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# Pakistan: De Facto Asymmetry (A Case Study of Centre-Provinces Relations)

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*Almost all federations have problems with centre-provinces ties from the beginning. Today, asymmetric federalism is considered as a tool to solve these problems. The term asymmetric federalism has many types of which de facto and de jure are the most important. De facto asymmetry is a constant feature of all federations of the world which creates the de jure asymmetry in most federations. Pakistan is a federal state and has the essentials of de facto asymmetry in its natural structure as well. Overall, the asymmetric federalism in Pakistan has been discussed by many scholars while the impacts of de facto asymmetry on centre-provinces relations in Pakistan have not been debated as yet. The purpose of this study is to measure the centre-provinces problems in Pakistan, created by de facto asymmetries. The main focus is on the de facto asymmetries while the de jure asymmetry brought forth where indispensable. This article tries to find out how de facto asymmetries weakened the relations between centre and provinces in Pakistan. In doing so, large number of theoretical foundations, natural structure of the country and constitutional schemes have been keenly observed in analytical way. This research opens the new dimensions of research on similar topics.*

**Key Words:** Pakistan, Federalism, Asymmetries, De facto Asymmetry, Centre-Provinces, Relations

## **Introduction**

A system of government which almost existed in the 28 countries of the world is federalism. Mostly consider as a device in diversified societies to unify them as the widely held definition of the federalism is, a system of governance which accommodates unity in diversity.<sup>1</sup> Thanking to its significance the eyes of scholars on federalism were an attempt to view and observe federal system by different angles e.g., cooperative, dual, creative and competitive federalism operated to accommodate the problems facing to the countries governed under federal system. Recent scholarship gazed on the asymmetric federalism to create harmony between centre and provinces and among the provinces and to accommodate the problems of federations. Asymmetric federalism covers many meanings and ideological debates. A concise definition is that asymmetric federalism is where constitutionally one or two federating units having more powers than others. Swenden, Burges and Watts describe two major levels of it; one level refers to political, cultural, socio and economic asymmetries among the federating units and they used the term de facto asymmetry or political asymmetry for this level. They were of the view that each federation has de facto asymmetry or political asymmetry in its natural structure. At the second level they describe the situation whereby one or two units (provinces) constitutionally gained more powers than others and for this they used the term de jure asymmetry or constitutional asymmetry. Spain, Russia, Canada, India and Belgium contained are examples of asymmetric federalism.<sup>2</sup> In foundation, asymmetric federalism is not a new term; it is as old as federalism. Nevertheless, Tarlton was the first who introduced or coined the term symmetry and asymmetry in 1965. He was against the asymmetric federalism and conceived it poison for the unity of federation<sup>3</sup> but his views could not gain attention of the scholars almost for forty years. However, after a long time this notion stimulated a heated debate, particularly on its ideological, notional and pragmatic aspects.<sup>4</sup> Thus, literature has emerged on the asymmetric federalism in the previous decades as, Ferran Requejo studied the modern states and pointed out the asymmetries existed within them.<sup>5</sup> Ronald Lampman Watts worked out political and constitutional asymmetries in the federations.<sup>6</sup> Some scholars choose the specific country for studying associations, benefits and drawbacks of asymmetric federalism. Arthur Benz explores the implications of asymmetric federalism in Germany.<sup>7</sup> Same question was explored by the Wilfried Swenden for Belgium.<sup>8</sup> Rao and Singh picked India to analyse the implications of asymmetric federalism.<sup>9</sup> Louise Tillin mapped the case of asymmetric federalism in India.<sup>10</sup> Similarly, Rekha Saxena also studied the case of asymmetric federalism in India.<sup>11</sup> Nasreen Kosar explored the case of asymmetric federalism in Pakistan.<sup>12</sup> Shahid and Malanie accentuated the constitutional asymmetry in Pakistan concerning subnational empowerment.<sup>13</sup> Another scholarship on asymmetric federalism concluded the asymmetric federalism as a helpful tool to escape the federation from secession due to its probability for accommodating diversity.<sup>14</sup> The main intent of all mentioned literature is to deliberate the ideological aspect of asymmetric federalism or its implications in different countries while this article will not view this ideological aspect. Instead, the focus of present paper is to indicate the de facto asymmetries and their consequence on centre-province relations in the federation of Pakistan. The present study argued that de facto asymmetries have starring role in disturbing the centre-province relations in Pakistan. The period 1988-1999 has selected to observe the authenticity of this argument. The literature on federalism, party politics, leadership, organizational approach and primary sources enabled the researcher to validate the meaning of de facto asymmetries and its implications on centre-province relations in Pakistan.

