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Amartya Sen, Martha Nussbaum, and the Capability Approach

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Abstract: This paper explores the theoretical foundations of the capability approach, co-developed by Amartya K. Sen and Martha C. Nussbaum. Both thinkers revolutionized development studies by shifting the focus from economic development to human well-being and social justice. They argue that political theories should be grounded in ethical considerations, asserting that only a moral framework can effectively measure human development and well-being. Although they share this foundational premise, their interpretations differ significantly due to distinct philosophical lineages. Sen's work, influenced by liberalism and Rawlsian procedural justice, positions individual freedom as both the means and the end of development. His emphasis on contextual adaptability allows for pluralistic, open-ended evaluations of well-being. He prioritizes agency and democratic deliberation over prescriptive metrics. In contrast, Nussbaum's approach, drawing inspiration from Aristotelian ethics and feminism, underscores universal entitlements and proposes a structured framework in which certain entitlements are non-negotiable. This paper analyzes the philosophical roots and critiques of their approaches to highlight their unique contributions to development studies. It also examines how Nussbaum has expanded the capability theory originally developed by Sen. Additionally, the study evaluates critiques of both perspectives, such as Sen's lack of specified metrics and Nussbaum's potential cultural bias, arguing that their integration offers a dynamic framework for addressing contemporary challenges. While their perspectives differ, this paper contends that integrating Sen's pluralism with Nussbaum's universalism provides a balanced approach to tackling global inequalities and advancing social justice. Their combined approach prioritizes human flourishing over GDP growth, redefining the parameters of development.

Keywords: Capability Approach, Capabilities, Functionings, Freedom, Opportunities, Well-being, Development.

Introduction

During the 1980s, a new theoretical approach for evaluating people's standard of living was developed, called the capability approach. A Pakistani visionary economist, Mahbub ul Haq, posited the notion of human development in the last quarter of the 20th century (Malook 2020, 170). It was a departure from the traditional economic metrics of the past (Sen 1999, 75). The prime focus on the freedom and agency of individuals distinguishes it from other famous ethical and economic approaches, like utilitarianism (based solely on the consequences of actions, i.e. resultant happiness) and resourcism (focused on the fair distribution of resources, like income or wealth). In contrast to these theories, the capability approach tends to ensure that people are capable of (that is, they possess the freedom to achieve) certain beings and doings, such as being healthy, having shelter, or being socially integrated (Sen 1999, 87).

According to the capability approach, a person's capability of living a good and praiseworthy life is evaluated through a set of valuable functionings – 'beings' and 'doings' – such as being happy and having actual access to making satisfying and loving relationships with others. According to this approach, poverty is an inability to live a good life; likewise, development means capability expansion (Nussbaum 2011, 18). This approach aims to assess an individual's well-being, keenly analyze social arrangements, and theorize about new policies that can bring about meaningful change. It was an effort to develop a comprehensive framework for measuring human well-being and development.

In *The Quality of Life*, Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum explore the philosophical underpinnings of the Capability Approach (Sen and Nussbaum 1993, 1). They emphasize the importance of freedom for a life worth living. They agreed that the horizon of opportunities and options available to individuals must be expanded for fostering fulfillment, purpose, and a deeper sense of meaning in life. However, they differ in methodologies, scope, and philosophical foundations. Sen's approach is procedural and context-sensitive, insisting on individual agency and public reasoning, whereas Nussbaum proposes a universal list of central human capabilities, which serves as a normative framework for human dignity and social justice (Nussbaum 2011, 18-36).

Amartya Sen's Capability Approach

Sen's work is rooted in Liberalism and Social Choice Theory. He has argued that the evaluation of well-being should be based on individual capabilities instead of subjective satisfaction or accumulation of resources. He rejects traditional utility-based models and emphasizes the importance of human freedom and the capability of making choices. For him, choice has its intrinsic value. At its core, the idea is that well-being is about the freedom to choose a life that one has reason to value. This approach distinguishes between capabilities and functionings, i.e. available opportunities, and actual outcomes (Sen 1993, 34).

