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Received: March 16. 2024

Revised: April 13 2024

Published: June 15, 2024

### Journal of Politics and International Studies

Vol. 10, No. 1, January–June 2024, pp.95–107

# **Politics of Financial Clientelism in Developing Democracies: insights from Nigeria**

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### Abstract

Political clientelism, locally known as godfatherism has been a recurring issue in the democratic practice of developing countries. It has become a key feature of Nigeria's democratic practice and has been adjudged by several literature as a bane towards good governance. The work focuses on the effects of godfatherism as well as the perceptions of the citizens of Kwara State, a state which has had a long history of acts of godfatherism in Nigeria and one which the citizens in the 2019 General elections denied the wishes of the godfathers with their votes. The study was conducted using a descriptive survey method, using questionnaire as a means of data collection from 385 Krejcie and Morgan samples in the state. The data was analysed using a regression model. The study found significant impact of godfatherism on governance in Kwara State.

Key Words: Godfatherism, Politics, Democracy, Governance, Nigeria, Africa.

### Introduction

In most African countries, especially since the attainment of independence, political development has been riffed by several issues. One of the major ones is the political clientelism or master-servant relationship in governance known as godfatherism1 which has been found to hinder political development and a huge stumbling block in the democratisation process in Nigeria (Ohiole and Ojo, 2016). Godfatherism is explained as a form of client-patron relationship between a politician and a prospective aspirant (Okoli, 2022) and this is clearly different from mentorship (see Salawu, 2023). Thus, when the aspirant assumes position through a successful electoral campaign, the effect of the relationship often results to imposition, abuses, and exploitation from the former to the latter. These Godfathers often fund the expensive electoral process of their anointed candidates, thus leading to a reciprocity and endearment upon the success of the client.

Mamogale (2013) asserts that despite the struggle for independence by many African countries, only few were genuinely prepared for the process of self-rule. This is so because many of African states became victims of poor economic performance, ethnic and political violence, series of power tussle and military coups as well as poor institutional quality. In Nigeria, similar narrative can be accounted for. Nigeria became one of the earliest countries on the African continent to gain independence in 1960. However, the democratic rule practiced at independence was truncated several times in the next 40 years after independence. Each republic 2 was characterized by domestic challenges which led to its eventual demise. This was because the nature of Nigerian politics was characterized by ethnic and religious differences, all justling to attain and retain political power. Therefore, stakes were and have remained high in the political practice. Vices such as corruption, mismanagement of funds, by elected officials needed to be covered by their successors, thereby leading the incumbent to have a say in their replacement whom they trust to cover their illegal trails. Thus, leading to the case of a godfather and godson relationship.

The process of godfatherism begins from the process of becoming a political party candidate for an election, a feat which has fast been taken over by top executive officers including local government chairmen, governors, and presidents in their respective tiers of government. Most times, these top executives impose their candidates based on their wealth, relationship etc. on the other members of the party. For example, in the 2019 general elections in Oyo state, the eventual party candidate, Adebayo Adelabu who was a former Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria was alleged to have paid the governor at that time a sum of 10 million dollars (3.57 billion Naira) to emerge as the eventual candidate (Sahara Reporters, 2018).

The process of becoming a political party's preferred choice of candidate is a process that requires patience, loyalty, and longevity, most importantly, what is commonly referred to as 'money politics', a process where financial strength reaffirms loyalty of party stalwarts. Several candidates by virtue of their relationship with their godfathers have been able to overcome these barriers. These may be through legitimate means which include financial superiority as demonstrated above. Others may be through non-existing internal democracy which often affects women (Oguadimma, Nwakalor & Ejinkeonye, 2021; CDD, 2019; Amina & Ibrahim, 2019; Ette, 2017).

