

**Conflict between State and Society in Pakistan:
An Analysis of Psychosocial Dimensions**

Ghulam Mujaddid*

Abstract

When the British transferred power and Pakistan emerged on 14 August 1947, the state remained colonial in nature. The psychosocial dimensions of values, attitudes and behaviour of the central authority and its structures remained unchanged. The fundamental paradigm of relationship between the state and society was, and still is, based on conflict between the “rulers and the ruled”. The state has manifested authoritarian and anti-people values and attitudes. The state institutions of civil and military bureaucracy, judiciary and police along with the coopted clergy- have become deeply interwoven in maintaining their hold over the society. On the other hand, the insecure Pakistani society has not been able to develop values and attitudes of trust and self-esteem, and unity in behaviour. The institutions of family, education, economy and politics are not producing strong, self-respecting, and aware individuals. As a result, the state has become fragile and the society has become more fragmented. The resolution of such a conflict requires transformation in the psychosocial dimensions.

Key Words: State-Society Conflict; Colonial State; Pakistani State-Society; Psychosocial Dimensions; Fragile State; Fragmented Society; Conflict Resolution.

Introduction

State and society emerged simultaneously in Pakistan on 14 August 1947¹. Before that day, Pakistani society had no shared existence and was only an “imagined community” (Qadeer, 2006) in the literal sense of the phrase, and what became the Pakistani state was an administrative arrangement put in place by the British rulers to ensure their hold through a coercive dispensation. This dispensation that had perpetuated the British rule in India had been created by Lord Charles Cornwallis and his successors during 1785-1947. This was a bureaucratic state that rested on the “steel frame” (Official Report Volume 300, 1935) of the Indian Civil Service (ICS). The state structure of the Raj was not really benevolent to the Indian society; it was as exploitative as any colonial state system could be (Ahsan, 1996). However, the colonial state’s edifice was subject to a system of accountability, authority, and legal process, which compelled the state representative to be upright, accountable, and efficient. When the British transferred power in 1947, the change of regime did not alter the nature or purpose of the state (Ihsan,

*Author is Acting Dean Faculty of Aerospace and Strategic Studies at Air University, Islamabad – Pakistan.

2010). The state officials remained unchanged in their obligations and attitudes of colonial state to those of 'their own state'. The institutions of governance, bureaucracy, judiciary, police, and military were not "Pakistanized". They remained unchanged in their attitudes, values, and behavior in dealing with the people and their social associations constituting Pakistani society. The fundamental paradigm of relationship between the state and the people has remained that of 'rulers and the ruled'. The persistent military interventions in politics have only reinforced and perpetuated the authoritarian nature of the state. On the other hand, the institutions of society did not develop the values and attitudes that could have helped in evolution of a welfare oriented state. As a consequence of such an incompatibility between power interests of the state and social interests of the society, dynamics of conflict in cognitions and behavior patterns started to emerge between state and society institutions. The nation-state of Pakistan paid a huge price for this antagonistic relationship in the shape of dismemberment of the country in 1971. The post-1971 Pakistan has continued with the incidence of conflicting interests and conceptions between state and society.

During the prolonged military rules, the state has continued to gain authority and control over the society. The situation has now come to a stage where the elected civilian governments cannot function independently and effectively (Sattar, 2014). Civil and military bureaucracy, landed aristocracy, industrialist-businessmen, and influential clergy have all become deeply interwoven in maintaining their hold over the society. The society on the other hand, continues to feel exploited and alienated. The symptoms of frustration, disenchantment, and resorting to alternative social paradigms- mainly extremism and militancy, are clearly visible in the society. The state and society of Pakistan continue to remain involved in a deep-seated conflict, which is evident in their mutually opposing attitudes, institutional values, and actions.

Statement of the Problem

There is a conflict between state and society in Pakistan that has aggravated with the passage of time. The power interests of the state and the social interests of the people are log jammed critically. The state is distrustful of and unjust to the people, who feel disillusioned and exploited by the state, and show signs of indifference and defiance to it. This conflict is caused by mutually conflicting psychosocial dimensions of values, attitudes and behavior of the state and society institutions and individuals. The conflict is likely to continue unless there was a transformation in the psychosocial dimensions.

Research Questions

The following questions need to be answered in order to address the problem: what is the evidence that the state and society are in conflict in Pakistan; what is the psychosocial nature of Pakistani state and society; what are the respective values, attitudes and behavior of state and society institutions and individuals that cause the state-society conflict; what is the quality of individual in Pakistan and how does it contribute to the conflict; how a consensual and harmonious relationship could be created between state and society?

Many in Pakistan are not even aware that their state and society is engaged in a conflict. Whereas, the people are involved in this conflict in many ways: as perpetrators, victims, and passive on-lookers. The intellectual narratives and social discourse have confounded the understanding on state-society relations by engaging in the mundane discussions on the deepening socio-political-economic and intellectual crises. Few intellectual discussions take place on the cognition, attitudes, value structures and behavior patterns of the human agency and institutions comprising the state and society. It may be due to the interdisciplinary challenge of analyzing perceptions, imaginations, attitudes, values and behavior. This article aims to highlight the causal dynamics of state-society conflict by exploring psycho-social dimensions of attitudes, values, and behavior of the respective institutions and individuals. The article aims to inform the educated citizens in general, and the policy and governance circles in particular on options and solutions to adjust state-society relations in Pakistan. If citizens and the policy makers could glean something about the options and solutions, they would be able to strengthen conflict resolution mechanisms of the state and society.

