
India-Israel Military Relations 1990-2000: Implications for Pakistan

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India and Israel, the two distant friends remained apart for forty years due to multiple domestic and international restrictions besides having some common traits but finally met in 1992 after the establishment of bilateral diplomatic relations. The two ancient nations struggle against British Empire and got independence. Following the end of bipolarity, India left its traditional policy of non-alignment and liberates itself from political oriented decisions. India committed itself with other aspect of friendship based on economic and security interests which helped her to embrace Israel towards multifaceted cooperation particularly in military and security fields. These two fields are significant as both states continued their cooperation during de facto recognition particularly in war kind situations. After the Cold War, their military relationship further solidified after getting the Regional Power Centre status by U.S. in their respective regions. Pakistan showed apprehensions upon India-Israel military relations and considered their collaboration as threat from two opposite ideology based countries. This article will highlight the specific period of India-Israel military relations from post-cold war till the end of twentieth century by using analytical approach and secondary data.

Keywords: India, Israel, Pakistan, military, nuclear

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Introduction

India had a secular stance upon its existence while Israel is committed to religious ideology of Zionism. India besides having the shared history of British Colonialism did not accept Israel before 1950. The delay from Indian side regarding Israel's recognition was particularly because of its ideological stance and outburst of Nehru's approach of non-alignment. Multiple factors compliments and supports the Nehru's approach as the most possible option for India to get maximum economic, social, political, military and diplomatic benefits out of it. India's relations with Israel during de-facto recognition were over-shadowed because of numerous factors like:

- Economic interests in Arab Countries as $\frac{3}{4}$ of total India's import and export passed through Suez Canal.
- To gain Arab Support on Kashmir issue.
- To show solidarity to USSR.
- Portray herself as the staunch supporter of Palestine cause.
- To please Muslim voters in India.
- Commitment towards non-alignment.
- To neutralize the strong hold of Pakistan's position in Arab countries.

However, India extended recognition to Israel in 1950 but did not establish diplomatic relations which brought question that either this recognition is de facto or de jure and created a sense of bewilderment but laterally, Government of India concluded the discussion in parliament that "India extended de jure recognition to Israel in September 1950"¹. Although both states did not exchanged their ambassadors before 1992 but India only allowed Israel to open an 'Honoury Council' in 1952. The functions of 'Honoury Council' were restricted to Jewish immigrants only but India refrained herself to open even the 'Hounary Council' on reciprocal basis. However, Israeli Council office worked to mend the mindset of Indian government and people in favour of Israel by supporting India-Israel friendship societies, hosting receptions and functions² which proved quite successful.

Numerous ups and downs were witnessed between both countries but the relations reached their lowest ebb when Yosef Hassen, the counselor General of Israel in India bluntly passed statement regarding India's hesitation for halting the bilateral relations. He added that Indian politicians are afraid particularly because of economic interests vested in Arab countries. As Saudi Arabia absorbs a large number of Indian emigrants as labours and the possibility regarding the cancellation of contracts with Iraq stopped them to recognize Israel³. However the relations were restored in August 1986 after intense lobbying by US based Jewish

lobby and a meeting was held with PM Rajive Gandhi with MorisAbraim along with Stephen Solarz-an influential Congressman⁴.

Besides such estranged relationship both countries covertly extended military cooperation and collaboration with each other. During Indo-China 1962 war, Israel first time extended military support upon Indian request and entertained India with several 80 and 120 mm motor guns⁵. From here to onwards, the journey of cooperation and collaboration accelerated in military, nuclear and intelligence fields. In 1963, Indian Government took military consultation from Israel's military specialist⁶ whereas in 1965 Indo-Pak war, India received heavy mortors and ammunities from Israel including 81 and 120 mm mortors and howitzer artillery pieces⁷. This collaboration continued during Arab-Israel 1967 war, Indo-Pak 1971. Their interdependency harmonized in nuclear field as India owns thorium reserves and Israel possessed nuclear know-how. The National security Guard was also formed after getting training from Israeli security specialists. The joint venture of RAW and MOSSAD to dismantle Pakistani nuclear arsenal during early 1980's was also the specific feature their covert military relations. P.R.Kumarswamy wrote that "Israel sought India's active cooperation in conducting a pre-emptive strike on Kahutta. The Indian air-base at Jamnagar near India-Pakistan was frequently mentioned as the possible refueling site"⁸

