
Punjab and the Extension of Reforms Package

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This paper discusses the impact of 1919 reforms in the Punjab and its aftermath followed by a communal competition for power. The Punjab Muslims tried to safeguard their interests vis-à-vis committees and commissions formed by the British from time to time. During the first three years of the working of Reforms there emerged a situation of no-compromise between the Muslims, the Hindus, and the Sikhs. Each community, disregarding the other, pushed its claims regarding its representation in the council, in the local bodies and in the services. With the passage of time relations between the communities went from bad to worse; and the gulf between them widened day by day. With future constitutional advance in mind, each community was adding to its strength. The Punjab Hindu Sabha was revived and soon under the leadership of Raja Narendra Nath, due to its propaganda against the Muslim interests, gathered a large following.¹ The Sabha leaders were against the historic Congress-League Pact, which, among other things had recognized the Muslim representation through separate electorates.² Some of its leading members, such as Dr. Gokal and Bhai Parmanand, were also committed to the Extremist anti-Muslim religious and cultural movements.³ And apart from the revival of anti-Muslim Hindu *Mahasbha*, the strength of the Punjab Hindus had by 1924 been increased due to, the formation of two more

political parties in the Punjab, i.e., the Punjab Swaraj Party and the Punjab Hindu *Swaraksha* Sabha. Although the Swaraj Party was not established to be a purely Hindu party, it soon assumed its Hindu character; the Nationalist Muslims registered their complaints against its attitude.⁴ The party was strongly against the Muslim interests, represented by the Unionist Party;⁵ its leading members, such as Duni Chand, Hans Raj, Ruchi Ram Sahni, Lajpat Rai and Dr. Gokal Chand Narang had established themselves as great critics of the Unionist Party. One of the main demands of this Party was the revision of the Government of India Act of 1919. The *Swarajists* had entered the councils with the sole object of wrecking them by applying a policy of non-co-operation from within;⁶ they declared themselves opponents of the people and parties which co-operated with the British for the working of Reforms. In some provinces, such as Bengal and the Central Provinces, the Swarajists had achieved a great degree of success. They were in command of a considerable majority of votes; they took every opportunity of bringing diarchy to an end by reducing ministerial salaries to a nominal figure, defeated the government over many important heads of budget, obstructed official measures and held up supplies as long as possible.⁷

In short, they did everything possible to hinder the working of the transferred subjects. In the Punjab, Lajpat Rai, a veteran Hindu leader and a great critic of Fazl-i-Husain's 'rule' in the Punjab and Choudhary Shahabuddin's 'rule' in Lahore,⁸ had helped the Swarajist election campaign. The Unionist Party obtained a notable victory in the elections held in 1923, and organized itself into a solid block of 12 members in the Punjab Council. Although the Party had no power to obstruct the working of the 1935 Act in the Punjab, its leadership (Lajpat, Duni Chand and Prof. Ruchi Ram) was extremely critical of the Muslim interests represented by the Unionist Party. Prof. R. Ram was elected in 1923, to represent the Punjab University, defeating a Muslim candidate, Dr. Shujauddin.⁹ Similarly the other Hindu political party, the Punjab Hindu Swaraksha Sabha, was formed a few months before the elections, with a view to

protecting and safeguarding Hindu interests in the Punjab.¹⁰ Its founding members, Raja Narendra Nath and Prof. Gulshan Rai, were also great critics of the Unionist Party. Both had been in the forefront against the measures adopted by Husain to improve the position of his community; while Raja Narendra Nath was active in the council, Rai was writing articles in the press. The party had difference of opinion with the other two Hindu parties on various issues; but as far as opposition to the Muslims was concerned, they stood together.¹¹

In addition to their combined strength, the fast-increasing strength of the All India Swaraj Party in the central Legislature, and its vigorous demands to revise the Montagu-Chelmsford Constitution for further constitutional advance in India, further strengthened the Hindu position in the Punjab. The government had introduced the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms with a view to satisfying the 'legitimate aspirations' of the Indians for reforms. As far as the moderate the 'reasonable' opinion was concerned, the reforms were welcomed. But the extremist section of the Indian opinion had rejected these reforms as inadequate.¹² Ever since, there had been constant demands, raised by the advanced section of Indian politicians, for further constitutional advance in India. As early as September 1921, Mojumdar Bahadur moved a resolution in the central Legislature, asking for the establishment of autonomy in the provinces and the introduction of responsible government at the Centre. The resolution was later amended by the Assembly, asking the government to appoint a committee for the purpose stated in the original resolution. The Secretary of State, however, did not agree to the demand, on the plea that further progress was possible under the existing Act. His dispatch (of November 1922) did not satisfy Indian opinion and in the following year demands were again made for the grant of constitutional advance.¹³

By 1924, the situation had become worse from the government point of view; the Swarajist element had won a great victory in the recent elections, and their entry into the

councils had stiffened the demand for further reforms in India. On 5 February 1924, Diwan Rangacharia moved a resolution recommending an early revision of the 1919 Act, with the object of granting full self-governing dominion status to India, together with provincial autonomy in the provinces. Nehru tabled an amendment suggesting the summoning of a Round-table conference to recommend a draft constitution for India. The debates took place on the 8, 13 and 18 February 1924, and the amended resolution was passed by an overwhelming majority of the Assembly.¹⁴ This notable success of the Swarajist Party was due to the fact that Muhammad Ali Jinnah, leader of the Muslim League and the Independent Party, (consisting of 17 members) had fully supported the move. He stood for a full enquiry into the Act of 1919, and was opposed to the government's desire to avoid the issue by conducting some sort of departmental enquiry. Jinnah was in agreement with Nehru, the leader of the Swaraj Party, as the demand developed in the Assembly.¹⁵ It was only due to the combined pressure of Hindu and Muslims that the government agreed to institute an enquiry into the working of the Montagu-Chelmsford Constitution, introduced only three years earlier.

The Home Member, Sir Malcolm Hailey,¹⁶ expressed government's readiness 'to make a serious attempt to investigate justifiable complaints against the working of the scheme in practice; to assess the causes and to examine the remedies, if necessary'.¹⁷ The government also expressed its willingness to make recommendations to the British Parliament, should the enquiry suggest any advance within the boundaries of the existing Act.¹⁸ This commitment first led to the appointment of an official committee with the object of examining the Act of 1919 and the possibilities of amendments, leading to the better working of the administration. It was followed by the appointment of the Reforms Enquiry Committee presided over by Sir Alexander Mudiman; the other members were Sir Muhammad Shafi (then law member of the Viceroy's Council), the Raja of Burdwan, Sir Tej Bahadur, Sir Sivaswami Iyer, Sir Arthur Froom, Sir Henry Smith, Jinnah and Dr. Paranjpye. The

appointment of the Reforms Enquiry Committee must have alarmed the Unionist Party in the Punjab. Although the Unionist Party was predominantly Muslim it had had no links with the Muslim League, since the latter decided in favor of non-cooperation.

The Unionist Party was isolated whereas its opposition was getting stronger. Since the elections of 1923, new developments had favored the Hindu community of the Punjab. By 1924, they had three political parties to advance their claims in future reforms. Moreover, the Hindus could count on their strong links with the All-India Swaraj Party, whose influence was growing fast at the Centre, as well as in the various provinces. The Hindu opposition at the time was more coherent and better organized, and demands for the cancellation of controversial measures introduced by Husain became louder. Likewise, the boycott of the municipalities gathered more support; above all an agitation had also been started against communal electorates by labeling it as a 'vicious principle'. The Congress-League Pact, by which certain Muslim rights, such as their share in the administration and communal electorates were recognized, was also frequently attacked.¹⁹ These developments were definitely a signal of alarm for Muslim interests in the Punjab in general and in particular for the ruling party. The opposition at this moment was so strong that if unchecked, it could have influenced the forthcoming Reforms Committee against Muslim interests.

The same might also seriously affect the ascendancy of the Unionist Party in the Punjab. That party by itself had no capacity to counter the opposition's strength. Unlike some Hindu political parties, it had no contacts or influence over the masses.²⁰ In fact the party's influence was largely confined to the walls of the provincial council, where, with the help of official bloc and some of its Hindu-Sikh rural supporters, it had been able to pass certain legislative measures, during the first three years of the Reforms. After the second election (as noted briefly in an earlier chapter) it had lost some of its Hindu-Sikh supporters; and the Punjab Government often found itself

under pressures from the opposition for its support of the Muslim minister and the Unionist Party.²¹ In these circumstances the Unionist leadership was left with no alternative but to seek help from Jinnah and the Muslim League.²² For the Unionist hierarchy this was not difficult.

The Unionist leader himself had been a leading member of the League before the reforms. Fazl-i-Husain had severed his connections with the League when it adopted non-co-operation as its creed and since then he had mainly concentrated on his ministerial responsibilities. Now that the non-co-operation movement had almost failed he could renew his links with the League. At this point in time, the League leader, Jinnah, was also in need of support. Like Husain, he had opposed the non-co-operation policy of the League; for he believed that the nationalist movement should follow constitutional means.²³ He was feeling uncomfortable because the League was still dominated by Nationalist Muslims (led by Muhammad Ali and Dr. Mukhtar Ahmad Ansari) who believed in continuing the policy of non-cooperation with the government. Although Jinnah was against this, so long as these Nationalist Muslims dominated the League, he could not influence the League to decide in favor of entering into the councils. In the 15th session of the League (March-April 1923) Jinnah had failed to secure a decision in this sense.²⁴ Thereafter the League leader looked to the Punjab, where the non-co-operation with the government was exemplary. Besides this, it was essential and logical for a leader of the Muslims of India and for a political party which claimed to represent Indian Muslims, to enlist the support of the Punjab Muslims.²⁵

Thus with the object of giving support to Fazl-i-Husain's party, and at the same time enhancing the League's prestige, Jinnah arranged to resume the League's discontinued session of the previous year in the Punjab's capital, Lahore.²⁶ The most notable feature of this session at Lahore (in May 1924) was the presence of an unusual fervor and enthusiasm.²⁷ On this occasion, the League was able to

attract a large number of delegates and visitors; the *Khilafatist* Muslims also attended in large numbers.²⁸ The Chairman of the reception committee, Agha Safdar, soon came to business by referring to the presence of tension between the three communities of the Punjab. He reported the demands of the Punjab Muslims regarding their share in the Provincial Legislature, local bodies, services, and administration of the province. Safdar also referred to the resentment and concern expressed by the other two communities over these demands. The League leader during his address first of all referred to the non-co-operation movement, by calling it a mistake and a failure. He then referred to the communal friction arising from the communal claims of each community.

