
Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah: An Effective Negotiator and Achievement of Pakistan

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Pakistan came into being on 14 August 1947 as a result of political dialogues by Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah with the British Viceroy, Congress and other leaders who were opposed to the idea of Pakistan. These dialogues have a long history since 1939, but the final round took place under the Viceroyalty of last British Viceroy Lord Mountbatten who headed these dialogues towards the final phase and on 3 June 1947 these dialogues culminated in the shape of Partition Plan to divide British India into Pakistan and Hindustan. Resultantly, Pakistan attained independence on 14 August and Hindustan attained independence on 15 August 1947, under the Independence Act 1947 passed by the British Parliament in July 1947. Initial dialogues on the issue of Pakistan, in a veiled form, were with Lord Linlithgow in Sept. 1939 but they became more specific in March-August 1940 and March-April 1942. Then meaningful dialogues were with Lord Wavell in June-July 1945. As a result of these dialogues, elections of 1945-1946 were held in which more than 90% of the All-India Muslim League candidates won on Muslim seats in the Central Assembly and Provincial Assemblies. This further strengthened the position of Quaid-i-Azam who represented 90 % voice of the Muslim India which was not possible for the British to ignore. Still an effort was made to sidetrack Jinnah's popularity on the issue of Pakistan by the Cabinet Mission during March-May 1946. When Jinnah's voice was ignored, he had to resort to Direct Action Day on 16 August 1946. The other trap was installing of Muslim League's five Ministers in the Wavell Cabinet in Sept. 1946. But this trap also failed because Quaid-i-Azam was determined to create Pakistan even though Wavell took Jinnah and Nehru to London in Dec 1946 for diverting attention from Pakistan. Once all these efforts to sidetrack the issue of Pakistan failed, it was decided to change the Viceroy on the whims of the Congress Caucus. Thus, Lord Mountbatten joined in March 1947 to settle the issue once and for all.

Key Words: Quaid-i-Azam, Jinnah, Negotiator, Pakistan, Achievement

Introduction

The dialogues conducted under the supervision of Lord Mountbatten were most arduous and very long. These dialogues continued for a few months from March to 3 June 1947 when Jinnah's idea of Pakistan was accepted although in a "truncated" form. Although Jinnah's full scheme of Pakistan was not accepted, yet Jinnah was ready to accept this because still Pakistan was going to emerge as the largest Muslim State in the World.

Lord Mountbatten joined on 22 March 1947 as the last Viceroy and Governor-General of British India. Immediately after joining, his first effort was to give British India freedom by keeping it united but when he failed to do so he went for partitioning the Sub-Continent. To achieve his goal, he interviewed over 50 British Indian political leaders and individuals of various political parties and groups between March and April. This was a strategic move to equip and prepare himself for a meeting with Jinnah, whom he viewed as the key proponent of partition. But main guideline regarding Jinnah came from M.K. Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru, who also submitted their points to tackle Jinnah in writing. Despite his thorough preparations, Jinnah outmaneuvered the Viceroy during their meeting on April 5-6, 1947. By April 21, Jinnah had compelled the Viceroy to work towards the creation of Pakistan, shattering all previous attempts to maintain the unity of British India. Subsequently, the Viceroy shifted his focus to addressing the partition issue through a different approach. Extensive meetings at the Viceroy's House in April and May culminated in the 3rd June Plan, where the details for the partition of British India into Pakistan and Hindustan were finalized through negotiation and compromise. In this paper how different issues were debated, settled, and carried forward are discussed along with different proposals of the Partition Plan.

A. The Dialogues

Immediately after his joining as Viceroy Lord Mountbatten wrote letters both to Jinnah and Gandhi on 22 March by which he invited them, what he termed, to discuss the "solution of complicated questions prior to the transfer of power".¹ While Gandhi was expected to reach Delhi on 30 March as "a plane has been arranged to bring him", but in view of his "health and blood pressure", it was doubtful whether he would avail of this opportunity.² Gandhi was at that time in Bihar consoling the Muslims

whose 30,000 numbers were killed by the extremist Hindus, according to Jinnah.³ This claim of Jinnah was disputed by the Congress circles.⁴ Actually this mass killing of the Muslims had happened during October-November 1946.⁵ Apart from consoling the bereaved families Gandhi's intention for being in Bihar was to avoid reaction in the Muslim majority areas.⁶ In his reply of 26 March, handed over to Governor of Bihar, he communicated to Mountbatten that he would reach Delhi on or after 30 March.⁷ Jinnah, who was in Bombay, in his reply of 26 March from Bombay, informed Mountbatten that he would come to Delhi in the first week of April and meet him.⁸ However, before this Mountbatten had his meetings with Nehru, V.P. Menon and others and discussed different ways how to tackle Jinnah. Gandhi also met the Viceroy and advised the latter how to deal with Jinnah. Thus, in the following parleys with Jinnah whatever was discussed, Mountbatten had his secret consultations with the Congress leaders who were enjoying special and privileged positions with the Viceroy. If there was any change of proposal(s) or position(s) with Jinnah and the Muslim League leaders, Mountbatten mostly took the Congress leaders especially Gandhi and Nehru into prior confidence.⁹ All the following discussions did prove this contention.

