

---

# The Nuclear Deal of Iran and Aftermath

\_\_\_\_\_ Karim Haider Syed  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

*On the one hand the agreement has imposed significant restrictions on Iran's nuclear activities, and on the other hand has removed sanctions from Tehran, which has significantly undermined the economic and the political power of the country. Thus, this agreement has to become the starting point for Iran's transformation from politically and economically isolated rogue state to an emerging regional power that will have later become the core of the formation of economic and geopolitical strategies of the world powers. This study aims to provide an academic assessment of the implications of the nuclear deal for Iran, as well as for key global powers because American withdrawal in 2018 has created many issues in this regard. The analysis includes Iran policy motives and role of international leadership during and after the agreement. Moreover, the political and religious aspects of Iranian policy are also considered, on which the adoption of any foreign policy decisions depends. This is very unique study as it has provided a prospective view of regional politics in case the deal can be implemented in letter and spirit. This study will also help to understand the aftermath of the Iranian nuclear deal if it is implemented with the consent of the all members including America.*

**Key Words:** Aftermath, Iran, implications, motives, nuclear deal, P5+1,

## **INTRODUCTION**

July 14, 2015 Federica Mogherini, EU President for External Relations policy and security, representing E3 + 3 or P5 + 1 (permanent members of the UN Security) and Mohamed Javad Zarif, Iranian Foreign Minister, addressed the signing of a comprehensive treaty on the Iranian nuclear program. Nuclear negotiations on Iran began in 2002 and were repeatedly interrupted due to divergence of positions of the parties. However, in 2012 a new stage was marked. (the starting points were the summit meetings in Moscow, Istanbul, Almaty, Geneva and Vienna), on account of a serious tightening of sanctions against Iran on the one hand, and the so-called 'Arab Spring', which radically changed the region, on the other. The transformation of the region has resulted in civil wars and the emergence of the organization of the Islamic State (ISIS), as a common enemy of peace as the whole and the Middle East region in particular. The result of long negotiations was a temporary treaty between Iran and a group of states known as 5 + 1, indicated by the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Action Plan on July 15, 2015. While the U.S. Congress had 60 days to accept or reject the treaty, the UN Security Council unanimously approved it. Although during the debate, regarding the Obama administration's position on the Iranian nuclear treaty, there were those who negatively and even cautiously reacted to this agreement, nevertheless the US Senate and the public in the media supported the administration's decision (Joyner, 2016). At the same time, an unprecedented development perspective arose for Iran, which before this time was actually a closed area. It is worth noting that the CQPD is an agreement that will be followed by significant political and economic changes in the balance of power in the Middle East and in the general strategic picture of the world. In this context, the nuclear treaty is not just a new chapter in Iran's relations with the West. This is an agreement that will entail the transformation of Iran from politically and economically isolated country into an emerging regional power that will become the core of the formation of strategies of the Western and non-Western worlds. Thus, the agreement gives rise to a new stage of geopolitical and economic development the Middle East region and is likely to have global implications. This topic has been relevant for many years, since the Middle East in general, and Iran in particular, have always been at the centre of the formation strategic and economic policy of world powers. The Middle East is the world's main arena for implementation of a new balance of power policy, which is likely to characterize a feature of the coming decades. This is the region where the first one is being played right now in the round of the Great Games, but the state of affairs in the region requires a radically different response on behalf of the world empires. Analysing the causes and results of the Iranian nuclear deal and its relevance to the regional politics has made this project very interesting.

## **LITERATURE REVIEW**

Iran Nuclear Agreement and U.S. Exit by Paul K. Kerr Specialist in Non-proliferation and Kenneth Katzman Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs is an article published in Federation of American Scientists on July 20, 2018. They

explain how after two years of long diplomatic and bilateral talks, a nuclear deal was reached in 2015 between Iran and six countries. Federica Mogherini represented the European Union in these talks. In that sense, it was a tripartite agreement. On the one hand, Iran, and the other hand, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany, as well as the European Union, participated as observers and mediators. After much struggle and brawl, the three sides agreed on a common, comprehensive, acceptable and workable product. The agreement was formally drafted and titled as a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. The draft was later ratified by the United Nations. They provided details of the agreement, to reveal its own sensitive nature and at the same time make it clear that any withdrawing party to the agreement will be a sign of extreme fraud, breach of trust, cynicism and suspicion in the world community (Paul, Katzman, 2018). This article also explains the reasons and causes of the American withdrawal from the agreement.