Literature Review

Starting from Aristotle (Tanwar), Ibn-e-Khuldun (Encyclopedia Briannica, s.v. Political Science), Thomas Hobbes (Encyclopedia Briannica, s.v. Political Science), John Locke (Encyclopedia Briannica, s.v. Political Science), Max Weber (Encyclopedia Briannica, s.v. Political Science) to William Zartman (Zartman, 1995), there are many political scientists who have regarded 'State' as an authoritative political institution, created for order, security, justice and wellbeing of a society within a recognized territory. Due to possession of instruments of coercion and authority, the state has the tendency to indulge in violent conflict against segments of the society (Jr, 2004). Karl Marx suggests that economic structure of society determines all power relationships in a society; and conflict is a pervasive condition in society (Allan, 2011). Max Weber opines that the state and the economy together set up conditions for conflict. He holds that all systems of domination ought to be legitimated in

order to function. (Collins) George Simmel is the first conflict theorist to consider the functional significance of conflict. His ideas were used by Lewis Coser to propound the functional aspects of conflict (Coser, 1957). Coser explained that conflict could be useful, and was not merely a disruptive source of change and disintegration (Coser, *The Functions of Social Conflict*, 1956). Ralf Dahrendorf formed a new perspective on social conflict by combining Karl Marx' idea of "dialectical change" with Weber's idea of "power and authority" and Coser's idea of "functional usefulness of conflict." Dahrendorf observed that society was not sustained by consensus, but by the presence of tensions among and between its constituents. There are ever present sources of conflict in society emanating from the authority positions of domination and subordination (Farganis, 1993). These positions have been termed as "Imperatively Coordinated Associations" (ICAs), which are the primary social units that impart hierarchical roles within the association or group. The positions of domination and subordination are widely dispersed in society; and it is likely that authority is asserted in one situation, and subordination is shown in another. Conflict is believed to use symbolic items and emotional cohesion as major means to prosecute conflict (Farganis, 1993). The other dominant perspective on how social order is achieved and maintained is the Functionalist Perspective propounded by Talcott Parsons and his followers (Farganis, 1993). The Functionalists assume that collective agreement about norms, values, and social positions creates and maintains the social order. It is the perspective of 'integration' as opposed to that of 'differentiation' of the conflict theorists that is seen as the basis of social order and its maintenance. Both agree that it is 'power' that defines and implements the guiding principles of society (Farganis, 1993). According to the scholar and researcher R.J. Rummel, the conflict process originates in the socio-cultural sphere of meanings, values, norms, status, and class. It is simultaneously a structure of the opposing attitudes, as well as the opposition and awareness of different interests (Rummel, 1976). The conflict may be hidden and dormant until the drive initiates action; or it gets settled through abstention or abandonment of interests. The conflict may get manifest as opposing interests endeavoring to overpower and balance each other. In every case, conflict is framed 'in a balance of interests, competencies, and wills' (Rummel, 1976). Eventually, changes in the underlying balance of the structures become incongruent, leading to disruption by a trigger event. A new process of conflict then ensues, resolving in a new balance that is built over the previous ones (Rummel, 1976).

There is substantial discussion on the difference and distinction between state and society (Shikha). Each entity, when observed separately, seems to exist for some particular purpose. Society constitutes a totality of all associations of individuals and groups in all sciences, arts and crafts, and in every good and

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benefit of the collectivity (Shikha). State has its own basis, character and purpose that are separate from the society. It exists for the purpose of establishing legal and social order in the society through laws that are enforced by prescribed means and sanctions (Shikha). The state constitutes the whole nation and is national in its scope; called 'national state' or 'nation-state'. State is "coextensive with society" and includes all members that populate its territory on voluntary basis. '[T]he State has the power of using legal coercion, the power of enforcing obedience, under the sanction of punishment, (and) to ordained rules of behaviour' (Shikha). This distinction of purpose and character of the state becomes 'a problem.' This is the problem of relationship between state and society. Joel S. Migdad propounds that state is not autonomous of society, but lies in the society; and the society and state constitute and transform one another (Migdad, 2001). Migdad's "State-in-Society" thesis holds that society is a mixture of social organizations that include leaders who organize the population for specific tasks through institutions. Society constrains the state and transforms it through societal forces; but the society, too, is transformed by the state (Migdad, 2001). From functionality point of view, the state is viewed as a sovereign entity and the "accepted source of identity" and the field of politics. State is also conceived as "a tangible organization of decision making and an intangible symbol of identity." State is seen as the "security guarantor" within an inhabited territory. These functions are intertwined; but the diminishing of one weakens the other functions as well. A protracted weakening of state functioning and prolonged failure of societal forces to transform the state means that:

[T]he basic functions of the State are no longer performed effectively. As the decision making center of government, the State is paralyzed and inoperative: laws are not made, order is not preserved, and societal cohesion is not enhanced. As a symbol of identity it loses its power of conferring a name on its people and a meaning to their social action. As the authoritative political institution, it loses its legitimacy and the right to command and conduct public affairs (Zartman, 1995).

In the above mentioned situation, state as a system of socio-economic organization, loses its practical balance of inputs and outputs; and ceases to receive support from its people and fails to exercise control over them (Zartman, 1995). In reality, this implies a breakdown in governance and law and order. As a decision making body, the state can hardly take and enforce decisions. This situation often leads to "societal collapse" or breakdown of social coherence; where society can no longer create, cumulate and express the demands that form foundation of the state (Zartman, 1995). Under such conditions, state generally turns into a tyrannical institution; and the balance

between its coercive and rewarding functions gets disrupted in favor of coercion (Zartman, 1995).

The long-standing view of the state as a social contract highlights that individuals in a society, while creating a state, barter their freedom in exchange for security and order (Jr, 2004). When the state overindulges in its control functions, it loses voluntary allegiance and legitimating cooperation of the population (Jr, 2004). This is the hard state, and not necessarily a strong state (Jr, 2004). The society of such a state pays the price of state oppression. But states' destruction of the society institutions makes its own demolition a matter of failure. The conflict between and among state-society actors and institutions is also seen as the venue of social change. Robert Gurr and Robin M. Williams Jr. provide evidence that peoples and states are in conflict in a number of situations; and the state has often proven to be the principal exterminator of its own people (Jr, 2004). The conflicts within states like civil wars, communal uprisings, "state democides" and guerilla wars are caused because of the antagonistic relationships and between state and the society institutions; and military coups, pogroms, riots, and persisting violence are many faces of such conflicts (Jr, 2004).