The first proposal which was discussed with Jinnah related as to how to keep British India united after the departure of the British. Mountbatten was working for this first because "he had received instructions to work for Unitary Government for India on the basis of the Cabinet Mission Plan". For this it was suggested by Gandhi that Jinnah should be asked by the British Government to form Union Government himself becoming the Prime Minister. Jinnah was also given the choice of forming "a government of his choice at the Centre."¹⁰ But Jinnah was wise enough to consider it a trick on the part of Congress and Gandhi in order to sidetrack him from the Goal of Pakistan, rejected this offer.¹¹ If this proposal was rejected, the Congress presented a second option to the British: to persuade Jinnah to maintain the unity of India within the framework of the grouping clause outlined in the Cabinet Mission Plan of May 16, 1946. Despite efforts from both British and Congress officials, they were unsuccessful in convincing Jinnah, who remained steadfast in his determination to include all six Muslim provinces—Bengal, Assam, Sindh, Punjab, Balochistan, and NWFP—into Pakistan. Although this option was deliberated for a brief period, the Viceroy shifted his focus primarily to Bengal, hoping to exploit differences among Muslim League leaders. When Hussan Shaheed Suhrawardy, approached by the British, expressed willingness to support an independent Bengal, it initially seemed like a

promising development. The British, with the initial intention of fostering discord between Jinnah and Suhrawardy, encouraged this move. However, unbeknownst to many, Suhrawardy had already secured Jinnah's confidential approval. The potential realization of this scheme had the potential to alter the entire situation. When consensus couldn't be reached on this matter, the Congress, despite initially signaling approval to the British, ultimately refused to accept it. Caught in this intricate situation, the British had to explore alternative options to secure the Congress's agreement. Against this backdrop, in confidential consultation and collaboration with Congress members, the British proposed the idea of a "truncated" Pakistan to Jinnah. This involved dividing Bengal, Assam, and Punjab, along with imposing various preconditions on the terms, with the hope those complications from other quarters might arise, leading Jinnah to reject the notion of a "truncated" Pakistan.

On 4 April 1947 Mountbatten had a meeting with Gandhi who "brought with him Abdul Ghaffar Khan".¹² Before Gandhi's entering into dialogue with the Viceroy, Ghaffar Khan was urged by Gandhi to give his briefing about the Governor of NWFP whom he charged "of being pro-Muslim League" and the person responsible for making the Government of NWFP "under his brother [Dr. Khan Sahib]"¹³ as "difficult as possible".¹⁴ Gandhi, when asked by Mountbatten about his opinion on this, agreed with what was expressed by Ghaffar Khan. Going a step forward, Gandhi even accused Sir Francis Mudie, Governor of Punjab, of also being "pro-Muslim League".¹⁵ Though he pleaded neutrality on the part of British officials, but as a matter of fact what Gandhi wanted was to remove all officers favorable to the partition of British India. He wanted the Viceroy to ignore or suppress public opinion of the Muslims and act according to the wishes of the Congress Caucus. In this meeting in New Delhi, Gandhi advised the Viceroy how the issue of transfer of power should be proceeded with. According to this scheme Jinnah was to be offered Prime Ministership of united India with the "option of forming a Cabinet of his choice".¹⁶ If Mr. Jinnah accepted this offer, the "Congress would guarantee to co-operate freely and sincerely, so long as all the measures that Mr. Jinnah's Cabinet bring forward are in the interests of the Indian people as a whole."¹⁷ Gandhi also wanted assurance from Jinnah through the Viceroy that the Muslim League should not maintain its National Guards ;in the form of private army.¹⁸ The other aspect desired by Gandhi was that the Muslim League members of the Constituent Assembly would join the Assembly whose verdict, where Congress had its majority, would be acceptable to Jinnah and the Muslim League.¹⁹ Lastly Gandhi suggested to Mountbatten through

Lord Ismay that “if Mr. Jinnah rejects this offer, the same offer to be made *mutatis mutandis* to Congress”.²⁰

As the first option could not work, the Viceroy went for the second option as mentioned above but, on this Jinnah, warned the Viceroy that if the Muslim League’s demand for Pakistan was ignored or any option other than Pakistan was resorted to, British India would perish for which he would not be responsible. The responsibility for this, as a matter of fact, what Jinnah argued, would lie on none but the British who were running the affairs of the State and the Empire.²¹ There was only “one solution”, Jinnah suggested, and that was a “surgical operation” of British India.²² Consciously or non-consciously retorting to Jinnah’s proposal, Mountbatten abruptly said that an “anesthetic” must precede any “surgical option”.²³ Thus Mountbatten was forced to confess that he “would of course not recommend any solution which was patently unacceptable”, the remarks which apparently heartened Jinnah²⁴.