Shift in Indian Foreign Policy

In Post-Cold War scenario, there were several factors which urged India to make a shift from its policy of non-alignment and liberate its economy such as end of Cold War, Unipolarity, Economic vulnerability, end of Warsaw Pact, Berlin wall fell and eventually the embracement of east with west. These factors were the driving force which enabled India to think otherwise and India moved with its "Look West Policy" primarily for its vulnerability for military purchase and Economic uplift as USSR lost its status of arms supplier and non-alignment policy badly hits its economy. Israel was the best possible option for India as the mode of world has changed and US being the sole super power on earth introduced New World Order in which India and Israel both got the status of US regional power centres in their respective regions. These reasons could be attributed as the turning point for India to formalize diplomatic channels with Israel. According to P. R. Kumarswamy:

The decision made by India's Prime Minister NarasimhaRao in January 1992, to establish diplomatic relations with Israel was partly influenced by an appreciation of the potential security operation between the two countries.⁹

J. N. Dixit in his memoirs specified one aspect which became the reason of change in Indian policy that "Israel had developed expertise in improving the

weapon system of Soviet origin, which could be utilized by India.”¹⁰ Kumarswamy further added in the scenario indirectly as:

The disintegration of Soviet Union and the multiplicity of the suppliers meant that India had to negotiate with numerous countries of the commonwealth of independent states (C.I.S). The fragmentation of the supply system made India extremely vulnerable.¹¹

It is said that, even before the disintegration of Soviet Union, the Indian military establishment looked forward to cooperate with Israel for Military and technological independence. As:

During the Gulf War Moscow failed to come to assistance of a third world client, it was prepared to stand on the side lines and watched the Iraqi military machine to be destroyed. One of the major attractions of receiving weapons from the Soviet Union had been its reliability as a defence supplier, particularly when war had broken out. National security policy in Delhi will need to assess the implications of Soviet behavior in the Gulf war for the other major recipients of soviet weapons and adjust pattern of sourcing defence supplies accordingly.¹²

Another military factor that diversified India's selection of Israel for strategic cooperation was that the 1991 Gulf war. The 1991 Gulf war had shown that the Soviet equipments were easily surpassed by the American weapons. India realized the superiority of advanced western arms. Moreover, the Pakistan's access to western arms had also motivated India for procurement of western weapons.¹³ Moreover the expensive Sukhoi Su-30 that India had imported from Russia were simultaneously being offered and sold to other countries as well like her adversary China. Furthermore, since 1991 India had tried to diversify its weapon procurement, and Israel was ready to supply specific advanced types of military equipment and technology not freely available from western countries, which restricted their arms sales to India.¹⁴

Viz-a-viz, it was also a good opportunity for Israel to enhance their military hardware support as they cannot depend on Israeli market alone. So they need to export 3 quarters of their military production and now India come up as the largest market for Israeli military industry and Israel was quite sure about to enjoy the status of reliable and trustworthy arms supplier. It was a major decision regarding

de-politicization and de-ideologization of Indian foreign affairs from domestic affairs.

Another major reason in India's major policy shift was regarding India's role in UN. India remained active in UN since inception and participated in several UN peace keeping missions. Earlier, India was traditionally relied on USSR veto regarding Pakistan's stand on Kashmir in UN which shield it from International condemnation and India on reciprocal basis invariably voted in harmony with USSR but with the disintegration of USSR, Uncertainty overcame within India regarding Russian Veto in UN over Kashmir

The Indian Diplomatic craving was mainly in search of permanent membership of UNSC and to meet this urge, India cultivated its connections with American based Jewish Lobby. India repels the Resolution of 10 no. 3379 in its best interest moved in 1975 that equated Zionism as Racism.