The social institutions shape the behavior of state and society individuals. The institutions are 'a complex of positions, roles, norms, and values lodged in particular type of social structures and organizing relatively stable pattern of human activity with respect to fundamental problems in producing life-sustaining resources, in reproducing individuals, and in sustaining viable societal structures within a given environment' (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, s.v. Social Institutions). Institutions are enduring features of social life that governed by the principles of justice; they comprise structure, functions, cultures, norms, spirits, and sanctions (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, s.v. Social Institutions). In addition to the social institutions, the elite of society play an important role in the socio-political, economic and cultural conditions of a particular state and society (North, Wallis, & Weingast, 2009). The elite comprise political, military, business, social, intellectual and religious leaders, and are found in all nation-states. In some states they have consensus among themselves over the core political, economic and social values; while in others, the elite behave more selfishly and predate over their own people, causing state-society tensions (North, Wallis, & Weingast, 2009). The breakdown in elite consensus on political, economic and social bargains often results in rise in conflicts within such a state (Siddiq, 2013).

Psychosocial theory explains the phenomenon of why people think and behave as they do? In doing so, this theory explores the intangible dimensions

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of state and society resilience and state-building (Pouligny, 2010). The psychological theory expounded by Sigmund Freud and further enriched by Erik Erikson and others, explains an individual's trust or mistrust in 'others' (Erikson). By corollary, the trust or mistrust is reflected in public, political, economic and social institutions that enhances or reduces partnership between state and society; fosters or flouts democratic practices and facilitates or frustrates institutions such as judiciary, civil service, army and police. In this regard, the concept of "social capital" as the aggregate value of the social networks of the people; and 'the benefits that flow from the trust, reciprocity, information, and cooperation associated with social networks' becomes important. Social capital can be actualized or wasted by creating meaningful or conflicting relations between state and society actors and institutions (Siisiainen, 2000). Social capital plays an important part in all substructures and sustains trust and mutual relationships that serve as hedge against conflict and violence (New World Encyclopedia, s.v. "Social Structure").

State-Society Conflict in Pakistan

The scholarly literature tends to suggest that incompatibility exists between state and society in Pakistan, basically due to pervasive tensions and contradictions between the respective institutions and individuals, since Pakistan's independence (Hasnat & Farooqi, 2008). Consequently, the construction and behavior of Pakistani state has continued to be on the colonial patterns of authoritarianism, apathy, strict administration and anti-people attitudes. Lawrence Ziring observes that the crisis of national identity in Pakistan has been a product of its politics and social order (Ziring, 1997). He points out the real predicament and dilemma for Pakistan's civil society and the state has been that of an ingrained mutual antagonism between the two (Ziring, 1997). Mazhar Aziz in his well-researched work, *Military Control in Pakistan: The Parallel State*, has observed that military and the bureaucracy were fairly well entrenched and organized in the time of country's independence in 1947 (Aziz, 2008). The political leadership had to cope with the challenging task of running the business of "moth eaten Pakistan" beset with problems of partition: resettlement of millions of refugees, rudimentary economic infrastructure, India's bellicose actions in Kashmir, Junagadh and Hyderabad, and challenges of nurturing of a viable civil society in a newly born nation. The state apparatus existed in 1947 and quickly responded to the above challenges, but the nation/Pakistani society did not exist in the sense that it was in the process of taking birth. The bureaucracy, especially the army, became real face of the state. However, the 'military regimes in Pakistan have tended to introduce deep fissures in the politics of the country while leaving the succeeding political governments with legacies with which

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the latter are not equipped to cope' (Aziz, 2008). Keith Callard has also alluded to the aspect of societal formation by pointing out that Pakistan's political parties of the initial decade were not able to aggregate and organize public action to represent public interest (Callard, 1957). This meant that civil society in Pakistan was still weak, and political parties had not garnered their active participation. He reports that Pakistani state of that time was being run by Indian Civil Service (ICS) bureaucrats who were backed by army (Callard, 1957). He is incisive in his observation that politics in the Pakistan's first ten years were also dictated by its relationship with India. In the same vein, a recent publication by Christina C. Fair on Pakistan army's way of fighting throws light on the role of military institution in prompting the conflict within by co-opting civil society elements against India and Afghanistan. (Fair, 2014) These elements have ultimately turned their guns against Pakistani society. Their attitudes are extreme and they want to impose their regressive conceptions of state on the people. Instead of mitigating the conflict and war on behalf of society, the co-option of militant non-state actors by the military seems to have aggravated factionalism and violent conflict within Pakistan society (Roberts, 2014).

