
Kashmir Issue and the Inter-Provincial Politics of Pakistan 1947-1969

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Generally, Kashmir issue is considered as an inter-state conflict between India and Pakistan .Its centrality in Pakistan's foreign as well as in domestic policy, has assigned this issue a very prominent place in the national politics and inter- provincial governmental relations. The issue lost its unanimous place very soon after the establishment of Pakistan. It has been argued that Kashmir dispute instrumentally utilized to legitimize the centralized state structure for the ascendancy of civil- military bureaucratic oligarchy dominated by Punjab. This article explores the development of internal discourse on Kashmir issue during the first parliamentary and first military era of Pakistan from 1947-1969.

Introduction

Since early days of independence, Kashmir issue has been considered as one major cause of the multiplicity of tensions and conflicts between India and Pakistan, along with the ensure of the evacuee properties settlement, the distribution of Indus Basin Water, the sharing of armed forces and war equipment and the distribution of treasury money, etc. This long standing tension is aggravated by the later extension of the disputes to Siachen Glacier, Sir Creek Border and the Wular Barrage. Of all

contentious issues between India and Pakistan, Kashmir was and still remains by far the most crucial one and considered as 'the core issue'.

At the time of the liquidation of British Empire in 1947, two-fifth of the subcontinent was ruled by princes over whom Britain had juridically been suzerain. In the liquidation plan of third June 1947, states were expected to join India or Pakistan, following the geographical position of their state as well as wishes of the people of state. The overwhelming majority – some 550 out of 560-were Hindu potentates ruling Hindu population and were swiftly rounded up for India by Lord Mountbatten at the time of independence. Kashmir, the largest princely state with a predominantly Muslim population under a Hindu Maharaja Hari Singh, was expected to join Pakistan as ninety percent of the population of the state was Muslim and it was geographically, culturally, religiously and economically was linked the areas constituting Pakistan. But contrary to the wishes of the people of Kashmir, through a forged declaration of accession to India by the Maharaja Hari Singh of Kashmir, Kashmir was annexed to India on 26 September 1947 and armed forces were deployed in Kashmir. Since then Kashmir remains the main dispute to directly impact the relations between India and Pakistan.¹ Both countries have fought two wars specifically over the question of title to Kashmir territory in 1948 and 1965. However, the war of 1971 started in East Pakistan ended in Kashmir. Kargil operation in 1999, further strained the relations between India and Pakistan.

However, the issue has a great impact on the internal politics of Pakistan. Generally, it is believed to be an issue unifying the conflicting ethnicities, yet it has caused a great deal of extension of internal conflict since the 1948 Kashmir war, not only on the issues of foreign policy, defence policy and relations with India, but also on the economic social and cultural issues threatening the integrity of Pakistani state and society. Recently moves to give India the status of Most Favoured Nation (MFN), Balochistan and Sind have shown their interest in favour of good relations with

India even at the cost of Kashmir issue while main stream Punjabis are not ready to establish relations with India until the solution of Kashmir issue in favour of Pakistan.

The geographical, economic, cultural and military based perspectives have developed a common perception among the politicians of Sind, KPK and Balochistan that through Kashmir issue, Punjab and 'Punjabi interests' are being projected as the national interest of Pakistan in the formulation of foreign policy. Attaullah Mengal considered the Kashmir dispute as manipulation of Punjab to keep a huge army intact to clout over the smaller provinces. For Pir of Pagaro, Kashmir was not an issue of Sind. Rasul Baksh Palejo and G. M. Sayed have the same views about the Kashmir issue². On the other side, Ayesha Jalal presents the view that political leadership of Pakistan used the Kashmir issue to assert central authority over the provinces and paradoxically enough, it also served to distort the balance of relations between centre and provinces. Ian Talbot views are not much different from those of Jalal, as he relates the security concerns emanating from the issue of Kashmir with Punjab not with Pakistan³. While Saeed Shafqat⁴ and Hussain Haqqani⁵ have found the army to be playing an extremely manipulative role and exploits the Kashmir issue for its institutional interests against the national. In this paradigm, civil bureaucracy supported and encouraged the military to legitimize administrative role in the politics of Pakistan on the one hand and minimize the influence of representative institutions on the other. Former Director General of the Inter-Services Intelligence, Hamid Gul believes that there is a great deal of ambivalence in Pakistan's policy on Kashmir.⁶ Some concrete inconsistencies on the policy/solution of Kashmir dispute seem to confirm this judgment during the periods of first parliamentary and the first military regime.

