

Pakistan's Internal Security Paradox: Challenges & Implications

Dr. Asif Salim and Muhammad Azeem

Abstract

Pakistan is grisly facing the challenge of religious extremism, ethno-nationalist violence and jihadi culture for the last many decades. These threats are the outcomes of flawed policies adopted by the state apparatus to achieve settled foreign policy objectives. The streamlining of political Islam with external security challenges gave rise to many sectarian and militant organizations which have now become security challenge for law enforcing institutions. The current research explores the factors responsible for the political violence in Pakistan in the recent past and the linkages between the religious political parties, ethnic groups and Islamist militants groups. Apart from this, it is deeply focused that how internal security developments and external security challenges are interlinked with each other. Arguably, the militant organizations and sectarian outfits can be useful to the some extant but the argument is that in the long run it would be deadly embrace for Pakistan. The management of security governance is no doubt is a challenging task for the security manager of Pakistan, it is therefore, argued in the paper that obstacle interposes in the way of internal security governance should reform with revisiting its revisionist policies towards its eastern and western fronts.

Keywords: Ethno-Nationalist Violence, Islamist Actors, Afghanistan, India, Security Governance

Introduction

Pakistan, for the last many decades, is facing challenging threat of ethno-nationalist violence, sectarian and communal hatred as well Islamist militancy especially in the borderland area. Various political and ideological groups have joined hands to achieve political and religious objectives by targeting the ordinary citizens, political leaders, government officials and security personnel. It is perceived by different historians and political experts that the roots of current political violence deeply rooted in the founding ideology of Pakistan. Later on, after the independence of Pakistan, civil and military governments tried to manage the ethnic and sectarian difference by opting the stylized version of Islam which was, no doubt, a direct threat to minority communities i.e. Hindus, Parsees, Christians, and Sikhs in Pakistan. Although, in objective resolution *{Constitutional guidelines for the constituent assembly, passed in March 1949}* provides the sections of protection of minorities but on ground they were in precarious conditions (Hassan, 2014).

It was failure of the ruling elites that they could not inculcate the seeds of Pakistani nationalism in the minds of the upcoming generation to accommodate the diversity of

*Authors are Visiting Lecturer, Department of Political Science, University of Peshawar, Peshawar and PhD Scholar, Department of History and Pakistan Studies, University of the Punjab, Lahore.

culture under the single umbrella in the new country. They tried to integrate ethno-nationalist, and religio-cultural diversity through branded version of Islam. Despite clear conflict between demographic reality {diversification in Pakistan} and ideology of Pakistan {rooted in Islam} political elites strengthened their commitment to alter the heterogeneity with homogeneity by forceful version of Deobandi Islam without analyzing that if the policy of unity through religion could not succeed horrendous future consequences would be faced. After the partitioned of subcontinent along with thirty two million Muslims in East of Pakistan twelve million Hindus were residing but ruling elite could not accommodate their regional and economic aspiration which leads to dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971. Similarly, the same situation, later on, gradually developed in the erstwhile Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), Baluchistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and some parts of Sindh province (Lambert, 1950).

It is pertinent to little analyze the irreversible path of radicalized Islamism by passing the Objective Resolution on 12th March 1949 by political, administrative and military ruling class of the country to provide restricted guidelines to the first constituent assembly. The resolution strongly enhanced the role of clergy class in political affairs of Pakistan. It provided a vast power to explain narrow definition of a “Muslim” which expelled Ahmadies, Shias, and to the some extant Barelvis from the boundaries of Islam. Arguably, religio-ethnic violent fissures have damaged the state of its different phases; however, it is a grave failure of the state institutions to effectively manage the threat of violent extremism. It is also deeply perceived that security vanguards enabled the threat in the country but at the same time they were at the forefront to address internal security threats. This situation, no doubt, raised inquisitive paradoxical questions. Pakistan, on one hand, is trying to manage successfully internal asymmetrical security threats. While, on the other hand, managing the regional conventional security balances with India by adopting asymmetrical tools of warfare. To counter domestic security threats armed forces used excessive forces against the rebels and insurgents in Baluchistan and erstwhile FATA respectively in different periods, nevertheless, in collateral damage civilians paid heavy cost of casualties and infrastructure destruction (Pakistan, Abuses, Impunity Erode Rights,, 2013).