Jinnah underlined the need of a Hindu-Muslim agreement to settle amicably the claims of each community; here he also warned the Hindu community by linking the freedom of India with Hindu-Muslim unity: India will get dominion responsible government the day the Hindus and the Muslims are united... Swaraj (self-rule) is an inter-changeable term with Hindu-Muslim Unity'.²⁹ Beyond any reasonable doubt the Unionists exploited the opportunity to give strength to their claims by using the League's platform. The Deputy President of the council, Abdul Qadir, moved a lengthy resolution to be incorporated as the League's policy in the event of future constitutional changes. As the reforms had been highly beneficial for the Muslims and the Unionist Party, the introduction of provincial autonomy with a weak central government was their first demand. The demand was also made that in the future the division of seats in the Legislature should be on the basis of numerical strength of each community; that would mean raising the Muslim share from 40% to 56%. The resolution warned the government that any attempts to reduce the Muslim share to please the other two communities would be highly undesirable. The Hindu-Sikh campaign for the introduction of joint electorates was denounced, and the continuation of separate electorates demanded. Mir Maqbul, another leading Unionist, referred to the most controversial issue, i.e., the Muslim share in the services and administration of the country.

He moved a resolution, asking the League's council to appoint a committee, in order to consider the genuine grievances of the Muslims in this respect.³⁰ These resolutions were accepted, to the Unionists satisfaction, as a part of the League's policy. This acceptance of their point of view was considered by the Unionist leadership as a great victory.³¹ As a result the hitherto isolated Unionist Party was able to secure an effective voice in the League's important committees, such as 'the committee, to frame a future Indian constitution'.

Moreover, the League's support helped the Unionists to counter the effects of Hindu campaign against their party. Lajpat Rai now started to criticize Jinnah for his support of the Unionist Party and advocacy of majority rule in the Punjab.³² It may be mentioned that at this critical juncture, the Government of India, under pressure from the Nationalist leaders, directed the provincial governments to elicit opinion on the subject of reforms. In April 1923³³ and April 1924,³⁴ all provincial governments were directed to send detailed papers on the working of reforms along with suggestions for further constitutional advance. The Punjab Government sent lengthy memoranda. Each time the Punjab Government expressed its satisfaction with the working of the reforms; the introduction of various reforms in the Local Self-government, especially the democratization of the local bodies, was particularly approved. Similarly, the emergence of a strong rural party in the Legislature was considered to be a good sign. The government was grateful to the Unionist Party, for its majority in the council had made the selection of ministers much easier than before, when there were no political parties. In the field of Legislation, the working of the system was also described as satisfactory.

The government pointed out that out of a total of 17 Bills introduced in the Legislature since the inauguration of reforms, 14 had been passed into law. However, one regrettable feature of the reforms, the government's note ran, was the emergence of

communal competition for power. In this context, various reforms introduced by Fazl-i-Husain, and the allegations by the Hindu leaders, were also discussed. Nonetheless the government felt Husain's actions were justified: 'The minister's attempt to secure definite opportunities for the community which constitutes his chief support in the council, is not in itself unreasonable; it may indeed be admitted as one of the inevitable results of the Reforms scheme. His actions, again, could be justified on their merits, for the community (Muslims) was backward in education, and had not so far gained in the administration a representation at all commensurate with its numbers ... Many of the measures introduced by the Minister would not have met with acute criticism, had they issued from an executive government not susceptible to the charge of communal feeling ... For the moment, there is every justification for the attempt of a majority community, backward in education and political status, to raise itself to the level of its rivals. Real harm will only be done if that community passes from the constructive task of securing its position to the destructive process of denying equal opportunities to other members, or deliberately excluding them from the administration'.³⁵

The Muslim point of view on this important matter was that there was a degree of justification for Fazl-i-Husain's efforts to improve the position of his backward community. It was not only the view held by Maclagan's administration; his successor Sir Malcolm Hailey also considered it justifiable.³⁶ In Bengal, it was observed; places were reserved for Muslim students in government colleges, in aided colleges and in 35 Zila and government high schools. These changes had been introduced during 1921-26.³⁷ Before the reforms the veteran Hindu leaders such as Lajpat Rai had been accusing the government of deliberately keeping the backward areas out of its educational schemes;³⁸ Lajpat was against Hindu opposition to Fazl-i-Husain's opening of intermediate colleges in the predominantly Muslim areas of Gujrat and Lyallpur.³⁹ But Hindu opinion at large was against the extension of reforms; for they feared that it would further improve the Muslim position and undermine theirs.⁴⁰ The Hindu press, which had earlier been the

greatest supporter of reforms, made no demands for the further transfer of subjects to popular control, and gave an impression to the government that 'there would be some gratification if certain subjects now transferred were to pass over to the reserved side'.⁴¹ They also persuaded Maclagan to adopt an undemocratic attitude and override certain decisions of the Ministry of Education and Local Self-Government which were supported by the majority in the Legislative Council.⁴² The Hindu attitude seriously affected the Punjab's constitutional advance. The Governor under these circumstances was compelled to advise against the transfer of any major subjects to ministerial control until the competitive rivalry of the communities had abated.⁴³

The Punjab Government also advised against any addition to the agricultural votes, demanded by the rural interests of the Punjab, for its feared that Hindu politicians would vehemently oppose such a move.⁴⁴ The ministers and the ruling Unionist Party, who were enjoying the fruits of the reforms, strongly advocated further constitutional advance. The Sikh member for revenue implied that one of the objects of the Act of 1919 was that the reforms would be extended: 'As time goes on, more reserved subjects should be transferred and (that) eventually all departments under the reserved head should be placed under the charge of the Ministers, thereby replacing members by Ministers, i.e., that the number of Ministers would increase and the numbers of members would decrease so as ultimately to place the ministers in charge of all the portfolios making them responsible to the Legislature'.⁴⁵ Sardar Singh opined that the transfer of subjects to popular control could be affected even without making an alteration in the existing Act.⁴⁶ The Unionist Party also favored the extension of reforms leading to provincial autonomy. The party strongly criticized the diarchy. This dual system, they thought, prevent (a) the creation of a united government, (b) the development of a party form of government and (c) the development of a sense of responsibility in the legislature. Like their Sikh colleagues, the Unionists also advocated the transfer of all reserved subjects, and on that subject they referred to the

section 25(a) of the 1919 Act, which allowed such a process. Being the representatives of rural interests, the Unionist's ministers demanded a substantial increase in the number of rural voters. They suggested a lowering of the franchise qualifications from existing Rs. 25 to Rs. 5 land revenue, and the enfranchisement of agricultural tenants.

The Ministers demanded the modification of electoral rules to ensure their (rural) monopoly in the future councils. In view of the wholesale propaganda against the Ministers, the Government was asked to provide its Ministers and members with the services of the publicity department to explain their policies to the illiterate population of the province. Such a measure, the Ministers thought, would help counter the spreading of false stories by the 'agitators' and 'mischief-mongers'.⁴⁷ A good deal of comprehensive data and official information collected by the Government of India in hand, the Mudiman Committee assembled in Simla on 4 August 1924 and started its business. The Committee received memoranda and evidence from various important sources, including the Punjab; the Punjab's case was presented by the following: Harkishan Lal (a former minister), Nanak Chand (secretary, Hindu Nationalist Party in the council), Professor Gulshan Rai (secretary Punjab Hindu *Sabha*) and Malik Barkat Ali (vice-president to the Punjab Muslim League). As expected the Hindu representatives complained bitterly against the system of communal electorates as a method of representation, and the administration of various subjects under the control of the Unionist Party. H. Lal, a former friend and a ministerial colleague of Husain, expressed his opinion against any advance towards self-government until the system of communal representation was abolished.⁴⁸ Nanak Chand also argued against communal electorates. He thought that this system was responsible for the communal tension and bitterness in the Punjab. The Hindu leader argued that the communal electorates for the Muslims were 'opposed to the spirit of democracy and cannot help in the formation of a nation ... the organization of the communities on the basis of religion would produce the most difficult problems in

the administration of the province'.⁴⁹ Although Nanak Chand admitted that even in the absence of communal electorates, the Punjab Muslims would still preponderate, he would still prefer to be ruled by a Muslim majority 'in whose election they (the Hindus) have a hand'.⁵⁰

However, in the event of the continuation of separate electorates, Nanak Chand suggested that this system not be continued for more than a 10-year period. He strongly advised against any further extension of these electorates in the local bodies; unless the minority community in a particular municipal area, or district board, demanded such an extension. The Hindu leader also expressed his community's concern over the Unionist Party's domination of the Punjab Cabinet. He opined that the Hindu representative in the Cabinet should be acceptable to the bulk of his own community. As far as the ministerial powers of recruitment were concerned, Nanak Chand pointed out that the ministers had abused such powers in the past. He suggested that recruitment in future be undertaken regardless of the communal claims; the ministers have nothing to do with it; and the Governor was responsible for such matters.⁵¹ Gulshan Rai also agreed with his Hindu colleague, in the matter of reduction of ministerial control over recruitment: 'It would be necessary to exclude the recruitment of services entirely from the jurisdiction of Legislatures and the ministers ... the ministers and Legislatures should have nothing to do with the grant of *Jagirs* (the grant of lands), pensions titles or the Crown Lands ... all these subjects should be under the control of the Governor'.⁵² The renewed contact of the Muslim members of the Unionist Party with the Muslim League, which had resulted in the revival of the Punjab League, soon paid its dividend. In order to counter the Hindu onslaughts the Punjab League sent its memorandum based on the resolutions passed at its Lahore session in May 1924.⁵³