## **METHODOLOGY**

This research paper is based on qualitative research in which descriptive and analytical models of research have been used. Secondary sources of data collection i.e books, journals, websites, newspapers are used for the collection of data according to the needs of the study. In order to analyse the current situation and predict the possible behaviour of post-sanction Iran and the responses of the other powers in agreement, it is necessary to use various methodological tools. The first and fundamental tool in an attempt to answer this the question is scenario analysis. The scenario in this case is understood as a hypothetical sequence of events designed to identify causal processes, consequences and subsequent decisions method, an attempt is made to determine in what sequence the development of the situation under consideration has taken place, as well as what alternatives exist for of the political actors involved in this issue, including if they stick to the intended scenario, or try to change it. In addition to the causal sequence of events, this work has also used a situational approach, implying forecasting a future hypothetical situation that may arise due to implementation of the script. In combination with other techniques, this approach attempts to give a most accurate forecast for the future development of events in the created framework. Since this work contains elements hypothetical model, it is necessary to understand that it will be a scenario-based future constructed on the analysis of previous events and interactions of actors. The research framework will primarily include interaction between Iran and the most active international players in the Middle East region; USA, China, EU, Russia.

## **HYPOTHESIS**

The withdrawal of United States of America from Joint Comprehensive Action Plan has serious repercussions for Iran and countries in agreement, and it can reduce the importance of the agreement in future.

## **RESULTS/FINDINGS**

Iran reached on an agreement with Russia, the United States, Great Britain, China, France, and Germany for the settlement of the longstanding nuclear issue in July 14, 2015. For the said purpose a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was agreed upon, the application of which eliminates the levied embargoes on Iran by UNSC and members of EU ("President Obama's legacy: The Iran nuclear agreement?," 2018). According to the document, Iran's long-term plan includes restrictions on all uranium enrichment and research and development work (R&D) in this area for eight years. The JCPOA stipulates that in 10 years Iran will begin the phased decommissioning of its IR-1 centrifuges (GARWIN, 2016). During this period, Iran will maintain the uranium enrichment capacity at Natanz at a level not exceeding 5060 IR-1 centrifuges. Surplus centrifuges and uranium enrichment infrastructure at Natanz must be kept under the continuous supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Iran will continue to conduct R&D in such a way that the accumulation of enriched uranium is not carried out. For ten years, Iranian R&D in the field of uranium enrichment will include only centrifuges of the IR-4, IR-5, IR-6 and IR-8 types. Iran should begin further tests of 30 IR-6 and IR-8 vehicles in eight and a half years. Iran should conduct its uranium enrichment activities, including R&D, exclusively at the Natanz enrichment facility. Iran is converting Fordow's uranium enrichment plant into a nuclear physics and technology center. For 15 years, Iran will maintain its uranium reserves with enrichment up to 3.67 percent at a level not exceeding 300 kilograms. Reconfiguration of the reactor should eliminate the potential for the production of weapons-grade plutonium in it. The reactor should provide for peaceful nuclear research and the production of radioisotopes for industrial and medical commitments. For 15 years, Iranian government was restricted to build further reactors of heavy water or store heavy water. Iran must remove all spent nuclear fuel from all future and existing nuclear power and research reactors. Within 15 years, Iran should be engaged in the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel or conduct research and development in this area. JCPOA gives authorization to the IAEA to gadget pellucidity actions, which comprise a continuing manifestation of the IAEA role in Iran, observing by the IAEA for 25 years at all Iranian uranium ore processing and uranium concentrate production facilities, monitoring for 20 years with respect to rotors and centrifuge bellows, use of approved and certified modern technologies of the IAEA, etc (Santoro, 2019). On July 20, 2015, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2231, endorsing the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. On December 15, 2015, an extraordinary session of the IAEA Board of Governors (BC) adopted a resolution on Iran prepared by the Six on the basis of the Russian draft. The resolution closes the dossier on Tehran's alleged research of a military-nuclear orientation, places the legal foundation for the IAEA's confirmation actions in Iran for the passé of implementation of the JCPOA. On 18 October 2015, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action entered into