Apart from this, the institutions which are responsible to ensure the rule of law within the country are in weak position to counter the myriad threat to the state security. Basically, there are two reasons; first, there are many terrorist groups which are immediate threat to the internal security threat to Pakistan have linkages to those Islamist militants groups which are engaged in Jihadi activities in Afghanistan against the foreign troops and Indian-held Kashmir. Secondly, there is a lack of will by the law enforcing institutions as the members various organizations are closely enjoying the patronage of the political parties. Surprisingly, the members of many militant and sectarian groups also enjoy the support of local people. In time of elections they influence the voices of local people in support of political parties who later on provide

Pakistan's Internal Security Paradox: Challenges & Implications

them protection in legal and administrative matters (Pakistan, Abuses, Impunity Erode Rights., 2013).

Political Actors and Domestic Insecurity

This section provides the detail account of political actors which are the immediate source of internal security threat to the state of Pakistan. Since, Pakistan is perceived to the host territory for the various violent groups such as ethno-nationalist and Islamist militant groups. Further, the organized linkages between political parties and criminal groups are important to be focused. It will give deep understanding to the experts and researchers to explore the multi-layered security threat to Pakistan.

Ethno-Nationalist Providers of Insecurity

Pakistan for the last many decades is facing challenging threat of ethno-nationalist violence. This political violence along with terrorist and militant attacks first occurred in the province of Baluchistan and Sindh. After the independence of Pakistan, disturbance in Baluchistan were started. Few tribes of Baluchistan expressed reservations and showed stiff resistance against the annexation with Pakistan. Even they took arms and initiated nationalist militant movements. These militant groups used to attack the government officials, security forces, professors, teachers, doctors and other professional of educated class. 'Punjabi settlers' in the province were also targeted by these groups. The central government started full-fledged military operations not only against the militant outfits which were creating disturbance but also booked the peaceful ethno-nationalist political leaders of Baluchistan. The missing person issue remains a bone of contention between the provincial government of Baluchistan and federal government. Dissident Baluch leadership makes the security forces responsible for the excess with Baluchistan (samad, 2014).

Now currently, there is two-fold resentment in Baluchistan. First, the militant groups consist of Baluch origin demands complete independence of the province of Baluchistan from rest of Pakistan. And this demand rose immediately after the partition of subcontinent. Second, the other ethnic groups of Baluchistan such as Pakhtuns, Baloch and other ethnic and religious minorities have reservations against the federal government by not transferring adequate funds and royalty of gas to the province. This create budget short-fall, resultantly massive under-development of the province is natural. The hard fact is that successive governments of Pakistan (civil-military) have failed to reconcile the different ethno-nationalist groups in Baluchistan and could not ensure complete devolution of constitutional and political power to the province (samad, 2014).

Sindh is also a hub of competition of ethno-nationalist actors. Four major groups i.e. Sindhies, Baluchies, Pakhtunes and Muhajirs (Urdu speaker migrated from India from the areas of Bihar and UP) are in deep conflict to get political influence in the province. These different ethnic groups are represented by their ethnic political parties. Almost all political parties especially in Sindh have their own armed militia

and student wings in colleges and universities. These wings often involve in violence and work for the broader agenda their organizations. In different phases of history, the federal government deployed military and Para-military forces to crush the elements of unrest in Sindh. However the problem unrest by the political parties is exacerbating with the passage of time. After 2001, law enforcing agencies started targeted operations especially in the Pakhtune areas of Karachi which generated contentions among Pakhtunes against the forces. Awami National Party (ANP) and Mutahida Quomi Movement (MQM) are often in clash to dominate the provincial politics. The MQM is secular political party but maintain its own armed militia and involve in organized criminal activities in the province (Siddiqi, 2015).