Similarly, Barkat Ali presented his memorandum and gave evidence to the Mudiman Committee, in support of the claims of

the Unionist Party. Malik Barkat Ali fully supported the introduction of provincial autonomy in the Punjab: "The distinction between the reserved and the transferred subjects should be abolished... all provincial subjects should be placed in the hands of ministers responsible to the Legislature... the appointment of non-official members in the Legislatures should be discontinued; the nominated official bloc should also disappear."⁵⁴ In complete contrast to the Hindu demands, Ali argued in favor of giving full powers to the Ministers in making parliamentary as well as other appointments in the subjects under their control. He also opined that the Cabinet as a whole should be responsible to the Legislature and also advocated strongly the retention of separate electorates for the Muslims and those they should be given a majority of seats in the Punjab Council.⁵⁵ The Reforms Committee published its report in December 1924. The Committee divided itself into two groups. The majority consisted of Mudiman (the Chairman), Shaft, A. Froom, H. Smith and the Maharaja of Burdwan; the minority were: Sir Tej Bahadur, S. Iyer, Jinnah and Paranjpye. The majority held the view that the 1919 Act was working in most provinces, and 'is giving training in parliamentary government to the electorate and also to the members of the Legislatures and to the Indian ministers'.⁵⁶ The report argued that 'the period during which the present constitution has been in force has been too short to enable a well-founded opinion as to its success to be formed. 'The evidence before us is far from convincing us that it (the Act) has failed'. The report, however, deplored the existing communal fiction. It said the tendency to prefer communal interests to the interests of India was not conducive to the success of responsible government; and this state of affairs, the committee felt, would retard the constitutional advance of India. Nonetheless, the committee asked Indians to take steps to remove this difficulty:

'We, however, are not without hope that the leaders of all communities will continue, in the interests of constitutional development in India, to strive to develop unity in place of discord, and thus prove that the acuteness of the existing communal tension

is but a temporary phase.⁵⁷ It would perhaps be helpful to examine the Reforms Committee's Report affecting the Punjab in the light of minutes and memoranda presented to it by the various representatives of the province. As regards the proposal to broaden the franchise, the Committee maintained that 'there had not been sufficient practice in the exercise of responsibility to justify any general lowering of the franchise qualifications'.⁵⁸ As for the reduction of the qualifications for the rural franchise and the enfranchisement of the agricultural tenants, as advocated by the Unionist ministers, the Committee rejected the proposal on two grounds: firstly, using the plea that the Ministers had failed to indicate the method and possible results of such an enfranchisement and secondly due to the fact that the Punjab Government itself was reluctant to see a large addition of rural votes, which would create difficulties for the administration.⁵⁹ The Committee also maintained the status quo in such matters as the introduction of provincial autonomy and the form of electorates. As regards the further transfer of subjects to the popular control, the Committee examined a list of reserved subjects, and agreed to transfer only the subjects of lesser importance such as Land Acquisition and Provincial Law Reports. So far as the role of the official bloc in the council was concerned, the committee did not agree that the official members of the council should not cast their votes on the subjects relating to the transferred departments.

The committee gave full rights of vote to the official members; but also accepted the provincial government's privilege to direct its officials as to the manner in which they should cast votes in their respective Legislatures.⁶⁰ As regards the question of communal electorates, the committee was placed in an awkward position. The minority community in the Punjab was against it but the majority community passionately demanded its retention. Taking a view of the all-India situation, the committee admitted that the separate electorates were an obstacle to the political advance of British India; but due to the absence of an agreeable solution of the matter, it could not recommend any

change in this direction.⁶¹ In the matters of recruitment, the Committee neither favored ministerial control nor local government's influence as proposed by the Unionist and endorsed by the Lee Commission. It gave all powers of recruitment to the proposed Public Service Commission.⁶²

On the most controversial aspect of recruitment, the communal quota in services, the committee neither accepted the Muslim claims nor the Hindu point of view. In order to adjust the claims of various communities it adopted a mid-way position by recommending the following formula: 'in the rules for recruitment, the government should prove that with due regard to efficiency, all communities should receive due representation in the public services'.⁶³ In the final analysis the findings and recommendations of the Reforms Committee were in no way injurious from the Unionist's point of view. With the exception of some reduction in ministerial control over recruitment, the committee made no recommendation which could affect the Unionist control over the affairs of the Punjab. Their association with the League paid its dividends, when the Mudiman Committee used the League's resolution of May 1924 to counter the Hindu-Sikh propaganda against the ruling party.⁶⁴ In the following year the Hindu propaganda was so acute that Lajpat went to the extent of suggesting the partition of the Punjab; the western part to be Muslim and the eastern to be non-Muslim. In order to prevent the Muslims from getting a majority in the council, Hindus and Sikhs united against them. Mangal Singh said the concept of a Muslim majority was fanatical. Lajpat pleaded for the Sikh case with the same intentions; criticizing the Lucknow Pact as a great blunder; he said that the communal electorates were a negation of nationalism and had divided the communities into water-tight compartments. He repeatedly pleaded for the abolition of separate electorates for Muslims.⁶⁵ Meanwhile, the bond between the League and the Unionist Party was also strengthened.

The 17th session of the League (1925) once again endorsed two favorite Unionist demands — the creation of the Muslim majority in the Punjab Council and the retention of communal electorates. The League also urged the British Government to appoint a Royal Commission, with the object of establishing self-government in India. Its committee to frame a scheme for constitutional advance included among others, Muhammad Shafi, Qadir, Sikandar, and Malik Barkat Ali from the Punjab.⁶⁶ The same bad omens began to appear again and again. Now what happened was that in the year 1926 when the Unionists' position in the Punjab once again seemed to be in jeopardy the League came to their rescue. The Governor had excluded the Muslims from the Cabinet, following a policy of reconciliation with the non-Muslim opinion in the Punjab. Only a year before, the League leader had pleaded for the Muslim case having a majority of seats in the Punjab Council before the All Parties Conference and warned that the attempts to deny these rights would not be tolerated.⁶⁷ The League's session in 1926, therefore, provided a golden chance for the Unionist Muslims to make propaganda against the Hailey administration.

The session was presided over by a leading member of the Unionist Party, A. Qadir. The latter himself was a victim of the government-Hindu understanding. Qadir had resigned his presidency of the Punjab Council to become a minister in the Punjab Cabinet in 1925; but due to the government's policy of reconciliation with the Hindus, his appointment was not renewed in 1926. Thus, angrily, referring to the exclusion of Muslims from the Cabinet, he said: 'A strange commentary on the so-called strength of the Muslims of the Punjab is furnished by the fact that during the year that is just ending, the Punjab has remained without a Muslim minister, simply because a tried administrator of the capacity of Fazl-i-Husain was chosen by the government as an executive councillor... Exception was taken to this by many Muslim associations and newspapers, but their voice remained unheeded ... It is further regrettable that in the newly-formed council also the transferred

subjects are probably going to be administered without Muslims having a share in that administration'.⁶⁸

Another leading member of the Party also asked the government to safeguard the interests of the Punjabi Muslims; he strongly argued that, out of two ministers in the Punjab Cabinet, one should be a Muslim.⁶⁹ It was noticed that as a matter of solidarity on communal issues, the delegates from other provinces supported the Punjab Muslims' case. Sir Abdur Rahim, a Bengal delegates also registered his criticism: 'As many as 36 men of one community made a unanimous demand that a representative of their community should be in charge of one of the portfolios in the transferred departments. It seemed to him that the local government would find its hands forced to recognize the demand. The law was sufficiently elastic, and the Governor could appoint a Muslim minister in addition to the two already existing. This would be better, as the three communities of the province, namely Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims would be represented in the ministry.'⁷⁰

Likewise, Dr. Sir Shafaat Ahmad Khan, a U.P. delegate, favored the demand but in a different style. He said: The argument in favor of the appointment of a Muslim minister was not one of the loaves and fishes; it was that of restoring the confidence of a community in government.⁷¹ The movement became fruitful; as a result the League passed a strongly worded resolution on the question of the Muslim share in the Punjab Cabinet: 'The League deplors the absence of a Muslim minister from the Punjab ministry and urges the necessity of having at least one Muslim minister in the administration of transferred subjects'.⁷² The League's session was also exploited by the Punjab delegates to repeat their other demands. Keeping in view the forthcoming enquiry into the Government of India Act 1919, Qadir emphasized the need to give majority rights to the predominantly Muslim provinces: If non-Muslim majorities in most provinces have the chance of an effective control of their affairs, there is no reason why the same privilege should not be extended to provinces where the Muslims dwell in large numbers'.⁷³ On this

point, Qadir criticized the joint efforts of the Punjab Hindus and the Sikhs to reduce the Muslim claims. He emphasized the need to demand from the forthcoming Royal Commission on Reforms majority rights for the Muslims of the Punjab and Bengal.⁷⁴

He also demanded the retention of separate electorates for the Muslims until a mutual agreement "was concluded. Qadir raised the demand for a proper share for the Muslims in the administration of the country.⁷⁵ Due to common cause, the Punjab had clearly dominated the proceedings of the League's session. Although there is no evidence to suggest that the government took serious notice of the League's demands, shortly afterwards Sir Feroz Khan Noon was appointed⁷⁶ as a minister in the Punjab Cabinet to represent the Punjabi Muslims. It seemed that the co-operation between the League and the Unionist Party would continue in future. The reverse however happened.

