

Revisiting the Mumbai Mayhem ‘26/11’ and India-Pakistan Response

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ABSTRACT

Mumbai attacks ‘26/11’ emerged as the ‘9/11’ of India in South Asia. The terror of Mumbai attacks still echoes between India-Pakistan relations. The mayhem laid a deep-rooted impact on the future prospects of both states. ‘26/11’ proved the failures at the end of both states, India’s security and intelligence system failed to prevent the assault, while Pakistan failed to curtail radicalized-groups. The terror attack also led the global community into chaos and fear of war-escalation between both arch rivals. However, the study is based on detailed newspapers follow-up, and in depth investigation of the incident and its impact on the India-Pakistan relations. The paper gives a detailed overview of 26/11, India-Pakistan relations and its global response and the mistrust between both states. The paper also examines the fault lines on both states’ end and their reaction towards the security concerns in the region and lack of confidence building measures and crises management.

Key words: Mumbai attacks, 26/11, Pakistan, India, Relations, Terrorism, Security and Global Response

Introduction

On November 26, 2008 a series of attacks occurred on seven different places in south Mumbai, which began around 10:30 pm, killing 173 people and left 350 injured. The city within hours crammed with fear and writhed with pain, the routes were deserted and the residents were prohibited from coming out fearing more attacks. The Maharashtra state police chief A.N. Roy said “unknown terrorists have opened fire in at least seven to eight places across the city. They include two five-star hotels ‘the Taj Palace and Oberoi-Trident’ the main railway popular with tourists” (AFP Report, 2008, November 28). In the beginning the terrorists were with unknown identity, the carnage witnesses claimed that the attackers were quite young aging less than twenty-five years. Initially it was announced that they were twenty-five in numbers, but later it was discovered they were only ten terrorists. “Police were clueless about the number of terrorists, their identity or their background. The surprise attack took the city of 15 million by surprise, with gunshots being heard in the tourist of Colaba around 10 PM” (Kumar, 2008, November 27).

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However, the Indian agencies linked the terror attack to Pakistan, according to an Indian Navy spokesman; around twenty-four terrorists had been landed in Mumbai through a merchant vessel ‘the MV Alpha from Karachi’. The police added its stance that the suspects reached to the Gate of India through the rubber boats. Later, the investigation revealed, “after landing at a fishing colony near Colaba, they are believed to have split up into groups of three and four, and headed for pre-determined destinations in south Mumbai” (Kumar, 2008, November 29). Two terrorists attacked at Mumbai’s main railway station the ‘Chatrapati Shivaji Terminus’; they killed 58 innocent communal passengers and wounded 104 until the police confronted them. “Gunmen opened fire from AK-47 rifles at the city’s busiest railway terminal, CST, killing near twenty people” (Kumar, 2008, November 28).

The terrorists entered a children hospital as well and opened the fire on patients and escaped by hijacking a police vehicle. Later, the terrorists were intercepted with the Mumbai police, one terrorist was killed and the other, Amir Ajmal Kasab, was wounded and captured, “If it had not been for Tukaram Omble, that humble policeman who caught the terrorists Ajmal Kasab alive, taking a shower of bullets from his AK 56 into his body, we would have been absolutely clueless about even the identity of attackers as we still are about other pertinent” (Teltumbde, 2009: 2). The other attackers occupied the Nariman House a Jewish commercial-residential, a study centre and also serves as a synagogue run by the Chabad Lubavich. The Jewish rabbi and his family have been taken as hostage. The Jewish rabbi and his wife were killed including six other individuals, it was reported that some of the casualties observed with physical torture marks as well.

The other terrorists moved to the Trident-Oberoi hotel where they continued the killing spree for nearly 42 hours. Before the security forces killed terrorists, they had killed 35 persons and foreigners. The fourth ‘four-man’ group headed, towards the Taj Mahal Palace hotel. The terrorists briefly entered the Leopold Café, a spot popular with foreigners, targeting its customers with modern guns, killing 10 people. “The siege, at the Taj hotel, ended 60 hours later when the last of the four terrorists was killed by the National Security Guard (NSG). Here they killed 36 guests including nine foreigners” (Jannepally, 2010: 14). The Indian police recovered eight kg of deadly RDX from vicinity of Taj Hotel. “The Taj Mahal Hotel and another luxury hotel that had been commandeered, ‘the Oberoi Trident’ new narrative went, had been seeded with lethal RDX bombs. These had providentially been detected and defused just in time” (Muralidharan, 2008: 17). The attackers were also seeking foreigner’s passports from the hostages. Both hotels were under attack by AK-47 rifles, and the upper floors of both hotels were set on flames through the used hand-grenades.

On November 28, 2008 one of the attackers has contacted an Indian TV channel and affirmed that they belong to an Indian Islamic group seeking an end to the persecution of the Indian Muslims and the cruelty towards the Kashmiris. The terrorist who called the Indian television named Imran asked the government that “are you aware how many people have been killed in Kashmir? Are you aware

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how your army has killed Muslims? Are you aware how many of them have been killed in Kashmir this week?" (Kumar, 2008, November 28). However, "after the Mumbai police failed to tackle the terrorists, they summoned Marine commandos and later the NCG commandos" (Kumar, 2008, November 30). The Commandos of the National Security Guard (NSG), who are India's elite anti-terrorism force, were engaged in battle with the terrorists until Saturday morning November 30, 2008.