force. On January 16, 2016, the practical implementation of the JCPOA to resolve the situation around the Iranian nuclear program (INP) began. It became conceivable by a report of IAEA claiming that Iran has developed its program for nuclear weapons according to the Action Plan. Iran also has concentrated its uranium upgrading volume at the Natanz nuclear facility to 5,060 centrifuges and the uranium enrichment level to 3.67percent, undone all supplementary centrifuges and associated substructure, engaging them in packing under the management of the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency). After it Iran has also reduced its reserves of uranium enrichment to 5 percent to a level of 300 kilograms, and the left-over has been exported to Russian federation. Iran also undone the core of the incomplete reactor of heavy water in Arak facility. In rejoinder to the measures of Iran in the field of nuclear program, all the current UNSC resolutions against Iran were canceled (some of the restrictive measures remain, but they are presented from side to side a distinct extension to Resolution NO. 2231 of the UNSC), a number of unilateral US sanctions and all preventive procedures by the EU. It intended that the UNSC restraints on the transfer of all armaments from Iran and on the source of armaments to Iran in seven categories of the UN Register of Conventional Arms will remain until 2020. A permitting procedure was introduced for the implementation of the relevant deliveries - after approval by the UN Security Council. A similar mechanism, but until 2023, should be in place for the supply of missile technology to Iran. By 2025, an unusual "supply channel" of nuclear program for peace and energy to Iran will operate according to the significant lists of the group of Nuclear Suppliers. The conclusion of UNSCR 2231 has been agreed to continue till 2025, after the said period the issue of Iran nuclear will be detached from the list of items of the UNSC. The UNO Security Council offers for an instrument for the promising reinstatement of embargoes in case one of the JCPOA members ruminates that Iranian government is not satisfying its responsibilities under the said agreement. Though, the restoration of the embargoes on Iran is conceivable simply through a procedure that requires the provision of weighty arguments when considering the issue in the Joint Commission of the JCPOA (Zhai & Lu, 2016).

## **DISCUSSION/ANALYSIS**

On October 13, 2017, Donald Trump announced during his keynote speech on the Iranian strategy that he did not confirm to Congress Iran's good faith adherence to the JCPOA. Tehran was accused of its policies in the Middle East, including support for terrorists in Washington's understanding, groups and the development of a ballistic missile program and non-observance of human rights. Using the cited accusations against Iran as argumentation, on May 8, 2018, Donald Trump announced the US withdrawal from the JCPOA and the restoration of the entire package of unilateral extraterritorial anti-Iranian sanctions, which were canceled by Washington as part of the implementation of the agreement, including secondary ones (with respect to other countries doing business with Iran). The rest

of the six members opposed such a step by the United States. Washington's European partners said they intended to continue to abide by the terms of the Iran deal. At the same time, at the next stage, if the member countries of the nuclear deal did not secure Iran's interests within the specified period, Tehran announced its readiness to suspend the modernization of the reactor in Arak, which was part of the JCPOA, and to abandon restrictions on the level of uranium enrichment (Bilal, 2019). On July 1, 2018, Jawad Zareef long-established that the state's assets of low-enriched uranium surpassed 300 kilograms provided for in the nuclear deal. On the same day, confirmation of Iran's exceeding the ceiling for reserves of low-enriched uranium was received from IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano. In response, the United States, France, and UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres called on Iran to continue to fulfill its obligations under the JCPOA. On July 7 2018, Iran announced the second stage of reducing its obligations under the nuclear deal due to the fact that the JCPOA member countries could not fulfill Tehran's demands within 60 days: to ensure the economic interests provided for by the agreement, in particular, in the banking and oil spheres. Tehran said it had started the uranium enrichment process at a level above 3.67 percent, provided for by the nuclear deal, and brought the level to over 4.5 percent. On July 8, IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano said agency inspectors had confirmed an increase in uranium enrichment in Iran ("The US withdrawal from the Iran deal: One year on", 2019). On September 1, 2018 Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Abbas Mousavi said that Tehran has prepared measures for the 3rd step of reducing responsibilities in the nuclear deal, they are tougher than Iran's previous measures. Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Arakchi said that the return to the implementation of the nuclear deal depends on the provision of a \$ 15 billion credit line to Iran by the end of the year. Tehran indicated to Paris, with which it was negotiating, that Europe should either buy oil from Iran or provide the equivalent in the form of a \$ 15 billion line of credit by the end of the year, which will secure Iran's oil revenues. On September 4, 2018 Iranian President Hassan Rouhani said that Iran and European countries have resolved most of the contradictions over the implementation of the nuclear deal, but did not come to a final agreement. On September 6, Iran began the third phase of reducing its nuclear obligations. Tehran said it has begun work with a range of centrifuges without being restricted to nuclear research and development by the JCPOA. The Head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), Ali Abkar Salehi, said on November 4 that Tehran had more than doubled its uranium production over the past two months. He also announced the launch of 30 IR-6 centrifuges, noting that another 20 had been installed earlier, thus Iran has brought the total number of this type of centrifuges to 60 (Mozafari, 2018). At the end of October, 2019 Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Abbas Mousavi said that Tehran had prepared measures for the fourth stage of reducing nuclear obligations, but hoped that Europe will fulfill its obligations and will not need to be introduced.