Military Relations 1990-2000

The establishment of full diplomatic relations paved the way for overt collaborations followed by the visits of various teams from multiple fields particularly related to military. Their cooperation can be gauged that between 1992 and 2000, there had been 50 exchanges of military missions, a figure that demonstrates the intense military interaction and discussion between the respective military staffs.¹⁵ This clearly shows the pace of development in bilateral relationship. Yitzhak Rabin, Israeli Prime Minister Spoke in an interview related to cooperation with India as "We are more than ready to cooperate with India in the field of defence whenever and whatever it suits India."¹⁶ A high level Israeli defence team visited India in May 1992¹⁷ whereas in August 1992, Israel offered Cruise Missile technology to India during Israeli aircraft industries MALAT's members visited India.¹⁸

On these Israeli military visits, an Indian delegation led by former Defence Minister Sharad Pawar visited Israel on reciprocal bases. The delegation visited Israel from May 3-8, 1993, apparently for participating in the Israeli AGRITECH exhibition. The purpose of the visit meant, to get benefit from Israeli expertise in drip irrigation in Rajasthan desert. But the hidden agenda of visit was to seek Israeli expertise in desert warfare. As Israel can render valuable services to India regarding desert warfare and equipment testing expertise in certain weather conditions across its western border where India needs these military proficiencies as precautionary measures for possible escalation with Pakistan. The Pakistani defence analyst General K. M. Arif, observed this development in the veil of drip irrigation as "absurdly comical when India already attain self-sufficiency in food". He further added that the "Rajasthan desert has been previously a venue of a nuclear test (1974) and a major military exercise (Brasstacks 1987). Moreover he

feels that this cooperation provides a good cover for defence cooperation in mechanized warfare and military maneuvers in desert terrain in which the Israeli army has attained great skill and experience.¹⁹”

From March 20-21, 1993, J. N. Dixit, the Indian Foreign Secretary, visited Israel, to discuss the overall framework of the Indo-Israel cooperation and finalize the programme for the visit of Israeli Foreign Minister and Deputy Foreign Minister, Shimon Peres, to India. Which was scheduled earlier in January but postponed as Hindu-Muslim riots were erupted due to demolish of Babri Mosque. Shimon Peres visited India between May16-19, 1993, and held wide ranging discussions. The leaders of both countries also explored the possibility of enhancing economic cooperation in fields of solar energy, technology, science, agriculture and health.²⁰ Peres also announced the setting up of a joint Indo-Israel fund with each side contributing 1.5 million dollars a year to coordinate research and development activities for civilian purposes.²¹ During the visit, both the countries signed four agreements and two Memorandums of Understanding (MOU).²² According to EphraimDowek, the Israeli ambassador to India, a range of agreements pertaining to various fields in civil aviation, science and technology which were under consideration were likely to be signed by the end of 1993.²³ As reported by the Indian Institute of Foreign Trade (IIFT), the two way trade had increased eight fold to Rs 317.8 crores in 1991-1992 from Rs 44.6 crores in 1985-86. In 1991-92 India imported goods from Israel worth Rs 160 crores, 11.65% more than in 1990-91 and exported commodities to Israel worth RS 157.8 crores in 1991-92, 65.4% more than in 1990-91.²⁴

An Israel's air Force Commander also visited India in March 1994.²⁵ The same year in December 1994, India and Israel granted the status of MFN to each other in conclusion of trade and economic cooperation agreement. This MFN status further smoothen the process for Israel to import Indian goods without import permits except those which required from all countries under Israeli customs regulations.²⁶

HelzBodinger, the then Israeli Air Chief General, visited India in April 1995 against an invitation by Indian Air Force Chief Marshal S. K. Kaul²⁷ and offered “a generous package deal, that included airborne warning and control systems, remotely piloted vehicles, access to an air platform for anti-detection and anti-jamming maneuver and specialized weapons”.²⁸ In return Israel required “utilization of Jodhpur and Bhuj bases of India's Air Force for halting and refilling services. . . [Because of] strategic and regional interest compulsions.²⁹” However, Indian Government denied the discussion of any such arms deal.³⁰ According to *Jane's Digest*, India purchased US\$14 million worth of light ammunition from Israel in 1995.³¹ The Indian Defence secretary, K. A. Nambiar, visited Israel in July 1995 to reciprocate the visit along with a high level team to identify the avionics and weapon systems to upgrade Russian made MIG-21, though Israel

offers expensive assistance package but its superiority in technical advancement in Russian made weapons appealed³².

India was also keen for remotely piloted vehicles and extends advanced negotiations with Israel for supply of art-fire control systems and thermal imagers for the Indian Army's Russian made T-72 tank fleet.³³ Israeli firms supplied the Indian Navy with its only aircraft carrier, the INS Viraat with upgraded electronic warfare equipments additionally it also supplied India with two Super Dvora Mark II attack boats and upgraded its tanks³⁴.

