with Indian national security agenda. India has long term hegemonic tendencies in South Asian region and aspirations to become a major power. The acquisition of these aspirations was not possible without attainment of the status of legal nuclear power.

Finally, India selected to work out for its nuclear choice to meet its evil agenda under the covert banner of so called “security issues and threats”.

1998’s Nuclear Tests

Aspired by its hegemonic tendencies and covert global and regional designs the Indian establishment had decided to conduct nuclear tests in May, 1998. This antagonistic Indian step was condemned by both U.S and world community. For U.S policy makers it was a shock. Because in 1990’s the issue of N.N.P was on top of U.S global agenda. They considered this Indian act as a negative gesture for Indo-U.S relations.

The U.S administration was annoyed from this Indian step. This U.S displeasure was clearly exhibited in statement of President Clinton, which he gave to international media right after Indian nuclear test, on May 12, 1998. He said,

“I want to make it very, very clear that I am deeply disturbed by the nuclear tests which India has conducted, and I do not believe it contributes to building a safer 21st century. This action by India not only threatens the stability of the region, it directly challenges the firm international consensus to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. I call on India to announce that it will conduct no further tests and that it will sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty now and without conditions. Our laws have very stringent provisions, signed into law by me in 1994, in response to nuclear tests by non-nuclear weapons states. And I intend to implement them fully.” (Clinton, 1998)

This American reaction was transformed into action and U.S announced strict sanctions on two states of India and Pakistan. The Indian reaction towards economic sanctions under Glenn amendment was mild. Finally, Indian leadership showed his intent to start a dialogue with Americans. The American reaction was positive. Consequently, the talks were started on June, 12, 1998, among the U.S secretary of state Strobe Talbot and Indian foreign minister Jaswant Singh. There were eight meetings held between Strobe Talbot and Jaswant Singh during June, 1998 to Feb, 1999. This type of urgency was not evident throughout the U.S diplomatic history. The strategists all over the world regarded it as an unprecedented event in Indo-U.S relations and declared it a tectonic change in American strategy towards India. As Strobe Talbot has pointed out in his book, "Engaging India Diplomacy, Democracy, and the Bomb", that how this series of dialogue, with his Indian counterpart, had shown a clear future path to both U.S and Indian leadership. (Talbot, 2004)

Kargil Issue

In summer of 1999, the Kargil dispute was took place between military forces of India and Pakistan. Like past, India looked towards U.S to interfere into the conflict and mediate between Indian and Pakistani forces. The Clinton administration rushed to help India and pressurize Pakistan to end the conflict. Pakistan's political administration, under the pressure of U.S, decided to vacate the Kargil site. This situation was proved as favorable for Indians. The Indians are really satisfied and happy from this pro-Indian U.S move. This U.S move also provided a green signal to Indian strategists that U.S administration is ready to give India a new prioritize role in its foreign policy agenda.

Strobe Talbot described it in his book in detail by commenting that these American favorable steps provided ground for construction of a new level of political confidence between New Delhi and Washington. This pro-Indian endeavor of U.S was considered by Talbot as a biggest diplomatic achievement of India in that era. (Talbot, 2004)

New warmth in Indo-U.S relationship emerged after the Kargil war in the last days of President Clinton's term. Narottam Gaan discussed the reason for this new warmth between India and Pakistan in his book. According to him, when the military confrontation between Indian and Pakistani forces had started in the Kargil district of disputed territory of Kashmir, Americans discouraged Pakistani political elites for further military adventure and pressurized to leave the Kargil area. By that way Americans played a pivotal role in brokering a cease fire agreement between India and Pakistan, warmness in their relations with India emerged. (Gaan, 2007)

President Clinton's Visit

As we discussed earlier, that there was no considerable development between U.S and India throughout the cold war period. It was twenty two years ago when last American President, Jimmy Carter, had visited India in 1978. Since then no other president of U.S come to tour India. It was President Clinton who made breakthrough and visited India in year 2000. This five day long India visit of President Clinton in March, 2000 proved as historic in Indo-U.S relations. During his five day visit President Clinton met not only political leadership of India but also interacted with Indian public. Many of "the agreements signed during his visit to India did prove that the relationship between the two countries was shaping up positively." (Embassy, 2000) It is worth able to mention here that this Indian visit of President Clinton had provided new basis to Indo-U.S relations. President Clinton was remained successful to get attracted both the Indian leadership and public. The Indian political elite and public sentiment was impressed from President Clinton's India vision.