On November 29, 2008 they recovered several dead bodies from the Oberoi Trident and the Jewish Centre and declared that over 350 have suffered with injuries. Taj Mahal Hotel was still under threat by two militants who were posing continues resistance. According to the NSG the assailants, "appeared to have earlier conducted extensive survey of the two hotels and knew the key locations, including the CCTV rooms. They were also well versed in handling sophisticated arms" (Kumar, 2008, December 1). Other sources added, "the assault was meticulously planned and executed only after the completion of long and arduous training with thorough preparation and briefing. The primary intention of the terrorists was to create unprecedented raw fear and panic in the minds of the Indian citizenry and foreign visitors to Indian soil" (The Mumbai Bombings Over the Past Years).

On November 30, 2008 it has been announced that the commandos of the elite (NSG) managed to take over the Taj Mahal Hotel on Saturday morning eliminating all the assailants. The Indian authorities claimed that Ajmal Amir Kasab, 21-year-old Pakistani national, had provided all the details of the terrorists' plot. The authorities also claimed under the preliminary investigations that the assailants came by the Arabian Sea route from Karachi on the Pakistani cargo vessel Al-Husaini. On November 23, 2008 they hijacked an Indian fishing trawler, the M V Kuber, within Indian waters. "Then, they murdered four sailors leaving the captain alive, and proceeded to Mumbai. On nearing the Mumbai shore, they killed the captain. On reaching the shore, heavily-armed terrorists divided into four teams, one with four men and three with two men each" (Jannepally, 2010: 11).

Foreign targets

The Mumbai attacks commanded attention from the whole world for the military precision, meticulous planning, use of ultra-modern electronic equipment, sophisticated weaponry, and ability to hold hostages for 60 long hours. The incident has been distinguished due to the targeted elites and foreigners. India has informed on November 29, 2008, that seventeen foreigners have been killed in the deadly attacks. According to Anand Kumar:

- At least three US citizens, including a Brooklyn rabbi, were killed in the attacks and the state department said more Americans were at risk.
- The Virginia-based Synchronicity Foundation said on its website that Alan Scherr and his 13-year-old daughter Naomi, who were in India as part of a mediation programme, had died in the attack.

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- The New York office of the Chabad-Lubavitch Jewish group said that Rabbi Caverial and his wife Rivka had been killed in the attack.
- In Paris, French Foreign Minister Kouchner said in a statement that two French nationals had died.
- The Singapore Foreign Ministry said Lo Hoei Yen, 28 was killed after she was taken hostage in the Oberoi-Trident hotel.
- A British businessperson Andreas Liveras, 73 years old had been killed (Kumar, 2008, November 29).

On November 29, The News [Pakistan] reported that at least 13 foreigners including three Germans, two Americans, one Australian, one Britain, one Canadian, two French, an Italian, a Japanese and a Singaporean national, were among the dead. While Daily Times [Pakistan] reported with the same statement except with change of number of deceased foreigners, were 14 (Daily Time Report, 2008, November 29). The Economic Times (India) reported about “30 foreigners were killed in the attack, which saw heavily-armed extremists attack a string of high-profile targets including the city’s main railway station, a popular restaurant, a Jewish cultural centre and two luxury hotels” (Mumbai Attacks Death Toll Revised Down to 172, 2008, November 30). CBC News reported that Maharashtra state government spokesperson Bhushan Gagrani said the dead persons include 26 foreign nationals (‘Final’ count puts death toll at 171 in Mumbai attacks, 2008, December 3).

Development between India-Pakistan (post ‘26/11’)

The then Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in his address to the nation, on November 27, 2008, stated, “the well-planned and well-orchestrated attacks, probably with external linkages, were intended to create a sense of terror by choosing high-profile targets”. He said that New Delhi would “take up strongly the use of neighbor’s territory to launch attacks on India” (India Sees ‘External Link’ as Troops Battle Militants, 2008). India blamed the *Lashkar-e-Taiba* (LeT) for their involvement in the deadly attack on Mumbai and asked the Pakistani civilian-government to crash down the terrorist activities that are emanating from Pakistan. India claimed that “Maharashtra police investigators say they have evidence that operatives of the Pakistan-based *Lashkar-e-Taiba* carried out the *fidayeen*-squad attacks in Mumbai—a charge which, if proven, could have far-reaching consequences for India-Pakistan relations. Police sources said that an injured terrorist captured during the fighting at the Taj Mahal Hotel was tentatively identified as Ajmal Amir Kasab, a resident of Faridkot, near Multan, in Pakistan’s Punjab province” (Swami, 2008, November 2).

On November 28, 2008, the then president Asif Ali Zardari and the Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gillani have sent messages that condemned the terrorists’ attack on the Indian soil. They also stressed on the need of mutual cooperation to curb terrorism. President of Pakistan said on November 28, 2008 that “militancy and extremism in all its forms and manifestations had to be eliminated and all

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countries needed to cooperate with each other in this regard. Premier Gillani also shared his condolence on the human loss and grievance on the pain through which the city passed. He emphasized on the concerted efforts to make the region peaceful. The foreign minister of Pakistan Shah Mahmood Qureshi was in New Delhi before the attack. He shared his grief with his counterparts and expressed the attack as a 'horrendous tragedy'.