Next meeting between Mountbatten and Jinnah was held in the afternoon of 7 April in which Mountbatten tried his utmost to bring Jinnah around the point of accepting the Cabinet Mission Plan and “enter the Constituent Assembly”, an effort in which also the Viceroy miserably failed and noted with dismay that what Jinnah wanted was “to hand over power as soon as possible, preferably Province by Province “so that the provinces” themselves decide “how they formed into groups”.²⁵ In his another meeting with Jinnah on 9 April Mountbatten directly put to Jinnah that he wanted Jinnah “to be Prime Minister” of united India, but Jinnah, considering it a trick to sidetrack him from the goal of Pakistan, showed his inability to accept this and pressed for “full Pakistan” consisting of undivided six provinces , as mentioned before, with its own separate Army.²⁶ Still Mountbatten, acting in connivance with the Congress Caucus, had another meeting with Jinnah on 10 April along with Lord Ismay at the Viceroy House in which Ismay, on encouragement from the Viceroy, argued with Jinnah for the united India but Jinnah candidly said that “what he wanted was a surgical operation cutting of the 5 Provinces in “B” and “C” areas, and turning over them to Pakistan, leaving the other six Provinces to Hindustan”.²⁷ As far as Baluchistan was concerned, it was then not included in the list of recognized provinces according to the Government of India Act 1935. It was termed as “British Baluchistan” of the status of an Agency. Jinnah also wanted to include Baluchistan into Pakistan as proposed in the “Pakistan Resolution”.²⁸ In order to make Pakistan a “viable” state, Jinnah wanted the British to play their role fairly as he had full faith in the British justice. But Mountbatten’s compulsion seemed to be

that he could not commit without consulting or having the Congress leaders' confidence before the offer was made to Jinnah and the Muslim League. What Jinnah, as a matter of fact, wanted the British rulers to do was to decide on their own in the light of the election results of 1945-1946 by which it was clear that AIML and Jinnah got the overwhelming support of more than 90% of the Muslim masses for the cause of Pakistan which got the approval of the Muslim people through the ballot box. He expected the British Viceroy Lord Mountbatten to be fair enough to the traditions of the British justice and take decision to turn the six Muslim provinces into Pakistan. If it was difficult for the Viceroy and the British Government what Jinnah's second option to the Viceroy was to transfer power to the provincial legislatures of the provinces with the choice to make their own decision regarding Pakistan and Hindustan. This most pragmatic, genuine, and democratic demand of Jinnah was also not acceptable to Mountbatten and the Congress. Certainly, if there had been any judicial British person belonging to parliament or judiciary this proposal of Jinnah might have appealed him. But the Viceroy trained in the traditions of the armed forces and his personal leanings towards the Congress, Mountbatten could not agree to these judicious proposals of Jinnah. In addition, Jinnah "quoted the partition of Poland as not having been made on the basis of counting heads or taking into account the will of the people".²⁹ But the Viceroy bluntly told Jinnah that he "was not prepared to proceed on this basis".³⁰ This may be because of his compulsion and commitments made to the Congress secretly. In order to discuss the transfer of power with the aforementioned options in the official circles, Governors' First Conference was arranged on 15 April 1947 in Delhi presided over by Mountbatten in which various ways and means to tackle Jinnah and the issue of Transfer of Power with or without Pakistan were further discussed.³¹ Some of the Governors even criticized Attlee for wrongly announcing on 20 February 1947 that the British would transfer power by June 1948. In the light of eminent "civil war" like situation being witnessed in some of the provinces especially in the Punjab, NWFP and Bihar the British officials were generally afraid of performing their duties in the troubled areas when the British India was going to resort to civil war on communal lines.³² The Viceroy briefed the Governors about his talks with the Indian leaders on the issue of transfer of power.³³ The Viceroy expressed his preference to transfer of power idea to "an united India".³⁴ But keeping in view the pressure of Jinnah, Muslim League, and the threat of civil war "the Viceroy pointed out that a quick decision would also give Pakistan a greater chance to fail on its demerits. The great problem was to reveal the limits so that the Muslim League could revert to a

unified India with honor”, a proposal to which all the Governors agreed unhesitatingly.³⁵ Sir Francis Mudie, however, “added the view that the demand for Pakistan was largely psychological. Once granted, even on paper, he thought that the two parts would be ready to talk about unity again”.³⁶ The possibility of Jinnah’s taking into Cabinet was also thoroughly discussed.³⁷ Regarding NWFP general consensus was to hold “general elections” in the province.³⁸ Caroe emphasized the importance of the solution of problem of NWFP at the earliest possible.³⁹ It was also agreed that as the option of general elections in NWFP would not be liked by the Congress, some other option should be suggested.⁴⁰ Various dimensions of the partition of the Punjab and Bengal were also discussed. From this meeting the Viceroy “concluded by saying that from the afternoon’s meeting it appeared possible that the Muslims in Bengal would not follow Mr. Jinnah’s lead that there was a chance of a Congress Ministry being returned again in the N.W.F.P. and that Mr. Jinnah’s Pakistan would, in the end, consist of Sindh and part of the Punjab”.⁴¹ This aspect was further confirmed by the Viceroy’s meeting with Sir F. Mudie in the afternoon of the same day.