The purpose of this paper is to explore and analyze the internal politics of Pakistan in relation to Kashmir issue. The paper evolves around the theme that among the federating units of

Pakistan, Kashmir has not been considered as a major concern; rather, it has been considered the major concern of Punjab. The paper focuses on the period before the emergence of Bangla Desh movement, an era that established the foundations of the concern with Kashmir issue. The relation is analysed through the prism of the nature of Pakistan's claims on Kashmir and Kashmir's geo-cultural relations with Pakistan, nature of controversies between the Federating Units and the role and place of Kashmir in inter-provincial politics and the role of institutions and communities in power sharing in the context of Kashmir issue.

Pakistan, Kashmir and the Punjab

Pakistan's claim on Kashmir as per liquidation of the British Indian Empire Plan was supported by a number of evidences and settings, all of those were primarily, associated with the Pakistani province of Punjab. Therefore, the issue was supposed not to have an absolute support of the other provinces, especially Sind, Balochistan and the East Pakistan. The North Western Frontier Province (NWFP) has a considerable support for racial-ethnic identity and in this context had not wholly supported the Federation.

Kashmir is a continuation of the plains of the region that constitutes Pakistan into northern mountains and makes Pakistan and Kashmir a single unit. The other part of the region, North Western Frontier Province (NWFP) had been the part of the Punjab province until 1901. Even the Northern Areas liberated in the war of 1948 were under the administrative control of Punjab and in this way Northern Areas boundaries with Tibet, China and Afghanistan and with a small intervening strip with United Soviet Socialist Russia had given Punjab a role in the 'strategic' policy. India's hold on Kashmir has been a constant threat to Pakistan's economy, security and stability, especially NWFP and parts of Punjab including Rawalpindi-Islamabad, headquarter of administrative and political institutions. Strategic loss of two Punjabi districts of Gurdaspur and Ferozpur at the time of

independence deprived Pakistan from land route to Kashmir. The irrigation of 19 million acres of land of Pakistan depends upon the five rivers, three of which the Indus, Jelhum and Chenab surge through Kashmir before flowing into Pakistan and irrigate NWFP and bread basket of Pakistan, Punjab.⁷ There are large Kashmiri ethnic settlements in Lahore, Gujranwala, Sialkot and Rawalpindi. Similarly, a significant number of Kashmiris also are recruited into the armed forces of Pakistan who had emotional approach to the Kashmir issue..

In this context, Kashmir issue became very vital in the internal politics of Pakistan, very soon after the war of 1948 with India. The sense of insecurity combined with Kashmir dispute brought military into the political scene almost from the very beginning. The military's identification with Islam mustered the support of religious parties and refugees on the issue of Kashmir. Thus military, migrated leadership and religious parties defined 'Islamic Pakistan' through the provision of resistance to 'Hindu India'.⁸ However, the areas comprising Pakistan had never voted for the forces of communal integration before the 1945-46 general elections in India. Urdu speaking Muslim community of UP and Bombay who had not political footing in the new state of Pakistan but being in the front line of the All India Muslim League, for a separate homeland. In this way Islam has been used instrumentally to centralize the state structure of Pakistan to serve the interests of this particular class, who were in hierarchy in civil military institution. Similarly, religious parties who opposed the idea of Pakistan during Pakistan Movement conditioned their survival with Islamic Pakistan. Therefore, military, religious parties and refugees portray Kashmir a highly emotional and ideological issue in terms of religion. Refugees were the original champions of Muslim nationalism in Pakistan.⁹ This scenario of the emergence of Islam and military as the key determinants of Pakistan's Kashmir Policy, identified these two factors and forces with the interests of the Punjab. A large number of Kashmiris' joining Pakistan Army confirmed the association of Islam , military and

Kashmir. This association practically determined the place of Kashmir issue in the domestic politics of Pakistan. The East Pakistan, Sind and NWFP now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa began to alienate themselves with the Kashmir Issue and did not consider it their major concern not only due to their socialist, nationalist or communist leanings, rather because they began to consider it as a tool of Punjab's hegemony over the other regions through the military and Islam. Balochistan had not any strategic threat from India¹⁰. Kashmir issue, therefore, has been considered the issue of Punjab having a here of 97.5 percent of the total refugees who entered in Pakistan from India during 1947-51. The central and upper areas of the province, (some parts of NWFP bordering the Azad Jammu and Kashmir and the Northern areas have Kashmiri refugees) has great geographical, economic and cultural affective with Kashmir.