Sen's extensive and rich background in Development Economics, Social Choice Theory, and Philosophy played a key role in developing this concept of capability. He acknowledges that these thinkers have profoundly shaped his understanding of development, freedom and human capabilities. Therefore, to properly articulate his approach, his underlying knowledge of diverse subjects must be kept under consideration, as this approach – which has been most distinctly presented in Sen's major work "*Development as Freedom*" (1999) – is, in a way, a synthesis of his contributions in these varying fields. Sen reports that his idea of the Capability Approach has conceptual connections specifically with the works of Aristotle, Adam Smith, and Karl Marx (Sen 1999, 13-15).

Significant concerns of Sen's work include emphasizing what people can do with the available means while rejecting the notion of simply focusing on making those means available, i.e., insisting that not everyone can exhaust the means equally. Moreover, he is concerned with the phenomenon of '*Adaptive Preferences*', which occurs due to the harsh circumstances of so many individuals that it eventually makes them stop desiring what seems impossible to achieve. Soon, they start declaring that they are happy and satisfied with what they have (Sen 1999, 62). This situation arises when people learn to adjust their aspirations, ambitions and desires according to their limited circumstances. For instance, two individuals with the same income may experience different levels of freedom due to differences in their health, gender, family background, education level, and social conditions, and eventually, they will learn to live with their reality.

Sen argues that this phenomenon of adaptive preferences reveals our limitations in assessing the true well-being of individuals. He contends that when we rely solely on subjective well-being (how people feel

about their lives) we risk overlooking significant inequalities and instances of capability deprivation (Sen 1999, 63). Sen emphasizes that there must be an objective evaluation of the reasons behind people's desires and motivations for those desires. In a nutshell, the evaluation must examine both functionings and capabilities. Almost all accounts of the capability approach are concerned with capabilities, substantive freedom and functionings.

Capability

It refers to a combination of valuable functions to which a person has adequate access. Thus, a person's capability represents the freedom she has to choose between different functioning combinations—between different kinds of life—the life choices she can enjoy (Sen 1992, 40).

Functionings

These are the various things a person may value and have reason to value doing or being, such as being well-nourished and having shelter. Functionings need to be distinguished from the commodities. (as 'bicycling' is distinguishable from 'possessing a bicycle') (Sen 1992, 39).

Sen argues that when evaluating the general well-being of the public, the primary concern must be to assess what people are capable of being and doing, rather than merely considering their access to resources. To illustrate this, he uses the example of a bicycle: though it is meant for transportation, not everyone who owns it can use it equally effectively. For instance, a man without one or both legs may find it difficult to ride it. Furthermore, some people may have access to bicycle but cannot benefit from it fully, for example, certain groups such as kids, the elderly, or women in restrictive environments cannot move freely due to certain social, physical or cultural barriers (Sen 1999, 39). Importantly, Sen's capability approach is not an explanatory theory; it does not indulge in explaining or offering definitions of poverty, deprivation, or well-being. Instead, it suggests a framework to conceptualize such notions in a way that allows for more nuanced and careful evaluation of the actual conditions of the lives of individuals within a society.

Sen critiques the Rawlsian concept of justice, arguing that it is overly focused on the equitable distribution of resources and fails to adequately account for individual capabilities and varying personal circumstances (Sen 1992, 12–13). According to Sen, justice should be evaluated not merely by the fairness of resource distribution but by how effectively individuals can realize their potential and achieve meaningful

functionings. In contrast, Rawls maintained that assessing individual achievements falls outside the scope of justice; instead, justice should ensure the fair distribution of opportunities and resources within society. Rawls's theory is rooted in the pursuit of egalitarian social justice, emphasizing the importance of fairness in the allocation of primary goods (Malook 2017, 48).

Sen counters this by asserting that the Rawlsian framework has altogether neglected the relationship between particular people (heterogeneity) and resources or commodities, and it has implicitly supposed that all people can equally avail themselves of opportunities, which is far from the actual human condition (Sen 1992, 25). For a more inclusive strategy on justice, Sen underscores the significance of considering the diversity between people's needs, aspirations and social circumstances (Sen 1992, 30).

While many scholars, such as Ingrid Robeyns, Sabina Alkire, and Martha Nussbaum, have adapted Sen's capability approach to align with their interests and respective fields and declared it as a foundation of their thoughts, they have also critiqued its openness. Specifically, they argue that Sen's framework lacks a specific list of capabilities and clear guidelines for their distribution, leaving these decisions to individual societies (Robeyns 2005, 107). For example, Martha Nussbaum addressed this limitation by proposing a list of ten central capabilities, which she argues should serve as minimum standards applicable at a universal level. These capabilities are intended to be relevant for all human beings, irrespective of their cultural or social context (Nussbaum 2003, 41-42).