Russia has reliably supported upholding the implementation of the JCPOA and increasing monetary and economic assistance with Iran, not withstanding

illegitimate and destructive US prohibitions. Russia call on Iran to show restraint in the situation around the JCPOA and to comply with the key provisions of the safeguards agreement with the IAEA and the additional protocol. On October 2, 2019, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said that Iran had still not violated any of its obligations under the legally binding documents - the nonproliferation treaty, the safeguards agreement and the additional protocol to the safeguards agreement that it voluntarily fulfills. "Everything he does is done under the control of the IAEA," Lavrov said. France, Germany and Great Britain after the withdrawal of America from the Iranian nuclear deal make unambiguous to create a joint instrument for reimbursements with Iran (INSTEX). After the meeting in Vienna on the nuclear deal in June 2019, Helga Schmid, the secretary general of the EU diplomatic service, said that the mechanism was in place and the first transactions were already being carried out. Iran was looking for the ability to trade oil amid the sanctions of American administration. After a meeting in June, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov noted that the EU is not yet ready to use INSTEX to service transactions for the export of Iranian oil. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said that Moscow calls on the European participants in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on the Iranian nuclear program to make INSTEX a truly effective mechanism for trade with Iran, without which it would be difficult to maintain the JCPOA. He also called on the European three to realize the responsibility for preserving the JCPOA. In early October, Sergei Lavrov noted that not a single deal with Iran under INSTEX was completed. UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres called for the preservation of the JCPOA on December 2018. In his report, he evaluated that the American decision to pull out from the JCPOA and restoration of unilateral prohibitions against Iran is a serious challenge that does not contribute to the achievement of the goals set by the JCPOA and Resolution 2231 (UNSC). On May 8, 2019, on the anniversary of the withdrawal of America from the nuclear deal, Iran announced the termination of a number of JCPOA clauses on the Iranian nuclear program - in terms of enriched uranium and heavy water supplies. Iran explained the measures taken by the US violations of the nuclear deal and the imposition of sanctions by Washington against Tehran, as well as the inability of the remaining members of the JCPOA (Germany, France, Great Britain, China and Russia) to adequately solve the problems that have arisen. In this regard, Iran gave these countries 60 days to ensure Iran's interests, promising at the same time to return to the implementation of the suspended obligations if they manage to solve the problems that have arisen in connection with the actions of the United States (Pieper, 2019).

### **Iran's Policy Motivations**

To predict the anticipated behaviors of Iran, it is necessary to take into account the aspects that govern Iran in the process of forming its foreign policy. This analysis will help to identify the causal relationship of certain actions and, such way, continue the existing logical chain of further hypothetical actions of Iran. Foreign

policy of Islamic republic of Iran is a product of covert and occasionally conflicting motives. Describing Data Driven Stress contradictions, one expert noted that Iran is constantly faced with the choice between “national and causal” (Bowen, 2015). At times it seems that Iran's leaders are constantly weighing the relative imperatives of its state revolutionary and religious ideology regarding national interests and needs. Consider the main factors that determine foreign policy Iran. This consideration will help to identify the main motives that, most likely, they will influence further foreign policy decisions. Understanding the threat It is obvious that the power of Iran, to one degree or another, perceives position of the United States and its allies as a threat to the country’s government and national interests. Despite numerous statements by US officials about America not wanting to change the government in Iran, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has frequently identified that the America is against the very birth of Islamic political system and is in try to achieve objective of government change. According to Khamenei, various actions were taken to try to change the government in Iran, such as support for the internal opposition of Iran, the introduction of economic sanctions, as well as the provision of military or other support to regional opponents of Iran (Khamene'I, 2014). Iranian leaders claim U.S. support for the military existence in the Gulf region and in the other states as they are taking it a possible intention of the United States to attack Iran, if the Iranian the policy will be viewed as hostile by the United States (Slavin, 2014). Some official Iranian media claim that America is not only backing governments with Sunni heads and organizations that actively clash with Iran, but also crafting and supporting fundamental Sunni Islamist groups against Iran (Mostaghim, 2014). The philosophy of the 1979 Islamic Revolution continues to provide influence on the formation of foreign policy direction of Iran so far. The revolution established an Islamic government in which highest powers are in the grip of the Supreme Leader, who is able to use governmental and religious power. Iran tried to export the revolution in the early years to neighboring Muslim countries. However, by the end of the 1990s, what has been achieved is only increased resistance in the region (Cagaptay, 2015). Iranian leaders argue that economic and political structures in the region of M.E are largely directed alongside oppressed nations courtesy of America and its friends, in particular, Israel. Oppressed nations commonly mention to Palestinians who do not actually have their particular state and the other Muslims, who are a minority in many states of the area, are also not represented in political structures and are in an unfavorable economic position. Iran demands that the politics and economy of the region be freed from Western intervention and economic domination. Iranian officials in their speeches often equate the creation of Israel to the emergence of Western involvement, depriving the people of Palestine of their rights and homes (Ghabra, 2019).