Simon Commission and after

The communal situation in India was rapidly growing worse. Swami Shradhanand,⁷⁷ one of the most prominent leaders of the Hindu community and a main supporter of the anti-Islam Shuddhi movement,⁷⁸ was murdered by a Muslim in 1926. This event was followed by a most serious communal clash in March 1927, at Kulkathi, in the Barisal district of Bengal. A crowd of 1,000 armed Muslims came out to fight a Hindu procession passing a mosque with music. The armed forces opened fire to disperse the crowd and as a result 14 rioters were killed and seven injured. The affected mostly were the Bengali Muslims. The Bengal Muslim Conference raised its voice against the behavior of Bengal Government.⁷⁹ The existence of communal electorates for Muslims was generally described by the Hindus as a major cause of communal trouble in India. These electorates were highly desirable from the Muslim point of view, but were never considered to be an ideal form of representation. Even the leading Punjabi Muslims, such as Fazl-i-Husain, Qadir, and Muhammad Shafi, considered this form of representation a temporary measure.⁸⁰ The Montagu-

Chelmsford Constitution had introduced this system; but only as a 'necessary evil'.⁸¹

The publication of the Mudiman Report (as mentioned earlier) also made it clear that a solution of this problem was highly desirable, if further constitutional advances were to be achieved. Above all, these electorates were only considered to be a means to an end; the end in view, as far as the Muslims were concerned, was only to safeguard their legitimate interests. Before the appointment of a Royal Statutory Commission, it was thought to be highly desirable to find a way to remove this barrier. The Hindu members of the Congress Party in the Assembly met on March 17, 1927; on the same day Muslim leaders met at Dr. Mukhtar Ahmad Ansari's house,⁸² where a modification of the existing system was discussed, but no progress was made. On March 20, an influential group of Muslim members of the various Legislatures met under the leadership of Jinnah; they discussed the possibilities of introducing common electorates; and at the end a set of proposals, commonly called the Delhi Proposals, was evolved. The Muslims made a provisional offer to give up their right to separate electorates under certain conditions: the separation of Sind from Bombay; introduction of reforms in the Frontier Province and Baluchistan; one third of representation for Muslims in the central assembly; and that Muslim representation in the majority provinces should be on the basis of their population.

The League's leader had planned that once he had received a clear answer from the Hindu leaders; he would discuss the matter with the central committee of the League, Khilafat Conference, *Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Hind*, the Muslim members of the Council of State and the Assembly, and then might form a small committee to discuss matters with the various Hindu organizations. Even after these arrangements the final settlement would be subject to ratification by the various Hindu-Muslim organizations of the country.⁸³ The Delhi Proposals were published on March 20, 1927. Sir Muhammad Shafi, representing the Punjab Muslims, had fully

agreed with the initiative in the Delhi meeting. But on his return to the Punjab, Muhammad Shafi changed his mind. Shortly afterwards the Punjab Muslims vetoed the proposal, without even considering it at any appropriate level. The Governor, Sir Malcolm Hailey, met the Viceroy to apprise him of the latest situation: The Punjab Muslims are greatly upset by Jinnah's statement about joint electorates... Many influential Muhammadans have said privately that there can be no thought of Muhammadans giving up separate electorates'.⁸⁴ The Viceroy in turn wrote to the Secretary of State that Jinnah's statements did not carry any weight.⁸⁵ The other two communities of the Punjab also vetoed the Proposals.

The Punjab Hindu Mahasabha met on March 23, and passed a resolution, challenging the right of Congress to represent the Punjab Hindus in its negotiations with the Muslims.⁸⁶ The Sikh leader, Sardar Mangal Singh, appreciated the offer of the Muslims to give up separate electorates, but criticized the principle of reservation of seats for them; he also opposed the idea of giving majority rights to Punjab Muslims.⁸⁷ The Mahasabha leaders like Lala Lajpat Rai and Pundit Madan Mohan Malaviya, who were in close touch with Raja Narendra Nath in the Punjab, had also vetoed the Proposals by remarking that it meant 'heads I win; tails you lose'.⁸⁸ N. Raja Narendra Nath and Lajpat argued the case of the Punjab Hindus in the Mahasabha session in April 1927; this gathering was prepared to accept neither majority rights for the Muslim or the principle of the separation of Sind.⁸⁹ The attitude of Mahasabha gave a genuine excuse to Muhammad Shafi to oppose the Proposals on the behalf of the Punjab Muslims. Now Muhammad Shafi was able to put the ball into the Hindu court. Addressing a session of the Punjab League in May 1927, he said: Until the mentality of the Hindu Mahasabha undergoes the necessary change and that body comes to realize that without Hindu-Muslim Unity the attainment of Swaraj for our common motherland is an absolute impossibility ... Until an effective guarantee of the protection of its vital interests is forthcoming, the Muslim community will continue

to insist on the retention of separate electorates as an integral part of the Indian constitution'.⁹⁰

Similar views were expressed by other leading Muslims such as Qadir and Iqbal. Iqbal reiterated that in the existing political conditions, separate electorates provided the only means of making the central and provincial councils truly representative of the Indian peoples; he strongly pleaded for the continuation of this system in the future Indian constitutions. Qadir also argued in favor of retention of communal electorates, which had been in existence since the Montagu-Chelmsford Constitution came into effect.⁹¹ A few days later the Viceroy commented: 'Muhammad Shafi's speech made it clear that Muslim opinion has not wavered in the very least way on the subject of electorates which the Muslims still regard as their greatest safeguard'.⁹² This point of view was given a good deal of support by the Governor of the Punjab and the Viceroy. The Governor wrote to the Viceroy and the Viceroy told the Secretary of State that the Muslims would not accept joint electorates; the Punjab group led by Muhammad Shafi was described as 'very influential' and 'truly representative' of not only the Punjab Muslims but also the whole of Indian Muslim opinion.⁹³ The opposition of the Punjabi Muslims to the Delhi Proposals gained strength with the passage of time.

Following the unequivocal rejection of the Muslim Punjab, Jinnah visited Lahore to assess the situation for him. Here he tried hard to prevent the Provincial League from taking an independent line on the question of electorates; and to win Unionist support for his proposals. But he failed to enlist any support whatsoever, and left the province empty-handed.⁹⁴ Now, the Unionists were on the way to making their case even stronger; Sir Feroz Khan Noon came to lead the movement from another angle. By the end of July 1927, he was able to secure a declaration in favor of the maintenance of separate electorates, signed by the 27 Muslim members of the Punjab Council. It declared that the Muslims favored the continuation of communal electorates until they could be abandoned by common

consent of Hindus and Muslims.⁹⁵ This document was a seal of rejection on the attempts to give up the communal electorate. In addition to this; the Unionists sent Sir Zafrullah Khan (a member of the Punjab Council and joint secretary of the Punjab League)⁹⁶ and Sir Shafaat Ahmad Khan, on a 6-week tour to England to 'state their views on questions which will come under review when the Statutory Commission is appointed'.⁹⁷ Both Sir Zafrullah Khan and Sir Shafaat Ahmad Khan met some influential politicians and gave press statements⁹⁸ against the proposed introduction of joint electorates.

They argued that the continuation of separate electorates was justified under the provisions of the Lucknow Pact; and that the Muslims felt very strongly that any change in the existing form of representation would seriously affect their welfare.⁹⁹ They also criticized the vigorous Hindu propaganda against the communal electorates.¹⁰⁰ It was noticed that this propaganda by the Punjab Muslims, led by the Unionists, clearly indicated that under no circumstances were they prepared to negotiate the communal form of representation. While their representatives were busy abroad, at home they were also opposing the moves by the section of the League which followed Jinnah. The League leadership wanted to hold its forthcoming session at Madras, in order to enlist support for the Delhi Proposals. The Punjabi group, with the support of some U.P. members,¹⁰¹ 'realizing that at Madras they would be swamped by the element which was in favor of joint electorates' was successful in preventing the move.¹⁰² Sir Feroz Khan Noon once again played a decisive role; the Governor was very pleased. The Governor sent this news to Fazl-i-Husain who was in London at the time:

'Feroz Khan bestirred himself a good deal about this and it was quite clear that the advocates of the joint electorates were outnumbered. I fancy as a result that we shall certainly have a meeting at Lahore instead of Madras'.¹⁰³ The decision was vital from the government's point of view, particularly because of the

forthcoming commission. The Montagu-Chelmsford Constitution had provided for the appointment of such a commission after ten years, in order to examine India's constitutional problems and make recommendations to the government in the Indian's future constitution. However, the date of the enquiry was advanced by the British Government,¹⁰⁴ under pressure from the Indian leaders. As a result, 2 years before the period prescribed by the Act of 1919, the Statutory Commission, commonly known as the Simon Commission, was appointed. The Commission contained no Indian members.¹⁰⁵ The announcement, therefore, surprised Indian opinion.

Only a few months earlier, Sir Feroz Khan Noon had proposed the names of Fazl-i-Husain and Sir Abdur Rahim as Muslim representatives on the Royal Commission; these names were proposed by him to counter what he called 'Jinnah's intrigues'.¹⁰⁶ Although this announcement had surprised the Indians, including the government's supporters, the administration had tried to ensure the success of the Commission. On October 20, the Viceroy advised his governor Sir Malcolm Hailey to use his ministers to secure the Punjab's support to the Simon Commission.¹⁰⁷ As far as the Muslims led by the Unionists were concerned, the ground had already been prepared; and to a great extent, the Shafi- Noon group's differences with the League on the matters of the Delhi Proposals facilitated the business. Although the official declaration was made on November 8, Sir Feroz Khan Noon had started maneuvering a little earlier. He met some influential Punjabi Muslim representatives such as Muhammad Shafi, Abdul Aziz, and Malik Barkat Ali and arranged a meeting of some 'selected' Muslim leaders on November 10, at Sir Muhammad Shafi's residence.¹⁰⁸

However, three days before this meeting, Sir Feroz Khan Noon had seen Hailey and assured him that he 'will get his party ready to express itself in favor of taking full advantage of the opportunities afforded'.¹⁰⁹ The minister also expressed satisfaction that the purely parliamentary Commission would give a good deal of

advantage to the Muslims over the Hindus, who would have preponderated on a mixed commission. Apart from Sir Feroz Khan Noon's crafty plans, the Punjab Governor himself worked on a number of local leaders (including Muhammad Shafi) to seek the Punjab's co-operation with the Commission.¹¹⁰ Within a short time the arrangements were made for the Punjab to spell out its support for the Commission. As a follow-up two days after the official announcement, the meeting of 'selected' leaders was held at Muhammad Shafi's residence; this was done without consulting the All India Muslim League. Muhammad Shafi made a long speech; blaming the communal tension, he held that the appointment of an 'all-white' Commission was justifiable.¹¹¹ Muhammad Shafi, Sir Feroz Khan Noon, and Sir Zulfiqar Ali Khan made statements against a boycott of the Commission.¹¹²

