

## DEEDS OR IDEAS

*(Iqbal's Philosophy of Dynamism)*

In the Preface to *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, Allama Iqbal (1877-1938), a great thinker of the Indo-Pak sub-continent, says, "The Quran is a book which emphasizes 'deed' rather than 'ideas'." Goethe utters the same truth when he maintains the primacy of action over thought. John Dewey (1859-1952), an American philosopher, asserts the same thing when he says, that we must study not 'states of consciousness', but modes of responses. "The brain," John Dewey observes, "is primarily an organ of a certain kind of behaviour, not of knowing the world." Thought is an instrument of adjustment but the adjustment is not passive, it is not simply an adjustment of internal to external relations, as Herbert Spencer conceived. For John Dewey as well as for Iqbal, complete adaptation to environment means death, the essential point in all response is the desire to control the environment. In the language of Toynbee, a British historian, adjustment is a response to a challenge and so cannot amount to passive acceptance or assimilation.

The shift in emphasis from 'ideas' to 'deed' is very significant and ushers in a new era in the domain of human thinking. The European Philosophy from Plato down to Russell is a long continuous attempt in the clarification and elucidation of concepts. There are exceptions however in the form of Marxism, Existentialism and Pragmatism, but, by and large, the major chunk of European philosophy has occupied itself with the critique and analysis of 'ideas'. Plato distinguished the world of 'ideas' from the world of senses, and made the former a domain for philosophical thinking. Ideas, according to Plato, were perfect and complete, whereas the sensory objects which exemplified or embodied them, were relatively imperfect and incomplete. This division is very innocent in itself, but

it led to misconceptions, to which Aristotle, the famous critic and pupil of Plato, is a party. Distinguishing the world of senses from the world of 'ideas', does not imply that the two worlds confront each other as enemies and that the one negates what the other stands for. Since 'ideas' represented reality, it was thought that Plato, as a philosopher, condemned the world of senses-which in fact is not the case. Platonic ideas have been wrongly conceived as independent entities standing over and above the world of senses. It was Lotze, a German philosopher, who contended that the 'ideas' must be understood as laws or methods of thought, and that the current view ascribing any kind of existence to them was based on a misunderstanding of Aristotle. Recently Cohen (1842-1918), and Natrop (1854-1924) have said the same thing. Plato has suffered because of his love for myths. In myths, ideas are dramatised and personified to stress a certain point or to bring out a hidden meaning. Quite a good many literati employ this technique to bring home to the mind of a reader, a truth which would otherwise remain hazy and blurred. Ideas do not exist as objects of senses do and there seems to be no point in the controversy which raged so severely in the history of European thought since the time of Aristotle over the problem of Universals and Particulars.

If the 'ideas' are simply laws, norms or methods of thought, and not independent entities, standing against the sensory objects, there is no sense in saying that Plato condemned the world of senses as illusory, insubstantial and shadowy. But unfortunately the impression is there. The entire British scholarship has fallen a prey to it, including Russell, who demanded, by way of criticism, an 'idea' of uncle, that is to say a complete and perfect uncle sitting in all its glory in the world of 'ideas'. It is no wonder if Muslim philosophers who regarded Aristotle, as the First Teacher, thought that Plato had lightly dismissed the world of senses. Plato's philosophy is thus considered to be a source of other-worldliness and asceticism. It is other-worldly in the sense in which all philosophy is, for it is interested more in conceptual frameworks, in principles and in underlying causes and less in the objects of senses. But it is not other-worldly in

the sense that it negates the world of senses, considering it an illusion or a maya. The Greeks had an intense love for life and Plato in constructing an ideal society in his world-renowned Republic evinced great practical acumen and sagacity. Plato's thought has a great practical import, but the opposite impression that Plato condemned the world of senses was also there, and Iqbal rightly combated it, pronouncing it to be anti-Islamic. Islam does not recognize a duality or a bifurcation of the sort that Plato is alleged to preach. Islam is very much earth-oriented and accepts in good faith the realities of life as well as the realities of the material world around. Iqbal was right, therefore, in protesting against the alleged other worldly import of Plato's philosophy.

Plato is also accused of stressing abstractions and neglecting the concrete and the particular. In a way all philosophy, no matter what its subject matter is, has to leave the individual and the particular, just as sciences do, and to soar in the realm of generalities and conceptual thinking. A philosopher theorises, like a scientist and in so doing he has to treat the particular and the concrete as a base for his flight. When however Plato is charged of loving abstraction in preference to the concrete, it is his theory of Ideas again under criticism. Plato's Ideas are often conceived as definition of concepts, and definitions are nothing but abstractions. In saying that the Idea of beauty is a perfection of its own kind, that is to say beauty in all its completeness and perfection, it is evident that Plato was alluding to the definition of beauty which would draw out from the manifold of experience, the essence of beauty—an eternal, immutable Idea of beauty. The essence of a thing is its substance or Idea in Platonic terminology. In dealing with Ideas, Plato was doing what other philosophers have done all along the ages. He has tried to identify the immutable and the eternal which lies at the basis of experience, providing it a ground as well as a cause. But I do believe that the impression is there that Plato has condemned concreteness and extolled abstractions. On the basis of this impression also Platonic philosophy has been censured and declared as un-Islamic. The underlying idea in all this

criticism is that Islam, being a 'yea-saying' religion to life cannot accept 'ideas' in preference to 'deed'.