This paper consists of three sections. The first one aligns the theoretical grounds and conformist criteria of de facto asymmetry is explained in detail; defines the key terms, classify the essentials of de facto asymmetry and its implications in the case of Pakistan. The second section analyses the de facto asymmetry underlying in the structure of Pakistan and its impacts on centre-province relations during 1988-1999. The third section calculated findings and suggestions.

### **A. Conceptual Grounds**

The key problem of this study is to enquire; how de facto asymmetries effected centre-province relations in Pakistan, 1988-1999? One cannot contemplate this question, however, without clarifying, some elementary perceptions of federalism.

Federalism consumes broad concept and meaning and the scholars of federalism determined its meaning by the approach that they decided to materialize. The present study outlines it as personified in federal governments. Intelligentsia defined the federalism as a system of government, where minimum two centres of power exist, namely centre and provinces.<sup>15</sup> And, in this system, both i.e., centre and provinces acquires their powers by a constitution as Hilsman, an American scholar, termed federalism a system of constitutionally dividing authorities.<sup>16</sup> Martin Papillon, Canadian scholar, logged the federalism constitutional division of powers between two tires of government.<sup>17</sup> Ervin Chemerinsky, describes, "Federalism is about how powers should be allocated between federal and state governments."<sup>18</sup> Livingstone stated, "Component states exist because of some great significant diversity of such importance that it is felt that only a federal organization can offer it sufficient protection."<sup>19</sup> However, it is considered device to synchronize the associations between federation and its federating units or centre and provinces as it is a complicated problem discerning to each federation. But, despite deploying the different models of federalism assumed problem i.e., the problem of centre-province relations persisted in each federation of the world as yet and it is mainly the outcome of natural variances that exist in the federations from inception. These variances led asymmetries in federal structure of the country termed as de facto asymmetries by the scholars. This type lends a hand in generating de jure type. Thus, asymmetric federalism springs from asymmetry. Hence, a brief analysis of asymmetry is necessary.

On the common grounds, asymmetry has broad associations in each aspect of life but this study defines the said term within the federalism. The term asymmetry has its origin from 1952 in federalism, when Livingstone assessed that the social diversities evolved or give rise to the "demand for some kind of federal recognition."<sup>20</sup> But he did not coin the word asymmetry for diversity. Charles D. Tarlton was the first who introduced the terms symmetry and asymmetry in 1965. Symmetry worth for uniformity or similarity while asymmetry stand for diversity, imbalance or inequality among the units of federation.<sup>21</sup> Thus, terminologically, asymmetry can be defined as persisted diversities and inequalities among units of the federation which spaced claim for special arrangements for one or two units.

As far as essentials of asymmetry are concerned, asymmetry dose not happen simply. All federations almost have less or more asymmetrical essentials in their structure. Watts and Burgess produce comprehensive account in this regard. According to Watts, political, social, economical and political factors exist in all federations which produced differences in powers among the federating units.<sup>22</sup> Burgess also affirms two major

essentials of asymmetry in federations, socio-economic and the cultural-ideology which he further singled out and identified some specific essentials of asymmetry i.e., “political culture and tradition, social cleavages, territoriality, socio-economic and demographic patterns.”<sup>23</sup> Burgess used the term “preconditions” for these essentials of asymmetry which fixed the empirical criteria to classify the different features of asymmetry.<sup>24</sup> These preconditions has unique status in each federation i.e., different in category and size of asymmetry. The major outcome of these essentials or preconditions is the two types of asymmetry. The first, de facto asymmetry is common to all federations and is the outcome of preconditions that was pointed out by Watts and Burgess as; it comes up from the cultural, economic, social and political conditions.<sup>25</sup> The second type de jure is less common and it takes root from the constitution because of difference in the degree of powers assigned to the provinces through constitution.<sup>26</sup> Thus, the provinces get asymmetry in the degree of powers with each other in federation caused by difference in the size of population, area, economy, and other social characters.

It is needless to say that de facto asymmetry exists in each federation. Since, it is fundamentally difficult that all units of federation can be equal in all natural facets. Ivo D. Duchacek stated, “there is no federal system of the world in which all the component units are approximately equal in size, population, political power, administrative skills, wealth, economic development, climatic conditions, predominance of either urban or rural interests, social structure, traditions or local geographic location.” Duchacek termed these variances “disparities to the power ingredients.”<sup>27</sup> In each federation there are enormous variations in size of population, area, and massive differences in wealth among the federating units. These existing variances in all federations are the de facto asymmetry as de facto asymmetry comes from “the actual practices or relationships arising from the impacts of cultural, social and economic differences among the ‘provinces’ within a federation.”<sup>28</sup> Watts described, “Political asymmetry among full-fledged constituent units exists in all federations.”<sup>29</sup> It is pertinent to mention that Watts used the term political asymmetry instead of de facto asymmetry. The present study mapped the de facto asymmetry through the parameters underlined by Burgess and Watts.