On November 29, 2008 the Indian external affairs minister Pranab Mukherjee has taken a step forward in accusing Pakistan's links in the Mumbai carnage. It was conceived as the first formal direct attack on Pakistan, although the social media had already accused Islamabad for their involvement in the attack. The Indian authorities requested to send the ISI chief Lt-Gen. Ahmed Shuja Pasha for help in Mumbai prob. The Pakistani authorities replied, "since we have nothing to hide, we thought there was no harm in calling the Indian bluff by agreeing to the request to send the ISI chief to Delhi" (Raza, 2008, November 29). The prime minister Gillani formally accepted the offer to send the ISI chief. Later, it was announced that a representative of ISI would go to India instead of director-general of the agency (APP, 2008, November 29).

On November 30, 2008, the president of Pakistan Asif Ali Zardari confirmed and clarified Pakistan's stance in an interview, which was given to an Indian channel assuring Pakistan's full support and help. He said, "as the president of Pakistan let me assure you that if any evidence is found, I will take action against those involved... without hesitation, no matter where it will lead to", [he told the Indian journalist Karan Thapar on the interview] (Abbas, 2008, November 30). Mahmood Qureshi also emphasized on settling down the issue with peace to combat terrorism as he said to rise to the occasion and understand the need for collaborative efforts by both states to face the prevailing menace.

By December 1, 2008, Mumbai attack's impact became more obvious, the incident led to a new phase of conflict in the South Asian region. The Mumbai assault revived India-Pakistan antagonism and led its impact on the bilateral talks. President Zardari tried to prevent the conflict escalation and forwarded his request that "it could be suicidal to indulge in a blame game even before the completion of initial investigation" (Raza, 2008, December 1). However, the military high-alertness in India created an atmosphere of post-war preparedness. The Inter-Service Public Relations (ISPR), Maj-Gen. Athar Abbas said that the army was ready for national defence and to handle any untoward situation. The foreign minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi shared that the Pakistani government was still aloof from the evidence that restricted Pakistan from taking any action. While the Indian home minister Shivraj Patil resigned after his failure in protecting the innocent civilians from the deadly attack, "and perhaps the most troubling question to emerge for the Indian authorities was how, if official estimate were accurate, just 10 gunmen could have caused so much carnage and repelled the Indian security forces for more than three days in three different buildings" (Naqvi, 2008, December 1). The Indian authorities placed their burden on the US personals to mount pressure on Pakistan against the growing terrorism in the region.

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Nonetheless, on December 2, 2008 India demanded Pakistan's serious action against the terrorist elements that carried the attacks on Mumbai and asked for the extradition of two wanted persons by the government of India 1) *Maulana* Masood Azhar, the leader of the banned Pakistani militant group Jaish-i-Mohammad and 2) Dawood Ibrahim, the former Mumbai underworlds don. It was not clear that the extradition request had international backing. Anyhow the Mumbai carnage dined the Kashmir dispute and cuffed Pakistan with the label of terrorism. The issue brought India and Pakistan on the verge of war. The Indian media alleged ISI for their involvement, "the architects of this calamity in Mumbai have managed to raise a threat on our other [eastern] borders. As we have these people [militants] on the run along our western borders [with Afghanistan], our intention is being diverted at this critical time" (Raza, 2008, December 2).

On December 3, 2008, All-Parties Conference (APC) supported the government's stance to settle the Indian intents. Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gillani on December 2008 said "it was encouraging to see all major political parties united on a single platform to face off danger to the integrity of the country. He praised the political parties for their unequivocal support to the government" (Hassan, 2008, December 3). Gillani also urged India to share the evidence of the deadly attack in Mumbai. Pakistan showed optimistic response to India and asked for the joint mechanism to probe the incident. The foreign secretary Quershi emphasized that "both sides should work together to reduce tension and continue their constructive engagement in a comprehensive manner". While India confirmed that no war was considered between the rival states, but the Pakistani authorities should reshuffle their policies and ban the terrorists' groups that might hurdle the peace process between India and Pakistan.

On December 5, 2008 India handed over a list of three suspects who were supposed to be involved in the Mumbai carnage, the advisor to the Prime Minister on Interior Rehman Malik confirmed and listed the accused persons for extradition. "Mr. Malik said that Dawood Ibrahim and Tiger Memon were not in Pakistan, while the government could not take any action against Maulana Masood Azhar unless evidence was provided by India against him" (Raza, 2008, December 5). Nonetheless, Pakistan initiated its internal investigation and reputedly again on December 6, 2008, asked the Indian authorities for concrete proves. On December 7, the Indian authorities proclaimed arrest of two Indians Muslims linked to the Mumbai attacks, the home-gown terrorists had been alleged of buying mobile phones SIM cards which were used by the militants during the attacks.

On December 8, 2008, Pakistan's Security Forces cracked down the activities of *Lashkar-e-Taiba* and banned the terrorist organization in the country. It also carried an army operation in Muzaffarabad on *Jamaat-ud-Dawa* (JuD) and arrested its senior leader Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi besides twelve other activists. "There are reports that similar actions are planned in some cities and towns of Punjab. Pakistan is under international pressure to take action against the organization for its alleged involvement in the Mumbai attacks" (Naqash & Raza, 2008, December 8).