Iqbal is also critical of Sufism or mysticism as it leads to passivity and quietude—not to 'deeds' but to 'ideas'. Mysticism is a view that there is a reality hidden from the ordinary channels of knowledge which can be revealed only to an individual mind in certain moments of insight. The mystic experience can be distinguished according to William James, from all other types of experience by the possession of four marks. The first is ineffability, which means that the mystical, revelatory experience is so absolutely indescribable as to be hostile to all attempts at ordinary expression. The second is noetic quality, which means that they have a cognitive content. They are states of insight into depths of truth unplumbed by the discursive intellect. The third is transiency, by which William James means the shortness of duration in the case of mystic experiences. He says, "Except in rare cases, half an hour or at most an hour or two seems to be the limit beyond which they (mystical experiences) fade into the light of common day." The fourth and the last characteristic of mystic experience is passivity. During the experience a mystic feels as if his own will was in abeyance and that he was grasped and held by a superior power. The last characteristic breeds determinism and fatalism. The mystic feels that he is in the grip of a Power which completely controls him and determines in all aspects the course of his life. The mystic, consequently withdraws himself from mundane activities and engages himself actively and devotedly to the refinement and elevation of his soul through mystic practices and contemplation.

Too much devotion to any thing is inimical to public or social duty. A scientist engrossed in his scientific pursuits or a philosopher immersed in the depths of Reality can find no time and have no liking for the daily evocations of life which by the way constitute the sum and substance of an ordinary man's life. A sufi too is seriously engaged in an activity directed to the realization of the Ultimate and the Incomprehensible, and can find no time for political, commercial, or social activities. And just as a scientist

engaged in scientific research feels as if he is under the domination of the god of Enquiry if there be any, so does a mystic feel that he is in the grip of the Power he is seeking through his contemplation and ascetic practices. But if this attitude remains with the mystic alone and does not travel to others who are not mystic and not engaged in the mystic activity, there can be no harm. The mystic is oblivious of the world around him, for that is required by the activity he is engaged in. But other people whose 'business' is not mysticism, it does not behove them to adopt an attitude which hinders them in the active participation of life's concerns. Since the sufis, by and large, did not participate in life's activities and spent their time in meditation and contemplation, the impression which a layman took was that Mysticism did not favour activity, but recommended on the other hand, a life of aloofness, resignation and quietude. And since a sufi's life was rated much higher than other types of lives, it was inevitable that a high premium should be put on the ideology which the sufis preached and practised. In the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent there were many Sufi orders, to one of which every Muslim was supposed to belong. There were exceptions, of course but the Muslims, by and large were attached to one of these orders whose founder was supposed to confer blessings, both spiritual and wordly in case they were believed in and their instructions faithfully carried out. It is a pity that not all sufis were of equal calibre. A good many of them had interests other than the spiritual but were clever enough to deceive the credulous and the unwary by incantations, invocations and ascetic practices which instead of elevating the protege spiritually resulted in breeding in them an attitude of transcendentalism.

Sigmund Freud, the founder of Psycho-analysis has called transcendentalism, an infantilism of mind. Just as a child cries and seeks help of his father in times of distress and privation so do a religious person, with the difference that the prayers of a child are directed to an earthly father while the prayers of a religious person are directed to the heavenly Father, who as compared to the earthly father is far mightier and far wiser. He is also eternal and immutable. But because of mental infantilism, a

person, instead of relying on his own resources, believes in prayers and loses faith in activity and self-help. Thus mysticism had a crippling effect and Iqbal was quite justified in running down the general effect of mystic practices on the minds of ordinary believers. Iqbal was not opposed to mysticism as such, for there is plenty of mysticism in Iqbal's poetry and prose. He was opposed however to the attitude which it bred because of which the people lost interest in working out their own destinies and became puppets in the hands of crafty people.

Besides Greek thought and mysticism another tendency which corrupted the Muslim mind and led to its deterioration is the loss of inductive spirit. Deduction which comes to us as a Greek cultural heritage stands for 'ideas', while induction which stands for scientific enquiry and exploration, is a symbol of 'deeds'. In the history of European thought, Aristotle is regarded as the father of Deductive Logic. It is also held that while Aristotle made wonderful observations in the domain of deductive reasoning, he had no knowledge of inductive logic and its methodology. This misconception is so widespread and so persistent that even logicians of the calibre of J.S. Mill have fallen a prey to it. A little reflection will however show the falsity of the claim. In *An Introduction to Logic*, H. W. B. Joseph has shown from the writings of Aristotle how Aristotle defined Induction as the process of establishing a general proposition not by deduction, from a wider principle, but by appeal to the particular instances, or kinds of instances in which truth can be shown. Aristotle, he says, was also aware of the fact that our knowledge of scientific principles springs historically out of our experience of particular facts, though it certainly ultimately rests upon an act of intellectual insight. Further Aristotle suggests dialectics as a method of rejecting or accepting any scientific principle. It is true that Aristotle did not elaborate his theory of Induction so well as he did that of Deduction but that is no reason for saying that the Greek mind was un-mindful of inductive reasoning or had no knowledge of Inductive theory.