Burges first starts with the constituent units which might be different from each other in territorial, population and wealth size. Consequently, federating units gain variances in relations with the federation in their will to accept the federal policies. Their insistence scope for provincial autonomy might be varying. Secondly, fiscal power of the federating units is another meter in measuring the de facto asymmetry. Due to varying in population size and other factors provinces vary in their financial resources and capacity. Thirdly, the issue of representation is very central to the federations. It aroused in accommodating diversity through asymmetrical steps which are necessary for the survival of federal system and mostly settled through the establishment of bicameral legislature. The fourth is political parties and party system. Rationally, parties prompt differences and are sources of assortment. They are prejudiced, in lieu of specific groups and personal interest. In this case, the role of regional parties in raising the regional diversities is one of the essentials of asymmetric political system. This attempt uses these approaches in detecting the part of de facto asymmetries in sabotaging relations between centre and provinces.

## **B. De facto Asymmetry: Centre-Provinces Relations in Pakistan, 1998-1999**

World’s scholars pondered on the asymmetric federalism by many angles one of which; is asymmetric federalism poison or cure? This question met with binary opinion. Tarlton who

coined the word asymmetry considered it poison for the centre-province relations.<sup>30</sup> Kymlicka also considered it poison rather than cure for the reason that it leads towards the secession.<sup>31</sup> Martin Papillon noted down some Canadian scholars who view the asymmetric federalism as “slippery slope”.<sup>32</sup> The other side of the coin is revealed someone considered it vital to keep together divers units, most important are Burgess, Gress, Watts and fossas.<sup>33</sup> However, the above mentioned question is not our query because of asymmetric federalism combined with two types i.e. de facto and de jure. The purpose of this paper is to explore only the role of de facto asymmetries in creating centre-province conflict in Pakistan.


Pakistan is a country, came into being in 1947. A unique structure consisted of two distinct regions was met to Pakistan by birth. Both regions were different to each other in natural, social, economical and political structures. East Pakistan was homogeneous and West Pakistan was heterogeneous in their structures. West Pakistan was consisted of Punjab, Sindh and N.W.F.P. (Now KP), had the status of full-fledged provinces while Balochistan was being governed by a commissioner. These federating units were various to each other in demographic, topographic, geographic and economic size. Even after the secession of East Pakistan in 1971, these variances persisted in Pakistan and reflecting the essentials of asymmetry in its structure. Following section highlighted the essentials of asymmetry in Pakistan.

Prior to discussing the specific issue an overview of conditions of asymmetry existed in Pakistan are being taken. As mentioned earlier, Burges pointed out first essential of asymmetry; *political culture and tradition*. This factor is also the part of federation of Pakistan as smaller provinces always resented against Punjab’s domination.<sup>34</sup> The second is *social cleavages* refer to religious, linguistic and ethno-nationalistic diversity among the federating units which claimed political recognition and federation of Pakistan is not free from this essential of asymmetry as linguistic and ethnic diversity is the part of federating unit of Pakistan. The next is *Territoriality*: indicate to the approach politics is blown up in place and in relationship among diverse regions. The following is *Socio-Economic*: points out the economic inequalities among the provinces and their concerns that are enormously exist among the provinces of Pakistan. Succeeding factor is *Demography*; in referring asymmetry is an argument about the representation in national institutions and in functioning central and provincial economy. This feature is also the part of natural structure of Pakistan as all provinces of Pakistan are various from each other in their population size. The objective of following paragraphs is to scroll the de facto asymmetry in Pakistan.

Above discussion made it clear that the essentials of asymmetry are persisted in the federation of Pakistan. The four provinces of Pakistan are different to each other in certain extent regarding population, territory, innate language, and socio-economic features which revealed the strong disposition for de facto asymmetry. The Punjab was a largest region in population with 72585(000) inhabitants out of the 1305880(000) of the Pakistan’s total inhabitants in 1998.<sup>35</sup> Sindh was the succeeding, with 29991(000) inhabitants, The KP was the next, with 17555(000) inhabitants and Balochistan was the smallest in population, with 6511(000) inhabitants.<sup>36</sup> Punjab single-handedly covered 55.6 per cent of the total population of Pakistan and other 44.4 per cent population divided among the three provinces, Sindh, KP, Balochistan and Capital Territory (Islamabad), and FATA which demonstrated the de facto asymmetry in Pakistan. Pakistan is not alone in this character; many federations of the world have this feature in their structure e.g., the German


confederation with Prussia, West Indies with Jamaica and Czechoslovakia with Czech Republic. These were the cases in past which had one dominant region in size of population.<sup>37</sup> The Belgian federation is a present example in this regard with Flemish region. Ratio of population diversity in Pakistan is shown in the figure 1.