Party chieftains otherwise known as godfathers have systematically degenerated political parties into tools for satisfying their voracious political appetite at the expense of merit and competence. In western developed countries, the electorate support political parties based on ideology and values. This is unfortunately not the case in Nigeria, where the electorate are financially induced and influenced in a massive case of vote trading (Jones, 2019). The concept of ideologies and values have gradually been replaced by financial gains for all parties involved in this. There is no gain-saying that in 2015, the INEC estimated that a huge number of monies amounting to 196 billion Naira was spent by political parties to participate and contest for electoral positions in the 2015 general elections (Daily Trust, 2019). Most of these funds were claimed to have been allegedly raised by political godfathers with then aim enjoying profitable returns from the stooges elected in public offices. Even godsons who are seen as men of integrity benefit from the

benevolence of their godfathers. For example, President Muhammadu Buhari had funds raised for him when he contested the 2015 general elections by a well-known godfather, Asiwaju Bola Tinubu (Premium Times, 2020). Buhari's campaign was alleged to have paid each party delegate the sum of \$3,000 to emerge candidate (Matenga, 2016).

It is however important to note that the pioneer set of godfathers in the country had a progressive ideological mindset. They deemed it unpatriotic to divert the privileges attributed to godfatherism for their personal aggrandizement. They were particular on the entrenchment of sound political values, grooming the right set of future politicians, as well as positively contributing to the development of their respective regions (Abdulkarim, 2019).

Godfathers according to Omotola (2007), exists in all strata of the Nigerian state, ranging from the religious, academic, and legal institutions. This has in no small way contributed to the criminalization of Nigerian politics. Political godfatherism and governance are two connected yet contradictory concepts that continue to negatively shape the socio-economic lives of teeming Nigerians. Due to this, an unexpected turnaround occurred during the general elections, in Kwara State, North-central Nigeria when the citizens and electorates voted against the godfathers who had held power since the start of the fourth republic in 1999. This signified the end of the 20-year reign of being controlled by the People's Democratic Party (PDP) lost all seats in the state to the All Progressive Congress (APC) in an unexpected turnaround of events in the state. This according to several political analysts in the country had sent very strong waves to other political godfathers that political power had returned to the people.

The theme of godfatherism has been fully operational in Kwara State since 1979 with Dr. Olusola Saraki being one of the earliest financier and godfather in the state. He was instrumental in the victory of Alhaji Adamu Attah in 1979 under the National Party of Nigeria (NPN). However, the relationship took a wrong turn and as a result, Dr. Olusola Saraki had to throw his weight behind Chief Cornelius Adebayo, a member of the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) despite being a cardcarrying member of the National Party of Nigeria (NPN). Unsurprisingly, he, Chief Adebayo won. It became glaring that Dr Olusola Saraki had rose to be the political juggernaut of the state. Upon the restoration to democratic governance in 1999, Dr Olusola Saraki supported once more Mohammed Lawal of the All-Peoples Party (APP). In 2003, Mohammed Lawal was not going to have any of Dr. Olusola Saraki's bullying and decided to break away from the de facto political godfather. The apolitical standoff brought the state to a standstill and was described by many as the primary reason for the loss of Muhammed Lawal in 2003. This ushered in the administration of his son, Dr Bukola Saraki from 2003 to 2011. However, upon completion of Dr Bukola Saraki's two-term tenure in 2011, it had been the silent wish of his father to sustain the chain of political dominance in the state. However, Dr. Bukola Saraki had another plan of his own. This time, it was to upstage his father as the sole political godfather of the state. This led to the defection of Dr Olusola Saraki with his daughter Gbemisola Saraki from the PDP to the Allied Congress Party of Nigeria (ACPN). Unsurprisingly, the Abdulfatah Ahmed of the PDP won the election, thereby signalling the end of the political dominance of Dr. Olusola Saraki. This brought into limelight the political acumen of Dr Bukola Saraki. It became dawn that a new political godfather had emerged in the state.

Unfortunately, Dr. Bukola Saraki's political influence came to an end with the loss of the People's Democratic Party (PDP) gubernatorial candidate in the March 9, 2019, election to the candidate of the All-Progressives Congress (APC). Abdulrahman Abdulrazaq of the APC polled at 331, 546 while Abdulrasaq Atunwa scored 114, 75 votes. The APC also secured all the available 24 seats in the House of Assembly as well as all the three senatorial seats in the state (Oladeinde, 2019).