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On December 12, 2008, in the wake of UNSC resolution Pakistan launched a countrywide crackdown on the JuD. Police shut down its offices throughout the country and arrested scores of operatives. Hafiz Saeed put under house arrest in his Johar Town residence for three months. "The government banned JuD, arrested its top leaders, sealed its offices throughout the country and Azad Kashmir, froze its bank accounts and cancelled the declaration of its publication after the United Nations blacklisted the organization for its alleged involvement in the Mumbai attacks and links with Al-Qaida, interior ministry source said" (Report, 2008, December 12). On the same date in a special report by Dawn, "crackdown hints at Faridkot-Mumbai link" it was found out that Kasab's family was living in Faridkot, Pakistan. His father Amir Kasab was interviewed who admitted terrorist Ajmal Kasab as his son.

On December 13, 2008, Mr. Qureshi affirmed Pakistan's determination to eliminate the threats of terror from the region. He again asked India to provide the evidence that was linked to Mumbai terror in order to do the required investigation. While, President Asif Ali Zardari and the Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gillani announced, Pakistan would not hand over any Pakistani national to India, linked to Mumbai attacks. As Pakistan will take its own action against any Pakistani individual found to have link with the Mumbai carnage. On December 14, 2008, the Indian planes violated the Pakistani air space; the establishment "termed it a deliberate attempt on the part of India to create war hysteria instead of responding positively to Pakistan's offer of cooperation in investigation of Mumbai attacks" (Khan & Raza, 2008, December 14). Pakistan rejected all the political accusations that Pakistan is the epicenter of terrorism and said that there was no evidence found of JuD's involvement in any violent act.

On December 15, 2008, Pakistan affirmed that there was no danger of war between India and Pakistan and explained that the Indian planes incursion into Pakistan air space was due to a technical mistake. While the Indian Prime Minister showed his assent for normal relations between Indian and Pakistan. However, a US news magazine reported, "the Indian military is trying to convince decision makers in New Delhi to authorize an aerial attack on Muridke, a *Jamaat-ud-Dawa* base" (Report, 2008, December 15). On December 16, 2008, the Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gillani declared that Pakistan did not want war but ready to handle any security threat and would stand up to protect Pakistan's sovereignty. On the other hand, the US military officials confirmed that India began to prepare air force personnel for possible missions into Pakistan after the Mumbai terror.

On December 17, 2008, according to Indian claim, war is not an option; terrorism is not a bilateral issue like Kashmir. Mumbai attacks are an issue of global war on terror and Pakistan should drain the element of terrorism from its soil and should work strictly on its word. While FBI investigation cleared that ISI is not involved in the Mumbai terror act. They also concluded, "the attackers had come to Mumbai from Pakistan; the plan was hatched in Pakistan and terrorists were provided necessary training by *Lashkar-e-Taiba*, according to the investigators" (Dawn report, 2008, December 17). On December 18, 2008, the

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Indian authorities affirmed Pakistan's civil government was not involved in the violent act of Mumbai. India emphasized for mutual-cooperation between India and Pakistan against terrorism that indulged the region in continuous security turmoil. Pakistan responded to evolve a new strategy to tackle the security threats in the region.

On December 23, 2008, Pakistan claimed that no evidence or information related to Mumbai attacks had received yet from the government of India. On December 25, the prime minister's advisor on interior affairs Rehman Malik said that they had thoroughly checked all the NADRA records and found no relevant data to Ajmal Kasab being a Pakistani national. However, both states moved their troops to face the next neighbour security threat. Pakistan moved its troops from the western border of Afghanistan, which was engaged in war on terror to the eastern border facing the Indian threat after the Mumbai '26/11'. On December 29, 2008, the Director General of Military Operations (DGMO's) of both states had an unscheduled phone call in order to remove misgivings about troops movement on the borders. India denied any threat of war to Pakistan and it assured that would hand over the evidence to Pakistan to pursue for investigation.

On January 6, 2009, the foreign minister of India Pranab Mukherjee announced that the Indian establishment had handed over all the Mumbai attackers relevant evidence to Pakistan. The Indian authorities emphasized that they needed actions not words, to eliminate terrorism. Manmohan Singh said "we have given them material that has come up during our investigations. We hope Pakistan will investigate this material that leads to Pakistan, share the result with us and extend to us legal assistance so that we can bring the perpetrators to Indian justice" (Naqvi, 2009, January 6). On January 7, the Pakistani authorities emphatically rejected the allegation that proved Pakistan's involvement in the attack. The Indian prime minister Manmohan Singh forcefully said, "there is enough evidence to show that, given the sophistication and military precision of the attack, it must have had support of some official agencies in Pakistan". India puts the issue on low burn and accused Pakistani official's involvement in the attack while, the ISI chief, Lt-Gen. Ahmed Shuja Pasha said on the same date that the Indians had failed to prove that Pakistani groups sponsored by the ISI were behind the attack (Report, 2009, January 7).

On January 8, 2009, the Pakistani authorities after series of investigations accepted that Ajmal Kasab was a Pakistani national. While India's stance was getting harder. India said that it would keep all options open to dismantle terror outfits after the Mumbai attacks. The foreign minister of India Pranab Mukherjee said in an interview to an international channel that, "sometimes it become difficult to believe that such a preparation is going on in a piece of land where there is a government, a civilian government, and it is fully unaware of it" (India has not Exhausted all Options FM, 2009, January 11). On January 12, Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gillani spoke in a gathering that Pakistan was carrying its own investigation and if they found any culprits involved in the attack, the

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government would take serious actions against them. In addition, we will not be intimidated by any foreign pressures since our hands are clean.