After his remarkable Indian tour, President Clinton had also paid a visit to Pakistan. A very next neighbor and traditional rival of India. This Pakistan tour of President Clinton was again labeled as 'historic'. It was shortest visit of any U.S president to Pakistan. Mr. Clinton stayed in Islamabad just for five hours. Once more, Indian establishment got impressed from this neglecting attitude of Americans towards Pakistan.

Overall, the India visit of President Clinton was considered as good will gesture for future enhancement of Indo-U.S relations. This visit had laid down the foundation stone of a new enhanced Indo-U.S partnership. However, some analysts revealed their reservations about this India centric approach of U.S leadership. If we examine U.S attitude towards India in this era from realist's perspective. It makes us clear that Clinton administration followed a two pronged strategy towards India. On one hand U.S offered India mutual cooperation in trade and on the other try to offend India by Nuclear Non-Proliferation regime. (Talbot, 2004)

The joint statement of President Clinton and Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, which was issued by both leaders, was focused on issues such as Nuclear Non-Proliferation, spread of WMD, global security, economic cooperation, eradication of human suffering, disease and poverty in India, sharing of Knowledge, clean energy, health, and education, and people to people contact. President Clinton also invited Prime Minister Vajpayee to visit America. The joint statement of both the leaders was ended by the words

"For India and the United States, this is a day of new beginnings. We have before us for the first time in 50 years the possibility to realize the full potential of our relationship. We will work to seize that chance, for

our benefit and all those with whom we share this increasingly interdependent world.” (Vajpayee, 2000)

This historic visit of President Clinton had signaled the world that a new Strategic partnership between India and U.S is going to start. The foundation stone of this strategic partnership was laid by President Clinton. But it was President Bush (2001 -2009) who actually built an empire of Indo-U.S strategic partnership on this foundation.

Indo-US Relations in Post 9/11

American crusade against terrorism after the incident of 9/11 was immediately supported by India. (Gaan, 2007) As Indo-US mutual affairs were in the low ebb, the South Asian region was deeply impacted by attacks on Pentagon and World Trade Center. The newly emerged circumstances provided Pakistan a central place in U.S global strategy and placed fragments of Indo-US cooperation on stand still position. (Schaffe) Suspicions were aroused in Indian public opinion on the prospects of India-America cooperation grounded on the feelings that the post 9/11 changes had flounced away all past efforts and struggles to streamline the relations. (Mishra B. , 2005) The policy of President Bush, in this era, was to “balance its new emphasis on terrorism with standing priorities such as the global economy and democracy.” (Lafranchi, 2001)

Some political scholars in the America assumed that this common objective had generated a critical condition for American strategists to chalk out equilibrium between India, its newly emerged strategic partner, and the obligatory Pakistan. However, U. S leadership tried not to spoil relations with India, the United States adopted pragmatic approach on its South Asia policy by dealing freely with both India and Pakistan for the sake of harmonizing its national interests.

Consequently, The U.S administration had decided to remove sanctions against both India and Pakistan. As far as concerned to U.S policy for India, defense related assistance remained continue. The Bush administration in its “The U.S Security Strategy and Policy (2002)” recognized India as a future global power. Although India criticized the Pak-US cooperation in the war against terrorism, it did not allow this matter turn as an irritant in their newly emerged strategic bond.

According to American envoy in India, Robert D. Blackwill, the U.S global war against terrorism had, “transformed Indo-US ties.” (The Daily Times of India, 2001) This transformation strengthened the process of Indo-U.S political discourse and boosted cooperation on complex matters to a greater level. An unlimited chain of formal government level negotiations was started in areas of defense, foreign affairs, military and intelligence sharing among the two states. This extra passionate Indo-U.S collaboration and cooperation reverberated in the Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s address to American Senate on October 25, 2001, in which he portrayed the two states as “natural allies”.

Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) 2004

In the era of President George W. Bush the Indo-U.S relations got new momentum. The strategic bond between both nations becomes stronger and stronger. The U.S resolve, to boost India as an important actor of global politics in its Security Strategy and Policy 2002, was practically observed in Indo-U.S series of strategic dialogues in 2003. In result of these strategic dialogues both nations considered each other as future global strategic partners.

To provide strong long term foundations to this new born strategic partnership President Bush along with Indian premier Vajpayee announced the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) in January, 2004. (Ereli, 2004) In NSSP document both states resolved to fundamentally cooperate in four basic arenas. These four areas of cooperation were civil nuclear technology, civil Space programs, missile defense and sharing of high technology to India. NSSP was considered by analysts as a revolutionary step in U.S's India strategy and a turn in U.S policy towards India with a go ahead signal for long term Indo-U.S strategic partnership. (Gaan, 2007)

The change of government in India has not hindered the momentum on this initiative of NSSP. In 2004, Manmohan Singh was became Indian Prime Minister. He had visited U.S in September, 2004. He met with President Bush on September 21, 2004. Both leaders restate their aspirations to form an advanced and equally advantageous Indo-U.S partnership. The joint statement issued by two leaders was...

“The United States and India announced today major progress in the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) initiative. Implementation of the NSSP will lead to significant economic benefits for both countries and improve regional and global security. In January 2004, the United States and India agreed to expand cooperation in three specific areas: civilian nuclear activities, civilian space programs, and high-technology trade. In addition, the two countries agreed to expand our dialogue on missile defense....”
(Ereli, 2004)

Indo-US Nuclear Cooperation

The Indo-U.S peaceful nuclear cooperation starts in 1950's under President Eisenhower's 'Atoms for Peace' program. (Eisenhower, 1953) Not with standing with the genuine purpose of the 'Atom for Peace', this nuclear strategy of President Eisenhower accelerate the global dissemination of scientific and industrial nuclear technology, while particular beneficiary states e.g. Israel and

India diverted U.S peaceful nuclear cooperation for covert purposes.” (Weiss, 2003)

The India and U.S were signed a nuclear cooperation pact in 1963. Under 1963 agreement, U.S provided India two reactors of light water at Tara pure, supplied nuclear fuel for once and offered research activities to Indian scientists in American atomic research centers.

India conducted her first nuclear test in 1974. The 1974 test resulted into American Congress’s announcement to ban anymore atomic assistance to India. (Legislation) In result, this assistance was stopped in 1980, on Indian denial to keep its all atomic installations under the observations of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). (Niazi, 2005)

It was President George W. Bush who had offered India a civil nuclear deal. In 2005, during American visit of Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, the talks on nuclear cooperation between U.S and India were started. It was President Bush who provided new vistas to Indo-U.S strategic partnership and accelerated unprecedented Indo-U.S ties. President Bush during his Indian visit, in 2006, had announced the famous Indo-U.S nuclear deal or 123 agreement. As Fareed Zakria pointed out, Adoption of the Indo-U.S civil nuclear agreement in the Indian visit of President Bush in March 2006 initiated a transformed era in the Indo-U.S relations, indicative to the previous Sino-U.S cooperation initiative in 1973 by Nixon administration. (Zakria, 2006)

In the history of nuclear proliferation Indo-U.S nuclear deal was a unique event. The American leadership had offered nuclear cooperation to a state that is not only non-signatory of NPT but also a big critic of this treaty. According to U.S constitution, America is not allowed to share nuclear technology to a state that is non-signatory of NPT. India, deliberately, not ratified NPT and also had a history to violate the rules and regulations of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). President Bush neglected all these realities and started negotiations on nuclear cooperation with India. With the announcement of this deal a new chapter in Indo-U.S strategic relations was opened.

To prove her seriousness in his ‘India centric policy’ the Bush administration started amendment in American constitution. On the eve of signing ceremony on this historical legislation bill President Bush addressed the nation.