The Governors’ meeting continued for the second day on 16 April 1947 in which, speaking with reference to the general political situation being part of item 3, the Viceroy expressed that “he maintained impartiality towards the Muslim League and Congress. He felt that, as a matter of principle, it would be preferable to hand over power to a unified India, but that equally it would be wrong to force the Muslims to give up Pakistan if sufficient safeguard for their minority position in a unified India could not be provided”.⁴²

But, at the same, he pointed out even if Pakistan is granted, it would not be possible “to split” the Indian Armed Forces before June 1948.⁴³ On this Lord Ismay said that “whereas Mr. Jinnah’s avowed object was to have a Pakistan consisting of Sind, Punjab, the North West Frontier Province, Assam and the whole of Bengal, he believed that he would sooner take whatever was given to him, however, much reduced, rather than join up with the rest of India.”⁴⁴ Sir Even Jenkins said that the “Sikhs were demanding partition in any event.”⁴⁵ As for the concept of various Constituent Assemblies for the provinces agreement emerged that there should be two Constituent Assemblies – one for Pakistan and the other for Hindustan.⁴⁶ Another thing for second day’s governors’ proceedings was that there were thirteen items discussed in the meeting. Of these only 5 (3-7) have been published in the Transfer of Power Volume. For the reasons unknown to the reader, the rest have been omitted.⁴⁷ The reasons for this

have been recorded. Sir T. Shone met Jinnah and submitted his note to the Viceroy on 16 April 1947 in which he reported that Jinnah was “unbending in his insistence on Pakistan”.⁴⁸ Jinnah considered “unified India as an artificial creation.”⁴⁹

Jinnah also opposed the idea of “division” of Bengal, Punjab, and Assam.⁵⁰ The rationale for this, according to Jinnah, was that Bengal consisted of 60% of the Muslims of the whole provincial population. Even of 40% Hindus, he maintained, half were the scheduled Hindus.⁵¹ In the Punjab Jinnah wanted the Sikhs to join Pakistan.⁵² His argument was that by dividing Punjab 2 crores of Sikhs would be in one part and one and half crores would be in the second part. Thus the Sikhs would be divided, which he termed to be a great mistake on the part of Sikhs.⁵³ His arguments against the division of Assam have been given somewhere else in this chapter. However, the main argument was that Assam was not a Hindu majority province. The Muslims formed the largest majority. Hence, they were entitled to their claim to get it included into Pakistan.

Before announcement in the Viceroy’s Staff meeting on 21 April, Mountbatten secured willingness of Gandhi, Nehru, Menon, Sardar Patel, Master Tara Sindh, Gianni Kartar Singh, Sardar Baldev Singh, Liaquat Ali Khan, Sardar Abdul Rab Nishtar, Kriplani, Abdul Ghaffar Khan, for offering Jinnah “truncated” Pakistan. This also carried a lot of conditions which would ultimately reduce Pakistan to the position of Sindh and parts of Punjab so that Jinnah may refuse and revert to united India.⁵⁴ On this basis it was reported in the newspapers of 22 April that “the question before the country today is no more to divide or not to divide but how to divide. In all sections of political opinion in Delhi, Pakistan is now taken for granted. Only the geographical content is in doubt”.⁵⁵ Expressing in this regard Nehru said that “those who demanded Pakistan could have it, but on conditions that they did not coerce other unwilling parts of India to join Pakistan”.⁵⁶ Later after partition in 1956 Nehru told his biographer Leonard Mosley that “we accepted partition” in the hope “that partition would be temporary that Pakistan was bound to come back to us”.⁵⁷