**Figure 1. Province wise share of population, 1998**



**Source:** Statistic obtained from *Economic Survey of Pakistan, 1998-1999*, 128.

Apart from population provincial variances in size of area also caused de facto asymmetry in Pakistan as Balochistan was largest in size of area with 43.6 per cent of the total. Punjab was the second largest with 25.8 per cent of the entire area, Sindh covers 17.7 per cent and KP is a tiniest to all with 9.4 per cent.<sup>38</sup> Moreover, social cleavages i.e. ethnic and linguistic pluralism demonstrated de facto asymmetry in the federations and these features are in Pakistan from the inception. In this case Pakistan is a maze of different cultures.<sup>39</sup> Four major ethnic groups i.e., Punjabi, Sindhi, Pashtuns and Balochi have further variances with Sirayki, Mohajir, Hindko and Brohi groups also delegated lingual diversity. In lingual perspective; Pakistan has strong diversity in its structure. Historically, before the secession of 1971; East Pakistan was free from language pluralism with one major or exclusive language Bangla while West Pakistan was a multilingual region.<sup>40</sup> After all, major languages Punjabi, Sindhi, Pashto, and Balochi along with minor lingoies i.e., Sirayki, Hindko, Brahvi etc. are in the vogue in present day Pakistan. Another inequality among the provinces is generated from the finance which deployed de facto asymmetry. The all provinces of Pakistan are various to each other in their income e.g., Punjab was paramount province with 57 per cent, Sindh stand for 27 per cent, KP 8 per cent and Balochistan 3 per cent. Asymmetries are shown in figure 2.

**Figure 2. Provincial Comparison in Area and Income**

Sources: Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, “Demographic Indicators - 1998 Census”; Economic Survey of Pakistan, 1998-1999,” (Islamabad: Finance Division, Economic Advisory Wing), 124; Shahid Javaid Burki, “Economics and Extremism”, *Dawn*, January 5, 2010.

These asymmetries in respect of centre-province relations are noteworthy. They distress the relations propensity of different provinces in exercising their constitutionally allocated authorities. These asymmetries also affect the degree of powers of the provinces in those federations in which representation founded on the base of population. As has been discussed previously de facto asymmetry almost the part of each federation but its excessive degree created the tensions, in words of Watts, “Political asymmetry has existed in every federation but where it has been in extreme it has been a source of tension and instability.”<sup>41</sup>

### C. De Facto Asymmetries and Centre-Province Relations, 1988-1999

As evident by the title this section focuses on the impacts of de facto asymmetry relating to both levels of governments, 1988-1999. The subjects of discord between two centres of power i.e. representation, financial distribution, ethnic identity and party politics in relation to de facto asymmetry are accentuated but before bring into light the real question an overview of the period under study is pertinent.

The years, 1988-1999, are very important in the history of Pakistan as the mentioned years witnessed four elected or democratic governments operated under this period. Unfortunately, none of these governments could complete its regular tenure of five years that prescribed under the constitution. Benazir Bhutto and Mian Mohammad Nawaz Sharif equally succeeded in gaining the portfolio of Prime Ministers twice in this period but both were remained unsuccessful. Disturbing situation between centre and provinces was one of the basic causes behind to root this failed as centre-province relations not attributed in good repute. The impacts of de facto asymmetry in creating this discord between centre and provinces are being illustrated here. Primarily we take into account demographical factor.

#### a. Demographic Factor

Demography is important by two means, first; demographic design routinely functions in central and provincial economies and the second; about the issue of representation.<sup>42</sup> Primarily we will take the matter of provincial representation in national legislature. *Representation*: the problem of representation is central to all federations. It begins from the way in accommodating the diversity essential for the existence of federal system and might come from different forms. Federal system provides electoral representation to the provincial governments and national legislature. It moderate the influence of unites larger in population size by creating bicameral legislature at federal level i.e. upper house (senate) and lower house (National Assembly). In lower house representation of the provinces is accommodated on the base of population size while provinces come to be equal in upper

house. Owing to federal country the parliament of Pakistan comprised of two houses i.e. senate and national assembly. The representation of provinces in lower house is accommodated on the base of population. This generates an asymmetry in the lower house regarding representation of each province and its influence in legislation as bigger province will have a solid influence than smaller provinces. However, an upper house i.e., senate was formed to moderate the asymmetry in representation among the provinces through giving symmetrical namely equal representation to all provinces which create another asymmetry by giving weight to the smaller provinces. But this step could not satisfy the smaller provinces because the upper house has miniature influence in legislation and policy making rather than lower house and they are in continues struggle to bring a change in the method for allocation of representation. This created a centre-province discord as the representation of the provinces in the parliament is still on the base of population. The ratio and representation of the provinces in the parliament during the period 1988-1999 is shown in the table 1.