Stephen Cohen in his scholarly account, *The Idea of Pakistan* (Cohen, 2005), observes that the present day Pakistan has fallen short of its idea and the biggest question today is how the idea of Pakistan would work. Cohen has examined the core aspects of Pakistani state and society through various state-society conceptions. These conceptions have been portrayed in the title of chapters-"The Army's Pakistan"; "Political Pakistan", "Islamic Pakistan" and "Regionalism and Separatism". Cohen maintains that Pakistan's founding father was a "secular lawyer-politician" for whom 'Pakistan would be a democratic, liberal, and just state' (Cohen, 2005). In reality, however, the state of Pakistan has come to be ruled by an oligarchy or establishment of about 500 individuals comprising the high ranks of military, civil bureaucracy, judiciary and some political and feudal elites (Cohen, 2005). Cohen adds that the membership of this establishment depends on '...adherence to a broad set of values and norms, including a particular understanding of the idea of Pakistan' (Cohen, 2005). The establishment in Pakistan possesses a common set of beliefs including the one that India has to be countered militarily. This belief or value tends to accord the military a primary role in the state and society of Pakistan. The establishment values the armed forces as a "model" that would never act against interests of the country; democracy is good as long as it did not meddle with the dominance of the elite; and the radical Islamic extremists are useful tool for the state policy. It can be inferred that these beliefs might be getting translated into specific values and attitudes, which in turn, serve as motives to behavior. Cohen's explanations bring into light the state's domineering psychosocial orientations. However, he does not

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throw much light on the values, attitudes and behaviour of institutions of the society and of the people of Pakistan. In his latest scholarship *Shooting for a Century: The India-Pakistan Conundrum*, Cohen has persisted with his stance that the Pakistan army has used Kashmir and Kashmiris to consolidate its dominance over Pakistani society (Cohen, *Shooting for a Century: The India-Pakistan Conundrum*, 2013). He regards Kashmir as a symptom of army's bid for dominance. He has examined the attitudes of specific interest groups including the military, intelligence services, diplomats, businessmen, academics and the common masses of both India and Pakistan (Cohen, *Shooting for a Century: The India-Pakistan Conundrum*, 2013). Inferred from this work is the impression that the attitudes, beliefs and values held by the state establishment tend to exacerbate state-society tensions. The military has internalized a value system centered on the perceived Indian threat and behaves as the sole guarantor of Pakistan's survival (Cohen, *Shooting for a Century: The India-Pakistan Conundrum*, 2013).

Hussain Haqqani's thesis that Pakistan is struggling between the mosque and the military, points to the conflicting pattern of relationship between state and citizens (Haqqani, 2005). Tracing origins of the conflicting relationship in the period after independence, Haqqani reports that the rivalry with India has served as an instrument of achieving legitimacy and authority the Pakistani state; and has dictated the relationship between the state and its citizens (Cohen, *Shooting for a Century: The India-Pakistan Conundrum*, 2013). Pakistanis have been made to believe that their nationhood is under perpetual threat from India. This view is reinforced by the contents of the editorial in the *Dawn* newspaper that had called for "guns rather than butter", urging a bigger and better-equipped army to defend "the sacred soil" of Pakistan" (White, 1949). Aysha Jalal supports the view that protecting Pakistan's nationhood by military means took priority over all else in the initial years of Pakistan (Jalal, 1990). The political ideas and diplomatic actions that could have been employed to secure Pakistan were interpreted as diluting its defence, and were considered as subversive (Jalal, 1990). Demanding ethnic rights or provincial autonomy, seeking friendly ties with India, and advocating a secular constitution fell under the category of subversion to Islam, and hence to Pakistan. Emphasis on Islamic unity was used as a hedge against the rise of ethnic nationalism, which was thought to undermine Pakistan's integrity (Jalal, 1990). The emphasis on Islam as the basis of national policy empowered the new country's religious leaders. It created a nexus between the "custodians of Islam", the military establishment, civilian bureaucracy, and intelligence apparatus, who viewed themselves as guardian of the new state (Jalal, 1990). The belief that India represented an existential threat to Pakistan led to development and maintenance of a large military. This in turn, helped the military assert its dominance in the affairs of the country. According to Aysha

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Jalal, the unequal social and economic relations within Pakistan are direct consequences of military's dictation in country's resource mobilization and distribution (Jalal, 1990).

Ashok Kapur has recognized the role of images in forming distinctions between the dominant and subordinate factions in a society, and in forming the identity (Kapoor, 1991). According to Kapur, "images refer to ideas, beliefs, values, and mores, myths, slogans, symbolism and flashbacks of glorious past and promising future. Images affect social and intellectual bondages and guide policy and social action." In case of Pakistan, "conflicting images" depict the Hindu-Muslim divide as the basis of India-Pakistan relations at the inter-society level. Within Pakistan ethnic, political and social pressures continue to challenge dominance of the ruling elite. At the first level, religion is the basis of 'us vs. them' divide. At the intra-societal level, distinctions are caused by ethnic, regional and inter-elite rivalries. Encounters at this level produce conflict in Pakistan due to presence of many competitive political subcultures (Kapoor, 1991). Ashok has covered some aspects of politico-cultural dimensions of the conflict, but the psychosocial spectrum has not been adequately addressed. Among the South Asian and Western scholars on Pakistan, there seems to be a shared opinion that state and society have been at loggerheads with each other since the independence (Shah, 2007). This tragic tug of war has sapped the potential of Pakistan and held it underdeveloped despite the immense human and material resources. The state-society dichotomy is considered to be acute in cases where the state became independent from the colonial rule, while the social, political and economic institutions of society were too weak to assert for justice, wellbeing and to compel the state to serve interests of the society (Shah, 2007). It is largely true that the independence came to Pakistan less because of the strength of social, political or economic institutions of pre-independence Muslim society, but more because of weakness of the colonial power which was weakened by the two World Wars (Shah, 2007). Well-being and development of the people was the basic aim of the state creation in case of Pakistan. However, its basic institution of education has been ineffective in developing the individuals; a cohesive society and core values. This has resulted in weak conflict management and resolution in the society². The unequal access to education and its poor quality has exacerbated the inequality and conflict in Pakistan. The training of the youth to explore, innovate and change the psychosocial milieu for better has not been the forte of the institution of education in Pakistan.