This claim looks all the more ludicrous when we glance through

the collected works of Aristotle, a portion of which is called physics, the other portion being metaphysics. The portion called physics comprises treatises on natural sciences, while the other portion consists of treatises dealing with supersensible realities. The enormous amount of work that Aristotle has done in connection with the collection, classification and relationship of natural phenomena give the lie to the supposition that Aristotle was ignorant of induction. In the *Story of Philosophy*, Will Durant writes, "The new School (Lyceum) was no mere replica of that which Plato had left behind him. The Academy was devoted above all to mathematics and to speculative and political philosophy, the Lyceum had rather a tendency to Biology and natural sciences. If we may believe Pliny, Alexander instructed his hunters, game-keepers, gardeners and fishermen to furnish Aristotle with all the zoological and botanical material he might desire, other ancient writers tell us that at one time he had at his disposal a thousand men scattered throughout Greece and Asia, collecting for him specimen of fauna and flora of every land. With this wealth of material, he was enabled to establish the first great zoological garden that the world had seen."

It may also be observed that the sharp division between deduction and induction which logicians like J. S. Mill and Bacon drew has vanished in modern scientific investigations which depend on the cooperation of both these methods. Deduction is no doubt a logico-mathematical technique, drawing out the possibilities and implications of the 'given' in various directions, but these implications are of supreme interest to a scientist, who tries out the various implications and selects the one which applies to the case under investigation. Gone are the days when Mathematics was regarded a science dealing with actual realities of the living and concrete world. Russell has shown in *The Principles of Mathematics*, that the relation between the axioms and the deduction of a mathematical system is that of 'if-then'. A mathematician and a logician brings to the notice of a scientist all the different lines which are suggested by his basic assumptions. All these lines may not be applicable to the world a scientist knows of, but that is immaterial. As Lewis says in *Logic and the World Order*,

a scientist has to make a choice, consistent with his requirements and he is helped in this connection by a concept called 'matching'. Out of the several possibilities worked out by a mathematician or a logician there will be one which matches the physical reality under consideration. It is, therefore, obvious that a scientist cannot go far without the aid of logico-mathematical techniques. Consequently, the higher a physical science goes, the more mathematical it becomes. Sciences at the elementary stages are concerned directly with facts but the moment they begin soaring up they find it impossible to fly without the twin wings of Logic and Mathematics. It is no wonder that Galelio has said, "Mathematics is the only language that Nature can understand."

It is a pity that scientific spirit was curbed in Europe during the Middle Ages. Priesthood reigned supreme in Europe and the slightest deviation from the authoritative interpretation of Biblical verses was not tolerated. The final authority was Pope, of course, and there were courts of Inquisition to try the offenders who, in most cases, were scientists and philosophers. They had either to recant or to face the most brutal kinds of punishments including expulsion, lynching and public hanging. In Muslim history, no such incident has ever taken place. No scientist or philosopher has ever been guillotined for the sake of his views. There are, however, cases of intolerance in respect of differences in religious matters but as far as philosophical and scientific knowledge goes there was not only tolerance but also respect and approval. The Muslim history can proudly present a galaxy of eminent thinkers and researchers who enriched the sum-total of human knowledge and made splendid contributions to almost all departments of knowledge, natural and supernatural. It is needless to recount the achievements of Muslim thinkers and scientists in various spheres of knowledge. Suffice to say that there was hardly any domain of thought in which the Muslims did not leave the mark of their scholarship, insight and learning. Muslim contribution to Mathematics and Astronomy is reflected by the host of loan-words in the terminology of these sciences. The foundation of numerous hospitals all over the world testify



to the considerable progress that Medicine might have made then. There were said to be six thousand medical students in the eleventh century Bagdad. They studied diseases carefully and recorded them systematically. "The knowledge of Chemistry and other natural sciences was advanced and Muslim cartography and descriptive geography greatly influenced Medieval map-making in the Meditterrenian." The Muslim scholars preserved and systematized older learning besides making their own contributions, at a time when Europe was ignorant of it and incapable of preserving it.