Islamist Actors: Political and Apolitical

The most sanguinary threat to the state is from Islamic extremist forces. These are the organizations {Jihadi and Sectarian} which are involved in lethal activities against the state and society. They targeted the innocent people through act of terrorism and at the same time have initiated guerrilla campaign against the law enforcing agencies. Notably, some time, the sectarian outfits are involved in ethnic violence i.e. slaughtering of Hazara Shia community of Baluchistan by Deobandi terrorist organizations in the recent years. The apparent relationship and linkages among various sectarian and Jihadi groups made the non-Deobandi communities more expose to vulnerability and dragged the society towards radicalization. Ahle Sunnat-Wal-Jamaat (ASWJ) is a new political-cum-sectarian entity in the political landscape of Pakistan. This organization consists of old membership of Siph-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) and Lashkar-i-Jhangvi (LeJ) and some elements of Therik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). These sectarian organizations have longstanding linkages with Afghan Taliban as well as Al-Qaeda. Deobandi groups are also involved in guerilla activities in Indian-held Kashmir and equally fighting with the Kashmiri fighters for the liberation of Kashmir. Jaish-e-Muhammad (JM), Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Harkat-ul-Jihad-e-Islami (HJI) and harkat-ul-Mujhideen (HuM) are exclusively Deobandi Jihadi organizations focusing to carry out attacks in Indian held Kashmir and sometime in India (Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, State of Human Rights in 2013, 2014).

Many Deobandi militant organizations relationship can be traced with Deobandi political organizations which provide shelter to these organizations in time crisis. The main Deobandi political parties are Jaamat-Ulama-i-Islam (JUI-F), JAmaat-i-Islami (JI) and Jaamat-Ulama-i-Islam (JUI-S). It is widely believed that these political parties are largely funded by wealthy Arab states. They then further distribute money to affiliated militant groups. Importantly mention, that in the 1980s and early 1990s Shia sectarian militant group emerged on the surface. Therk-e-Nifaz-e-Fiqh-e-Jafaria (TNFJ) is an ostensible example which was founded in 1979. This organization not only resists Zia-ul-Haq anti-Shia laws campaign but also targeted the Sunni groups. The main source of funding to this organization was from Iran. However, the current

Pakistan's Internal Security Paradox: Challenges & Implications

trends are different as it is perceived that violent threat only generate from Deobandi outfits. Therefore, to counter the threat, the rival Deobandi sects have maintained their own militia. In erstwhile kurram Agency a small group of militia has formed to themselves against the possible Deobandi attacks. Further, Bralvi sect is also highly prone to Deobandi violence, therefore, increasingly militarizing themselves (Fair, 2011).

Geo-Politics of Jihadi-Culture: Sectarian Violence and Emergence of Pakistani Taliban

Currently Pakistan is facing multi-layered contemporary domestic internal security challenges. However these challenges are not the outcome of bad policies adopted by the security managers of Pakistan due to which internal security threat seems to be uncontrolled. It would not be wrong to say that managing the external security challenge the instrumentalization of political Islam was vital in shaping the foreign policy of Pakistan especially towards its eastern and western borders. The emergence of TTP and ASWJ is, no doubt, an outcome of the decision of the security vanguards to settle the scores in Afghanistan as well as in India. The watershed event of 9/11 gave more strength to the proxies' policies especially in Pak-Afghan borderland area. After analyzing the brief account of Jihadi policies in Afghanistan and India it has been explored that Islamist insurgency has now been uncontrollable and needs comprehensive strategy to counter it (Mahsud, 2010).