On January 18, 2009, India's stance was softening on the extradition of the Mumbai suspects, and Pakistan headed with cooperative attitude. The Federal Investigative Agency (FIA) announced that it would provide the investigative report of Mumbai attacks after ten days. After analyzing all the provided information from New Delhi on February 10, 2009, Pakistan declared the information provided by India was insufficient, "India had categorically rejected Pakistan's claim that the information contained in its dossier was insufficient and announced that it would not provide any further information to Pakistan" (Raza & Hassan, 2009, February 10). By February 13, 2009, the Pakistani government accepted that the Mumbai attacks plot, had partially planed in Pakistan, and a FIR had been lodged against eight assailants. "Some part of the conspiracy took place in Pakistan. We have lodged an FIR against eight perpetrators, including mastermind Zakir Rehman Lakhvi" (Raza, 2009, February 13). By February 15, 2009, the seven suspects of Mumbai attacks were granted 14 days' remand by the anti-terrorism court, FIA was also involved in the process. The suspects included the *Lashkar-e-Taiba* commander Zakir Rehman Lakhvi. On February 19, the team of FIA investigators was sent to India to probe the matter as per requirements. On February 23, The Indian foreign minister Pranab Mukherjee said "Pakistan was still in a denial mode over the Mumbai terror attacks. No explanation was given for the comment. The report quoting him said Islamabad had linked further progress in its '26/11' probe to New Delhi's response to its 30 questions seeking more information" (Pakistan still in 'denial mode', says Mukherjee, 2009, February 23).

"The 11,280-page charge sheet in the Mumbai terror attacks case was filed against the perpetrators of the attack on February 25 that indicated that a conspiracy was hatched in Pakistan and masterminded by the *Lashkar-e-Taiba* and also included comprehensive evidence, including a confession by one of the perpetrators, to set out an unassailable case. Significantly, the charge sheet did not make any reference to the ISI or suggest that a section of the Pakistan establishment was involved in any way in the attack" (Zeb, 2009: 10).

Pakistan remained firm on her stance that the Mumbai attacks carried out by the non-state actors that had no links with the incumbent government and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). India kept on pushing for a speedy trial of the perpetrators of the Mumbai attacks, involving seven suspects, including LeT's member Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi. On November 25, 2009, Seven men are charged in Pakistan in connection with the attacks, including the alleged mastermind, Zakiur-Rehman Lakhvi. On March 13, 2015, the Islamabad High Court in Pakistan orders the release of Lakhvi, calling his detention illegal, and he was released on bail on April 10, 2015. The only surviving gunman of '26/11' Mumbai terror

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attacks, Ajmal Kasab was formally charged on February 25, 2009 and hanged in Pune's Yerwada jail on November 21, 2012. Indian officials maintained secrecy while transferring Kasab from Mumbai to Pune. President Pranab Mukherjee rejected Kasab's mercy plea earlier in November 2012. Moreover, on October 3, 2009, the US citizen David Coleman Headley was arrested in Chicago. He was accused of scouting out locations to target in the Mumbai attack. Later, on March 18, 2010, Headley was pleaded guilty and on January 24, 2013 Headley was sentenced to 35 years in prison. On January 29, 2017, Hafiz Mohammed Saeed, the leader of a group associated with *Lashkar-e-Taiba*, was placed under house arrest in Pakistan for his suspected role in the Mumbai attacks. November 24, 2017, the Lahore High Court free Saeed from house arrest citing a lack of evidence. The United States, which labels Saeed as the leader of *Lashkar-e-Taiba*, said it was 'deeply concerned' about his release. By July 17, 2019, Saeed was arrested again by Pakistan's Counter Terrorism Department on terror financing charges [unrelated to the Mumbai attacks] and on February 12, 2020, Saeed was convicted of terror financing charges and sentenced to two prison terms of five and half years, to run concurrently." (Mumbai Terror Attacks Fast Facts, 2020, December 3). Teams from both sides have conducted investigations and sought to cooperate, but due to mutual mistrust and deliberate and inadvertent bureaucratic hurdles have continued to hold them back. Ultimately, both states alleged ill-intent on the other's part. (Ten Years after the Mayhem in Mumbai, is South Asia any Safer? 2018, November 26).

Global response of '26/11'

The eastern border tension between India-Pakistan has been hyped among the international community. They feared that the chronic contention could affect the War on Terror on the western borders with Afghanistan. On November 30, 2008, US expressed its concerns and fears over India-Pakistan tension that could affect the security of the South Asian region. It has also been mentioned that the Indian authorities would pursue US to influence Pakistan for complete crackdown on the terror elements. White House on December 2, 2008 mentioned that the Pakistani newly elected civil government is not involved in the Mumbai Attacks (The News Report, 2012, December 2). However, the US secretary Condoleezza Rice visited India and Pakistan to lower the tension that had been resulted due the Mumbai chaos. US Secretary Rice indicated that whether there was a direct *Al-Qaida* hand or not, this was clearly the kind of terror, in which *Al-Qaida* operated. On December 4, 2008, the U.S. Joint Chief of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen discussed Pakistan's involvement in the Mumbai attacks. Admiral Mullen also met the army chief Gen. Ashfaq Pervez Kyani, the joint chiefs of staff committee chairman Gen. Tariq Majeed, national security advisor Mahmud Durrani and Inter-Services Intelligence director general Lt-Gen. Shuja Pasha and affirmed that US would play its role in defusing the tension between the scorching states. The US Defence

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Secretary, Robert Gates also urged India and Pakistan to sensibly deal with the delicate situation.