### **National interests**



Iranian national securities, meeting and sometimes complicating the country's ideology, also shape foreign policy. Iranian leadership, highlighting a powerful civilization and historical freedom, claiming the right to be documented as a great nation of influence in the Middle East. The country's leaders often contrast Iran with six other monarchical countries of the region (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, UAE and Bahrain), which structure the Council for the Cooperation of Countries Persian Gulf (GCC). Some of Iran's actions have shown that sometimes it ready to step back from its commitment of helping the Shiites to promoting their own geopolitical interests. For example, Iran supports Christian-populated Armenia, not Shiite Azerbaijan, in particular, with the aim of avoiding the spread of nationalism among large Azerbaijani diaspora of Iran. Also Iran tends to renounce assistance to the Islamist movements in the region of Central Asia, in particular, to avoid resentment from Russia, which is the most an important supplier of weapons and technology to Iran, as well as a friend in the support of the President of Syria Bashar al-Assad. Factional interests of foreign policy of Iran often reflects differing approaches and views among key players and factions. The Supreme Leader (known to eleven Ayatollah Ali Khamenei) has the final say in the decision of all foreign policy issues. Khamenei is universally regarded as an adherent of a tough ideological line, which is expressed in a deep distrust of US intentions with regard to Iran. Khamenei's consistent refrain, and the title of his book, widely circulated in Iran, is "I am a revolutionary, not a diplomat"(Erdbrink, 2014). The leadership of Revolutionary Guard Corps of Iran and other security organizations of Iran, have consistently expressed support for Khamenei's position on foreign policy issues. Although Khamenei tacitly supported the nuclear treaty, after its final approval, the Supreme Leader has repeatedly stated that foreign policy and commitment of Iran to oppose American positions, will not tolerate change in the consequence of the concluded agreement (Khalaji, 2015). Although the leadership of the IRGC criticized the nuclear treaty, it could not undermine its approval, and made statements similar to those of Khamenei regarding the future Iran's foreign policy. However, the more moderate top of the Iranian authorities, such as the incumbent President Rouhani are still providing strong inspiration. A.A. H. Rafsanjani, the former President of Iran claimed that Iranian government should not label any state as permanent enemy and that a practical foreign policy will inevitably weaken international sanctions and increased support for the Iranian position in the Middle East. This position received support from young people and intellectuals of Iran, who argue that Iran should take such position regarding its foreign policy, which will avoid global isolation and achieve greater integration into the international community (Khalaji, 2015). Unlike Khamenei, September 13, 2015 the Iranian President said that the nuclear agreement is "the starting point for creating a friendly atmosphere and cooperation with various countries " (Edrbrink, 2015). Some Iranian figures, including the former president (1997-2005) Mohammed Khatami is considered a reformist. Reformists tend to have a larger focus on internal reforms rather than drastic changes in foreign policy. However, at this time in history, most leading reformists are in the shadows and have little

influence on foreign and domestic policy. Politics-ideological aspect of Iranian foreign policy to predict further options for Iran's behavior, it is important consider the political value system. It must be understood that ideology and national interests have always been and will be paramount for The Islamic Republic, which means that the situation will develop in the direction that which will be the slope of the current government of Iran. When the secret program was uncovered in 2002, leaders of several divisions of government in Iran proposed to choose the person in charge on this issue, and a pragmatist, Rouhani, was elected. Rouhani's main goals in the context of Iran's foreign policy is an attempt to avoid or postpone the Iranian cause from the so-called governing board of the IAEA and move it to the Board UN safety just for to evade sanctions although maintaining nuclear cause. In the eyes of the international community Rouhani was gaining time to deceive the world on its program for nuclear weapons. After exposure of nuclear program, Iran has already managed to overcome technological barriers in grasping the complete nuclear fuel sequence. Iranian president Rouhani reasoned that the State is vulnerable as long as it is on the verge of developing a full fuel sequence or at the beginning of the atomic explosive venture. So one can do conclude that Rouhani is using negotiations to bounce the time for completion of the nuclear program of Iran (Kazamzadeh, 2014). Iran's crumbling economy was the reason for the loss popularity of the hardliners and thus allowed Rouhani to be elected president. Economic sanctions, especially EU sanctions and 2012 USA, which significantly compact the proficiency of Iran to sell oil, had dire consequences for the Iranian economy. Looking at the 2013 report of the international monetary institution World Bank, the average annual growth rate of domestic Iran's gross product in the era of nine years; 2000 and 2009 remained at the 4.6 percentage. After the growth rate of Iran in GDP became fast as it was in 2010 at 5.9 percent; in very next year 2011 it came down to 1.7 percent; and in 2012 it increased to 1.9 percent (Global Economic Prospects, 2013). The same report noted that the level inflation in Iran over these years was more than 40 percent, which put Iran in third place among the countries with the highest inflation rate. Many sanctions could be lifted only in the case of fundamental changes in foreign policy of Iran. Hassan Rouhani tried persuading Khamenei to take his political proposals into consideration on US-Iranian relationship, nuclear debates with P5 + 1. The influence gap at the time was too big to just give up challenge to Khamenei's power. (Kazamzadeh, 2014).