The Shafi-Sir Feroz Khan Noon group also sought the Punjab League's endorsement. On November 13, its executive, with Muhammad Shafi as its President, held its meeting in his house. A resolution was moved from the chair that 'in existing political conditions a boycott of the Statutory Commission on the constitutional question would be detrimental to the best interests of the country in general and of Muslims in particular'.¹¹³ The resolution was passed by an overwhelming majority (24 votes to 4); Sir Feroz Khan Noon enthusiastically conveyed the news about his group's performance to Hailey. The news pleased the Governor, who ordered a good deal of publicity for the decision.¹¹⁴ Shortly afterwards, the Governor got into touch with the Viceroy; and in the light of the decision of the Punjab League, asked the Viceroy to persuade the Muslims elsewhere to follow the lead given by the Punjab League.¹¹⁵ The Viceroy also admitted that the Punjab League's decision was 'a significant development'.¹¹⁶

In Nationalist circles on the other hand this move (on the behalf of the Shafi-Sir Feroz Khan Noon group) was considered to be an uncalled-for event; it had reduced the chances of a successful boycott of the Commission. Khaparade wrote to Dr. M. A. Ansari: 'I feel

almost certain that the proposed boycott is not likely to succeed as the Punjab Muslims are against it'.¹¹⁷ The four executive members of the Punjab League who did not co-operate with the Muhammad Shafi group were Maulana Zafar Ali, Dr. Saif-ud-Din Kitchlew, Mohiuddin and Malik Barkat Ali; the first three belonged to the Khilafat Committee, which met in Dr. Muhammad Alam's house and unanimously adopted a motion urging a complete boycott of the Commission. It declared: "Nothing short of a round-table conference in which British and Indian statesmen take part as plenipotentiaries would be acceptable to a self-respecting nation; and that cooperation with the Commission would be detrimental to the national interests in general and Muslim interests in particular. The committee urges an amicable settlement of the points in difference between Muslims and Hindus in order to create a congenial atmosphere for a round-table conference'.¹¹⁸ The fourth dissident, Malik Barkat Ali denounced the Commission; in his statement of November 13, he remarked that 'its personnel betrayed the astonishing shortsightedness of the British Government. The exclusion of Indians from the Commission was an open challenge to them and he appealed that it should be met in the same spirit in which it was given'.¹¹⁹

A little later, Ali joined the City Congress Committee in its condemnation of the Simon Commission. The committee, on Malik Barkat Ali's resolution, expressed its indignation at the exclusion of Indians from the Commission; it also called upon all the communities to boycott it, regardless of their communal differences.¹²⁰ The resolutions and statements condemning the commission were given wide publicity by the associated press, which was sympathetic towards the boycott movement. This publicity for the dissident group of the Punjab Muslims worried the Governor; thus he assured the Viceroy that the intensity of the opposition was not as great as it appeared: 'The *Khilafatists* occupy a very insignificant position among the Punjab Muslims; they could only reckon 2-3 members in the Punjab council; outside the council they have very little influence'.¹²¹ As far as the Punjab Muslims were concerned,

with the exception of a few, the matter was thought to be under the Governor's control. The other important community, i. e. the Punjab Hindus, led by Raja Narendra Nath, had also been won over by the Hailey administration due to latter's conciliatory policies towards them. The Hindu community in the Punjab occupied a peculiar position. The Congress policy of give and take and its secular program only suited the Hindus in predominantly Hindu provinces. Since Hindus were a minority in the Punjab and Congress-League understanding which recognized certain Muslim rights was not acceptable to them.¹²²

As a matter of fact 'they were convinced that the representative institutions must be given power to the majority; and that in the Punjab they must themselves remain in a perpetual minority'.¹²³ The Hindus had even given the impression to the Governor that 'it would be better for them to go back to bureaucracy rather than to contemplate an advance in reforms, which would place them still further under the domination of a Muslim majority'.¹²⁴ These apprehensions of what they called Muslim Raj in the Punjab inevitably threw Hindus into the arms of the Punjab Governor. It may be added that such a policy had helped them in the past. After the process of toeing a government line the Hindus were pinning their hopes on the Royal Statutory Commission. A few months before its appointment, Raja Narendra Nath had contacted the Governor on this subject. Raja Narendra Nath made it clear that he did not desire to see any extension of reforms, which he feared would place his community in a worse position. He expressed his views on further constitutional advance and dissatisfaction over the working of the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms, arguing that the reforms had failed to safeguard Hindu interests in the Punjab. As for Indian representation on the Commission, Raja Narendra Nath desired the exclusion of the League's representatives, who he thought were associated with the Punjab Muslims. He recommended that only 'advanced politicians' should be appointed on the Commission.

He demanded representation of the Punjab Hindus on the Commission, but did not favor the inclusion of the Muslim representatives from the Punjab, using the plea that they were a majority community¹²⁵ and therefore did not need any protection. He also sent a copy of a paper which he had given on the subject of 'The Punjab Problems and the Next Statutory Commission', before the Tilak School of Politics in May 1926. This document gave detailed information about the Hindu grievances against the Muslims in the Punjab. Criticism was leveled against the decision to reserve places for the Muslims in various colleges in the Punjab; the fixing of communal proportions in the services was described as a violation of the fundamental rights of a free citizen in a democratically governed country and a denial of equal opportunities to all.¹²⁶

The Hindu leader made a forceful appeal for the introduction of joint electorates: 'one-third of the population of the Punjab desire that they should be allowed to exercise their right of selection or influencing the selection of those representing the remaining two-thirds of the population ... Is it just and fair to deny them their right?'¹²⁷ The opposition leader also made a strong case for the abolition of special facilities (communal representation in services, special grants for Muslims etc.) afforded to the Punjab Muslims, concluding that 'spoon-feeding of the majority community should be discontinued.'¹²⁸ Now the politics in the Punjab had taken a new turn. The events clearly indicate that the Punjabi Hindus were making preparations long before its appointment put their case before the Commission. Following the appointment of a Hindu representative in the Punjab Cabinet and Fazl-i-Husain's relegation to the reserved business of the government, the Hindus had been able to establish very cordial relations with the Punjab Administration. In addition to all this, the Punjab League's decision to co-operate with the Commission left them with no choice but to co-operate, regardless of what the Congress said and did.

The Punjab Congress had passed a resolution in favor of boycotting the Commission; Lajpat 'telegraphed to Col.

Wedgwood, saying that no change in the Commission scheme would be acceptable unless as many unofficial Indians as Englishmen are appointed members of that body and given equal status.¹²⁹ His voice was, however, crying in the wilderness. There was no possibility that he could affect the Hindu decision at this stage. 'By using their astuteness of mind and argumentative skill, they (the Punjab Hindus) hoped to defeat the plan for a Muslim greater Punjab or, at worst, to secure for them a very much better position.'¹³⁰ The pro-Hindu press also expressed its willingness to co-operate with the Commission, using the plea that the Punjab Hindus could not abstain if the Muslims co-operated.¹³¹ The government already realized the importance of the Muslim decision.

As early as in May 1927, Hailey and Montmorency were both definite that the Punjab Muslims' decision against the boycott would have a good effect on the Punjab Hindus.¹³² It was under these circumstances that the Governor telegraphed to the Viceroy with authority: "Raja Narendra Nath and other Hindus as a body cannot afford to support boycott in the face of determination expressed by the Muhammad Shafi group to accept the Commission."¹³³ This assessment was absolutely correct. In the following month a Swarajist member of the council tabled a motion expressing disappointment at the constitution of the all-white commission; this was supported neither by the Muslims nor by the Hindus. The mover, after assessing the mood of the House, withdrew the motion.¹³⁴ Everything went smoothly and easily as far as the Punjab's cooperation was concerned. However, Fazl-i-Husain's unexpected attitude in the matter embarrassed the Government of India in general and the Punjab Governor in particular. He had gone to Geneva as an Indian delegate at the League of Nations.

It was during his absence that the Punjab League had made its commitment to offer its co-operation to the Commission. On his return to India, Fazl-i-Husain gave an interview to the Indian press regarding the constitution of the Commission. He observed:

Indian opinion was in favor of strongly protesting against the exclusion of Indians from the Commission ... (the decision) will not satisfy a vast majority of the enlightened public.¹³⁵ As for the proposed association of Indians at a later stage, Husain considered it as 'a superfluous, purposeless, and inert body'. He opined that the Muslims would lose nothing by boycotting the Commission provided that the Mahasabha also did likewise. He argued that if further reforms were to be introduced, they would be for the whole of India; it was impossible that one community would be given some concessions while the other was denied them.

He also felt that the Commission was capable of functioning even without India's co-operation. Commenting on the decision of the Punjab League Fazl-i-Husain asked 'what reasons do they give for isolating themselves from the rest of the Indian Muslims?'¹³⁶ The Punjab government was not in a good mode. These statements against the policy of the government came as a bombshell to the Punjab government where Fazl-i-Husain was a member of the Governor's Council. Hailey, the chief architect of the government policy of the day, angrily responded: 'I do not think it right for anyone occupying an official position to emphasize the disappointment expressed at the decision. Nor do I think it right to suggest that the proposed association of Indians at a later stage 'means nothing'. That suggestion only lends an argument to those who advocate boycott... I hope you would assure me that you are misrepresented.'¹³⁷ Husain well knew the value of his support to the government, particularly at this hour when the Punjab was giving a valuable lead.

He refused to budge and instead tendered his resignation.¹³⁸ This threat worked out exactly as Fazl-i-Husain would have liked. The Governor was not in a position to afford controversy in his Cabinet in the Unionist Party, in the League, and above all in the Punjab. He very wisely took no action on the letter of resignation and did not pursue the matter any further: 'I think you have given my letter a more serious interpretation than I intended it to bear...