The Congress leaders were perturbed over the lawlessness in the Punjab, N.W.F.P. and other parts of India in which minorities particularly the Caste Hindus and Sikhs were harassed. Sardar Patel felt so much perturbed by these that he met the Viceroy on 24 April and said: “If you will not act yourself, then turn over full authority to the Central Government and let us stop the Muslim League war in the Punjab and North Western Frontier; let us stop the Muslim League being mobilized in Bengal to attack Assam; let us govern”.⁵⁸ This, as a matter of fact, was result of the reaction of what

happened last year to the Muslims in Bihar, U.P, and Bengal. First Calcutta was affected in August 1946, killing hundreds of Muslims and then in October-November 1946 Bihar was affected when Hindus raided the Muslims in Chopra Town as a result of which 13 persons were killed and 40 others wounded on 27 October 1946.⁵⁹ This disturbance spread to neighboring villages of Chopra where 115 Muslims were killed and 160 injured on 28 October.⁶⁰ The situation became so tense that troops were called to control the situation.⁶¹ Condemning this brutal act on the part of the extremist Hindu community, Jinnah, in a statement to the press on 11 November 1946, said: "The Bihar Tragedy does not have any parallel or precedent in this record of cold-blooded butchery of the Muslim minority in the various parts of the country committed by majority Hindu community".⁶² What Jinnah feared was the wave of "vengeance" in the Muslim majority areas of the country may not engulf the whole country.⁶³ Despite all this Jinnah called for patience by the Muslims because, otherwise their cause for Pakistan will suffer. Although, Chopra was most affected but lawlessness was witnessed in other districts of Bihar such as Patna, Gaya, Muzaffarpur, Bhagalpur and Meagher.⁶⁴ Thousands of Muslims were uprooted from their houses in these districts and hundreds killed causing major problem for the orphan children.⁶⁵ For this Jinnah blamed the Congress for organizing "the massacre of Muslims" in Bihar.⁶⁶ Jinnah even charged that about 30,000 Muslims had been "murdered in Bihar", a claim which was disputed by the Congress leaders.⁶⁷ Before reaching agreement on 3rd June Plan, several drafts were prepared and exchanged between the Congress and Muslim League leadership. One such draft was prepared by the Viceroy on 14 May 1947 which was sent to the Congress and the Muslim League leaders for their opinions.⁶⁸ Before this Mountbatten had sent Lord Ismay and George Abell to London on 2 May with a partition draft to discuss it with the British Government "clause by clause".⁶⁹ Jinnah sent his comments on this draft to the Viceroy on 17 May 1947 by which he pleaded that

"the Muslim League has already decided that India must be divided and Pakistan should be established".⁷⁰ Regarding Bengal and Punjab, he made it clear that "the Muslim League cannot agree to the partition of Bengal and the Punjab on the following ground: It cannot be justified historically, economically, geographically, politically or morally. These provinces have built up their respective lives for nearly a century administratively, economically

and politically and the only ground which is put forward for the partition is that the areas where the Hindus and Sikhs are in a majority should be separated from the rest of the provinces on the ground that the Caste Hindus and Sikhs don't want to be under a government in which the Muslims will be in a majority".⁷¹ Taking another line of argument Jinnah pleaded:" The same can be urged by the Muslims and others that they don't want to be under a Government in which the Caste Hindus are in a majority and therefore other provinces should also be partitioned. It may be noted that there will be nearly 25 million of Mussalmans under the Hindu Government in Hindustan and millions other communities such as the Scheduled Castes, the Christians, Adibasis and Tribes. The principle underlying the demand for establishment of Pakistan and Hindustan is totally different and I have already sent my Statement to you which I issued on the 30th of April, copy of which has also been sent to the Prime Minister. The Muslim League, therefore, cannot agree to the partition of Bengal and the Punjab and I do hope that His Majesty's Government, when they examine this demand will not accept it and that you and His Majesty's Government will both, in the name of justice and fair play not submit yourselves to this clamour. For it will be sowing the seeds of future serious trouble and the results will be disastrous for the life of these two provinces and all the communities concerned."⁷²

Jinnah also made it clear that the present existing Constituent Assembly "cannot" be allowed to continue. Rather "two independent Constituent Assemblies" – one for Pakistan and the other for Hindustan – should be established.⁷³

Jinnah's statement of 30 April 1947 was published in the *Dawn*, 1 May 1947. It was considered so important that it was reported to the higher British circles in England before Jinnah could send its copy to the Viceroy.⁷⁴ The purpose of this statement was to counter the Congress propaganda that in case Pakistan was to be established "the Punjab will be partitioned"⁷⁵ and the Hindu Mahasabha resorted to "vigorous propaganda that Bengal should be partitioned."⁷⁶

Countering this proposal Jinnah argued that the concept of division of Punjab and the Bengal is calculated to "unnerve" and "harass" the Muslims

in order to shorten the geographical areas of Pakistan and increase geographical areas of Hindustan which will form three fourth of British India.⁷⁷ Quaid-i-Azam also argued that the proposed division of provinces would also destroy the administrative, geographical, political, economic and cultural unity of these provinces which have been successfully worked for over a century. Jinnah even said that this division would also divide the minorities just as Sikhs in the Punjab and the Scheduled Castes in the Bengal.⁷⁸

He also added:

B. 'CLEAR-CUT ROAD

“If power is to be transferred to various Governments, it can only be done successfully to the Pakistan Group and the Hindustan Group which will establish stable, secure Governments and will be able to run these Governments peacefully and successfully.