### **Role of Khamenei**

Aytullah Khamenei is supreme leader in Iran who had to decide whether to consent or reject the proposals of Rouhani on political change. It should be noted that in the Islamic Republic has a great influence on the conservative bloc headed by Ayatollah Khamenei. In this regard, the last word in Iran belongs to the supreme leader, whose opinion prevails over the position of the president. At Khamenei there are three possibilities: first, to agree to the key alterations projected by Hassan Rouhani; second, to discard the proposals of president and utilize his

superiority to restrain the president of Iran if he refuses to comply; third, to throw away Hassan's suggestions, and formerly use political opportunities. In order to end supplementary sanctions and achieve time to develop the nuclear capability provided that President Hassan was going to approve to this. One would assume that Khamenei accepted the proposals for political changes from Rouhani in the event that Iran agreed to negotiate with America in order to resolve key issues among the parties or if Iranians offered or accepted the extensive suggestions with the leadership of P5 + 1. It would also be possible to argue that Khamenei rejected Rouhani's proposals, in the event that nothing foreshadowed changes or Rouhani would have filed in resignation. Moreover, it would be obvious that Khamenei decided not to subject his political line to the proposed changes, and Rouhani agreed to cooperate exclusively on diplomatic matters if by October-November 2013, there would have been only minor changes in foreign policy of Iran. However, the era of July 2013 and November 2014 seen very strange events, explaining that Khamenei acknowledged President Hassan policy. It remains unclear how long it was provided by Rouhani for the implementation of the goals set and there is only in general this time frame. Time in this context was of great importance as Ban Ki-moon, General the UN secretary, believed then that Supreme Leader of Iran was playing for time with the aim of completing its nuclear weapons program (Gearan, 2013). Such discreet, towing tactics, which were to do or allow small steps to be taken by suggesting minor changes and taking superficial procedures while permitting the program to continue development of uranium, gave time to the Iranian nuclear researchers as they needed for the completion of the nuclear program. The consensus of the world community, as shown by a significant part of UN Security Council resolutions was that Iran needed was to stop any activity related to uranium enrichment. But on November 24, 2014 an agreement was signed between Iran and P5 + 1, which allowed uranium enrichment, at a low level. By January 2014, thanks to Rouhani's policies, Iran was able to stop further sanctions from the EU countries, the USA and the UN. Moreover, it was possible to lifting current prohibitions, maintaining the drive on uranium enrichment.

### **Hopes and Hurdles in Implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Action Plan**

The Joint Comprehensive Action Plan was undoubtedly historic moment for the whole world. A significant part of the sanctions imposed on Iran, were going to be removed, which would have a beneficial effect on Iran's crumbling economy but there were a number of factors that has significantly constrained economic growth in the Islamic Republic and the possibility of using the latest resources to achieve their foreign economic goals. First, the United States was not ready to allow the lifting of sanctions as long as Iran did not actually reduce its nuclear opportunities. And this, in turn, means the inability to achieve what was desired for Iran's influence in the region. Moreover, it was necessary to understand that despite the