**Table 1. Representation of Provinces in Parliament**

National Assembly	Total	Punjab	Sindh	KP	Balochistan
General seats	207	115	47	26	11

Senate	Total	Punjab	Sindh	KP	Balochistan
General seats	40	10	10	10	10

Source: Government of Pakistan: National Assembly, *Composition of Former Members*, accessed January 27, 2018, <http://www.na.gov.pk/uploads/former-members/9th%20National%20Assembly.pdf>

Taking together, smaller provinces had equal ability in theory via equal strength in upper house that was to remove the imbalance persisted in the lower house. Actually, upper house is less powerful in parliament system than the lower house. This made the issue of representation complicated in Pakistan and led the discord between centre and smaller provinces as they claimed some additional steps to make their voice audible in legislation and policy making but centre avoided to accept this. In the whole period, 1988-1999 issue persistently claimed and revised by the members from smaller provinces in the sessions of national assembly. For instance, Haji Ghulam Ahmad Bilour, a member of national assembly from KP, 1988-1990, submitted his objection on the population based representation in the sitting of national assembly held on December 12, 1989, because his province i. e. KP had only 26 seats in the house of 207.<sup>43</sup> The concern was also raised by a member from Balochistan in national assembly on December 31, 1990. He criticised the strength given to Balochistan in the decision making body because merely 11 legislatures like a peppercorn in the business of legislation making.<sup>44</sup> Though, Asfand Yar Wali was from KP but he could not keep himself away from criticise the small numbers of Balochistan.<sup>45</sup> Maulana Mohammed Khan Sharani suggested that the “representation of the provinces in the national assembly should be equal for all units”.<sup>46</sup> Thus demographical dynamics of Pakistan deputed variances in population size and coined a de facto asymmetry which created variances in size of the provincial representation in national legislature that caused discords between centre and smaller provinces as provinces i.e.,



Sindh, KP and Balochistan claimed constitutional steps to revise their representation in the national legislature but the centre was reluctant to do that even conflict is exist as yet.

The further dimension of demographical factor is to impute the asymmetry in the financial share of provinces as distribution of divisible pool among the provinces based on population. Population base formula created the variance in the assigned share among the provinces. The smaller provinces claimed further constitutional steps to revise the distribution formula which blowout a discord between centre and provinces. Almost all federations have developed various committees, commissions and councils to ease the adaption of financial arrangements, Pakistan has the same arrangements one of which the establishment of NFC that is responsible for allocation among the provinces. In 1988-1999 two NFC Awards were constructed. Succeeding detailed account revealed the consequences of both awards i.e. 1990 and 1997.

The problem of horizontal sharing was more complex owing to demographic patterns. Since, populace was the single indicator for horizontal disbursement. Smaller provinces wanted the multifactorial method instead of single factor method for horizontal pay out.<sup>47</sup> Benazir Bhutto decided to accept the claim of less populated provinces to address the problems but it resented the Punjab and initiated a grave conflict with the said province.<sup>48</sup> Ghulam Haider Wayne said that the centre is sprouting strategies to generate financial problems in provinces ruled by opposition. The centre must to evade to it as it would create conflict and would not solve the issue.<sup>49</sup> Later, NFC Award, 1991 could not remove discord due to its population centred horizontal sharing which unreceptive to the KP and Balochistan. Yousfi identified, "NWFP miserably failed to obtain an award based on the extent of the backwardness."<sup>50</sup> Balochistan denounced the centre to decide single factor indicator for revenue distribution. Balochistan declared that because of population based method for the allocation of revenue, it certainly never ever can get development.<sup>51</sup> Dr. Mohammed Yasseen Baloch was of the view "though the amount specified for Balochistan on the population basis was more than previous times but was not enough for meeting the basic necessities of Balochistan peoples."<sup>52</sup> Punjab and Sindh were more populated than KP and Balochistan and gained big slice in dividable revenue. Mahmood Khan Achakzai, from Balochistan rejected the population centred formula and proposed a multi indicator formula; centred on population, income, area, and backwardness.<sup>53</sup>

There was no change in subsequent years. Provinces revealed aggressiveness on the NFC Award 1997.<sup>54</sup> Sole factor formula grew conflicts. Balochistan gravely resisted the share allocated for it.<sup>55</sup> Bloch argued, "I assure, Balochistan cannot progress till the day of judgments if funds will be granted to Balochistan on the basis of population." Baloch claimed funds for his province based on area.<sup>56</sup> Sindh also rejected the revenue distribution approach define in the 5<sup>th</sup> NFC Award of 1997.<sup>57</sup> In later years, Sindh had demanded formula based on revenue-generation and not on the basis of population."<sup>58</sup> The said views showed the resentment of the smaller provinces counter to the division of share among the provinces on population basis. Sindh, KP and Balochistan wanted allocation from the divisible pool suited to their interest.<sup>59</sup> Nazir stated accurately, "Each province had been advocating a formula for distributing the funds in the federal divisible pool that serves its interests. Punjab wanted to retain the formula that provided the division of resources on the basis of population, Sindh advocated the criteria of revenue collection, and Balochistan and KP emphasized special circumstances and backwardness of the area as the criteria for the distribution."<sup>60</sup> Thus, revenue distribution was the cause of conflicts. De facto factors were

more instrumental in blazing the conflict. Since, asymmetry was propagated extremely by political parties and political leaders, which added the lack in consensus.<sup>61</sup>