(your) action does not amount to that 'breach of duties and obligations' which would justify a Governor in feeling that he could no longer work with a colleague whose services he values and whose friendship he appreciates.¹³⁹ A few days later, Hailey sent Fazl-i-Husain a passage of a letter from Lord Lytton:

"Fazl-i-Husain was by common agreement the best Muhammadan representative that India has ever sent to Geneva. He mastered his subjects well, was very clear in his arguments, and intervened several times — always with effect.¹⁴⁰ In short the Governor had handled Husain very tactfully. This wise policy was expected to pay heavy dividends and the Shafi-Sir Feroz Khan Noon group not only remained solid in its support for the Simon Commission, but also tried hard to secure the support of the Muslim League organization, for the Commission. As we saw earlier, Madras was rejected as the venue for the League's forthcoming session — Calcutta and Lahore remained the two options. However, the former option became unacceptable to the Punjab group; due to the sudden and rather unexpected declaration of Sir Abdur Rahim against the Commission.¹⁴¹ Following the announcement of the Commission, Abdur Rahim addressed a meeting in Calcutta at which resolutions were passed for a boycott of the Commission. Now the Punjab group feared that at Calcutta the League would decide in favor of the Delhi Proposals.

The issue was of considerable importance; Sir Feroz Khan Noon once again came to lead the movement. He and his friends were able to collect proxy votes in order to decide the issue in favor of Lahore, where they were certain to dominate the session, as they had done in 1924. When the League met to decide the issue, the Punjab group insisted that unless they could have their own way, they would not cooperate with the League. This threat worked out as they would have wished; and they were unexpectedly successful¹⁴² in getting Lahore as the venue (for the forthcoming session) and Muhammad Shafi as president. The decision was very important from the government's point of view, for the Shafi-Sir

Feroz Khan Noon group openly stood for cooperation with the Commission.

The Punjab Governor was very pleased and called this development 'significant'; he suggested to the Muhammad Shafi group that they should assume the leadership of the Indian Muslims.¹⁴³ But the fact of the matter was that despite the result that the Punjab group had won the day, and the decision had been made in their favor, the Jinnah group was not content with the decision. For one thing, the Punjab League had committed itself to cooperate with the Commission against the policy of its parent body;¹⁴⁴ secondly, the designated President, Muhammad Shafi, was not generally trusted by the Muslims. In this atmosphere of suspicion, the League's secretary, Dr. Saif-ud-Din Kitchlew, 'received a number of letters and telegrams from Bengal, Madras and other places, expressing the disappointment of leading men of those places at the venue fixed and the President elect.¹⁴⁵ Similarly, some important Leaguers such as Raja Sahib Mehmudabad, Sir Muhammad Yakub and Muhammad Ali Jinnah were particularly concerned. Raja Sahib Mehmudabad believed the League's decision was most regrettable. He wrote:

"The Muslim League has practically gone in the hands of the reactionary element (Muhammad Shafi group)... and there is no chance of its being put right.¹⁴⁶ Sir Yakub was even more disappointed. Writing to Dr. M. A. Ansari, he said: 'I wanted the League's session either at Calcutta or Madras ... but the decision of the council has upset the whole arrangement. However, I have made another effort to have the decision of the council revised and another meeting will be held at Delhi on the 11th instant Please exert all your influence and secure a majority of the council in favor of Calcutta and the Sir Aga Khan ... you will also realize that it will be suicidal for the Muslims **to** leave the League in the hands of the reactionaries (the Punjab group) and allow them to carry the day according to their wishes.¹⁴⁷" The leader of the Muslim League was not going to give up so easily. These deep feelings against the Punjab group led Jinnah, the

League leader, to call a special meeting of the League's Council on 11 December 1927, to reconsider the whole issue. The Punjab Governor thought that Jinnah had done this by 'quite unconstitutional use of the League's secretariat.'¹⁴⁸

The new arrangements were also unacceptable to the Shafi-Sir Feroz Khan Noon group; they were not prepared to give way on an issue already decided in their favor.¹⁴⁹ The meeting was held. To save the situation a compromise was offered to the Punjab group according to which Calcutta should be the venue and Muhammad Shafi the President. This was rejected by them. The Punjab group's leading member, Sir Feroz Khan Noon, protested that the meeting was called for the sole purpose of upsetting the previous decision; he angrily questioned and cross-examined the League's secretary for calling the meeting. Many leading Muslims, such as Maulana Muhammad Ali, Hakim Ajmal Khan, and Malik Barkat Ali, supported the Secretary in his argument that the proceedings were perfectly in order.¹⁵⁰ Thereafter a heated discussion took place on the question of the venue for the forthcoming session of the League. In the end the old decision was reversed; 84 voted in favor of Calcutta and 54 voted for Lahore. This was a clear defeat for the Punjab group; they walked out of the meeting when Calcutta was declared as the venue.¹⁵¹ On reaching Lahore, the Shafi-Sir Feroz Khan Noon group held an urgent meeting of their supporters and summoned an emergency meeting of the Punjab League.

They expressed their indignation over the proceedings at Delhi by calling them out of order and insulting, and declared that a separate session would be held at Lahore.¹⁵² Now the actual position was that two separate sessions of the League were held, one in Lahore as planned by the Punjabi group, and the other in Calcutta as decided by the League's council. At the Calcutta session (30 December — 1 January 1928) a resolution denouncing the Simon Commission was passed. The Punjab League's decision to cooperate with the Commission was criticized by Muslim leaders such as Muhammad Ali, Yakub and Zafar Ali. They also condemned the actions of the

Muhammad Shafi group in rebelling against the authority of the League and held them responsible for the split in the Muslim community. The Punjab League was disaffiliated and the Punjab Muslims were asked to constitute a League which was 'truly' representative of Muslim opinion.¹⁵³ The proceedings of the Lahore session (31 December 1927 -1 January 1928) were not as smooth as the Shafi-Sir Feroz Khan Noon group would have liked. The prime task of the group was to secure a mandate of the session to co-operate with the Commission. Sir Zafrullah Khan argued: If they wanted to end the British domination, they should either rise in an armed revolt or submit to the Parliamentary Commission. The first was not possible, and therefore they should accept the Commission and submit their views before it.¹⁵⁴

Similarly, Maulana Hasrat Mohani argued in favor of cooperation, implying that a boycott movement would not succeed. These views were vehemently opposed by the *Khilafatists*; Choudhary Afzal Haq opined that the failure of the non-co-operation movement was not enough justification to offer co-operation to the commission. He argued: No program in the world was ever carried out completely or successfully ... As Muslims, it was their duty to convert the whole to Islam. Had they been able to do it? If they had not, should they give up Islam?¹⁵⁵ As a result of this opposition, the resolution offering co-operation to the Commission was carried amidst shouts of 'shame, shame' from the opposition led by Dr. Muhammad Alam.¹⁵⁶ Similar opposition was noticed when a resolution proposing to elect Muhammad Shafi as President of the League, and Allama Muhammad Iqbal as secretary and Hasrat Mohani as Joint Secretary, was debated. Raja Ghazanfar Ali maintained that Muhammad Ali Jinnah was already the League's President. Likewise, Sheikh Sadiq, a Muslim leader from Amritsar, criticized Muhammad Shafi for not objecting to the remarks made by some of his supporters against some eminent Muslim leaders such as Jinnah, M. Ali, Azad and Ansar Sadiq also advised Iqbal and Maulana Hasrat Mohani not to accept the offices offered to them.¹⁵⁷

But they refused, for they did not desire any reconciliation with the League, at least in the near future. Although not unanimously, they succeeded in getting the results they desired. Only one month after the Punjab League's proceedings, the Chairman of the Commission suggested that the Council of State, the Legislative Assembly, and the local legislatures move to elect their representatives to co-operate with the Commission.¹⁵⁸ Fazl-i-Husain moved a motion in the Punjab Council to elect a committee. As the spade work for such as association had been done earlier, the motion was carried without any division in the Legislature.¹⁵⁹ There were many... Council members, including the ministers,¹⁶⁰ anxious to be elected as the members of the committee. But the Punjab Governor desired a smooth passage for the affair; he wanted to avoid an election which could have involved a good deal of political wrangling. In order to avoid this and any other possible delay or breakdown, Hailey discussed this issue with his ministers and the leader of the opposition, Raja Narendra Nath. The Governor realized that the opposition did not favor the inclusion of the ministers in the committee.¹⁶¹ Shortly afterwards Raja Narendra Nath sent two nominations, one of his Sabha colleague, Dr. Gokal and the other of O. Roberts; the latter name was included with a view to avoiding any possible domination of the Unionist Party.¹⁶²

The Sikhs recommended Sardar Mohindar Singh as their nominee.¹⁶³ On the other hand, the Hindu-Sikh portion of the proposed committee was easily completed. Unexpectedly, the Unionist Party worried the Governor. There emerged rivalries within the party. It was revealed that a good many of its members were intriguing and lobbying against each other for a place on the committee. Sir Feroz Khan Noon¹⁶⁴ refused to withdraw his name despite the Hindu-Sikh opposition and his party's reluctance to approve his name. The Governor did not want Sir Feroz Khan Noon to hinder the process. He discussed the issue with Fazl-i-Husain and Montmorency in the light of the latest situation. It was revealed that even Husain who had the reputation of holding his party members together also seemed to have lost control of the

situation. However, when Sir Feroz Khan Noon's position within his party became very uncomfortable, he met Hailey to seek his advice on his possible withdrawal. The Governor who was not happy with Sir Feroz Khan Noon, said: 'It would be a graceful thing to do.'¹⁶⁵ The minister followed the advice and withdrew his name by giving a carefully worded statement, implying that he had withdrawn in the interests of his party.¹⁶⁶ His withdrawal ended two months of controversies and intrigues within the Unionist Party. The Punjab Council therefore was able to elect the seven member committee unanimously; it comprised Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan, Sir Zafrullah Khan, Sir Chottu Ram, Sardar Ujjal Singh, Raja Narendra Nath, Pundit Gokal Chand Narang and Mr. Roberts.¹⁶⁷ The Punjab's decision was followed by Assam and Bengal.¹⁶⁸ The Punjab once again gave a lead; Hailey suggested that the Viceroy should send a congratulatory telegram to the Punjab committee to avoid any further mischief in this matter. Both the Viceroy and the Secretary of State sent telegrams, congratulating the Governor and the committee.¹⁶⁹