Kashmir Issue during 1947- 1958

During the first parliamentary era of Pakistan 1947-58, Kashmir issue dominated the internal politics of Pakistan. It brought military into the internal decision making and policy making of Pakistani civil administration and influenced the internal strategy of Pakistan Army that was considered to be serving Punjab through the medium of Kashmir and Islam. Although there was a difference of opinion within the military circle regarding the solution of the Kashmir dispute on the basis of ethnic representation, yet, as an issue of institutional survival and institutional discipline, the military showed unanimity of attitude on the issue. One faction of Pakistan Army while had been fighting in Kashmir during the war of 1947-48 with the help of tribesmen and 'Azad Forces', was in favour of military solution to the problem. Colonel Akbar Ali Khan, Commander of the operational forces in Kashmir in 1947-48, was convinced that in case of war Pakistan Armed Forces could inflict a defeat on India. The Punjabi politicians whether migrates or otherwise, such as Ghulam Mohammad, Iftikhar Hussain Mamdot, Ch. Muhammad Ali, Sardar Shaukat Hayat and Mian Iftikharuddin provided

political support to this faction of military. In this way they wanted to save Pakistan and Punjab from any sort of future threats from India. While, the pro-Western faction of Pakistan Army who had not participated in the Kashmir war 1947-48, influenced Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan in favour of political solution of the issue and acceptance of United Nations ceasefire proposals that came into effect on January 1, 1949. The ceasefire line was declared temporary control line between India and Pakistan on 27 July 1949 through the Karachi Agreement. The ceasefire line was set as the border of Independent Kashmir under Pakistan's protection and the rest of Kashmir and Jammu as part of India. The decision to accept ceasefire in Kashmir was highly resented in Pakistan particularly in the Punjab. In this tense situation, Government of Pakistan's correspondence to India regarding Declaration of No-War, proposal of Non-Aggression Pact and 'Possibility of Joint Defence of the Subcontinent'¹¹, was sharply criticized by the activist sections of the military, the Punjabi elites and Kashmiri settlers of the Punjab.¹² Various articles and editorials were published in national newspapers of repute to record the resentment of Punjab on the government policy. *The Pakistan Times* presented the sentiments of Punjab in the following words:

*It was the Punjab along with NWFP that was called upon to share with the Azad Warriors the dire and prolonged travail of the Kashmir struggle. And our bill of national duties is as full and crowded today as it was yesterday. In the rehabilitation of the refugees, in the defence, food, commerce and organizational task that await us in the coming days to win Kashmir the role ordained for the West Punjab continues to be vital and overwhelmingly pregnant. In view of all, the people rightly expected that their national leadership in the province would conduct themselves in a manner merited by our past and demanded by our present.*¹³

The ceasefire in Kashmir had vested Punjab with an obligation and a duty far exceeding provincial boundaries in connection with the forthcoming plebiscite in Kashmir and preparations for it. That role could not be played by Punjab with political rivalries and distrusted political environment. The central administration had advantages of factional tussle of Chief Minister Mian Iftikhar Hussain Mamdot and Finance Minister Mumtaz Daultana in the Punjab government to monopolize the power structure to lead Kashmir policy suited to their interests.¹⁴

It was a common opinion that the annexation of the state of Hyderabad Deccan was the priority of Liaquat Ali Khan, Prime Minister of Pakistan. He was not ready 'to give off Hyderabad which [was] much larger than the Punjab for the sake of the rock of Kashmir'.¹⁵ Through this he wanted to create a more powerful space for the refugees in the politics of Pakistan against the supposed Punjabi dominance. However, Rawalpindi conspiracy and electoral calculus of Punjab forced Liaquat Ali Khan to refuse 'No War Declaration' with India without the settlement of all disputes in 1950. Moreover, to find out the support of Punjabi politicians, Prime Minister conditioned the participation of Pakistan in Annual Commonwealth Conference of 1951 with the placement of Kashmir dispute on the agenda of the conference to be discussed. These initiatives of the central Government were highly appreciated in the Punjab. Members of Punjab Legislative Assembly offered full support to the central government to find a viable solution to the Kashmir issue. However, the delay in the solution of the dispute led to the demand by Punjabi politicians of the withdrawal of Pakistan from the Commonwealth and suspension of relations with the United Nations.¹⁶