“The transfer of power to Pakistan and Hindustan Governments must mean a division of the defences as a ‘sine qua non’ of such a transfer and the defence forces should be completely divided – and in my opinion can be divided before June 1948 – and the States of Pakistan and Hindustan should be made free, independent, and sovereign. This is a clear-cut road and the only practical solution of India’s constitutional problem.”⁷⁹

Jinnah was particularly touchy about the issue of partition of Bengal. He had very many arguments against this partition: “I have every reason to believe that the Scheduled Castes are strongly opposed to the partition of Bengal because they rightly say that they will be divided into two parts, one at the mercy of the Caste Hindus in Western Bengal and the other at the mercy of the Muslims in Eastern Bengal. They dreaded the Caste Hindus, and it is well known that they have suffered economically and social tyranny at the hands of the Hindus for which there is no parallel in the world. But if, unfortunately, partition is decided upon and Eastern Bengal is deprived of its only port of Calcutta which has been developed in its present position, in no case, should it be allowed to go with the Western Bengal, otherwise it will follow as a corollary that the Western Bengal will go into Hindustan and His Majesty’s Government will be making the present of one great port to Hindustan. In any event, if worst comes to worst, Calcutta should be made a free port”.⁸⁰ In this connection, Jinnah

also pointed out, that despite his regard for the Communal Award of 1932 which was modified by the Poona Pact “in tragic circumstances, the Scheduled Castes have been completely left at the mercy of the Caste Hindus in the Electorates”.⁸¹

Jinnah was also concerned on the issue of partition of Punjab which he was not willing to accept. Depicting the list of majority Muslim and non-Muslim districts allegedly sent to him, was actually not received by him, these “areas” should be demarcated “down to Girdawar circles”.⁸² Same arrangement was to be made “in case of Bengal.”⁸³ He pleaded that there was no genuine ground for division of Punjab as none of the districts of the Eastern Punjab was Hindu majority or Sikh majority area.⁸⁴ The same applied to Bengal because none of the districts of Western Bengal was a Caste Hindu majority area. Therefore, the partition of Bengal and Punjab was not justified.⁸⁵

The Congress did not agree to the concept of holding “elections” in the NWFP based on secret reports shown to them by the British officials that in the event of elections being held in NWFP there was every possibility of the Congress losing because if that was resorted to their government in the province would come to an end. To save this situation, they proposed “referendum” secretly to Mountbatten who made Jinnah agree to this arrangement.⁸⁶

While agreeing to holding of the referendum in NWFP, Jinnah pleaded that “after the verdict in favour of Pakistan the present Ministry cannot be allowed to carry on the administration of the province”.⁸⁷ As to the Baluchistan, he said that 90% of the Muslims of British Baluchistan are the Muslims. According to the principle of majority Muslim areas going to Pakistan, Baluchistan was to be included in Pakistan. Additionally, he pleaded, the only Muslim League elected member from Baluchistan “has not taken his seat in the existing Constituent Assembly”.⁸⁸ Regarding Assam he pleaded that it was “neither a Muslim province nor a Hindu province”.⁸⁹ However, the district of Sylhet and the areas adjoining the district and contiguous to Bengal are predominately Muslim. In the event of partition of Bengal, Sylhet district and other Muslim majority areas of Assam contiguous to Bengal should be amalgamated to the Eastern Bengal.⁹⁰ He also failed to understand the logic how the rest of Assam can go to the Hindustan Constituent Assembly when there is no single Hindu majority district. Jinnah was also careful enough to think of majority Muslim areas of Bihar adjoining Eastern Bengal like the “Perinea district in Bihar which should be amalgamated with Eastern Bengal”.⁹¹ With reference

to Tribal areas of NWFP, Jinnah pleaded that it was the right of the Pakistan Constituent Assembly to “negotiate” with them.⁹²

Jawaharlal Nehru sent his comments to the Viceroy on 16 May 1947 in which while generally accepting the proposal of the Viceroy he indicated certain changes in the language of various paragraphs.⁹³ He, however, insisted on the Viceroy to press on Jinnah for one Constituent Assembly. As for the Boundary Commission, Jinnah was not in agreement, but Nehru suggested that “the Boundary Commission will have to take into consideration many other factors also apart from the nature of the population”.⁹⁴ Nehru was also particular that Gurdaspur district, despite being a Muslim majority area should not be allowed to go to Pakistan despite being it a “logical” proposal.⁹⁵ Next day, i.e. 17 May 1947 Nehru wrote another letter to Mountbatten after consulting Sardar Patel whose views largely were expressed in this letter that it was with great “agony” that we have agreed to the partition of British India and that was also on the condition of “partition of certain provinces” and that if Jinnah and the Muslim League do not agree to this “truncated” Pakistan “then inevitably we stand for a united India and the Cabinet Statement of 16th May”.⁹⁶ On the issue of Governor-General, Nehru said: “The Governor-General should be common to both the States, if there are to be two States. For our part we shall be happy if you could continue in this office and help us with your advice and experience”.⁹⁷ Nehru firmly believed that Mountbatten had taken the “trouble” to keep British India united as he sincerely believed in the “goodwill for India, which we have preceded so far”. Despite all this he was hopeful that the two states would join hands together for the sake of united India and it was in this way that “we shall see some (?) light soon and put an end to the horrors that are disfiguring India”.⁹⁸ This was a clear indication that if Mountbatten continues as common Governor-General of Hindustan and Pakistan, the future of united India would be ensured even if Pakistan is created for a short while.