Montmorency, who succeeded Hailey as Governor, also praised the Punjab decision several times in these words: The government looked for support to the Unionist Party and was never disappointed.¹⁷⁰ Even though the committee was elected in May 1928, the Simon Commission had completed its preliminary enquiry in the Punjab by March. The Commission arrived on March 10, and was accorded a warm reception by the Shafi-Sir Feroz Khan Noon group. At the residence of Sir Zulfiqar, 1,000 (including the Governor, ministers, judges, and members of the council and association) gathered to entertain the members of the Commission. The Muslim dominated Lahore municipality¹⁷¹ also arranged a cordial welcome. By this time all the local bodies in the Punjab had also passed resolutions in favor of cooperation.¹⁷² The Commission members attended a meeting of the Legislature at the invitation of its President, Choudhary Shahabuddin.¹⁷³ On March 15, the Commission began a tour of the Punjab districts in two parties; Simon, Strathcona and Lane Fox made

Lyallpur their headquarters, and the rest Ferozpur.¹⁷⁴ At Lyallpur, the members attended a meeting of the Lyallpur district board. The Amritsar Committee and the people of Ferozpur also gave a warm welcome to the Commission.¹⁷⁵ However, the extremist sections of the Congress, the Akali Sikhs,¹⁷⁶ and the *Khilafatist* Muslims arranged protests and meetings to make the Commission's visit a failure.¹⁷⁷

The chief organizers were: Dr. Satyapal, Maulana Zafar Ali Khan, Saghab, M. Anand, Kharak Singh, Gopal Singh, Sardul Singh, Moulvi Qadir, Dr. Muhammad Alam, Choudhary Afzal Haq and Lala Bodh Raj.¹⁷⁸ The Hindus militant organization N.J.B.S. got hold of the student community to create a situation like that of 1919.¹⁷⁹ Their efforts, however, failed miserably due to the general endorsement of the Commission by all the three communities; at some places crowds foiled their attempts.¹⁸⁰

Notes and References

- 1 N.G. Barrier, 'The Arya Samaj and the Congress Politics in the Punjab, 1894-1908', *The Journal of Asian Studies*, (May 1967), p.376.
- 2 For details, see Governor to Viceroy, 22 January 1925; Raja Narendra Nath to Craik, 13 February 1925, in Hailey Collection, 7A, IOR. The pact was considered to be a great blunder and a bitter experience. See Dr. Monje's address to Mahasabha session, April 1927. *The Civil and Military Gazette*, 19 & 20 April 1927. (Henceforth C.M.G.)
- 3 Bhai Parmanand used his journalist and oratorical skills to popularize the anti-Muslim ideas as an expression of the Hindu community's will to

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- survive; he advocated vigorous 'self defence' against Muslims. (R. Gordon, -'The Hindu Sabha and the Congress, 1915-26', *Modern Asian Studies*, 9(1975), p.181; B.E. Cleghom, 'Leadership of All-India Hindu Mahasabha, 1920-39', in B.N. Pandey, (ed.) *Leadership in South Asia*, (Delhi, 1977), pp. 102-03.
- 4 A.M. Zaidi, (ed.), *Evolution of Muslim Thought*, Vol. II, (1975), pp.632-33. (Henceforth *Evolution*).
 - 5 P.A.R., 1923-24, pp.2-3; I.S.C., Vol. X, pp.58-59; Notes on the Second Reforms Council (Swaraj Party), Hailey Collection, 11 A, IOR: Speeches of leading Swarajists, see *Zamindar*, 16 May to 25 May, 1925.
 - 6 P. Sitaramaya, *The History of the Indian National Congress*, Vol. II, (1947), pp.252-79.
 - 7 *M.M.P.C*, 1924-25, (London, 1926), pp.55-56.
 - 8 Lajpat wrote 13 thoughtful articles against Unionist Party's interests which appeared in *The Tribune*, and other leading dailies — reproduced in V.C. Joshi (ed.), *Lajpat Rai; writings and speeches*, Vol. II, (Delhi, 1966), pp.170-222.
 - 9 Return Showing the Results of Elections in Indian, 1923, (*Cmd* 2154), pp.63.
 - 10 C.M.C., 24 June 1923.
 - 11 Hailey's note, 15 September 1924, *Hailey Collection*, 6B, IOR; Cleghorn, 'Leadership of

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- Mahasabha', p.401; Gordon, 'The Hindu Sabha', p.180.
- 12 Viceroy to S/S, 9 February 1922. Telegraphic Correspondence Regarding the Situation in India, No. I, Cmd 1586.
- 13 *M.M.P.C.*, 1924-25, (London, 1926), pp.55-56.
- 14 Out of 101 non-official only 25 voted against. See Reforms Enquiry Committee Report, 1925, (Cmd.2360), p. 134.
- 15 Zaidi (ed.), *Evolution*, Vol. II, p.690.
- 16 Designated Governor.
- 17 Extracts of his speech in Enquiry Committee Report, (Cmd 2360), pp. 1-2.
- 18 Ibid.
- 19 Resolutions of the Punjab Hindu Conference, Zamindar, 25 & 26 February 1924.
- 20 Even as late as 1936 the Muslims thought it could not give lead to Muslims in the Punjab; it was not an organized party. (Barkat Ali, to Husain, 4 April 1936, *Letters of Fazl-i-Husain*, (Lahore, 1976), (ed.) W.Ahmad, p.508.
- 21 Resolutions of the Hindu Conference, February 1924; Sentiments of the Punjab Hindus; extracts of S. Ram's speech — February 1925. *Hailey Collection*, 7B, IOR.

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- 22 M.H. Saiyid, *Muhammad Ali Jinnah, a political study*, (Lahore, 1945), p.305.
 - 23 Saiyid, Jinnah, p.49.
 - 24 Zaidi (ed.), *Evolution*, Vol. II, pp.257-67; Jinnah's speech, p.269.
 - 25 In 1936 when Jinnah revived the League, Punjab was once again his priority. See chapter 5.
 - 26 *Zamindar*, 28 May 1924. (Jinnah's press interview).
 - 27 Ibid.
 - 28 Ibid.
 - 29 Ibid; Pirzada, *Foundations*, Vol. I, pp.577, 580-81.
 - 30 *Zamindar*, 28 May & 1 June 1924; Pirzada (ed.), *Foundations*, Vol. I, pp.575-81.
 - 31 Fazl-i-Husain to A. Din, 24 November 1932, *Ahmad (ed.), Letters of Husain*, p.233.
 - 32 Joshi, *Lajpat Rai*, Vol. II, pp.212-220.
 - 33 The secretary to the Government of Indian, Home Department, to the Chief Secretaries of all local governments, 23 April 1923, in *Views of the Local Governments on the Working of the Reforms, 1923*, CMD. 2361, P. I.
 - 34 *Views of the Local Governments on the Working of the Reforms*, CMD.2362, p.I.

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- 35 Ibid., pp.200-01.
- 36 Hailey to Reading, 22 January 1925, *Hailey Collection*, 7A; Hailey to P. London, 29 September 1924, *Hailey Collection*, 6B.
- 37 Note by Raja Narendra Nath on Reforms (Report of the Punjab Committee), Indian Statutory Commission, Vol. III, (London, 1930), Cmd.3572, p.496.
- 38 Joshi, (ed.), *Lajpat Rai*, Vol. I, pp.228,244.
- 39 Ibid., Vol. II, p.217.
- 40 Hailey to London, 29 September 1924; Hailey to Reading, 22 January 1925, *Hailey Collection*, 6B, 7A, IOR.
- 41 Working of Reforms, *CMD.2362*, p.206.
- 42 Maclagan to Reading, 27 May 1924, *Reading Collection*, 238/24.
- 43 Ibid.
- 44 Memorandum by the Governor on Reforms, 4 January 1922, in *Chelmsford Collection*, 238/24, IOR.
- 45 Sikh Minister's note, Working of Reforms, (Cmd.2362), p.209.
- 46 Ibid., p.211.
- 47 For details, see Lal Chand-Fazl-i-Husain's notes, *ibid.*, pp.211-14.

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- 48 Reforms Enquiry Committee, Appendix 5, written evidence, (London, 1925), pp.348-49, V/26/261/12, IOR; appendix, Vol. 6 (oral evidence) 9 August, pp.21, 240.
- 49 Ibid., p.381.
- 50 Ibid.
- 51 Ibid., pp.382-83.
- 52 Ibid., pp.385-86.
- 53 Pir Tajuddin's (secretary of the P.M.L.) memorandum, *ibid*, pp.374-77.
- 54 Malik Barkat Ali's memorandum, 6 August 1924, *ibid.*, pp.378-80; oral evidence, (Appendix 6), pp. 408-48; *Zamindar*, 23 August 1924; R. Afzal, *Barkat Ali*, p. 16.
- 55 Ibid.
- 56 *Reports of the Reforms Enquiry Committee*, (London, 1928), Cmd.2360, p.37.
- 57 Ibid., pp.51-52.
- 58 M.M.P.C., 1924-25, p.62.
- 59 *Reforms Enquiry Committee Report*, p.56.
- 60 Ibid., p.64.
- 61 Ibid., p.60-61.

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- 62 Appointed in June 1923 to enquire into organization and the general conditions of the Services, recruitment, etc. Its report was published in May 1924; it recommended a plan of entrusting to the local governments' future recruitments, for the services operating in the transferred subjects. (See *M.M.P.C.*, 1924-25, p.65).
- 63 *Reforms Enquiry Committee Report*, p. 87.
- 64 *Ibid.*, pp.38-39.
- 65 The Proceedings of the All Parties Conference 1925, Zaidi (ed.), *Evolution*, Vol. II, pp.495-96; Joshi, Lajpat Rai, pp.212-13.
- 66 Pirzada (ed.), *Foundations*, Vol. I, pp.69,70-71.
- 67 Zaidi (ed.), *Evolution*, pp.495,700-01.
- 68 Pirzada (ed.), *Foundations*, p.90.
- 69 *Ibid.*, p.98.
- 70 *Ibid.*
- 71 *Ibid.*
- 72 *Ibid.*
- 73 His speech. *Ibid.*, p.83.
- 74 *Ibid.*, pp.89-90.
- 75 *Ibid.*, pp.84-87.