Dilemma of Afghan Jihad and Role of Pakistan

Pakistan is involved in the internal politics of Afghanistan since its independence. Despite cultural and religious affinity Afghanistan was the first country opposed Pakistan admission in the UN. The then Afghan government claimed that Durand Line is not a permanent border between Afghanistan and Pakistan and in fact did claim on large swathes of territory of Baluchistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Since, Pakistan was facing security threat from its border and had deployed increased number of troops so it did not want to open a new front because of minimal resources. Therefore, Pakistan from the very beginning started to manipulate the internal events in Afghanistan to install pro-Pakistan government in Afghanistan. The political landscape of Afghanistan dramatically started to change. King Daoud ousted the government of his cousin King Muhammad Zahir Shah. King Daoud was anti-Pakistan and pro-Soviet. He immediately took measures to impose Soviet-back secularization in the country. No doubt, that was an alarming situation for Islamabad. In 1974, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto opened ISI Afghan cell with the aim to organize the dissidents into militant groups so as to out the government of King Daoud. After the toppling Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's government by General Zia-Ul-Haq the former policies were continued in Afghanistan (Zahab & Roy, 2004).

In December in 1978, Soviet signed a treaty called "Treaty of Friendship" with the government of Noor Muhammad Taraki. The treaty was for 20 years and the aim was

to provide economic and military aid to Afghanistan so that suitable pro-Soviet government can be installed. Since, the members of Afghan communist party were not satisfied with the government of Taraki therefore his government was overthrown and later on he was killed by the party. In December, Soviet troops moved to Afghanistan with its mighty force established a pro-Soviet rule in Afghanistan. It is important to understand, that Pakistan's secret agency have already trained the Islamist militant groups which nearly 50 in numbers. The task was given to Lieutenant General Fazle Haq to reduce the numbers of groups and bring them under the single umbrella. It is true that the US actively involved in affairs of Afghanistan after Soviet forces entrance into Afghanistan but its policies were very clear to halt Soviet forces territorial expansion and defeat them in Afghanistan before 1979. The 10 years of Afghan Jihad entirely reshaped the domestic fabrics of Pakistan. Extremism and radicalization deeply flourished in Pakistani society and state policies were entirely dependent to secure success in Afghanistan at any cost (Zahab & Roy, 2004).

In 1988, Geneva Accord was signed between Pakistan, Afghanistan, Soviet Union and the US. However, Americans were not directly and influentially involved in the accord. Washington has already balanced the scores of Vietnam in Afghanistan and internally weakened the Soviet Union. Therefore, it was not much interested about the future of Afghanistan. But, on the other hand, Islamabad was interested to install pro-Pakistan and Islamist government in Afghanistan. However, when the soviet withdrew from Afghanistan there was government of Muhammad Najib Ullah with pro-Soviet tendencies. He was remained in power by 1992. Civil war was in full swing among the different Afghan groups. Pakistan supported Pushtun Islamist groups under the leadership of Gulbaddin Hikmaat Yar. Pakistan did an effort to bring all Afghan faction under compromise solution and ultimately a "Peshawar Accord" was signed but soon it was broke down. In 1996, powerful group with the name Taliban and under the leadership of Mula Omer emerged and captured the capital city of Kabul (https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1988/04/15/agreement-on-afghanistan-signed-in-geneva/c7288c6764-4e73-9bc5-7eeb48f7827d/?noredirect+on&utm_term+4c20534b5532).

The Taliban leadership came into contact with Pakistani political leadership with their ties with Jammait Ulma-i-Islam leader Mulana Fazlul Rehman. Rehman was an ally of the Banazir government so he facilitated contacts with between banazir Bhutto and Afghan leadership. The task was given to then interior minister Naseer ullah khan Baber to provide logistic and other support to Taliban. There is no denial to the fact that policy of supporting the Islamist groups in Afghanistan is started since the government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto but later on it was considered by policy-makers of Islamabad that Gubadin Hikmatyar is not enough to install pro-Pakistan government in Afghanistan. Therefore, Pakistan supported and welcomed Afghan Taliban government in 1996. However, Pakistan continued to provide safe shelters to the other leadership of Afghan Islamist factions such as Heekmat Yar and Jalal-ud-Din Haqqani [Haqqani Network perceived to be based in North Waziristan] (Ahmad, 2010).