During this period of political godfatherism, particularly between 1999 to 2019, quite a lot of irregularities had occurred which had impeded upon the developmental and democratisation process of the state. This spans across the health, economic as well as educational sectors. The crux of his paper however seeks to investigate the effect of godfatherism on governance Kwara State. The specific objectives of the study are to:

- Examine the effects of political godfatherism on democratic practice in Kwara State.
- ii. Examine the effects of political godfatherism on governance in Kwara State.

### **Research Hypotheses**

The study will also be guided by the formulation of hypotheses which include:

H1: Political godfatherism has no effect on democracy in Kwara State.

H2: Political godfatherism in the society has no effect on governance in Kwara State.

### **Theoretical Framework**

Vilfredo Pareto's elite theory propunded in 1935 was employed for the purpose of this paper. The elite theory indicates that power resides with individuals who make key decisions in economic, political, military sectors as well as those who determine the mode of production. Due to the privileges that comes with power, the elite theory posits that the elites find it difficult to surrender power and would do everything possible to hold on to it. In the event of a military coup, regime change or end in democratic tenure, power still gets recycled back within the elite caucus. The theory asserts the inequality that exists in the society and that the discussion of rights are only among equals. Hence, this forms the backbone of the mental and intellectual superiority that the elites have over others in the society with the belief that they are high accomplishers in their respective fields of choice. They are endowed with adequate resources by virtue of inheritance or otherwise which include social and oratory skills, cleverness, and distinct interest in politics. The theory thrives on class structures because politics is basically defined in terms of power and relies on the relationship between haves and the have not. Therefore, the political elite, refers to a group of highly eminent people who are characterized by unique political acts and can utilize or monopolize their influence and who possess a logic of camaraderie to sustain and strengthen their grip on the teeming populace. These political elites constantly excel in the capability to attain power and rule through whatever means possible. (Woleola, 2017). Scholars have however criticized the theory based on its opposition to pluralism. It has also been labelled as anti- democratic because of its reliance on the minority few who determine and dictate on behalf of the majority. This theory in every sense contradicts with the values of democracy, which is hinged upon accountability, transparency, periodic election amongst others.

### Literature Review

The conceptual overview of 'Godfatherism' is one issue that continues to evolve in the Nigerian Political system. 'Godfatherism' is not just prevalent in Nigeria alone but a global phenomenon, However, this has risen to prominence especially in the case of Nigeria where so many factors are contributing to these unpatriotic activities (Muhammed, 2022). Unsurprisingly, majority of emerging literatures on political godfatherism focus on developing countries, particularly Africa. This is because patrimonialism, clientelism, rent seeking kleptocracies and electoral malpractices accompanied most democratic dispensations in Africa (Mamogale, 2013). As a result, political godfatherism can be seen as a patron-client relationship in which the states resources are depicted as goods and services. This transaction is often not traded within the boundaries of the law and regulations and constitutionalism (Mamogale, 2013; Mustapha, 2019).

Political party can be seen as the platform through which individuals contest for electoral offices in any functional democracy. However, to a large extent, majority of the political parties, particularly in Africa have been subjected to compromise by the godfathers. The formation of Party system in Nigeria has become a wholly private investment. While it is logically correct that candidates must depend upon political parties for canvassing for votes from the electorate, emerging as flag bearers is solely dependent in most cases on lobbying and coming into ludicrous agreement with party stalwarts and godfathers. This negates the doctrine of merit and competence. The introduction of political money bags has reshaped the dynamics of political processes in the Nigerian political space (Philip, Chris, Osimeral & Kingsley, 2014).

Alabi & Tunde (2013) opined that the political godfather phenomenon is a new feature in the Nigerian political space. This spectacle dates back to the First Republic when the leading nationalists in the country (Nnamdi Azikwe, Chief Obafemi Awolowo, Alhaji Tafawa Balewa etc.) orchestrated political activities in the country. Since then, there have been lots of changes and dynamics in the philosophical positions of godfatherism in the First Republic and the current fourth republic (Mustapha, 2019).