On December 5, 2008, the US secretary of state Condoleezza Rice held meeting with Pakistani establishment focusing on the evolving regional situation in the aftermath of the Mumbai terror attacks. US on December 7, 2008, planned to send some names of the militant individuals and groups to the UN Security Council to tighten the sanctions against them. On December 8, the US secretary of state Condoleezza Rice admitted Pakistan's involvement in the Mumbai terror of '26/11', she also cautioned India against unilateral strike, and asked Pakistan to act quickly to probe the Mumbai attacks. Pakistan responded with positive outlook to US and headed with cooperative attitude and crackdown on JuD. "The European Union welcomed Pakistan's raid on a suspected militant camp and the arrest of a suspected ringleader of last month's deadly attacks in Mumbai" (Islam, 2008, December 9). The UNSC decision to ban the JuD as a global terrorist organization could only become possible after China, which had thrice blocked similar attempts, finally gave its assent vote for the UN resolution in the aftermath of the Mumbai attacks (Mir, 2008, December 12). On December 14, US declared neither United States nor United Nations is declaring Pakistan as a terrorist state [as India is trying to declare Pakistan as a terrorist state since 1993]. Moreover, on December 15, 2008, the British Prime Minister Gordon Brown blamed *Lashkar-e-Taiba* for the deadly attacks of Mumbai '26/11' and offered help to India and Pakistan in the investigation process. In a joint press conference with Asif Ali Zardari he stated, "we have asked Pakistan to provide access to our people to interview those detained in Pakistan in recent crackdown against Mumbai attacks suspects and similar request has been to Indian prime minister to interview those who were arrested following the Mumbai attacks as three British citizens were also killed" (Yasin, 2008, December 15). On December 16, 2008, the US senator John Kerry visited India and Pakistan, he emphasized that the civilian government should control ISI and to curtail their independence, currently ISI has no role in Mumbai attacks but ISI is the creator of *Lashkar-e-Taiba*. He also expressed his concerns over the nuclear arsenals to be safe and out of the terrorists' reach. President Zardari assured him that Pakistan's soil would not be used for terrorism activities. The US senator John Kerry also urged for resuming the dialogue process between the two conflicting states to secure the region from the war hazardous.

On December 21, 2008, the US secretary of state Condoleezza Rice urged Pakistan to understand the gravity of the current situation and take immediate steps to stop terrorism. On December 24, India urged the international community to pressurize Pakistan to weed out the terrorists from its soil, who were behind '26/11'. India also threatened to act against Pakistan if the world did not. The US joint chief of staff chairman Admiral Mike Mullen revisited Pakistan to seek cooperation against the involved terrorists. Admiral Mike Mullen got encouraged on the efforts that have been made in order to resolve the issue, after his meeting with the Pakistani establishment. The UN officials were also satisfied with the

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extended and full cooperation in implanting the UN sanctions against *Jamaat-ud-Dawa* and *Lashkar-e-Taiba*.

After the struggle to defuse the tension between the rival states, on December 27, 2008 the Pakistani troops moved from the Afghan to the Indian border and India warned its citizens from travelling to Pakistan. “The White House urged India and Pakistan to avoid actions that increase tension between them following the Mumbai” (Maraina, 2008). On December 28, India urged Iran to pressurize Pakistan to end the cross-border terrorism. However, US and the Britain shared the Mumbai attacks evidence with Pakistan. On December 30, China urged India and Pakistan for immediate de-escalation and defusing the tension between the rival states as it is posing threat to the whole region. The US Senator John McCain voiced against the dicey situation of South Asia, he claimed that India was on the verge of attacking Pakistan. “The cumulative international efforts, especially those of the US, China, Saudi Arabia and Iran have finally succeeded in de-escalating the situation between Pakistan and India” (Baabar, 2008, December 30).

On January 1, 2009, US, India and Pakistan agreed on no war-escalation in the region. US also supported Pakistan by refusing for any call for extraditions by Indian authorities and supported the demand that the Mumbai suspects should be tried in Pakistan. On January 9, US urged India and Pakistan for joint probe to punish the culprits, both states having incomplete evidence as piece of puzzle that need to be meshed. On January 13, 2009, Pakistan accepted that the Mumbai attacks had been partially planned in Pakistan. On January 15, US proclaimed that India-Pakistan tension had been managed, the spokesperson McCormack confirmed, “to this point, both sides have managed to do successfully, some of these troops movements notwithstanding, both on the Indian side as well as the Pakistani side”. On January 17, 2009 the British foreign secretary David Miliband urged Pakistan to investigate faster in persecuting and punishing the people involved in the Mumbai attacks and to ensure that the terrorist structure within the Pakistan boundaries had been uprooted.

By February 6, 2009, India kept on blaming Pakistan being the epicenter of terrorism. The Indian officials continued with the interest of joining international alliances to curb the menace of terrorism without involving the dispute of Kashmir. On February 10, “US special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan ambassador Richard Holbrook urged the Pakistani leadership, to eliminate safe havens of terrorists in tribal areas and said the Obama administration would fully support efforts for achieving the objectives” (Sajjad, 2009).