Meanwhile, the appointment of Ayub Khan as Commander in Chief of Pakistan Armed Forces on January 17, 1951, changed the direction and scope of Kashmir policy. This decision had twofold impact on the state mechanism.¹⁷ First, it strengthened the pro Western section and centralized the political structure of the state

with the armed forces under the control of the federal government. On the appointment of Ayub Khan, there were reservations among the senior military ranks who considered the appointment as a biased decision on the part of the Prime Minister and General Sir Douglas D. Gracy. Simultaneously, a section of military officials was not satisfied with the Interior and Kashmir policy of the government and considered the army best to take over and run the state.¹⁸ Some of the army officers had already planned to overthrow the civil government and conquer Kashmir by force. Major General Akbar Khan (promoted as major general in early 1951) was the master mind of this plan. He prepared all documents and staff work. However, the plan was leaked out before it could be launched. Ayub Khan was called upon to crush the military dissidents who accomplished this task skilfully and arrested the conspirators in Rawalpindi.¹⁹ This opportunity was availed to clear the army from leftist and anti Western officers and to send a message to the leftist politicians to keep their peace and calm. In effect, therefore, feudal conservative politicians joined hands with the pro-Western civil-military bureaucracy, for their political survival. Through these politico- administrative tactics the centralized state structure was advocated as an inevitable solution for the stability of the state. The treatment of the establishment towards freedom fighters in Kashmir depressed the Punjabi politicians having socialist leanings and demanded immediate solution of the Kashmir dispute.

After the assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan in 1951, the civil-military bureaucrats became more direct and decisive than before. They were the actual policy makers of domestic and foreign affairs of the state.

A major shift took place in the state policy on the Kashmir dispute during this time that created suspicions between centre and Punjab. Muhammad Ali Bogra Prime Minister of Pakistan, extended his support to the notion of the regional plebiscite in Kashmir in 1953 following the Government alignment with the

West through defence agreements of South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) and Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), to strengthen the Pakistan defence capability vis-a-vis India and to secure Western support for the solution of Kashmir dispute. Since the majority of the politicians belonging to Punjab were not in favour of joining those pacts, the policy of alignment defeated the very purpose for which the SEATO and CENTO were signed.²⁰

Civil military bureaucracy was conscious to maintain its relations with India on external front and did not want to encourage any direct or indirect move to pressurise the Indian Government to resolve the Kashmir dispute. Therefore, there was a visible conflict between civil-military bureaucracy and Punjabi politicians on the issue of the underground activities of the leader of Kashmir Liberation Movement (KLM), Ch. Ghulam Abbass, having support of various politicians from Punjab and NWFP, decided to send armed volunteer fighters into the Indian – occupied Kashmir in 1958 with the aim of liberating it. Pakistan army was against that decision and influenced central government to deal with the KLM strictly. Consequently, the leaders of the Movement were arrested before they could cross the ceasefire line. An adjournment motion was moved in the National Assembly of Pakistan against the oppressive treatment of the Government towards the leaders of the Movement. The Punjabi stand point on the Kashmir policy was under the strong check of pro-Western politicians, military and civil bureaucracy. In this way, every move which was encouraged or initiated by the politicians through Liberators to settle the Kashmir dispute was suppressed by the civil-military bureaucracy. However, the unrest created by the policy of suppression de-popularized the civil government and growing conflict between the civil and military leadership led the situation towards an entirely new end in the form of the Martial Law of 1958.