Godfatherism in Nigerian politics is deep-rooted in the Nigerian system, and is apparent in all parties in Nigeria. Where political support is mobilized based on values and ideologies in western climes, the reverse is the case in Nigeria. Political support is mobilized based on the direction and influence of godfathers. There has been a recurrent pattern of former governors' desires to remain significant as policymakers and economic drivers in their respective states, partly due to the roles they play in the emergence of their successor. This is usually with the intent to impose on these successors. In most cases, this imposition often degenerates into clashes of interest between these godfathers and their incumbent (Muhammad, 2022; Jones, 2019). The fracas in Osun State between Mr. Rauf Aregbesola, a former governor of the state (2010-2018), minister of interior (2019-2023) and

Governor Gboyega Oyetola readily comes to mind. Aregbesola assumed the role of a godfather in the state's politics with the capacity to decide the fate of successive governors in the state including his successor, Oyetola. However, tensions began to rise between both individuals over matters of state which subsequently occasioned a major intra-party skirmish in the APC. Aregbesola foretold Oyetola that he would not return as governor of the state for a second term, which came to pass in an electoral showdown on 16 July, 2022 (Ukor, 2022).

Before the election, the former minister had favored Alhaji Moshood Adeoti for the position, but Oyetola wanted a second shot at the governorship position. Alhaji Moshood Adeoti was defeated in the 2022 Osun State APC primaries with 12, 921 votes to that of the Oyetola with 222,169 (Ukor, 2022). This fallout has been described by political spectators as one the major reasons why governor Oyetola lost the election to Ademola Adeleke of the PDP. In Kano State, similar pattern of betrayal has been recorded. Governor Abdullahi Ganduje was Rabiu Kwankwaso's deputy. He thus became the governor's godson with many other contestants reportedly frustrated out of the race to pave the way for him to take over from Kwankwaso in 2015.

Godfatherism is hinged on influence, and this was evident in the wrangle in Ogun State between Governor, Dapo Abiodun and his predecessor, Ibikunle Amosun. While it has been the ambition of the latter to hold a firm grip on the political terrain of the state under ruling APC in the state, the former would not bulge to such intimidating plans. He was equally adamant on consolidating his grasp on power in the state as well as breaking from the shackles of his predecessor. This led to internal wangling within the Ogun State APC chapter. With Amosun having established a formidable party structure in the state, he therefore decided to play the godfather role, preferring to put forward Adekunle Akinlade as his successor, not Dapo Abiodun. However, with a more superior backing from arguably the topmost godfather Asiwaju Bola Ahmed Tinubu, Abiodun emerged as the party's preferred choice of candidacy, thereby defying the strongholds of Amosun in the state (Ukor, 2022).

Similar case was observed in the row between Adams Oshiomhole and the incumbent Governor Godwin Obaseki in the Edo State 2019 elections where the latter had been preferred by his predecessor. Oshiomhole, the former governor had previously described Obaseki as the creative mind behind his administration. Nevertheless, after numerous disagreements which erupted between both individuals, their political relationship got to a breaking point and enmity shown. The favored son began to act against his erstwhile political father to limit his influence on decision-making affairs in the state.

In Lagos, ex-governor Akinwunmi Ambode also lost the goodwill of the political godfather of the state, Asiwaju Bola Ahmed Tinubu. Since 1999, Bola Ahmed Tinubu has been a force to reckon with in both state and national politics. He successfully fought with the federal government against the creation of more local governments in Lagos State. This indeed shows how powerful he is. It is believed that the disloyal attitude from Ambode was the real cause of the fallout between them. Since the return to democratic dispensation in 1999, Akinwunmi Ambode is the only Lagos State governor that has served a single tenure in office as Tinubu had

favored a more devoted Babajide Sanwo-Olu. It is germane to remain graced by Bola Ahmed Tinubu for a healthy and prosperous political career in Lagos State.

Borno State however presents a completely opposite narrative. This is because there seems to be a sense of utmost mutual respect and robust relationship between the godfather of Borno politics; Senator Kashim Shettima and his political godson, Professor Babangana Zulum. In a recent interview, Senator Shettima spoke on his relationship with governor Zulum citing the cordial relationship between them and the confidence he has in his successor to take the state to even greater heights (see Economic Confidential 2022, Pp 3). He also opined that political godfathers always have the larger chunk of the blame in these recurring issues and it always commences from transition which escalates in the second term of office.