Pakistan's Jihad in India

Pakistan is perceived to be the pioneer of asymmetrical warfare South Asia formally when it first used irregulars in Kashmir. Kashmir was a princely state ruled by the Sikh ruler Hari Singh. According to 3rd Jun Plan of 1947 three options were given to the rulers of princely states [there were round about 600 princely states in time of partition]. First, declares accession with newly born state of Pakistan. Second, to annex with India and third option was to retain their independent identity without declaring accession with any state. It was categorically mentioned in the plan that doing any decision desires of the local population and geographical proximity is important to be looked into. Almost, all the princely states peacefully declared their accession with India and Pakistan except three states i.e. Hyderabad, Juddnagr and Kashmir. The first two states were captured by India fiercely while Kashmir became bone of contestation between India and Pakistan. Kashmir Signed "Stand Still Agreement" with Pakistan as well as with India that not to interfere in the internal affairs of Kashmir. However, middle ranked army officers of Pakistan were not satisfied and wanted to annex the state of Kashmir with Pakistan. Colonel Akbar Khan-director of weaponry- coordinated facilitated the tribal people to invade and liberate Kashmir. The forces of Raja Hari Singh could not resist the naturally trained tribal combatants so Raja immediately calls for assistance to Indian government. Hari Singh first signed agreement of accession with India then India sent their troops. At the same time, Pakistan also sent their forces. Thus, the first war between India and Pakistan was fought in 1948. When the war ended, on-third Kashmir was in the hand of Pakistan while rest part was in the control of India. The conflict bequeathed a nuclear flash point of South Asia that exists to date (Nawaz, 2008).

Since the first war between India and Pakistan ended with involvement of the UN Pakistan continuously used proxies in Indian-held Kashmir. The local uprising in Kashmir first started in 1989 in Poonj district due to mismanagement by the Indian government to address the political grievances of Kashmiries. Pakistan took full advantage of the situation and entered battle-hardened Mujhideen from Afghanistan to Kashmir. It was suitable time to ensure the militants' entrance into Kashmir because Soviet troops had been withdrawn and Pakistan made its defense invisible with 'nuclear umbrella'. Since 2001, the guerilla campaign of the militant groups has become more deadly than ever. Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith militant groups currently are actively involved in lethal attacks on Indian army in Indian-held Kashmir (Swami, 2007).

Emergence of Pakistani Taliban and Deobandi Militant Groups after 9/11

The tragic of 9/11 not only transformed the world politics but left no options for the weak and small states to pursue independent foreign policies. Pakistan became front line the US war on terrorism because of close geographical proximity and close relation with Taliban regime. Pakistan sent delegation of Ulama (Clergy class) to talk to Taliban to handover Osama Bin Laden the leader of Al-Qaeda and alleged

perpetrator of 9/11 attacks. But, Taliban leadership clearly deny to handover Laden to Pakistan or the US. Therefore, Pakistan took a u-turn from the Taliban and the then President-cum-army chief General Pervez Musharaf decided to support the US in the war against terrorism. This decision created a rift among the Pakistani based militant groups. First ever split took place in the ranks of Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM). The head of JeM Masood Azhar was loyal to the state while the split group Jaamat-ul-Furqan (JF) involved into deadly suicide campaign against the government installation and security forces (Johnson, 2007).