Security concerns in South Asia (post ‘26/11’)

The security threats in subcontinent rose after the well-planned attacks on ‘26/11’. Both countries were about to indulge in immense danger and war. The threat of nuclear upheaval was expected to put an end to the entire region. The war mania between the nuclear rival states could escalate the issue rather than achieving any one of the desired ends. Limited war or surgical strikes were the

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immediate response of India after Mumbai Attacks. "There are signs that sections of the Indian political class are eagerly awaiting closer military cooperation with US under Obama with the hope that India would be the sole beneficiary of the new South Asian war against terrorism. That would be a fresh invitation to greater disaster" (Uyangoda, 2008: 8).

Uyangoda argues that South Asia is becoming the epicenter of new US war against militancy. India and Pakistan should avoid the indirect trap, which has been worsened due to their chronic rivalry. "All South Asian should begin to worry about the emerging American scenario of "democratization at home while more war and deep militarization in South Asia" (Uyangoda, 2008: 9). The US strategy and practices during the Cold war era were according the democratic rights and political liberties. These rights have been victimized in War on Terror. US proved to be a model of Neo-barbarian rather a democratic power. The US intentions in the subcontinent are violating the democratic norms. US and UK are the key player in defusing the tension between India and Pakistan post '26/11', but their intervention in the region under the broad perspective of War on Terror laid its deleterious implications. After the US-Taliban war, terrorism has been diversified from the centralized position in Afghanistan to the entire region especially in Pakistan.

The political context is too vague due to Pakistan's involvement in War on Terror on its western border with Afghanistan. The armed action of India would worsen the situation and build more insecurity in Pakistan that could result in hard line confrontation with India. Furthermore, US is supporting War on Terror but not in favour of armed conflict between India and Pakistan. "Yet Washington and London would hardly appreciate a full-blown crisis that necessitates Pakistan to redeploy its forces from the west to the east" (Raghvan, 2008: 11). US interests in the region are defined through War on Terror, US will never support any one of the states which against their own interest. The US strategy is to assure end for the anti-American militant groups that's why US forced for ceasefire between the rival states and assured that Pakistan must focus on its western border. On December 6, Pakistan assured US that it was not withdrawing troops from the Afghan borders despite tension with India following the Mumbai terrorist attacks, a US general said (Iqbal, 2008, December 6).

The other option is diplomacy, a peaceful solution rather conventional warfare. "A far more productive approach would be bilateral, multilateral, and United Nations-sanctioned diplomatic pressures on Pakistan to act on domestic terror groups" (Raghvan, 2008: 10). Diplomacy is a non-military option or the only option, as Dr. Hassan Askari has said that India and Pakistan's conventional war methods cannot be achieved any more due to their nuclear strength. Raghvan argues that multilateral diplomacy between India and Pakistan is possible because Pakistan's economic and political systems are receptive to change. Pakistan's political and economic conditions are passing through serious crisis that can be angled according to the Indian desire. To carry out the diplomatic response after Mumbai attacks, the author had suggested certain steps:

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- The available evidence and material of Mumbai attacks must be shared with the main international players China, US, UK, EU to get advantage over Pakistan.
- Efforts should be made to obtain a UN Security Council resolution calling Pakistan to fulfill its obligations under the Resolution 1373.
- The Indian government should use the composite dialogue as a series of structured incentives.
- Wider diplomatic maneuvers should not hide from direct contact with Pakistan.

Thus, India cannot indulge in conventional war with Pakistan because they are not unaware of Pakistan's military strength. However, multilateral diplomacy is only safe option that India has chosen in order to encounter Pakistan. The most important diplomatic tool that India used was to involve the international players 'US, UK, EU and China' to get advantage over Pakistan. "But India is well aware that the more pressure it puts on Pakistan's president, Asif Ali Zardari, the weaker he becomes, potentially destabilizing the country even further. Pakistan's decision to take actions against *Lashkar-e-Taiba*, the militant group held responsible for the attacks, may stabilize the international situation, but could well result in a domestic clash" (Price, 2009: 11). India kept on saying 'no war' to Pakistan; simultaneously India has been threatening the world for independent surgical strikes if they did not support to curb terrorism from Pakistan. Resultantly, India succeeded in defaming Pakistan within the international community.

Indian internal security system failure (26/11)

India and Pakistan's polices have been criticized on different levels, it also flashed out both states' weaknesses and vulnerabilities. India failed in restoring security and intelligence system to encounter the terror assault of Mumbai '26/11'. "All India's intelligence agencies have failed, and the most critical element in their collective failure is their overwhelming focus on militants' groups based out of Pakistan" (Saleem, 2008). India's systematic failure has proved its inability to curtail terrorism.

"Consider the following facts. The attack by armed gunmen on 26 November last year could have been prevented by the Indian navy, the coast guard and the Mumbai police with the existing resources at their command, failing which, had not security been lowered at the hotels, due to misappraisal by the state police, the gunmen could have met some resistance, and their entry could have been delayed. Even if all this had failed, the 58-hour long stand-off could have been cut short, if commandos had not arrived 12 hours later, due to unavailability of a plane at Delhi to ferry the commandos, or if they did not have to wait, for more than an hour at the Mumbai airport, for a bus to take them to the scene of crime.