### **b. Social Cleavages and Territoriality**

As mentioned earlier, the social cleavages meant cultural factors i.e. religious, linguistic and ethnic pluralism and territoriality defined at this point as political place or space. Both are the conditions of de facto asymmetry. Territorial based prevailing social cleavages create tensions associated with Centre-Province relationship when they demanded their political recognition. In Pakistan, territorial base ethnic pluralism deputed disputes between centre and respective provinces when the territorial based ethnic groups claimed their political recognition in demanding ethnic name of the province and creation of ethnic base provinces but central government showed reluctance. The demand to give new name to a province was the case of political recognition. Pashtun are the major ethnic group in KP and they claimed the recognition of ethnic name for their province which mounted dispute between centre and KP. The demand was on-going from the formation of Pakistan and was a dispute between centre and KP. During 1988-1999, this claim got serious conflict between two centres of powers.<sup>62</sup> KP Assembly passed a motion on November 29, 1990, which claimed to recognize the ethnic name of the province.<sup>63</sup> In national assembly of Pakistan, the claim was continuously asserted by the members of regional political parties. They intensely claimed legislative measures to give new name to the province e.g., Mahmood Khan Achakzai claimed the replacement of NWFP with Pashtunistan on 16<sup>th</sup> May 1991.<sup>64</sup> Ghulam Ahmed Bilour revised this demand in the same session.<sup>65</sup> Asfand Yar Wali,<sup>66</sup> Hamid Khan Achakzai<sup>67</sup> and Haji Ghulam Ahmed Bilour<sup>68</sup> were the most prominent who continuously stressed to give new name to the province as the other provinces are identified by the racial name e.g. Punjab-Punjabi, Sindh-Sindhi and Balochistan- Balochi. The issue discussed abundantly in the sessions of national assembly. Wali rejected the NWFP as a name and stressed for placing Pashtunistan on the atlas of Pakistan.<sup>69</sup> All members from KP pleaded for giving new name to the KP.<sup>70</sup> The KP Assembly also approved many resolutions to change the name NWFP.<sup>71</sup>

Summing up, in 1988-1999 the issue of renaming the province resulted by ethnic diversity or asymmetry as all provinces have their ethnic names apart from NWFP which caught a grave clash. However, no legal step was taken via central governments operated in this era to resolve the conflict because Malakand, Hazara, and Bannu Divisions were reluctant to do that.<sup>72</sup> This clash distanced the paths of coalition partners i.e., PPP-ANP and PML-N- ANP which created discord in centre and KP relations. The demand to rename the province was recognised under the 18<sup>th</sup> Amendment, 2009. Moreover, during 1988-1990, Punjab government claimed a political recognition of Sirayki ethnic group and started a movement for the creation of Sirayki ethnic base province composed on Bahawalpur, Jhang, Dera Ismail Khan, Dera Ghazi Khan and Multan.<sup>73</sup> The purpose was to fail the central government. In the meanwhile Centre faced disorder in Sindh that was result of discord between ethnic groups i.e. Muhajirs and Sindhis. At one go, centre faced the Jiye Sindh Movement which claimed the establishment of separate autonomous of Sindhu Desh. Above all, in Sindh, law and order situation was out of control in the whole period despite conducting army operations there more than one time. Centre faced these problems created by territorial base ethnic groups in the provinces due to their moves for political recognition or symbolic recognition that poisoned the centre's relations with respective provinces.

### c. Political Parties or Political System

It has been mentioned earlier, one of the major reasons of de facto asymmetry was varying power of provinces in central government caught by majority party system.<sup>74</sup> Fragile majority party system is petitioner for regional asymmetrical arrangements. According to Burgess political parties are the source of diversities.<sup>75</sup> They are one-sided, expressive particular group of dividing structure and regarding this the starring role of provincial parties in voicing regional diversities is the essential of asymmetric party system. Burgess stated, "The role of regional parties expressing territorial diversities is part and parcel of an asymmetrical party system."<sup>76</sup> In Pakistan parties reveals regional cleavages and exerts pressure for asymmetry by claiming the interests of particular group or province which lend a hand in creating tensions between two levels of power. Historically, this factor became the part of Pakistan's politics after a while of its establishment on primarily stud by United Front and latterly by Awami League in East Pakistan before 1971. In Bhutto period NAP was focal in voicing regional diversities in KP. This de facto factor also the part of the period under study as the regional parties were in forefront in instigating the diversity by flaming the issues of ethnic rights, discrimination, deprivation and exploitation of natural resources, as Dr. Amna Mehmood stated accurately, "the regional parties exploited this opportunity and instead of playing a positive role in the national government,... continued their chorus of deprivation and exploitation and threatened the break up from coalition if their demand would not be fulfilled."<sup>77</sup>In each general election of 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 winner parties lost absolute majority, which necessitated the support of regional parties for parliamentary system. The composition of coalitions in centre and provinces is listed in table 2.