It is, however, a sad commentary on the affairs of the Muslims that they could not maintain the high standard of scientific research and enquiry for long. As a matter of fact the spirit of enquiry declined sharply, after Europe had its Industrial and Agrarian revolution, marking the advent of a new type of technology and a new insight into the mysteries of nature. The Muslims failed to appreciate the significance of the new challenge embedded in the latest techniques and weapons. Their response was poor and ineffective and the result was that they suffered defeats on all levels. They were crippled militarily as well as intellectually. They were declared sick, suffering from incurable diseases having hardly any chance to survive. With the downfall of the Ottomans after Suleman the Magnificent, of the Safawids after Shah Abbas the Great, and of the Mughals after Aurangzib, the entire Muslim world lay prostrate at the feet of the Western imperialists and colonialists. It was a great fall, and Iqbal like many other Muslim leaders in other countries was conscious of it. Terrible diseases need terrible remedies and the fall so terrible in extent and significance required the most drastic changes to halt it in the first instance and then to overcome it later on. All this needed herculean efforts and Iqbal did not fight shy of it. He thought that what the Muslims wanted was a new type of philosophy—a philosophy of 'deeds' rather than of 'ideas', a dynamic world outlook which should galvanize them into life and help them in shaking off their passivity, quietitude and inertia.

A philosophy of this type Iqbal found in change. The idea of change

is very old. In European philosophy it goes back to Heracleitus (535-475 B.C.), a pre-Socratic philosopher for whom existence is a perpetual change; it is not mere 'being' but is essentially 'becoming'. He also anticipated Karl Marx (1818-1883) in saying that contradiction is the central fact of existence, the spring that makes the wheel of the universe go round. "Through strife", he says, "all things arise and pass away." His philosophy was, however, over-shadowed by the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle, who in spite of their difference agreed that the ultimate Reality was perfect, and therefore static and unchanging. Plato said it blatantly, Aristotle quietly, but the net result was the same. The Reality in the form of Ideas as Plato held or in the form of 'formless' matter as Aristotle held was immutable, self-subsistent, and independent, and as such admitted of no change. The great Idealistic tradition of which Plato is the arch-protagonist and which comes down to Bradley (1846-1924) and Bosanquet (1848-1923) through different forms and shapes and which reached its culmination in Hegel (1770-1831) maintained with all the force at its disposal that the ultimate Reality, as a spiritual entity standing for a system of all-consistent and all-comprehensive ideas, could not change. The Absolute of Hegel was Logic personified and as the laws of Logic are cold, unchanging, so is the Absolute, the ultimate Reality. Such an idea Iqbal abhorred.

And Iqbal is in good company, for every thinker of the present day has evinced a strong dislike for a block universe, that is to say a universe which is complete and perfect and as a result of that does not admit of any change. The scientific ground for such a view was set by Darwin's theory of Evolution, according to which all living things, plants and animals start from a stage of simple, undifferentiated homogeneity and move towards a stage of differentiated, complex heterogeneity. Darwin's conception was at first confined to living species but it was later extended by Spencer and others to cover all social institutions and philosophies of life. The central thesis of Spencer's thought was that in general the homogenous is unstable, that a trend towards heterogeneity is characteristic of evolu-

tion in all its phases, whether we are thinking of individual organisms, of the earth, the solar system, or the entire universe.

The philosophies of evolution or such philosophies as were guided and inspired by evolutionary concepts of life accepted either the mechanical laws of physical sciences to explain development or regarded the phenomena of life as *sui generis*, differing radically from physico-chemical phenomena. The first view is known as Vitalism, to which Iqbal, along with Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) and Henri Bergson (1859-1941) belongs. The roots of this doctrine are to be found in Schopenhauer (1788-1860) and in the voluntaristic idealism of Fichte (1762-1814). In recent decades resemblances may be found in American Pragmatism and in A.N. Whitehead (1861-1947); in Existentialism; and in three Latin-American philosophers: Alejandro Korn (1860-1936), Jose Vasconcelos (1882- ), and Antinio Caso (1883-1946). Vitalism is anti-rationalistic and pragmatic. It is idealistic, as Arthur Berndston says (in *The History of Philosophical Movements*, edited by Vergilius Ferm) both in the ontological sense, identifying the real with something akin to spirit and the epistemological sense, classing many of the objects of knowledge as appearances dependent on cognition. It regards time and change as fundamental and favours an evolutionary and historical outlook. It rejects external norms and external imperatives. It is pantheistic to some extent, and is endowed with a profoundly religious sense in its feeling for a universal and self-transcending creativity.

The representatives of the mechanical interpretation of the evolutionary push are very many. Karl Marx, the founder of Dialectical Materialism was one of them. He believed in the physico-chemical explanation of the historical process, and rejected all types of Idealism and Theism. Iqbal had no sympathy for this doctrine and condemned its theory in very strong terms. But what is important in this theory is that it revised the notion of a philosopher. Far from being a spectator of heavens and an inhabitant of 'ivory tower', he becomes very much an inhabitant of earth, participating in the common joys and sorrows of the

people. The difference between theory and practice vanishes, as the philosopher had not to weave ideas in an atmosphere of 'airy nothing', but to test what ever he states in the crucible of life. According to Karl Marx, the task of a philosopher is not to interpret but to revolutionise the world. Karl Marx did not condemn interpretation as such, what he condemned was arid, barren and unfruitful thinking which had no contact with the hard realities of life. \*Philosophy gets a positive role in the scheme of life, if it does not indulge in thinking for the sake of thinking but thinks to improve the conditions of life, materially and spiritually. Thus considered, Marxism is a philosophy which comes very near to the aforesaid Quranic concept in as much as, instead of laying stress on 'ideas', it stresses 'deeds'. It has consequently a dynamic outlook, like Voluntarism and Vitalism.