### Methodology

An exploratory survey method was adopted for this research to enable the research obtain empirical data from the electorates of the state after the general elections. Kwara State was thus chosen among other states due to the revolt against godfatherism which has ushered an opposition political party in the 2019 general elections which also won re-election in 2023. A Survey method was adopted as a means to gather data from the samples using questionnaires. To achieve this, the research designed a questionnaire to target appropriate audience. The sample size was determined using the Krejcie and Morgan sampling table at 95% confidence level and a 5% error margin.

Furthermore, multi- stage cluster sampling was employed which requires choosing samples in stages due to the technicalities involved in the distribution of population that requires more than one sampling technique. They were different stages of the sampling procedures that were used in this study to collect data. At the initial stage, a list of all 3 senatorial districts was selected and they include Kwara Central, Kwara North with 5 Local Government Areas (LGAs) each and Kwara South with 6 LGAs.

In the stage two of the selection, simple random sampling technique was used to select five local government areas (Ilorin West, Ilorin South, Offa, Irepodun, Isin). The technique was chosen because it gives all members of the population the equal chance of being included in the sample. Lastly, the convenience sample technique was used in the distribution of the questionnaire to residents of selected areas with the age bracket of 18 and above which is the minimum age requirement for voter franchise in Nigeria. The data for this study was gathered using self-administered questionnaire. This questionnaire specifically contained question items that dealt with the purpose and problem of the study in close ended in format and measured with 5-point Likert scale items. The data elicited was analyzed quantitatively looking at the pattern of responses from the key respondents. Similarly, the data collected was based on a descriptive statistical analysis using frequency tables. Inferential tool of regression was used to check the effect of godfatherism on governance. Frequency tables was adopted to analyse the data collected using a frequency table and recurrence of value.

## **Findings and Discussion**

This section presents the analysis and interpretation of data that was derived for the research work. A total of 370 questionnaires were administered and responses are presented in the table below.

# Analysis of Overall Response Rate of Share Questionnaire

Table 1: Socio-Demography of Respondents

Socio-Demographic Characteristics of Individual	Frequency	Percentage
Sex of Respondents		
Male	233	63
Female	137	37
Total	370	100.0
Age of Respondents		
20-29 years	20	5.4
30-39 years	107	28.9
40-49 years	118	31.9
Above 50 years	125	33.8
Total	370	100.0
<b>Marital Status</b>		
Single	115	31.1
Married	182	49.2
Divorced	73	19.7
Total	370	100.0

Source: Field Survey (2023)

The result showed that 233 (63%) of the respondents were male while 137 (37%) were female. This implies that they were more males than females. This is an indication that both genders were involved in the respondents.

Furthermore, the ages of the respondents also show that 125 (33.8%) were above 50 years, followed by 118 (31.9%) who were between 40-49 years, followed by 107 (28.9%) who were between 30-39years, lastly 20 (5.4%) were between 20-29 above. This indicate that majority of the respondents were above 50 years and are perhaps one of the most affected by the scourge of financial clientelism in the state.

# Data Presentation and Analysis of Research questionnaire

Table 2: Community Development and Local Government Efficacy

S/N	Community Development	Mean	Std.
			Dev.
1	Political godfatherism exists in the society	3.19	1.518
2	Access to wealth contributes to godfatherism	3.59	1.418
3	Godfatherism has a positive influence in local politics	3.62	1.404
4	Incumbency factor is a major determinant of godfatherism	3.99	1.129
5	Has the government been poor in service delivery	2.29	1129
6	Do you think corruption exists in the current government administration?	3.04	1.414
7	Do you think that high level of favoritism has over shadowed governance?	2.95	1.363
8	Do you think that citizens are able to air their views on current happenings?	3.38	1.440
9	In your experience, do you think that democracy supports free and fair election?	3.39	1.339

Source: Author's Computation (2023)