Given the Congress and Muslim League proposals, Mountbatten, in light of the situation, crafted a second draft for the partition. He flew to London on May 19, 1947, seeking approval from the Home Government. Prior to this, following Mountbatten's instructions, Ismay had flown to London in early May 1947 to brief the Cabinet on the plan.⁹⁹ On May 5, Ismay briefed the British Cabinet on the highly tense situation among Muslims, Sikhs, and Hindus, prompting the Viceroy to expedite the decision on the transfer of power before June 1948.¹⁰⁰ Mountbatten returned to Delhi on May 31, 1947, presenting a final plan.¹⁰¹ This plan was shared with leaders of both parties and Sikh leaders. On June 3, a meeting took place between Nehru, Jinnah,

and Sardar Baldev Singh with Mountbatten, who announced the British Government's approval of the plan, later known as the Mountbatten Plan. The leaders then broadcasted the details through Radio India from Delhi on the same.¹⁰²

Conclusion

The Mountbatten Plan, announced on June 3, 1947, by British Prime Minister Attlee in the House of Commons divided the British India into two parts. One was Hindustan and the other was Pakistan. The Hindustan was represented by the Hindustan Constituent Assembly, while the Pakistan would be represented by the Pakistan Constituent Assembly. Bengal and Punjab were to be divided into two parts – one part to form part of Hindustan and the other was to go to Pakistan. The Boundary Commission would be tasked with defining the boundary between the two states, determining the division between Muslim majority and non-Muslim majority areas in the provinces of Bengal and Punjab.

Consequently, the Partition Plan took legal form through the Indian Independence Act passed by the British Parliament in July 1947. This legislative basis resolved partition issues, leading to the establishment of the Pakistan Constituent Assembly. Its inaugural meeting, held in Karachi from August 10 to 14, 1947, saw Quaid-i-Azam elected as the first President. On August 14, 1947, Lord Mountbatten transferred power to Quaid-i-Azam and the Pakistan Constituent Assembly. Pakistan, thus, came into existence as a result of Quaid-i-Azam's negotiations with British, Indian, and other leaders of British India. The creation of Pakistan reflects the remarkable foresight and skill of Quaid-i-Azam, rightly honored as the Father of the Pakistani Nation.

Notes and References

¹*Times of India*, 27 March 1947

²*Ibid*

³ *Indian Annual Register*, Jan-June 1947, Vol.I, 209-210

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⁶Stanly Wolpert, *Shameful Flight: The Last year of the British Empire in India*, (Karachi: Oxford university Press, 2006), 126-127

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⁸ Jinnah to Mountbatten, Bombay, 26 March 1947, *Quaid-i-Azam Papers*, F.182, National Archives of Pakistan.

⁹ Penderel Moon, *Divide and Quit: An Eyewitness Account of the Partition of India*, (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998), 65

¹⁰*The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi*, Vol. LXXXVII, p. 180. For text of Gandhi's plan in this connection see *ibid*, 199-200.

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¹⁴*Ibid*.

¹⁵Riaz Ahmad, *Pakistan Movement: New Dimensions: 1935-1948*, (Islamabad: Alvi Publishers, 2017), 327

¹⁶*Ibid*.,328

¹⁷*Ibid*.

¹⁸Riaz Ahmad, *The Frontier Muslim League 1913-1947: Secret Police Abstract*, (Islamabad: NIHCR, QAU., 2008), 54

¹⁹. H.V. Hodson, *The Great Divide: Britain, Indo-Pakistan*, (London: Hutchinson and Company Ltd., 1969), 228-230

²⁰Richard Hough, *Mountbatten: Hero of Our Times*, (London: Suffolk Book Club Associates, 1981), 145-150

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²²*Ibid*

²³*Ibid*.

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²⁵*Ibid*, 149.

²⁶*Ibid*, 163-164.

²⁷M.H. Sayid, *Mohammad Ali Jinnah: A Political Study*, (Karachi: Elite Publishers Ltd., 1962 (Second edition), 69-80.

²⁸*Ibid*.

²⁹*Ibid*.

³⁰*Ibid*.

³¹M.H. Sayid, *Muhammad Ali Jinnah*, 242. See Alan Campbell-Johnson, *Mission with Mountbatten*, London, Robert Hale, 1972, 64-66.