Whether evolutionary philosophies are vitalistic or mechanical they agree in presenting the view of a developing and an 'unfinished' universe. Thus the climate of opinion, to borrow a phrase from Whitehead, was supremely conducive to a new type of thinking. Iqbal accepted the dynamic frame work and expounded his ideas in accordance with it. He disagreed with philosophers who put forward the idea of a static universe and interpret change as illusory. Iqbal was in many respects an Idealist, but he differed from many outstanding Idealists, for instance Plato and Hegel since they advocated a static, un-creating and non-creative ultimate Reality. Plato's Ideas could not change or develop, as they were perfect in their essence. Hegel did introduce the notion of the 'Degrees of Reality' to lend some sort of reality to appearances which would otherwise be relegated to the world of illusions and shadows. Hegel's Absolute is rationalism par excellence. It is reached through the operation of two antithetical forces, one positive called the thesis and the other negative called the anti-thesis, which were transcended in synthesis since it abstracted the truth both of thesis and anti-thesis and assimilated it in a new proposition called the synthesis. The synthesis in turn became a thesis for a new anti-thesis leading to a new synthesis. This process goes on till a final synthesis is reached which admits of no anti-thesis, indicating there-

by that all contradiction have been overcome and the synthesis reached at the culmination of the dialectical process is all-consistent and all-comprehensive. The final synthesis is christened by Hegel as the Absolute. This notion of ultimate Reality is as static as that of Plato. Little wonder that William James (1842-1919) recoiled from it, and when efforts were made by Harris and others to import a moribund Hegelianism into America, James reacted like a quarantine officer who had detected an immigrant infection. Soren Kierkegaard (1813-1855), a Danish existentialist cum theological thinker, observed that he could not breathe God's fresh air in Hegel's Absolute, and rejected it outright.

Iqbal abhorred the idea of a Static Reality. He loved creativity, freedom and originality. The ground for such a viewpoint, as already observed, had been set by the theory of evolution, which signifies change and development at every step of life. Darwin's conception of these changes was much too much mechanical and, therefore, rejected by Bergson, who saw novelty, creativity and vital push at each stage of evolution. Life, he says, is distinguished from dead matter by virtue of its non-repetitive character. Matter repeats itself but not life, because the fundamental category in the case of life is not space but time. And time is growth, accumulation or duration. He says, in *Creative Evolution*, "Duration is the continuous progress of the past which gnaws into the future and swells as it advances." It means that "the past in its entirety is prolonged into the present and abides there actual and acting." "Doubtless we think with only a small part of our past; but it is with our entire past . . . that we desire, will, and act." "And since time is an accumulation, the future can never be the same as the past, for a new accumulation arises at every step." "Each moment is not only something new, but something unforeseeable . . . change is far more radical than we suppose." "For conscious being", he says, "to exist is to change, to change is to mature, to mature is to go on creating one's self endlessly."

Iqbal supports Bergson in this view and thus runs counter to the orthodox conception of Taqdir or destiny which envisages an eternal preordina-

tion of all happenings in the universe. To save creativity and freedom of man, Iqbal had to limit and redefine the conceptions of the omnipotence and the omniscience of God. As Khalifa Abdul Hakim observes in his article 'Iqbal' contributed to *A History of Muslim Philosophy Vol. II*, "Iqbal does not conceive of God's knowledge as omniscience in the sense of an immediate awareness of the entire sweep of specific events in an eternal ever-present "now". Further he says, "A thinker (Iqbal) for whom the Ultimate Reality, which is phenomenal as well as noumenal, is a Creative Self, perpetually creating and objectifying ever-new possibilities, could not conceive of God, the Perfect Ego, as omniscient, as one that knows in detail not only the past and the present but also the not-yet happened future events. Such a static view of Reality would nullify God's creative activity which would no longer be conceived of as free but as eternally determined." About omnipotence, I quote again Khalifa Abdul Hakim, who says, "Iqbal considers the prevalent idea of God's absolute omnipotence to be a misconception. According to him, all activity, creational or otherwise, is a kind of limitation, without which it is impossible to conceive of God as a concrete operative Ego." Iqbal admits in *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, "The emergence of egos endowed with the power of spontaneous and hence unforeseeable action, is in a sense a limitation on the freedom of the all-inclusive Ego."

From the above it will be clear that Iqbal has put forward the concept of a limited God, which was very much in air when the Lectures were written. Joad advocated it in *God and Evil*, Rashdall expounded it in the *Theory of Good and Evil Vol. II*, and Bergson maintained it as a logical consequence of the creativity of God.