Pakistan has been seen as a "dream gone sour" (Khan, 1997). In the present day Pakistan, the citizens live in an environment of severe socio-political conflict and contradictions. The social chaos on the street is indicative of a

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deeply disturbed psyche and scarred personality of the peoples of Pakistan. The underlying reasons for this “lost dream” and apparent failure of the “Idea of Pakistan” (Cohen, 2005) have been documented in the scholarly literature in Pakistan and abroad. It points out that “burdens of the Pakistani nation” have become excruciating. The most burdensome aspect seems to be the militarization of the state of Pakistan, which has “muffled” the creation of viable democratic institutions (Hasnat & Farooqi, 2008). Many believe that illegal and self-propelled control of the state by civil-military bureaucracy has encouraged social conflict and militancy; has stymied the growth of genuine national civil society; and has spread the culture of distrust, greed and hypocrisy in Pakistan.; (Hasnat & Farooqi, 2008) making Pakistani society weak and unstable.

Christophe Jaffrelot in his latest scholarship, ‘*The Pakistan Paradox: Instability and Resilience*,’ argues that from the 1950s onward, Pakistani society has been in the clutches of a civil-military establishment which has cultivated the legacy of the pre-partition Muslim League in the sense that it was primarily interested in protecting its interests and dominant status (Jaffrelot, 2015). The elitist rationale of the idea of Pakistan resulted in social conservatism and persistence of huge inequalities. Whereas, some politicians have fought for democracy, they have hardly been successful in dislodging the well-entrenched civil-military establishment (Jaffrelot, 2015). The lack of effective political alternatives has led to further radicalization and inequality of the system (Jaffrelot, 2015). Anatol Lieven’s scholarship, *Pakistan: A Hard Country* provides a rational description of the multidimensional nature of Pakistani state, its people and relations between the two (Lieven, 2011). It attributes the deep nature of Pakistani state to the resilience of the people that stems from their extended family or “beraderi” type associations. He considers the Pakistani military as a special cast that is interlinked by a system of perks and privileges. Ishtiaq Ahmed’s book *Pakistan: The Garrison State* highlights structural vulnerabilities of Pakistani state and society since its inception (Ahmed, 2013). This well-written account on Pakistan shows that over a span of time, the army has continued to grow in power and influence. Consequently, it became the most powerful institution of the country. Such a development has been ruinous to Pakistan’s economic and democratic development.

In the 1950s, American anti-communism derives saw Pakistan as a natural ally against the Communism. This colluded with the military’s interest in getting stronger and more political within the state and society (Jalal, 1990). During the Russian intervention in Afghanistan (1979-1988), Pakistani state and society was further permeated by external processes that affected and re-structured psychosocial dimensions of the state and society (Hilali, 2002).

Similarly, there is a large body of literature that focuses on the 9/11 episode and its tremors that seem to have re-enforced the negative relations between state and society to unprecedented levels of conflict and instability in Pakistan (Ahmad, 2008). Consequently, Pakistani state gives indications of an impending collapse. Simultaneously, the society is becoming extremely volatile, schizophrenic, and stresses nearing a state of social collapse (Khan A. , 2011). Muhammad Waseem, in his scholarly paper *The Patterns of Conflict in Pakistan: Implications for Policy*, contends that Pakistan's political instability is largely due to contest between the civilian part of the state, the military, and the Islamists elements (Waseem, 2011).

The military constrained the authority of the constitutional state by assuming an informal but substantive role as the supreme political agent and influencing state policies and strategy. The state's authority has also been threatened by the Islamic establishment which has, since the founding of the state, pressured the state to establish *sharia*, or Islamic law (Waseem, 2011).

Even a cursory scrutiny of Pakistan's democracy would reveal that the authoritarian-hierarchical post-colonial political settlement remains largely preserved. As a result, 'military and political elite's attempts to ossify social divisions, and sustain these inequalities in the face of urbanization and rapid social change maybe creating the space for violent and xenophobic political alternatives' (Waseem, 2011). The traditional focus of such a conflict in Pakistan has been in the bordering areas of Afghanistan and India. Currently, the real threat to the socio-political stability is the growth of such a phenomenon in the urban hinterlands of central Pakistan (Waseem, 2011). The continuing unequal political settlement is likely to be accentuated by the psychosocial stresses.

Mukhtar Masood in his highly acclaimed intellectual work on Pakistan in Urdu, *Aawaz-e-Dhost (Friend's Voice)*, has observed that any living society requires three essential groups of people: the Volunteer Sacrificers; the Selfless; and the Beautifiers (Masood, 1973). The first group dies for others, and with its blood ensures the life and existence of the society. The second group lives for others and ensures perpetuation of the good and noble values. The third group proliferates excellence and beauty in the society. A society blessed with these groups becomes immune to decay and weakness. Mukhtar concludes that in Pakistani society, the three groups seem to be missing; and Pakistani society is a multitude of mundane beings and not of "self-aware and self-respecting human beings (Masood, 1973)". Mukhtar's theorization is validated by observation. It describes the general condition of Pakistani society and diminutive quality of its individuals.

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Muhammad Qadeer has deftly analyzed Pakistani society in his comprehensive work *Pakistan: Social and Cultural Transformation in a Muslim Nation* (Qadeer, *The Conflict Between Lived and Imagined Culture of Pakistan*, 2012). It contains elaborately evidenced analysis of the cultural dynamics, value pursuance, functioning of social institutions, attitudinal structures and behavior of the people in an environment which is being simultaneously acted upon by modernization and Islamization. He has looked into aspects of incongruence between the 'lived culture' and 'imagined culture' of the people of Pakistan (Qadeer, *Pakistan's Split Culture, Family of the Heart Dialogue and Discussion*, 2012). He raises the question as to what goes through the minds and conscience of millions of people in Pakistan who take bribes, cheat their customers, exploit servants, put the life and safety of others at risk, adulterate food and medicines, grab land and appropriate others' properties (Qadeer, *Pakistan's Split Culture, Family of the Heart Dialogue and Discussion*, 2012). He observes that from such moral roots 'springs the daily crop of brutality, mayhem, corruption, and violence against minorities' (Qadeer, *Pakistan's Split Culture, Family of the Heart Dialogue and Discussion*, 2012). He evidences the state of Pakistani morality by observing that the day designated to express love for the Prophet (may peace be upon him) turns into an occasion for looting, burning, and killing. This gap between the 'imagined Pakistan' and the 'lived Pakistan' is actually an aspect of the incompatibility between the structures of central authority and the people's behaviours:

“Our notions of right and wrong have been scrambled. Our moral clock is set at a different time and long lost social order. We are in a state of confusion about values and norms, though we loudly proclaim moral and spiritual superiority. A crack runs through Pakistan's national and regional cultures” (Qadeer, *Pakistan's Split Culture, Family of the Heart Dialogue and Discussion*, 2012).