removal secondary sanctions from Iran, primary sanctions affecting support for terrorism and human rights violations was remain in place. This fact was a deterrent for the Iranian economy achieving its potential, since the imposed sanctions were not allow Iran to gain access to American capital and, most importantly, to the latest technology. The same applied to European sanctions against Iran. A favorable prospect for Iran could be an increase in exports and imports, in particular with Russia, China and some European countries. Possible the transition to the use of national currencies, instead of the dollar (for example, with Russia in food imports) could have also facilitate bilateral trade. Despite the fact that the CQPD were entailed significant investments in the Iranian economy and the general economic recovery due to the resumption of oil exports, it should be understood that over the previous year's expensive nuclear policy, Iran had accumulated significant debts, and therefore financial investments and profits from exports was primarily be used in as payment of existing debts. Moreover, given the current trend and expert forecasts that oil prices was going to remain at a low level for the foreseeable future, which will have prevent Iran from quickly recovering its economic sector, besides, Iran could have face global competition, and years of absence from the world oil market that was not be allowed to quickly establish interstate relations. An important a factor in the further development of cooperation between Iran and Western countries was unpredictability of the Islamic Republic in the international arena("US and Iran: Key events since Trump withdrew from nuclear deal", 2019). It is likely that many foreign companies were hesitant about trade and investment to Iran in connection with the danger of renewal of sanctions. Large drop in oil prices likely to motivate easing positions of Iranian leaders on nuclear negotiations and support for Bashar Al-Assad, in order to get out of political and economic isolation. Nonetheless, the economic situation was unlikely to be able to radically change Iran's regional ambitions as a potential Middle East hegemon. The supreme leader of Iran repeatedly stated that the nuclear treaty was in no way going to oppress the national interests of the Islamic Republic. Nuclear Treaty, was likely to reduce the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, given the expected increase in the presence of international inspectors in Iran. Moreover, the risk of direct military confrontation with the United States or Israel was also serious diminution. However, at the regional level, the Iranian nuclear deal could play destabilizing role. The nuclear treaty can strengthen Iran's regional position, which negatively affect other regional powers such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Israel. This was likely to lead to an increase in regional tensions and bloodshed during the ongoing conflicts in Syria, Iraq, Palestine and Yemen. The interests of the leading regional powers overlap in the context of the conflicts based on the struggle between Sunnis and Shiites, as well as Israel and Palestine. Such an unstable security environment could have only increased the terrorist threat from radical Islamic groups, at the least in the long run. At the state level, in particular in Iran itself, the internal political competition between hardliners and moderates political forces might also increase (Isaev, 2019). Differences in positions regarding the implementation of the nuclear deal

and its impact on the regional and geopolitical context was going to intensify the struggle between competitors.

## **CONCLUSION**

In all likelihood, the nuclear deal was going to transform the struggle of key powers of the world for security in the Middle East into economic rivalry. A tangible economic struggle could cause even more tension, including in the Euro-Atlantic relationship. For regional powers in the Middle East - mainly Israel and Saudi Arabia, political security issues are going to remain decisive and could continue to influence their internal politics. However, the nuclear deal has not solved all security issues, even in regional context, just because the treaty served as a kind of symbol renewed regional power of Iran and increased its influence in the region, which could not have disturbed Tehran's regional rivals, in particular Israel and Saudi Arabia. The nuclear deal was a historic moment and in terms of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The Cold War states were accused by the international community of trying to create and develop nuclear weapons. Moreover, Iraq and Iran were the only states whose nuclear programs were prosecuted not only through the sanctions government, but also direct threats of war. The fact that the issue of nuclear proliferation was settled through diplomatic instruments, proves that a complex a system for preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, including intelligence, The NPT, the IAEA and the UN Security Council were working well. Moreover, the Iranian deal was likely set a precedent for the future before the withdrawal of America from deal. American withdrawal from agreement can bring serious problems for the other signatory being a leading economic, political and defense power of the unilateral world. Through the sanctions on the government as well as the utilization of tools of diplomacy, Iran was returned to the reverse as a passivity government. After the deal it was impossible to say with certainty what consequences were going to entail a nuclear treaty in the context of a regional and global balance of power. In general, the deal spawned global competition, mainly in the economic sector of Iran. As for the winners and losers, Iran has definitely found itself to gain, since in addition to clearly indicating the sovereignty of their state, the treaty has allow Iran to realize significant economic benefits, and assert its status as a regional power.

## **LIMITATION AND STUDY FORWARD**

This is study is limited to the foreign policy of Iran in the context of Iranian nuclear deal and response of the world leading powers and it could be enhanced by analysing the foreign policy approach of all other members of this treaty along with the nations having direct implications of this treaty.

## End Notes and Bibliography

Belal, M. (2019). Uncertainty over the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action: Iran, the European Union and the United States. *Policy Perspectives*, 16(1), 23-24. doi:10.13169/polipers.16.1.0023

Bowen, J. (2015). After Nuclear Deal, Which Iran Will Flourish. *International Peace Institute*. Retrieved on March 20, 2020 from <http://theglobalobservatory.org/2015/08/karimsadjadpour-iran-nuclear-khamenei>

Cagaptay, S., James F., Khalaji M. (2015). Iran Won't Give Up on Its Revolution. – New York Times, oped. April 26, 2015. Retrieved on March 10, 2020 from <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/27/opinion/iran-wont-give-up-on-itsrevolution.html? r=0>

Erdbrink, T. (2014). A Nuclear Deal Is Likely to Hit Hurdles in Iran. *New Times*. Retrieved on March 10, 2020 from <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/21/world/middleeast/iran-us-nuclear-talks.html? r>

Edrbrink, T. (Septemeber 18, 2015). Post-Deal Iran Reappraising 'Great Satan'. *New York Times*.