³², Campbell-Johnson, *Mission with Mountbatten*, 242-243.

³³, Campbell-Johnson, *Mission with Mountbatten*, 250.

³⁴*Ibid*.

³⁵*Ibid*, 251.

³⁶Hector Bolitho, *Jinnah: Creator of Pakistan*, (London: John Murray, 1954), 183-190.

³⁷*Ibid*.

³⁸*Ibid*, 252.

³⁹*Ibid*, 253.

⁴⁰*Ibid*.

⁴¹Riaz Ahmad, *Pakistan Movement: New Dimensions 1935-1948*, 255.

⁴²*Ibid*, 269.

⁴³*Ibid*, 270.

⁴⁴*Ibid*.

⁴⁵, Ahmad, *Pakistan Movement: New Dimensions 1935-1948*, p. 271.

⁴⁶ Quaid-i-Azam Papers, Vol.16 &19, F.182, F.357, Islamabad: National Archive of Pakistan, Ministry of Culture,

⁴⁷*Ibid*. 269 & 279.

⁴⁸*Ibid*, 279.

⁴⁹ Nicholas Mansengs and Penderel Moon, *The Transfer of Power 1942-47*, vol. X, 150

⁵⁰<http://en.sikipedia.org/wiki/>. Austria. and [http:// history. sandiego.edu/gen/WW2 Pics/81520. GIF](http://history.sandiego.edu/gen/WW2Pics/81520.GIF) and

<http://history.sandiego.edu/gen/WW2Pics/81522.GIF>., 253

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⁵² *Ibid*.

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⁵⁴Nicholas Mansengs and Penderel Moon, *The Transfer of Power 1942-47*, vol. X, 352-358.

⁵⁵ *Times of India*, 22 April 1947. This aspect has been ignored by Alan Campbell-Johnson, *Mission with Mountbatten*, pp. 68-70.

⁵⁶ R.C. Majumdar, *History of the Freedom Movement in India*, Vol. III, (Calcutta, Firm K.L. Mukhopadhyay, 1963), 797

⁵⁷ Nehru's Address at United Provinces Political Conference, Benares, *Times of India*, 22 April 1947

⁵⁸ *Transfer of Power 1942-47*, Vol. X, 398

⁵⁹ *Indian Annual Register, July-Dec. 1946*, Vol. II, 40

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 41

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

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⁶³ *Note from IAR*

⁶⁴ *Indian Annual Register, July-Dec. 1946*, Vol. II., 210

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶⁶ Stanley Wolpert, *Shameful Flight*, 125.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

⁶⁸ British Library (OIOC), Vol. L/PO/6/121(1), London.

⁶⁹ Hector Bolitho, *Jinnah*, 183

⁷⁰ Note from Mr. Jinnah, 17 May 1947, L/PO/6/121(1), British Library (OIOC), London.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*

⁷² *Ibid.*

⁷³ *Ibid.*

⁷⁴ *Mountbatten Papers*, Eur. MSS, F.200/208, British Library (OIOC Collection), London. This press statement has been ignored by most of the Pakistani and foreign authors/biographers of Jinnah or Pakistan Movement.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

⁷⁸ *Mountbatten Papers*, Eur. MSS, F.200/208, British Library (OIOC Collection), London

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

⁸⁰ Nicholas Mansengs and Penderel Moon, *Transfer of Power 1942-47*, Vol. XI, 89-101.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*

⁸² *Ibid.*

⁸³ See More details Farooq Ahmad Dar, *Jinnah's Pakistan: Formation and Challenges of a State*, (Karachi, Oxford University Press, 2014)

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

⁸⁵ Panderel Moon, *Transfer of Power 1942-47*, Vol. XI, London, 1982, 104-106

⁸⁶ Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, *India Wins Freedom: A Autobiographical Narrative*, (Bombay: Orient Longmans, 1959), 70-80

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

⁸⁹ *Transfer of Power 1942-47*, Vol. XI, London, 1982. 107-109

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

⁹¹ Ian Talbot, *Provincial Politics and the Pakistan Movement*, (Karachi: OUP, 1988), 90-98

⁹² Stanley Wolpert, *Jinnah of Pakistan*, (New York: OUP, 1984), 104- 120

⁹³ *Mountbatten Papers*, Eur. MSS. F. 200/152, British Library (OIOC Collection), London.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

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⁹⁷ *Mountbatten Papers*, Eur. MSS. F. 200/152, British Library (OIOC Collection), London

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹⁹ Wolpert, *Shameful Flight*, 144.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁰¹ *Times of India*, 31 May 1947.

¹⁰² *Transfer of Power 1942-47*, Vol. XI, London, 1982, pp. 89-101. Also see *Mountbatten Papers*, Eur. MSS. F. 200/112, British Library (OIOC Collection), and London.