Kalim Siddique has also researched into the continuum of attitudes and interests of the ruling elite; and their use and exploitation of state's resources to marginalize the people of Pakistan (Siddiqui, 1972). His thesis holds that the state of Pakistan had contradictions right at its creation. The state structures along with attitudes of the rulers and the bureaucrats remained unchanged after independence:

The year 1947 was a turning point where Muslim history failed to turn...The Promised Land had been reached, but the people were not allowed to participate in building the

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egalitarian and just social order that had been promised (Siddiqui, 1972).

Consequently, the exploitation of the masses, their alienation from the political power, and the lack of 'belief in Pakistan' by the ruling elite resulted in dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971, which was the consequence of the conflict between state and society. Siddiqui's reliable research, covers only the first 25 years of the conflict and crises of Pakistan, but sets out the basic contours of state-society conflict in Pakistan. Paula R. Newberg has researched into the constitutional and judicial crises in Pakistan (Newberg, 1995). She asserts that citizenship must be meaningful to individuals in political society and effective in the State structures. When collective memory and expectations don't support the way power is distributed and used, relations between state and society can undercut the constitution and the institutions it creates, and erode the concept and practice of constitutionalism. She opines that civil war in 1971 was culmination of political conflicts that had raged since Pakistan's founding and linger on till today (Newberg, 1995). History of Pakistan has been defined by her as uneasy relations between state institutions and civil society. She argues that the disruptions and discontents of civil society have often 'skirted at the edges of state violence', and have given continued cause for citizens to reexamine their relationship with the state. Ayesha Siddiqa has carried out research on the involvement of the military in the economy of the country, which she terms as "milbus"-meaning military business (Siddiqa, Military Inc, 2007). Milbus intensifies military's interest in remaining in power, or in direct or indirect control of the governance. The implications of the milbus are quite drastic. It has ensured irreversible domination of the military in politics, economics, education and judicial system. Forcing the society to take a certain direction could push the common people, in opposite and competing directions; aggravating relations between the state and society. Ayesha, Stephen Cohen, Hasan Askari Rizvi, Aysha Jalal, Shuja Nawaz and Mazhar Aziz have portrayed how the military has dominated the state in Pakistan to exercise coercive social control over the society. This appears to be one of the major factors of conflict between state and society in Pakistan. On the other hand, Pakistan's current struggle with Islamic militancy has been termed as "Pakistan's battle with itself" by Zahid Hussain (Hussain, 2007). His research brings out the phenomenon where segments of society are opting for an alternative social paradigm, *i.e.* armed struggle to establish a *Sharia* based rigid Islamic order on a part of the country. He observes that the phenomenon is likely to spread with ominous consequences for social cohesion and security of Pakistan. He has gathered valid evidence on the scourge of militant politics, representing conflict between communities and the state of Pakistan. His research points out that disparate and contrasting concepts of an Islamic state, role of religion in state politics,

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and success of the modern secular welfare states elsewhere in the world- seem to be at the heart of the state-society antagonism in Pakistan.

International Crisis Group Report, "*Pakistan: The Mullahs and the Military*" exposes existential threats to the state of Pakistan if religious clergy were not controlled. The report evidences that resurgence of religious parties is not healthy for Pakistan's political and social stability (International Crisis Group, "Pakistan: The Mullahs and the Military" Asia Report No. 49, 2003). The rise of religious parties threatens to undermine civil liberties, freedom of expression and legal reforms by materializing political clout. The state institutions show lack of will to implement policies for controlling the mullahs whose personal causes are flourishing at the cost of Pakistani society (International Crisis Group, "Pakistan: The Mullahs and the Military" Asia Report No. 49, 2003). In a similar vein, Vali Nasr's scholarly article on "*The Rise of Sunni Militancy in Pakistan: The Changing Role of Islamism and the Ulema in Society and Politics*," holds religious clergy responsible for sectarian violence. His main thesis is that the hunger for power and parochial interests of the militant Sunni and Shi'a organizations have carried out assassinations and bombings that have killed political rivals, children and the innocent while praying in mosques (Nasr, 2000). There is an increased polarization within society; and the military and bureaucracy use this polarization for their interests. There is convincing evidence in the literature on the nexus between lack of education, poverty and political violence. Pakistan's political economy is rent-based and exploitative. The market elite, political bigwigs and the state are in collusion against the masses. They are predatory in character and behavior and keep the masses in deplorable conditions as reflected in appalling human development indicators (UNDP Human Development Report, 2010), fracturing society, extreme poverty and loss of self-esteem among the people- all of them have been intensifying the state-society conflict. Some well-researched works on Pakistan's political economy describe that domination of politico-economic power by a small elite lay at the heart of state versus people problem in Pakistan (Husain, 2009). As a result, poverty and inflation have increased and aggravated state-society incongruous. Evan S. Lieberman in his article, '*Taxation Data as Indicators of State-Society Relations: Possibilities and Pitfalls in Cross-National Research*,' argues that tax collection data can be a powerful resource for measuring and comparing state-society relations. Tax collection is directly linked with the process of state building, collective action and distributive justice because taxation has become so central to daily life. The development of state power and authority over society and market is usefully examined by Lieberman in highlighting state's ability to get citizens to pay taxes. The state plays a critical role in exacerbating or ameliorating existing inequalities and conflicts through differential allocation of the tax burden. In case of predatory tendencies like