The militant groups which were rapidly evolving in Pakistan events in the erstwhile FATA were dramatically shaping. When the US initiated full-fledged military operation 'Operation Enduring Freedom' (OEF) in Afghanistan many affiliated Uzbeks, Uighers, Arabs, and Afghans were fled to Pak-afghan border land area and took shelter in erstwhile tribal areas. They poured money to the local people of FATA of shelter and cooperation. In 2002, Pakistan army started limited military operations in some parts of FATA conflict emerged between the tribal people and security forces. The dominant tribes of Waziristan decided to fight against Pakistan army. In 2007, Mullah Nazir and hafiz Gul Bahadur formed Muqami Threek-e-Taliban with aim to protect the interests of Wazir and Mhesud tribes and also balanced Baitullah Mehsud and its affiliated faction Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). Nevertheless, later on Nazir and Bahadur signed a peace agreement with army that they will not attack the army and government installation and would remain focused to oust the US and NATO troops from Afghanistan and restore the government of Taliban (Rassler & Brown, 2011).

In November 2007, various militant commanders collectively decided to operate under the banner of Threek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) under the leadership of Baitullah Mehsud. It is important to mention, that many commanders called themselves as Pakistani Taliban but they were not the part of TTP. Gul Bhadur and Mullah Nazir did not join TTP and their focus was only towards Afghan Jihad. In August 2009, Baithullah was killed in the US drone strike and then Hakeem Ullah Mehsud took over the charge of TTP. Under his leadership new wave of bloody campaign of suicide attacks were in full swing. Security forces were killed, common citizens were attacked, Shia and Ahamdi communities were brutally slaughtered, and sacred Sufi shrines were boomed. TTP made alliance with the sectarian outfits such as SSP and LeJ so as to facilitate and assist each other in time crisis (Rassler & Brown, 2011).

In November 2013, TTP leadership was changed after the killing of Hakeem Ullah Mehsud in the US drone strike. He was replaced by Mulvi Fazlullah who was previously the head of Threek-I-Nifaz-e-shariat-e-Muhammadi (TNSM) in district Swat of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa largely called "Mulana Radio". TNSM was established in 1990 but reinvigorated after 2001 and fiercely claimed to imposition of Sharia in the district. Muvi Fazlullah join hands to implement Sharia laws in the area. Fazlullah forced an agreement called System of Justice in 2009. Under this so-called

Pakistan's Internal Security Paradox: Challenges & Implications

justice system various human rights violations were recorded and image of Pakistan was distorted in the comity of the nations. Nonetheless, TNSM broke the agreement and Pakistan army immediately launched full-fledged military operation in valley and crushed the militants. Fazlullah was succeeded to escape and refuge in Afghanistan's province of Kunar (Khan, 2010).

The Pakistani Taliban movement first started in the erstwhile North and South Waziristan agency but later on it was expanded to the agencies of FATA such as Kurram agency, Bajaur and Muzaffargarh and Orakzai Agencies. Among all these, Kurram agency [Shia populated agency] was a peaceful place but the deadly wave of sectarian violence started there with the active assistance to the Deobandi sectarian outfits by TTP. Later on, the adjacent areas of frontiers i.e. Bannu, Tank, Kohat, Lakki Marwat, Dera Ismail Khan, and Swat were also become the hub of activities of TTP. Apart from this, in April 2009, new militant group emerged on the surface with the name of 'Punjabi Taliban'. Although, Punjabi community largely deny the fact by saying that Punjabis are not involved in any kind of insurgency but on the other hand Pakhtun community states that religious militancy and insurgency is not limited to the Pakhtuns. However, the existential fact is that Punjab is a new theater of Talibanization as most of Punjab based militant groups such as JeM and LeT have secret linkages with TTP. It would be wrong to describe the Punjabi Taliban as backbone of TTP which facilitate the later one to target Shia, Ahmadies, Brahmins throughout Pakistan in general and in Punjab in Particular (Hashim, 2013).