A. P. J. Abdul Kalam Azad, the chief of the Indian Defence Research and Development organization (DRDO) visited Israel in 1996. Abdul Kalam's visit gave a new fillip in Indo-Israel ties that resulted in Israel's President Visit to India. S. K. Sareen, Air Chief of India, visited Israel in July 1996 whose program was most likely comprised on Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) and related to electrical items³⁵. Elta, an Israeli company also finalized a deal of worth 80 million dollar in November 1996 to provide electronic fighting gears to Indian MiG-21³⁶. Further, in November 1996, the visit of Israeli Naval Chief also had a significant importance³⁷. An air tactics system was installed at the place near Jamnagar³⁸. Jamnagar's name was frequently used in 1980's for Israeli jets refueling site for an attack on Pakistani nuclear installation in Kahutta.

President Ezer Weizman's trip in December 1997 was accompanied by 24 member business delegation³⁹. Weizman said that "Israel was eager on providing skills in missile technology fields and avionics to India"⁴⁰ and was looking forward that Tel Aviv and New Delhi "will find a happy hunting ground"⁴¹ in Defence cooperation. In the visit, the Israeli company Elta signed "100 million dollars agreement with that of Indian state to supply electronic fighting system" whereas another Israeli company Iscar "began a joint venture contract with Air Force of India for blade plant."⁴² Under this visit, India made a proposal to purchase the Barak-I surface to Air missiles (SAM)⁴³ from Israel. The Barak-I has the ability to intercept anti-ship cruise missiles such as Harpoon⁴⁴. Indian Navy considered Barak-I as best option to counter Pakistan's three missiles as P3-C II, Orion maritime strike aircraft and 27 Harpoon sea-skimming anti-ship missiles⁴⁵. In this visit, both the countries also decided to send their military attaché. And in April 1997, Wing Commander N. Brown assumed office as India's first Defence Attaché in Israel⁴⁶.

Speculations arose in 1998 regarding India's nuclear blasts that it was actually meant for Israel to test her nuclear technology as because of non-availability of testing grounds in Israel's territory⁴⁷. Financial times of London as well described the collaboration as there was "hard evidence of Israeli Indian nuclear cooperation" following the disclosure in an Israeli newspaper that

connected this cooperation with “APJ Abdul Kalam’s visit to Israel in 1996 and 1997” respectively⁴⁸ but the charges were denied by Indian diplomats for any such alleged assistance⁴⁹. However, The Hindu reported that “Israel’s Foreign Ministry never condemn India’s nuclear weapons test rather refused to say whether Israel would impose sanctions on India or re-examine the close military ties between the two countries.”⁵⁰ Besides this Israeli support to India, Israel accelerate the pace of collaboration “by sending its six high tech aircrafts fully loaded with sophisticated missiles that landed on different air bases in the Indian Held Kashmir to neutralize Pakistani electronic network at its nuclear facilities, particularly at the Kahutta plant.⁵¹” to counter such attacks “Pakistan placed more than 125 surveillance planes over Kahutta round the clock.⁵²” Indian Newspaper which also revealed that “Israel spy satellite was providing India with intelligence on Pakistan” and “Israel was also allowed by India to undertake missions on Indian Territory (probably Kashmir) to monitor points of Interests.”⁵³

After the 1998 Indian nuclear blasts, a team of the Israeli Aircraft Industry (IAI) toured India to hasten the sale of Israeli Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPVs) and anti-ship missiles⁵⁴. Same year, IAI finalized to sell Israeli technology of Advanced Electronic Equipment (AEE) made of purely from Israeli technology⁵⁵. Israel also “sold advanced electronic warfare system to India overruling US objections that sought to block the deal in the wake of Indian Nuclear tests in May 1998.⁵⁶” General V.P. Malik and National Security Advisor of India Brajesh Mishra’s visit to Israel in 1998-99 respectively left significant importance which emphasized on tactical collaboration between New Delhi and Tel Aviv⁵⁷.