the ones in Pakistan, the state could tax the poor through indirect and inconsiderate ways; this is likely to delegitimize the state. Rubina Saigol in her admirable scholarship, '*Radicalization of State and Society in Pakistan,*' has analyzed the deep-rooted causes of radicalization ingrained in Pakistani state and society (Saigol, 2011). According to her, the issues of terrorism and extremism do not arise merely from ideology, backward thinking and lack of education. Rather, the problems arise from fundamental socio-economic and class inequalities in Pakistan which have allowed the ruling classes to promote and encourage rigid and fundamental versions of religion (Saigol, 2011).

According to a succinct state-society analysis of Pakistan by Marco Mezzera and Safiya Aftab, the current state of affairs in Pakistan is characterized by a situation of fragility; and the resilience at state and society level seems to have reduced to low levels (Mezzera & Aftab, 2008). The colonial history of the country has left imprints on Pakistani state and the way people have interacted with it. Actual power is wielded by tiny elite and the military; and there is a lack of horizontally organised networks of citizens based on shared interests (Mezzera & Aftab, 2008). Military's pervasive role in politics, economics and other aspects of social life is getting more pronounced. The capacity of the political leaders to make and implement public policy and distribute services has diminished. The limited capacity to be effective and to establish the required legitimacy in Pakistani society is the principal challenge to the stability of Pakistan. This legitimacy gap is being filled by the actors other than the state, who have radical ideologies to mobilize the masses (Mezzera & Aftab, 2008). The state-society analysis by Mezzera and Aftab is well-grounded in theory and is well argued. However, it falls short of carrying out a wholesome inquiry into the psychosocial dimensions that influence state-society dynamics in Pakistan. Majority of state-society analyses do not include the psychosocial aspects as independent analytical variables in the contemporary literature. The state-society analysis framework (Mezzera & Aftab, 2008) examines the three dimensions of politics, economy and social systems. Pakistan's state-society dynamics is also examined from perspective of politics, economics and social system. It appears to be particularly anemic in the study of psychosocial dimensions. This paper has attempted to fill this gap and highlight that the psychosocial dimensions of values, attitudes and behaviour are crucially important determinant of the conflicting state-society relations in Pakistan.

Postulating Psychosocial Dimensions of Conflict

As discussed above, the available literature on the dynamics of state-society relations in Pakistan has not been touched by most scholars as their principal

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area of research. There is a need to look at the phenomenon with reference to the psychosocial constructs of the people and of the institutions they have created. This brings into focus the multidisciplinary interaction between political science, sociology and social psychology. The dependent variable in this research is the conflict between state and society. This conflict is basically due to the opposing values, attitudes and behaviors that have been developed and operationalized in the respective institutions of the state as well as society, and in the individuals in Pakistan. The values, attitudes and behaviours as manifested by the institutions and individuals in Pakistan, have been taken to be the independent variables. The paper postulates that incidence of conflict in values, attitudes and behavior between state and society institutions, and individuals, causes fragility of the state and fragmentation of the society in Pakistan.

Analyzing Psychosocial Dimensions

Conflict in Pakistan appears to be serious and embedded in the structures of state and society. Many individuals, families, and communities experience varied levels of this conflict and insecurity that make their lives difficult. The drivers of this conflict and violence lie in the complex psychosocial milieu that exists between state and society. The state has continued with the colonial structures and mind-set; it has not developed benevolent institutions; and, has continued to exercise coercive control over the society. The society has remained too weak (Qadeer, 2006) to help create a benevolent state. State and society have continued to evolve on conflicting paradigms of attitudes, values and behavior. This conflict cycle is detrimental to the dignified existence of Pakistan. Yet, the people of Pakistan at all levels appear to be unaware of such a conflict, and there is a sense of denial of the same at the elite level. T.S. Eliot has observed that "Humankind cannot bear very much reality." And, this research attempts to provide evidence of this reality- chronic and increasingly violent state-society conflict that has dictated and shaped the lives the multitudes in Pakistan. This research unravels the causal dynamics of this conflict and measures its incidence and effects. Confronting the denial and unleashing the reality about the ongoing conflict, is expected to lead to managing the ominous conflict between state and society in Pakistan. There are not many research endeavours that study the conflict between state and society in Pakistan, and even fewer have addressed the psychosocial dimensions of such a conflict. This research is significant in daring to explore complex and interdisciplinary issues about the social conflict in Pakistan.

There is tangible evidence of state-society conflict in Pakistan. The state has been in conflict with the people since the early years after the independence. One of the earliest instances was removal of the popular government of

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Khawaja Nazimuddin in 1953 by the Governor General. Then was the imposition of martial law in East Pakistan in 1954, dismissal of elected provincial assembly, and the abrogation of the Constituent Assembly. The next display of the conflict behavior was the abrogation of the 1956 Constitution and imposition of martial law in October 1958. The state has been in conflict with nation in Balochistan in 1948, 1962; in East Pakistan in 1954, and 1971; in Balochistan again in 1973-77; against the Movement for Restoration of Democracy in Sindh in 1984-86; against the MQM in Karachi 1992-1998; imposition of Martial Law in 1999; against Baloch nationalism since 2004 (Sial & Basit, 2010), and the ongoing operations in FATA and Karachi. The conflict due to radicalization, sectarianism and economic predation of the state has caused death and destruction.