Kashmir Issue during Military Regime 1958-69

By the declaration of Martial Law on October 8, 1958, Ayub Khan initiated the policy of developing amicable relations with India. In his first press conference, Ayub Khan expressed his deep concern with the Kashmir issue to get the political allegiance from the Punjab. Practically, his policy towards Kashmir dispute did not represent the claims of Punjab. Ayub Khan offered a 'Joint Defence Pact' to Nehru, the Prime Minister of India in 1959. Although the offer was rejected by India out rightly, Ayub Khan preferred diplomatic handling of the issue to avoid a war with India. His willingness to withdraw the insistence of Pakistan on the unitary plebiscite in Kashmir was an indication of soft attitude towards India's claim.²¹ In this background, the Indus Water Treaty (1960) emerged as a blow to the Pakistan's stand on Kashmir. Accepting the right of India on three major rivers having source in the Kashmir, Ayub Government practically weakened the case of Pakistan about Kashmir issue on external front. That decision had great implications for the inter provincial relations regarding the distribution of Indus water as well as hydraulic conflict with India.

The process of normalizing relations with India was nevertheless replete with contradictions. The growing resentment against the decisions of the government on the Kashmir issue created a serious disturbance in a section of military belonging to Rawalpindi and Jehlum districts and in central Punjab, however the politicians of East Pakistan Sind, NWFP and Balochistan had not expressed any anger to the state policy about Kashmir issue.

Sino-India border clash in 1962, provided Pakistan an opportunity to invade Kashmir. The plea was strongly resented and refused by Ayub Khan on technical grounds. Meanwhile, massive aid provided by the Western countries to India after the Sino- India border clash compelled Ayub Khan to reconsider Kashmir policy of Pakistan. A general motion was presented in the National Assembly in 1962, expressing the worries on the supply

of Arms to India by the Western countries and its implications for the Kashmir dispute. Kashmir issue became more complex in the changing balance of power in the subcontinent. The right wing Party Jama'at-i-Islami was in favour of military solution of the dispute. Politicians from Punjab and NWFP such as Sardar Shaukat Hayat, Raja Mansab Ali and Raja Ghulam Sarwar from Rawalpindi and Syed Safi-ud-din from Campbelpur showed their opposition to any compromise with India on the Kashmir issue. Syed Safi-ud-din believed that by not taking an advantage of Sino-India border clash through the claim of a neutral position, Pakistan 'lost the greatest chance' that it ever had to get the Kashmir'.²² Alastair Lamb point of view is worth mentioning that 'at this juncture Pakistan with China's collaboration could force India to settle the Kashmir issue'.²³ Under domestic pressure, Ayub Khan had to give top priority to the issue. Bhutto the Foreign Minister fought the case of Kashmir with tremendous zeal during the India-Pakistan negotiations held between December 1962 and May 1963. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's presentations on the Kashmir issue in the Security Council of United Nations in February, March and April of 1964, were an indication of comparatively resolute stand of Pakistan.

However, the change in the policy of Pakistan and taking hard line was to ensure the success of the government in domestic program and the support of Punjab in the upcoming presidential elections 1965.²⁴ The decision to reject the Indian proposal of No-War-Pact by the Government of Pakistan in 1964 had same objectives. Pakistan insisted on holding a fair and impartial plebiscite in Kashmir as the only acceptable solution to the Kashmir dispute. Hence, India-Pakistan negotiations could not reach any solution.²⁵

The indiscriminate arms aid to India by the Western powers after the Sino-India border clash made Ayub Khan conscious of taking strong steps at the domestic and foreign fronts to resolve the issue. Ayub very boldly expressed his fears during the

Commonwealth Conference held in 1964 that 'indiscriminate arms aid to India by Anglo-American bloc showed that they wanted to shift the scene of war now to the Indo- Pakistan subcontinent'.²⁶ Ayub's statement boosted the moral of the public and drew political support for Ayub government. After the clash of Rann of Kutch between India and Pakistan in March-April 1965, a secret Kashmir cell, consisting of Secretaries of Foreign and Defence ministries, Director Intelligence Bureau, Chief of General Staff and Director Military Operations was established on the instructions of Ayub Khan. The cell prepared secret plans of Operation Gibraltar and Grand Salam to check the Indian military activities across the ceasefire line with the support of Kashmiris. Astonishingly it was assumed that these developments would not escalate into a full scale war between India and Pakistan. Asghar Khan is of the opinion that this assumption was advanced by Z. A. Bhutto to achieve his own political ends.²⁷ Lawrence Ziring also presents the same views about the miscalculations about the operations in Kashmir.²⁸

All these assumptions of Foreign Office and Defence Secretaries, however, suffered a strong blow in the wake of operations Gibraltar and Grand Salam, resulting in war of September 1965.²⁹ The right wing parties and the Punjabi politicians fully supported Ayub regime during the war and people of the Punjab responded wholeheartedly to the call for *Jihad* against India.