**Table 2. Composition of Central and Provincial Coalition Governments, 1988-1999**

Year	Federal	Punjab	Sindh	KP	Balochistan
1988	PPP-MQM	IJI	PPP-MQM	PPP-ANP	BNA, JUI, IJI, PKAMI
1990	IJI	IJI	IJI-MQM	IJI, ANP	IJI, PNP, PDA, JUI-F
1993	PPP, PML-J	PPP-PML-J	PPP	PML-N, ANP	PML-N, ANP, MDM, BNM, PKMAP
1997	PML-N	PML-N	PML-N, MQM	PML-N, ANP	Independents BNP, JWP, JUI-F

**Source:** the figures given in the table collected by the author personally from different sources of information.

The party position in coalition governments was as PPP and PML were in forefront in four operated governments and the noteworthy position had gotten by two major regional parties MQM and ANP as coalition partners. This situation aggravated the disputes about the participation of the central government party in the provincial governments and by the regional parties for gaining the influence in centre. In case of less influence in centre regional parties voiced slogan against the centre and revised their political demands to

pressurise the central party. The coalition governments were determined by the outcome of elections and by the preference of party leadership. In 1988-1999, elections results led a tug of war among the political parties and also two party's competition about to gain rule but it was unfeasible without the inclusion of regional parties as the both said parties failed to secure absolute majority. Both parties, Pakistan Peoples Party and Pakistan Muslim League (N), were successive twice with the collaboration of provincial parties. But shaky political collaboration among the central and regional political parties put the centre-province relations on the thin ice. The collaboration among the central and regional parties was conditional as regional parties join hands with the central parties on the condition of recognition and accommodation of their ethno culture and minority. Later, the central party was reluctant to keep its words true which caused concern for the centre in those provinces where it has no majority and establish there a government with the collaboration of provincial or regional parties. For instance, ANP and MQM were the major allies in 1988-1999 both wanted the accommodation of their ethnic groups. They distinct their ways with the central parties on not accommodating their recommendations i.e. to appoint the ANP nominee as governor, to rename the province ethnically, and repatriation of Biharies were the major causes of discord with the centre. Moreover, on-going operation in Sindh by the central governments parties was another cause of conflict. The parties who succeed the rule in Balochistan also continuously voiced the deprivation of Balochistan and exploitation of their sources. On the other side of the coin, the parties in Central governments were in effort to establish their rule or to accommodate persons from their own party as chief minister or governors in those provinces where opponent political parties were succeeded. For instance, dissolution of Balochistan ministry after a few days of its establishment caused serious discord. In 1988-1990, PPP was in Centre and IJI was in Punjab were the staunch opponent. The centre appointed Tika Khan as a governor of the Punjab which gave concern to IJI government of Punjab. This was considered influence enhancement of central party in the province led by opposition party of the centre. Moreover, both i.e. centre and Punjab governments did their best to remove the governments of each others to establish governments their own in their respective regions. In later years, replacement of chief ministers i.e. Ghulam Haider Wayn with Manzoor Ahmed Wattoo, Pir Sabir Shah with Aftab Ahmed Sherpao, Manzoor Ahmed Wattoo with Arif Nakai and Akhtar Mangle with Taj Mohammed Jamali linked with the same series. Besides, the provincial governments belong to central opposition parties created asymmetry in the implementation of central programs of development i.e. Peoples Work Program restricted in the Punjab and Balochistan by opposition led provincial governments in 1988-1990. Moreover, during 1997-1999, Punjab province has an asymmetrical influence in centre as Punjab chief minister hold key position in central party which contributed a cause of discord to other provinces. Such kind of political party culture was owing to the de facto asymmetry destabilise the centre-province relations, 1988-1999.