Obstacles Interpose in the way of Reforming Security Governance in Pakistan

- **Lack of Will by the Security Establishment**

Internal security threat is directly linked with external security challenges. Islamist militant groups are third and fourth line of defense for the state of Pakistan as considered and described by many security experts. The militant groups which are fighting in Afghanistan and Indian-held Kashmir are considered the 'strategic assets' of Pakistan. These militant groups on one hand are enjoying the patron-ship of security elites while on the other hand they are closely linked with Deobandi sectarian outfits. Although army initiated military campaign against those militant groups who turn their guns towards military but at the same time draw a line of good militants and bad militants which make the army approach ambivalence. Moreover, no law enforcing agency approach to Punjab based militant groups and broke down their relationship with TTP. It is, therefore, important for the security managers that first to abandon the Jihadi policy in its foreign policy and then to take measures to weed out these militant organizations.

- **Lack of Capability and Management of Security Governance**

As it has been established that domestic security challenges are the manifestation of its own policies therefore shortcoming on the part of law enforcing agencies are obvious. For the sake of viable security policy it is important that all the civil and

military security agencies should be on the same page. The problem is that military intelligence agencies viewed particular group as an asset while at the same time the local police consider it criminal gang. Similarly, the police arresting a particular individual, the Interior ministry or other government agency often demand the suspect's release. This shows the apathy and lack of capability of the law enforcing institutions especially at local level (Fair C. , 2012).

- **Criminal Justice System in Pakistan**

There are many flaws in the criminal justice system of Pakistan. Mostly its criminal law draws on three colonial era laws, the Pakistan Penal Code of 1860, the Evidence Act of 1872, and the Criminal Procedure Code of 1898. At the same time, Pakistan has also retained the colonial-era Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) of 1901, which actually places FATA under a different regulatory framework which gives unbridled legislative, executive and judicial powers to political agent and maintains peace under the law of "collective punishment." However, after the passing of 25th amendment in the constitution {merger of FATA with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa} gave relief to the people of FATA especially in legal matters.

The hard fact is that Pakistan's legal framework is not compatible to modern state beset with complex law and order problems. The system of courts and prisons are derisory. According to the report of International Crisis Group, at the beginning of 2010 there were more than 177,000 cases pending in the superior courts and 1.3 million in the lower judiciary. The judges are few to manage the court system viably. As are civil servants everywhere, judicial officers are poorly paid and prone to bribery (Raza, 2018).

It is therefore important that concerted efforts are employed to reform the criminal justice system of Pakistan. Officials of the state should begin by revamping the legal framework and at the same time to invest in the construction of a modern policing force. Moreover, lawyer training is equally important as they are pleaders and investigate the matters. Further, reforming judicial recruitments and appointments, both at the lower and superior level needs to be focused and working to stem the institutionalized corruption that extends throughout the breadth of Pakistan's legal system.

Conclusions and Implications

Since the independence of Pakistan both civil and military leadership has adopted the national ideology based on political Islam. In due course of time liberal class entirely suppressed by religious elites and assumed the permanent control to decide who is a Muslim and who is non-Muslim. The aim of the ruling elite was to ensure integration of ethno-nationalist and religio-cultural diversity with unjust and meager economic resources. However, the use of political Islam was not only restricted to bring unity in the country but the hidden agenda was streamlining political Islam with external security objectives. This approach gave rise to religious extremism and radicalized the

Pakistan's Internal Security Paradox: Challenges & Implications

society. Jihad in Afghanistan and Indian-held Kashmir gave further impetus to this policy. The tragic event of 9/11 provided more space to the Islamist militant outfits to freely use the Pak-Afghan borderland area. Since 2001 to 2015 Pakistan experienced unbearable losses from nationalist and religious actors of violence.