Among the Muslim thinkers of the past Iqbal finds a close parallel to his views in the atomistic occasionalism of Asharite theology. Iqbal thinks that the rise and growth of Atomism in Islam is the first important indication of an intellectual revolt against the Aristotelean idea of a fixed universe. For the Asharites the world is not a fixed system of substantial entities similar to Aristotle's, but rather a stream of continually created

atoms conjoined to a stream of positive or negative accidents upon which the nature of created entities in the world depends. To make it consonant with the fundamentals of Islam, Iqbal interprets Asharite Atomism in terms of monadology or spiritual pluralism. Though in European Philosophy, the notion of monad is to be found in Pythagoras, Aristotle, Euclid and Augustine, yet the real founder of monadology is Leibniz. To him the monads are the real atoms of nature, the elements of things. The monad is a simple substance, completely different from a material atom. It has neither extension nor shape nor divisibility. Nor is it perishable. Monads exist or cease to exist by a decree of God. The universe is the aggregate of the monads. The highest monad is God, Who is both the creator and the unified totality and harmony of self-active and self subsistent monads. Iqbal does not call the spiritual atoms as monads but egos.

In the great Idealistic tradition of the West and the East, Iqbal believes that the only road through which we can reach the ultimate Reality is by 'the interpretation of our conscious experience.' Hence in thinking of God as an ego or self, Iqbal has conceived of Him on the analogy of a creative human self, creative either in the realm of intellect or in that of aesthetics. The universe is a valley of egos, each ego being a centre of consciousness. endowed with individuality and uniqueness. But there are different degrees of individuality, the individuality of an ego being dependent upon the degree of consciousness it possesses. "Throughout the entire gamut of being", says Iqbal, "runs the gradually rising note of ego-hood until it reaches its perfection in man." Thus the higher the selfhood or consciousness, the greater the reality of the entity in question and the closer it is to God. Reality is consequently, essentially spiritual to Iqbal. He says, accordingly, "that our criticism of experience reveals the Ultimate Reality to be a rationally directed life, which in view of our experience of life, cannot be conceived except as an organic whole, a something closely knit together and possessing a central point of reference." The chief exponent of this view in Islam according to him, is al-Ghazali.

In this view the dualism of soul and body is overcome and the finite egos are shown to be aspects of the Ultimate Ego.

The importance of this philosophy, for the Muslim nations, is immense. It rids them of the false notion of fate. As Iqbal observes, "If history is regarded merely as a gradually revealed photo of a pre-determined order of events, then there is no room in it for novelty and initiation. Consequently we can attach no meaning to creation which has a meaning to us only in view of our own capacity for original action. The truth is that the whole theological controversy relating to pre-destination is due to pure speculation with no eye on the spontaneity of life which is a fact of actual experience." So keen was Iqbal to preserve the creativity and freedom of the ego, that he accepted the idea of a limited God, though it ran counter to the orthodox view.

It has been observed already that Iqbal believed in 'degrees of individuality' very much on the pattern of the Idealistic doctrine of the 'degrees of Reality', with the difference that the Idealistic doctrine measured the degree in terms of consistency and comprehensiveness while Iqbal would measure it in terms of its approximation to the Ultimate Ego, Who combines in His own Person, not only the excellences of intellect but of other aspects of personality as well. The Idealistic Absolute is built on principles of Logic, namely those of non-contradiction, Ground and Consequent and a few others. The principle of Non-contradiction is of course the supreme-most and so enamoured are the Idealists of this principle that Bradley, a notable representative of this movement, has found contradictions in the idea of God and has relegated it to the world of appearances. In his great book, *Appearance and Reality*, which some people jokingly call 'the disappearance of Reality', Bradley finds the God of religion, a pack of contradictions and so dismisses Him lightly. Iqbal does not measure the degree of individuality in terms of consistency, but in terms of one's awareness of one's own destiny.

It is difficult to say what human destiny is. The Idealists have interpreted it as 'self-consciousness', and so has Iqbal, but he has also given



it a spiritual tinge. It is held by a good many Idealists that man is distinguished from all other things by virtue of self-consciousness and therefore an analysis of consciousness would reveal not only the nature and destiny of man but also the nature of the ultimate Reality which has the same characteristics par excellence. The door to ultimate Reality lies through consciousness. Cartesian maxim, "I think, therefore I am," and the logical conclusions drawn from it regarding the nature of the external world and the existence of God point to the inalienable tendency of the idealistic frame of mind. Whatever be the affiliation of an Idealist, he must start from consciousness and make it the base of his metaphysical super-structure.

Iqbal feels that 'individuality' has to be achieved and to be strengthened. The path is difficult, for it lies through rigorous self-discipline—not an easy task. It means the subordination of all instinctive and emotional tendencies to the dictates of sharia, that is to say, the will of God as embodied in the Holy Quran and as interpreted by the Holy Prophet. Self-discipline coupled with the conquest of nature physical as well as psychical, will entitle a person to become the vice-gerent of God on earth, vicegerency being the summum bonum of human life. Individuality, therefore, is to be measured in terms of eligibility and approximation to the state of vicegerency.