During BJP Government, the bilateral relations were further solidified between India and Israel followed by Israel’s willingness to provide ordnance laser guided bombs and UAV’s during Indo-Pak clash in 1999 on Kargil.⁵⁸ Israel’s provided RPV’s and UAV’s during Kargil war were viewed as the strategic force which could strengthen and maximize the capability of the Indian force at high altitude battle field. Whereas, “the real time intelligence pictures could include enemy defence layout preparedness, weapon deployment along borders. Israel has earned world fame in developing smaller, lighter and maneuverable UAVs.⁵⁹”

If India already possesses those UAVs and RPVs, then the intrusion in Kargil could have been spotted earlier. So, the possession of Israeli UAVs became the urgent need of India after the intelligence failure in Kargil. The Indian Government could not afford to ignore these surveillance and intelligence capability anymore. As these UAVs were “ideal for surveillance on the 704 km long LoC, 140 km of which falls in high altitude ranging from 13,000 ft to 19,000 ft.⁶⁰” Resultantly, the “Indian Air Force had asked for immediate induction of the UAVs for intelligence of the 140 km long high altitude ranges along the line of control in Kargil border.⁶¹”

For extension in surveillance capability in Kashmir against Pakistan, India-Israel signed a contract for UAVs⁶² and negotiations have also been done for the joint production of 'Heron' for Indian Navy. This was the most "modern UAV made by Israeli Aeronautical Industry (IAI) and has a longer range and more sophisticated payload than the 'searchers' which India had first agreed to buy from Israel in 1996."⁶³

The conventional arms deal in September 1999 reached to an estimate about 150 to 200 million dollars a year⁶⁴. The other procurement items under discussion were artillery and battle field systems, up to eight units of the Searcher-2 Unmanned Aerial Vehicle. The proposed plan also includes "avionics and other upgrades for India's fleet of MI-35 helicopters, T-72, Arjun Tanks, Russian-built SU-30 and MIG-27s and British made Jaguars."⁶⁵ Israel also agreed to speed up delivery of more than 150 million dollars' worth of equipment India had earlier ordered, including munitions, weapons, surveillance systems and military communications gear.⁶⁶

In April 2000, Soltam- an Israeli Company- won the contract to upgrade the Indian artillery having 47.5 million dollar worth.⁶⁷ In June the same year, Indian Home Minister L. K. Advani paid a successful visit to Israel along with the number of security officials including Intelligence Bureau Chief, Director General Security border Force, Union Home Secretary and CBI head. This team visit French and UK as well. The main objectives of these visits were "to learn the counter insurgency tactics of Mossad."⁶⁸

In the meeting, the focal point between Tel Aviv and New Delhi was the counter terrorism where both the countries agreed for cooperation and collaborations. As Sharad Pawar earlier said in his visit to Israel in February 1992 after formalization of their relations that, this Indian Diplomatic moves will "pave the way for drawing on Israel's successful experience to curb the terrorism." He also added that "India would also like to get acquainted with Israeli experience in developing technology for anti-terrorism operations."⁶⁹

Advani during his visit discussed the different techniques which Israel had employed to restrain terrorism with top Israeli police officials and acknowledge her border management techniques while visiting Israeli border with Lebanon. Advani also said that "it would help [us] in effectively managing the Indo-Pak border to tackle the cross border terrorism."⁷⁰ Jasjit Singh, the leading Indian defence expert observed that "there is a great deal" for India "to learn from the principles and the practices" followed by Israel. But he persisted as well that, Israeli "template cannot be automatically" applied in India due to it "structural and situational differences between the two countries." He argued his analysis by stating that "Israelis have turned intelligence gathering into a fine art" and

dissimilarly “India tended to treat intelligence as a police function rather than a specialized professional task.”

From 30th June, four days later to Advani’s visit, Jaswant Singh, the Indian external Minister paid a visit to Israel. The visit had an importance as it was the first visit by Indian External Minister after 1992. In meeting with Israeli leadership, “Jaswant Singh was able to score an assurance that Tel Aviv would keep New Delhi’s security concerns in mind while selling arms to Beijing and would not encourage any deal that might jeo-paradise Indo-Israeli Ties.⁷¹” Delegates from both the countries decided “to set up a joint ministerial commission to have regular dialogue on security and counter terrorism and on substantial cooperation on information technology.⁷²” The commission will be setup alternately in capitals of both countries twice in a year. Jaswant Singh told to Israeli Foreign Minister David Levy, that there is a “need to set up a global mechanism against terrorism, and asked that there be intelligence cooperation between the Governments of Israel and India”.⁷³