Arguably, the since 2001 political and security dynamics in the south Asian region dramatically changed which to the great extent were unmanageable for the security vanguards. The ethnic and cultural diversity would be ensured through Islam was adversely diversified. Baluch nationalist in Baluchistan and Pakhtun sections in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa have further away from centre-petal tendencies. Baluch Liberation Army (BLA) and Pakhtun Tahfuz Movement (PTM) are the glaring examples which are the elements of unrest in the respective provinces. At the same time, the state institutions must also think to review the authoritarian policies and give larger space to the ethnic, nationalistic and religious elements of violence so as to mainstream them into broader constitutional democratic arrangements. Moreover, to counter multi-layered security threat it is important that that civil and military leadership should on the same page and chalk out a comprehensive policy to weed out roadblock interpose in the way of security governance. No doubt, achieving security governance is long-term project, yet in this regard, two fronts need to be immediately addressed on emergency basis. First, the foundational definition of ideology needs to be changed which should be embraced by all the sectarian, communal and ethnic actors. Second, Jihadi culture and Jihadi approach in shaping the foreign policy of the state must immediately be abandoned by civil and security establishment. Until the state respond in democratic way to domestic and external security challenges there are less chances of peace inside and outside the borders of Pakistan.

References

- Pakistan, Abuses, Impunity Erode Rights*,. (2013, 02 01). Retrieved from <http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/02/01/pakistan-abuses-impunity-erode-rights>
- (2014). *Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, State of Human Rights in 2013*. <http://www.hrcp-web.org/hrcpweb/report14/AR2013.pdf>.
- Ahmad, M. (2010). Implications of the War on Terror for Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. *Journal of Critical Globalization Studies*, 12-102.
- Fair, C. (2011). The Militant Challenge in Pakistan. *Asia Policy*, 11, 37-105.
- Fair, C. (2012, 01 05). Security Sector Governance in Pakistan: Progress, but Many Challenges Persist. *Centre for International Governance Innovation, SSR Issue Paper*. http://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/SSR_Issue-no5.pdf.
- Hashim, A. (2013, 11 08). The Iron Fist of Maulana Fazlullah. *Al Jazeera*.
- Hassan, R. (2014). *Imagining Religion: Portraits of Islamic Consciousness in Pakistan," in Being Muslim in South asia: Diversity and Daily Life*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1988/04/15/agreement-on-afghanistan-signed-in-geneva/c7288c6764-4e73-9bc5-7eeb48f7827d/?noredirect+on&utm_term+.4c20534b5532. (n.d.). Retrieved 04 21, 2018, from https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1988/04/15/agreement-on-afghanistan-signed-in-geneva/c7288c6764-4e73-9bc5-7eeb48f7827d/?noredirect+on&utm_term+.4c20534b5532
- Johnson, H. (2007). Understanding the Taliban and Insurgency in Afghanistan. *Orbis*, 71-89.
- Khan, Z. (2010, 07 26). *Pakistani Spies Trace Fazlullah to Kunar Province*. Retrieved from Express Tribune: <http://www.tribune.com.pk/story/31093/pakistani-spies-trace-fazlullah-to-kunar-province>
- Lambert, D. R. (1950). Religion, Economics and Ciolence in Bengal: Background of the Minorities Agreement. *Middle East Journal*, 307-28.
- Mahsud, M. (2010, 04). The Battle for Pakistan Militancy and Conflict in South Waziristan. *New America Foundation, Counterterrorism Strategy Initiative Policy Paper*.
- Nawaz, S. (2008). The First Kashmir War Revisited. *India Review*, 54-115.
- Rassler, D., & Brown, V. (2011). The Haqqani Network Nexus and the Evolutio of al-Qaeda. *West Point: Combating Terrorism Centre*, 172-186.
- Raza, M. (2018, 07 04). Pakistan's Frail Judicial Sturcture. <https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2015/07/04/pakistans-frail-judicial-structure/>.
- samad, Y. (2014). Understanding the Insurgency in Balochistan. *Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, 293-320.
- Siddiqi, F. (2015). Intra-ethnic Fissures in Ethnic Movements: The Rise of Mohajir Identity Politics in Post=1971 Pakistan. *Asian Ethnicity*, 25-41.
- Swami, P. (2007). *India, Pakistana and the Secret Jihad: The Covert War in Kashmir 1947-2004*. London: Routledge.
- Zahab, M., & Roy, O. (2004). *Islamist Networks: The Afghan-Pakistan Connection*. London: Hurts and Company.