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Commando operations could have been made relatively easier, if they had access to maps/drawings of the buildings, which further complicated the operation. All this did not require extraordinary laws of sophisticated weaponry, but preparedness, since India has been insisting that it has been subjected to terrorism since the 1980's. Surely three decades is long enough to get our act together" (Navlakha, 2009: 13).

After the Mumbai attacks, India indulged in talks and blame game with Pakistan rather than focusing on inward systematic failure. The Indian authorities ignored their own security collapse and their chauvinistic attitude towards the Indian Muslims. Aggressive nationalism is the cause behind Muslims' massacre in India, in 2006, 2,765 Indians died in terrorism-related violence. Terrorism is a regional issue not only Pakistan's concern. India paid less attention to the terror elements on its land and this has proven by the slow pace investigations of Malegon bomb blast, Samjhotta Express, Meca Masjid and Ajmir Sharief, and delayed action against who carried out the anti-Muslim as carnage in the case of Babri Masjid. "Let, which carried out the attack in Mumbai in the email sent under the name of Deccan Mujahedeen, justified the massacre in order to avenge injustice perpetrated on the Muslims community in India since 1947" (The Indian Express, 2009, November 28). Pakistan so far is not unique in its support to the majority fundamentalistic groups. India is also passing more or less from the same fanaticism under the ideology of Hindutva [RSS] and Modi's aggressive nationalism towards Muslims.

Navlakha (2009) emphasized after all pain that has been caused by the Mumbai attacks, India needs to look inward in order to rectify the wrongs that exist. India does not need all the hassle through the corrosive diplomacy, international support, diversion of resources for security build up and frustrating dialogues with Pakistan. India can neither control the outer world nor it can choose its neighbours, the only revelation of secure state and society can be done through by ensuring justice for our own people who are marginalized and suffer persecution. Moreover, after discussing the security failure and aggressive nationalism, the Mumbai attacks pointed out on another dimension of political failure. Mumbai witnessed a flood of anti-politicians' expression articulated mainly by the middle class. "The anti-politician campaign appears to have three dimensions: it represents an overall disappointment with our politics felt mostly by the urban middle class; it surreptitiously calls for withdrawal from or distancing from competitive politics; recommended 'tough' measures to combat terrorism; it seeks to 'reform' politics" (Palshikar, 2008: 10). By the second half of 2013 a member of a special investigating team (SIT) of India's central bureau of investigation accused the Congress government in orchestrating the terror attack on the Indian Parliament 2001 and the 2008 Mumbai attacks, which later claimed that the statement was to strengthen the counter-terror legislation. Nonetheless, the Parliament attack followed by the controversial Prevention of Terrorism Act

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(POTA), and the 2008 Mumbai attacks led to amendments in the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (UAPA). The self-contradictory derivative of the Indian policy reveals their internal cracks that make an edge for Pakistan to justify its standpoint.

Pakistan, with the optimistic strategy to curtail terrorism had never succeeded in securing its soil from radicalization. The global agenda of *Jihad* was left alone after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, “with the money from the Saudis and later CIA, the ISI was able to train Afghans to fight the Soviet invaders more effectively. The ISI set up training camps along the Durand Line where Afghans learned more sophisticated tactics and skills for waging Jihad” (Riedel, 2011: 24). Dr. Hassan Askari supports by his statement that ‘the non-state actors are difficult to be controlled by the establishment’. However, the terror act of Mumbai attacks has been widely criticized by international community. “The terrorist attack in Mumbai have dramatically damaged Pakistan’s image in United States where a consensus seems to be emerging that the terrorists may be planning a Mumbai-like attack on the US as well and that if such attack happens, it will originate in Pakistan” (Iqbal, 2009, January 10). India tried many time to declare Pakistan as a terrorist state and imposed the label of terrorism on Pakistan, moreover, “the Mumbai attacks are also responsible for cementing Pakistan’s image as a perpetual enemy in the minds of young Indians who otherwise did not carry the baggage of history.” (Ten Years After the Mayhem in Mumbai, is South Asia any Safer?”, November 26, 2018). Whereas, Pakistan’s policies and response was quite ambiguous and undefined, their statements and strategy were puzzling. Thus, both states are not cooperative and serious in order to curtail terrorism from the region, neither they are stopping the nourishment of terrorist elements on their soil.

Conclusion

The contemporary analysis of India-Pakistan relations proves the changing regional security trends due to the new unconventional method of terrorism. Mumbai attacks ‘26/11’ are among the terror acts that have been carried by the fanatic non-state actors. Mumbai attacks proved the inabilities of both states to curtail terrorism from the region. India’s security and intelligence system failed to prevent the assault, while Pakistan failed to curtail transitional terrorism and radicalization. Both states need to look inward in order to prevent the external threats. India needs to strengthen its internal security mechanism and to restrain the homegrown anti-Muslim terror elements. On the other hand, Pakistan needs to strengthen its internal political and economic structure in order to control terror elements.

Sadly, after twelve years, there are still no bilateral efforts to present a united front against terrorism by both states. Moreover, there have been no serious terrorism-related confidence building measures concluded between the both states since the Mumbai attacks. “There is one thing that hasn’t changed in 10 years: India and Pakistan had no direct crisis management and escalation control

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protocols in place in 2008 and they have none now". Persuasively, the mistrust between India and Pakistan is too deep for this to happen.

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