Ghabra, S. N. (2019). Palestinians Become Refugees. *Palestinians in Kuwait*, 25-31. doi:10.4324/9780429300950-3

GARWIN, R. L. (2016). The 14 July 2015 Iran agreement: Joint comprehensive plan of action—Jcpoa. *International Seminars on Nuclear War and Planetary Emergencies 48th Session*. doi:10.1142/9789813148994\_0002

Gearan, A. (2013). Iran Could Use U.N. Talks as Cover to Build Bomb, Ban Ki-moon Says. *Washington Post*. Retrieved on March 10, 2020 from [http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-02-14/world/37097672\\_1\\_uranium-stockpile-nuclear-program-nuclearwatchdog](http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-02-14/world/37097672_1_uranium-stockpile-nuclear-program-nuclearwatchdog)

Global Economic Prospects (2013). Less volatile, but slower growth. - Washington, DC: 175. Retrieved on March 10, 2020 from <http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/GEP/GEP2015b/GlobalEconomic-Prospects-June-2013-Less-volatile-but-slower-growth.pdf>

Isaev, L. (2019, October 20). The Middle East after the US's Withdrawal from the Iran Nuclear Deal. Retrieved March 29, 2020, from <https://www.ridl.io/en/the-middle-east-after-the-uss-withdrawal-from-the-iran-nuclear-deal/>

Joyner, D. H. (2016). The joint comprehensive plan of action and developments since July 2015. *Iran's Nuclear Program and International Law*, 221-246.

- Khalaji, M. (2015). Khamenei vs. Rouhani: Projecting Very Different Views on the Nuclear Deal. *Washington Institute*, July 16, 2015. Retrieved on March 10, 2020 from <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/khamenei-vs-rouhaniprojecting-very-different-views-on-the-nuclear-deal>
- Kazemzadeh, M. (2014). Hassan Rouhani's Election and Its Consequences for American Foreign Policy. - *American Foreign Policy Interests*, 36:2, 127-137.
- Khamene'i (2014). U.S. Would Overthrow Iranian Government If It Could. *Reuters*. 51. Retrieved on March 20, 2020 from <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/08/us-iran-usa-leaderidUSBREA170CT20140208>
- Mostaghim, R. (2015). Iranians Rally to Support Iraq; Some Blame U.S. for Sunni Insurgency. - *Los Angeles Times*, June 24, 2014. 52 Retrieved on March 20, 2020 from <http://www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fg-iran-volunteers-militants-iraq20140624-story.html>.
- Mozafari, M. (2018). Saving the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action: Full of hope or just hopeless? *The Lancet*, 391(10116), 119. doi:10.1016/s0140-6736(18)30011-4
- Paul K. K., Katzman, K. (2018) Iran Nuclear Agreement and U.S. Exit . *Federation of American Scientists*, 121-129.
- Pieper, M. (2019). An Iran Nuclear Deal Without the United States? Chinese, European, and Russian Interests and Options After the US Withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. *Contemporary Issues in International Political Economy*, 35-53. doi:10.1007/978-981-13-6462-4\_2
- President Obama's legacy: The Iran nuclear agreement? (2018). *The SHAFR Guide Online*, 12(21). doi:10.1163/2468-1733\_shafr\_sim260100168
- Santoro, D. (2019). The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action at a crossroads. *The Politics of Resilience and Transatlantic Order*, 108-125. doi:10.4324/9780429028847-7
- Slavin, E. (2014). Iran Emphasizes Nuclear Reconciliation, Criticizes U.S. Military Posture in Persian Gulf, Stars and Stripes. Retrieved on March 20, 2020 from <http://www.stripes.com/news/iran-emphasizesnuclear-reconciliation-criticizes-us-military>
- The US withdrawal from the Iran deal: One year on. (2019, March 08). Retrieved from <https://www.sipri.org/commentary/expert-comment/2019/us-withdrawal-iran-deal-one-year>
- US and Iran: Key events since Trump withdrew from nuclear deal. (2019). Retrieved March 2, 2020, from <https://www.usatoday.com/in-depth/news/2020/01/03/us-iran-conflict-since-nuclear-deal/2803223001/>

Zhai, Y., & Lu, Y. (2016). An Assessment of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on the Iranian Nuclear Issue. *International Strategic Relations and Chinas National Security*, 191-209. doi:10.1142/9789813144941\_0010