Critics argue that Sen's capability approach is under-theorized and thus inadequate as a theory of justice. They contend that his framework needs a definitive list of essential capabilities to establish specificity, provide clear societal objectives, and enable the identification of shortcomings in the pursuit of a just society. Robeyns argues that to ensure meaningful comparisons between societies and to provide a foundation for justice, some initial capabilities should be specified to begin the human development project (Robeyns 2005, 107). Sen has countered this criticism by asserting that it is misguided. He maintains that the capability approach should be understood as a flexible framework rather than a rigid theory due to its inherent openness and deliberately open-ended design.

Ingrid Robeyns, in her critique of the capability approach, criticizes it for its crudeness and idealization because it relies heavily on extensive data collection (Robeyns 2005, 109). This data is primarily subjective as it is information about how individuals make choices and form relationships. The heavy reliance on subjective data makes it impossible to get to any reasonable quantification method for two reasons. First, only a limited amount of information is readily available or easily accessible; second, individual accounts are often less reliable and lack credibility. Personal biases, errors, memory problems, and other inconsistencies can pose serious hurdles (Robeyns 2005, 110).

Likewise, Sabina Alkire has offered a thoughtful critique of Amartya Sen's capability approach, emphasizing the need for a well-defined conceptual framework and robust measurement tools to evaluate capabilities effectively. While she acknowledges Sen's emphasis on individual freedom and well-being, Alkire critiques the model for failing to suggest which capabilities are central to living a fulfilling life (Alkire 2002, 183). She advocates for a more systematic methodology to identify and prioritize central capabilities. According to her, without being structured, the approach risks inconsistency and limited practical applicability. She contends that abstract ideas should be capable of translation into concrete policymaking to ensure their real-world impact (Alkire 2002, 185).

Alkire introduces the concept of '*capability deprivation*' as an attempt to operationalise the capability framework. She identifies basic human capabilities and tries to underscore the interrelations between them. Alkire highlights how deprivation in one capability, like health, can translate into limitations in others, like education and employment opportunities. This interconnected perspective emphasizes the need for comprehensive approaches to policymaking. Her emphasis on practical implication seeks to improve policy effectiveness in tackling inequalities and global injustices while staying true to Sen's core principles regarding human development and social justice (Alkire 2002, 12-14).

Sen is also challenged for overemphasizing an individual's effective freedom. He is criticized for overlooking the communal values and traditional ways of life, as well as neglecting the fact that an individual's freedom affects the freedom of others too. Nussbaum points out that for a just and balanced society, some freedoms must be restricted, and there must be a categorization of which freedoms are good or bad, important

or trivial (Nussbaum 2000, 50). Furthermore, interpersonal goods such as friendship, care, and respect are essential for personal growth, as humans are inherently social beings. Interpersonal relationships enhance the effectiveness and productivity of human actions (Malook 2018).

Scholars like Martha Nussbaum argue that Sen's refusal to define a specific list of capabilities leaves his framework too vague, allowing societies to ignore critical freedoms (e.g., gender equality). Others, like Ingrid Robeyns, note that without a list, policymakers might prioritize capabilities based on dominant cultural/political values, sidelining marginalized groups (Nussbaum 2000; Robeyns 2005). Another point of criticism on Sen's assertion that the general well-being of individuals hinges on '*the ability to attain a kind of living we have reason to value*' (Sen 1999, 87), –despite its pluralistic intent–is that it risks imposing a valuation from outside regardless of what people think of a fulfilling life thus hindering people from pursuing their conception of the good life. It restricts people's autonomy to pursue their self-defined ideals.

While Amartya Sen's capability approach has areas for improvement, such as its heavy reliance on gathering and analyzing complex data, Sen must be recognized for his conscious departure from traditional distributive justice theories that previously dominated the discourse (Sen 1999, 12). He should also be acknowledged for shifting the focus from simplistic metrics – such as resource allocation or utilitarian measures of happiness – to a more nuanced understanding of what individuals can truly achieve or become. He addressed human diversity by recognizing that people vary in their abilities to convert opportunities into outcomes (Sen 1999, 87). Accessible resources must be effectively translated into meaningful outcomes to significantly enhance people's quality of life.