“Today, I have the honor of signing a bill that will strengthen the partnership between the world's two largest democracies. The relationship between the United States and India has never been more vital...and this bill will help us meet the energy and security challenges of the 21st century.” (W.Bush, 2006)

After ratification from Congress and House of Representatives, the Bush administration has provided final shape to the deal in October, 2008. The deal was

remained under critic both at global and domestic level. This deal was proved as a disastrous blow to nuclear non-proliferation regime. It not only harms global NNP efforts but also opened a door for future spread of WMD's technology. The balance of power in South Asian region was also at stake due to this deal.

Indo-U.S Relations in Recent Times

The tale of Indo-U.S relations is not ended here. The coming leadership in U.S indicated their willingness to enhance it. In 2009, Barak Obama was the new U.S president. President Obama also followed India centric policy which was started by his predecessors. In this era, the Indo-U.S. mutual cooperation had settled into a comprehensive strategic partnership, constructed on growing conjunction of benefits on bilateral, regional and global issues. The State visit of Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh to Washington D.C. from 22-26 November, 2009 as the first state guest of President Barack Obama reiterated the Indo-U.S strategic partnership. President Obama's visit to India from 6-9 November 2010, reported the advance drive in mutual assistance and facilitated launching of a future based agenda for Indo-US growing relations. The American President categorized Indo-U.S. liaison as one of the significant courtships of the new era. In Obama's India visit of November 2010, the two regimes declared accomplishment of all procedures to start operation of the civil nuclear agreement." (Affairs) Furthermore, the foreign secretary level dialogues were remained continue in Obama's era. The main areas of these negotiations were cooperation in nuclear, space and missile defense technology. The other concerns of mutual relations were in the arena of education, clean drinking water, information technology and enhancement in people to people contact.

In 2017, Donald J. Trump was seated as President of America in white house. Trump also declared India as an important strategic partner of U.S. During U.S visit of Prime Minister of Pakistan Imran Khan, in 2019, President Trump offered his mediation on Kashmir dispute to India and Pakistan. India, who was already in a troubled situation due to Indian spy kalboshan jadhav's arrest by Pakistan, new wave of Independence movement in Kashmir and the capturing of Wing Commander Abhinandan Varthaman by Pakistani security forces, refused the mediation offer from Trump. From 24 to 26 February, President Trump paid a two days visit to India. During his visit he again offered Indian leadership to mediate on Kashmir dispute between Pakistan and India. During his stay in India President Trump further enhanced the already buildup strategic partnership by offering a 3 billion dollar defense deal to India. (Liptak, 2020)

In 2021's U.S presidential elections, the Democrats nominated an Indian American lady, Kamala Devi Harris, as candidate for Vice President of America. Kamala Harris has won the election. This may provide more suitable circumstances for promoting India-U.S relations.

Conclusion

According to Barjesh Mishra, India and United States have come out of the box of “neither enemies nor friends” status and “freed themselves of the limiting confines of Cold War ideologies.” (Mishra B. , 2003) Indian official and unofficial diplomacy and strategies successfully conveyed to the American policy makers that a nation of its size, population, economy and market potential, human resource, and its geo-political relevance could be of substantial significance to the United States in accomplishing its global agenda.

The most important achievement for India over the last decade was to convince the United States that India has more to offer to the world if perceived as a power beyond South Asia. There has been a priority shift in the US foreign policy objectives towards India, from nuclear non-proliferation to trade and commerce, energy security, promoting democracy, etc. However, the Indo-U.S relations are still evolving and waiting for a conclusive nature. (Mishra B. , 2003) But there is another aspect of the picture, as international relations are based upon acquisition of national interests. Both U.S and India need to realize and address the question that how both states use each other to acquire their national goals. Especially, U.S is famous for using states like a tissue paper. Is India ready to face itself in the shape of a used tissue paper? The internal situation of India is miserable. Its covert agenda is now very much open to its neighbor states. In these conditions India must take care of its land and people instead to make trouble in the region by inviting and aligning with Americans. This may trigger a new race of balancing and counter balancing in South Asian region. India must change its basic philosophy and hegemonic designs against its neighborhood. As Prof. Dr. Jahangeer Tamimi pointed out...

“India may eagerly wish to be an international and regional power. Her inner picture is miserably poor. Indians are unable to mend their internal condition but they desired to fly high in the sky. They are sympathetically advised to look at your skirt and joints for your tattered tunic.” (Tamimi, 2008)

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