The questionnaire sought to find out the perception and impacts of godfatherism on governance in Kwara State. A variety of questions which revolved round the quality of governance in the state and respondents provided answers. Godfatherism has been a major part of the state's history and it was no surprise that majority of the respondents agreed to its existence in the state. Several reasons are responsible for this, one of which is the expensive nature of Nigeria's political governance which has made desperate politicians give their all to attain this position (). In agreement with (), majority of the respondents strongly agreed that access to wealth contributes to godfatherism with a mean ratio of 3.59. It is also strongly believed that the effects of godfatherism is felt across the grassroots and in local politics. This implies that citizens bear the brunt of ill-fated governmental policies the most. This often come in the form of economic depression and deteriorating social services. However, respondents still thought that the government had done considerably well when it came to service delivery in the state. The existence of good roads and other infrastructural services majorly in its capital are responsible for this. Contrary to this in question 6, majority of the respondents agreed that corruption existed in the governmental administration with the mean ratio of 3.04. Majority of the respondents also strongly agreed that high level of favoritism has over shadowed governance but still, citizens agree that they are able to vocally share their opinions on the happenings in the state. The next question sought to find out from respondents if they thought incumbency factor was a major determinant of godfatherism as has been seen in various states' practice. With a mean ratio of 3.99, majority of the respondents agreed to this claim. Finally, the respondents are also fully aware that the practice of democracy supports free and fair elections. Thus, this political awareness was displayed in the movement that ousted the incumbent administration in the state after a plethora of years. However, this implies majority of the respondents agreed to the question. This response is however surprising. This is so because the state is a Muslim dominated region, where one would have assumed that the concept of democracy would not be favoured compared to Islamic mode of governance (Shariah). This response however further attests to the popularity of democracy even in the core Muslims dominated regions of the country

## **Hypothesis One**

Political godfatherism in the society has no effect on governance in Kwara State.

Table 3		Model Summary			
Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	
1	.383ª	.146	.144	1.308	

a. Predictors: (Constant), Political godfatherism exists in the society

Source: Field Survey, 2023

Table 3 reveals the extent to which the dependent variable (governance) is explained by the independent variable (political godfatherism). R-squared measures the goodness of fit of the model, indicating the fraction of variance in the dependent variable that may be forecast from the independent variable. The R-squared value is 0.146 expressed as a percentage (14.6%), which shows that 14.6 variation in governance is explained by political godfatherism existing in Kwara. The R value of 0.383 indicates that there is a positive relationship between political godfatherism which exist in society and governance.

Table	4	ANOVA <sup>a</sup>				
Model		Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	107.931	1	107.931	63.108	.000 <sup>b</sup>
	Residual	629.377	368	1.710		
	Total	737.308	369			

- a. Dependent Variable: Governance
- b. Predictors: (Constant), Political godfatherism exists in the society

Source: Field Survey, 2023

Table 4 shows the complete assessment of the statistical significance of the model result. The F-statistic of the model is 63.108 with a significance level of 0.000, which indicates that the model presented in the table is statistically significant (sig = 0.000). Based on this result, we reject the null hypothesis (p < 0.05). Thus, the alternate hypothesis is accepted, which means that political godfatherism influences governance in Kwara State.

Table 5: Coefficients<sup>a</sup>

		Unstandardized Coefficients (		Standardized Coefficients		
Model		В	Std. Error	Beta	Т	Sig.
1	(Constant)	1.905	.159		12.010	.000
	Political godfatherism	.356	.045	.383	7.944	.000

a. Dependent Variable: Governance

Source: Field Survey, 2023

Table 5 presents the extent to which political godfatherism affects governance on teenage students. The beta coefficient is 0.356 with an associated significance level of 0.000. The significance level shows that there is a substantial contribution in explaining governance. Hence, political godfatherism has a significant effect on governance in Kwara State.

#### **Decision Rule**

Since the significance level of the model is less than 0.05, the null hypothesis should be rejected, while the alternate hypothesis is accepted. It can therefore be concluded that political godfatherism has a significant effect on governance in Kwara State.

Hypothesis 2
Political godfatherism has no effect on democracy in Kwara State

Table 6	Model Summary				
Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	
1	.096ª	.009	.007	1.046	

a. Predictors: (Constant), Political godfatherism exists in the society

Source: Field Survey, 2023

Table 6 reveals the range to which the dependent variable (democracy) variance is explicated by the independent variable (political godfatherism). R-squared measures the goodness of fit of the model, indicating the fraction of variance in the dependent variable that may be forecast from the independent variable. The R-squared value is 0.009 expressed as a percentage (9%), which shows that 9 variations in democracy is explained by political godfatherism. The R value of 0.096 indicates that there is a weak positive relationship between political godfatherism and democracy.