Sen founded his argument for the capability approach by critiquing all three foundational pillars of utilitarianism: act consequentialism, welfarism, and resourcism (Sen 1999, 57-60). For example, act consequentialism focuses merely on outcomes while completely ignoring the inequalities and transparency of the processes to get to those outcomes. Likewise, other utilitarian theories emphasize subjective happiness and neglect many significant aspects of human well-being, like autonomy and education. Welfarism puts so much weight on collective welfare that the specific needs of individuals go unnoticed. In short, he thought these theories failed to address nuances of justice, so he used these critiques to provide philosophical

foundations for his more inclusive and capability-based approach to justice (Sen 1991, 61-62).

Martha Nussbaum's Capability Approach

Among the capability theorists, Martha Nussbaum has most effectively and systematically developed a capability theory of justice. She called it a partial theory of justice that rests on three main concepts: human dignity, a list of fundamental capabilities and a threshold level for each of these capabilities. Nussbaum has mainly drawn her thoughts from Aristotelian and Kantian philosophical traditions. Using them as foundations, she highlights the imperative of guaranteeing a set of basic human capabilities for each individual, especially for vulnerable and marginalized populations like women, children and individuals with disabilities (Nussbaum 2011, 18).

According to her, this predefined list of basic human capabilities has the potential to serve as a universal threshold for ensuring human dignity and social justice. It transcends the confines of cultural and political boundaries (Nussbaum 2011, 33). While Nussbaum emphasizes human dignity as a foundational principle within her universal framework for justice, Saad Malook positions reverence as an equally fundamental moral and political value, essential for the development of both the individual and the social dimensions of human life (Malook 2024, 301).

Martha Nussbaum maintains that without addressing the issues related to sexual discrimination that women face in almost all nations, the problems related to poverty, development, and justice can never be resolved. She highlights the urgent need to address women's issues in the world through a universalist account of basic human capabilities, which is closely linked to a form of political liberalism (Nussbaum 2003, 41). Her project aims to provide the philosophical background to an account of fundamental constitutional principles. She insists on respect for human dignity and treating people as ends in themselves. For the sake of it, she introduces two principles:

- (i). Principle of each person's capability.
- (ii). The principle of each person is an end.

Women are usually treated as tools for the ends of others; therefore, Nussbaum seeks to use the second principle as a crucial force in advancing women's dignity and social position. In her words,

“ Women are the people who suffer pervasively from acute capability failure, and also as people whose situation provides an interesting test of this and other approaches, showing us the problems they solve or fail to solve” (Nussbaum 2000, 6). Nussbaum’s capability approach is normative and is based upon the focus on the moral significance of individuals in creating and promoting social justice and development.

Nussbaum's central human capabilities serve as political goals that can form the basis of an overlapping consensus among individuals with diverse conceptions of the good life. She also incorporates the idea of a threshold level for each capability, representing a fundamental social minimum below which genuine human functioning becomes impossible (Nussbaum 2000, 70). The list of central human capabilities she suggested is as under:

1. Life
2. Health
3. Bodily integrity
4. Senses, Imagination, and Thought
5. Emotions
6. Practical Reason
7. Affiliation
8. Other Species
9. Play (Recreation)
10. Control over one's environment.

In contrast to Sen's central position of effective individual freedom, Nussbaum's account of the capability approach's core concept is human dignity. One has human dignity, which means that one should not be exploited by others (Malook 2023, 275). She argues that access to these fundamental capabilities is a requirement of dignity, and the threshold she stated is the minimum requirement of justice, the provision of which is essentially the responsibility of governments and other relevant international organizations as well as institutions (Nussbaum 2003, 40-44).

Nussbaum highlights the distinction between capability deprivation and capability choice. She contends that respecting human choice is critical to upholding human dignity (Nussbaum 2003, 46). The inability to access a capability by choice and its deprivation are two different situations, as their underlying circumstances differ. An individual who lacks sufficient food is experiencing deprivation. In contrast, someone who voluntarily abstains from eating and drinking despite having access

to food—such as in the case of fasting—is exercising choice. Their decision must be respected, as honoring human dignity includes respecting personal autonomy.