With a specific aim to institutionalize these contacts, a joint Working Group (JWG) was formed in 2000 in order to strengthen their intelligence and counter terrorism cooperation. The first meeting of this group was held in January 2002 when Shimon Peres visited India and “a mutual agreement on counter terrorism was discussed between both the countries.⁷⁴” The second meeting was concluded in May 2002 in Delhi related to counter Terrorism. The third meeting was held in Jerusalem on 24 March 2003 and the fourth meeting in connection to last three meetings was took place between 29 November to 2 December 2004 in New Delhi where counter terrorism and disarmament issues come under discussions. After the fourth meeting, a joint statement was published as “both sides reaffirmed their unequivocal condemnations of all acts of terrorism. They reviewed the global campaign against terrorism and discussed ways and means by which the fight against terrorism by the international community can be made more effective and how India and Israel can contribute to this.⁷⁵”

As a result of L. K. Advani and Jaswant Singh’s visit, Israel trained “nearly 3,000 Indian soldiers for specialized anti-insurgency strikes, and to stop infiltration by Pakistani terrorists into India via Kashmir region.⁷⁶” Reportedly, “India concluded 30\$ million deal with Israel [regarding purchase of] Tavor assault rifles, Galil sniper rifles, night vision and laser range finding and targeting equipment [for the Indian] soldiers.⁷⁷” The world renowned intelligence information source *Janes* further unveiled the objectives of Advani visit and reported about this Israel-India nexus as “the Indian spy agency RAW and the Israeli spy agency Mossad have created four new agencies to infiltrate Pakistan to target important religious and military personalities, journalists, judges, lawyers and bureaucrats. In addition, bombs would be exploded in trains, railway stations,

bridges, bus stations, cinemas, hotels and mosques of rival Islamic sects to incite sectarianism.^{78,}

The Indian Newspaper also reported that “Fencing of the Indo-Pak was not enough. To check Pakistan sponsored Cross-border terrorism, top security experts of Israel have suggested that hi-tech gadgets ranging from an electronic barrier system of radars to thermal imaging devices should be immediately installed on India’s sensitive international border in J[ammu] and K[ashmir] and Punjab sectors.^{79,}” The Mossad officials, experts from Israeli Army and Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI) also collaborated in the much-talked incident of the Samjhauta express.⁸⁰ The experts from Israel “advised that instead of Lahore, the train should terminate on the Attari border.” It was also reported that “the sources in Ministry of Home Affairs of India said the Israeli experts surveyed the 198 km international border in Jammu and Punjab and reviewed the route of the Samjhauta Express with top officials of the Boarder Security Force.^{81,}”

Implications for Pakistan

Pakistan had ideological contradiction with India and Israel and always perceives their military cooperation as threat which had potential to disturb the security balance of power in South Asia. Pakistan’s reservations regarding their covert and overt relationship in military, nuclear and intelligence fields are not baseless as they always touched the India-Pakistan rivalry like 1965, 71 wars, possible attack on Kahutta installations, demographic settlement strategies in Kashmir, up gradation of Indian military equipment, valuable guidance for Desert and the Kargil clash. Beside India-Israel bilateral cooperation, the US backing behind this axis rings the bell in Islamabad.

After Pokharan nuclear testing in 1998, India come under severe criticism from international community, diplomatically pressurized and faced economic sanctions. United Security Council also unanimously passed resolution 1172 on 6 June 1998 to condemn the nuclear test. But it was Israel among few countries – along France and Russia- that did not condemn India nor halt any sort of diplomatic and economic relations which proved that both countries do not have limits for bilateral ties.

In 1999, when Pakistani troops took position in Kargil, one of the first thing that India sought was the GPS data for the region because India faced limited sight problems with their inaccurate guided missiles as Pakistan already shot down their photo reconnaissance and left India with no alternative for accurate imagery in absence of high altitude surveillance equipment. The space based navigation system maintained by US Government would have provided vital information but US denied it to India.

Israel was having expertise in border control and surveillance strategies because of its alive Palestine issue and stepped in with unmanned reconnaissance aircraft or drones in the battle zone to assist India directly in its war time situation. Israel not only provided UAVs but also provide images of Kargil region from its own military satellite. The on time supply of sophisticated sensors helped India to monitor cross border infiltration and overcome the lacking of Indian defense military. India was also promptly provided with laser guided missiles for its mirages from Israel. In June 1999, the precision strikes from Mirages limited the advantage of Pakistani soldiers based on high positions and helped to turn around the conflict in India's favour. Israel's arms lobby worked and upgraded its status as "reliable arms supplier" to India which multiplied India's arms capability which further bloomed their relations.

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