The results of the war proved unsatisfactory and against the expectations of the people of the Punjab. The Tashkent Declaration (January 10, 1966) further inflamed the sentiments of the Punjabis. The right wing parties such as Pakistan Democratic Party, Jamaat i Ulama Pakistan, Jamaat i Islami and Council Muslim League strongly criticized the Tashkent declaration harshly. It was considered 'not a step forward but a sharp retreat to the pre-war situation'.³⁰ The people were fed on the stories of victories, but the acceptance of ceasefire with a zero outcome led

to the denunciation of Ayub Khan.³¹ The law and order situation deteriorated by the killing of four students by police in Lahore. Section 144 of the code of criminal procedure, prohibiting public gatherings was imposed in all major cities of West Pakistan. However, it was violated in the Punjab particularly.³² A national conference was organized in Lahore in the first week of February 1966 by the Jamat-i-Islami to demand the withdrawal of Ayub's acceptance of Tashkent Declaration.³³

On the other side, National Awami Party having its base in NWFP and Balochistan and Awami League having support in Bengal welcomed the ceasefire and Tashkent declaration as Kashmir did not figure for them as an issue of importance,³⁴ while PPP took up the Kashmir dispute as of national importance to secure political support from the Punjab.

Conclusion

Kashmir issue has played a very important role in the internal politics of Pakistan. Seemingly a trans-border dispute, it has never been considered unanimously as the issue of interest for all regions and ethnic groups of Pakistan. Having been geographically and culturally associated with Punjab, it has always been considered as the issue of the Punjab and therefore any policy framed and steps taken for the assertion of Pakistan's right on Kashmir have been considered as protection of Punjab's interests in the Federation of Pakistan. The natural institutionalization of Kashmir with the military and the dominance of Punjabi ethnicity in the Pakistan Army has also been associated with the same sort of theorization.

However, the Punjab's concern with the issue has not able to find a resolute policy. The civil and military Governments advanced almost similar approaches to policy objectives on Kashmir issue. Simultaneously the civil and military bureaucracy seems to be manipulating Kashmir issue to hegemonic the political institutions for the centralization and administrative ascendancy of the Federation. That is what Bengal, Sind, NWFP, and

Balochistan considered as the exploitation of national rights of smaller provinces on the bases of Kashmir issue and that is why smaller provinces have limited concern with the Kashmir issue. The ideological and sentimental place of Kashmir in the politics of Pakistan's early years, especially after the demise of Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan, is believed to be used for the monopolization of state structure for the military and civil bureaucracy. Lack of coherence on Kashmir policy at political and administrative level has been observed both in parliamentary and military Governments. For politicians, Kashmir issue remained a short term agenda to get electoral support from populous Punjab in the elections while in other provinces they fail to win seats on the basis of Kashmir issue. The Indus Basin Water Treaty (1960) and Tashkent Declaration (1966) during Military regime practically sidelined the issue in national politics. Yet the governments are unable to settle the other issues without addressing the Kashmir issue. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's government was interested to establish economic relations with India side by side with the negotiations on Kashmir dispute, but failed to take any initiative. At present, Nawaz Shrif (Kashmiri origin) the Prime Minister of Pakistan is ready to reconsider the position of Pakistan on Kashmir and initiate bilateral trade, yet the same sort of resistance from the Punjab seems to be dominating. These changing trends about India on state level indicate a complex interplay of forces on complementary, parallel or even contradictory lines. The problem on internal front of Pakistan with respects to Kashmir issue may not be considered as serious hindrance in the solution of Kashmir issue between India and Pakistan, but it has imposed strong challenges to the existence of the federation of Pakistan. Some observations even become harsher claiming that the secession of Bengal was basically result of discriminatory policies developed on the basis of Kashmir Issue. Therefore, it is clear that the delay in the solution of Kashmir issue can raise the level of unrest to a discrete level among the Federating Units of Pakistan and the emerging political formations of Pakistan.

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