The psychosocial nature of state in Pakistan can be described by various cognitions regarding the state in Pakistan⁴. State's behavior as an authoritative-coercive political institution has been marked by bad governance and corruption⁵. Pakistan ranks 147 out of 188 countries and shows weak ratings in the governance indicators compiled by the World Bank. The instrumental use of Islam, predating and parochial interests of the elites have also shaped the existing psychosocial nature of the state of Pakistan and have made Pakistan unstable and weak in the process. The nature of society in Pakistan is marked by the fact of its being a newly born society on August 14, 1947. Before that, Pakistani society did not exist; it was only imagined. There is a dichotomy between the 'lived' and 'imagined' society; it's so called Islamic orientations; the attitudes of the elites, middle and lower classes; the aspects of social mobility and value pursuance. The nature of Pakistani society is insecure; (Fair, Crane, Pure, & Michael, 2010) lacking in mutual trust, self-respect and innovation, weak in society networks; but resilient as well. The attitudes held and the values prevailing in the state institutions of Constitution-Judiciary, Civilian and Military Bureaucracy, and Police shows that each state institution seems to pursue values quite opposite to its purpose. The attitudes prevailing in these institutions are anti-people and apathetic. And, their behaviours are self-aggrandizing at the cost of the country and its people. The institutions of state have been failing in achieving their respective purposes; and resultantly the state of Pakistan has become fragile (Tasleem).

The societal institutions of family, education, (Smith, 2011) religion, economics and politics have been weak in upholding the core values of trust, respect, industry, honesty and innovation. They have been penetrated by the state and have developed sense of fear, insecurity and deprivation. The attitudes held by the society are those of doubt, cynicism and double-standards. The behaviours in Pakistani society depict these attitudes. The inherent strengths of the societal institutions of Pakistan are enormous but are shackled due to

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coercive nature of the state. The analysis of Pakistan's national character and quality of the individual constituting the society and state is done to determine as to why an individual emanating from the same society develops fratricidal attitudes, values and behaviors when he or she joins any of the state institutions. Similarly, why the individuals belonging to the same societal structures learn to develop attitudes of indifference, mistrust and fear against their own fellows in other institutions of society. The massive proportion of the young generation in the population could help engender values of nationalism, patriotism, mutual trust and well-being among the people and a much better Pakistan could be created with well-managed levels of conflict.

Based on the understanding of the conflict dynamics, the way forward and solutions for transforming state-society (Smith, 2011) can be achieved by altering attitudes and values held by the people of Pakistan and the institutions of state and society. The changes in values and attitudes would have to culminate in change in the behaviours. It is the positive change in behaviours that is needed to change the psychosocial environments of Pakistan for better. This research has highlighted some other areas like "study of psychosocial dimension as part of conflict analysis", "social change management" and "creating benevolent citizenship in Pakistan" which require focused research to create congruence and accord between the state and society in Pakistan.

Conclusion

The state structure in Pakistan has remained unsympathetic to the people after independence. The nature of relationship between the state and the people has remained that of 'rulers and the ruled.' The behavior of state and its institutions of governance, bureaucracy, judiciary, police and military have remained largely unchanged from their apathetic colonial authoritarian disposition towards the people. The antipathy between the 'non-Pakistanized' state and institutions of the society has persisted in antagonistic values, attitudes and behaviours of the state institutions. Resultantly, societal institutions and individuals in Pakistan could not develop themselves to the level of mature citizenship. This has further aggravated the conflict between state and society. Engulfed by the sense of insecurity, the elected representatives, military and civil bureaucrats and other elite- all have continued to distribute patronages and while remaining immersed in their parochial interests and self-enrichment. The excessive usage of discretion to favour particular interest groups by the state has further enhanced the state-society antagonism. Whereas, the state has suffered loss of legitimacy, the society has endured most of the violence associated with the psychosocial conflict. Day to day state-society relations in Pakistan seem to have become

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more antagonistic and conflict laden. There seems to be some inertia in making meaningful shifts for better value pursuance, sublime attitudes and cordial behaviours on part of the institutions of state and society. Therefore, a pressing need exists for analyzing the values, attitudes and behaviours of institutions and individuals in Pakistan so that a consensual and constructive dynamics could be created; and Pakistan could become a serene, dignified and livable country for every Pakistani.

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Notes

1. Pakistan is unique among the post-colonial states. Most of them had some prior state-society configuration or at least a continuous society before they were colonized. In case of Pakistan, there was no Pakistani society; neither an independent state had ever existed within the borders that constituted independent Pakistan on 14 August 1947.
2. For detailed study See Jakob Rösel, "Mass-education in a vast, in a dangerous and a fragmented State- education policy in India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka," Paper presented at Conference on Education in Fragile Context, *Arnold-Bergstraesser-Institut, Freiburg, Germany*, Sept 2009. From the conflict perspective, the author describes how language and education politics in different countries has been used in ways that exacerbate conflicts. He has analyzed language policies of India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. He shows the means at the disposal of elites and interest groups through which they use language to dominate access to higher education. Overcoming these issues could help in diminishing state-society conflicts through effective education policies. The main thesis of the paper is that good governance of education system is one of the most important ways of contributing to equality, inclusion and social cohesion. Good governance protects against grievances about access and quality of education becoming source of conflict.
3. Ayesha Jalal & Ayesha Siddiqi, in their cited works in this chapter has pointed out these traits of Pakistan's political economy and their impact on Pakistani society. Moreover there is prolific literature and debate in print media on the issues being endured by the people of Pakistan.
4. See various state cognitions in Stephen Cohen's book, *The Idea of Pakistan*; *The State of Martial Rule* by Aysha Jalal; *The Elitist State* by Ishrat Hussain, *The Garrison State*, *Praetorian State*, and Islamic conceptions of Pakistan by various scholars reveal values, attitudes and behaviour of the state institutions.
5. Pakistan ranks 117 out of 168 countries in corruption in 2015; see Corruption Perception Index 2015 by Transparency International.

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