According to Nussbaum, any capability theory needs to be committed to these five principles (Nussbaum 2007, 50-54) (though not all capability theories strictly follow all of these):

1. Treating each person as an end in themselves.
2. A focus on choice and freedom rather than achievements.
3. Pluralism about values.
4. Being deeply concerned with entrenched social injustices.
5. Ascribing an urgent task to the government.

Nussbaum recommends that her list of fundamental capabilities be democratically debated and made part of national constitutions, international human rights legislation, and international development policy (Nussbaum 2006, 91-94). The strength of her approach lies in the fact that it is neither static nor rigid nor entirely open-ended. Instead, she intends to provide a starting point for discussion and, eventually, relevant actions. However, this framework is also usually criticized for its vagueness. Her list of ten central capabilities usually includes vague definitions of its components. This vagueness makes it extremely difficult to operationalise in specific developmental contexts. Again, the question is about its practicality and effectiveness, as was observed with Sen's approach.

Sen and Nussbaum: A Juxtaposition

Nussbaum has sought to highlight the points of agreement she shares with Amartya Sen regarding the evaluation of capabilities. Some of their key commonalities include the following: According to Sen, comparing individual's quality of life or standard of living is only feasible within the capability space. This approach does not focus on inquiring about people's subjective feelings or the resources available to them. Instead, it emphasizes the extent of actual freedoms they possess—that is, their ability to make deliberate choices (Sen 1993, 30). Nussbaum agrees wholeheartedly with Sen's claim about capability space. However, for her, establishing a minimum threshold level for each capability is far more crucial than achieving full capability equality (Maboloc 2008, 43-46). Sen's framework does not explicitly indicate whether he favors full capability equality.

In her version of the capability approach, Nussbaum asserts that all capabilities are equal (Nussbaum 2011, 25-27). Both thinkers agree that fulfilling economic needs at the expense of liberties is unacceptable. Although Sen does not explicitly state this principle, Nussbaum is sure that his criticism of organic family models reflects his belief in the importance of capabilities for each individual. The primary distinction between Sen and Nussbaum lies in her aim to establish a philosophically grounded, systematically coherent normative (albeit partial) theory of justice. In contrast, Sen, is more interested in producing a general framework for evaluating the quality of lives individuals can lead (Sen 2009, 231).

Sen has never developed a list of specific fundamental capabilities that should be central to evaluating human well-being. Instead, he deliberately left it unspecified and open-ended. He has provided numerous examples to clarify his position (Sen 2009, 242-245). He prioritizes flexibility, allowing for the incorporation of empirical information when formulating policies, whereas Nussbaum largely rejects such an approach. Conversely, Nussbaum thought making a list is essential for establishing specific political aims and goals. Her version of the capability approach is more structured and detailed, as she also offers definitions for three types of capabilities (Nussbaum 2011, 20). These three types are basic, internal and combined capabilities.

Basic Capabilities

These capabilities refer to an individual's innate abilities, inherently present as inborn potential. These are possessed by her from birth but require external help to be developed and actualized. For instance, a newborn's ability to learn a language is a basic capability but she needs an enabling environment to transform it into a fully developed internal capability.

Internal Capabilities

Internal capabilities are developed states of a person's basic capabilities. These are skills that allow an individual to behave and perform in certain ways when provided with opportunities. These are learned through education, social interaction and personal experiences. For example, a person who has received training and relevant education to become a musician has polished her basic capability to compose music which could not have been effectively actualized without external support.

Combined Capabilities

These are internal capabilities that are brought to practice without barriers or restrictions. An individual can enjoy combined capabilities when their internal capabilities are complimented by favorable external conditions. For example, a female musician born with a gifted voice who receives a formal education and training in music but is then restricted from performing freely faces a challenging situation—her capabilities are not being turned into functionings. Nussbaum insists that governments should strive to foster combined capabilities because only through this way human dignity and social justice can be ensured. People should have freedom to be and to do what they think is valuable and worth living.

Nussbaum's theory faces significant criticism for being overly idealistic and optimistic regarding what governments can achieve and what can be incorporated into constitutions. Some critics argue that her approach is similar to the Aristotelian list and overlooks many important capabilities, labeling it as oversimplified and lacking practical value. It is deemed impractical and unrealistic, particularly for societies with limited resources. Sen has also criticized Nussbaum for placing excessive emphasis on ten central capabilities, suggesting that this approach is overly prescriptive (Sen 1999, 247-249). His capability approach focuses primarily on practical, incremental improvements for human development. In contrast, Nussbaum's approach is seen as more utopian, as it demands rigorous implementation of minimal justice by ensuring all individuals reach a minimum threshold of fundamental capabilities (Goodin et al., 2011).