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- 76 The session ended in December 1926 and Sir Feroz Khan Noon took charge in January 1927.
- 77 Arya Samaj leader converted a large number of Muslims in the U.P. to Hinduism.
- 78 For details, see K.W. Jones, 'Communalism in the Punjab: The Arya Samaj Contribution', J.A.S. (November 1968), pp.39-54; G.R. Thursby, *Hindu Muslim Relations in British India*, (Leiden, 1979) R
- 79 Sir Rahim's address - *Indian Quarterly Register*, (henceforth I.Q.R.), (January to June 1927), pp. 32-33.
- 80 Fazl-i-Husain's speech, P.L.C.D., 26 October 1923, pp.372-75; Muhammad Shafi argued for its abolition at R.T.C., I.S.C., Vol. III, Raja Narendra Nath's note, p.493; Mujahid *Jinnah*, p.493.
- 81 I.S.C., Vol. III, Note by Raja Narendra Nath, pp.488-92.
- 82 I.Q.R., (January-June 1927), p.33.
- 83 His statements in C.M.C. and *Zamindar*, 30 & 31 March, 1927.
- 84 Viceroy to S/S, 24 March 1927, *Birkenhead Collection*, 705/5, IOR.
- 85 Ibid.
- 86 Hailey to Mudiman, 13 June 1927, *Hailey Collection*, 10A; *Zamindar*, 24 & 25 March 1927.

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- 87 His letter in I.Q.R., (January-June 1927), pp.35-36.
- 88 Ibid.,pp.34-35.
- 89 Hailey to Mudiman, 13 June 1927, *Hailey Collection*, 10A.
- 90 For details, see Zamindar, 2,3,4,5 May 1927.
- 91 Ibid.
- 92 Viceroy to S/S, 11 May 1927, *Birkenhead Collection*, 703/5.
- 93 For details, see Viceroy to S/S, 27 March, 11 May, 29 September, 5 October 1927, *ibid.*
- 94 The Governor and the Home member were watching his activities with a keen interest. (See Hailey to Mudiman, 13 June 1927; Mudiman to Hailey, 15 June 1927, *Hailey Collection*, 10A.)
- 95 M.M.P.C., 1927-28, pp.49-50.
- 96 Son-in-law of Muhammad Shafi.
- 97 Statement in *The Time London*, 20 September 1927.
- 98 Brown to Hailey, 22 September 1927; Hailey to Brown, 10 October 1927, *Hailey Collection*, 11 A.
- 99 The Times, 20 September 1927
- 100 Ibid.

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- 101 There was a good deal of understanding at ministerial level between Punjab and the U.P. (See Yousaf to Hailey, 23 August 1928, Hailey Collection, 13B.)
- 102 Hailey to Irwin, 23 November 1927, *ibid.*, 1 IB.
- 103 Hailey to Fazl-i-Husain, 6 October 1927, Letters of Fazl-i-Husain, p.37
- 104 Statement published by the G.G., 8 November 1927Cmd.2986, pp. 1-3.
- 105 For details, see Page, *Prelude to Partition*, pp.153-4; Hasan, *Nationalism*, Np.265.
- 106 Viceroy to Hailey, 20 October 1927, *Hailey Collection*, 11B.
- 107 Viceroy to Governor, 20 October 1927, *ibid*
- 108 Sir Feroz Khan Noon to Hailey, 4 & 6 November 1927, *ibid.*
- 109 Hailey to Irwin, 7 November 1927, *Halifax Collection*, 152/21, IOR.
- 110 Hailey to Irwin, 7 November 1927, *Halifax Collection*, 125/21.
- 111 Inqilab, 11 & 12 November 1927.
- 112 The Times, 22 November 1927.
- 113 *Ibid.*

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- 114 Hailey's note, 13 November 1927, *Hailey Collection*, 11B.
- 115 Hailey to P.S.V., 15 November 1927, Halifax Collection, 125/21.
- 116 Viceroy to S/S, 24 November 1927, *Birkenhead Collection*, 703/5.
- 117 Letter dated 4 Dec., 1927, in *Dr. Ansari's correspondence*, edited by M. Hasan. (Delhi, 1979), pp.29-30.
- 118 The Times, 22 November 1927.
- 119 Afzal, Barkat AH, p.20.
- 120 Inqilab, 7 December 1927.
- 121 Hailey to Irwin, 23 November 1927, Hailey Collection, 1 IB.
- 122 Hailey to Vincent, 8 July 1927, Hailey Collection, 11 A.
- 123 Hailey to Francis, 21 May 1925, *ibid.*, 7B.
- 124 Hailey to Vincent, 8 July 1927, *ibid.*, 11 A
- 125 Raja Narendra Nath to Pott, (P.S.G.), 3 July 1927, *ibid.*
- 126 Raja Narendra Nath admitted that this was not Fazl-i-Husain's innovation. Raja Narendra Nath's paper, p. 11, *ibid.*
- 127 *Ibid.*, p.25.

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- 128 Ibid., p.26.
- 129 The Times, 22 November 1927.
- 130 Ibid., 13 March 1928.
- 131 Hailey to Irwin, 23 November 1927, *Hailey Collection*, 11 B.
- 132 Viceroy to S/S, 26 May 1927, *Birkenhead Collection*, 703/5. 15
- 133 November 1927, Hailey Collection, 1 IB.
- 134 Hailey to Irwin, 30 December 1927, *Hailey Collection*, 11B.
- 135 Cuttings from C.M.G. and Indian National Herald, 19 November 1927, *Hailey Collection*, 11B; *Letters of Fazl-i-Husain*, pp.40-46.
- 136 Ibid.
- 137 Hailey to Fazl-i-Husain, 24 November 1927, *Letters of Fazl-i-Husain*, 46-47
- 138 Fazli to Hailey, 6 December 1927, *ibid.*, p.47.
- 139 Hailey to Fazl-i-Husain, 8 December 1927, *ibid.*, p.49.
- 140 Hailey to Fazl-i-Husain, 10 December 1927, *ibid.*
- 141 The Times, 23 November 1927.
- 142 Yakub to Ansari, 7 December 1927, *Ansari's Correspondence*, pp.32-33.

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- 143 Hailey to Irwin, 23 November 1927, *Hailey Collection*, 11B.
- 144 Sir Yakub's address to the 19th session of the League, in Pirzada (ed.), *Foundations*, Vol. II, pp. 110-111.
- 145 Ibid., p.108.
- 146 Mehmodabad to Ansari, 4 December 1927, *Ansari's Correspondence*, p.27.
- 147 Maulvi Yakub to Ansari, 7 December 1927, Ansari's correspondence, pp.32-33.
- 148 Hailey to Brown, 14 December 1927, *Hailey Collection*, 1 IB.
- 149 Ibid. For the moment Hailey feared that the commission would have a poor reception.
- 150 The Times, 16 December 1927.
- 151 Pirzada (ed.), *Foundations*, Vol. II, p.108.
- 152 The Times, 16 December 1927.
- 153 Pirzada (ed.), *Foundations*, Vol. II, pp.107-26.
- 154 Ibid., p. 134.
- 155 Ibid., p. 132.
- 156 Inqilab, 10 January 1928; Pirzada (ed.), *Foundations*, Vol. II. pp.128-38; Mujahid, *Jinnah*, p.390.

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- 157 Pirzada (ed.), *Foundations*, Vol. U, pp.128-31; Muhammad Shafi presented a copy of his address to Simon. See Simon Collection, 77/255, IOR.
- 158 Letter from Simon to the Viceroy, 6 February 1928, *Indian Statutory Commission*, CMD.3029.
- 159 P.L.C.D., 14 March 1928, pp.716,759; *The Times*, 19 March 1928.
- 160 Hailey to Irwin, 12 May 1928, *Halifax Collection*, 152/22.
- 161 Governor's note, 2 May 1928, Hailey Collection, 12B.
- 162 Raja Narendra Nath to Pott, 4 May 1928, *ibid.*
- 163 Governor's note, 7 May 1928, *ibid.*
- 164 He had been a host of E. Cadogan, a member of the commission, during the commission's preliminary visit. (E. Cadogan *The India we Saw*, (London, 1933), p.94.)
- 165 Hailey to Irwin, 12 May 1928, *Halifax Collection*, 152/22.
- 166 P.L.C.D., 11 May 1928, p.1192.
- 167 *Ibid.*
- 168 M.M.P.C., 1928-29, (London, 1930), p.27.
- 169 Simon to Viceroy, 14 June 1928; Viceroy to Hailey, 12 May 1928, *Halifax Collection*, 152/14.

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- 170 Montmorency to Irwin, 9 September 1928, *ibid.*, 152/22; C.M.G., 21 February 1929.
- 171 With Muslim majority it decided to co-operate. (See Emerson's memorandum, 23 April 1928, Hailey Collection, 12B.)
- 172 *Ibid.* Kasur was the only exception.
- 173 The welcome at Lahore 'was never to-be-forgotten episode in the career of the commission', (Cadogan, *The India we Saw*, p.93).
- 174 *For details, see The Times, 12 & 17 March 1928.*
- 175 *Ibid.*, 19 March 1928.
- 176 The Sikhs at large had decided to put their case before the commissions; they feared that if they boycotted, they might be placed in a position of subservience to Muslim rule. (See *The Times*, 14 March 1928).
- 177 Emerson's secret memo 23 April 1928, in *Hailey Collection*, 12B.
- 178 *Ibid.*
- 179 Hailey to Crear, 8 May 1928, *ibid.*, 26A.
- 180 *The Times*, 19 March 1928.