William McDougall (1871-1938), a British psychologist whose views Iqbal appreciated, presented a very neat and clean picture of the development of human personality in his book *The Social Psychology*. He starts from instinctive tendencies which are native propensities to think, feel and will and proceeds to show their organization under higher and higher organizations. The instincts which are seventeen in number lie disorganized, as it were, ready to fight. In order to introduce some kind of order and to minimise the chances of collision, a higher organization in the form of sentiments is set up. A sentiment is an organization of instinctive and emotional tendencies around particular objects. These sentiments are very many and come in conflict with one another. What

one intends, may be contradicted by an other, and so we rise to a higher organization which orders and regulates the sentiments themselves and these are called master sentiments. Our major interests are represented by the master sentiments which accordingly may not be more than two or three. In the presence of master sentiments, the possibilities of conflict in human life are very much minimised but not altogether eliminated. Hence a still higher organization comes into being—of course not in the lives of all but in the lives of a few chosen, and this means living life under the suzerainty of a single sentiment—an ideal or a principle. For want of a better word, this sentiment may be called the 'king sentiment'. McDougall calls it the sentiment of Self-regard, while Iqbal calls it ego-hood or vicegerency of God. Iqbal's conception is spiritual in as much as he envisages the development of the human personality on Islamic lines while that of McDougall is psychological, based as it is on his harmonic view of life. But the net-result is the same. It is the regulation of life under the dominance of a single 'universe of desire', to borrow a phrase from Prof. Mackenzy or the Idea of Good, to talk in Platonic language. Iqbal calls it the vicegerency of God, for God is the sum-total of all values human and non-human. It is interesting to note that the Christian theologians of the Middle Ages held that Platonic Ideas could not float in vacuum, for Ideas being psychic realities, must have some mind to reside and that mind could only be the mind of God. It could not be the mind of any human being, for human mind being finite, could not contain what was in essence perfect and flawless. Thus the stage of vicegerency indicates a stage where a person lives habitually and not as a matter of accident, a divine life so far as it is possible to live under physical and psychological limitations.

Neitzche came very close to this view in his conception of the Superman or the Overman. He says, "Not mankind, but superman is the goal," for mankind does not improve, it does not even exist—it is an abstraction; all that exists is a vast ant-hill of individuals. Out of this 'ant-hill', the super-man has to emerge. But who is the superman, whom Neitzche

regards the goal of humanity, for after him the process of 'eternal recurrence' starts working ?

Nietzsche is the first European philosopher, who proclaimed with all the force at his disposal, that God is dead. Various interpretations have been put on this statement and different meanings have been brought out. Sartre claims that his whole philosophy of Existentialism is nothing but an explication of the hidden meanings of this statement. Some religious thinkers have made it a symbol of the godlessness of the modern man in his thoughts and actions. It is well to remember that distinction which John Dewey drew between 'having a religion' and 'being religious'. No doubt almost all of us have a religion—at least for the purposes of census, but as far as 'being religious' is concerned, hardly one out of a million can be found. The whole purpose of Kierkegaardian Dialectics was to delineate the character and type of a person who had not only a religion but was 'religious' in the Deweyian sense. Kierkegaard found around him Christians—of course for census purposes, but did not find a single soul who was truly Christian. Nietzsche made, therefore, a statement of profound truth when he proclaimed the death of God. God had died in the hearts of mankind.

In *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, wherein Nietzsche announces the death of God, Nietzsche was not concerned with Existentialism or the religious meaning of his maxim. He was concerned, on the other hand, with the superman and his evolution through eugenics and proper education. For this purpose the death of God was essential. If there is no God or gods, "Shall we not ourselves have to become Gods, merely to feel worthy of it." Again he says :—

"Dead are all Gods; now we will that superman live

I teach you superman. Man is something that shall be surpassed. What have you done to surpass him?

What is great in man is that he is a bridge and not a goal; what can be loved in man is that he is a transition and a destruction."

'God is dead, Long live the Man' seems to be the sum and substance of Nietzsche's teaching. Human freedom is not complete unless God is dead. There is, as Dostoyevsky had portrayed in the Brothers Karamazov, a freedom to choose between Good and Evil, but there is not a freedom to go beyond good and evil. This freedom can be achieved only upon the occasion of the death of God, the annihilations of the constricting force of all schemes of values. Molina. F. says, "Nietzsche's overman is the person who has become god-like by murdering God, that is he is the person who not only chooses between good and evil, but who himself establishes new values and affirms the significance of life in so doing..." (Existentialism as Philosophy).

Iqbal was impressed by Nietzsche's account of the superman, for in common with other evolutionary thinkers of his time Iqbal did cherish the desire that humanity be transcended and the present man be surpassed by a superior type of person; but he differed from Nietzsche in the characterisation of the superman. Nietzsche was the child of Darwin and the brother of Bismarck. His superman had all the qualities of a victorious beast and the cunningness of Bismarck. He had no other aim but to dominate and no other morality but that of a power-drunk person. Iqbal's superman was charged with finer sensibilities. He evolved, not on the strength of biological forces but on the basis of and through the operation of moral and spiritual forces. Iqbal had, therefore, to look to Muslim mystical philosophers like ibn Arabi, Rumi, and Jili for a correct understanding of the nature and significance of the Man yet to be born. It was due to his religious thinking that the Future Man instead of being a product of the ruthless forces of nature, had to evolve through the exercise of values which humanity had tested and approved.