## **2. Conclusion**

Crucial point of this paper is to find; is de facto asymmetry exist in the federation of Pakistan and how it destabilise the centre-province relations in Pakistan, 1988-1999. The explorations initiated with the theoretical ground which lend a hand in concluding de facto asymmetry exist in Pakistan abundantly due to asymmetric natural structure of the country. The study further investigates that how these de facto asymmetries destabilise the centre-province relation, 1988-1999. For accurate findings, the query was conducted under specific factors i.e., Political culture, demographical factors, social cleavages and

territoriality and political parties. Demographical factor i.e. asymmetry in population size of four provinces of Pakistan bloated de facto asymmetry in case representation of the provinces in lower house. Since, the representation of the provinces in national assembly is based on the population. The issue was raised by the less populated provinces, they voiced against the dominance of the Punjab and claimed the constitutional or de jure arrangements to increase their fewer representations in the national assembly but central government was unwilling to do so which enraged centre-province conflicts. Demographic factor also flamed clash in economic distribution as horizontal formula for divisible pool based on population size which rejected by the less populated provinces. They claimed multi factor formula. Territorial based social cleavages i.e., religious, linguistic and ethnic pluralism is another dynamic of de facto asymmetry which set the stage for renaming the NWFP, Sirayki Province movement, Sindhi-Muhajirs dispute as this was done for their ethnic recognition and accommodation constitutionally. The other distinctive form of de facto asymmetry is political parties which are vehicles of differences in federations. In 1988-1999, the differences among the political parties caused concern in centre-province relations. Thus it can be concluded that dynamics of de facto asymmetry were abundantly existed in Pakistan via demographic, territorial, socio-economic and political culture which made effects in Pakistan regarding administrative representation, socio-economic division, and political parties' role set the stage for claiming de jure asymmetry, deferral or refusal by the centre accommodated destabilisation in relations between two centres of powers. This study suggests maximisation of consensus among the central and provincial leadership and political parties to solve the mutual differences which are the main cause of discord as underlying de facto asymmetries flamed by the political parties and leadership of centre and provinces for personal gain instead of national interest.

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<sup>33</sup>Burgess, *Comparative Federalism*, 225. Watts, “Comparative Perspective,” 6.

<sup>34</sup>Particularly, this tradition rises in case when “certain federations have culture of citizen welfare” for individuals extending beyond regionalism. For example, Canada and Germany.

<sup>35</sup>It is pertinent to mention that the given statistics are obtained from the census, 1998 instead of the census, 2017 because this study focuses on the period, 1988-1999.

<sup>36</sup>*Economic Survey of Pakistan, 1998-1999*, Government of Pakistan, Finance Division, Economic advisor’s wing, Islamabad, 128.

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<sup>51</sup> *National Assembly Debates*, session 10<sup>th</sup>, vol. IV, no. 8, June 13, 1994, 856.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*, session 10<sup>th</sup>, vol. IV, no. 11, June 16, 1994, 1366.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, session 17<sup>th</sup>, vol. III, no. 10, June 19, 1995, 1141.

<sup>54</sup> The NFC held its second meeting in January 16, 1997, the distribution formula get serious Debates in this meeting. The Sindh claimed the horizontal distribution according to the incidence of tax collection. Punjab stressed on the population base formula while KP and Balochistan claimed the distribution of sources on the base of backwardness and area. Pakistan, *Report of National Finance Commission 1996*, 14.

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<sup>61</sup> The horizontal distribution formula was not changed in the 6<sup>th</sup> NFC Award. However, Punjab compromised on four factors formula based on populations, backwardness, revenue and inverse density population for horizontal distribution of resources among the provinces under 7<sup>th</sup> NFC Award, 2009.<sup>61</sup>

<sup>62</sup> At first, the slogan of Pashtunistan was voiced by Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan. Pushtunistan means land of Pashtun and Afghan peoples. This name was given to the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Balochistan regions that which now the part of present Pakistan by afghan nationalist at that time the region was under the Persian empires. It became the part of Afghanistan in 1747 and later it ruled by Ranjeet Singh, a Sikh ruler and British government of India. In 1893, the British government was separated the area from the Afghanistan and created a province by the name of NWFP in 1901. After the partition, Pakistan faced the issue establishment of separate Pashtun state consisted of Afghanistan and Pakistan Pashto speaking areas. However, since 1990, to rename the province became the hot issue. A.Z. Hilali, *US-Pakistan Relationship: Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan* (New York: Routledge, 2017), 58.

<sup>63</sup> *Frontier Provincial Assembly Debates*, vol. IV, no. 2, November 29, 1990, 86. *Dawn* (Karachi), November 30, 1990.

<sup>64</sup> *National Assembly Debates*, session 6<sup>th</sup>, vol. VI, no. 13, May 16, 1991, 1403.

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*, 1424.

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*, session 10<sup>th</sup>, vol. IV, no. 9, June 14, 1994, 1025.

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<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*, session 6<sup>th</sup>, vol. VI, no. 6, June 19, 1997, 701, 712.

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<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*, session 11<sup>th</sup>, vol. I, no. 13, March 12, 1998, 1289-1290.

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