Sen and Nussbaum have adopted distinct philosophical foundations for their respective approaches, resulting in differing methodological orientations. Sen's methodology is flexible and open-ended, allowing for democratic discussion and processes rather than prescribing a specific list of capabilities. His context-dependent model encourages societies to prioritize individual well-being within their unique cultural contexts. Sen underscores the importance of public reasoning and individual agency, avoiding rigid structures in his approach. This stems from his economist background, emphasizing human well-being without being inflexible or overly prescriptive.

In contrast, Nussbaum argues that at least ten capabilities are central and universally applicable for promoting a life of dignity. Her focus is more on human rights and justice, with her approach grounded in Aristotelian ethics. Nussbaum adopts a normative and universalist methodology, proposing her list of ten central capabilities as a universal benchmark for enhancing the chances of achieving justice across diverse cultures. She believes that institutional performance and policies should be evaluated against these central capabilities.

While Sen's approach is more flexible and pluralistic, Nussbaum seeks to provide moral guidance. These differences illustrate the tension between contextualism and universality: the former emphasizes public reasoning, while the latter insists on establishing universal standards for a life of dignity and quality. This tension could be resolved by reconciling the capability approaches of both scholars. I agree with Sen that context is essential and cannot be overlooked. Nevertheless, some universal standards are necessary at the outset of discussions regarding human well-being, development, and dignity. Nussbaum's list, even if vague, can offer normative foundations for a quality discourse on these topics. Notably, she has left her list open to value addition, allowing for context-sensitive research that could introduce new central human capabilities.

Moreover, in an era where artificial intelligence and generative technology are rapidly transforming the world, the discussion about human dignity, freedom, and agency has become increasingly urgent and critical. Both scholars are sources of profound insight; their approaches can offer robust foundations for contemporary discussions on human development and dignity (Sen 1999, 247-249).

Conclusion

Sen and Nussbaum aim to improve human well-being and ensure human development. Both have focused on different aspects of human development. The difference in their approaches is visible through Sen's emphasis on individual freedom and human agency, while Nussbaum focuses more on identifying universal capabilities that ensure human dignity. By combining their perspectives, a more comprehensive understanding of living a fulfilling life can be developed. The demand for universal standards of equality and justice, as well as the need to consider individual choices, can be catered through the integration of the thoughts of Sen and Nussbaum. Moreover, as their integrated framework balances ethical rigor with pragmatic adaptability, it offers an effective

model for addressing contemporary issues such as systemic oppression, digital divides, and climate inequality.

Sen's account is more flexible and context-sensitive. He has offered an account adaptable to different contexts and cultures, whereas Nussbaum's model offers clear ethical guidance. These differences underscore a fundamental philosophical divide in their thought process. Sen has focused on context and processes, while Nussbaum is more concerned about content and universality. Although both approaches are divergent on the face, they complement each other. Sen's capability approach allows societies to respond to their local values. It needs democratic deliberations, but there is a risk that many important issues like gender equality could be left unattended, as in many societies, it is pretty standard to assume that women should gracefully hold their subordinate status in familial and social setups. So, here comes the universalist and normative approach of Martha Nussbaum, which suggests that ten central capabilities are non-negotiable for a life of dignity and that justice should be ensured across contexts and cultures.

Since its inception, the Capability Approach has been modified across diverse fields—including Social Theory, Development Studies, Welfare Economics, and Political Philosophy—as a framework for redefining human development and well-being. International organizations like the United Nations have adopted it as a viable alternative to traditional economic metrics, such as GDP growth, to assess progress in terms of substantive freedoms rather than material wealth. Scholars and policymakers further value the approach for its utility in interpersonal comparisons, assessing how individuals perform under identical conditions and how a person, group, or society progresses over time. These features—its interdisciplinary adaptability, emphasis on human agency, and focus on well-being—collectively explain its enduring relevance in shaping global discourse on justice, equality, and sustainable development, offering a holistic alternative to growth-centric paradigms.

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