Iqbal's superman is *Mard-i-Momin* and that makes all the difference. But as far as dynamism is concerned, the superman as well as the *mard-i-momin* are charged with high ambitions and possess an indomitable will to subjugate the universe, and to court dangers in the pursuit of their ideal. Nietzsche proclaimed, "Live dangerously" and Iqbal endorsed it

by saying, that if you want to live then live in dangers. Rigidity means death, movement means life. When an individual or a nation stops moving, it dies. The Muslim nations have stopped moving for the last four or five centuries and have accordingly sunk to the lowest level of degradation. In order that they may live again, it is essential that they should march onward with a firm determination to catch, if not to surpass, such nations as have stolen a march over them.

Conscious of the fact that poetry stirs hearts more easily and more passionately than prose can ever do, Iqbal expressed his ideas in soul-inspiring verses. His poems read in *mushairas* and other gatherings made a powerful impact on the Muslim mind and made them aware of their destiny. The result was that the Muslims arose as if from a deep slumber and longed to regain their past glory, first by acquiring political independence and then by living a life as enjoined by the Holy Quran and its interpretations in the sayings of the Holy Prophet.

In Islam in Recent History, Professor Wilfred Cantwell Smith, a notable Islamicist and an oriental scholar, says, "The transmutation of Muslim society from its early nineteenth century stolidity to its twentieth century ebullience is no mean achievement. The change has been everywhere in evidence. It was given poetic expression by the Indo-Muslim Iqbal with an eloquence and inspirational fieriness that are artistically superb." But, says Prof. Smith, "the modern situation can be understood aright only if one recognizes how often the dynamic quality has been associated with no pattern of control or directional rationale. It can thus become nothing more than the froth of arenzied ecstasy or even the irrational fury of the mob. Iqbal himself lauded passion (*ishq*) as excellent in itself and attacked the intellect (*aql*), which might not only have checked but guided it."

No one can deny the dangers of directionless dynamism. In the absense of programme, dynamism can become a potent force of destruction. But that was not the intention of Iqbal. Iqbal stirred people to work for an ideal, and also for a political programme which eventually

succeeded in the creation of Pakistan. It is a pity that after the accomplishment of the political aim and the establishment of Pakistan, the dynamism of the Muslim masses was not harnessed to a purpose and in some cases it exhibited itself in an unbecoming manner. But the fault does not lie with Iqbal. 'Ishq' does not stand for passions, with Iqbal, as Prof. Smith thinks. It is very like the notion of the intellectual love of God, in Spinoza's philosophy. It is with Iqbal a principle of growth and development in human life, and a necessary ingredient of the development of ego-hood.

In common parlance, love is a sentiment which draws a lover towards his beloved, but its scientific interpretation is different. It may be conceived as a biological urge required for the propagation of species or a life-urge needed for the survival of human and animal life. It can even be conceived as a constructive force, the eros, in opposition to the destructive force, the thanatos, as Freud supposed, or as Karl Jasper says, it is implanted in life, and is unconditionally identified with it. Sufis however believe that love provides the necessary dynamism to traverse the path from mundane reality to the supersensible one. This path they believe is very arduous and cannot be traversed without love. It is because of this sentiment that one takes risks and continues his journey despite handicaps, fears, temptations and doubts. One can recall in this connection the Pilgrim's Progress of John Banyan, wherein a pilgrim whose goal is godhead, is guided by a light and goes onward in spite of the hazards that he meets on the way. Love, therefore, provides indomitable will to the lover and enables him to make the utmost sacrifices in the attainment of the final goal. Iqbal's notion of love is very close to that of the sufis for, in this idea, he was strongly influenced by Rumi, whom he has taken as his spiritual guide.

Prof. Smith has not read Iqbal correctly, otherwise he would not have translated Ishq as passions. Passions lead to human bondage, as Spinoza said long long ago, but love liberates a person from the yoke of passions and thus becomes responsible for human freedom. Iqbal preferred love

over intellect for the reason that intellect alone could not lead a person to the ultimate goal. In this he seems to be in good company, For not only have all sufis detected the incompetence of reason in matters of super-sensuous realities but a host of anti-intellectualistic philosophers, also including Existentialists, Voluntarists and some notable Idealist's like Bradley, Taylor etc., etc. Another reason which can account for the superiority of love is that it is both a knowledge and an urge. It provides the vision and also the dynamism to reach that vision. Intellect is simply knowledge and does not possess the energy to translate that knowledge into practice.

In emphasizing love, Iqbal has provided a motive-force for actions, and not inflamed passions. If the Muslims have deviated from the path of 'true' love and taken to sensationism, rowdyism or things of that kind, the fault does not lie with Iqbal or his teachings. Iqbal wanted to provide dynamism and that he has done through the principle of Love.