Table 7 ANOVA <sup>a</sup>						
Model		Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	3.764	1	3.764	3.437	.065 <sup>b</sup>
	Residual	403.004	368	1.095		
	Total	406.768	369			

a. Dependent Variable: Democracy

b. Predictors: (Constant), Political godfatherism

Source: Field Survey, 2023

Table 7 shows the complete valuation of the statistical significance of the model result. The F-statistic of the model is 3.437 with a significance level of 0.065, which shows that the model in this table is not statistically significant (sig = 0.065). Based on this result, we accept the null hypothesis (p > 0.05). Thus, political godfatherism has no effect on democracy in Kwara State, which means that the alternate hypothesis is rejected.

Table 8: Coefficient Table

Coefficients<sup>b</sup>

Model	Unsta ndardi zed	coefficie nts Std. Error	standard ized Coefficie nts Beta	T	Sig.
1 (Constant)	3.668	.127		28.904	.000
Political godfatherism exists in the society	.067	.036	.096	1.854	.065

Dependent Variable: Democracy

Source: Field Survey, 2023

Table 8 presents the extent to which political godfatherism affects democracy in Kwara State. The beta coefficient is 0.067 with an associated significance level of 0.065. This indicates that a more prevalent occurrence of political godfatherism will not bring about an effect on democracy. The significance level shows that there is no significant contribution in democracy. Hence, political godfatherism has no significant effect on democracy in Kwara State.

### **Decision Rule**

Since the significance level of the model is greater than 0.05, the null hypothesis should be accepted, while the alternate hypothesis is rejected. It can therefore be concluded that political godfatherism has no significant effect on democracy in Kwara State.

### **Hypothesis One**

It was found from table 15 that the F-statistic has a value of 63.108 with a probability value of 0.000, indicating that the model has overall significance. Based on this result, we reject the null hypothesis and accept the alternate hypothesis that Godfatherism has significant impact governance in Kwara State.

This finding aligns with Chukwuemeka, Oji and Chukwurah (2013) statement which states that Political godfatherism and governance are two connected but contradictory phenomena that have sparked a lot of intellectual interest in trying to figure out what they are, what they are like, what causes them, and how they affect governance and democracy in Kwara State.

### Hypothesis Two

Table 18 revealed that F-statistics in the regression model has a value of 3.437 with a significance level of 0.065, which is an indication that the model has no overall significance. Hence, we accept the null hypothesis and reject the alternate

hypothesis that Godfatherism has no effect on democracy in Kwara State. However, the result does not correspond to the current reality and as a result, further study is recommended.

#### Conclusion

Based on the analysis conducted through the data gathered from the respondents, the study generated some empirical findings. The result obtained provide answers to the hypothesis stated in this paper. It was found out that godfatherism has a significant impact on governance in Kwara State. This implies that as the influence of godfatherism increases in a state, there is bound to be a direct impact on governance. Impacts such as thuggery, corruption, mediocrity, poverty and under development. It was also discovered according to the research analysis that godfatherism has no significant relationship and impact on democracy in Kwara State. This does not conform with expected result as well as current life reality.

### Notes

- 1. Political clientelism and godfatherism are used interchangeably in the research.
- 2. A republic refers to a period of democratic practice before truncation by military rule. Each republic ends once the practice of democracy ends. Nigeria at independence practiced a democratic rule from independence till 1966 and this period is referred to as the First Republic. Nigeria returned to democratic rule in 1979 till 1983 which constituted the Second Republic. The Third republic lasted for just 3 months in between August and November 1993. The country is still in the Fourth Republic which commenced in 1999 and represents the longest era of uninterrupted democratic practice in Nigeria.

## **Funding Details**

No fundings were received for the purpose of this research. All expenses were covered by the authors.

### **Disclosure Statement**

This author reports that there are not competing interests to declare.

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